Franz Evegren

Robust brandriskbedömning ur ett IMO-perspektiv

SP – a wide technical range SP Calibration and Verification SP Certification SP Electronics SP Chemistry, Materials and Surfaces SP Energy Technology SP Fire Technology SP Measurement Technology SP Structural and Solid Mechanics SP Process Development SP Wood Technology CBI, Swedish Cement and Concrete Research Institute Glafo, Swedish Glass Research Institute JTI, Swedish Institute of Agricultural and Environmental Engineering SIK, Swedish Institute for Food and Biotechnology SMP, Swedish Machine testing

Novel Designs at Sea Shipping & Offshore

Military know-how to civil production

FRP composite FRP = Fibre Reinforced Polymer FRP PVC / balsa

-C Aimed at improving the efficiency of marine transport and to increase the competitiveness of Swedish and European shipbuilding industry by development and demonstration of techniques for using lightweight materials for ship construction

Weight item Tun island ferry [kg] Eco-Island ferry [kg] Lightweight 250 000 72 000

Ballast 33 900 0

Fuel & water 18 800 8 000

Stores 1 000 1 000

Passengers 15 000 15 000

Crew 225 225

Luggage 2 000 2 000

Cars 16 000 16 000

Deck cargo 3 075 3 075 Displacement 340 000 117 300

• Global strength (FEM) • Life cycle environmental effects (LCA) • Life cycle cost (LCC) • Fire Safety Assessment

Eco-Island ferry Displacing island ferry 200 passengers, 6 cars, 9.5 knots

Displacement: 120 tons (340 tons)

Engine power: 220 kW (590 kW)

Alternative fire safety design SOLAS (Safety Of Life At Sea) Regulation 4 Probability of ignition Regulation 5 Fire growth potential Regulation 6 Smoke generation potential and toxicity Regulation 9 Containment of fire Regulation 11 Structural integrity Regulation 10 Fire fighting Regulation 13 Means of escape ...

Reg. 9 prescribes main vertical and horizontal zones of A-class divisions = steel or other equivalent material = a non-combustible material which, by itself or down to insulation provided, has structural and integrity properties equivalent to steel at the end of the standard fire test.

Reg. 11 prescribes the hull, superstructures, structural bulkheads, decks and deckhouses to be constructed of steel or other equivalent material.

Alternative fire safety design - process Regulation 17 Alternative solutions for fire safety are allowed if they can be shown to be at least as safe as a prescriptive design Is shown through an analysis based on MSC/Circ.1002

Alternative fire safety design SOLAS (Safety Of Life At Sea) Regulation 4 Probability of ignition Regulation 5 Fire growth potential Regulation 6 Smoke generation potential and toxicity Regulation 9 Containment of fire Regulation 11 Structural integrity Regulation 10 Fire fighting Regulation 13 Means of escape

Reg. 9 prescribes main vertical and horizontal zones of A-class divisions = steel or other equivalent material = a non-combustible material which, by itself or down to insulation provided, has structural and integrity properties equivalent to steel at the end of the standard fire test.

Reg. 11 prescribes the hull, superstructures, structural bulkheads, decks and deckhouses to be constructed of steel or other equivalent material.

Combustible

Alternative fire safety design - process Regulation 17 Alternative solutions for fire safety are allowed if they can be shown to be at least as safe as a prescriptive design Is shown through an analysis based on MSC/Circ.1002

SOLAS II-2 Regulation Objective (RO)

Regulation Functional Requirements (RFR)

Comment on how the base design challenges the regulation

Part B Prevention of fire and explosion

Reg. 5 Fire growth potential

Limit the fire growth potential in every space of the ship.

(1) Control the air supply to the space; (2) Control flammable liquids in the space; (3) Restrict the use of combustible materials.

Unprotected or insufficiently protected FRP composite surfaces could be a fire risk. If open deck is considered a space, unprotected external surfaces challenge RFR 3.

Reg. 6 Smoke generation potential and toxicity

Reduce the hazard to life from smoke and toxic products generated during a fire in spaces where persons normally work or live.

Limit the quantity of smoke and toxic products released from combustible materials, including surface finishes, during fire.

Unprotected interior FRP composite surfaces deviate from Reg. 6.2.1, even if they are without finish.

Part C Suppression of fire

Reg. 9 Containment of fire

Contain a fire in the space of origin

(1) Subdivide the ship by thermal and structural boundaries; (2) Boundaries shall have thermal insulation of due regard to the fire risk of the space and adjacent spaces; (3) The fire integrity of the divisions shall be maintained at openings and penetrations.

Load-bearing bulkheads, decks, and where necessary also internal bulkheads, made in combustible material deviates from the “A-X” class definition.

Reg. 11 Structural integrity

Maintain structural integrity of the ship, preventing partial or whole collapse of the ship structures due to strength deterio-ration by heat.

Materials used in the ships’ structure shall ensure that the structural integrity is not degraded due to fire.

Reg. 11.2 is deviated as it states structures to be constructed in “steel or other equivalent material”, which is defined as non-combustible (Reg. 3.43).

Time

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To better determine the verification needs, a more thorough process for identification of differences in fire safety was incorporated

Collection and rating of all pros and cons in fire safety

Alternative fire safety design Preliminary analysis report

Alternative fire safety design Quantification

Probabilistic fire risk assessment

Functional assessment

Consequence assessment

Hazard id.

Consequence assessment

Consequence

Evaluation: Evaluation of better or worse consequences when plausibly worst scenarios appear

Proposed design Prescriptive design

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Functional assessment

Consequence

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Evaluation: Higher or lower probability of different consequences (failure of different safety functions), considering the full range of scenarios

Failure of different safety functions

Probabilistic fire risk assessment

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Evaluation: Higher or lower risk (combination of probability and consequences), accounting for the full range of scenarios

Consequence (loss of life)

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Consequence (loss of life)

Risk curves

The used method must be sufficient to quantify the proposed design in terms of fire safety

SP Fire Technology

SP Fire Technology

Alternative fire safety design Quantification

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Alternative fire safety design Quantification

Relative acceptance criteria will reduce uncertainties.

IMO guidelines for use of FRP Development of IMO guidelines for how to evaluate fire safety when using FRP composite within ship structures Naval ship code guidelines

Conclusions Statement #1: Regulations are incomplete; a risk assessment may need to go beyond regulations to describe the proposed design in terms of fire safety Statement #2: A larger focus on the hazard identification (detect weaknesses, define dependencies, assess redundancies in barriers) and where this is carried out early in the design phase Statement #3: Regardless of requirements, the used method must be sufficiently sophisticated to quantify the proposed design in terms of fire safety Statement #4: If input data is too uncertain, you will be better off performing a less sophisticated assessment. Statement #5: Relative acceptance criteria will reduce uncertainties.

Franz Evegren franz.evegren@sp.se +46 (0)10-516 50 88

www.e-lass.eu

Conclusions Statement #1: Regulations are incomplete; a risk assessment may need to go beyond regulations to describe the proposed design in terms of fire safety Statement #2: A larger focus on the hazard identification (detect weaknesses, define dependencies, assess redundancies in barriers) and where this is carried out early in the design phase Statement #3: Regardless of requirements, the used method must be sufficiently sophisticated to quantify the proposed design in terms of fire safety Statement #4: If input data is too uncertain, you will be better off performing a less sophisticated assessment. Statement #5: Relative acceptance criteria will reduce uncertainties.

Stena F-MAX designed with FRP composite superstructure

“As long as safety can be assessed and risks addressed, the possibilities are endless.”