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Roger Sandilands “Land Value Taxation” and the Glasgow connection

Roger Sandilands “Land Value Taxation” and the Glasgow connection

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Page 1: Roger Sandilands “Land Value Taxation” and the Glasgow connection

Roger Sandilands

“Land Value Taxation” and the Glasgow connection

Page 2: Roger Sandilands “Land Value Taxation” and the Glasgow connection

Rent and its Hidden Potential

I aim to show that by ending taxes on wages and enterprise and instead financing the state via land

rents, we can significantly boost Scotland’s economic performance.

To see why this is so, we need to grasp the meaning of rent and its quantitative significance.

The starting point is the Scottish Enlightenment

Page 3: Roger Sandilands “Land Value Taxation” and the Glasgow connection

Land and natural resource rents in classical economic thought

(i)The influence on Adam Smith of the French “économistes” and the “impôt unique” or “single tax” on Land

“The landlord loves to reap where he has not sown.”

Page 4: Roger Sandilands “Land Value Taxation” and the Glasgow connection

But…

Page 5: Roger Sandilands “Land Value Taxation” and the Glasgow connection

The Nature and Source of Economic Rent

(ii) David Ricardo’s Law of Rent (1817):

On the least favourable land in use, labour and capital can produce just enough to pay the competitive rates of wages and profits,

leaving nothing for the landlord to extract as rent.

This is “marginal” or “no-rent” land.

Contrast “intra-marginal” land: There, labour and capital are more productive.

But the extra output goes not to the producers but to the owners of superior land as RENT.

Page 6: Roger Sandilands “Land Value Taxation” and the Glasgow connection

Ricardo: Land commands a Rent even though it’s a “Free Gift of Nature”.

Thus Rent is a pure surplus: land’s annual price exceeds its cost of production. Hence Rent is a monopoly price: - we can’t produce more to reduce its price to its (zero) cost.

Because supply is fixed, price is entirely demand-driven. Price is just a rationing device or transfer payment between owners.

It does not use up real resources.

So, if the state collects rents by imposing user fees this simply causes rents to be transfered to the community.

There are no “deadweight losses” or “excess burdens”.

Contrast the taxation of productive activity.

Page 7: Roger Sandilands “Land Value Taxation” and the Glasgow connection

However, land does have an opportunity cost.

A site could be used for many different uses.

So its price (rent) is needed as a rationing device, to encourage its best use.

The only question then is: who should get this rent?

Page 8: Roger Sandilands “Land Value Taxation” and the Glasgow connection

The Adequacy of Rents

The National Accounts fail to reveal the true extent of rents

This is how the accounts reported UK GDP in 2011 at market prices (£1,537bn) by category of income:

Total gross operating surplus: £436bn 28.4% “Mixed” incomes (of the self-employed): £ 85bn 5.5% Employee compensation £820bn 53.4% Taxes less subsidies on products and imports: £190bn 12.5%

Page 9: Roger Sandilands “Land Value Taxation” and the Glasgow connection

The 2011 accounts estimate that property income totalling £483 billion accrued to individuals in the following ways

(i) interest: £210bn

(ii) distributed incomes of corporations £72bn

(iii) reinvested earnings on direct foreign investment: £130bn

(iv) “property income attributed to insurance policy holders” – presumably the owners of buildings: £71bn

(v) rent on land: £0.417bn [includes only the explicit payments for land qua land alone, hence a relatively trivial sum]

Page 10: Roger Sandilands “Land Value Taxation” and the Glasgow connection

=> Land’s disappearing act

Page 11: Roger Sandilands “Land Value Taxation” and the Glasgow connection

The hidden rents: a list

• Rents that should be imputed as part of services of buildings of all kinds: houses, factories, shops, offices, theatres

• The radio spectrum• The rental value of subsoil and submarine mineral resources

(oil, coal, copper, etc) • Parking lots and road licences• Agricultural land rent (currently exempted)

Plus, most important of all,Rents hidden by taxation

Page 12: Roger Sandilands “Land Value Taxation” and the Glasgow connection

Hidden Rents and the Incidence of Taxation

Adam Smith and ATCOR – “All Taxes Come Out of Rent”

Why? Because they add to the cost of labour and capital

At the no-rent margin, labour and capital cannot justify the going wage and profit rates. They are priced out of production.

On intra-marginal land, rents are squeezed to prevent net wages and profits from falling. The cost of taxes are borne out of rent

Page 13: Roger Sandilands “Land Value Taxation” and the Glasgow connection

This explains why a tax on rent cannot be passed on to labour and capital.

-- The going wage and profit rates do not contain a surplus that can be squeezed for long.

If rents are taxed according to land’s optimum permitted use, the tax encourages fuller use of land – in contrast to taxes on

labour and capital whose supply is elastic and mobile

Page 14: Roger Sandilands “Land Value Taxation” and the Glasgow connection

Adam Smith again:

“Ground rents are a still more proper subject of taxation than the rent of the houses. “A tax upon ground rents would not raise the rent of the houses. “It would fall altogether upon the owner of the ground rent, who acts always as a monopolist, and exacts the greatest rent which can be got for the use of his ground…”

Page 15: Roger Sandilands “Land Value Taxation” and the Glasgow connection

Another policy implication

If we reduce the taxation from labour and capital, more will be employed and more land demanded. => Rents would transparently increase => a greater pool for the government to collect.

If not all is collected, there may even be more left for the landlords than they had before! (Martin Feldstein)

Page 16: Roger Sandilands “Land Value Taxation” and the Glasgow connection

Furthermore,

• By removing taxes from production and on to rent, national income increases. And this increases the size of the market.

=> Smith’s most important aphorism: “The division of labour is limited by the size of the market.”

• And increased specialisation was the main source of the increase of the Wealth of Nations.

• Hence the gains are cumulative and self-sustaining.

• This implies that “deadweight losses” of taxation are far greater than commonly realised. By depressing the growth of the market, the losses are compounded over time.

Page 17: Roger Sandilands “Land Value Taxation” and the Glasgow connection

• I estimate that by replacing taxes with land rents – and so removing deadweight losses – we can conservatively reckon that annual economic growth would increase by two percentage points, cumulatively. More on this shortly.

• But if the Scottish government seizes the opportunity now being given it to slash income taxes and replace them with land rent revenues, this could expand the Scottish economy by £60bn over the five years from 2016 to the Holyrood election of 2021

• And it would also create thousands of new and better jobs.

Page 18: Roger Sandilands “Land Value Taxation” and the Glasgow connection

The buoyancy of rents

• But how ‘buoyant’ are they?

• Very buoyant, as revealed by the secular rise in the real price of land. That is, by the greater rate of “house” price inflation relative to the CPI and the growth of nominal GDP.

• However, speculation causes this market to be highly volatile – something that LVT would assuage, giving both faster and more stable economic growth.

Page 19: Roger Sandilands “Land Value Taxation” and the Glasgow connection

HOUSE PRICE BOOM, 1969-2011

Source: D Bell & D Eiser (2014)

Page 20: Roger Sandilands “Land Value Taxation” and the Glasgow connection

House prices for first-time buyers have massively inflated between 1969 and 2012. Not only have prices increased, but they have become more unaffordable. In 1969 the average home cost just over £4,000, against an average buyers' wage of £1,600 (price: 2.5 times income). By 2012, the price had increased to almost £182,000 against a buyers' wage of just under £45,000 (price: 4 times income). The following graph shows the same data between 1978-2012, adjusted for inflation using 2012 as the basis.

Page 22: Roger Sandilands “Land Value Taxation” and the Glasgow connection

A list of deadweight losses and excess burdens from taxation of labour, capital and products

• Unemployment and underemployment of labour and capital – and land too

• Distorted relative prices of productive factors => inefficiency• Unaffordable housing• Speculative purchase and holding of land• Boom-bust cycles• Poverty and inequality => conflict, crime and drugs• Reduced market size => less specialisation• Reduced specialisation reduces growth, cumulatively

Page 23: Roger Sandilands “Land Value Taxation” and the Glasgow connection

Quantitative estimates of the Losses of Nations from forfeiting a postulated two percentage point increase in GDP growth

• 1970 real UK GDP: £575,736 bn. Population 55.6 million. Income per head £10,555.

• 1970-2012: UK average growth rate = 2.52% (2.2% per capita) => 2012 GDP = £1,414,821 bn. Population now 63.7 million. Income per head doubles to £22,211.

• Now assume, conservatively, that our fiscal reforms had boosted the average annual growth rate to 4.52%

• => 2012 GDP = £3,768,398 bn. Income per head, instead of doubling, would have risen nearly six-fold, to £59,158.

• The difference (£59, 158 - £22,211) is £36,947 per head.

Page 24: Roger Sandilands “Land Value Taxation” and the Glasgow connection

The Hidden Potential of Rents – The Scottish Example

In 1970 the average income in Scotland was £9,166 (in 2011 prices).

By 2013, this had increased by 133% to £21,378, an increase of £12,212 per person. Had Scotland had a fiscal system based on Land Value Rating, the annual growth rate could have been boosted to 4.1%, and the 2013 average income would have been 463% higher at £51,589. This is an increase of £30,211 per person. This is the scale of past losses and the scale of Scotland’s future opportunities.

Page 25: Roger Sandilands “Land Value Taxation” and the Glasgow connection

Conclusion• We have seen the magical power of compound

interest, or the self-sustaining nature of growth. • This justifies every effort to grasp the nettle of

reform that would boost the rate of growth.

So, end taxes on wages and enterprise: Fund government with land rents instead.

Let’s keep what we make, and pay for what we take