PHENOMENOLOGY AND NORTHROP FRYE'S ANATOMY OF CRITICISM

APPROVED:

"7

MajorProfessor

R.M.Q Minor Professor

i. v>. % Director of the Department of English

PHENOMENOLOGY AND NORTHROP FRYE'S ANATOMY OF CRITICISM

THESIS

Presented to the Graduate Council- of the

North Texas State University in Partial

Fulfillment of the Requirements

For the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

By

Ralph Michael Tuck, B.A.

Denton, Texas

August, 1968

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter Page

'I. THE PRINCIPLES OF PHENOMENOLOGY 1

- II. THE CRITICAL THEORY OF ANATOMY OF CRITICISM . . 24

III. THE INTERRELATION OF PHENOMENOLOGY AND ANATOMY OF CRITICISM . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . 7 1

ill

CHAPTER I '

THE PRINCIPLES OF PHENOMENOLOGY

It is quite common among literary critics to ignore

or disavow the relation of aesthetics to their own dis-

cipline. In general the decline of aesthetics has given

rise to this break between the two disciplines. In the

polemical introduction to Anatomy of Criticism Northrop

Frye specifically denies that his analysis of literary

criticism is related to the aesthetic theories of contem-

porary philosophical disciplines."1' He does not want to

use these disciplines because he does not want his analysis

to be prejudiced by any criterion external to the body of

literature. Frye attempts to develop a system of criticism

that describes the body of literature in terms of its

structure without reference to external hierarchical

theories.

The content of any metaphysical system tends auto-

matically to place some literary works in higher positions

than others. For instance, in an idealistic system the

work of Yeats takes on a much sharper perspective if

idealism controls the literary system. Frye1s point is

1Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism (New York, 1967), pp. 22-25.

that nothing inherent in the body of literature justifies

the imposition of external theories on it:

To subordinate criticism to an externally derived critical attitude is to exaggerate the values in literature that can be related to the external source, whatever it is. It is all too easy to impose on literature an extra-literary schematism, a sort of religio-political color-filter, which can make some poets leap into prominence and others show up as dark and faulty.

While there is a great deal of merit in the refusal to do

this kind of analysis, nonetheless it seems that the limits

and means of categorization that Frye uses imply some sort

of philosophical theory behind the analysis he is doing.

The discipline of phenomenology may provide a framework

within which Frye's literary criticism can be interpreted

and expanded.

The roots of the phenomenological method of philosophy

hinge on the principle of structural analysis. It purports

to discover essences through this analysis. At this point

one must be careful about the use of the term essence, for

the phenomenologist employs it in an unusual sense. Essence

refers not to some sort of metaphysical condition for ex-

istence, but rather to the realm of meaning in experience.

On a superficial level, the most important similarity

between phenomenology and Frye's theory of literary crit-

icism m Anatomy of Criticism seems to be that Frye's

2Ibid., p. 7.

theory of the nature of criticism corresponds to this

concern for meaning, Frye thinks that all criticism is

3

allegorical. If this statement is taken to mean that

criticism reveals the underlying structure of literature,

then it is clear that a phenomenological interpretation

of his work is justified because such an interpretation

resembles the phenomenological definition of essences.

If, on the other hand, Frye means that the allegorical

principle of criticism is merely an arbitrary attachment

to the body of literature, then his relationship to phe-

nomenological philosophy remains rather obscure. It does

not appear, however, that Frye intends such a definition. '

If this were the meaning Frye intends for the concept of

allegory, his criticism would be subject to the same

attack that the phenomenologists make on the natural

sciences. Frye unequivocably states that criticism is

separate from the body of literature. In fact, literature

cannot be studied as such because criticism of literature

is a descriptive discipline, whereas literature is not.

The central problem concerns the relationship of criticism

to the body of work that it analyzes. The nature of Frye's

theory of displacement is also important to his relation-

ship to phenomenology. This theory indicates that Frye

thinks all literature has the same structure. Frye thinks

-̂ Ibid. , p. 6.

that there is only one story in literature, the "quest-

myth." The last four modes of historical criticism provide

4

successive displacements on the basic mythical structure.

In order to understand the way in which phenomeno-

logical aesthetics relates to Frye's work, it is necessary

to go back to the beginning of the phenomenological dis-

cipline and trace its development to the twentieth century.

As it is used today, the term phenomenology has its roots

in the distinction made by Immanuel Kant between phenomena 5 .

an<3 numena. Kant observed that there is a distinction

between the idea that we get in our minds of an object and

the object itself. Of course, the distinction is only

theoretical because it is impossible to know the "thing in

itself." The implication that Kant draws from this dis-

tinction is that metaphysics is impossible to establish

in the traditional manner because all former metaphysical

systems hinged on an attempt tc make observations about

the natxire of the external world based on the ideas pre-

sented to the mind. Kant attempts to reconstruct

metaphysics in terms of the categories of the mind,

which take on absolute characteristics in terms 4 Northrop Frye, Fables of Identity: Studies in Poetic

Mythology (New York, 1963), pp. 262-263."

~ Quentin Lauei:, Phenomeno logy: Its Genesis and Prospect (New York, 1958), pp. 1-2.

of the phenomena presented to them because they govern the

conditions for all possible knowledge. Kant refers to this

process as the Copernican turn of metaphysics.^

Hegel was the first philosopher who called himself a

phenomenologist. He took the observation made by Kant that

all external information is presented to the mind in terms

of phenomena and attempted to do an analysis of that phe-

nomena. However, his analysis is not strictly one of phe-

nomena because it is filtered through the dialectic process

that he developed. All phenomena are put into the frame-

work of either the thesis, antithesis, or synthesis. The

dialectic differs from Kant's categories of the mind in

that the dialectic is conceived as the absolute condition

by which phenomena are presented. Hegel would, of course,

deny that he imposes the dialectic on the phenomena, and

claim that it is a part of the phenomena, but few of his

critics would concede this judgment. The development of

the dialectic theory of phenomena hinges not on an exam-

ination of the phenomena themselves but on the way in which

historical events are juxtaposed. In other words, the

phenomena themselves do not lead him to the dialectic pro-

cess; instead he imposes the dialectic on the phenomena.

In fact, this dialectic process becomes the absolute toward

which all phenomena are working. Therefore, phenomena lose

their priority in the Hegelian system.

John A. Mourant and E. Hans Freund, editors, Problems of Philosophy (New York, 1964), pp. 305-306.

The discipline of phenomenology as it is known today

was developed by Edmund Husserl. He attempted to do a

structural analysis of the way in which phenomena present

themselves without any reference to external theories about

the nature of the phenomena. His initial motto was "back

7

to the things themselves." Husserl most certainly did not

think it possible to go back to some sort of pre-Kantian

metaphysics, nor did he think that the answer could be

found in empiricism. Husserl thought that a pure des-

cription of phenomena reveals their essential structures.

A shift in the meaning of the term essence allowed him to

hold this position. Husserl thought of essence as what-

ever is necessary to describe meaning. In other words,

his concern was not with'the nature of the universe, but

rather with the meaning of it.

It is already clear that there might be some relation-

ship between the phenomenological method and Frye's Anatomy

of Criticism. Frye states that he is doing an inductive

study of the body of literature which he thinks as rigorous

as any scientific discipline.® The study is based on the

allegorical principle which Frye identifies as the nature

of all criticism. The question that presents itself con-

cerns the nature of this allegorical principle. If the

7 Lauer, p. 9.

8 Frye, Anatomy, pp. 15-16.

structures described by Frye cut through the actual physical

fact of the body of literature to its essential structures,

then its relationship to the phenomenological method would

obviously be very close. If, on the other hand, Frye thinks

that the allegorical principle is simply a matter of cate-

gorization based on an empirical investigation of literary

artifacts, the relationship would then be very tenuous,

because such a study would be entirely dependent on the

particular works that happen to come under observation.

Indeed, structural principles in any meaningful sense of

the term would be impossible.

In order to do his analysis, Husserl rejected most

traditional logical systems and replaced them with a new

one of his own. Traditional notions of logic hinge on

either a deductive or inductive method of reasoning, but

Husserl developed a system of logic which employs a re-

ductive means of reasoning. The reductive method of rea-

soning assumes that in the investigation of any object the

stripping away of all ideas that might lead to uncertainty

about the object will necessarily produce certain and there-

fore essential knowledge about the object. When the structure

of any object is discussed, technically structure refers only

to the result of the application of the phenomenological

method. Phenomenology as such is only methodology and can

therefore be used to examine any field that one chooses. The

8

reductive method of reasoning is explained by a discussion

of two concepts, the epoche and intentionality.

Epoche comes from a Greek word meaning "to bracket." In

Husserl the epoche implies six levels of reduction. They are

successive levels of development of the epoche, but this suc-

cession is one only in terms of logic. The reductions are

not rigid formulae for deriving essences. All of the re-

ductions are being performed together in the process of the

phenomenological investigation. The first level of the

epoche is the'psychological reduction. It involves the

cutting off of consideration of the self as important to the

discovery of essences. It is important to understand that

Husserl is not saying that the self does not exist. It is

just that in terms of essential structures the self is unim-

portant. For instance, in the discovery of the essence of

a cube it is not at all important who discovers the essence.

In any case the essence remains the same. There is not much

doubt that such a reduction is absolutely necessary in any

investigation that purports to describe essences. However,

many critics, particularly psychologists, criticize this

portion of phenomenology because they maintain that it is

impossible to achieve. Husserl defends himself by sug-

gesting that the content of consciousness may indeed be

subjective, but the structure of it is not. For instance,

in his examination of consciousness itself he says that to

be conscious is to be conscious of something. In other

words, it is impossible to have any idea at all except

when some object is being entertained. Such an observation

gives him grounds for maintaining that subject and object

should not be separated in thought; it is also difficult

to see how such an observation could be in any way colored

by subjective considerations. The fact that objects are

always entertained in the conscious act leads to the second

reduction.

The second reduction is somewhat more difficult to

understand. It involves the cutting off of consideration

of the object as objective. The reason for this bracket

goes back to Husserl's analysis of consciousness. If there

is no knowledge of objects except in terms of their appear-

ance in consciousness, then there is no reason to think in

terms of their being objective entities. Again it must be

cautioned that Husserl is not denying the existence of the

objective world. Its existence is simply a question that

is bracketed because it leads to uncertainty. Furthermore,

Husserl is able to disregard the question of the objective

content of the world because he is concerned with its

essential structures rather than its specific content.

This reduction is the point at which Husserl is most clearly

indebted to Kant. The reasoning behind it is related to

Kant's idea that the thinq in itself cannot be known.

10

Husserl places more emphasis on the idea than Kant does,

however. If the objective world is not considered to be

the focal point of knowledge, then the description of the

presentation of phenomena without subjectivity takes on

significance. The description becomes the criterion for

meaning in any occurrence of the phenomena. The second

reason for cutting off consideration of the object as ob-

jective is that if it is not done, then one is caught in

an endless progression of examinations of physical objects.

It is the failure to make this reduction that leads the Q

natural sciences to relativism. Furthermore, the ob-

jective reduction accounts for a certain kind of criticism

frequently raised by psychologists, which is the possibility

that the ideas that present themselves are the result of

dreams or hallucinations. Descartes was the first philos-

opher who attempted to deal with this problem. For

Descartes the problem is ultimately resolved by the fact

that conscious thinking cannot itself be denied even though

it may be in dreams or be a distortion. Husserl carries

this reasoning even further by suggesting that if one is

not concerned with objects as objects, it does not make any

difference whether the object is a dream or a hallucination.

The reason that Husserl can make this concession is that he

is not concerned with the origin of objects but rather with

the meaning of them. With these two reductions Husserl cuts

9 Lauer, p. 52.

11

away the problem that has been the primary concern of mod-

ern philosophy— that is the subject-object problem— and

he can deal with it in such a summary manner because he

shifts the emphasis of philosophy from questions of existence

to questions of the meaning of phenomena. He now can return

to the study of essential structures in philosophy.

At this point is it already clear that there is a con-

siderable degree of affinity between Frye's critical system

and phenomenology. Not only does Frye object strongly to

literary criticism that is subjectively oriented, but also

his definition of criticism suggests the application of the

second reduction:

Criticism, rather, is to art what history is to action and philosophy to wisdom: a verbal imitation of a human productive power which in itself does not speak. ̂

If criticism is an activity that is qualitatively separated

from the data that it analyzes, then it cannot be a simple

matter of abstracting inductive data from the body of lit-

erature. Frye assumes that criticism is not simply in-

duction and proceeds with his criticism, but Husserl feels

compelled to give an account of the mechanism by which it

is not inductive. This fact leads him to the third re-

duction.

The third reduction is called the phenomenological

reduction. Husserl uses the name of the discipline for

10Frye, Anatomy, p. 12.

12

the third reduction because it is the key to the whole

method. The reductive process now takes a transcendental

turn. Husserl uses the term transcendental in an unusual

sense. Phenomenology is not transcendental in the Platonic

sense, for Husserl does not think that there is a world of

forms. The essences are transcendental in the sense that

they are the structures that give meaning to the world. The

means by which transcendental meaning related to the world

is through intentionality. A more complete discussion of

intentionality will be given later; however, at this time

it is necessary to discuss some of the implications of in-

tentionality. This concept gives the phenomenological

method its practical use. By transcendentally positing

meaning in the world, phenomenology establishes an absolute

ground for other disciplines. As Husserl originally thought

of the process of reduction, it was intended as the radical

11

root of science. In its development through later phe-

nomenological writers, the method has been applied to

virtually every area of consciousness. Although Husserl did

not himself consider questions other than technical questions

of mathmatics and logic, he did give his blessing to some

work in other areas of consciousness.

The last three reductions deal with the way in which

essences are constituted and interact with one another, and

Edmund Husserl, Ideas (New York, 1962), p. 19.

13

except for the last one are not particularly important for

our purposes. Also, they are not particularly well defined

in Husserl's writing. The fourth reduction culminates in

what Husserl calls the transcendental ego. Perhaps this

can best be described as non-subjective consciousness. It -

should be noted that most of the phenomenologists who follow

Husserl do not accept this reduction because they think

that he is slipping a form of idealism into the system. The

fifth reduction deals with the constitution of essences in

the transcendental ego. The sixth reduction is the most

obscure of all, and Husserl did not see fit to mention it

1 0

in any of the works published during his lifetime. It

deals with the intentional interrelationship between

essences, and is called transcendental intersubjectivity.

For our purposes, however, this reduction will become im-

portant in explaining the interaction of the four essays

in Anatomy of Criticism.

Almost equally important as the process of reduction

in terms of our problem in literary studies is the phenom-

enological concept of intentionality because it is central

to Husserl's justification of.the method. Husserl developed

his concept of intentionality out of the theory of his

teacher, Brentanno. Intentionality is that which relates

the various levels of reductions. A so, intentionality is

the development of relationships in consciousness. In

12 Lauer, p. 55.

14

The Place of Value in a World of Fact, Wolfgang Kflhler

explains Husserl's theory of requiredness, which is the

logical foundation for the concept c£ intentionality.

KdJhler argues that not all objects present themselves as

singular. Some of them present themselves as necessarily

related:

Not all of them [senses of relation] occur in-differently. In the very nature of some facts there is, as a constitutional trait, a quality of acceptance or rejection of something beyond. Human interest, striving, conation are' all of this kind. It belongs to their character that they point or refer to other facts. And this reference to other facts is far from neutral. They are very partial, they are selective with regard to other facts to which they refer.13

Nor is this requiredness strictly related to the requiredness

of human values. For instance, if three colored patches—a

red one, a blue one, and a purple one—are presented in

random order and one is asked to place them in logical order,

then the arrangement is absolutely required simply in terms

of their own qualities.^ The facts themselves place certain

requirements on the way in which we choose to think about

them. This theory of requiredness indicates the way in

which intentionality works. We necessarily intend the world

as meaningful, first as a result of qualities of our own

13 Wolfgang K&hler, The Place of Value in a World of

Facts (New York, 1966), p. 66.. 14Ibid.

15

consciousness which require it, and second as the world

itself requires specific intentional relationships.

In terms of aesthetic consideration the concept of

intentionality is extremely important, not only because

it is the means by which we move toward essences, but also

because a transintentional relationship develops between

the realm of meaning and the creative act.

There is a third major theme in phenomenology which

has only been developed by men who come after Husserl,

although perhaps it is implicit in Husserl's phenomenology.

This theme concerns the study of areas of experience in

terms of perspectives on them. This type of phenomenology

is most fully developed by Paul Weiss. It involves the

study of the various ways that the world can be intended.

For instance, there are at least two perspectives from which

verbal structures can be seen, commonsensibly and aesthet-

ically. In this respect, Frye is clearly reLated to phe-

nomenology. He outlines four modes of criticism describing

various perspectives from which literature can be seen.

In Europe the phenomenological method has gained wide-

spread acceptance and in fact has been the dominant philo-

sophical school. Phenomenologies of religion, aesthetics,

mathmetics, natural science, and existential situations

have been written. In the United States, however, the

phenomenological method has been somewhat slower in gaining

16

acceptance and its influence lias been restricted primarily

to Catholic universities where is has been used mostly for

the purpose of discussing religious questions. In literary

circles those aspects of phenomenology which are related

to existential concerns have received some notice. Most

of the literary circles that have used existentialism have

done so as if it were an old-stlye metaphysics, which can

be used to separate the good books from the bad. They

frequently use existentialism to describe the content of

a book. For instance, Hemingway's heroes are sometimes

called existential heroes. There is nothing particularly

wrong with this kind of analysis, but it does not describe

the structure of the work. Unfortunately, this kind of

criticism becomes vicious when it tries to maintain that

only existential heroes and themes are valid literature.

There has been a split in the ranks of the phenomeno-

logical movement over the question of existential import.

The pure Husserlians are concerned primarily with the

question of meaning, while the existentially oriented

philosophers are concerned with using the results of phe-

nomenological investigations to deal with existential

problems. The dichotomy has grown so large that it has

given rise to an independent discipline of existentialism.

On the whole, existentialism has gained widespread credence

only in literary circles. For the purpose of this paper,

the split is not terribly important, except when existential

17

outlooks are used as norms for literary works. In any

event, such a reading of the major existential thinkers

is probably not even accurate, although literary critics

have taken them in this manner.

Perhaps the most fully developed phenomenological

aesthetics is that of Paul Weiss in Nine Basic Arts.

The description of aesthetics in this work should serve

as an accurate indication of the kind of analysis that

phenomenologists do, and provide a starting point for

demonstrating the affinity of Frye's critical methods

for those of the phenomenological method.

Weiss begins by separating the aesthetic experience

from the work of art. This distinction is extremely

important because there is a difference between the

presentation of the aesthetic experience and the work

of art. There are at least two perspectives from which

any experience can be seen. Ordinarily experiences are

constituted into a commonsense view of the world. However,

if an experience is internalized and examined in terms of

its own configuration, then an aesthetic experience arises.

In Weiss's system the object of aesthetic experience is

the aesthetic object:

An aesthetic object is a dislocated commonsense object. It is a bounded region, a fragment of the commonsense world which we fixate in an attitude of concentrated concern. It usually has an

18

arresting qualitative side. In fact, one of the reasons men attend to aesthetic objects is to 1 enable them to have new aesthetic expex-iences.

Experiences of aesthetic objects are not themselves works

of art but rather the building blocks from which works of

art are made. The failure to make a distinction between

works of art and aesthetic experience leads to subjectivism

in aesthetic theories, because it is extremely easy to con-

fuse the aesthetic experience of the artist and the structure

of the work of art. Weiss is guarding against the intentional

fallacy at this point in his argument. The distinction is

equally important as a guard against subjectivism in art

from the other direction. It is important to distinguish

the work of art from the particular aesthetic experiences

of the reader or spectator of a work of art.

There is a considerable degree of affinity between

Frye and Weiss about what they do not like in aesthetic

theory. It is quite clear that both of them are in reaction

against- those theories of art that depend on an emotional

identification between the artist and his reader. They are

opposed to what Frye calls the theory of naturally creative

folk. Weiss's separation of aesthetic experience and works

of art also indicates a distaste for aesthetic theories

that are based on the subjective preference of the reader

or spectator of art.

15 Paul Weiss, Nine Basic Arts (Carbondale, 1961), p. 5.

19

The characteristic which sets the work of art off

from an aesthetic experience is the interaction of aes-

thetic experience with resistant materials. According

to Weiss, most intellectual theories about art fail be-

cause they do not take into account the activity of the

artist in his work. They tend to remain on the level of

aesthetic experience. While aesthetic experience is

absolutely necessary to the production of art, it is not

itself a work of art. The artist is never content with

the simple completion of the idea of his work; rather he

is concerned with the way that idea can be completed

through his material. It may seem that these observations

are far removed from the principles of the phenomenological

method. Aesthetic objects relate to aesthetic experience

through the concept of intentionality. In the production

of works of art neither the aesthetic experiences nor the

activity of producing them has priority. The intentional

process is reciprocal. The primary consideration that

makes the study of essences different in the field of

aesthetics is the relationship of intentionality to the

end product of the examination. For example, the essence

of a cube is known through an intentional process, but

the essence is not in the final analysis a part of the

process. In the completed work of art the intentional

structure remains as an essential part of the work.

20

In addition to the obvious difference between the

materials used by the various arts, there is a distinction

between them that can be drawn on the basis of the kind of

structure revealed. Weiss maintains that all works of art

reveal either time, space, or becoming. A work of art is

an illustration of one of these qualities in a unique way.

The artist reveals time, space, or becoming in a way that

the spectator or reader does not normally think about.

Because the spectator does not normally entertain the

world in terms of aesthetic experience, the artist serves

the function of bringing into focus a new category of

essential structures.

Weiss delineates nine art forms. For our purposes,

the space arts, architecture, sculpture, and painting, and

the becoming arts of music, theater, and the dance, are not

particularly relevant. The time arts of story, poetry,

and musicry have relevance to this thesis.

The disciplines of story and poetry have clearly de-

fined limits in the empirical corpus of literature. There

is, however, a good deal of possibility for overlapping

between them. While musicry is concerned with time as

common, story is concerned with unusual structures

of time as set over against the times of everyday life.

The sentences of a story are not subject to any kind of

external verification as independent entities:

21

The sentences of a story make no claim severally, but only together. Only together do they offer a unity which could be used to refer to a reality outside the discourse. It is a set of sentences in a story that makes a statement. That state-ment, which may cover a paragraph, a chapter or an entire book, makes us attend to man as having certain features and promise and thus as being more than an agent or patient of actions.

Weiss does not make it clear exactly how it is that the

sentences of a story make claims about the outside world

in the unified context. In other words, if the sentences

do not individually make claims about the character of the

outside world, then how do they make such claims as a whole?

The answer to this question lies in the kind of statement

about the outside world that the sentences make even in

their totality; the sentences of a story always refer to

the structure of time.

At this point we have several questions about the

relationship of this kind of aesthetic analysis and the

work of Frye. The key to possible similarity between

phenomenology and Anatomy of Criticism hinges on the

nature of the archetypes that Frye discusses. If the

archetypes reveal temporal configurations, then Frye is

very close to Weiss's aesthetics. (In fact, it will

probably be necessary to modify Weiss's position to a

certain extent in order to draw out the similarities.)

In any event, it may well be that Frye more accurately

^^Ibid., p. 135.

22

represents a phenomenological view of literature than

does Weiss.

The third temporal art is poetry. Poetry, like

painting, creates a time that is set over against the

commonsense world of time. Its detatchment is somewhat

different from that of painting because it also has the

added dimension of translucence. The poem makes comments

about the outside world because of its enclosedness:

Both poetry and painting are set over against the world of commonsense; but the poem unlike the painting courts and uses echoes of the commonsense world. The time of a poem replaces common time as thoroughly as the space of a painting replaces common space, but in poetic time there are always resonances of the common-sense world.n

In relation to Frye, Weiss seems to be using poetry in a

rather specialized sense. It would seem that Weiss means

roughly by poetry what Frye means when he talks about

lyrics.

With our tentative description of the phenomenological

method and the example of the way in which it may be used,

let us turn to Northrop Frye to see if we can relate his

critical insights to it.- The development of the relation-

ship hinges on several important points. It is quite clear

that both Frye and the phenomenologists are trying to do

some sort of structural analysis. The question now concerns

17Ibid., p. 149.

23

the extent that Frye's analysis attempts to reveal es-

sential structures in the sense that phenomenologists

talk about them. We will also have to deal with the

nature of the allegorical principle of criticism. If

the allegorical- principle is interpreted as related to the

transcendental turn in Husserl, then the relationship

will be clearly demonstrated. If Frye does relate to

phenomenology on the first two grounds, we will need to

make some kind of assessment of the accuracy of his

phenomenology and its position in relation to other

phenomenological aesthetics. Finally, we will have to

make some kind of assessment of the effects of such an

interpretation of Frye on the stated purpose of Anatomy

of Criticism and the possibility of wider application of

his principles within the phenomenological movement.

CHAPTER II

THE CRITICAL THEORY OF ANATOMY OF CRITICISM

Because Husserl was concerned primarily with the theo-

retical justification of the phenomenological method rather

than the results of its application, there has been a con-

siderable amount of latitude in investigations that have

been done since Husserl. In fact, there is no complete

agreement about all of Husserl1s reductions. Some investi-

gators accept only the first two reductions, while others

add further reductions of their own. The problem is com-

pounded because Husserl provides few practical examples of

his method. Following any of several liberal interpretations

of Husserl1s method, Frye clearly falls into a phenomeno-

logical interpretation simply because of his attempt to do

a descriptive analysis of the body of literature. Such

broad interpretations of the method are not particularly

useful, however, because of their breadth. A careful study

of the intent and development of Frye's critical theory may

reveal strong parallels between a strict interpretation of

Husserl's work and Frye's critical theory in Anatomy of

Criticism. It may also show the need for the phenomeno-

logical method to provide a ground work for Frye1s theory

of criticism. fc

24

25

Anatomy of Criticism is Frye's major critical work.

The basic outline of Anatomy presents four perspectives

from which literature can be approached. The perspectives

are not independent of each other, however. They interact

with each other.to establish a total concept of the dis-

cipline of literary criticism. Because he is only outlining

the direction that he thinks criticism ought to take, Frye

develops them in apparently independent essays. This tech-

nique is misleading, for its purpose is to allow easier

correction and addition to the system, rather than to in-

dicate independent types of criticism. Frye thinks that

at least four perspectives 011 literature may prove valuable

in delineating the structure of literature. Most of them

are not original with Frye in their separated form. The

originality of Frye's system comes from the way in which

he shows their interaction.

The first essay deals with the historical progression

of literature. Western culture reveals five modes of ex-

pression in relation to the hero's degree of power over

circumstance. Frye claims that these five modes also appear

in abbreviated form in classical culture. The second per-

spective is called ethical criticism; this is the study of

symbols. Frye uses the term ethical in an unusual sense.

He seems to mean that the study of symbols is ethical in

that it is through the study of symbols that the reader

26

knows the meaning of a particular literary work. Ethical

criticism is the balance for historical criticism. His-

torical criticism deals with the topography of literary

movement. Ethical criticism deals with the way in which

we may delve into any point of the historical progression.

When ethical criticism reaches its deepest level it becomes

archetypal- Archetypes, because of their universal char-

acter, turn us back to the first mode discussed in his-

torical criticism and also lead forward to what Frye calls

rhetorical criticism. Rhetorical criticism deals with the

way in which literature presents itself and with its rhythmic

patterns. Rhetorical criticism is also important because it

is one of the means of separating literary structures from

nonliterary verbal structures. Because archetypal criticism

is the deepest level of ethical criticism and refers back to

historical criticism and forward to rhetorical criticism,

Frye identifies it as the core of criticism that allows us

to judge and organize the means of critical work.

In addition to the four essays in Anatomy of Criticism,

Frye has a polemical introduction in which he outlines his

attack on contemporary criticism and develops the prin-

ciples on which his analysis is based. This .introduction

is particularly important for our purposes because it

suggests many parallels to the phenomenological method.

Frye also has a tenative conclusion to the book in which

27

he makes observations about the implications of his work

within the discipline of literary criticism and its pos-

sible implications for other disciplines.

According to Frye the discipline of literary criticism

is in a state of. disarray in the twentieth century. In

fact, he sees little of value in criticism since the four

levels of medieval biblical criticism, which are the lit-

eral, allegorical, mystical, and anagogic levels of crit-

icism. There are two critical attitudes that influence

contemporary criticism which are incompatible but frequently

mixed. The first is the romantic notion of "spontaneously

creative folk" in which there is no need for professional

critics to act as mediators between the artist and the

reading public. The second notion is that the writer him-

self is the ultimate revealer of the meaning of his work.

Frye barely even comments on the first of these. He simply

says that it has been tried and found wanting. He maintains

that it cannot survive the age of Jung and Cassirer, because

it rests on Arnold's "plain sense" critical axioms that are

rooted only in subjective preference. The second hinges on

the assumption that the writer of a literary work has some

specific assertive or descriptive content that he intends *

for his work. Within this view of criticism, the profes-

sional critic is seen as a parasite on the body of literature

who aspires to but is incapable of creative work of his own.

Frye says that this second notion rests on two fallacious

28

theories concerning the nature of criticism. The first is

the theory that the person who creates a work of art is also

qualified to explicate it, and the second is that works of

art have an assertive or descriptive meaning. Notice that

this concept assumes that the writer has a message and is

being deliberately obscure in revealing it. More sympa-

thetically, he may have a message which he is trying to

convince the reader of by cleverly casting it as a story

or poem.

We can already begin to see some parallels to Husserl's

phenomenology. The reason for the first reduction in Husserl's r

system is to eliminate what he calls psychologism. He wants

to eliminate considerations of the configuration of the sub-

ject, because it ultimately leads to a system in which the

whole world becomes an extension of the individual mind.

Husserl would undoubtedly approve of a system of criticism

which attacked the critical notion that each individual is

capable of working out his own critical theories or one

which asserted that the meaning of any particular object

hinges on the explication of one particular and privileged

investigator.

The first critical assumption that Frye makes is that

the work of art stands as a structure that has only internal

meaning. Literature as such does not make comment about

the external world. If it did, then the writer would be

29

obligated to attempt to make only true statements in his

discourse. The only responsibility that the writer has,

however, is to the internal consistency of his structure.

Frye points out that several languages make note of this

observation by equating literary terms with untruthful

terms.^ Since literary structures do not make descriptive

statements, the first task of the critics is to talk des-

criptively about literature:

Criticism can talk, and all the arts are dumb. In painting, sculpture, or music it is easy enough to see that the art shows forth, but cannot say any-thing. And, whatever it sounds like to call the poet inarticulate or speechless, there is a most important sense in which poems are as silent as statues.2

We can begin to see a parallel between Frye's position

and that of Paul Weiss in Nine Basic Arts. Frye holds the

position that the individual work of art does not itself

have descriptive conceptual meaning. Its descriptive

meaning is drawn from the critical observations that can

be made- about it. Furthermore, there may be a slight

parallel to Husserl's second reduction, in which he elim-

inates consideration of the object as object.

The parallels should be highly guarded at this point,

however, because of the introduction of Frye's second

critical principle. Frye says that the study of literature

•'•Frye, Anatomy, pp. 75-76.

2Ibid., p. 4.

30

should be an inductive study based on principles derived

from the body of literature itself. In so far as Frye is

simply guarding against the imposition of external theories

on the body of literature, there is no contradiction of

phenomenological principles. If, however, Frye means that

criticism can never get past generalizations drawn from

empirical observations of literature, then Frye would be

disassociated from phenomenology from the very start of

his investigation, because traditional inductive studies

are limited by the particular data at hand and can make no

observations about the general character of literature.

It appears, however, that Frye is using the term inductive

for the first purpose rather than the second. If we ex-

amine the first critical principle again, this conclusion

will be borne out. Frye says that literary structures do

not have descriptive meaning. If he means the term in-

ductive in the literal sense, it would then be impossible

to derive criticism from it, because criticism itself is

descriptive. Apparently Frye is the victim of a plague

that follows him throughout the book, for there simply are

not appropriate terms for many of the ideas he wishes to

convey. *

One further assumption is necessary before one can

begin any meaningful criticism— the total coherence of

the body of literature. At first glance this assumption

31

would seem to be extremely arbitrary and unjustified.

After all, those structures which we commonsensically

refer to as literary seem to be diverse and unrelated.

If we examine the assumption more carefully, however, we

notice that the assumption is similar to the philosophic

assumption that all the facts that appear for investigation

belong to the same universe. If they do not, then there is

no possibility for ever making synthetic judgments. The

problem is slightly more difficult for the investigator

who wants to examine only one area of that universe, be-

cause he must delineate that area from others. Frye deals

with this problem by making all verbal strxictures the

starting point and later making a distinction between

literature and other verbal structures on the basis of

the criticism that he has developed. On commonsense

grounds it appears to be necessary that the universe con-

tained by all verbal structures must also contain all lit-

erary structures. Beyond this assumption, the only kind

of assumption that Frye makes is the same assumption of

the basic rationality of the universe that the philosopher

makes.

With these principles Frye begins his literary crit-

icism. The most cursory examination of literature will

reveal that it usually involves someone doing something.

Even literature that does not on the surface appear to

32

have characters uses the implied character of the author.

That is, the lyric, although it appears to have no hero,

actually operates with the author as the hero. Along with

Aristotle, Frye begins his criticism with a classification

of literature on the basis of the relative weight of heroes.

Frye states that Aristotle has frequently been dismissed

because his classification of heroes is taken in a narrow,

moralistic way. When Aristotle refers to higher and lower

characters he is not speaking ethically. The progression

of the relative strength of heroes seems also to follow the

general historical development of literature. It is not

clear from Frye1s analysis, however, whether he thinks that

this progression is culturally dependent. He does comment

that the progression holds true in abbreviated form for

classical literature as well as Western literature. Frye

distinguishes five modes of literary progression in Western

literature.

The first of these modes is the mythic mode. The

mythic mode is rarely found in isolated form. It is most

usually associated with religious works of literature.

Frye states that for the purposes of criticism these re-

ligious works stand as literary documents of value, what-

ever their theological content. The mythic hero is superior

to other men and to his environment in kind. He is always

either a god or a demi-god.

33

The second mode' of literature is the romance. The

romance is exemplified by the legend, folk tale, and the

m&rchen. The hero of the romance is superior to other men

and to his environment in degree, but not in kind: "The

hero of romance moves in a world in which the ordinary 3

laws of nature are slightly suspended." He operates in

a world of "enchanted weapons, talking animals, terrifying

4

ogres and witches. . ."

The next two modes are mimetic modes. The hero of the

high mimetic mode is superior to other men in degree but

not to his environment. This mode is most clearly repre-

sented in classical tragedy, although it is also found

frequently in Elizabethan tragedy as well. The low mimetic

mode is characterized by heroes who are superior neither to

other men nor to their environment. This mode is almost

always the mode of realistic fiction.

The fifth mode is the ironic mode. The ironic hero is

inferior both to other men and to his environment. As we

move through the lower reaches of the ironic mode to black

satire and the various absurdist movements, an interesting

feature of the literature begins to appear. It begins to

take on mythic overtones again. This development seems to

indicate that the modes operate cyclically rather than on

a linear continuum. Frye speculates in the conclusion

3Ibi.d., p. 3. 4Ibid., p. 33.

34

of the book that the cyclical character of criticism may

arise because of a cultural myth surrounding Spengler1s

analysis of history. It may be that we are simply in-

capable of thinking any other way. It would seem, however,

that these five-modes exhaust the possibilities for his-

torical progression and that the progression repeats itself.

In addition to the five modes of literature, each mode

also exhibits two phases, tragic and comic. The prototype

of the tragic hero is Dionysus, whereas the prototype of

the comic hero is Apollo. The primary characteristic of

the tragic hero is that in the final analysis he is alien-

ated from his society. The comic hero starts with some

kind of an obstacle between him and society which is des-

troyed in the resolution" of the plot. Frye further divides

comedy into two types, old and new. Old comedy arises out

of the tension that results from a hero who is equally

balanced between the standards for a high mimetic hero and

an ironic hero. New comedy usually involves an erotic

situation which is blocked by some obstacle to the passion.

It is usually resolved by a twist in the plot which makes

the marriage of the lovers possible. Because the comedy

requires a resolution with society, the plot of new comedy

is usually more highly manipulated than plots of tragic -

forms of literature.

At the end of his analysis of the historical development

of literature, Frye discusses the projection of the

35

various modes. Myth, for instance, projects itself as

theology, and the high mimetic mode projects itself in a

quasi-Platonic theory of eternal forms. In the final

analysis, however, these projections are not significant

from a critical point of view. For instance, while it is

interesting to speculate as to whether Yeats believed in

the romantic universe that he created, it is not necessary

that we know in order to do literary criticism.

While historical criticism studies the continuum of

the body of literature, ethical criticism is the means by

which we analyze it. Ethical criticism is the study of

symbols. It is ethical criticism in the sense that it is

the way the reader knows the work under discussion. Ethical

criticism also operates o'n a continuum, but its levels are

considerably more complex than those of the historical pro-

gress of literature. The first level of ethical criticism

presents the delineation of the symbol. All symbols have

both centifugal and centripetal force; symbols refer both

to something outside the discourse and forward to the context

within which they are placed. Although Frye defines symbol

as "any unit of any literary structure that can be isolated

for critical attention," his discussion of symbols goes

quite a bit further than a simple discussion of literary 5

structures. For example, the description of symbols on the

literal and descriptive levels applies to nonliterary

Slbid., p. 71.

36

discourse as well as"literary discourse. More important,

it is the analysis of symbols that provides us with the

first clear-cut distinction between literary and non-

literary verbal structures. Once we have made this dis-

tinction, Frye's definition of symbol becomes quite adequate

for the purpose of discussing literary criticism. Within

literary studies there are four levels on which symbols

operate: descriptive, formal, mythical, and anagogic. At

the deepest level of symbolic criticism we move into arche-

typal criticism which provides the total framework for

ethical criticism and refers back to historical criticism.

This archetypal criticism might be more profitably called

anagogic criticism for reasons that will be discussed later.

At.the first level of ethical criticism Frye analyzes

the symbol in its literal and descriptive phases. This level

is particularly important because at this level we are able

to distinguish the literary verbal structures from the non-

literary ones. There are two distinguishing characteristics

which separate the literary structure from the nonliterary

one. The first of these is that the symbolic structure of

nonliterary verbal structures operates only on the des-

criptive and literal level. The second is the character

of the movement of symbolic structures. Frye observes that

when we read anything we find our attention moving in two

directions: outward toward the tilings that the words

37

represent, and inward toward the context of the discourse.

The distinguishing characteristic of nonliterary verbal

structures is that the final direction of the symbolism

is always outward. That is, the writer who is attempting

to convey descriptive information or to make assertive

statements about the outside world is always primarily

concerned with the literal accuracy of his statements.

The final consideration of the creative writer is always

toward the internal progression of the symbols that he is

using. No matter how great an effort he makes to insure

the descriptive accuracy of his statements, in the final

analysis it does not matter whether or not they are

accurate.

After distinguishing literary structures from non-

literary verbal structures, Frye goes on to the way in which

symbolic structures are explicated by ethical criticism.

At the literal level, the literary work is just what it

presents: "The poem is literally a poem."^ The literal

meaning of a poem is the progression of symbols that it

presents. Frye, of course, does not think that he is re-

sponsible for this observation about criticism. New

Criticism provides an important basis for further criticism

by making the central concern the actual work itself. The

^Ibid., p. 73.

^Ibid., p. 82.

38

fundamental givenness of any particular work of literature

is the principle of recurrence:

Some principle of recurrence seems to be funda-mental to all works of art, and this recurrence is usually spoken of as rhythm when it moves along in time, and as pattern when it is spread out in space. . . . The inference is that all arts possess both a temporal and a spatial aspect, whichever takes the lead when they are presented.®

The symbols of a work of literature point to one another,

rather than to some external context. Since the movement

of all literary works is essentially internal, they may in

one sense be referred to as ironic. Literature always

means something other than what it ostensibly refers to.

On the first level of ethical criticism a considerable

similarity between Frye's description of the basic quality

of literature and Weiss's aesthetic theory is already

evident. Frye rather cogently argues for seeing all arts

as both spatial and temporal. This argument would seem to

be an important modification of Weiss's position. We

should not place too much emphasis on the parallel at this

point, because it is practically the end of Weiss's analysis,

but only the beginning of Frye's.

The second phase of ethical criticism is formal, or

the study of symbol as image. Formal criticism is actually

a deeper level of the same kind of criticism that goes on

8Ibid., p. 77.

39

at the descriptive level.- As we work through the pattern

of literal symbols of any given work, one of the symbols

emerges as the image around which all the other images move.

This central image can be thought of in two ways. First, it

can be seen as the static concept which integrates the work.

Second, it can be seen as the image which moves through the

work. In terms of the experience of the work it should

seem that the movement is more fundamental than the static

quality of the image. After all, in the direct awareness

of the work we move through the informing image.

The third phase of ethical criticism is the study of

symbols as archetypal. On the surface this section seems

to be devoted to a study of the recurrence of central images

in literature in their static form. This analysis is mis-

leading, however, because the archetypal structure relates

dynamically not only to the particular work in question,

but also to the whole body of literature. At the level of

archetypal criticism it becomes apparent that historical

criticism and ethical criticism are in no sense unrelated.

The archetype dynamically relates or informs the whole

continuum of literary experience. Somewhat misleadingly,

Frye goes on to what he calls the anagogic level of the

study of symbols, which is the image in particular works

that is a microcosm of literature as a whole within a

particular archetypal structure. The pervading image is

called a monad of literary structure. As it is seen as

40

informing only the particular work of literature, the image

is called an archetype. When it is seen as a microcosm of

all literature, it is called anagogic criticism. Here is

an example of the outward and inward movement of the symbol

within the study of literature. When seen internally as

it moves through the particular work of literature, the

central image is referred to as an archetype. When it is

seen an outwardly directed toward the body of literature,

it is called a monad.

It is rather unfortunate that Frye chooses the terra

monad as the description of anagogic criticism. Apparently

Frye is again the victim of an inadequate vocabulary of

criticism. The term monad was originally used by Leibnitz

to refer to the theoretical constituents of the universe.

Apparently Frye is referring only to the quality of monads

that requires them to be microcosms of the entire universe,

because if he is not, Leibnitz's pluralism, which is also

implied by the term, would eliminate the possibility of

delineating an overall criticism of the body of literature.

The two strains of criticism that Frye has developed

thus far provide us with intersecting points of view of

literature. Although synoptic criticism ostensibly pro-

vides different perspectives from which we may view lit-

erature, they are in no sense unrelated. Neither is it

possible to do one type of criticism to the exclusion of

the other. Overemphasis of either one leads to an

41

unbalanced view of literature. Graphically we may see

"historical criticism as the continuum across which lit-

erature moves. Ethical criticism is the conceptual analysis

by which we may move into a work of literature at any point

on the continuum. It might seem to be belaboring the obvious

to say that criticism always criticizes a work in the his-

torical continuum, but it will become quite important as we

move into archetypal criticism, because it becomes the basis

for understanding the process of the intentional structure

of literature.

Ethical

Non-Literary

Mythical J Romantic I High Mimetic j Low Mimetic i Ironic

Literal

Formal

Archetypal

Monad

K H-01 r+ 0 t-s F-O 03 H

42

Archetypal criticism is the study of the basic

structure that pervades all literature. The archetype

gives us a historical understanding of the conceptual

framework of literature. Archetypal criticism studies the

way in which a particular work of literature is a micro-

cosm of the whole sweep of literature. The reason that

archetypal criticism should be called anagogic criticism is

that is gives us an apocalyptic view of literature and brings

about the unity of its criticism. As painting is most closely

related to geometry, literary structures most clearly relate

to the mythic mode and to religious vision:

The world of mythic imagery is usually represented by the conception of heaven or Paradise in religion, and it is apocalyptic, in the sense of that word already explained, a world of total metaphor, in which everything is potentially identical with everything else, as though it were all inside a single infinite body.9

The controlling principle on which the historical

progression develops in literature is the principle of

displacement. The two ends of the progression are myth

and naturalism. Between them literature moves through

a series of displacement.

The central principle of displacement is that what can be metaphorically identified in a myth can only be linked in romance by some form of simile: analogy, significant association, incidental accompanying imagery, and the like.

9Ibid., p. 136. 10Ibid., p. 137.

43

The romance that Frye talks about here is not the same as

romance in the historical mode, but the romantic tendency

in literature. It is built on the ironic premise, if men

were gods, then. . . . If the emphasis is on the ludi-

crousness of this proposition, then comedy is created. If

the premise is postulated as a realistic possibility, then

a tragic form of literature is produced.

Archetypal criticism develops in three patterns. The

first phase of archetypal criticism is apocalyptic imagery, the

second is demonic imagery, and the third is analogical imagery.

Apocalpytic criticism shows the way that all images can be

reduced to one central image. Demonic imagery emphasizes the

theme of discordance in literature. In pure form, apocalyp-

tic imagery is found only in the mythic mode of literature,

and demonic imagery is found only in the ironic mode. In

the three intermediate modes of literature, analogical imagery

sets the controlling tone. Analogical imagery is created by

the dialectic between apocalyptic imagery and demonic imagery.

These three phases of archetypes explain archetypal criticism

in its static sense. In its dynamic sense archetypal cri-

ticism has four phases.

The first phase of dynamic archetypal imagery is the

Mythos of Spring: comedy. It always involves the flowering

forth of fertile youth. Its usual resolution is the mar-

riage feast, frequently in multiple marriages. The mar-

riages usually form a progress, that is, the primary hero

44

is romantic, and the succeeding marriages are of characters

of lower* rank in mode. There is always some kind of obstacle

to the marriage, usually parental objection, which can be

seen as the influence of the Mythos of Winter on comic forms.

The second phase of the dynamic movement of archetypes

in literature is the Mythos of Summer: romance. The char-

acterizing mark of romance is the conflict between the

mature hero and the Mythos of Winter. Unlike the comedy in

which the youthful hero always wins against minimal opposition

the romance is a fight to the death. Whether the particular

work falls into the tragic or the comic phase of its parti-

cular. mode depends on the final outcome of the conflict.

It is probably wise at this point to make some clarification

of terms. Although the terms of the mythic analysis that we

are doing are frequently the same as those used in Frye's

analysis of the modes of literature, they do not refer to

the same things. The Mythos of. Summer may operate through

all the historical modes. It is, however, common for the

archetype of romance to appear in the romantic mode. Because

the romantic myth involves conflict betv/een the romantic hero

and a figure who represents the Mythos of Winter, there is

always a progression of episodes in which the hero shows his

right to meet the supreme test of fighting the powers of

darkness. This position is established by a series of lesser-

conflicts in which the hero shows his valor by courageously

45

fighting against and defeating the lieutenants of the

powers of darkness.

As we move through the tragic form of the Mythos of

Summer, there is an overlap into the Mythos of Autumn:

tragedy. When it becomes clear that the romantic hero

cannot ultimately win against the force of the Mythos of

Winter, we move into this archetypal structure. The tragic

situation develops from the dialectic between the necessity

of fate that the appearance of freedom. The tragic hero is

the very highest of men, and he appears not to be sub-

ject to man's frailties, but he is caught in the human

condition of everyman. The writer of tragedy is moved to

his highest sense of diction, because he must make it appear

that the tragic fall could not have been otherwise. While

comedy sets up a rather arbitrary group of rules for society

which are broken with impunity,.tragedy puts an essentially

free man into a set of rules that he is powerless to act

against. Very often these rules are just as arbitrary as

those of comedy. The tragic situation develops in its first

three phases like the romance, but in its last three phases

it develops like irony. The tragedy is that men who appear

to be higher than ourselves in the final analysis are no

stronger than we are. The realization of this fact is

very sobering.

The fourth phase of archetypal structure is the Mythos

of Winter: irony and satire. The distinction between irony

46

and satire is one of degree. It depends on the position

of the author. In satire we find a militant form of irony.

The moral standard of satire is relatively clear. Grotesque

or absurd situations are juxtaposed to this standard. In

irony the position of the author is more ambiguous. There

is some effort to present the grotesque and absurd situations

as if they were to be taken at face value.

Structurally the form of the Mythos of Winter is that

of a parody of the romance:

As structure, the central principle of ironic myth is best approached as a parody of romance: the ap-plication of romantic mythical forms to a more realistic content which fits them in unexpected ways. No one in a romance, Don Quixote protests, ever asks who pays for the hero's accomodations. *•

Generally the structure of satire follows the development

of comedy, and the structure of irony develops out of

tragedy. The emphasis of satire is on incongruity. The

focus of irony is on the way mimetic characters deal with

a tragic situation. In the lower reaches of the ironic

myth it tends to become more and more populated by the

figures of the Comic myth seen from the opposite direction,

There seems to be a circular structure to the development

of the four phases of myth. Frye theorizes that the

mythic structures may imply one another. Within this

framework, the reason for the catharsis of ironic tragedy

11Ibid., p. 223.

47

is the implied comedy that follows it. The pattern, of

course, is the cycle of nature. Literary structures

ultimately mirror the pattern of seasonal existence.

With the theory of archetypal criticism, Frye en-

closes the literary universe that is developed in his-

torical criticism and ethical criticism. The theory of

archetypal criticism provides us with an apocalyptic view

of literature.

Ethical

Criticism

Monad

48

In this diagrammatic manner of presentation, it appears

that the structure of literature is two dimensional. The

fourth essay in Anatomy of Criticism concerns the form of

presentation of literary structures. This essay provides

the depth of the diagrammatic structure; it also provides

an explanation of the process by which literature is ap-

proached from our commonsense perspective. Frye calls

this essay rhetorical criticism — the theory of genres. In

literary structures the primary rhetorical consideration is

the radical of presentation. The.genre is determined by

the relationship of the author of a work to the audience

that is being addressed. There are four ways that a work

of art may be presented.

Words may be acted in front of a spectator; they may be spoken in front of a listener; they may be sung or.chanted; or they may be written for a reader.

Rhetorical criticism is further divided into two sub-

divisions. We may see the rhetoric of a work either in

terms of its rhythm or in terms of its pattern. It must

be remembered that rhetorical criticism does not classify

specific works but points to their general emphasis. For

instance, we would usually classify a novel that has no

poetic qualities in its rhetoric as being very bad even

though the primary intention of novels is not poetic.

12Ibid., p. 247.

49

The first division of the rhythmic phase of pre-

sentation is the rhythm of recurrence which Frye calls

epos. The rhythm of recurrence is the point at which

literature comes closest to music. The basic rhythmic

progression of the English language is the four beat line

that has a variable number of unstressed syllables. It

may be developed through alliteration, but since the

Middle Ages it has been rhyme.

The second rhythmic phase of rhetorical progression

is the rhythm of continuity: prose. The basis of prose

rhythm is semantic. There are two directions that con-

tinuous rhythm may take. If it takes the form of persuasion

then it quickly moves out of the literary discipline. Con-

tinuous literary structures have an ornamentation. The

primary characteristics of continuous rhythm are recur-

rence of semantic units, grammatical constructions, and

the principle of their balance.

The rhythm of decorum, drama, is the third radical of

presentation. There is a peculiar rhythm to the makeup of

every person's speech. Drama attempts to reflect this

quality in its structure. The reason for this rhythmic

pattern of drama is the crucial importance of characteri-

zation in drama.

The fourth rhythm is the rhythm of association, or

lyric. The lyric depends on the technique of metaphor for

50

its force. Since the primary concern of the lyricist is

recognition or insight, its presentation is as if the

audience were the writer of the work. There is a de-

liberate attempt on the part of the lyricist not to

address any reader, or at least not the real reader.

In addition to their rhythmic qualities, literary

structures also exhibit rhetorical marks on the basis

of their pattern. While the rhythm of literature appeals

basically to the sense of hearing, its patterns relate

most clearly to the sense of sight. For our purposes

it will not be necessary to go through all of the phases

of the patterns of literature. It is sufficient to say

that they relate generally to the type of concepts that are

being dealt with in the literary structure. While the

phases of rhythm in literary structures correspond most

clearly to historical criticism, patterns of rhetoric are

more closely related to ethical criticism.

On the basis of this analysis it should be quite

clear that the organization of An atomy of Criticism is

such that it attempts to describe literature in terms

of its own properties rather than by imposing external

theories of literature on it. Such a description itself

warrants the conclusion that Frye's work at least closely

parallels the phenomenological method of examination.

Taking the insights that Frye has illuminated and

51

examining them with the help of phenomenological tech-

niques should contribute a significant insight into the

nature of literary criticism.

CHAPTER III'

THE INTERRELATION OF PHENOMENOLOGY AND ANATOMY OF CRITICISM

The central problem that needs to be resolved in order

to establish a significant relationship between Frye1s

theory of literary criticism in Anatomy of Criticism and

the phenomenological school of philosophy is the appro-

priateness of the concept of intentionality to Frye1s

critical method. Secondary to this question, but quite

important, is the extent to which Frye employs methods

which are similar to Husserl1s six reductions, and the

extent to which Frye's synoptic criticism is similar to the

phenomenological thinkers. If a significant degree of com-

patibility can be established between Frye1s criticism and

phenomenology, there would be considerable benefit to both

sides. In terms of Frye's criticism it would provide a

systematic rationale for his method of criticism. The dis-

cipline of phenomenology would of course benefit from the

extented use of its method.

I hope to show that the concept of intentionality is

not only appropriate to Frye's method of criticism, but

also is necessary to explain the interrelation of the

four types of criticism that Frye develops in Anatomy

of Criticism. Furthermore, I hope to show that

52

53

Frye's critical theory meets most of the standards outlined

in Husserl's six reductions and that despite differences

of terminology this fact is suggested by Frye in Anatomy

of Criticism and Fables of Identity. Thirdly, Frye's de-

velopment of synoptic criticism seems to be quite com-

patible with the perspectival studies constructed by

several phenomenologists. For instance, it seems to be

quite similar in approach, if not in content, to the

aesthetic system developed by Paul Weiss and to the gen-

eral phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty.

The most important consideration in establishing the

appropriateness of the concept of intentionality to Frye's

criticism is his use of the term structure. This term

could be employed .in such a way that it implies not only

the process of intentionality but also the use of a re-

ductive process in deriving that structure. Although it

is unlikely that Frye deliberately uses the term in a

phenomenological sense, there does not seem to be any

particular difficulty in relating it to phenomenology.

In Fables of Identity Frye states that there is only

one story in literature: the quest-myth. On the surface

this statement would seem to be a completely arbitrary

judgment based on the dubious theory of the primacy of

Western civilization, and in no way compatible with either

Iprye, Fables of Identity, pp. 262-263.

54

the first or the second reduction of the phenomenological

method. If the statement is taken in light of the ten-

tative conclusion to Anatomy of Criticism, however, it

becomes clear that he is referring not to the content of

Western culture .but to the structure of the cyclic ex-

perience of literature. If the general nature of existence

is cyclic as the seasonal character of life seems to indi-

cate, there is nothing unusual or surprising about finding

the pattern expressed in literary structure. In this sense

Frye's statement refers to a generalized analogue that is

frequently repeated in experience. Literary motifs in

this sense provide varied and unusual perspectives on a

central intuition. There does develop another problem

with this explication that Frye recognizes in another part

of the tentative conclusion, which is the possibility that

the cyclic pattern is culturally dominated by Spengler1s

cyclic theory of history. This possibility would mean

that Frye has failed to make the first reductbn. Actually,

the very fact that he recognizes the problem is a kind of

indirect evidence that he does not want to fall into a sub-

jective trap. Frye does not attempt to defend himself

against the possibility, but the perspectival theory of

phenomenology seems to make it practically irrelevant,

because it does not matter as long as the pattern does in

fact appear in the body of literature. What is entirely

55

possible is that there is a cultural predisposition to

the recognition of a particular pattern in literature.

This problem can be guarded against by remaining open to

other perspectives on the body of literature. In other

words, any perspective may be valid as long as it is not

looked upon as being absolute.

Frye develops his criticism in four interrelated

essays. The ostensible reason for this format is that

it is a preliminary study in which he wants to leave room

for future modifications. More important, however, is the

fact that in developing these essays independently, the

case for their interrelation becomes at least rhetorically

stronger when it is developed in separate essays. The

four types of criticism can be divided into two categories

for our purposes. Historical and rhetorical criticism are

descriptions of the time structure of literature. Ethical

and archetypal criticism describe the way in which concepts

appear in time structures. Archetypal criticism acts as

the core around which all the other modes operate, because

it not only unifies ethical criticism, but also encompasses

historical criticism.

Frye identifies two ways in which time operates in

literary works, historical and rhetorical. The first is

the hero's relation to time, arid the second is the reader's

relation to the author, which is essentially a time relation,

56

Although Frye does not mention it, the same centrifugal

and centripetal force analogy works with time structures

as it does with symbolism. The hero governs the way in

which time moves internally in the work of art, and the

reader's relation to the author directs him to an outward

or common notion of time. The distinguishing feature of

literary structures is the movement from an external use

of time to an internal one.

Frye distinguishes five relations that the hero may

have to the reader. These five are distinguished by the

time pattern exhibited by the hero. The mythic mode re-

presents an absolute view of time. The mythic hero operates

without the restraint of time --in other words, he is eternal.

The romantic hero operates in what may be called aspirative

time. He is that to which men aspire. He is in time but

not dominated by it. The two mimetic modes are difficult

to distinguish because of their closeness. The heroes of

the mimetic modes operate in a commonsense time. These

two modes are defined in terms of the hero's success with

time. The high mimetic hero's success is governed by time

to a high degree. The low mimetic hero's success is governed

by time in that he is either lucky or unlucky depending on

the rhythm of the situation that he finds himself in. On

the other hand, the ironic hero is victimized by time; he

is totally at its mercy. Frye rightly describes these modes

57

as operating in a circle, but "he does not give any ex-

planation of this phenomena. The reason that they move

in a circular fashion is that essentially the same

structure is being described in each one but they are

being distorted by the various kinds of heroes. This fact

can be most easily seem by contrasting the mythic mode with

the ironic mode. In the mythic mode time is described in

absolute terms through an identification with a hero. In

the ironic mode the description is equally absolute, but it

is contrasted with a hero. The intermediate literary forms

deal with varying degrees of identification and contrast.

From a literary standpoint rhetorical criticism can

be seen as the technique by which the reader plugs into

the historical progression. The bridge here is found in

Frye's description of the two phases of each mode, tragic

and comic. There is a twofold criterion for these phases.

The first is the nature of the resolution. Tragedies end

in a dissolution of society, while comedies end in a re-

union of society. The second criterion is diction. Tragic

forms use an elevated diction, while comic forms generally

use low diction. Clearly the first criterion is an internal

one and the second is an external one, because both high and

low diction must be relative to the reader. Frye distinguishes

four phases of rhetorical criticism. All of them emanate

from common sense time structures, because this is the most

58

likely place to pick up readers. There is no reason in

principle why rhetoric could not use other bases. The

rhythm of recurrence appeals to the repetitive character

of language. Prose appeals to the flow of language. Drama

and lyrical rhetorical forms make use of individualized

language patterns for their effects. Drama uses the

variations of rhythm exhibited by different speakers of

the same language, while lyrics bring the reader to the

author's position to examine a theme.

It is wise to point out here that the process can be

reversed. If the movement of a verbal structure is from

the historical to the rhetorical, then a nonliterary

structure is produced. This process works on the same

principle as the direction of the symbol as a means of

distinguishing literary structures from descriptive or

assertive verbal structures. If the movement is internal,

then a literary structure is produced. If the movement is

external, a descriptive or assertive structure is produced.

In addition to providing a clearly defined second

criterion for delineating literary structures, the obvious

interrelation of these two modes illustrates the way in

which the concept of intentionality is appropriate, and

the importance of perspectival analysis in Anatomy of

Criticism. All verbal structures consist of an inter-

action of two time structures, and the direction of this

59

interaction determines the literary or nonliterary char-

acter. The interaction of the time structures describes

an intention between them that is not governed by the

writer of the particular work. In other words, this

relationship appears every time a verbal structure ap-

pears, regardless of the author of it. This description

exemplifies the process of logical requiredness that was

discussed in the first chapter. That is the intention

that is required in experience, not an arbitrary imposition

on it. The description also shows, the importance of per-

spective. It indicates that there are at least two dir-

ections from which any verbal structure can be seen,

aesthetic and descriptive. In order to illustrate the way

in which the six reductions are employed it will be nec-

essary to complete the discussion of the other two essays

in Anatomy of Criticism.

Ethical criticism and archetypal criticism interact

in a manner similar to the interaction between historical

criticism and rhetorical criticism. Frye1s explication of

this interaction is much more complete, however. The

interaction is described in terms of the literal and des-

criptive phases of the symbol. Frye uses this description

to distinguish literary structures from nonliterary ones,

but it is clear that the same distinction holds between

the symbol as an internal entity in the literary work and

the symbol as monad of the entire literary universe. On

60

the surface it appears that the distinction between sym-

bolic criticism and archetypal criticism is not as great

as that between historical and rhetorical criticism. The

apparent similarity between the two arises from the fact

that the focal point pf the two kinds of criticism is the

same. The primary difference between them is the di-

rection of movement tjiat they take from that point. The

center of both studies is the literal work of art in the

full "New Critic" sense of the term. As symbolic crit-

icism reaches its deepest level in the literal work of art

it takes a dramatic turn toward the universal paradigms

that pervade all literary structures. Frye aptly demon-

strates the contrast in another context. While discussing

the literal and descriptive phases of the symbolic de-

velopment of all verbal structures, Frye says:

Whenever we read anything we find our attention moving in two directions at once. One direction is outward or centrifugal, in which we keep going outside our reading, from the individual words to the things they mean, or, in practice, to our memory of the conventional associations between them. The other direction is inward or centripetal, in which we try to develop from the words a sense of the larger verbal pattern which they make.2

Symbolic criticism studies the progression of symbols

in a particular work of art, while archetypal criticism is

concerned with the meaning that informs works of art in

2Frye, Anatomy, p. 73

&

*

61

the historical progression of literature. Although both

kinds of criticism are descriptive, symbolic criticism is

more closely allied with the actual experience of the lit-

erary structure than archetypal criticism. In terms of

their association with the time structures in literature

symbolic criticism is closely associated with rhetorical

criticism and archetypal criticism is associated with his-

torical criticism. Indeed, as Frye develops archetypal

criticism it becomes clear that the conceptual framework

developed in the study is the basis for the categories in

historical criticism. For instance, the Mythos of Winter,

irony and satire, are closely related to Frye's description

of the ironic hero.

The passage is even more important because it provides

the key to the interrelation of the four essays and the

discipline of phenomenology. As Frye describes literature

there are two vectoral forces operating in any literary

structure, time and concept. The forces are in no sense

unrelated, however. The conceptual structure examined by

symbolic criticism is interrelated with rhetorical criticism

and the analysis of archetypes is related to historical

criticism. Since archetypal criticism arises out of sym-

bolic criticism it would seem that the modes of criticism

must be interrelated. The most accurate judgment that can

be made about them is that, they are mutually interdependent.

I

62

While it seems quite clear that Frye's Anatomy of

Criticism is similar to the perspectival studies done by

many phenomenologists, it is necessary to go into more

detail to show the relationship of the six reductions

and the concept of intentionality to his work. The

first reduction poses no problem because Frye's work

quite clearly attempts to avoid the problem of sub-

jectivity in literary criticism- In fact the polemical

introduction to Anatomy of Criticism begins with a tirade

against the imposition of external theories on the

. body of literature. In discussing both romantic and

aesthetic attitudes toward criticism Frye says:

The fallacy common to both attitudes is that of a rough correlation between the merit of art and the degree of public response to it, though the correlation assumed is direct in one case and inverse in the other.3

The evidence for Frye's use of the second reduction is

not so direct as the first. Husserl's second reduction

holds that the object is not to be entertained as objective,

in a sense it is encompassed by the first, because the

theory that objects exist as independent entities without

reference to the mind is as undemonstrable as metaphysical

idealism. On the surface Frye appears to fall into an

objective trap by calling for an inductive study of lit-

erature. However, once it becomes clear that Frye does

3lbid., p. 4.

63

not use the term inductive in the usual sense of the term,

the difficulty is resolved. The fact that he is not using

it in a normal sense is revealed by the distinction that he

draws between criticism and literature itself:

. . .Nor is it strained wit that causes. Mr. MacLeish, in his famous Ars Poetica, to apply the words "mute," "dumb," and "wordless" to a poem. The artist, as John Stuart Mill saw in a wonderful flash of critical insight, is not heard but overheard. The axiom of criticism must be, not that the poet does not know what he is talking about, but that he cannot talk about what he knows. To defend the right of criticism to exist at all, therefore, is to assume that criticism is a structure of thought and knowledge existing in its own right, with some measure of independence from the art it deals with.^

Since criticism is an enterprise that is distinct and in-

dependent from literature, it could not be an inductive

study in the traditional sense of the term, because in-

duction, strictly speaking, means to extract from the

object of investigation. Furthermore, if Frye were using

the term inductive in the traditional sense, there would

be no rational ground for archetypal criticism, which he

identifies as the core of his criticism in the tentative

conclusion of Anatomy of Criticism, since it deals with

the universal framework for literature. This evidence is

admittedly negative argumentation. It might be more

accurate to say that Frye needs something at least similar

4Ibid., p. 5.

64

to the second reduction in order to explain the process

by which he derives archetypal criticism. Since criticism

is a descriptive activity and literature is not, Frye

certainly cannot be extracting his criticism directly

from the actual experience of the work of art.

The third reduction is more difficult to relate to

Frye's criticism because it is not as carefully worked out

in phenomenology. It involves what Husserl calls the

transcendental turn, and is predicated on the theory of

intentionality. If one is cut off from the object as

objectified, knowledge derived from analysis is con-

ceptual in nature. This reduction and the thrust of phe-

nomenology in general is the assumption of an ontological

significance to meaning. For Husserl the world has sig-

nificance in terms of its meaning. Again the evidence for

Frye's use of this redaction is negative. Since criticism

is descriptive and literature is not, the only sense in

which criticism could be meaningfully related to it is in

a transcendental one. In discussing this point Frye is

clearly not using the phenomenological method, because

he suggests that it is axiomatic that criticism is sep-

arated from literature, but meaningful to it.5 Such a

suggestion is adequate to allow him to begin his critical

system, but would leave the system groundless if it were

merely axiomatic, because one can presumably start an

5Ibid.

65

axiomatic system with any axioms that one wants. At this

point Husserl's theory of intentionality rescues him from

having just one more axiomatic system, and can be applied

to do the same for Frye. For Husserl the experience itself

calls for its description or meaning. In other words, the

fact that .people always assign meaning to their encounter

with the world is not one of those things that is arbitrarily

or subjectively imposed on experience. The particular meaning

that I give to an experience may indeed by arbitrary, but if

the first reduction is applied properly the-residue of meaning

must be required by the experience itself. Such a concept of

applied to Frye1s critical theory gives him a certain ground

from which to start the criticism.

The fourth and fifth reductions are not particularly

important to the application of the principles of Frye1s

criticism because they deal with technical problems of

the constitution of transcendental meaning. The sixth

reduction, transcendental intersubjectivity, is quite

important, however. As Frye develops his critical theory

the experience of literature can be described in terms of

the interaction of four modes of criticism. As has already

been demonstrated, these four modes can be seen as two

double perspectives on the interaction of time and concept.

Frye's analysis at this point closely parallels Husserl1s

theory of the progressive development of interaction between

concepts.

66

At this point the problem of distinguishing between

literary and commonsense verbal structures reappears. It

is perhaps the easy, but more probable way out to suggest

that on a transcendental plain the distinction between

aesthetic meaning and commonsense meaning simply does not

exist. In other words, the interaction between concepts

is neither aesthetic nor comraonsensical, but simply mean-

ingful. The other possibility is that the problem is again

a matter of the direction of movement that one takes. If

the movement is outward toward that which the progression

means, then there is a descriptive verbal structure. If

the movement is inward from the concept to the environment'

in which it is a progressive element, then there is a literary

structure. The only indication in Anatomy of Criticism on

this question seems to suggest the latter alternative. In

discussing Gibbon's The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire,

Frye says that it is an example of a work that was once read

from a descriptive perspective, but is read now from an

fs

aesthetic one.

It is probably a good idea to point out at this time

that there is no particular reason why verbal structures

are limited to these two vectoral forces except, that for

commonsense reasons one generally rules out all others as

literature. In some contemporary poetry the pattern of the

^Ibid. , p. 75.

67

words on the page reveals a spatial vector in the work.

E.E. Cummings suggests this dimension to literature. As

this movement goes on to patterns in which the words

themselves are of no importance except as outlines for

spatial pictures, it quickly moves into the domain of

painting. As Frye indicates, however, this spatial di-

mension is not completely abandoned even in the most tra-

ditional verbal structures. For instance, the arrangement

of words on the page indicates a distinction between

poetry and prose. The spatial aspect of this arrangement

is important only as a kind of punctuation of the rhythm

of the work. Interestingly, this type of analysis suggests

the possibility that there is a blank art form between

painting and literature of which there are no, or very few,

examples.

Despite the occasional use of spatial patterns either

for an additional perspective, or as added punctuation,

it is clear that the primary concern of literary structures

is the revelation of archetypal structures in temporal

configurations. It is also quite clear that the two

primary constituents of literary structures are inter-

dependent in any meaningful criticism of literature.

Furthermore, Frye's analysis of literature seems to

parallel and in many senses hinge on a phenomenological

base. The concept of intentionality is implicitly the

68

basis for the development of the interrelation between the

four essays in Anatomy of Criticism. In the case of

rhetorical criticism, its relationship to historical

criticism is less clearly drawn than that between sym-

bolic and archetypal criticism. The reason for this

failure seems to be the fact that for the purpose of

criticism itself it is not particularly important to show

the mechanism by which the reader moves into the historical

progression of literature.

In the actual development of his criticism Frye more

.or less explicitly employs Husserl's six reductions, where

they are relevant to critical theory. The evidence for

this judgment is most explicit in the case of the first

reduction, but it is sufficient in the other cases to

warrant a phenomenological interpretation of Anatomy of

Criticism. In the case of the third reduction Frye1s

criticism seems to be not only appropriately derived from

it, but also absolutely necessary in order to provide

the scaffolding on which the criticism is based. Further-

more, since the third reduction depends entirely on the

first two and somewhat less strongly points toward the

other three, it appears that they are also appropriate

to the development of Frye1s criticism.

Although there is little evidence of direct influence

of phenomenology on Anatomy of Criticism, the striking

69

parallels between them indicate that they arise from some

sort of common ground. Both phenomenology and Anatomy of

Critic!sm respond to two intellectual trends of thought in

the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, romanticism and

scientism. Romanticism has its roots in a subjective

theory of the universe which both phenomenology and Frye

reject. In phenomenology the attack on subjectivism takes

the form of an objection to what Husserl calls psycholigism.

Despite the fact that his major work of practical criticism,

Fearful Symmetry, concerns the romantic William Blake, Frye

also attacks subjectivism in criticism. He rejects Arnold's

touchstone theory and in discussing the elements of criticism

that must be eliminated says:

It includes all casual, sentimental, and prejudiced value-judgments, and all the literary chit-chat which makes the reputation of poets boom and crash in an imaginary stock exchange. That wealthy in-vestor Mr. Eliot, after dumping Milton on the market, is now buying him again. . . .This sort of thing cannot be part of any systematic study, for a systematic study can only progress: whatever dithers or vacillates or reacts is merely leisure-class gossip. The history of taste is no more 'a part of the structure of criticism than the Huxley-Wilberforce debate is a part of the structure of biological science.7

The discipline of phenomenology is equally in op-

position to scientism. Husserl1s second reduction is an

effort to avoid an inductive system of thought. Frye,

^Ibid., p. 18.

70

at least on the surface, is not. strongly opposed to

inductive processes in criticism. However, it has been

shown that Frye is concerned with much more than a simple

inductive study of the body of literature.

Both the discipline of phenomenology and Frye1s Anatomy

of Criticism share in an attempt to deal directly with the

data of experience. The attempt in both cases is to de-

lineate the structures that appear in that experience.

Frye1s effort to examine literature without imposing ex-

ternal theories on it provides the most convincing evidence

for drawing a parallel between Anatomy of Criticism and

phenomenology.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Frye, Northrop, Anatomy of Criticism, New York, Atheneum, 1967.

./ Fables of Identity: Studies in Poetic Mythology, New York, Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1963.

, Fearful Symmetry, New York, Beacon Press, 1962.

Husserl, Edmund, The Idea of Phenomenology, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1964.

, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, translated by W.R. Boyce Gibson, New York, Collier Books, 1962.

K6hler, Wolfgang, The Place of Value in a World of Facts, New York, New American Library, 1966.

Lauer, Quentin, Phenomenology: Its Genesis and Prospects, New York, Harper and Row, 1965.

Mourant, John A. and E. Hans Freund, editors, Problems of Philosophy: A Book of Readings, New York, Macmillan Company, 1964.

Weiss, Paul, Nine Basic Arts, Carbondale, Southern Illinois University Press, 1961.