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Review: The Convergence Effect: Challenge to ParsimonyAuthor(s): Robert C. North and Matthew WillardSource: International Organization, Vol. 37, No. 2 (Spring, 1983), pp. 339-358Published by: The MIT PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706539 .

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The convergence effect: challenge toparsimony Robert C. North and Matthew Willard

Richard K. Ashley. The Political Economy of Warand Peace. London:Frances Pinter; New York: Nichols, 1980.

Francis A. Beer. Peace against War: The Ecology of InternationalViolence.San Francisco:W. H. Freeman, 1981.

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita. The War Trap. New Haven: Yale UniversityPress, 1981.

A. F. K. Organskiand Jacek Kugler. The War Ledger. Chicago:University of ChicagoPress, 1980.

David Wilkinson. Deadly Quarrels:Lewis F. Richardsonand theStatistical Study of War.Berkeley:University of CaliforniaPress, 1980.

Debates in the field of internationalpolitics over the last two decades havedriven otherwise sober scholarsto indulgein vivid metaphor.In 1961 InisClaudereferred o internationalpolitical theoryas "more a thingof shredsand patches than a seamless garment covering our understandingof theprocesses of internationalrelations."' Since then, little progresshas beenmade toward even a minimal unificationof the field. "In our teaching andresearch,"wrote Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing, "we are like travellers na houseboat, shuttlingback and forth between separate'islands'of theory,whose relatednessconsists only in theirbeing commonly in the great 'ocean'of 'internationalbehavior.' Some theorists take up permanentresidenceonone island or other, others continue to shuttle, but few attempt to build

bridges, perhapsbecause the islands seem too far apart."2

1. Inis L. Claude Jr., "The Management of Power in the Changing United Nations," Inter-national Organization 15 (Spring 1961), p. 220.

2. Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Makingand System Structure in International Crises (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), pp.21-22.

International Organization 37, 2, Spring 1983 0020-8183/83/020339-19 $1.50? 1983 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the World Peace Foundation



340 InternationalOrganization

In an alternative metaphor, we might comparetheoreticiansand inves-tigators n the fieldof internationalpoliticswith medievalknightswho lowertheir castle drawbridgesrom time to time and ride theirchargersout to thejousting field intent on unhorsingtheir rivals.Then, whatever the outcomeof thejoust, theyrecrosstheir moats and raise thedrawbridges ehind them.Opportunitiesor cumulativeresearchand thedevelopment,refinement,andenrichmentof paradigmsundersuch circumstances emainpainfully imited.

It is not difficult to account for splinteringtendencies in the field. Therealitiesof internationalpolitics are extended, diverse,and complex. Unlessthe whole is broken down into manageable parts, the problems seem too

large for the available tools. And unless parsimony s pursued,theories tendto expand out of control. Paradoxically,however, the more that we learnabout the disjoined partsof reality,the less we may know about the whole.And whereasa lack of parsimonyoften yields amorphoustheory,an excessof parsimony may produce tautology, explain the obvious, or, in the caseof some approaches o internationalpolitics, reducecomplex human inter-actions to rigid,almost mechanicalabstractions.

Focusing upon the study of war, P. TerrenceHopmann,Dina A. Zinnes,and J. David Singerhave arguedthat what is needed is "not a call for the

generation of allegedly 'new' theories . . ." but, rather, "aclearerunderstandingof theories that already exist; a clearerunderstandingof their respectivepotencies in explaining particularevents of war (and other outcomes, pre-sumably);a clearerunderstandingof the relationshipsbetween one particaltheory and others."3

One possible step in this directionis an integration hat appears feasiblefrom a reading of these five books. As far back as 1959 Kenneth Waltz-addressing he question,"Whereare the majorcauses of warto be found?"sought to make manageablethe "bewildering"variety of possible answers

to that question by ordering hem under threeheadings:"within man" (thefirst image); "within the structureof the separatestates" (second image);and "within the state system" (third image).4Littleprogresshas been madetowardthe linkingof these "levels"or systems, however,or the achievementof any degreeof consensus.

The five titles under review suggest, implicitly if not explicitly, two ob-servations.First, phenomenaon all three levels are probablyrelevantto anunderstandingof war and other internationaloutcomes. Second, withoutsome more definable, bounded, widely agreed-uponconceptualframework

andwithout dentifiableinkagesbetweenactorson and between mage evels,approachesto the study of war and other outcomes are likely to remain asisolated as the "islandsof theory"to which Snyderand Diesing referred.

3. P. Terrence Hopmann, Dina A. Zinnes, and J. David Singer,eds., Cumulation in InternationalRelations Research, University of Denver Monograph Series in World Affairs 18, Book 3 (198 1),pp. 30-31.

4. Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State and War. A Theoretical Analysis (New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press, 1959), p. 12.



The convergenceeffect 341

The core problemlies in the use of the word linkage. In the early 1960s

Heinz Eulau called the linking of different evels of analysis"a major un-

resolved item on the methodologicalagenda."'The word "linkage" s com-monly used in many different ways-linkage between issues, betweenvariables,betweenactors,and so forth.All threeof these usagesare legitimate.Here, however,we use the word linkageprimarilyas James Rosenau definedit-a recurrent equenceof behaviorthat originateson one side of the bound-ary betweentwo systemsand that in some waybecomes connectedor closelyassociated with phenomenaon the other side in the process of unfolding.6Human activity-behavior-is implicit, if not explicit, in all such linkages.

What Hopmann, Zinnes, and Singer identified as worth pursuingwas amodel or "even an analytical framework capable of linking behaviors onone level with those on another and capable of accountingfor differentialexplanatorycontributionsof such linkages."7 n this article we propose toformulate a loose conceptualframeworkas the first of three stages in de-veloping adequate theory. In this first stage we relax parsimony n ordertocreate conceptualblueprintsof international or better, global)politics as awhole. Our aim is to identify as many as possible of the generic elementssuch as actors, motivations, demands, capabilities,decisions, linkages,pro-

cessesof conflictandintegration,andthe like. After accomplishing his initialstage,however tentatively,we shouldattemptin a second,morechallengingstageto consolidateor mergeas manyas possibleof the specificassumptions,elements, and processesof the framework nto a more abstract,more gen-eralized,more parsimonious,more nearlyuniversalmodel. We should basesuch a procedure upon the premise that the number of generic functionsnecessaryand sufficientfor explainingoutcomes in globalpolitics-the de-cision function, for one-is limited, even though numerous variationson

these functionsmay be appropriateor

particularasesor analyticpurposes.

Once these genericfunctionshave been integrated nto a "master"model,it shouldbe possiblein a third stage to derive whole families of partial,moredetailed, more discretely specified models for cross-checking,comparing,empiricaltesting,and refinementof the genericmodel. Ouremphasisin thisarticlewill be on the first,or conceptuallyexpansionist,of the three stages.

A conceptualframework,as we use the term, is more specific,internallyconsistent, and integratedthan an approachbut more tentative than, andlackingthe consensual supportof, a paradigm.It is also less parsimonious,

less rigorous,and less directly falsifiablethan a theory or formal model.Althoughwe conceive of a conceptualframeworkas includinga wide rangeof explanatorypositions, we also assume that in the initial stage one cansubstitutedescriptionwhererigorousexplanationremains to be developed.

5. Heinz Eulau,The BehavioralPersuasion n Politics(New York: RandomHouse, 1963),p. 123.

6. JamesRosenau,LinkagePolitics(New York:FreePress, 1969), pp. 44-45.7. Hopmann,Zinnes,and Singer,Cumulation,pp. 30-31.




We take it that a conceptualframeworkand its constituentparts may be

falsified,substituted or,orrefined- ultimately-through constructionof themore parsimonious"master"model and the testingof more localizedandspecificderived models.

From a readingof these five books we infer a phenomenonthat we call

the convergenceeffect.With varyingdegreesof directnessand indirectness,remoteness and proximity, a great many diverse actors, interactiverela-tionships, and associated factors on different evels of aggregationand or-ganizationmay contributeto an outbreakof war or other event that needsexplanation. Wars and other major internationalevents may be seen, in

short, as outcomes of "horizontal"and "vertical"phenomena convergingfrom many different"directions."A recentexampleis providedby the ad-vance of Israeliforces from the Lebaneseborderto Beirut.This outcome,in principleat least, could be explainedby the convergenceof a vast arrayof historicaland contemporaryconsiderations ncludinglimited land andother resources,populationpressures,relationsbetween the PalestineLib-eration Organizationand various Arab states, changesin the configurationof domestic Israeli politics, the death of Anwar Sadat, Lebanon'sinternalconflicts, bureaucraticrelationshipswithin the government of Israel, the

personalstrengthsand idiosyncraciesof MenachemBeginand ArielSharon,the trend of interchangesbetween Beginand Ronald Reagan,and so on.

Critics might agreethat these convergingphenomenaare not equallyim-

portantas explanationsbut the crucialandbothersomeconsideration s thatany effortat makinga selection-any attempt to establishcriteria,even-will be biasedby the "island of theory"one happens to be situatedon. We

proposehere that, by providinga more unifiedcontext for analysis,a con-

ceptualframeworkwould help to alleviatethe problem.In The PoliticalEconomy of War and Peace, RichardAshleybeginswith

threefactorsthatmanycriticswouldseeas remotein explaining heoutbreakof war orthepreservationof peace.His purpose s to explore"conflictamongtoday's majormilitary powers"(the Chinese People's Republic,the SovietUnion, and the United States)with emphasisupon "the long-termprocessentangling he threemajorpowers n a common nearly neluctableproblema-tique." He identifiesthis "modernsecurityproblematique"as an outcome,in part,of unevendevelopmentof seeminglyremoteandindirectly nfluentialdemographic,echnological, nd economicfactorswithinand betweennations.

Expandingon and refining he lateral-pressureonceptof Nazli ChoucriandRobert North,8he presentsthree sets of intertwinedprocessesthat he seesas driving countries into conflict:unilateralgrowth (populationincreases,advances in technology, and derivationstherefrom);bilateralcompetitionand rivalry;and multilateralbalanceof power.From the starthe confronts

8. Nazli Choucri and Robert C. North, Nations in Conflict:National Growthand International

Violence (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1975).




but fails to deal adequatelywith a selection and boundaryproblem:to whatextent can he draw conclusions about the "modem security

problematique"from three countries,and why these particular hree?How much differencein findingsmight the addition of even one more country(Japan, or example,or Israel) conceivably make?

Although classicallyinclined political economists may consider the titleof the book misleading,Ashley-by derivinghis basic processes from thefundamental nterplaybetween human beingsand the naturalenvironment(pp.3, 11-12) and fromthe capacityof human beings o learn(pp. 217-18)9-necessarilyassumes andexplicatessome of the criticalwaysin which political

and economic functions combine in contributingto conflict as well as tocooperationand the formationof alliances.In Chapter 1, Ashley presentswhat he identifies as a conceptual frameworkfor defining and developing"the modem securityproblematique."This amounts to his "abstracted ep-resentation"of some aspects of "the gap between the actualand preferredhumancondition" (p. 315). AlthoughAshley's "representation"makes val-uable contributions,it is not sufficientlybroad, inclusive, or specified toencompass and thus to identify linkagesbetweenany substantialnumber ofcompetingtheories. Since Ashley adheres most closely to the startingpoint

we prefer,however, we shalltry to developthe broadoutlines of a conceptualframeworkbeginningwith and buildingupon his basic assumptions.

Severalof Ashley's premises, explicitandimplicit,need to be underscoredas fundamentalcontributions to the overall conceptualframeworkwe areseeking. Individual human beings, and only individualhuman beings (notgroups,states, or international ystems),perceive,think, feel,make decisions,and act (pp. 11-12). States and other organizationsare actors only in ametaphorical sense; they are more accurately perceived as systems of in-

dividuals interacting n a variety of roles.'0Except for alliances and othercoalitions of states, most internationalsystems-balance-of-power systemsand the like-are not actors in either sense. Whateveractivity takes placein suchsystems is performedby individuals nteractingn the name of states.What are often referredto as internationalsystem-level constraints mightbetter be envisagedas the constraints hat states impose on each othermet-aphorically, s theoutcome ofdecisions akenbytheir eadersandbureaucrats.

As Ashley implies throughout his book, every human being is both anenergy-and an information-processing ystem. All of an individual's activ-

ites-thinking, feeling,and other psychic as well as muscularphenomena-depend upon sustainedacquisitionandmetabolismof energyfrom the phys-ical environment(pp. 10-12, 252-5 3). Humanbeingsare thus motivatedina generalizedwaymerely by beingandactingto stayalive. Morespecifically,

9. CompareRichardM. Cyertand JamesG. March,A BehavioralTheoryof the Firm (En-glewoodCliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,1963), pp. 99-101.

10. Harold and Margaret Sprout, The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs (Princeton:PrincetonUniversity Press, 1965), p. 11.




decision-makingbehavior ncludestwo basic components: he determinationto act differentlyfrom the way one is acting at a given time, or even tocontinue doing what one is already doing; and the selection of a means,mode, or course of action." Sinceindividualsrespondover time to differentpressures,inducements,and motivations, many of them mixed, and sincedifferentpeople respond to the same phenomena in differentways, it isextremelydifficult o specifysuch factors in any detail. One way of handlingthe problemis to view all human beings as actingto narrow or close gapsbetween theirperceptionsof value ("whatought to be") and perceptionsoffact ("whatis") (pp. 10-12, 215-16, 252-53). 12The strengthof a pressure,

inducement, or motivation can be estimated by the amount of capital re-sources,effort, deprivation,or othercost that the actor is prepared o investin order to narrowor close the gap.

Demands,as David Eastondefinesthem, maybe viewed as "anexpressionof opinion"derivingfrom a "need"or desire to narrowor close a gap.'3Aswe used the term here,however,a demand is not necessarilycommunicatednor is it necessarilysatisfied.Demands combinewith capabilities o produceactivity;even simple undertakings annotbe implementedunless an appro-priatecapabilityexists for carryingout the action. Capabilitiesderive from

technology-cognitive, muscular,organizing, nd mechanicalknowledgeandskills-and accessto resources.Peopledeveloptheircapabilitiesn twomajorways:they increasetheirknowledgeand skills (technology);and theybargainwith and apply leverage (positive, coercive, negative, punishing)on othersin order to achieve collectivelywhat they find difficult o accomplishsingly.In principle,at least, economic, political,military,and othercapabilitiescanbe measuredby specificindicatorssuch as grossnationalproductper capita,militaryexpenditures,militaryexpendituresper capita,personnelunderarms,and so forth. In pursuit of security, basic resources, goods, services, andenhanced capabilities,people make demands directly upon the natural en-vironmentand alsoupon otherpeopleand uponorganizations,which, throughleadersand bureaucrats, end in turn to make demands upon them.

Ashley sees demands increasingwith technology as well as population.Providingopportunitiesorvariousspecialized apabilities,echnology nablespeople to acquirenew resourcesand find new uses for old resources.Eachsuch application, however, contributes to further demands: resources tomaintain the technologyand pay its costs, and to meet some of the rising

expectationsthat tend to be associatedwithtechnologicaladvancement.The

11. HerbertA. Simon,Administrative ehaviorsNewYork:Macmillan,1955), pp. 3-6; Johnvon Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1947), p. 17.

12. Kenneth E. Boulding,The Image (Ann Arbor:Universityof MichiganPress, 1956), p.11;Karl W. Deutsch, The Nervesof GovernmentNew York:Free Press, 1963), pp. 75-97.

13. David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley, 1965), pp.38-39.




more advanced the technology,moreover, the greaterthe amount and thewider the rangeof demands for goods and services.

Driven by unusually strongmotivations or inducements,extremely highdemandsmay substitute for limited capabilities n some situations (the VietMinh and Viet Cong in the 1960s, for example); whereas extremelyhighcapabilitiesmay substitute for low demands in other situations (producinga "steamroller ffect").In combinationpopulationgrowth,technologicalad-vancement,risingdemands,and increasingcapabilities some governmentalbut many generatedby commercial,industrial,and otherprivate undertak-ings)commonlygive rise to the expansionof a society'sactivitiesand interests

beyond national rontiers.Thislateralpressureapproximates ut is somewhatbroader than what Simon Kuznets refers to as "outwardexpansion"(pp.13-14).14

Dealingwith simple aggregationsof populations,technologies, demands,resources,and capabilities,Ashley does not indicatehow such aggregationsof "molecular"units combine into higher,"molar" actor-units such as thestate. Identifyingorganizations nd institutionsas "socialstructurationsivenform and identity throughcomplex reproductivepatternsof choice amongindividuals,"he fails to specify what the implicitlyintegrativechoices, de-

cisions,and resultingprocessesare(pp. 27-28). This criticismcan be leveledagainstChoucri and North's approachas well: the political processescon-tributingto lateralpressureare ignoredin the analysis.

The strengthof lateral pressures differscountry by country, dependingupon the respectivelevels and rates of change of criticalvariablessuch aspopulations,technologies,capabilities,and so forth,at any given time. Dif-ferential levels and rates of change of these basic variables contribute topower transitions,the uneven development of capabilities,and conditions

for dominance and subordinationamong societies. When the expandingac-tivities and interests of two or more countries intersect, competition andrivalrymay be exacerbated.

Ashley is critical of traditionaltreatmentsof the internationalsystem-especiallybalance-of-powerapproaches-but he does not pursuesuch crit-icism as far as the logic of his own propositions mighthave allowed.In theconventional literature,"power" s definedin many differentways. Unfor-tunately, many of us who rely on the concept fail to use it consistentlyoreven to define it with precision.Is power synonymouswith capability?Or

does it refer to the abilityof one actor to influence anotherto do somethinghe would not otherwisedo, or to prevent him from doing somethinghe isprepared o do?If powermeans the abilityto influenceor dominateanother,actor, then the concept refers to an outcome of interactions between twoparties,not to a precondition.Ashley questionsthebalance-of-power oncept

14. Simon Kuznets, Modern Economic Growth: Rate, Structure and Spread (New Haven:

Yale University Press, 1955), pp. 334-48.




as an objective phenomenon.but concedes that, if national leadersact as ifthe concept were real, it takes on a cognitive reality and contributestooutcomes.

Although Ashley calls his treatment of population, technology, and re-sources as master variables in the international system "world modelingresearch,"he does not specifywhat a world model would look like or howit would differ from the internationalsystem. He does state that a worldmodeling approach"uses sophisticatedmodeling techniques .. in order torepresentand empiricallyexamine long-termaggregate ocial processesona global scale" (p. ix).

FrancisBeeralso deals withaggregationnd its contributiono organizationand institutions. Beer'sPeace against Warfocuseson fourmajor questions:What do we know about the historicaloccurrenceand causalitiesof war?Whatare the major causesof peace andwar and how are theyrelated?Whatis the likely future of peace and war? What can be done to createless warand more peace?Drawingfrom many qualitativeand quantitativesources,he seeks to provide an "epidemiology"of war and peace resting on twoassumptions:that war is "like a disease" and that "a scientificknowledgeof war can be developed similar to the knowledgewe have about disease"

which will allow us "better to describe, explain,predictand control it" (pp.xxii, 10).

As we noted at the outset of this article, the use of similes, metaphors,and analogiesis commonplace in the social sciences-and often with goodeffect. The dangeris that the unwary may be captivatedby the metaphoror misled into thinkingthat analogiesare closer than they reallyare. Asidefrom avoiding pitfalls in their use, which Beer consciouslyattempts to do,the theoreticianneeds to considerwhether the reader is likely to be misled

and whether the use of suchconceptsis worthwhile.In fact,Beer'sapproachto the study of war and peace does not depend upon his epidemiologicalanalogy but, perhapsinhibitedby his introductionof the disease simile, hefails to develop a set of hypothesessufficientlyrigorous or the organizationand integrationof his many ideas and insights.

Beer sees conditions associatedwith war as located in the "worldsystemand its two majorcomponents,the environmentand decisionmakers"p. 9).This perspectiveencompassesa wide rangeof elements. Failingto specifylinkagesbetween human beings and the naturaland social environments,

however, he leaves unresolved what appearto be inadequacies n his as-sessmentsof the constraintsof nature.He cites climaticconditions, he human"conquestof nature,"andthe deleterious ffectsof"an almostentirelyartificialenvironment"of "ourownmaking" pp.8-9), butlargelyneglectsunevennessin the natural distributionsof energyand other resources.

Aggregations a centralelement in Beer's schema. Referring o it as "thelogicof technology,"he perceivesaggregation s including he common linksin the social environment and making "largerrelatively integratedunits"




(organizations,bureaucracies,markets,transactions,communications,com-

munities,governments,bodies oflaw, and the like) out of "smallerpreviously

unconnectedparts."Aggregation mplies "structure, ymmetry,regulation,cooperation,"and provides"the differencebetween orderand randomness"(pp. 11-12, 71-74). Aggregation llows peopleto "coordinate heir activitiesand ideas,to workcooperatively n largergroups,"and to providemachineryfor limitingconflict;butit also contributeso polarization,which encompassesthree cleavages-differentiation, inequality,and instability.While referringto aggregationsas "integratedunits," Beer, like Ashley, makes no attemptto explain the processes by which individuals combine to become molar

actorunitsor how such "higher"unitsrelate to "lower units," including heindividual.

Fortunately,the literature of political science encompasses concepts ofprocessthat provide for many, though possiblynot all, of the linkagesthatneed to be identified and used if phenomena on individual and variousorganizationalevels are to be connected systematically.Until recentyearslargelyoverlookedin the literatureof internationalpolitics, bargaining, e-verage,and coalitionformationappearto be virtually synonymouswith thepoliticalprocess-"who gets what, when and how."'"

Thomas Schellinghas construed bargainingprocessesas verbaland non-verbal interchanges n situationswhere the ability of one actor to gain hisends depends to an importantdegreeon the choices or decisions that theother actorwill make.'6Effortsby one bargainer o influencethe choices ordecisionsof the otheractor are identifiedvariouslyas leverages, nducements,sidepayments,rewards,threats,punishments, coercions,"the carrot,""thestick," and so forth. Here we shall refer to such effortsas leverages.Bothpositive and negative leveragesareused in the formationand maintenance

of coalitions as well asin the

conductof relationsbetween coalitions.William

Riker and others refer to states as coalitionsof coalitions, managedby gov-ernments or regimes (specializedelite coalitions).7

We conceive of coalitions and coalitions of coalitions as emergingfromand being sustainedby networksof bargainingand leverage.'8The conceptof "network"is, of course, used in many differentways: there are com-municationsnetworks,kinship networks,tradenetworks,and so forth.Net-

15. Harold D. Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When and How (New York: Meridian,1958).

16. Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,1960), p. 5; I. William Zartman, The 50% Solution (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor,1976).

17. William Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions (New Haven: Yale University Press,1962); Snyder and Diesing, Conflictamong Nations; and Fred Charles Ikle, How Nations Negotiate(New York: Harper & Row, 1964).

18. See Anatol Rapaport, "A Probabilistic Approach to Networks," Social Networks 2 (1979/80): 1-18; George Modelski, Principles of World Politics (New York: Free Press, 1972), pp.232, 270-72, refers to "layered networks."




worksare often definedas voluntaryrelationships. n these pages, however,we think of bargainingand leveragenetworksas tending to vary from moreto less voluntary dependingupon the extent to whichthey become formallyintegratednto thestructure f a coalitionor, especially,a coalitionof coalitionsand its governmentor regime.Thus a neighborhoodsecuritynetwork maybe voluntaryin ways that a police securitynetwork n the same areawouldnot be. Yet both networks nvolve bargaining ndleverageof a sort,althoughthe bargainingand leveragethat takes place within the command structureof thepoliceor themilitarymaybe unrecognizable t firstglance.Perseverantbargainingand leverageactivities serve as network linkageswithin, across,

and betweencoalitionsand coalitionsof coalitions.Some of these networksbecome institutionalized;others are much more transitory.Many provideconnectionswhereconventionaltheoriesplace "systemic,""level," "struc-tural,"and other conceptualboundaries.Bargaining nd leverageemergeasstrongcandidatesfor genericstatusin our proposedconceptualframework.

Within societies organizedas states, the governmentenjoys, in principleat least, the ultimate in coercive leverage:a monopoly of legal force. On aday-to-day basis most governments, dictatorships ncluded, make consid-erableuse of the carrotbut in all states the threat of force is also thereand

the stick is displayedif we are caughtevading taxes, challenging he draft,or committingsome other less-than-minor nfraction.Indeed,to exemplifythis, the whole apparatusof taxationcan be viewed conceptuallyas a never-ending bargainingand leverageconfrontationbetween the government, inpursuitof resources o runitself andto meet someproportionof the demandsmadeupon it, and the citizen,whoby andlargewouldlike to see an optimumnumberof his or her demands met in returnfor a minimum of taxes paid.Presidingover these operations,the rulingelite-through the government-must decide how many resourcesare to be allocated for "butter"(welfare,subsidiesto special interests,and other "carrot" everages)and how manyto police, armed forces, tax-collecting agencies,and other institutionalizedwielders of "sticks." One responsibilityof the chief executive is to keepdomestic and externalbargainingand leveragein operationalbalance.

Demand, capability,bargaining, everage, and coalition- and adversary-formationgo a longwaytoward oiningthe multilevelphenomenaof Ashleyand Beer and connectingtheir concerns in systematicways with those ofOrganskiand Kugler,Wilkinson-Richardson, nd Bueno de Mesquita.We

can think of the international or better, the global)conceptualframeworkthat begins to emergeas an arrayof coalitionsand coalitionsof coalitions,each sustainedby domestic bargainingand leveragenetworks,each linkedwith others by transnationaland internationalnetworks of bargainingandleverage,and all competingfor the life-sustainingresourcesavailablefromtheenvironment n whichtheyarenested. Thepopulationsof thesecoalitionsof coalitions are growingor decliningdifferentially, heir technologiesandspecializedcapabilitiesare advancingat differentrates.An outbreakof war,




or some other decision or action that occurs in any sector of the wholeframework,will thustend to be explicable n terms of phenomenaconvergingfrom different evels and sectors. Dependingon the problem under inves-tigation, certain variables or sectors may be held constant;but in each casethe rationale or selecting uch an analytical trategyneeds to be madeexplicit.

Metaphorically,coalitions and coalitions of coalitions qualify as organi-zational actor systems to the extent that individual participants,throughsome regimeor comparablearrangement, an agree upon and effectunifiedactivities in the name of the organization.States meet these criteria,as doother types of organization.Lacking such unity of purpose, decision, and

action, however, most balance-of-powerand other international systems(other than tightly joined blocs or alliances) are not organizationalactorsystems but human ecological systems of interacting coalition actors orcoalition-of-coalitionactors. So-called international"systemic"constraintsand other influencesareno more than the outcome of activitiesamongstatesand other actorspossessingunequal capabilitiesandpotentials n bargainingand leverage.

A similarconcernpertains o the conceptof "structures." tructures mountto relativelystabilizedpatternsof coalitionsand their inkingactivities,which

are conditioned by all sorts of interactive phenomena from demographicchangesto technologicaladvances,economic fluctuations,shifts in produc-tivity, alterationsin military capabilities,and the like. Uneven levels andratesof change n these various dimensions-both within societiesand acrosssocieties-give rise to continuallyshiftingdomestic and internationalasym-metries. Such asymmetriesinfluencewho gets what, when, and how, andcontributeto adversarialconflict and also to the formation of coalitions onall organizational evels. The mechanicaltreatment of such structuresmaydeprive the investigatorof access to importantchanges taking place withinand between countries.'9

Well within the broad conceptual context suggestedby Ashley and Beer,A. F. K. Organskiand Jacek Kuglerin The WarLedgeraddress and testpropositionsabout some major questionsthat have challenged he field fora longtime:Whydo warsoccur?Underwhat conditions do powerfulnationsfight?What determineswhich side will win and which side will lose? Howare the participants n a war affectedby victory and defeat?Is there a pre-dictablepattern (the Phoenix phenomenon)in states' recoveries from war?

And to whatextent, if any, has the conflictbehavior between nations alteredsince the advent of the nuclearera?In approaching he firstquestion, Organskiand Kuglerput forward hree

models of the "causes" of war: balance of power, collective security,and

19.SeeErnstB.Haas,"WordsCanHurtYou; or,WhoSaid Whatto WhomaboutRegimes,"InternationalOrganization36 (Spring 1982), p. 242: "The existence of structuremust bedemonstrated.. . not prespecified."




power transition(pp. 14-63). In the balance-of-powermodel war is seen as

the outcome of an unequaldistributionof power(essentially,a gapbetweenan equal distributionand the actual distribution). Balance-of-powerpro-ponents disagree as to whether the weakerpower, seekingto close the gapbetweenits own capabilitiesand that of its strongerrival, is the more likelyaggressoror whetherthe strongerpower,threatenedby effortsof the weakernation to "catch up," is more likely to initiate hostilities. As defined byOrganskiand Kugler, a collective security model assumes that an equaldistributionof power eads to war, triggered ythepreviouslyweakerpower'ssuccessfully closing the gap. In the power transition model, by contrast, it

is unevenness in the size and rates of growthamong various members ofthe internationalsystem, not necessarilydefined as a clearcut balance orimbalance, that contributesto the outbreakof war. The power transitionmodel emphasizesdifferentialhangerather han themorestatic(and possiblynonexistent) phenomenonof purebalance or deviation therefrom.

After exploratory ests of the three models, Organskiand Kuglerconcludethatwar is causedby "differencesn rates of growthamongthe greatpowersand, of particular mportance,the differencesn ratesbetween the dominantnation and the challengerthat permit the latterto overtakethe former.It

is such leapfrogging hatdestabilizes he system"(p. 61).20 This finding endsto supportthose of Ashley.

Organskiand Kugler'sfindingsare persuasiveand should be investigatedfurther.Indeed, their choice of historical data for testingthe three modelsmakes follow-up investigationsessential. In particular, hey have focusedon World WarI and World War II for theiranalysisand have generatedanumberof cases of "warinitiation"by pairingall the major protagonists nthese two conflicts. The procedure yielded a sample of country pairs that

did or did not fight.However,this methodof generatingmultiplecasesfromthe two world wars may obscure elusive and complex dynamics wherebylocalizedwarsare transformednto majorconflagrations.Organski nd Kuglerhave advanced well beyond some of the more simplistic balance-of-powerexplanationsof outbreaksof war but their proceduresneed considerablerefining,as they themselves concede.

Movingfromthe "causes"of warto predicting ts outcome, OrganskiandKuglerconsiderwhetherpatternsof economicand militarygrowthand "theconsequent responses of power [determine]the outcome of conflicts they

seem to have caused." In this part of their study the authors devise anindicatorof politicaldevelopmentformeasuring he abilityof a governmentto mobilize the resourcesnecessaryfor war(pp. 74-85). HereOrganskiandKuglerdrawuponconceptsof penetration,extraction,allocation,regulation,and so forth, which can be viewed as an aspect of the bargaining hat is

20. See,forexample,RobertGilpin,WarandChange n WorldPolitics NewYork:CambridgeUniversity Press, 1981);Choucriand North,Nations in Conflict.




carriedon by rulingelites in the course of day-to-day governance.21Thedegree of success achieved by a government in such domestic bargainingand leverage may be expected to constrain its abilityto bargainand applyleverage externally.

Unfortunately,Organskiand Kuglerapplied their indicatoronly to de-veloping nations as war participants.They contend that an indicatorof po-litical development is unnecessary for developed nations, thereby seemingto overlook the probabilitythat political, like economic, development isunevenandchanging mongdevelopedaswell asamongdevelopingcountries.The success of the authors in this aspect of the investigation s limited also

by their choice of cases.Theirselectionconsists of countriesreceivingvarying,but in at least two instances "massive," amounts of foreignaid. Organskiand Kugler allow for this considerationbut concede that "We have notdefinitelyresolved the difficulty nsofaras our measure s concerned" p. 84).Additionally,in theirexamination of the Arab-Israeliwars they treat Syria,Jordan,and Egyptas a singleunit. With the benefit of hindsightone wishesthat Organskiand Kugler had used a common set of countries for the twoinvestigations-both, that is, for the analysis of "causes"of war and for thepredictions of outcome.

Organski and Kugler's investigationof the Phoenix phenomenon stemsfrom the observationthat "after wars, the active losers catch up with thewinners in comparatively short order, and .., the system of internationalpower [read"competition"?I eginsto behave as one would haveanticipatedif no war had occurred" p. 142).Among their findingsarethat, in the shortrun, winnersexperiencedonly slight osses as a resultof a war whereas oserssufferedheavily;in the long run,however,victorsshowed littlechangefromprewar rendswhereas losers accelerated heir recoveryand "roughly ifteen

to eighteen yearsafterthe gunswerestoppedwere backup to the levels theywould have attainedhad no war occurred" p. 212). However, the authorsdo not take sufficientaccount of those entities such as Austria-Hungary ndthe OttomanEmpire hathave beenpermanent asualtiesof war.Historically,the disappearanceof losing states has often contributed o major changesinthe international ystem.This has tended to be truewhetherthe losing polityhas been absorbed by the victor, splintered nto a number of independentstates that did not exist before,or integratedwith other elements into a newfederationor empire.Suchchangescan alterthe internationalconfiguration

of power in importantways, as the breakupof the Austro-Hungarian ndOttoman empires after World War I amply demonstrates.

Finally, Organskiand Kugler assess the impact of the advent of nuclearweaponryon the outbreakof war. They raisethe questionwhetherpoliticaland economic powerhave tended to be decoupledas a consequence.From

21. See Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell Jr., System, Process and Policy: ComparativePolitics(Boston:Little,Brown, 1978), chap. 2.




an examination of fourteen "critical"cases they reach the conclusionthat"nuclearweapons do not deter confrontationson all levels" and that "thetendency to go to warincreasesas the likelihoodof greatpower involvementincreases and as the possibility that nuclear weapons may be used becomesmore real" (p. 161).Whileconcedingthe absence of anybasis forconcludingthat nuclear weaponry necessarilydeters nationsfrom war-a post hoc ergopropterhoc fallacy-we fail to see formal evidence for Organskiand Kugler'sfinding to the effect that "the tendency to go to war increases ... as thepossibility that nuclear weaponsmay be used becomes more real"(p. 161).

In Deadly Quarrels,David Wilkinsonproposes to summarizewhat math-

ematician Lewis Frye Richardson"intended to do and did in Statistics ofDeadly Quarrels";22 to investigate what Richardson left incomplete, whathas since been done with his work, and what can be done now;and to extendRichardson'swork somewhat (p. 9). AlthoughRichardson s best known forhis book Arms and Insecurity,23n which he attempted to construct math-ematicalmodels of armsraces,Wilkinsonassesses Statisticsof Deadly Quar-rels as "his most seminal work" (p. 3).

Wilkinson recodes and reanalyzesRichardson'sdata, compares Richard-son's methods with those used by successors(includingcritics), reappraises

Richardson's work in the context of the contemporary literature on thesubject,and makes specificrecommendationsorfurther esearch.Wilkinson'snine coding and data appendicesprovide a valuablesourcefor investigatorsconcerned with the statistics of "deadly quarrels."The book as a wholesuffers,however, from the lack of a clear statement of what Wilkinsonpro-poses to do, a thesis integrating he variousparts,and a briefrecapitulationof what Wilkinsonhimself has contributedto the undertaking.

Becauseof the specializednatureof hisbook, Wilkinsondoes not contribute

directlyto the notion of a conceptualframework:he does not providea fullydeveloped theory.Nor does he, any more thanRichardsondid, suggesthowthe latter's somewhat disparatearrayof theorems, equations,and clustersof data might be linked in unifiedways. Nevertheless, virtuallyall the dataand considerationsin the book must be presumed relevant to an under-standing of war and its antecedents. It goes without saying that a usefulconceptualframeworkwould have to encompassthem and indicate,at leasttentatively, how'they fit togetheron internationaland global levels.

Fortunately, ome of the mechanismsand processesof linkagemost relevant

for the Richardson-Wilkinson ataandconceptshavealreadybeen discussedin the literature. Over recent years Schelling, Alexander George, RichardSmoke, OranYoung, Snyderand Diesing, and others have used bargainingand leveragein several studiesof deterrence,escalations,armsraces, crises,

22. Lewis F. Richardson, Statistics of Deadly Quarrels (Pittsburgh: Boxwood Press, 1960).23. Lewis F. Richardson, Arms and Insecurity (Pittsburgh: Boxwood Press, 1960).




limited wars, and comparable situations.24 uch bargainingand exerciseofleverage often start off like a pokergame in which the players, determinedto win by any available means, have pistols and are backed up by armedfriends eaningagainst he bar. Commonto all these phenomena s a situationin which an act by one country,A, is perceived by another, B, as blockingits (B's) purpose and widening the gap between B's perceptions of realityand preference.

From this perspectivea true arms raceamountsto specialcase of bargainingand escalationof leverages.Not all escalationsare true armsraces,however.Even if the arms expendituresof countries A and B are increasingat com-

parable rates, there may be no connection between the two trends. Eachnation may be strengtheningts armaments or domesticreasons; or example,theirrespective industrialand military establishmentsmay have developedinformal coalitions in pursuit of their own respective special interests.Oreach may be responding o a threatfrom some third country.In a true armsrace,on the other hand, the leadersof A, perceivingB's increase n armamentsas a threat to A's security, may try to stay ahead of B or seek to deterB byraising their own military expenditures.B's leaders may then proceedwithmirror-image ncreasesof their own-trying to influenceA's behavior with

increasing expenditures. We believe we are able to describe all true armsraces in terms of escalating exchangesof leverage.

Some-but not all-arms races, crises,and otherthreatening nteractionsbetween states lead to the type of decision situationthat Bueno de Mesquitaconcerns himself with in The War Trap.In this book he presentswhat heidentifies as "a general theory of war and foreign conflict initiation andescalation" togetherwith "both the logic of the theoryand a broadlybasedanalytictest of the theory'smost criticaldeductions"(p. ix). Firmlylocatedwithin the rational-actor raditionand decision theory, the undertaking sbasedon fourassumptions: n each case, decisions aboutwarare dominatedby a single "strong" eader;such leadersare "rationalexpected utilitymax-imizers"; examined individually, they have differingpersonal orientationstoward risk taking;and decision making in these situationsis significantlyaffectedby uncertainty bout theprobablebehaviorof otherstatesconfrontingthe possibilityof war.Suchuncertainties tem fromquestionsabout the war-makingcapabilitiesof opponentsandof other countriesthatmightbe drawninto the conflict; the values attachedto a particularpolicy by one country

as contrasted with the values that the opponent may attach to it; and the

24. ThomasSchelling,Arms and Influence New Haven:YaleUniversityPress, 1955);Alex-anderF. George,David K. Hall, and William R. Simons, The Limits of CoerciveDiplomacy(Boston:Little, Brown, 1971);AlexanderGeorgeand RichardSmoke,Deterrence n AmericanForeignPolicy:TheoryandPractice NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress, 1974);OranYoung,The Politics of Force: Bargaining during International Crises (Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress, 1968); Snyderand Diesing, Conflictamong Nations. Riker'sapplicationof the "size"principle o coalitionaland adversarial argainings crucial o thenotion of internationalonflict(in Theory of Political Coalitions).




values attached to possible moves that may be made towarda country-or

towardits opponents (pp. 20-21).In developing establepropositions roman expected-utilityalculus,Buenode Mesquitaconfrontsfour issues. How do prospective nitiatorsof conflictdiffer rom their opponents?When are conflicts ikely to be resolvedwithoutescalating nto open warfare?How does expectedutility affectthe costs thatnations are willing to endurein pursuingtheir objectives throughwarfare?Who is likely to win an ensuing conflict?In dealingwith these issues, hedivides initial combatants into three possible combinations:"nonaligned"states, which have revealed virtually no preferenceswith respect to other

states;"aligned" tates,whichhave revealedpreferences egardinghe policypositions of other nations;and two states, one aligned and the other non-aligned.Withinthis framework,he provides"severalsignificant,and severallesser,deductionsaboutthe necessaryconditionsof war" including"expec-tationsderived fromthe theory that are often counter-intuitive," longwithspecifichistoricalexamples "to supportthe propositions" p. 92).

Bueno de Mesquita's heory is well-reasoned,parsimonious,and internallyconsistentbut if it were locatedwithinour proposedconceptualframework(and it should fit well there) we would have to conclude that it does not

constitutethe "general heory of war"that Bueno de Mesquitaclaims it tobe. The theorycannotaccommodatesuch relevantphenomenaas escalation,arms races, and other complexitiesthat characterized he course of eventsbetweenthe assassinationof ArchdukeFrancisFerdinandand the outbreakof generalwar. Essentially,what Bueno de Mesquitapresentsis a theory ofdecision for or againstwar-the kind of "go/no-go"determinationmade bythe Kaiser and other German leadersduring 1-2 August 1914.

Here our proposed conceptual frameworksuggestsan alternative.The

possible applicationsof bargainingand leverage in both domestic and in-ternationalpolitical processes have been extended by Riker, Snyder andDiesing, Cyert and March,and others, who see group decision making onany level as a process of forminga coalition around an alternative-withvaryingmanifestationsand degreesof rewarding, hreatening, oercive,evenviolent leverages.25 uenode Mesquita's"strong" eadermight thusbe iden-tified as that individual actor in the nation state who is able, by whatevermeans (coercive,logrolling,or otherwise),to muster a consensusfor war. Itis bargaining ndleverage, n short,that endowsthe leaderwith the "strength"

that Bueno de Mesquita'stheory requires.Thus, while the "strong-leaders"assumptioncan be maintainedin the interests of parsimony,it can also beanchoredto a foundationof bargaining, everage,and decisionmaking.

AlthoughThe WarTrapderivesfromthetraditionof basic power-orientedtheories of war and peace, Bueno de Mesquitaconsiderssuch theories in-

25. Riker, Theory of Political Coalitions, p. 12.; Snyder and Diesing, Conflict among Nations,p. 349; Cyertand March,BehavioralTheory,pp. 99, 124.




sufficientfor understandingdecisions to go to war or to refrainfrom war.

Fromanalysisof his dataheconcludes hat utility,whichcombinespreferences

with power, is the "strongerand more stable predictorof the predilectionto initiate a conflict"(p. 156). More recentlyhe reinforcesthis conclusionwith the assertionthat "any effort to inferanythingabout the likelihoodofwarfrom the presenceor absenceof a particulardistributions likely to yieldno betterresults than randomguessing.26

This conclusion conflicts with Organskiand Kugler's finding that it isunevennessin the size and rates of growthof competingnations that givesriseto war.Three possibleexplanations or these divergentconclusionscome

to mind. First, differingconceptualizations,definitions, and indicatorsofpowermayhave contributed o the discrepancy.Second, Bueno de Mesquitauses a wide arrayof datafrom manycases over a long spanof time whereasOrganskiand Kuglerconfined themselves to "majorwars,"that is, WorldWarI and World WarII. And third,from our perspective n this article, allactsarethe outcome of multiplecombinations f motivations,dissatisfactions,incentives,gaps, Bueno de Mesquita'sconceptof "preference,"demandsorutilities,on the one hand,and specificcapabilities rather hanpowerdefinedas the specificability to influence)on the other. National leadersseem to

be situatedat the convergence point of internallyand externallygenerateddemands,leverages,andperceptionsof shiftingcapabilitiesamongalliesandrivals; they may see war as the lesser of evils or as a genuine gain. Ourpositionthuspredisposesus to acceptthe notion that bothutility(motivation,demands,will, incentive)and perceptionsof the capabilityof self and otherare centraland necessaryfactorsin virtuallyall decisions for war. Throughtime and across cases, however,the relativeexplanatorystrengthof the twofactorsmay vary considerably.

Bueno de Mesquita's"strongleader" confronts a war/no-wardecision,

like a Hitler contemplating nvasion of the Low Countriesand France, aRoosevelt responding o PearlHarbor,a Begin consideringan incursion ntoLebanon. Such a leader is located at the center of messages and eventsconverging rommanydirections: romthe antagonist, rom other countriesin the internationalenvironment,from within the "strong leader"him- orherself,from sectorsof the leader'sown country,from history,and so forth.Seen from the perspectiveof an interactive, conceptual framework,suchvariableshavenot "caused" he crisisdirectlybut haveaffected he demands,

capabilities,and bargainingand leverage potentialsof rival "aggregations"(Beer)or coalitions of coalitions. Derivingfrom the intersectionof the ex-pandingactivitiesandinterestsof twoor more nations(Ashley), nternationalcompetitions,armsraces,and crises (Richardson-Wilkinson)ften contributeto a situation hat seemsto requirea war/no-wardecision.At suchajuncture,

26. BruceBueno de Mesquita,"Risk, Power Distributions,and the Likelihoodof War,"InternationalStudies Quaterly25 (December1981), p. 566.




the "strong" eader's calculationof the home nation's utilities,based upon

personal preferencesand estimates of probabilitiesof success, will be con-ditioned by assessmentof nationalcapabilities-economic, financial, ndus-trial, military,and so forth-and by feedbacks romhisorher owninitiatives.Outcomes, however, will be determined in large part by the bargaining-leverageprocessof one state interactingwith anotherand the abilityof eachstate to maintainits capabilitiesand the supportof its populace.

One advantage of the bargainingand leverageapproachto the escalationof conflict is the clear light it sheds upon increasinglycoercive and violentleverages,whether undertakenoffensivelyor defensively, as a centralfactor

in the movement of countries from peace towardwar. The approachalsoplaces the ultimateresponsibility or escalatingnegative leverageand otheractions leadingtowardwar directlywhere it belongs:on individuals,indi-viduals in many roles, from the"strong" eader o constituentson all "levels"without whose support or minimal complianceeven a tyrant cannot wagewar.

If, in the courseof an increasinglynegative exchangeof leverages a crisis),Buenode Mesquita's"strong" eadershoulddecide n favorof war-a decisionthat in most instancescan be viewed as an interactivegroupdecision-the

consequencesmayincludea radical ransformation f international ndglobalsystems with the collapse of one hegemon and the rise of another, theredrawingof boundaries,shifts in capabilitiesand leverage potentials, therearrangement f alliances, the generationof new demands, and so forth.Inthis way we see the internationaland global systems as fluid, dynamic,andever emerging rom the demands of national leadersand, less directly,fromthe demands of bureaucratsand the rank-and-file.

With respectto the explicationof bargainingand leverage aspectsof the

conceptualframework,one furtherphenomenonof war needs to be takeninto account:Schelling has interpreted"all-out"war as "bruteforce" and"beyond bargaining."27Organskiand Kuglershare this perspective.Theywrite:"In the case of all-out war . .. disagreementbetweenthe combatantsis of such a nature and degree that the goal that each sets for itself is nolonger ust to induce the other partyto changeits mind and course of actionbut to crush the other's resistanceand control its behaviorregardlessof itswishes" (p. 7). Despite Schelling'sand Organskiand Kugler's stipulations,however, all-out war seems to fit both Schelling'sdefinition of a bargaining

situation and our own proposalthat bargainingand leverageserve to linkconflictualas well as coalition-formingbehaviors at all image levels and atall potential intensities of rewardand punishment.The abilityof each sideto achieve its objectives still depends upon the decisions and actions ofothers.Higher evels of violence may alter the goalsof the adversaries ome-what, but it is rarethat either sidewholly abandonsearlierpurposes.Victory

27. Schelling,Strategyof Conflict.




for either one depends, in any case, upon the performanceof the other. At

the armisticeor peace table,the victor commonlyraisesold objectivesalong

with newones andthe documentthatis signedmay be viewed as an ultimatebargainenforced by superior everage.

All five books workwith Waltz'sthreeimagesof the locus of war:withinman, within separatestates, and within the system of states. None dealsdirectlywith the fourthor globalimage.It may thereforebe useful to assess,however briefly, the contributionsthat the various authors make to ourunderstandingof internationalpolitics. To the extent that, from its own

"islandof theory,"each book focuseson a different ectorof the converginginfluences, t is neithereasy nor profitable o rank them arbitrarily.Eachhasits own strengthsand weaknesses,eachprovidesuniqueand valuable nsights,and each deserves to be read by anyone seriouslyinterested n the field.

The PoliticalEconomy of War and Peace contributesmost to the idea ofa conceptual framework,however partially. The WarLedger, in spite ofcase-selectionand relatedproblems,clearlyadds new dimensions of inquirythat fit logically nto Ashley'spartialframework. t issues methodologicalaswell as substantivechallengesthat need to be picked up and assessed by

other investigators.In The War TrapBueno de Mesquita,while operatingwithin a more conventional framework,deals with utilities, uncertainties,risks, and decisionsinnovativelyandwith a finetouchof elegance.His basicequationshave possibilitiesfor development well beyond the bilateral,es-sentially go/no-go applicationof this study.28 n many respects the mostspecializedapproach,Deadly Quarrelsprovidesa compact primerfor thosewho want an introduction o quantitativeanalysis; t is also a valuablehand-book for the specialist.While fallingsomewhat short as an integratedcon-

tribution to the literature,Peace against War comes throughas a small

encyclopediaof unusualperspectivesandpromising nsights.As foundationsfor a conceptual ramework,heAshley,Organski ndKugler,andWilkinson-Richardsonapproacheshave dynamicqualities hattheothertwo either ackor fail to make theoreticallyor operationallyexplicit.

The fourthimage,which tends to be implicitif not alwaysexplicitin thesefive books, can be conceptualized n differentways. The most obvious is asimpleextension of the international ystem as conventionallypresented.Aglobalconceptualframeworksuggestsa somewhatdifferentset of reference

points.Conceived as a set of nested relationships-of individuals,networks,co-

alitions,coalitionsof coalitions, nternational lliances,adversarialblocs,andso forth-the overall global assembly can be identifiedas an ecologicalorenvironmental system of ever-fluctuating, increasingly interdependent,asymmetrical,adaptive,andpotentiallyevolving components;but not, even

28. As a revisededitionof the book, now in progress,may demonstrate.




metaphorically,as a unifiedactor system. As we view it, at least three majorconsiderationsdistinguish ucha systemfrom a conventionalapproach.First,a global perspective deals with wholes, aggregations,and totals:the wholeworld and its environment, the total human population, aggregationsofhuman demands, aggregationsof availableresources,and so forth. Thesewholes, aggregations,and totals mark the boundariesof the global systemat any given time. Second,a global approach s concernedwith componentssuch as individualhuman beings, coalitions,and coalitionsof coalitions,andwith who and which among them gets what portion of the totalswhen andhow. And third,a global perspective dentifies ndividuals, n social contexts

and playinga multiplicityof roles in a wide varietyof networks,coalitions,and coalitionsof coalitions,as the only responsibleactors in the system.

Our intent in this article has been to draw upon the five books underreview as a way of suggestinghow islands of theoryin global politicsmightbe bounded and connectedin systematicways. The varietyof phenomenathat appear to convergeupon and influence an outcome in the field of in-ternationalpolitics,either directlyor indirectly, s likelyto be large.A criticalproblem, therefore, is how to trace them across conventional islands oftheory,to see howtheyare linked,to ascertainwhichof thempossess optimal

explanatorypower,and to determinethe extent to whichparticularized le-ments and processes can be merged on more abstractand parsimoniouslevels of conceptualization.Towardthese ends, we have proposeda three-stage approach: he identificationof a broad and somewhat loose array ofphenomena that seem to be likely candidates for necessaryand sufficientexplanation;he consolidationand integration f these elements nto a genericprocessmodel compatiblewithdiverse approaches ndapplicableo differentlevels of organizationfrom the individual to the global environment;and

the long-termdevelopmentof familiesof derivativemodelsorpartial heories

for testingin particular ases and forvalidating,modifying,and refining he"master"model.Bargaining,everage,andcoalition-andadversary-formationare centralto this undertaking.

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Robert C. North, Matthew Willard.pdf