Romanian Journal of International Relations and Security Studies

EDITORIAL BOARD: EDITOR-IN-CHIEF: SORINA-ANDREEA CIOTÎRCĂ DEPUTY EDITOR-IN-CHIEF: ALEXANDRA NĂSTASE EDITOR: ALIN BOERU REVIEWERS: ŞERBAN F. CIOCULESCU, Lecturer at the Romanian Diplomatic Institute and

Associate Professor at the Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Bucharest.

CRISTIAN BARNA, Lecturer at the National Intelligence Academy Mihai Viteazu, Associate Professor at the Faculty of Sociology, University of Bucharest, expert in

Terrorism.

ANTONIA COLIBĂŞANU, Director of Research Europe at Stratfor Inc., Guest

Lecturer at the Academy of Economic Studies, Bucharest.

ISSN 2247 – 6903 Romanian Journal of International Relations and Security Studies is a publication of the Romanian Center for International Relations and Security Studies.

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The distribution of this material is free. Neither this publication nor any part of it may be comercialized or reproduced

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TABLE OF CONTENT:

FOREWORD

4

ARTICLES FAILED STATES – ARE THEY A THREAT TO REGIONAL SECURITY? A CASE STUDY OF SOMALIA - Andrei IOVU

6

CORROSIVE BORDERS: FAILLED STATES AND THEIR PATTERNS OF MULTIPLICATION IN THE NEWLIY FORMED STATES – Vladimir RĂUŢĂ

17

A PROBLEM OF CONSOLIDATION. MOLDOVAN DEMOCRACY AND REGIME CHOICE FROM

INDEPENDENCE TO THE ''TWITTER REVOLUTION'' - Paula GANGA

25

CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE IN THE EU NEIGHBOURHOOD: EUROPEAN UNION APPROACH TO THE ARAB

SPRING – Ana POSTOLACHE

41

NATO AFTER LISBON: A CASE STUDY ON NATO’S OPERATION IN LIBYA – Raluca - Iuliana RĂILEANU

50

RELIGION AS A FACTOR IN THE FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS OF ISLAMIC STATES – Ilona ŞERBAN, Alexandru VOLACU

65

OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS

KEYNOTE ADDRESS AT THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE'S 2011 DEMOCRACY AWARDS DINNER – Hillary Rodham CLINTON, Secretary Of State

78

STATEMENT ON LIBYA - Following the working lunch of NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs with non-NATO contributors to Operation Unified Protector

85

Resolution 1937 (2010), Adopted by the Security Council, on 30 August 2010 87

Resolution 2009 (2011),Adopted by the Security Council, on 16 September 2011 89

CALL FOR PAPERS 94

FOREWORD

The theme of the second issue of the Romanian Journal of International Relations and Security

Studies is: Security And Democracy In The Current International Environment.Recent events occurring in the Middle East have represented an extraordinary wave of

political change, a new spirit to the Arab world, but also a regional political earthquake with global effects that must be managed carefully. These events have revealed the necessity of designing new approaches in order to tackle the emerging global challenges.

Articles will analyse specific cases such as Somalia and Southern Sudan, elections in Republica Moldavia and the Twitter revolution, NATO intervention in Libya, the EU response to the events in the Middle East and religion as a factor in the foreign policy decision-making of Islamic states.

The first analysis uses methods consisting of a wide review of relevant literature, coupled with a case study on Somalia, to show that the “failed states” create “bad neighborhoods” that endanger regional and international security.

The second article examines the relation between the Republic of Sudan and the newly formed South Sudan, focusing not only on the perspective of maintaining security and peace in the area but also on the chances for the country to become another failed African state.

While democracy’s most memorable triumphs have occurred in sweeping waves such as the democratic movements that changed the face of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in 1989 and 1991 and possibly the current democratic movements in the Middle East, some democratic changes are inherently more technical and have more to do with institution building rather than simple strong popular support. The most recent case to express this assertion occurred in the Republic of Moldavia. The third paper argues that in spite of the strong popular support showed by the 2009 manifestations, democracy in the Republic of Moldavia has been weakening since the early 2009 due to the change in regime type from semi-presidential to parliamentary.

The next two articles examine how the European Union responded to the conflicting waves from the Middle East and North Africa and how the military intervention in Libya in March 2011 will expose the allies’ different approaches to conflicts, based on their interests.

Last but not least, the final article argues that, due to the socio-cultural particularities of Islamic societies, religion can be a key factor in the process of internal policy design. Yet, in what concerns foreign policies, they are not significantly influenced by religion due to the difficulties experienced by citizens regarding information costs. The authors analyze the hypothesis from an empirical standpoint by studying the votes given by Islamic governments in the UN General Assembly between 2000 and 2010 for resolutions which specifically target an Islamic state.

Sorina CIOTÎRCĂ, Editor-in-Chief

Romanian Journal of International Relations and Security Studies, No2/ 2011

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ARTICLES

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FAILED STATES – ARE THEY A THREAT TO

REGIONAL SECURITY?

A Case Study of Somalia Andrei IOVU 1

Abstract

The research addresses the problem of “failed states” and their impact on regional security.

The paper identifies main causes that weaken states; evaluates critically the models and frameworks

that categorize states as “failed”; explores the impact of “failed state” on regional security. The

research methods consist of a wide review of relevant literature, coupled with a case study on

Somalia. The concept of “regional security” is developed through the Regional Security Complex

theory. The findings from this research show that the “failed states” create “bad neighborhoods” that

threaten regional and international security. These entities also harbor terrorist organizations and

often lead to humanitarian disasters, endemic civil war, refugee flows, international human trafficking,

illicit trade of drugs and weapons. Finally, the study emphasizes that analyzing this phenomenon in a

regional context can prevent the expansion of “failure” to other regions.

Keywords: failed state, collapsed state, state failure, state weakness, Regional Security Complex, Somalia,

terrorism, piracy.

1 Andrei Iovu works in the Security Sector Reform Program, at the Institute for Public Policy from the Republic of Moldova. He holds a master degree in Politics, Security and Integration from the University College of London. Also, Andrei graduated from the Moldova State University, being Licentiate in Political Science and has also studied Security Studies as an undergraduate student at the Slippery Rock University of Pennsylvania, USA. His research interests include security sector reform, ethno-political conflicts, international security and European integration of South-Eastern Europe. Email: [email protected].


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INTRODUCTION The number of nation-states rapidly

increased after the Second World War. In 1914, there were fifty-five recognized national politics and in 1950 the number reached sixty-nine. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and when the African, Asian, and the Oceanic territories declared independence, the number of nations jumped to 191 - East Timor‟s independence in 2002 brought the number to 192i. Due to increasing number of nations, there is an inherent risk that the newly created independent states (or some of them quasi independent) remain vulnerable to failure, especially those with colonial history.

The nation-state exists in order to provide public goods to persons living within designated borders. This makes the difference between a “strong” and “failed” or “collapsed” one – the capacity to deliver effectively political goods (Rotberg, 2003, p.3). By “political goods” we mean expectations, obligations, the capacity to maintain the so-called “social contract” between the ruler and the ruled, and most important, a state should maintain monopole over the coercive force ii (no other actors within the state‟s borders should hold such power).

Robert I. Rotberg proposed a hierarchy of political goods that a state should provide. In his view, the state‟s prime function is to provide security, mainly human security. That is to say, to prevent invasions and infiltrations, loss of territory, to face effectively domestic threats (attacks to the national order, social structure), to prevent crime and any other dangers related to domestic human security; and finally, to provide citizens with the possibility to solve their problems without recourse to arms or violence (Robert Rotberg, 2003, pp.1-24). Other forms of political goods that usually are provided by states are medical care, education, infrastructure, economical system, regulating norms, etc.

“Strong states” perform well and offer high levels of human security, ensuring civil liberties, civic participation, good infrastructure, and creating favorable environment for economic growth. “Failed states”, besides the inability to provide these goods, suffer from internal antagonism that erodes them from inside. When evaluating whether a state is doing well or

poorly, various indexes are employed such as Gross Domestic Product per capita, Gross National Income per capita, Infant Mortality Index; and reports such as UNDP Human Development Index, Freedom House‟s World Report, etc.

WHAT DOES “FAILED” MEAN?

Before proceeding further with this study,

it is important to reveal that there is no official definition of what a “failed state” represents. The discussion over the “strong”, “weak”, “failed” or “collapsed” states is not clear-cut. As Ashley Townshend mentioned, “defining the „failed state‟, remains a largely unresolved scholarly debate (Ashley Townshend, 2007, p.8). The origins of the term are traced from the CIA commissioned study called “State Failure Task Force”, first published in November 1995. The aim of the report was to help the US foreign policy to deal with the serious political crisis in the Balkans, Afghanistan and elsewhere in the world.

In the academic debate, scholars provide explanations for this term emphasizing various elements of the phenomenon. As an example, Rotberg identified “failed states” as “tense, deeply conflicted, dangerous and contested bitterly by warring factions” where “government troops battle armed revolts led by one or more rivals” laying in “ethnic, religious, linguistic, or other intercommunal enmity” (Robert Rotberg, 2004, p.5). The same author distinguished “collapsed state” as an entity which “exhibit a vacuum of authority” which “is a rare and extreme version of a failed state” (Robert Rotberg, 2004, p.9). Ashley Townshend defined “failed state” “as one in which the central authority has lost its capacity to uphold the monopoly over the means of coercion within a clearly defined territory” (Townshend, 2007, p.10). This definition emphasized the importance of a state as the main authority over the coercive power. The Task Force Report defined “failed state” as the one that is “utterly incapable of sustaining itself as a member of the international community” (Daniel Esty, 1995, p.1). A similar definition that limits the understanding of the phenomenon to the most extreme cases is proposed by Nelson Kasfir, who defined “state failure” as being:

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“in its most extreme form, the disappearance of both public authority and its supporting social norms. In other words, state failure creates domestic anarchy, which invariably involves the threat of violence, if not violence itself” (Robert Rotberg, 2004, p.54).

As we can see, these definitions do not illustrate the whole “variety” of “failed states”, illustrating just some of the manifestations of this occurrence. As the authors of the “The State Failure Project: Early Warning Research for U.S. Foreign Policy Planning” rightly mentioned, “the term state failure and state collapse are analogous” iii. In many instances, the definitions describe the same fact, but from different perspectives. However, each state is unique and an exact conceptual definition that would differentiate “failed” and “functioning” states is problematiciv(Charles Call, 2011, p.304).

In order to provide a deeper understanding of the problem, Daniel Thürer identified three elements that characterize “failed state” from political and legal point of view.

The first determinant relates to the geographical and territorial aspect of a state. Although the phenomenon has cross-border implications and consequences, when we speak about “failed states” we essentially associate them with internal and endogenous problems. Thürer mentioned that a “failed state” faces destruction, rather than dismemberment. However, in many cases the weakening of the central authority enhances secessionist movements and as a consequence, a state may dismember in separate factions (although unrecognized on the international arena). As an example, the tensions between clans in Somalia determined the formation of an unrecognized entity that separated from the rest of the state.v

The second element implies the political aspect, more specifically the international collapse of law and order. Thürer asserted that a “failed state” faces a total breakdown of institutions that guarantee law and order. vi In other words, the conflict in a “failed state” is very close to what Hobbes described in Leviathan as “Bellum omnium contra omnes”.

The third element represents the functional aspect of this phenomenon. A “failed state” lacks institutions capable to represent the state at the international level, on one hand, and to be

influenced by the outside world (sanctions for human right violations, etc.) on the other hand. This entity suffers from deficit of authority that would negotiate, represent, enforce decisions or commit itself to an agreement.

Summing up these ideas, we can notice that the explanations for “failed state” have conceptual variations, which mainly describe the institutional and political collapse in a certain state. Nevertheless, these definitions have shown some of the most important elements and determinants of this phenomenon.

INDICATORS OF FAILUREvii

State failure is a chaotic and anarchic

process that may last over a long period of time and across a wide range of dimensions (political, economical, social and military). According to the Task Force Report, “states fail when they are unable to provide basic functions for their citizens.”viii Besides this general idea, Daniel Esty indicated three elements that denote whether a state is likely to fail.

The first element relates to the openness to international trade. This determinant represents an indicator of international political and economic integration. Esty emphasized that when a nation-state promotes a closed-economic system, the wealth decreases and the economical failure is eminent. The measurements of the economic welfare are most often represented by the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita as an indicator of country‟s standard of living and by the Gross National Income (GNI) per capita as an indicator of state‟s general wealth. In the case of Somalia, the GDP index in 2010 represented $600ix, being one of the lowest rates in the world, while the GNI consisted $150x. The World Bank‟s Fragile States Initiative indicated that “failed states” are those countries where the Gross National Income per capita is $905 or less.xi

The second indicator in Esty‟s opinion is the rate of infant mortality. The infant mortality index represents as well an indicator of the living standards. If the ratios are higher than the international median, this means that a state cannot longer provide health care and its inhabitants are exposed to high risks. As an example, in Somalia the infant mortality rate is 109 xii, while the World infant mortality rate is

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43,15 per 1 000 live births. xiii This index clearly indicates the severity of living standards in this country and shows the inability of the state to provide basic social welfare.

The third element is represented by the political regime. Esty indicated that undemocratic states are at higher risk to fail.xiv This idea raises the question whether democracy is the political regime that assures stability or this is rather a Western approach towards the nondemocratic regimes when determining their capacity to govern.

All these variables do not provide a cause-effect explanation of why and how states fail. Also, this approach does not reveal how the non-states actors take over the state institutions and gain control of the coercive power. However, this approach emphasizes the importance of democratic regimes, economical development, and cooperation as a guarantor of a state stability.

Another approachxv suggests that there are four factors that are responsible for state failure: flawed political structure, economical crisis, loss of state legitimacy, and systemic pressures (Townshend, 2007, p.17). The flawed political structure erodes state power and institutions, undermining the capacity to control military forces. The economical crisis deteriorates the state‟s capacity to rule and maintain its coercive power. This determinant in the context of other elements leads to state collapse. Nevertheless, many states have suffered from the economical crises, but did not fail. This idea suggests that the economical index as a separate indicator cannot be considered as a determinant sign of failure.

The loss of state legitimacy provides grounds for non-state groups to organize and accumulate economic and military resources. The loss of legitimacy is rather a consequence of failure itself, comprising economical and institutional collapse. Systemic pressures stand for the regional and international context. This is the pressure that emanates from outside and may affect states in two ways. First, state weakens when the external assistance is reduced or denied, and second, when external support is directed towards the rival sub-state groups or non-state actors undermining state‟s coercive power (Townshend, 2007, p.19). This perspective uses four variables combining them in internal and

external factors, and emphasizes the influence of non-state actors in the process of state failure.

Similarly, Charles T. Call identified other three determinants that can serve as indicators of state collapse. The first element refers to the capacity gap – ability of a state to deliver “minimal” public goods and services to the population. Nevertheless, the “minimal capacity” is somewhat an abstract and relative term. What is considered “minimal” differs from state to state.

The second factor represents the security gap that affects state‟s ability to provide security to the citizens and face the armed groups. This determinant relates as well to the ability of a state to maintain monopoly over the coercive force and provide security. The index is represented by the conflict intensity, impact across territory, human rights violations, and coups.

The third element, relates to the legitimacy gap, where society rejects the regulating power of the state (Charles Call, 2011, p.304). This indicates whether the political elites and state institutions gained credibility in people‟s eyes.

Analyzing these approaches we can clearly frame Somalia as a “failed state”. First, as we have seen, scholars emphasized that the index of state wealth and standards of living are relevant indicators of state‟s performance. In the case of this country these indices in most of the cases are twice lower than the world median. Although the economical factor solely cannot lead to state failure, in combination with other determinants it is a powerful element. The second component is represented by legitimacy, which plays an important role in recognizing a state‟s authority and determines its capacity to exercise power. The central Somali government struggles to achieve legitimacy, but the presence of other regional and local governing bodies that continue to exist independently, greatly challenges the ability of the central government to gain credibility. The third indicator refers to the ability of a state to provide security and maintain monopoly over the violence. In Somalia, clans, criminal groups, warlord and pirates took over the governmental forces, being the main actors in dealing with violence. If the non-state actors take over the coercive force, the existence of a state is greatly challenged. In addition, its inability to provide security and order emerges a type of non-state actors that spread violence and

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instability beyond political borders, changing the patterns of the regional security.

ON REGIONAL SECURITY

The idea that the relation between

regional security and “failed states” is an important question for the international security, has not figured prominently in the security studies. However, over the last two decades, the question of regional security was transformed into an important analytical category. Scholars have elaborated on the concept of “regions”, providing clarifications and contextual analysis of these entities (Väyrynen, 2009); proposed theories of regional security (Adler and Barnettxvi, Buzan and Wæverxvii, Lemkexviii, Ayoobxix, Fawcettxx, Lake and Morganxxi, Roperxxii, Sperling and Kirchnerxxiii) and regional conflict management (Diehl and Lepgoldxxiv, Dukexxv, MacFarlanexxvi); analyzed the influence of non-state groups (including ethnic and religious groups, civil society, business, organized criminal organizations, rebel groups) at regional level (Adamsonxxvii, Minchevaxxviii, Pugh and Cooperxxix).

In Buzan and Wæver‟s work “Regions and Powers” (Buzan and Waever, 2003) the authors provided a useful insight on the impact of “failed states” on regional security. They continued to developed the idea proposed in their previous work “Security: a New Framework for Analysis” (Buzan and Waever, 1998) on the so-called “Regional Security Complexes”. A “Regional Security Complex” (RSC) is defined “by durable patterns of amity and enmity taking the form of sub-global, geographically coherent patterns of security interdependence” (Buzan and Waever, 2003, p.45). They added to this idea that “geographic proximity is said to matter more in terms of military, political, societal and environmental dimensions of security, less so in relation to economic ones”xxx (Buzan and Waever, 2003, pp.45-46). Buzan and Wæver identified four main elements of any RSC: boundaries, anarchic structure (requiring a minimum of two autonomous unitsxxxi), polarity (uni-, bi-, multi- polarity), and patters of amity and enmity. It is important to mention that Buzan and Wæver perceived RSC as a dynamic entity that can evolve in three main ways: by keeping the status quo, suffering internal transformations (influenced

by amity and enmity), and external transformation (where the RSC merges or splits). xxxii The main deficiency of Buzan and Wæver‟s RSC theory represents the fact that they perceived states as main actors in regional security, which limits the role of non-state groups in the regional context. Although they agreed that “when states are weak [...] non-state actors take on a relatively larger role”xxxiii, the authors have not elaborated on the role of non-state actors in the context of RSC. We have seen from the previous chapter, that the collapse of legitimate authority and disintegration of state institutions enhances the power of (violent) non-state actors (armed groups, militias, warlords, etc.), which take over the formal institutions.

In the context of “failed states”, their capacity to play a determinant role in RSC is very limited. The security threats are coming mainly from the non-state actors. However, the RSC approach provides an understanding of the importance of regional security analysis and prevention of state failure in regional context, as instability tends to spread beyond state‟s political borders, through overwhelming refugee flows, increased arms smuggling, breakdowns in regional trade, and on other ways xxxiv(Myron Weiner, 1996). Besides this, state failure is a dynamic process that can lead to the “export of instability”. In a regional context, the states that connect two regions can serve as “buffer zones” preventing the spread of insecurity from one region to another. Of course, if these entities are affected as well, insecurity and instability will spread to another region, respectively to another RSC.

THE CASE OF SOMALIA

Somalia was a British and Italian colony,

which after the Second World War became an independent territory, forming the Somali Republic. In October 1969 the country faced a coup d‟état and a military dictatorship being established. In 1991, the civil war lead to the collapse of Siyar Barre‟s regime, leaving a political vacuum and all public institutions disintegrated (Ali Hassan, 2001). Today, this country is considered a “classic” example of “failed state”.

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Analyzing the situation in Somalia in a regional framework, we have several options when placing this country into a Regional Security Complex. The first approach perceives Somalia as a part of the Horn of Africa, region that comprises Eritrea, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Somalia. The second option marks it as a part of the Gulf of Aden. This region would consist from Somalia, Oman, Yemen and Djibouti. These two frameworks are most often employed when referring to Somalia‟s threats to regional security. The next two approaches are rather based on political considerations and the country‟s membership in the regional organizations. The first standpoint would incorporate Somalia in the Sub-Saharan Africa, region that comprises African countries located south of Sahara (a number of approximately 48 countries) and the second, Somalia as a part of the Arab World, due to country‟s membership in the League of Arab States.

In the regional context, the most severe security threat represents piracy. As Peter Pahm mentioned, this is one of the manifestations “resulting from the collapse of the Somali state” (Peter Pham, 2010, p.2). In 2009, more than 214 vessels were attacked and 47 hijacked in the region by Somali pirates.xxxv In fact, state failure creates a legal loophole for piracy. Once the Somali state ceased to exist (de facto) there is no other authority that would take care of the territorial waters. The profits earned from piracy go to warlords and terrorist organizations - it is also claimed that between 20% and 50% of the ransom money pirates receive is given to al-Shabaabxxxvi – a terrorist organization (Mohamed Ibrahim, 2010, p.292). The insecurity in this country engendered fishing industry and tourism in neighboring Seychelles, Mauritius and other islands. The piracy posed threats to maritime safety raising as well other issues such as bioterrorism, smuggling of arms and dangerous goods, kidnapping, etc.

In addition, the piracy in Somalia leads to militarization of the region. Military ships of NATO, Russia, Japan, China, and India moved their navy into the region to protect their vessels from piracy.xxxvii The international environmental organization Ecoterra alleged that anti-piracy activities in the Gulf of Aden serve as a cover-up for testing of the new weapons.xxxviii

Another severe threat to the regional and international security emanating from Somalia, relates to the terrorist organizations, mainly from the Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen movement („Movement of Warrior Youth‟, al-Shabaab), wishing to establish a fundamentalist Islamist state. This organization has claimed the responsibility for the suicide bombs detonated in Kampala (capital city of Uganda), killing 74 and wounding dozens. Also, it is believed that al-Shabaab has allegiance with al-Qaeda.xxxix In the same context, is important to mention that terrorists who have organized attacks against the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, and in 2002 attack in Mombasa, Kenya, have recruited, trained and smuggled weapons through Somalia.xl

Recently, UN declared famine in Somalia after the worst drought for 60 years. Due to the ban on foreign aid agencies imposed by al-Shabaab, the access of the UN agencies and humanitarian organizations is complicated. The armed groups impede the staff to reach those in need, pushing the country into a humanitarian catastrophe.xli The famine in Somalia enhances the instability and insecurity in the region, risking expanding in the neighboring Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda that have also been affected by the severe lack of rain.

Ultimately, the debate on the security threats coming from “failed states” has greatly changed after the events from September 11, 2001. Before, this issue was seen as a “regional security threat”, but after that date, a new doctrine has been developed, relating these entities to the problem of international terrorism.xlii These lead to new policy developments and placed the issue of “failed state” as an international security threat (US National Security Doctrine, EU Security Doctrine, High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 2004). Somalia, in this context, is perceived as a potential shelter for the terrorist organizationsxliii and specific military measures are being taken.

CONCLUSION

As we have seen from this study, there is a

lack of consensus over what constitutes a “failed state”. Nevertheless, the destructive phenomenon that affects nation-states, especially those that

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recently became independent, raises numerous questions regarding the feasibility and universality of such processes as nation-building, national identity formation, and challenges the whole idea of nation-state as well.

Although, this study tended to explain main conceptual elements of “failed state”, revealed potential indicators that would help to prevent and indentify “weak states”, analyzed the security impact of a “failed state” on the regional security, it raised as well numerous questions that should be subject of further research. Some of the most relevant remarks are related to the role of non-state actors in the Regional Security Complexes; the relation between the political regime and “state weakness”; and the liaison between international terrorist networks and “failed states”.

Furthermore, the study has contributed to the understanding of the dynamics of state failure and the threats that such entity poses to the regional and international security. It has shown as well that “regionalizing” the analysis of state failure may lead to a more precise delimitation of states that are under risk of “importing instability”. That is to say, regional analysis of “failed states” helps to identify countries that are under potential

risk of failure and such approach helps to identify the regional actors and structures that can prevent a state from breaking down.

The case study on Somalia identified main threats for the regional and international security that have the roots in this country. The research revealed that the lack of state authority engendered violent non-state actors to form terrorist organizations, armed groups, criminal networks, and to engage in large scale piracy, drug and arms trafficking and kidnapping.

In addition, the study revealed that the “regional threats” (e.g. piracy, activity of armed groups) tend to transform into “international threats” once the security and interests of superpowers is affected. As an argument, the problem of Somalia‟s “failed state” drew attention of the international community notably when the pirates from this country have attacked foreign vessels and kidnapped their nationals. The same situation applies in the case of the radical Islamist group called “Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen” that committed atrocities in Somalia and the region, but became a security threat at the international level once believed that the group has allegiance with al-Qaeda.

Notes:

i “Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade”. Australian Government. Available at:

http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/east_timor/east_timor_brief.html . Accessed on August 27th, 2011.

ii The idea of State monopoly over the coercive force was developed by Max Weber in his essay “Politics as a

Vocation”.

iii Daniel C. Esty, Jack Goldstone and others. “Failed States and International Security: Causes, Prospects, and

Consequences”. In: Paper presented within the State Failure Project: Early Warning Research for U.S. Foreign

Policy Planning, at the Purdue University. West Lafayette. February 25-27. 1998. Available at:

http://www.comm.ucsb.edu/research/mstohl/failed_states/1998/papers/gurr.html#1. Accessed on August 27th,

2011.

iv It is important to mention that besides the debate on defining the states as “failed” or “collapsed”, there is

another current of scholars (David Chadler; Morten Boas and Kathleen Jennings) who argue against any attempt

to generalize the problem of certain states as being “failed”. They claim that “the West, especially the US, has

strategically deployed the terms „failed state‟ or „fragile state‟ to justify intervention in areas previously deemed

http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/east_timor/east_timor_brief.html

http://www.comm.ucsb.edu/research/mstohl/failed_states/1998/papers/gurr.html#1

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sovereign, generally through perceived links to transnational security threats like terrorism and drug trafficking”

(source: Charles T. Call, “Beyond the „failed state‟: Toward conceptual alternatives”. In: European Journal of

International Relations, 2011, p. 304.

v In the northwestern part of Somalia there is a self-declared entity called the “Republic of Somaliland” that

claims secession. Also, another semi-autonomous State of Putland, in northeastern Somalia seek international

support in the secessionist aspirations . Available at: CIA Word Factbook. Accessed on September 5th, 2011,

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html.

vi Daniel Thürer, “The „failed state‟ and international law,” ICRC Resource Centre,

http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jq6u.htmh.

vii Speaking about the indicators of state failure, there is an impressive amount of reports providing quantitative

data on the state failure indices. The most relevant are: the Conflict Analysis Framework (CAF) – World Bank; the

Conflict Analysis for Project Planning and Management (GTZ); UNDP Conflict-Related Development Analysis; the

Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST) – Fund for Peace; the Stability Assessment Framework: Designing

Integrated Responses for Security; Governance and Development (Clingendael Institute); An Early Warning

Approach to Conflict and Instability Approach: The Fuzzy Analysis of Statistical Evidence (FASE) model; the US

Army Centre for Army Analysis; FAST Analytical Framework; Conflict Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP)

(Carleton University); the Political Instability Task Force (PITF); the Index of State Tension (IST); and The Stability

Assessment Framework (SAF).

viii Esty and others, “State Failure Task Force Report” p. 4.

ix CIA, “The World Factbook,” Country Comparison GDP per capita, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-

worldfactbook/rankorder/2004rank.html?countryName=Somalia&countryCode=so&regionCode=afr&rank=222#

so.

x The World Bank, “Somalia,” Accessed on August 27th, 2011, http://data.worldbank.org/country/somalia.

xi The World Bank Independent Evaluation Group, “Engaging with Fragile States” .Washington, DC: The World

Bank, 2006, p. 175.

xii UNICEF, “Statistics. Somalia,” Accessed on August 27th, 2011. Available at:

http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/somalia_statistics.html#73.

xiii The World Bank, “World Development Indicators”. Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/data-

catalog/world-development-indicators?cid=GPD_WDI.

xiv Esty and others, “Failed States and International Security: Causes, Prospects, and Consequences” . Accessed on:

August 27th, 2011. Available at:

http://www.comm.ucsb.edu/research/mstohl/failed_states/1998/papers/gurr.html#1.

xv The findings of the study are based on the examination of state failure in Zaire, Afghanistan and Yugoslavia.

xvi Emanuel Adler and Michael N. Barnett, Security communities (Cambridge University Press, 1998).

xvii Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, Regions and powers: the structure of international security. Cambridge University

Press. 2003.

xviii Douglas Lemke. Regions of war and peace . Cambridge University Press. 2002.

http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jq6u.htm

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/rankorder/2004rank.html?countryName=Somalia&countryCode=so&regionCode=afr&rank=222#so



http://data.worldbank.org/country/somalia

http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/somalia_statistics.html#73

http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators?cid=GPD_WDI

http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators?cid=GPD_WDI

http://www.comm.ucsb.edu/research/mstohl/failed_states/1998/papers/gurr.html#1

[14]


xix Mohammed Ayoob, “From Regional System to Regional Society: Exploring Key Variables in the Construction of

Regional Order”. In: Australian Journal of International Affairs, 1999, pp. 247–260.

xx Louise Fawcett, “The Evolving Architecture of Regionalisation”. In: The United Nations and Regional Security:

Europe and Beyond , Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003, pp. 11-30.

xxi David A. Lake, Patrick M. Morgan. Regional orders: building security in a new world . Penn State Press. 1997.

xxii John Roper. “The Contribution of Regional Organizations in Europe”. In: Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for

the New Century, Rowman & Littlefield, 1998, pp. 255-271.

xxiii James Sperling, Emil Joseph Kirchner. Recasting the European order: security architectures and economic

cooperation. Manchester University Press. 1997.

xxiv Paul Francis Diehl, Joseph Lepgold. Regional conflict management . Rowman & Littlefield. 2003.

xxv Simon Duke. “Regional Organizations and Conflict Prevention: CFSP and ESDI in Europe”. In: Conflict

Prevention: Path to Peace or Grand Illusion?, United Nations University Press, 2003, pp. 91-111.

xxvi Neil MacFarlane. “Regional Peacekeeping in the CIS”. In: United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Ad Hoc

Missions, Permanent Engagement, United Nations University Press, 2001, pp. 77-99.

xxvii Fiona Adamson.“Globalisation, Transnational Political Mobilisation, and Networks of Violence”. In: Cambridge

Review of International Affairs, No. 1, 2005, pp. 31-49.

xxviii Lyubov Mincheva.“Dissolving Boundaries between Domestic and Regional/ International Conflict: The

Albanian Ethno-territorial Separatist Movement and the Macedonian 2001 Crisis”. In: Paper presented at the

Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, New Orleans, FL, 24-27 March , 2002.

xxix Michael Charles Pugh, Neil Cooper, and Jonathan Goodhand. War economies in a regional context: challenges

of transformation. Lynne Rienner Publishers. 2004.

xxx Ibidem, pp. 45-46.

xxxiBy “unit” Buzan and Wæver meant “actors composed of various subgroups, organizations, communities, and

many individuals and sufficiently cohesive and independent to be differentiated from others and to have

standing at the higher levels (e.g. states, nations)” (Source: Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde. Security: a new framework

for analysis. p. 6).

xxxii Buzan and Wæver. Regions and powers. p. 53.

xxxiii Buzan and Wæver. Regions and powers. p. 64.

xxxiv Myron Weiner. “Bad Neighbors, Bad Neighborhoods: An Inquiry into the Causes of Refugee Flows”. In:

International Security, 1996, pp. 5-42.

xxxv Ibidem.

xxxvi Mohamed Ibrahim, “Somalia and global terrorism: A growing connection?”. In: Journal of Contemporary

African Studies, No. 3, 2010, p. 292.

xxxvii Ademun Odeke, “Somali piracy – effects on oceanborne commerce”. In: Australian and New Zealand

Maritime Law Journal, p. 143,

https://maritimejournal.murdoch.edu.au/index.php/maritimejournal/article/viewFile/149/196. Accessed on:

September 5th, 2011.

https://maritimejournal.murdoch.edu.au/index.php/maritimejournal/article/viewFile/149/196

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xxxviii Australia.to News Magazine, “Ecoterra international - updates and statements, review and clearing-house,”

http://australia.to/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1388:ecoterra-intl-no-339-somali-piracy-

news&catid=70:piracy-in-somalia&Itemid=142.

xxxix Council on Foreign Relations, “Al-Shabaab”. Available at: http://www.cfr.org/somalia/al-

shabaab/p18650#p4.

xl Bronwyn Bruton, “In the quicksands of Somalia: Where doing less helps more,” Foreign Affairs,

November/December 2009. Available at: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65462/bronwyn-bruton/in-

the-quicksands-of-somalia.

xli BBC, “UN declares Somalia famine in Bakool and Lower Shabelle”. Accessed on September 5th, 2011.

Available on: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14211905.

xlii Wolff, “State Failure in a Regional Context,” p. 3.

xliii Euronews, “Bush worried Somalia may become terrorist shelter”. Accessed on: September 5th, 2011. Available

on: http://www.euronews.net/2006/06/07/bush-worried-somalia-may-become-terrorist-shelter/.

http://australia.to/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1388:ecoterra-intl-no-339-somali-piracy-news&catid=70:piracy-in-somalia&Itemid=142

http://australia.to/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1388:ecoterra-intl-no-339-somali-piracy-news&catid=70:piracy-in-somalia&Itemid=142

http://www.cfr.org/somalia/al-shabaab/p18650#p4

http://www.cfr.org/somalia/al-shabaab/p18650#p4

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65462/bronwyn-bruton/in-the-quicksands-of-somalia

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65462/bronwyn-bruton/in-the-quicksands-of-somalia

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14211905

http://www.euronews.net/2006/06/07/bush-worried-somalia-may-become-terrorist-shelter/

[16]


Reference:

Ashley, Townshend. Anatomy of State Failure. Case Studies in Zaire, Afghanistan and Yugoslavia. Dissertation,

University of Sydney. 2007. Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver. Regions and powers: the structure of international security. Cambridge University

Press. 2003. Barry, Buzan, Ole Wæver, Jaap de Wilde. Security: a new framework for analysis. Lynne Rienner Publishers.

1998. Charles, T. Call. “Beyond the „failed state‟: Toward conceptual alternatives”. In: European Journal of

International Relations , No.17, 2011. Daniel, C. Esty. Working Papers. State Failure Task Force Report, 30 November, 1995. David, A. Lake, Patrick, M. Morgan. Regional orders: building security in a new world. Penn State Press, 1997. Douglas, Lemke. Regions of war and peace. Cambridge University Press. 2002. Emanuel, Adler, Michael N. Barnett. Security communities. Cambridge University Press. 1998. Fiona, Adamson.“Globalisation, Transnational Political Mobilisation, and Networks of Violence”. In:

Cambridge Review of International Affairs, No. 1, 2005, pp. 31-49. Louise, Fawcett. “The Evolving Architecture of Regionalisation”. In: The United Nations and Regional Security:

Europe and Beyond , Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003, pp. 11-30. James, Sperling, Emil ,J. Kirchner. Recasting the European order: security architectures and economic

cooperation. Manchester University Press. 1997. John, Roper. “The Contribution of Regional Organizations in Europe”. In: Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for

the New Century, Rowman & Littlefield, 1998, pp. 255-271. Lyubov, Mincheva. “Dissolving Boundaries between Domestic and Regional/ International Conflict: The

Albanian Ethno-territorial Separatist Movement and the Macedonian 2001 Crisis,” In: Paper presented at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, New Orleans, FL, 24-27 March 2002.

Michael, C. Pugh, Neil, Cooper, and Jonathan Goodhand. War economies in a regional context: challenges of transformation. Lynne Rienner Publishers. 2004.

Mohammed Ayoob, “From Regional System to Regional Society: Exploring Key Variables in the Construction of Regional Order”. In: Australian Journal of International Affairs, No.53, 1999, pp. 247–260.

Mohamed, Ibrahim. “Somalia and global terrorism: A growing connection?”. In: Journal of Contemporary African Studies 28, No. 3, 2010.

Myron, Weiner. “Bad Neighbors, Bad Neighborhoods: An Inquiry into the Causes of Refugee Flows”. In: International Security, No.21, 1996, pp. 5-42.

Neil, MacFarlane. “Regional Peacekeeping in the CIS”. In: United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Ad Hoc Missions, Permanent Engagement, United Nations University Press, 2001, pp. 77-99.

Paul, F. Diehl, Joseph, Lepgold. Regional conflict management. Rowman & Littlefield. 2003. Peter, Pham. “Putting Somali piracy in context”. In: Journal of Contemporary African Studies, No. 3, 2010. Raimo Väyrynen, “Regionalism: Old and New”. In: International Studies Review, No. 1, March 2009, pp. 25-

52. Robert, I. Rotberg. State failure and state weakness in a time of terror. Brookings Institution Press. 2003. Simon, Duke. “Regional Organizations and Conflict Prevention: CFSP and ESDI in Europe”. In: Conflict

Prevention: Path to Peace or Grand Illusion?,United Nations University Press, 2003, pp. 91-111.

[17]


CORROSIVE BORDERS: FAILLED STATES AND THEIR PATTERNS OF MULTIPLICATION IN THE

NEWLIY FORMED STATES

Vladimir RĂUŢĂ1

Abstract

This article examines the relation between the Republic of Sudan and the newly formed South

Sudan from the perspective of maintaining international security and peace. It addresses the role of

South Sudan in mapping security and democratic principles in the African continent in general, and in

the war torn regions of Eastern Africa in particular. It mobilizes the analytical device of the Failed

States Index as the methodology draws on the general assumption that failure cases impact on the

humanitarian, legal and security related levels. Particular attention is paid to both strengths and

weaknesses of the state most countries are willing to recognize. In this sense, the analysis seeks to

examine the chances for the country to become another African failed state.

Keywords: South Sudan failed state, international peace and security.

1 Vladimir Răuţă is currently student at the University of Nottingham, Nottingham, United Kingdom enrolled in a Masters in International Relations with a Research Track. Email: [email protected]


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The African continent has been the subject of numerous debates (that) have paved the way for it to develop a distinct rhythm of understanding democracy. With it, security, stability and the attitudes regarding the options of war and peace have themselves followed particular paths. The atomized views on both security and use of military power are the result of the rapid modernization processes that neglected the traditional – the specificity of the African continent - and the transitional. This is why certain African countries came to be defined by “further cleavage, division, conflict and instability” while being “confronted by rapid and multiple changes involved in the modernizing process” (Gruffydd, 2005, p.991). A clear example of such processes is offered by Sudanese state.

As an identity related conflict, the civil war in Sudan has been deconstructing peace in the region ever since the obtaining of independence on the 1st of June 1956. In its entire history, Sudan experienced more periods of instability, insecurity and democratic anxiety than of fully fledged peace and prosperity. What is more, with a politically challenged scene, the country found grounds for balance, even if in the form of “precarious peace” (Deng, 2006, p. 155), only for a decade, between 1972-1983.

The normative framework of this case of perpetual projection of conflict originated in the antagonism brought by the Arab-Islamic identity, on one side, and the black African identity, on the other side. Geographically, while the Arab-Islamic group belonged to the North of Sudan, the African ethnic group was mostly dominant in the Southern regions of the country.

The North-South relationship has always been problematic and has never followed an equidistant path. Since the North raised claims of racial superiority over the South, a policy of assimilation had been employed with the purpose of converting the South to a unitary political, cultural and religious dimension. Thus, leaving behind the prospects of peaceful multicultural border coexistence, forced integration by Arabization and Islamization became the operative instruments. As a result, the immediate consequence took the form of armed interaction, seeing at one pole the North with its messianic purpose, and at the other, the South aimed at obtaining equality.

Diachronically, the North-South conflict series begins even before 1956, the independence year, with the first clash dating from 1955. The Peace Agreement of 1972 opened a period of relative calm, with a secular character and with minimal conflict prone behavior. It was prolonged until 1983 when the military dictatorship of Jafar al-Numayri decided in favor of the annulment of the Peace Agreement, favoring the implementation of the “so-called Islamic laws” (Warburg, 1995, p. 221). In 1987, in the aftermath of the collapse of the military regime of Numayri, the newly installed Umma Party, headed by Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, signed the Sudanese Charter of National Unity. This document, firstly, took into consideration the grievances of the Southerners, and, secondly, called for a new constitutional conference “whose legal resolutions shall be ultimately put before the constituent authority for adoption in the permanent constitution or in appropriate legal measures.”(Sudanese Charter of National Unity, 1987, p. 2).

Before this moment, and even after it, it could be noticed that the civil war in Sudan is the result of the conflicting self-perceptions of the parties. Furthermore, it is enhanced by the development of a series of misperceptions and attitudes towards the other, the case being evident when looking at the Northern perspective on the South. While the North identifies itself not with the African continent, but rather with the Middle East, it asserts itself as an entity of higher rank, entrusted with a mission of culturally and religiously changing the non-Muslim groups of the country. By doing as such, it simultaneously deemed black Africans of Sudan as “inferior, a heathen, and a legitimate target of enslavement” (Deng, 2006, p.155).

In this equation, the North acted as an agent of change, while the South was considered the beneficiary of change. For the North, the modifying capabilities draw legitimacy from their own aim, which is that of reaching peace and stability. For the North, the permutation of religious and axiological values in the South and the forced integration of the region in a common sphere derive naturally and are enforced by both their numeric superiority and the historical developments. For the latter element, colonization and slavery played along the previously

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mentioned central motive by increasing the pressure and the tension between the parts, aiding to the creation of an intricate pattern of causes. Colonization, in particular, emphasized the racial incompatibilities by drawing the line of economic development for the North and underdevelopment for the South. Moreover, Deng (2006, p.156) writes that “the British-dominated Anglo-Egyptian Condominium administration governed the country as two distinct entities, with the North advancing politically and economically, while the South remained isolated and undeveloped.”

The infrastructure of the conflict pattern changed in the 1990s and, as the “war had both exposed and aggravated a feeling of difference between Arabs and non-Arabs” (Tubiana, in de Waal, 2007, p.70), the North-South dimension included developments in other regions, of which the most affected was Darfur. The beginnings of the unrest in Darfur “can be dated from at least the 1984 famine” (Young, 2007, p.166). This situation was primarily linked to the geographical particularities of the area. As a semi-arid plateau, the region is defined by features that make the practice of any agricultural activity almost impossible. The sandy soil, that “mantle of sand, known locally as Qoz” (Parry, Wickens, 1981, p.307) is a type of waterless soil that is continued in the North by the Sahara desert. Moreover, these characteristics also include seasonal floods and areas of basement rock, apart from the Marrah mountains, both which have proven to be factors of land infertility and, subsequently, causes of famine.

“The unusually horrible and complicated crisis” (Waal, 2006, p.737) developed having as key actors the armed movements and the Khartoum government with their allies the Janjaweed. The latter, considered to be “the landless Arab camel herding groups of Northern Darfur” (Waal, 2007, p.68) aided the government in their attacks against the armed rebel movements, of which the largest were the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army and the Justice and Equality Movement. The collaboration with and sponsorship of the militia was the result of the fact that the Government of Sudan found itself incapable of managing another plan of direct conflict, as a very large extent of the military capacity was placed in the South. The direct

conflict, whose origins are multiple ranging from ethnicity to land ownership, began in 2003, when the aforementioned parts “decided they could no longer wait on the sidelines of the North South negotiations” (Waal, 2007, p.72).

What is extremely important to emphasize when taking into consideration the further escalation of the conflict is the fact that, as opposed to the rational used in the belligerences between North and South, in the Darfur case, the narrative changes. For this reason, the Arab-African dualism can no longer be considered the only cause of war. Although having an impact, in the sense that the repeated use of “racial epithets” (Hagen and Rymond-Richmond, 2008, p.876) lead to marginalization and dehumanization, the African-Arab debate is no longer valid as a central causal element. The United Nation International Commission of Inquiry (2005, p.159) pointed out that “the various tribes that have been the objects of attacks and killings (chiefly the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa tribes) do not appear to make up ethnic groups distinct from the ethnic group to which persons or militias that attack them belong.” This is why the explanation of the causes needs to include the important issue of access to land. It is the problem of the competing interests of the already environmentally challenged farmers and that of the herders in search of areas to graze and water their animals. These concerns lead the rebel groups to demand a better and more balanced distribution of wealth, primarily in the Darfur region, and on a second plan in all of the Sudan. However, upon a closer analysis it can be noticed that this request brought with it a second set of requirements. The equal sharing of wealth and of natural resources also implied a demand for more fair distribution of power. And this aspect transformed Darfur in a challenge not only for the government of Sudan and the entire situation, already complicated by the North-South issue, but also for the international community.

Sudan is, thus, a country facing many problems which depart from “long, complex and embittered rivalries among the different groups of people within the area” (Reinton, 1971, p. 241). Sudan is a state that has been torn apart by armed conflict, high levels of violence, displacement as well as refugee issues. Furthermore, the lack of any success in assimilating

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democratic principles and the self-serving attitudes of the governments has transformed Sudan in a testimonial of African political and economic bankruptcy. It is following this path that Sudan came to be considered a failed state, and this belief was also highlighted by Young (2007, p.167) who mentioned that “the most fundamental mistake of the diplomats was to believe that Sudan’s conflicts were of regional character instead of being a product of a failed state.”

As previously mentioned the article mobilizes the analytical device of the failed states index, as introduced in the article “Saving Failed States” by Helman and Ratner. According to it, a failed state is a country “utterly incapable of sustaining itself as a member of the international community.” (Helman and Ratner, 1992/1993, p.3)

This definition forms the framework and it is used as the methodology by which conclusions are drawn on the general assumption that failure cases impact on the stability and security related levels of countries, and in this case, Sudan.

Factionalism, corruption, harmful enmities, fragile peace settlements, continuous drive for monopoly, fear of relinquishing sovereignty, fluctuating economic policies, incongruent laws, irredentism and ethnical inequities are elements that are galvanized around the idea of “failed state”. The concept of state failure is in itself a paradigm as its “achievement was sufficiently unprecedented to attract an enduring group of adherents away from competing models of scientific activity” (Kuhn, 1962, p.10). With a character that is “complex and controversial” (Ehrenreich Brooks, 2005, p.1160), the expression defines a reality that is the product of the on-going process of globalization, which started in the form of increasing interdependence in the 1980s.

A failed state is a state which cannot exert its capacity to control. It cannot make use of its “monopoly of power” (Webber, 1996, p.27). It cannot protect its people, it cannot assure, let alone maintain, peace and security. It is defined by a zero degree of self-sufficiency, by weakness and by constant struggles. With a firm grasp on their sovereignty and fully reluctant to cooperation unless compromise is minimal, cases of failed states portray a dysfunctional image, one whose affected structures are internally

challenged and externally projected. Politically, economically and socially damaged, a state in this situation faces a “perpetual risk of collapse into devastation civil war or simple anarchy” (Ehrenreich Brooks, 2005, p.1161).

Lost in a maze of interests, failed states are a deep cause of concern for all levels, from the regional one to the international one. With a crucial role in assessing and dealing with the problem, the latter is “a fictional” term which “implies a cohesive community of states with the capacity to act in a reliably coordinated and effective fashion” (Ehrenreich Brooks, 2005, p.1164). The repercussions of a state being labeled as a failed one impact, therefore, in a twofold manner – firstly, on the state, as it loses international credibility and secondly, on the previously described international community.

The membership of the international community includes among states with their own different interests, the United Nations, whose role of “saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war” (UN, 1945, p.1) is vital, the European Union, and the African Union. To these, other smaller regional groups and non-governmental organizations are also added and can be considered an involved segment. In addition, these units of action “had to cope with the dilemma of choosing between two fundamental principles of legitimacy in international law: on the one hand, the sovereignty and equality of States and, on the other hand, the right of peoples to self-determination” (Thürer, 1999, p.735). However, the number of the parties involved is not directly proportional with higher chances of successful conflict mediation, or problem solving. In most cases, from Rwanda, Liberia, Congo, Haiti, Sierra Leone to Afghanistan, the actors reached joint decisions after long debates at the expense of the country in question, this being the result of the multitude of interests and overlapping competences.

As an affected county, a failed state is no longer a policymaker. As it cannot make use of the specific political mechanism required for the proper implementation, ranging from a clear agenda to bureaucracy, a failed state cannot carry on the policies. At the same time, paradoxically, it remains rigid and repressive, seeing any form of intervention as an attack on

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sovereignty. The most interesting aspect that a failed state is defined by is its relation with the concept of sovereignty. As arduous as the term “failed state”, sovereignty opens by itself an entire debate. However, what is to be noted from the point of view of the states in question is

the fact that even if faced with civil war, displacement, refugees, multiple outbreak of violence, humanitarian crises, which is normally doubled and enhanced by famine and draught, the failed state would by no means accept any derogation from the full use of its sovereignty. This aspect can be explained since the states consider it vital to have a tight grasp on sovereignty as a concealing instrument. Moreover, the artificiality of the relationship is so extended that border changes are preferable to avoiding international pressure. For this case, a clear example is the situation in Sudan and the recent developments that lead to the creation of the new Republic of South Sudan.

According to the Failed State Index published in 2011 by Foreign Policy, Sudan is, for the third consecutive year, the third most damaged state in the world. On the basis of an accurate system that takes into consideration relevant political, social and economic criteria, the Index placed Sudan in the category of states facing internal dissolution. To the extensive conflict history of Sudan which has already been presented, another triptych of causes leading to this taxonomy needs to be detailed. Besides the effect of war on the Sudanese society, the failure of Sudan as a statehood is also related to the cold war era. From this point of view, the prolonged maintaining of military regimes and of dictatorships in Africa translated itself in a destabilizing factor for Sudan. Secondly, what played another role was the colonial rule. Although previously mentioned, colonialism deepened the cleavage between traditionalism and modernization.

This is particularly important in the case of Sudan as this has been a space of several traditional descents and the drastic impact lead to the over-evaluation and over-appreciation of a particular tradition in the detriment of the other(s). Lastly, the modernization process did not only manage to slow down the rhythm of development, but, as it was applied to unstable and unfinished

structures, it lead to the point of reaching a full stop.

The eruptions of violence between the North and the South of Sudan lead, after the consultative discussions in 2005 for the signing of Comprehensive Peace Agreement, to the radical decision favoring secession. In July 2011, following a popular referendum, the provisions of the agreement reached fruition and the Republic of South Sudan declared its independence. The politically oriented readers have been focusing since then on the future of the political landscape. However, there are now two directions that manage to be, at the same time, both independent and inter-dependent. As international relations is often portrayed in theory as a game of variables, in the present case, attention needs to be oriented to the future of the new state and to the past of the remaining Sudan.

The past of the Republic of Sudan is continuously dictating the present of the country. There is no future for the already failed state if the core issues are not addressed. This is a valuable process for both the North and the South. It is at this point that the chances of state failure multiplication can be narrowed down. The South learns by taking example once the North clarifies major problems. One such step has been taken, and the quasi-solution or even pseudo-solution for some analysts, of the split opened the path for issue resolution. Invested with popular recognition, the separation and the birth of the new state signify steps forward in the sense that they give a joint answer to a common problem for the North and the South. The separation process proves to be instrumental as it also manages to determine a process of reorientation of the priorities in both countries which can now focus on further political, economic and social reconstruction. For the Republic of Sudan, the political dimension is not necessarily central, but it extends to the regional level as well with Darfur and Abyei. These are regions which remain constant and key problems and which require a comprehensive solution. The narrative of the separation faces the Republic of Sudan with the reality of having lost almost 1/3 of its territory and this stands for the loss of economic force, mainly due to the vast amounts of natural resources the South now benefits on. In the light of this, Abyei, which was granted a special administrative status in the provisions of the 2006

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Comprehensive Peace Agreement and which is an oil-rich region and a true salient of economic prosperity, plays a fundamental role. Establishing the permanent status of the aforementioned region will indicate the level of political maturity of the parts. Moreover it will point to the rational employed by the North for rapidly recognizing and accepting the separation.

These political challenges are not the only ones as setbacks can be seen in the Economic sphere as well. Their relevance to the future trajectory of development is immense especially since “the northern economy is in dire straits due to inflation, corruption, and the less of oil revenue that […] accompany southern secession” (Temin, Murphy, 2011, p.2). Furthermore, very closely related is the extremely important concern regarding the dynamics of diversity. The North has a long and detailed history of unilaterally understanding the other, be it Black African or Arab with a different perspective on Islam, and its roles. It is why, the North faces the task of asserting less radical views especially since “the so-called perfecting of the Islamist Project will do nothing to address the underlying centre-periphery asymmetry” (Temin, Murphy, 2011, p.2). Therefore, it is of great relevance that the entire policy process, starting with the policymakers and continuing with the institutional infrastructure involved in policy articulation, meet the requirements and of the word “inclusive”.

As mentioned, the chronological developments look back for the Republic of Sudan and in front for the Republic of South Sudan. But the political design of the South is faced with the problem of inheriting the political behavior of the North and most importantly falling in the same category of failed states. The projected questions relate to the degree to which the new state will be the subject of transfer of artificiality from the North. The borders are still volatile. The secession, although adopted with an overwhelming majority, can be the cause of irredentism and future conflict. At this moment, time is the required factor to prove the corrosiveness of the boarders. The willingness of the parties to look forward and achieve their goals of meeting the needs of the country is significant. It is a crucial element in the matter of building confidence in the people, and by doing such, confidence in the state. Confidence levels are, for the number of months that have

passed since the split, satisfactory and they base themselves primarily on the success of the referendum, and, secondly, on the immediate recognition from the government in Khartoum.

The compliance of the North Sudan must not be understood as a gesture of finally expressing tolerance and political disposition for the end of military interactions. With a failed state, humanitarian concerns from the international community derive from proof of major and significant violation, even if the failed state pattern normally mentioned a high reluctance of the governments to offer access to the correct data. In most cases, these are devastating statistic or losses of lives, of physical and psychological mutilation, of assault and of displacement. And they lead to the deferring of the head of government to the proper institutions under accusations that are related to crimes against humanity. As Thürer states with regard to the liability of the State for violations of international law on the international level “it must be assumed that, by definition, the legal capacity of the failed State continues to exist. Though the State is for all practical purposes incapable of acting, it continues to have rights and obligations” (1999, p.740). Following this theoretical reasoning, the recognition of the Republic of South Sudan can be interpreted as a form of avoiding the continuation of the procedures for the indictment of the Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir for war crimes. Also it may be related with the desire of the Republic of Sudan to be taken off the list of countries that support terrorism, measure which would have positive effects and would raise the credibility of the country.

A second element that might undermine the fluidity of the confidence building process and might, thus, lead to the emergence of a new failed state, regards the fact that “it was the presence of thousands of Eritrea, Ethiopian and Ugandan troops and amour in Sudan, supporting the Sudan People’s Liberation Army, that forced Khartoum into making major concessions in the south” (Waal, 2006, p.738). This factor highlights the heavy voice of the regional, yet simultaneously places a question mark on the nature of the reasons for rapidly accepting the secession. Furthermore, it leaves the open discussion on the future of the situation in the case of regional alliance shifts.

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Coming back to the matter of transfer of failure from a state to another, it is necessary to mention that with the passing of time, certain elements will point out whether the Republic of South Sudan is the newest African failed state. By this, the article is referring to the points in the Failed State Index that were accounted strictly by the Government. Access to information, corruption levels, degrees of censorship, public services, security apparatus, group grievances, factionalized elites, infrastructure are all internal aspects the new state needs to first build and then consolidate in order to truly express the will of the people and address the needs of the people. Among these, the dialogue with the international arena is of fundamental importance. The voice of the Republic of South Sudan is the voice of a state that can set a precedent, although following the one Eritrea established in “a UN-backed referendum that took place in 1993” (Correia, 2011, p.1). Additionally, the South has to learn to speak of its problems in a unitary manner and not proceed by isolating questions that have common cause.

These elements of state building and consolidating are intertwined with the multiple weaknesses of the highly polarized area. Thus, by modifying the framework, ethnic division, resource competence, and lack of any successful background of economic development are factors that may qualify the state as a failed one, if not taken care of. The federal structure proposed in the Constitution was aimed at dealing with the ethnical pluralism, yet the “habits of war” (Stefanska, 2001, p.2) are a mark that has long been engraved. The lacks of infrastructure as well as the lack of any capacity to attract investments stress the fragility of the economy. To this, aiding in a negative manner is the lack of force of absorption of any investment.

Lastly, and again of political nature, a point of concern is the future of the relationship between the countries. What is clear is that the North and the South are clearly defined by “in between’s”. A mere border cannot erase decades of shared past, be it in the form of a conflict or in that of relative peace. Abyei is the element that

will either tie the countries or bring them in conflict again. A referendum to determine whether the Abyei region would remain to the North or to the South was scheduled, but it never occurred. It is a matter in which the sides still show signs of little flexibility and the articulation of a feasible decision for the both sides requires time. With regard to this, the Foreign Minister of Sudan, He Ali Karti stated that “though it is a problem and not an easy one, I will assure you from what we have heard from our partners it could be easily solved with some kind of patience and good mediation, and it will be easy for us to get out of that.”( Opposition Spokesperson for International Development, House of Lords, 2011, p.5). The statement is politically polite and partly conceals the nature of the interests of the parties, and this derives from the placing of an accent on the issues of citizenship, distribution of assets, visas, boarders.

Corrosive borders have been drawn all over the African continent. However the pencil holders were never from within the borders to be. A historical event with strong impact not only in the African space, but also in the entire world brought to life and into debates the questions of the future of the two countries, and of the chances that the new Republic of South Sudan fails as a state. The lowest common denominator that can be used to assess the paths of development at this moment is time. Behavior from the political to the cultural one, needs to be projected on an objective background, one that is euphoria free and that does not rejoice in happiness over an achieved goal. At present, the fragility of the region, the constant image of the past, the fluidity of the unknown place South Sudan in a transient position that clearly points to an inherent capacity of the South to fail. What can be concluded up to hitherto is that the secession was actually the most facile step, a step, however, bearing great implications for the future. The correctitude of the measures will be confirmed in time, and the pattern of political decisions that is going to be employed will point to whether or not the Republic of South Sudan can be labeled as a failed state.

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Reference:

Chatman House. Transcript: Current developments in Sudan. London: Chatman House. 2006. Correia, J. M. “North and South Sudan: What lies ahead?”. In: IPRIS Viewpoints, pp. 1-3. Davidson, J. and Wood. C. “A Conflict Resolution Model”. Theory into Practice, vol. 43, no. 1. In: Conflict and

Resolution and Peer Mediation, Winter, 2004, pp. 6-13. Deng, F. M., “Sudan: A nation in turbulent search of itself”. In: Annals of the American Academy of Political

and Social Science, vol. 603, Law, Society, and Democracy: Comparative Perspectives, January, 2006, pp. 155-162.

Ehrenreich Brooks, R. “Failed States, or the State as failure?”. In: The University of Chicago Law Review, vol. 72, no 4, Autumn, 2005, pp. 1159-1196.

Gruffydd, J.B. “Africa and the Poverty of International Relations”. In: Third World Quarterly, vol. 26, no. 6, 2005, pp. 987-1003.

Hagen, J. and Rymond-Richmond, W. “The Collective Dynamics of Racial Dehumanization and Genocide Victimization in Darfur”. In: American Sociological Review, vol. 73, no 6, December, 2008, pp. 875-902.

Kuhn, T. S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: Chicago University Press. 1962. Parry, D. E., and Wickens, G. E. “The Qozes of Southern Darfur Sudan Republic”. In: The Geographical

Journal, vol. 147, no. 3, November, 1981, pp. 307-320. Reinton, P. O. “Imperialism and the Southern Sudan”. In: Journal of Peace Research, vol. 8, no. ¾, 1971, pp.

239-247. Stefanske, B. “South Sudan on the Eve of Independence. Assessing the Viability of the World’s Newest State”.

In: The Polish Institute of International Affairs, no 10, 2011, pp. 1-9. Temin, J., and Murphy, T. “Towards a New Republic of Sudan”. United States Institute of Peace. In: Special

Report 278, 2011, pp. 1-12. Thurer, D. ”The failed state and international law”. In: International Review of the Red Cross, no. 836, 1999. Udombana, J, N. “When Neutrality is a Sin: The Darfur Crisis and the Crisis of Humanitarian Intervention in

Sudan.”. In:Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 27. No. 4, November, 2005, pp. 1149-1199. Waal, de A. “Darfur!”. In: Review of African Political Economy, vol. 33, no. 110, Religion, Ideology and

Conflict in Africa, September, 2006, pp. 737-739. War in Darfur and the Search for Peace. Harvard. Global Equity Initiative. 2007. Warburg, G. “Mahdism and Islamism in Sudan”. In: International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 27. No.

2, May, 1995, pp. 219-236. Webber, M. Staatssoziologie. Berlin. Johanner Winckelmann. 1996. Young, J. (2007) “Sudan: Not More Diplomacy but Popular National Struggles”. In: Review of African

Political Economy, vol. 34, No. 111, Debates on the Left on Southern Africa, March, pp. 165-168.

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A PROBLEM OF CONSOLIDATION

Moldovan Democracy and Regime Choice from Independence to

the ''Twitter Revolution'' Paula GANGA 1

Abstract

While democracy’s most memorable triumphs have occurred in sweeping waves such as the

democratic movements that changed the face of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in 1989 and

1991 and possibly the current democratic movements in the Middle East, some democratic changes

are inherently more technical and have more to do with institution building rather than simple strong

popular support. The most recent case to express this assertion occurred in the Republic of Moldova.

This paper will argue that in spite of the strong popular support showed by the 2009 manifestations,

democracy in the Republic of Moldova has been weakening since the early 2009 due to the change

in regime type from semi-presidential to parliamentary. Because the population currently does not

directly elect its president – the Parliament does – the quality of democracy in Moldova has been

degrading steadily in spite of the vigorous 2009 signal. The causes as well as the possible solution for

the democratic stagnation in Moldova will be explored in the following.

Keywords: democracy, regime change, Moldova, Twitter Revolution.

1 Paula Ganga, Graduate Student Center for Eurasian, Russian and East European Studies Georgetown University, Washington DC, United States. Email: [email protected].


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Although it was among the first Soviet republics to express its wish to build a separate national destiny by refusing to sign Gorbachev's Union Treaty, Moldova seems to have gotten lost along the road to consolidated democracy. From the civil war of the early 1990s to the post-electoral unrest that some have called the ―Twitter Revolution‖ of 2009, Moldova has been struggling with economic weaknesses, national identity problems, and massive emigration of most of its qualified workforce to Russia, Romania or the EU.

Yet, according to some definitions of democracy, Moldova is actually doing fairly well. Although an unreformed Communist Party remains one of the most important political forces in the country, Moldova's elections have been repeatedly judged free and fair by OSCE international observers (leaving aside those held under the auspices of the breakaway regime in Transnistria). Unlike in Belarus or Russia, Moldovan presidents have repeatedly lost out in power struggles with legislatures; moreover, civil society and the press regularly criticize the government, even if they face occasional intimidation from the authorities. (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2007, pp.86-87)

In spite of these achievements, Moldova's democratic consolidation seems inexplicably frozen. According to Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, explaining why Moldova fares so bad[ly] after behaving relatively well does not stumble from want of justifications. We confront too many explanations, not too few‖ (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2007, p.86). The absence of a clear identity and a common history accepted by the entire population, the deep societal divisions between Romanian - and Russian - speakers, the unresolved conflict in Transnistria, the weakness of state structures, and the generally poor record of economic performance are all viable explanations for Moldova's lack of consolidation. While in the literature on Moldova a separate case has been made for the specific importance of each one of these factors, this paper will instead focus on a more recent important development: the change in political regime of 2000, when the country shifted from a semi-presidential to a parliamentary system.

This change not only had a negative impact on reforms in that year (in which yet another round of voting in parliament was required before a president was finally elected)

but in subsequent years as well. Moldova has not had a permanent head of state since September 2009.i Accordingly, this paper will argue that the 2000 shift in political system is a key reason for the lack of democratic consolidation in Moldova. After tracing the broad historical development of the country, it will consider the institutional changes that Moldova has gone through since independence, as well as the ways in which these changes have influenced the democratization process. Despite the fairly wide-ranging consensus that parliamentarism is more suitable for democracies in transition than presidentialism, this paper argues that the change from semi-presidentialism to parliamentarism blocked further democratic consolidation in Moldova. This happened because in the context of a fragmented system of weak actors (what Lucan Way describes as ―pluralism by default‖) either a very strong actor emerges monopolizing the resources of the system (as it happened under the Communist administrations) or the weak actors do not have the strength to further the democratic agenda (Moldova's situation since 2009). Though Moldova shows encouraging signs of democracy, its development could have been much more stable and consistent. Finally, an analysis of the recent ―Twitter Revolution‖ and of the electoral processes taking place in Moldova since 2009 will assess the state of the current level of democracy in the country and its prospects for the future.

1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Although a part of the medieval

principality of Moldavia, the current territory of Moldova was annexed by the Tsarist Empire in 1812. Following the end of World War I, local elites decided to join with the Kingdom of Romania. After World War II this territory was again under Russian rule.ii For the next 50 years Moldova would be a part of the Soviet Union. At the time of the post-World War II annexation, the USSR faced the challenge of having to build the Soviet identity of the region not in addition to the existing Romanian identity, but in opposition to it, as Romania was demanding the return of the territory (Dima, 1991, pp.47-49). This pushed the Soviet Union to pursue an active policy of creating as many differences between Romania and Moldova as possible in an attempt to erase the

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existing linkages. The fact of the previous incorporation of the territory into the Russian Empire became the main argument in the Soviet propaganda. It was argued that the century spent under Tsarist rule had ―transformed the local population into Slavs‖iii (Ciscel, 2007, p.10).

However, in spite of considerable Soviet attempts to erase or weaken ties to Romania by encouraging the migration of Russian-speaking populations to Moldovan cities and to its industrial region of Transnistria, during the 1980s Moldova nevertheless experienced a ―Romanian awakening‖ (Dima, 1991, p.141). In the context of perestroika and of the national revival wave that was sweeping the entire Soviet Union, the frustrations of the Romanian speakers of Moldova found an arena where they could be voiced. In May 1989 several cultural societies that had come into existence during the 1980s united under the name the Moldavian Popular Front. This organization with a membership of close to a million people became the most important political force in Moldova (Dima, 1991, p.144). The elections of March 1990 brought the Popular Front two thirds of the local Soviet parliament. Petru Lucinschi, the secretary of the Communist Party, tried to prevent the Front from naming a Moldavian-Romanian as president of the republic but in the end Mircea Snegur became the new pro-Romanian president. (King, 2000, p.146)

The Russian-speaking population, already frightened by the prospect of a pro-Romanian leadership in the Moldovan parliament, felt further threatened by a new language law (Dima, 2001, p.146). According to this legislation, Russians living in Moldova had five years to learn the new state language if they wished to become—or remain—state employees. To express their opposition to the new pro-Romanian laws, the Russians went on strike in key Moldovan industrial cities, most of which are located across the Dniester River in what later became the breakaway republic of Transnistria.

In addition to this, another minority in Moldova declared its autonomy in the face of this pro-Romanian assertiveness. In August 1990, the Turkic-speaking Gagauz declared a separate ―Republic of Gagauzia‖ in the south of Moldova, while an independent Transnistria (formally, the ―Dniester Moldovan Republic‖) was proclaimed in eastern Moldova in September 1990 (King, 2000,

p.147). The Gagauz were integrated into the Moldovan state fairly quickly by means of concessions such as the creation of a local elected assembly, the provision for institutional representation at the national level, and the guarantee of local autonomy in matters of natural resources, economy, justice, higher education, and cultureiv (Roper, 2004, p.533). However, Transnistria has proved to be a much more difficult problem to solve. After a violent civil war in 1992 in which the Russian Fourteenth Army helped the separatist side, Chişinău had to accept the creation of this de facto state that remains under the protection of a permanent Russian military presencev (Lynch, 2000).

The defeat of the Moldovan state in the Transnistrian war under a pro-Romanian Popular Front government inflicted lasting wounds on the pro-Romanian parties. The first Moldovan president, Mircea Snegur, together with Romanian President Ion Iliescu agreed that reunification was not an immediate option, as on the one hand the threat from secession of Transnistria was quite serious and on the other Romania had enough problems of its own at the time. (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2007, p.92)

Additionally, public opinion polls in 1990 showed that only 3.9% of Moldovans (and even fewer Ukrainians, Russians, and other minorities) approved of unification, although independence was favored by 54.8% of Moldovans, 8.8% of Russians and 8.4% of Ukrainians (King, 2000, p.145). Thus, in order to prevent the disintegration of Moldova, Sengur gradually distanced himself from Romania, promoting instead the independence of the Moldovan state. Posing as a guarantor of independence and territorial integrity, Snegur also hoped to win votes, as a large majority of the population preferred a moderate option to the radical reunification with Romania. Despite his change in tactics he lost to Petru Lucinschi in the country's first free and fair presidential election. In the late 1990s, as Lucinschi was approaching the end of his term in office—and as the parliamentary elections scheduled for 2000 drew nearer—a series of institutional reforms changed the rules of the game. The president of Moldova would no longer be elected by the population, but by the parliament, thus making any presidential hopeful depend on a strong party with enough seats in the

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parliament to ensure election. As a result of these reforms, a strong Moldovan Communist Party (PCRM) took control of parliament; this newly-elected body then chose Vladimir Voronin as president.vi

2. INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND DEMOCRATIC

CONSOLIDATION IN MOLDOVA

In discussing the possibilities for democratic transitions in the states that emerged from Communism in the 1990s, political scientists have sought to draw lessons from earlier democratic transitions in Latin America and Southern Europe (Linz and Stepan, 1996). One such lesson—which had garnered the support of ―transitologists‖--was that parliamentary regimes are more conducive for the development of democracy than presidential regimes. (Linz, 1990) Though Juan Linz, the author of this theory, acknowledges that both regime types have created stable democracies across the world, he argues that there are shortcomings associated with presidentialism that make it a less suitable institutional choice for fledgling democracies. Based on the experience of Latin American countries, Linz claims that presidentialism holds within itself a constant paradox. On the one hand, the system creates a strong executive legitimated by popular vote; while on the other hand, the constitutions of these systems always reflect the suspicion that the president will use this legitimacy to personalize the power of the office (Linz, 1990, p.54). Therefore, presidentialism carries with it a high degree of conflict and at any time the elected leader can fall to the temptation of marginalizing his opponents and further concentrating power on the basis of his popular mandate.

This dimension of conflict is visible in the ―perils‖ Linz famously associates with presidentialism. In his analysis, the fixed-terms create an artificial segmentation in governing along a predetermined electoral cycle. This can make the political actors time their actions to the elections, exacerbating political conflict in the process. Secondly, the other great shortcoming of presidentialism is that in its ―winner-take-all‖ logic the opposition might be sidelined for too long, resulting in its demise. For Linz, these shortcomings—absent in a parliamentary

system—can exacerbate preexisting tendencies toward authoritarianism, which happens much more rarely in a parliamentarian regime.

This traditional view on presidentialism versus parliamentarism does not, however, find support in the Moldovan experience.vii There, the greatest level of political pluralism was found when the country had a semi-presidential regime, whereas the turn toward parliamentarism in 2000 created both the conditions for the advent of the Communist Party to power and the current continued instability of a system that is still unable to elect a president. It was Moldovan parliamentarism that was vulnerable to the ―perils‖ Linz warned against: the concentration of power in the hands of Vladimir Voronin as the leader of the largest political force in the parliament, the lack of continuity in government because of the election cycle,viii and the sidelining of the opposition (which is still unable to garner the support needed to elect a new president).

Lucan Way uses the concept of ―pluralism by default‖ as a means of explaining this paradoxical situation. This phenomenon, which is pervasive throughout the former Soviet space and which is responsible for the general decline in democratic politics across the region, characterizes countries in which political competition survives ―not because leaders are especially democratic or because societal actors are particularly strong, but because the government is too fragmented and the state too weak to impose authoritarian rule in a democratic international context‖ (Way, 2002, p.232 and p.127). Leaders lack the authority to prevent defection of their allies to the opposition, control the legislature, or use force against political opponents. While this ensures continued political pluralism and prevents the concentration of resources in the hands of incumbents, it also ―undermines effective governance and may ultimately threaten long-term democratic consolidation‖ (Way, 2002, p.127). In Moldova this type of pluralism emerged from the polarization over national identity as well as weak elite networks. (Way, 2003, p.455)

Already in the early 1990s Moldova was considered one of the most robust democratic polities in the former Soviet Union after the Baltic countries. In spite of ―poverty, economic decline, ethnic conflict, and weak civil society and rule of

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law, Moldova (…) had come very close to meeting standard minimum definitions of democracy‖ (Way, 2002, p.130). Way supported this argument by highlighting the active contestation of elections in the country. Parliamentary elections in 1990, 1994, 1998 and 2001 were also highly competitive, the composition of parties changing from one legislature to the other (See Table 1 at the end of this paper). Second, there were other sources of support for pluralism in this period. Media sources presented a wide range of views, even though many outlets were controlled or owned by the state or by political parties. The Constitutional Court of Moldova acted independently to resolve disputes between the other branches of government (Way, 2002, p.130). Furthermore, the legislature ―consistently constrained presidential authority to a degree not seen in Moldova’s post-Soviet neighbors,‖ as strong parliaments are rare in the CIS (Way, 2002, p.130). Currently, Moldova has one of the few parliamentary regimes in the region. Yet, the establishment of a parliamentary system has not promoted democratic consolidation. If anything, the opposite has been the case.

3. REGIME CHANGES AND THE DEMISE OF PLURALISM

Moldova first chose the institutional form of

its political system at a time when scholars were still debating the virtues of parliamentary versus (semi-)presidential systems. However, in choosing the regime by which they would govern themselves, the countries in the region did not act in a vacuum uninfluenced by tradition. Mazo argues that ―constitution-makers in these countries functioned within the constraints of Soviet-era institutions, and in fact were heavily influenced by them as well; they were not functioning with a blank slate at all‖ (2004, p.11.) Maurice Duverger noted that semi-presidentialism is somewhat similar to Soviet administrative law, in that executive power is divided into strategic and managerial functions. In the Soviet Union, these functions were assigned respectively to the party central committee and the state administration (Duverger in Matsuzato, 2006, p.317). This characteristic leads Matsuzato to argue that when semi-presidential regimes emerged, particularly in

CIS countries, the political elite recognized in this type of regime a structure compatible with the clientelistic characteristics of their country's politics. Under semi-presidentialism, the president enjoys abundant potential to manipulate elite clans by exploiting his prerogative to appoint and dismiss prime ministers. (2006, p.317-8)

Between 1991 and 1994—that is, after independence but before the adoption of its new constitution—Moldova had been governed under the institutional framework it inherited from the Soviet Union. In 1991, Snegur, then a leading opposition figure, became Moldova’s first president.

Still, the institution of a presidency was not created at the time. Rather, Snegur’s new ―presidency‖ had been superimposed over the Soviet-era institutions that were left in place as the USSR was dissolving. This resulted in a constant power struggle between the executive and legislative branches that could not easily be resolved. (Mazo, 2004, p.12-13)

To a degree not witnessed in other post-Soviet states, the first legislature in Moldova was consistently able to constrain the president’s power. This parliament was even able to draft the constitution; however, it chose to create a semi-presidential regime due to the unique circumstances of the early 1990s, particularly the political struggle between Mircea Snegur and Petru Lucinschi. When the constitution was being drafted in 1994, President Snegur unsurprisingly preferred a stronger presidential office, while Lucinschi was the head of parliamentix and preferred a semi-presidential model.

The newly-created regime was ―premier-presidential‖ (Mazo, 2004, p.13). This semi-presidential arrangement created both a president who served as head of state and a prime minister as head of government.x Moldova’s elected president would always be outmatched by the country’s legislature, which was consistently able to constrain his authority. Under the new constitution, the president could not circumvent the will of the legislature by resorting to referenda; only parliament could make amendments (Matsuzato, 2006, pp.329-330). ―Pluralism by default‖ did indeed result in the legislature which, despite being composed of bitter political rivals, was united in its goal not to relinquish the power it gained over to the common enemy, the president.

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In this period, ―pluralism by default‖ was also reflected in the diversity of political parties and political opinions. The new electoral system was based on party-list proportional representation, with the entire country serving as one electoral district. The threshold was set at 4%. The system was designed to ensure the development political parties, and to encourage the emergence of issue-based politics over the politics of personalities. As Table 2 shows, 13 parties participated in the 1991 election, of which 4 crossed the threshold into Parliament. The Democratic Agrarian Party, which was made up of former communists, received 43% of the vote, with three other parties receiving 22.0, 9.21, and 7.53% of the vote, respectively.

By 1998, another parliamentary election was held in Moldova. Its results were to usher in an important change: the re-legalized Communist Party, which had been banned in 1991, managed to obtain 30% of the vote. After the redistribution of seats from wasted votes, it secured 40 of the 101 parliamentary seats (see Table 3).xi (Mazo, 2004, p.28)

President Lucinschi thus lost the center-left parliamentary majority that he had enjoyed for the previous two years. During the next three years of ―cohabitation,‖ five prime ministers were appointed and dismissed. This situation not only devastated Moldova’s social-economic situation but also its international reputation and its ability to secure foreign investment. Facing this deadlock, Lucinschi organized a non-binding referendum on the introduction of a more presidential system in May 1999. (Roper, 2008, p.120)

At the same time, a parliamentary alliance between the Communists and the center-right was taking shape. These two forces proposed amending the constitution to introduce a more parliamentary regime, with the president elected by the parliament. To compensate for the potential reduction in presidential legitimacy caused by the change from direct popular elections to an indirect parliamentary presidential election, the constitutional amendment of July 5, 2000 required that the president obtain a three-fifths supermajority of votes from the legislature. The amendments also eliminated the president's ability to initiate legislation and transferred most presidential powers to the majority party or bloc in the legislature. (Roper, 2008, p.120)

Contrary to what Moldova’s parliamentarians claimed at the time, Moldova did not become a pure parliamentary republic with the passage of these amendments. Instead, it now resembled a new and rare regime typology that some have called ―semi-parliamentary‖ (Mazo, 2004, p.29). Although the president was now to be elected by parliament, he still served for a fixed term in office. He also retained the power to nominate the prime minister and was still the head of government. By retaining a fixed term after his parliamentary selection, the new president could not—unlike the prime minister—suddenly be brought down by a vote of no confidence. In short, the two branches, executive and legislative, still retained to their fixed terms of office, even though they no longer had separate sources of popular legitimacy. The changes in the regime type in Moldova resulted in eliminatin key sources of pluralism and competition. (Levitski and Way, 2010, p.231)

Even though Lucinschi's term expired in the fall of 2000, he stayed on as acting president because no candidate was able to gather a majority vote in parliament. Centrists within the parliament repeatedly blocked the election of PCRM leader, Vladimir Voronin. The resulting gridlock eventually led to the parliament's dissolution in January 2001 and to new elections a month later. These resulted in an overwhelming Communist majority, which then voted Voronin into office. Although the Communists won just over 50% of the vote, they benefited from an increase in the threshold (passed the previous year) from 4% to 6% xii (Table 3). As a result, several center-right parties, which ironically had supported the raising of the threshold, failed to qualify for seats. (Mazo, 2004, pp.12-16)

In explaining the Communists' electoral success, several important factors come into play: the disastrous socioeconomic situation making Moldova the poorest country in Europe, with 60–70% of its population living below the poverty line; the departure of between 600,000 and 800,000 Moldovans to work abroad in Russia or Western Europe (some 15% of the total population) leaving home an electorate comprised mostly of pensioners, who tend to be the poorest, most nostalgic, most electorally disciplined, and most pro-Communist of all voters. Additionally, the Communists were helped by the complete

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meltdown of the political oppositions that had opened up the political space for them to expand. Plus, political instability (with eight prime ministers in office between 1991 and 2001) only exacerbated the population's rejection of the previous parties in power. Moreover, the fact that the PCRM had not participated in any national elections prior to 1998 meant that it could present itself as a group of ―outsiders,‖ a tactic that was used actively during a 2001 campaign in which politicians’ integrity was the dominant theme. Voronin himself acknowledged that many people voted for the Communists in protest, not in support of the party's platform. (March, 2004, p.511)

Once Voronin took office, the political situation stabilized dramatically. The referring of constitutional questions to the Constitutional Court, which had often resulted in the defeat of the president and/or the prime minister decreased significantly after 2001. Some experts maintain that Moldovan politics stabilized under Voronin not because the new constitutional regime functioned well, but because he was the leader of the largest organized party in the country and had leverage to influence the parliament’s activities.xiii (Matsuzato, 2006, p.332)

This change, which brought an end to ―pluralism by default,‖ did not promote democratic consolidation in Moldova. The opposite result was achieved instead; democracy soon became less consolidated and was now marked by its lack of pluralism.

4. PLURALISM UNDER VORONIN For Luke March, one of the Communists'

main undeniable achievements was ―democracy deterioration‖ (2004, p.518). Since its first term, the PCRM's policies were not only contradictory, paternalistic and centralizing, but were also implemented without any consultation with the opposition or the people as a whole. Often, these policies were not even made public until after decisions were already reached in backroom deals. Such examples were the controversial decision to make Russian the second state language and the project to replace the textbook History of the Romanians with History of Moldova in schools. Combined, these measures provoked the biggest and longest-lasting demonstrations (allegedly including up to 40,000 people and

lasting for 3 months) in the Moldovan capital since independence. The Communists responded by temporarily banning the Christian Democratic People’s Party (PPCD), the chief instigator of the protests. (Way, 2002, p.130)

In addition, evidence surfaced of the PCRM's repeated pressure on opposition media; not only had some outlets been closed, but journalists were intimidated through such methods as frequent tax inspections or closure of their offices on sanitary grounds; especially vulnerable were those working for the state broadcaster Teleradio-Moldova. The government’s control over the media was particularly evident in the local elections of 2003, when state-run media were openly biased in favor of PCRM candidates, in violation of the electoral code. (March, 2004, p.515)

Additionally, in late November 2001, the Economic Court ordered the closure of the stridently antigovernment weekly Kommersant Moldovy—the first such closure in the history of post-Soviet Moldova. State television and radio, the main source of news for much of the country, were widely criticized for their severely limited coverage of opposition politicians. In the spring of 2002, journalists unsuccessfully went on strike as a protest against what they saw as undue pressure to stick to the party line. In mid-March, the anchorman of the Russian-language newscast was fired after he aired information on the protest. (Way, 2002, pp.130-131)

Although these worrying trends did not amount to an outright reversal of all democratic freedoms, no further consolidation took place either.xiv Moreover, an authoritarian and opaque political modus operandi characterized many of the actions of the party and the president. For example, government employees were fired with regularity and without explanation. Only seven of the original seventeen government ministers remained by April 2003. Some 30% of local administrators were also replaced, and the reintroduced Soviet-era administrative systemxv conveniently reflected the structure of the party’s regional organizations. According to critics, personal loyalty to Voronin became the main criterion for selection and promotion in the government and party bureaucracies. (March, 2004, p.518)

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The most evident infringement of democratic values occurred in the judicial sphere. Voronin increased his powers of appointment over new judges, while carrying out a widespread purge of the security services. Ostensibly this was intended to root out corruption, but the concurrent dismissal of the human rights ombudsman and attempts to limit the powers of the Constitutional Court did not fit this explanation.xvi (March, 2004, p.516)

The greatest contradictions were however in Voronin's foreign policy. Promising during the campaign to make Russia Moldova's strategic partner, the PCRM seemed clearly anti-Western. However, in spite of a promising start,xvii relations with Moscow took a turn for the worse in 2003, when Russia proposed the Kozak Memorandum as a solution to the situation of Transnistria.xviii Although initially, Voronin reacted positively to the proposal, following intense popular pressure,xix he backed down on the document one day before the scheduled signing of the accord, creating permanent strains in his relationship with Putin.

After this episode Voronin adopted a less friendly tone towards Russia, playing the ―anti-Russia‖ card during the 2005 elections when the Communists repositioned themselves as pro-Europeansxx (Crowther, 2007, p.284), making Brussels a ―source of identity and appeal for both sides of the political spectrum‖ (Cash, 2009, p.267) and forcing the liberals to complain of the appropriation of ―Europe‖ by the Communists. The reasons behind this inconsistent foreign policy can be traced to Voronin's wish to solve the problems of a highly-divided Moldovan society, especially the issue of Transnistria (which hit close to home for Voronin that year, when the separatist authorities prevented him from attending his mother's funeral). As the Russian plan was not conducive towards the solution of the conflict, the EU emerged as an alternative partner on conflict-resolution and economic-development partner. (March, 2004, p.519)

During Voronin's two terms as president, Moldova's Freedom House democratization rating dropped from ―non-consolidated democracy‖ to ―semi-consolidated authoritarian‖ regime (Mungiu-Pippidi and Munteanu, 2009, p.137). In general, Moldova's scores in Nations in Transit (Table 9) had since the beginning of the program in 1997 placed the country close to Romania, especially

regarding the electoral process. Moldova lagged behind on local government and on governance issues more generally. It is also one of the most corrupt countries in Europe according to Transparency International, but its scores over the last years were close to those of Romania and Bulgaria, which joined the EU in 2007. The rule of law is the area in which Moldova most notably fails to meet democratic criteria. Moldova’s judiciary does not provide the checks and balances fundamental to a consolidated democracy. The judiciary also suffers from weak institutional capacity, caused in part by low wages and by the absence of internal corruption controls. (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2007, p.87)

5. THE “TWITTER” REVOLUTION AND BEYOND

On April 5, 2009, Moldova held new general elections. The PCRM faced an opposition divided less by ideology than by petty interests. Among the opposition parties were the Our Moldova Alliance (AMN), led by Serafim Urechean; the Liberal Party (PL), whose young charismatic leader Dorin Chirtoacă had been elected the mayor of Chişinau in 2007; and the new Liberal Democratic Party (PLDM), led by Vladimir Filat. All three parties shared a pro-European orientation, with the PL distinguished by its uniquely pro-Romanian stance. (Socor 2009a)

During the campaign, opinion polls consistently showed the Communists with around 35% support, while the opposition parties combined came close to the same figure. When the Central Election Commission (CEC) announced that 50% of the vote—and 60 out of 101 seats—had gone to the Communists, the result differed strikingly from previous polls, including a national exit poll on election night. The opposition attributed the discrepancy to fraud (Mungiu-Pippidi and Munteanu, 2009, pp.137-138). On April 6, as the OSCE was giving the election a clean bill of health, local NGOs started calling for a protest rally. The next day, the protestors were joined by some opposition leaders in front of government offices in the heart of the capital. The demonstrators’ numbers had grown from 10,000 the day before to nearly 30,000,xxi a huge number for a metropolitan area with a population of about 900,000. (Negru, 2010, p.20)

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As the official media did not cover the protests, information about them spread instead through Twitter and other online networking services.xxii Accounts, pictures, and videos of the rally were appearing in real time on Twitter and YouTube, in addition to the intense use of mobile phones and SMS services.xxiii As the authorities denied the organizers access to microphones and electronic speakers, the crowd split into segments. Some protesters responded angrily to the massive presence of the police, whose use of water cannons ignited the crowd’s fury. A hail of stones thrown by the crowd forced the police to withdraw. The police regained control of the city center only on April 8, after hundreds of arrests. President Voronin accused Romania of having orchestrated an attempted coup, as he expelled foreign activists from the country and passed a decree requiring that Romanian citizens get a visa in order to travel to the countryxxiv (Socor 2009b). A recount of the votes brought no change in the results but both the opposition and the OSCE pointed out to several ways in which fraud was most likely committed.

Following April 7, the regime's retaliation came as the Moldovan police not only arrested rioters but also unleashed a massive general campaign of repression against dissent in general, detaining more than a thousand people. Teenagers, civil society organizations, and the media were special targets. Three deaths due to police abuse have been documented. Several Western television crews, as well as journalists from Romania, were asked to leave the country, and restrictions on access to the Romanian media were tightened (Mungiu-Pippidi and Munteanu, 2009, p.139). These developments prompted foreign actors to react to the police violence occurring on the streets of Chisinau. For example, the European Parliament initially released a mild resolution on the April 5 elections noticing the orderly fashion in which the process took place and asking Romania and other neighbors not to interfere with Moldova’s sovereignty. Yet the next day a more decided resolution condemned the police interference in the protests.xxv

As the results of the election had left the PCRM one seat short of the 61 needed to elect the president (Table 6), the opposition was successful in blocking the election of a new Communist president. This led to new elections in

July 2009. Though the PCRM still gathered the greatest number of seats (48), the results were more reflective of voters' actual intent (Table 7). As the opposition held 53 seats, it had enough votes to form a government, though too few to elect the president. Vlad Filat became the new prime minister, while Mihai Ghimpu was named interim president, to serve until a candidate could attract the necessary three-fifths (61 votes) majority. Since the dramatic events of what has come to be known as the „Twitter Revolution,‖xxvi the four previous opposition parties have created the ―Alliance for European Integration.‖

Under the Filat government, the problem of the parliamentary regime of the country was addressed. However, instead of a deeper reform Moldovan policy-makers decided for a referendum asking the population to support the change of procedure in electing the president.xxvii This would mean a return to the previous way of electing the president through direct vote and not by parliament. As a result of this decision, a referendum was held in September 2010 asking Moldovan citizens whether they wanted a directly-elected president. 87.83% of those who voted supported the proposal; however, since voter turnout (at 30.29%) was below the 33% threshold, the referendum was declared invalid (Socor 2010). These results were highly surprising especially in the context of the popular participation to the events of April 2009. xxviii

6. CONCLUSION

Even if a parliamentary majority finally

emerges from this current cycle of inconclusive elections, Moldova will be trapped in a catch-22. If the PCRM takes power, then the realities of Voronin's early years will return, including the party control of the state, the neo-Soviet populism, and the crackdowns on opposition-minded civil society groups, media sources, and political parties. However, if the Alliance gains control, the instability of the pre-2000 period will return.

In contrast to the traditional warnings of the ―perils of presidentialism,‖ we have seen that the Moldovan case is one in which an unconsolidated democracy can fall victim to the perils of parliamenarism. By analyzing the context of each of Moldova's constitutional changes from independence to the most recent referendum, this

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country presents a highly contradicted image. Although it does indeed present to the outsider a ―normal‖ political sphere, with frequent, free, and relatively fair elections that incumbents can and do lose, Moldova has nonetheless failed the test of democratic consolidation.

Moldova's current political deadlock is due most of all to the fact that the dynamic between the presidency and the parliament that existed under semi-presidentialism has been destroyed. Only two alternatives—the monopolistic party and the weak coalition—have replaced this dynamic; moreover, without a change in system, these are the only alternatives that can replace it.

As its parliament continues to prove incapable of electing a president, Moldova's

political elites have finally begun to understand the need to change the system. Yet, in the aftermath of the Twitter Revolution, the population has become understandably frustrated and dismayed with the democratic process. Less than one in three Moldovans could be persuaded to vote in a referendum that—at least in institutional terms—could have wiped the slate clean of the chaos of the last decades. Unfortunately, it

seems all too likely that in the immediate future Moldova will remain stuck at this dreary rest-stop along the road towards democratic consolidation. If, however, Moldovans can all agree on the need for cooperation, then they—the people as well as the political elites—can push together and get their country moving again.

Notes: i Since Vladimir Voronin resigned from the presidency on September 11, 2009, a closely-divided parliament has been unable to agree on his replacement; Mihai Ghimpu, Vlad Filat and Marian Lupu have served as acting presidents since then. ii At this time, the area east of the Dniester River currently under the control of the Transnistrian authorities was added to the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic. iii The use of the Cyrillic alphabet together with a more archaic version of the Romanian language were the main linguistic arguments used by the Soviets. iv The Gagauz leaders accepted the compromise as the ethnic Gagauz population was the majority of only two of the five administrative regions included in the claimed territory. In the 1994 Moldovan Constitution, the cities and villages of the region could hold referenda and choose to be part of the special „territorial autonomous region.‖ In March 1995 Gagauz Yeri (―Gagauz land‖) was created and equipped with the institutions of governor (Başkan), executive committee (Bakannık Komiteti), and a legislative assembly (Halk Topluşu). (King, 2000, p.218-9). v The regime is kept alive and thriving to this day thanks to its ties to Russia, which provides it with 1.1 billion cubic meters (bcm) of free gas each year. By comparison, the rest of Moldova (whose population is seven times larger) has an annual consumption of between 2.5 and 2.7 bcm. (Baclajanschi, 2006) Additionally, along its extensive border with Ukraine, Transnistria has been conducting for years a massive contraband trade that ranges from oil products to cigarettes, alcohol, industrial and agricultural goods, military hardware, money laundering, and even human trafficking. This smuggling operation is essentially carried out by the Transnistrian customs service (headed by the son of the regime's president) and maintained with the implicit consent of Ukraine and of numerous, well-bribed Moldovan and Ukrainian officials. (Quinlan, 2004, p.498). vi These developments will be discussed in detail in the third section. vii Additional critiques to those presented here with direct application on Moldova were brought from a more general perspective with examples from Latin America by Horowitz (1990). The debate was continued with Linz’s response in the same issue of the Journal of Democracy (1990). viii Such instances of incoherent policies dictated by the electoral cycle are discussed in the next section. ix As he was also chair of the Constitutional Commission, this made him the designer of the constitutional text. x For Mazo, countries in which the prime minister exerts greater power are labeled ―premier-presidential‖ while countries in which the president wields the real authority are known as ―president-parliamentary‖ regimes. (2004, p.15) xi Described as an unreformed Communist Party, Vladimir Voronin's PCRM made no explicit commitments to democracy in its program. Yet, the Party rejected dogmatism, totalitarianism, ideological monopoly, and the Stalinist cult of personality, with commitments to reformed socialism, political rights and freedoms, and

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entrepreneurship. The party has attempted to broaden its appeal beyond the Russian-speaking ethnic minorities. It has espoused a Moldovanist stance promising to defend the terms ―Moldovan people‖ and ―Moldovan language.‖ (March, 2004, p.508). xii This meant that only two opposition parties entered parliament, essentially increasing the Communists’ margin of victory and creating a seventy-one-seat Communist majority that could form a government (fifty-two seats), elect a president (sixty-one seats), and change the constitution (sixty-eight seats). (March, 2004, p.512) xiii The current instability—when no single party dominates the political arena—has proved this opinion to be accurate. xiv By some evaluations Moldova was now simply authoritarian. For example, in 2004 Freedom House categorized Moldovan media as ―not free.‖ (see table 9 at the end of the article). xv This reform replaced the thirteen large judeţe (counties) introduced in 1998 with the Soviet-era system of thirty-two raioane (districts). These reforms incurred widespread condemnation, particularly from the Council of Europe (which had helped finance the original reform), for limiting local autonomy. (March, 2004, p.515). xvi By early 2002, 70% of the heads of district and appellate courts had been replaced and the selection of the Constitutional Court judges was placed under legislative authority. (Way, 2002, p.130). xvii In June 2000 then-President Vladimir Putin made a state visit to Chişinău, the first by a Russian leader since the demise of the USSR; it was reciprocated in November 2001 by Voronin's visit to Moscow. (RFE/RL Newsline 19 June 2000 and 6 November 2001). xviii Although it contained the provision of creating an asymmetrical federation in which Chişinău would have the lead, the plan would have allowed Russia to keep its troops in Transnistria indefinitely as peacekeepers, placed Transnistria in a highly favorable position in a future Moldovan federal state (with effective veto over all federal legislation), and made Moldova a neutral and demilitarized state with Russian as an official language. (Quinlan, 2004, p.496). xix Crowds of as many as 30,000 protesters would regularly gather to call for Voronin's resignation. (Nygren, 2007, p.89). xx Two years after gaining power on a pro-Russian platform, Voronin started to declare that EU integration was Moldova's main strategic direction. The government even sent demining personnel in Iraq to support the US-led coalition. (March, 2004, p.519). xxi Hotnews.ro, ―Chisinau, ciocniri intre cei 30.000 de manifestanti si politie. CLadirea Parlamentului e in flacari – ora 22:00‖, April 8, 2009. Available at : http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-esential-5560436-video-update-chisinau-ciocniri-intre-cei-30-000-manifestanti-politie-cladirea-parlamentului-flacari-ora-22-00.htm . Accessed on: October 9, 2011. xxii Hotnews.ro, ―Moldova pe Twitter, Facebook si site-uri: Prima revolutie transmisa online‖, April 7, 2009. Available at: http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-ultima_ora-5557292-moldova-twitter-facebook-site-uri-prima-revolutie-transmisa-online.htm . xxiii A first person account of the events is Rodion Burca’s book . 2010. xxiv This new visa regime instituted on April 9th was ended on September 18th by the acting president Mihai Ghimpu. Available on : http://www.ziare.com.―De vineri, romanii intra fara viza in R. Moldova‖. Accessed on : September 17, 2009. xxv The two resolutions are the B6-0261/2009 of April 29, 2009. Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?language=EN&reference=B6-0261/2009. Accessed on: April 10, 2011 and resolution B6-0267/2009 of April 30, 2009. Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=MOTION&reference=B6-2009-0267&language=EN . Accessed on: October 10, 2011. xxvi The events of April 2009 are still being analyzed and the jury is still out on the real role of the online media in the final outcome of the protests. For an alternative perspective from a panel of Moldovan experts see Costin Ionescu (2009). xxvii The text of the question in the referendum as well as more details on the results and the parties for and against it can be found at: http://www.e-democracy.md/elections/referendum/2010/. Accessed on: August 29, 2011. xxviiiThe utility of the referendum however has been widely debated in the Moldovan media. Some saw in this attempt to modify the Constitution a way for the current coalition to use its position to pass advantageous changes and waste the possibility of building a parliamentary democracy in the country (Botan, 2010), while others analyzed the ways in which the ruling coalition, the political parties and the media did not explain the utility of the modification to the population (Panfil 2010).

http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-esential-5560436-video-update-chisinau-ciocniri-intre-cei-30-000-manifestanti-politie-cladirea-parlamentului-flacari-ora-22-00.htm

http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-esential-5560436-video-update-chisinau-ciocniri-intre-cei-30-000-manifestanti-politie-cladirea-parlamentului-flacari-ora-22-00.htm

http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-ultima_ora-5557292-moldova-twitter-facebook-site-uri-prima-revolutie-transmisa-online.htm

http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-ultima_ora-5557292-moldova-twitter-facebook-site-uri-prima-revolutie-transmisa-online.htm

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?language=EN&reference=B6-0261/2009

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=MOTION&reference=B6-2009-0267&language=EN

http://www.e-democracy.md/elections/referendum/2010/

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127-141.

Annexes: Table 1. Change in the parliamentarian composition (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2007: 93)

1994 1998 2001 2005

Communist successor parties 81 27 Socialist Party (22 Socialists, 54 Agrarians)

40 40 PCRM

71 71 PCRM

56 56 PCRM

Pro-Romanian parties 20 11 PIB 9 AFPCD

37 26 CDM 11 PFD

11 11 FPCD

11 11 PPCD

Unaffiliated centrists 0 24 24 PMDP

19 19 The Braghiş Alliance

34 34 BMD

Table 2. Results of Moldova's 1994 Parliamentary Election (Mazo, 2004: 39)

Party/Grouping Votes % Votes Seats % Seats

PDAM- Democratic Agrarian Party of Moldova 766589 43.18 56 53.85

PSMUE- Socialist Party and “Unitate-Edinstvo” Movement Bloc 390584 22 28 26.92

BTI- Peasants and Intellectuals Bloc 163513 9.21 11 10.53

AFPCD- Alliance of the Popular Christian Democratic Front 133606 7.53 9 8.65

Political groups that did not pass the threshold 321085 18.08 0 0

TOTAL 1775377

100 104 100

http://www.e-democracy.md/monitoring/politics/comments/postreferendum-analysis/

http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1142520.html

http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1142144.html

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Party/Grouping Votes % Votes Seats % Seats

PCRM- Party of Communists 487002 30.01 40 39.6

CDM - Electoral Bloc Democratic Convention of Moldova 315206 19.42 26 25.74

PMDP - Electoral Bloc For a Democratic and Prosperous Moldova 294691 18.16 24 23.76

PFD - Party of Democratic Forces 143428 8.84 11 10.89

Political parties and independent candidates that did not pass the threshold

677351 41.73 0 0

TOTAL 1622987

100 101 100


Party/Grouping Votes % Votes

Seats % Seats

PCRM - Communist Party 798080 50.07 71 70.3

BEAB - Electoral Bloc 'Braghiş Alliance' 212071 13.36 19 18.81

PPCD - Christian Democratic Popular Party 130810 8.24 11 10.89

Political parties and independent candidates that did not get a place in parliament

446296 28.11 0 0

TOTAL 1587257

100 101 100

Table 5. Results of Moldova's 2005 Parliamentary Election (www.e-democracy.md/elections accessed: November 2010)

Party/Grouping Votes % Votes Seats

PCRM – Communist Party 716336 45.98 56

BEMD - “Democratic Moldova” Electoral Bloc 444377 28.53 34

PPCD – Christian Democratic Popular Party 141341 9.07 11

BEPR – Electoral Bloc “Patria-Rodina” (Motherland) 77490 4.97 0

PSDM – Social Democratic Party 45551 2.92 0

MSPR – Republican Social-political Movement 44129 2.83 0

UCM – Centrist Movement in Moldova 11702 0.75% 0

UMPR – Labor Union “Patria-Rodina” 14399 0.92 0

PTCDM - National Peasant Party Christian Democratic 21365 1.37 0

PDSEM – Party of Social-Economic Justice in Moldova 25870 1.66 0

Independent candidates (12) 14676 0.93 0

TOTAL 1557828 100 101

http://www.e-democracy.md/elections

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Table 6. Results of Moldova's April 2009 Parliamentary Election (www.e-democracy.md/elections accessed: November 2010)



PL – Liberal Party 201879 13.13 15

PLDM – Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova 191113 12.43 15

AMN – Our Moldova Alliance 150155 9.77 11

PSDM – Social Democratic Party 56866 3.7 0


PDM – Democratic Party of Moldova 45698 2.97% 0

UCM – Centrist Movement of Moldova 42211 2.97 0

MSPAE – Social-Political Movement “European Action” 15481 1.01 0

PDSMU – Party of Spiritual Development “United Moldova” 3377 0.22 0

Independent candidates (5) 17287 1.12 0

TOTAL 1537087 100 101

Table 7. Results of Moldova's July 2009 Parliamentary Election (www.e-democracy.md/elections accessed: November 2010)





PDM – Democratic Party of Moldova 198268 12.54 13

AMN - “Our Moldova” Alliance 116194 7.35 7


PSD – Social Democratic Party 29434 1.86 0

PEAVM – Ecologist Party of Moldova “Green Alliance” 6517 0.41 0

TOTAL 1581517 100 101



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Table 8. Results of Moldova's December 2010 Parliamentary Election (www.e-democracy.md/elections accessed: December 2010)





PDM – Democratic Party of Moldova 218847 12.72 15

AMN - “Our Moldova” Alliance 35282 2.05 0


PSD – Social Democratic Party 10161 0.59 0

MAE – “European Action” Movement 21105 1.23 0

TOTAL 1721037 100 101

Table 9. Nations in Transit scores for Moldova, Freedom House (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2007: 87)

Nations in Transit 1997 1998 1999

2001 2002 2003

2004

2005 2006

Electoral Process 3.25 3.5 3.25 3.25 3.5 3.75 4 4 3.75

Civil Society 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 4 3.75 4 4 4

Independent Media 4 4.25 4 4.25 4.5 4.75 5 5 5

Governance 4.25 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.75 5.25 5.5 n.a. n.a.

Constitutional Legislative & Judicial Framework

4.25 4 4 4 4 4.5 4.5 4.75 4.5

Corruption n.a. n.a. 6 6 6.25 6.25 6.25 6.25 6

Democracy Score 3.9 4 4.25 4.29 4.5 4.71 4.88 5.07 4.96


[41]


CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE IN THE EU NEIGHBOURHOOD: EUROPEAN UNION

APPROACH TO THE ARAB SPRING

Ana POSTOLACHE 1

Abstract

The contemporary events from the Arab world have revealed the inevitability of new

approaches that have to be designed to tackle the new global challenges. The ardent European

Neighbourhood has shaken the global security arena and put the EU in front of a great challenge.

Divided in two main parts, the paper has the aim to identify how the European Union responded to

the conflicting waves from the Middle East and North Africa.

The first part of the paper comprises the theoretical framework and captures the spectrum

where EU operates by highlighting the particularities of the Arab system. The second part of the

paper focuses on the European Union approach to the events and analyzes the Union performance in

the Arab security arena. The paper concludes with the success or failure of the European Union

approach and its echo over the entire global security arena.

Keywords: Arab world; European Neighbourhood Policy; authoritarian regimes; conflicts; global security.

1 Postolache Ana is a graduate of the Master in Europe Studies Centre for European Studies, University Alexandru Ioan Cuza, Iasi, Romania. Email: [email protected].


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INTRODUCTION The European Union follows the traditional

line of foreign policy of the sovereign states and focuses on the establishment and development of friendly relations with its neighbors. Launched in 2004, the European Neighbourhood Policyi was created as a direct consequence of the last wave of enlargement and was developed in order to avoid the creation of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and the new neighbors. The increased involvement of the European Union in the ENP area was classified as a positive aspect and was aiming to democratize, modernize and stabilize the neighbor states of the Union. But, from theory to practice, from agreements to implementation, the achievement of the ambitious goals proved to be defective and the neighbouring states continued to remain trapped in the barbaric rules of their authoritarian leaders.

Although no one predicted the change in the Arab world, the uprisings have succeeded to breakdown the authoritarian regimes and change the political environment of the Arab countries of the Middle East and North Africa. The revolutionary waves that started in Tunisia on December 2010 expanded through Egypt, Libya, Syria and Yemen and the entire region. Spreading like fire on an unprecedented scale in recent history, in conflict waves have inspired the people across the region and gave birth to what now is called the Arab Spring.

Not a simply aspect of a regional crises but potentially dangerous for the entire global security arena, the conflicts from Middle Eastern and North African countries demands new approaches designed to ensure the entire global stability and security. In front of the new challenges, the paper looks at the natural partner of transition of the Arab countries, the European Union, and has the aim to identify how the European Union responded to the conflict waves from the Middle East and North Africa and what was the Europeans Union approach to the Arab Spring?

Firstly, the paper is focusing on the particularities of the region. More precisely, for analyzing the contemporary developments of the Arab events I am looking to the nature of states, the mechanisms of power and the economic and social particularities of the region. The analysis

seeks to find what led to the dynamics of popular movements for change and what underpinned the popular calls for reform and political change? I will leave aside the aspects related to the particularities of every country and I will limit my attention to the common patterns of change of the region. The analysis does not exclude the distinctive characteristics of every county but draws on the regional approach in order to build a holistic frame of the Arab Spring. Secondly, the article is focusing on the European Union approach to the events and seeks to find how the European Union responded to the conflict waves from Middle Eastern and North African countries. The article is ending with the discussion related to the success or failure of the EU approach to the Arab Spring and its echo over the entire global security arena.

DEPICTING THE ARAB WORLD

The Arab world, often portrayed as

″mysterious, a region of intrigue and war, the cradle of terrorism, religious extremism and

barbaric rule″ (Beverly, 2006; Korany and Dessouki, 2008) has become now the world of popular calls for reform and political change. The contemporary events represent the result of enormous internal pressure that came out of a whole myriad of political and socio-economic dissatisfaction.

Looking first to the politics of the region, it is easily to note that no Middle Eastern or North African state had an entirely democratic political system. After the colonial experience, the post-independence period (1945-1960) represented an era of weak states governed by externally imposed elites driven by fear of domestic instability. After the post-independence period, state building was under way in the Arab world. In the region, the state formation took place in an opposite manner, on the one hand under the Western patronage and on the other hand under the patronage of the authoritarian-nationalist regimes. The authoritarian nationalist regimes originated in the overthrown of the Western powers by the local military leaders, which installed themselves at the helm of the country (Hinnebusch and Ehteshami, 2002, p.12). In the following years, the Western patronage had lost their leading seats while the local leaders had

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considerably strengthened their power. The growing power of the local leaders was accompanied by the adaptation of instruments of control and surveillance. Numerous methods of sever repressions were introduced with the specific aim of repeal and suppress the population. Especially in Egypt and Libya the violence and the brutality have replaced the regular course of relations between the leader and its own citizens.

Furthermore, this ″model of relations″ expanded throughout the region, knowing a dramatic grow in Syria, Yemen, Bahrain and Algeria.

Despite the growing number of instruments of control, spread it through the region, the structures of the Arabic states continued to remain absent. The idea of creating national institutions, organizations or any alliances was completely ignored by the leaders and the ruling elite. For example, Qaddafi devoted himself to reform the Libyan society. He organized a so-called cultural or popular revolution that was envisaged to eradicate the bureaucratic perceived as inefficient. In the rest of the Arab world the bureaucracy was not absent but was deeply inefficient, cumbersome, and especially corrupt.

Furthermore, the issues of regime legitimacy remained a constant feature of these authoritarian regimes. For decades the regimes failed to promote transparency and accountability and the states were governed by a single secular political party led by authoritarian and violent leaders. The decision-making process had a personalized character, where the strong leaders held the entire control; regardless the fields or their competences, they always had the ultimate say. After colonialism, the position of the central strongman became a universal characteristic of the political systems of all Middle Eastern and North African countries.

By the year 2000, the Arab countries of the region seemed to appear in a new light. In response to a changing international context and domestic pressures, some important changes seemed to occur in the politics of the region. The quasi totality of Arab countries was undergoing political changes. Most of them were moving from one-party rule to multipartytism and the civil society as well as the independent press and other forms of independent information were becoming more active. But, beyond this promoted façade, beyond the manipulated internationally

image of the region, the free expression was still prohibited and the bureaucracy of the public sector as well as the government ability to provide services and goods for its own citizens, were still absent.

The crisis of the political system of the region is linked by the process of globalization where the ruling elites were extremely vulnerable to the influences emanating beyond their supposedly sacred and sovereign borders. The authoritarian regimes have rejected any foreign policy, which was perceived as a tool of offsetting the domestic crisis of legitimacy and not as a means of achieving the national goals. These rigid beliefs prevented the Arab states from reconstructing their foreign policies to fit to the rapidly changing external and internal contexts and added new possibilities of marginalization (Korany and Dessouki, 2008, p.4). As Lawson remarks very well, “the Arab world is written off as a region where the normal rules do not apply” (Lawson, 2006, p.IX).

Another common feature of the region is represented by the image of power and strength of the army, perceived as a symbol of national independence and dignity. Despite the economic difficulties of the region, the funds allocated to support the military capabilities have increased year by year. The statistics show that between 1996 and 2005 the Arab countries of Middle East and North Africa exceeded 50 percent of the average on global arms expenditure while, the European expenditure reached only 8 percent. The ambitions and the fears of the authoritarian

leaders transformed the region in ″the most

militarized area of the world″ (Cordesman, 2004). Moreover, the funding of the military capabilities was coupled with the sponsorship of violent acts across the region that led to a significantly increase of the level of riots and conflicts in the region (Korany, Dessouki, 2008, p.36).

The analysis of the political environment of the region certainly entitles the revolts across the Middle East and North Africa. From Tunisia to Egypt, from Libya to Yemen, the Arab autocrats that have been able to stay in power over the past 40 years have been overthrown. It was the death of Mohamed Bouazizi in protest at his treatment by the Tunisian police who confiscated his only means of livelihood, and the misguided

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consideration of President Ben Ali’s that led to the large-scale demonstrations that brought down the regime in Tunisia. In Egypt, it has been the wealth of the ruling business elites that amplified the frustrations of Egyptians. In Libya the authoritarian desires of Colonel Muammar Qaddafi brought the Civil war and in Yemen the arrogance of Ali Abdullah Saleh, in power for 30 years, produced major demonstrations.

But the politic hardship of the region was not the only reason of rebellion in the area. Exceeding the political sphere and focusing on the socio-economics particularities of the region, the reasons of instability considerably increase. The anger of the revolutionaries was considerable fuelled by the economic difficulties. The scale of corruption at the top of the hierarchy and the family networks all over the business sectors slowed the economic cycle of the region. The economy was severely controlled by the state: in Libya, Gaddafi and his family, in Egypt, Mubarak and his sons, Ben Ali in Tunisia and Ali Saleh in Yemen have controlled the business sectors and impeded the expansion and development of the economy. The slowness of the Arab nations to liberalize their economies and to enter in the global competition have exacerbated the commercial and financial problems (Wright, 2001, p.154) and gave birth to economic isolation, leaving the countries of the Arab world behind in the global competition (Bromley, 1994, p.8).

The analysis of the economic sector reveals the relevance of the oil sector that appears as a key feature of the region. But in the new era of globalization, the economic capabilities are not measured only in terms of material resources. Even though the major Arab states are oil monarchies, they are still economic dependent on external resources, technology and foreign aid (Korany and Dessouki, 2008, p.30). In these oil-producing monarchies there are two few people to carry out basic development and management projects, and this led to a noticeable population/resource gap in all the Arab countries. Mai Yamani, a

Saudi scholar explained that: ″the huge windfall of oil wealth since 1950 has not only restructured employment, it has also disordered educational system that was designed to meet the needs of rigidly hierarchical, traditionalist, and patriarchal social order. The huge skills gap has been widen

by the rules prescribed by the religious and political elite, leaving the economy with insufficient indigenous expertise. Thus, despite high oil prices, unemployment remains high, with graduates of the

sharia colleges being the worst affected″ (Mai Yamani apud. Bowden, 2007, pp.103-107).

A huge rate of unemployed population, it is common in all the Arab countries. Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Algeria, Yemen are all deeply affected by the high rate of unemployed. Moreover, the inability of the economies to absorb the demographic waves of the last decades increased the poverty in the region and transformed the Arab countries in a fertile recruiting ground for terrorists. The terrorist’s attacks from 9/11 and the implication of the Arab world in the tragic events put even more pressure on the Arab regimes, intensifying the need to reform and democratize.

Another explanation that justifies the contemporary events is the Islamic legacy, in that the Islam, the dominant religion of the region is considered an inhibitor of the economic performance, impeding the economic development of the region (Noland and Howard, 2007). The growing integration of the Middle East and North Africa countries into the wider global economy appear often undesirable, been perceived by the Islamic supporters as a threat of the traditional values.

Together with the Islamic legacy the strong pan-Arab sentiment explain the chain of the contemporary events. The sentiment rests on the idea that all Arabs share a common political identity and a common fate. The importance of the Arab identity experienced a continue road but has taken a very different form than it did in previous times under the leadership command. The Arab revolts have shown that what happens in one Arab state can affect others in unanticipated and powerful ways. Arab citizens certainly demonstrated the desire and ability to mobilize against their governments. Starting from Tunisia, the conflict waves expanded through Egypt and Yemen and through the entire region. The modern media was just a useful tool in achieving the desired goals but the pan-Arabism sentiment seems to be the real vehicle that put in motion people’s desires.

The analysis of the Arab particularities shows that the Arab world shares a common

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economic, social and politic destiny, with extremely small variations from one country to another. The political repression, the economic deprivation with population living close to the poverty line and the high rate of unemployment, the Islamic religion, the violation of human rights and the lack of freedom, represent common features of all the countries from the region. These common features encountered in all the Arab countries seem to explain the chain of events that led to the birth of the Arab Spring and make them share a common fate.

THE EUROPEAN UNION APPROACH ON THE

ARAB SPRING Looking to EU role on the contemporary

events from the Middle East and North Africa it is essential to note the remarkable development of the Union from the statute of passive security actor (or consumer of security) to the statute of active security actor (or provider of security). The EU began to be known as a peace-builder in the world arena (Solana, 2007) by advancing a new approach of security which doesn’t require the use of the military force in order to ensure its influence (Cardwell, 2011, p.22).

As an effort to increase coherence in the external actions, the new High Representative deal with both external economic relations of the Union, in the capacity of Vice-President of the Commission, as well as CFSP issues in the capacity of High Representative and as Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Council. Expected to facilitate the development of a more effective external policy the HR is assisted by the new European External Service Action, composed of officials from the Council Secretariat, the Commission and seconded from Member States Foreign Ministries. The aim of the EU’s external policy is to preserve its common values, promote peace and security, develop and consolidate democracy, the respect of human rights and the rule of law. Also, the EU highlights the importance of an effective multilateralism as well as the need to build a stable and secure Neighbourhood.

Aware of the importance of a stable Neighbbourhood the EU has been actively involved the Neighbourhood area. The framework of relations between the European Union and the Southern Mediterranean countries dates before

the establishment of the European Neighbourhood Policy framework and is known as the Barcelona Process which was launched in November 1995ii. The Partnership highlighted the strategic importance of the Mediterranean and represented a new framework of relations aimed to manage both bilateral and regional relations.

With the introduction of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2004, the Barcelona Process became a multilateral forum of dialogue and cooperation between the EU and its Mediterranean Partners. The ENP aimed to go beyond the existing relationships by offering political association and deeper economic integration, increased mobility and more people to people contacts. In 2008 the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership evolved and was re-launched as the Union for Mediterranean.iii The re-launch was an opportunity to render more concrete and more visible relations with the initiation of new regional and sub-regional projects. But these attempts of stabilization and democratization of the region have been considered defective and they did not delivered the expected results. Despite the previous failed attempts to ensure the rule of democracy in the region and the course of a sustainable economy, the new events opened the possibility of a more solid process of transition.

The uprisings demonstrated the great ambitious of the Arab people to establish the democracy based on freedoms, human rights and the rule of law. The uprisings are certainly classified as positives but their courage to overthrown the regimes need to be supported by a realistic approach who serves the need of the Arab peoples. In this context the European Union can play a crucial role in shaping the events by helping to stabilize the region, in building constitutional states and developing democracy and the rule of law. Bringing the democracy model into the Arabic societies is backed up by the successful political and economic transition of the ex-communist Eastern Europe. The Europeans have a vast experience in assisting the democratic process by succeeding in the difficult transitions from dictatorship to democracy. The Union also has at its disposal a widely variety of instruments that can be effective in the development process of the Arab world. In addition, the credibility of the European Union as their partner to democracy

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gives priority to the EU to assist the process of building democracy in the region.

The European Union was the first global player who offered a serious response to the Arab Spring by launching on 8 March 2011 the ambitious Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterraneaniv.

The new approach wants to be a joint commitment to common values, the advancement towards higher standards of human rights, the rule of law and good governance. In the new partnership the Union affirmed its active involvement in the region and its intention to deepen economic integration, widen market access and political cooperation. The EU stressed the need for faster and more ambitious political and economic reform in order to assure the political participation, dignity, freedom and the employment opportunities. Furthermore, in the Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity, the European Union emphasized its support to the democratic and constitutional reform process. Judicial reform, enhanced transparency and fight against corruption are considered of particular importance in this process. The Union support for democratic transition includes support to establish an appropriate legal framework for holding of elections and the deployment of an important number of instruments designed to back up the democratic transition. The EU expertize is provided through the Instrument for Stability, the Observation Mission for the election process, the Twinningv and TAIEXvi instruments.

In the new approach, the differentiation and conditionality became the basic features of the reconstructed relation. More precisely, despite the commonalities of the region, the European Union aims to focus on a differentiated approach for every country of the region, acting after the specificities of each of them. Following the principle of variable geometry the European Union will respond depending on the needs and interests, on the circumstances and aspiration, as well as on the degree of reform undertake by each of the Arab countries. The partnership represent an incentive approach based on more differentiation “more for more” vii, those that go further and faster with reforms will be able to count on greater support from the European Union. Comparing the case of Tunisia with the case of Egypt it can be easily noted the differentiation.

For example, in the case of Tunisia, the European

Union offered ″A privileged partnership″ where the financial support is accompanied by trade opening and improved mobility. The liberalizing of trade aims to allow the access of Tunisian agricultural and fisheries products into the EU, as well as industrial products such as mechanical and electrical goods, and construction materials. The EU also launched the Taskforce, concluding the

EU’s first ″Mobility Partnership″ in North Africa. The improved mobility stresses the importance of developing links between the EU people and the Tunisians. Through the Taskforce new funds were announced to support the mobility of students and researchers and also the mobility of civil society to the EU. In the case of Egypt and in line with the Egyptian priorities, the EU focused on the improvement of living conditions, the creation of more jobs and a more widespread availability of sustainable energy. Treating each transition as unique, the EU manages to gain coherence in its action and succeed to move closer to the achievement of tangible results in the development process of the Arab countries. But besides the will and the involvement of the Arab people to transform their countries into democratic entities, the Union ability to provide coherent answers is extremely important.

The coherence of the European Foreign and Security Policy disbanded and fragmented the Union’s voice. The interests and the diverging national agendas of the member states brought criticism and even pessimism regarding the Union ability to face the challenges of the Arab Spring. But, as the past experience showed, the European Union have often been able to grown stronger through the crises and to reach consensus in its action. viii

Two months later after the ″Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the

Southern Mediterranean″, the European Union launched a new and ambitious European Neighbourhood Policy. The reinforcement of ENP represents the adaptation of the Union to the current challenges and the advancement of a more realistic approach. The renewed ENP confirmed the European engagement with its neighbors and established a new framework that

is aiming to promote ″deep and sustainable

democracy with economic prosperity″.

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The revitalization and the re-launch of the ENP does not represent the failure of the policy but rather represent the ability of the Union to adapt to the changing surroundings and its ability to respond in a concise manner to the new challenges. The ambitious goals of the Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity and as well as the goals of the renewed European Neighbourhood Policy, grant credibility to the Middle Eastern and North African countries and reinforce the vision of democracy in the region.

CONCLUSION

What is now happening in the Arab world

is without precedent. The great uprisings for democracy and human rights, freedom and independence are happening for the first time since the fall of the Ottoman Empire. The revolutionary waves succeeded to overthrown the authoritarian regimes that transformed the Arab countries from Middle East and North Africa into tyrannical, poor and undeveloped monarchies.

The road to democracy is accompanied by the European Union that has kept to its principle and continues to offer its commitment and support to the peaceful resolution of disputes by advancing a process of negotiation and communication rather than a process of constraints. The new events have been quickly approached by the European Union that managed to establish a new framework of relation with the Southern Mediterranean. Moving away from the gun

forces, the EU advanced a soft approach and counts to succeed by overcoming the previous deficiencies of the Union for Mediterranean and the ENP. The Arab world need time to build a civil society and open a political spectrum that has been mostly closed for decades and EU commitment to a long term approach represent the first guarantee of turning into reality the hopes of the revolutionary waves.

The success of the European Union approach on the Middle East and North Africa states can be achieved through the necessary coherence between the political reforms and economic and social policies. Moreover, the global vision that accompanies the approach increases the chance of its success. A stable and secure Neighbourhood it is not just beneficial for the EU but for the entire global scene and the European commitment in building a secure world, strengthens the vision of democracy, stability and security in the revolutionary countries of the Middle East and North Africa.

Even the EU approach can be considered very optimistic for the reality of the Middle East and North Africa countries, this doesn’t mean that the EU doesn’t knows very well the risks of the transition processes in the region. But as the President of the European Commission noted

″Europe would rather be accused of holding illusions of democracy than be guilty of cynicism

or of missing this rendezvous with history″ (Barroso, 2011).

Notes: 1 There are two regional components of the European Neighbourhood Policy, the near south and the near east. The present demarche characterizes and refers only to the near south. ii European Commission. 1995. Barcelona Declaration adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference. Available at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2005/july/tradoc_124236.pdf. iii Albania, Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey. iv European Commission. 2011. Joint Communication: A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean. Brussels. 08.03.2011. v Twinning is the principal tool of pre-accession assistance. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/how-does-it-work/technical-assistance/twinning_en.htm. vi TAIEX is the Technical Assistance and Information Exchange instrument managed by the Directorate General Enlargement of the European Commission. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/taiex/what-is-taiex/index_en.htm. vii Štefan Fülle, Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy. viii The case of Balkans in the 1990’s where the failure to react to the crises was followed by the birth of CSDP or the Iraq crises in 2003 known as a deep incoherence of the Union, was followed by the development of the European Security Strategy.

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NATO AFTER LISBON A Case Study on NATO’s Operation in Libya

Raluca-Iuliana RĂILEANU1

Abstract

To further understand the theoretical implications of the NATO Strategic Concept adopted in

Lisbon in 2010, a case study regarding the military intervention in Libya in March 2011 shall expose

the allies‟ different approach to conflicts, based on their interests.

Starting by briefly analyzing NATO‟s strategic concept, the interests of various NATO

members shall be examined to prove that the alliance works predominantly according to realist

principles, while trying to convey idealistic goals and community-oriented behavior.

The future of NATO shall also be discussed keeping in mind the recent developments in Libya

and the allies‟ behavior towards solving this conflict.

Keywords: NATO, allies, the responsibility to protect, democratization, airstrikes.

1 Raluca Raileanu is a graduate of Old Dominion University, in Norfolk, Virginia, where she majored in International Relations and Business Administration. The author also completed a master in International Relations, Analyzing and Solving Conflicts at the National School of Politics and Administration in Bucharest, Romania. Email: [email protected].


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1. INTRODUCTION NATO is a defensive alliance formed in

1949, having in mind that its purpose is to prevent and to fight a common external threat, whether it was the Soviet Union in the past or asymmetrical threats such as terrorism in the current times. As one of the most successful current political and military alliance, NATO comprises 28 member countries, and roughly 2.5 million military personnel, with military operations in Libya and Afghanistan.i(Evans, 2011)

Some principles of classical realism can be applied to NATO‟s strategic concept adopted in November 2010. Thucydides, the Greek historian famously stated that "Right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must” (Thucydides, 1914, p.394). In the spirit evoked by the Thucydides in ancient times, Hans J. Morgenthau, a German-American political scientist, developed a notion of 20th century realism in 1948, as well as in the subsequent editions of his book Politics among Nations.

Power is the keyword of realism, and each NATO-member nation has its own interest. Power is given by economic, political, and military factors of a country. It could also mean that a country can strengthen its power if it is member of a politico-military alliance. Arnold Wolfers defines “an alliance as being the promise of mutual military assistance between two or more sovereign states.”(Snyder, 1997, p.35)

The relationship among NATO-members can be best understood if we look at Stephen M. Walt, a neorealist, and his perspective on alliances. Stephen M. Walt broadens the mutual military assistance as he sees an alliance as “cooperation on security matters formally and informally between two or more sovereign states” (Snyder, 1997, p.35). Membership into a political and military alliance such as NATO brings power due to a variety of reasons. The essential advantage would be increased security for its members, as outlined in the North Atlantic Treaty. If one NATO member is under attack, then other members should join the fight against the external threat, according to the concept of collective security. Let‟s not forget the pillar of the alliance, Article 5 of the Atlantic Treaty:

‘The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area’ (The North Atlantic Treaty, Art.5, par.1).

If one NATO member is under attack, then other members should join the fight against the external threat, according to the concept of collective security. In addition to the benefits of collective security, NATO membership brings more visibility and a different status on the international scene for the member country. In that regard, NATO could be thought of as a club, and membership in the club is highly valued and hard to attain. Of course, NATO membership also brings responsibilities, such as the obligation to contribute to the alliance with military capabilities and human resources and the responsibility to protect. Alliances may be formed only among states, thus excluding transnational political and economical entities, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, revolutionary groups, etc. The strategic concept outlines several NATO responsibilities and it tries to direct its future relationships with non-NATO members.

In that regard what is really changing is NATO‟s view towards the last phrase of article 5, which is “to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area” (Stephen Walt, 1987, p.1). The Strategic Concept adopted in Lisbon in 2010 states that:

‘The citizens of our countries rely on NATO to defend Allied nations, to deploy robust military forces where and when required for our security, and to help promote common security with our partners around the globe.’(Strategic Concept For the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Preface, Lisbon 2010).

The new strategic concept calls for global NATO action, in those areas where it is needed, even outside the membership area. This is one of

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the main points of the new strategic concept. However, the New Strategic concept does not change the Atlantic Charter, thus implicitly neither article 5. Instead, the New Strategic concept adapts the Atlantic Charter and brings NATO into the twenty-first century, especially when the nature of threats has changed. In light of this approach, NATO‟s main role is to provide security assurance to its members and as it has been proven several times, even beyond NATO member‟s territory. As to when exactly should Article 5 be invoked, there is no right or wrong answer. Generally speaking, Article 5 would call upon measures of last resort, such as military force, when all other measures to bring security to an area have been exhausted or when a NATO member has been attacked without prior notice. In those cases, as an alliance, NATO needs to act accordingly to face the attackers. Taking into consideration the principle of collective security, NATO invoked Article 5 after the September 11th, attacks, meaning that the Al-Qaida attacks on the World Trade Center twin towers in Manhattan, New York posed a threat for the remaining 18 NATO members at that time. The decision to invoke article 5 was based on the following criteria: “it was an armed attack; it was of sufficient scale and character to engage considerations of peace and security in the North Atlantic area, and it was directed from abroad.”ii

There are other instances when NATO can intervene militarily in a country that is outside its membership area, when the use of force is legitimized by the United Nations Security Council. With the exception of the military intervention in Kosovo, where the United Nations Security Council Resolution was passed after NATO‟s military intervention in the area, the United Nations Security Council authorized the NATO interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya.

After analyzing those two instances, it can

be concluded that NATO can intervene militarily if the following conditions are met:

a) in case an attack occurs on one of NATO member states‟ territory;

b) when crimes against humanity or human rights abuses occur in a country outside NATO member states‟ territory and NATO acts according to the principles of humanitarian intervention.

2. CASE STUDY – LIBYAN FOREIGN MILITARY INTERVENTION, MARCH

2011: Apparently, beyond NATO allies‟

individual interests, NATO‟s intervention in Libya could be legitimized by the „responsibility to protect‟ under UN mandate. The one that actually heavily promoted this concept was former UN-Secretary General Kofi Annan. The UN does not have the military capabilities of NATO, but it has a great role of discussing and directing alliances such as NATO towards “protecting populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”iii

The concept of „The Responsibility to Protect”:

The report of the United Nations secretary-general‟s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change from 2004 states that “all signatories of the UN Charter accept a responsibility to protect their own citizens and to meet their international obligations to their fellow nations.”iv That means that even if the principle of sovereignty states that a state should not intervene in another‟s state internal affairs, UN member states indeed have a responsibility to ensure human security and effectively resolve the humanitarian crisis they could face. Three years earlier, there was a precursor to this document elaborated by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) which framed the “„responsibility to protect‟ as an emerging principle of customary international law, which was not law at that time but it was a part of state practice and several legal sources.”v

It is useful to correlate NATO‟s actions with NATO‟s strategic concept. As previously stated, humanitarian intervention is not yet a solid part of international law recognized by all nations, but it could be inferred that NATO members acknowledged it in the lines of the New Strategic Concept adopted in Lisbon 2010.

„20. Crises and conflicts beyond NATO’s borders can pose a direct threat to the security of Alliance territory and populations. NATO will therefore engage, where possible and when necessary, to prevent crises, manage crises, stabilize post-conflict situations and support reconstruction.”(NATO Strategic Concept 2010, article 20).vi

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In light of these documents, the right to humanitarian intervention has been widely discussed, especially in the context of NATO‟s intervention in Kosovo, which was carried out without UN mandate. UN Security Council Resolution 1244 on Kosovo was adopted June 10, 1999, after NATO‟s Operation Allied Force had conducted airstrikes on Serbia since March 24, 1999. One could argue that there were many interests at stake in NATO‟s Kosovo intervention even though in the end the atrocities stopped. The right to humanitarian intervention is an accepted way to legitimize a foreign military operation in a sovereign country. One could also argue that according to more realist and Machiavellian thought, there were many voices that argue that NATO‟s intervention in Libya is a showcase of power and will of the Western NATO allies to remove Muammar Abu Minyar al-QADHAFI from power, and not to primarily assist the Libyan civilian population.

The situation in Libya before NATO’s Operation

Unified Protector: Before NATO‟s intervention and its

legitimacy is briefly anaylzed, it is important to understand several key facts about Libya, the 4th largest country in Africa by area. Lybia was under several foreign rulers, such as the ancient Greeks, the Romans, the Arabs, the Ottomans, and the Italians. Following decolonization, „Libya became a kingdom in 1951 which was ousted by the military leader Col. Muammar Abu Minyar al-QADHAFI in 1969.”vii He introduced Lybia to a form of governance known as the Third Universal Theory, a “combination of socialism and Islam derived in part from tribal practices and is supposed to be implemented by the Libyan people themselves in a unique form of „direct democracy." Islamic law, or Sharia, is the guiding judiciary principle in Lybia. The military leader despises capitalism and Marxism and he has a violent history with the West, being renowned for his orders for terrorist attacks such as the ones in „the Pan AM Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, the LaBelle disco bombing, and the UTA 772 plane bombing.” After a closer look into the attacks, all of them have a common denominator: United States victims, more precisely civilian and military United States citizens. In October 2008, Libya gave the US Government “$1.5 billion

pursuant to the agreement to distribute to US national claimants.” Consequently, the United States and Libya reestablished their diplomatic connection.

The key to Col. Muammar Abu Minyar al-QADHAFI‟s violent actions and their funding is oil, the primary natural resource that Libya successfully exported for decades. Oil was “first discovered in Libya in 1959.”viii Oil improved the overall wealth of Libyans but much of the oil revenue was “wasted on arms purchases and sponsorship of revolutionary movements around the world.”ix With a population of 6, 597, 960 million people and GDP of $14,000 per capita, and with an unemployment rate of 30%, Lybia imports 75% of its food due to the fact that most of the country is a desert area and the climatic conditions do not allow crop cultivation.x Additionally, the government “supplied shoddy housing, free cars, schooling and health care, but state salaries seldom exceeded $500 a month.”xi

The term „Arab Spring‟ applies to Libya, as well, maybe due to the many similarities between the countries that are facing rebellions and mass-protests from their disgruntled populations. Like in Egypt, Syria, or Tunisia, the ruler of the country holds control of most flourishing businesses and the ruling family has impressive bank accounts abroad, while the rest of the population has to cope with low wages and high prices. Then in February 2011 Libya‟s upset population rebelled against Colonel Muammar Abu Minyar al-QADHAFI‟s oppressive regime. By March 2011, two factions clearly emerged: Colonel Muammar Abu Minyar al-QADHAFI‟s forces and the rebels whose forces formed The National Transitional Council, with their main quarters in the eastern Libyan port of Benghazi. The eastern region of Cyernaica is where the rebellion started and Colonel Muammar Abu Minyar al-QADHAFI sent Libyan tanks and airplanes to crush the rebellion. In Tripoli, it has been reported that “mercenaries working for Gaddafi have taken over ambulances and killed the injured to cover up the fact of the atrocities that were happening after Friday prayer in the region.”xii

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United Nations Security Council Resolution 1970:

The international actors became aware of the situation and they decided to press the issue in the United Nations Security Council. The United States, Great Britain, France, Russia and China decided it was time for sanctions for the Libyan ruler. On February 26th, 2011, the United Nations Security Council voted to impose sanctions on Colonel Muammar Abu Minyar al-QADHAFI, referred Libya to the International Criminal Court, imposed an arms embargo on Libya, international travel ban on 16 Libyan officials, and the freezing of assets of Colonel Muammar Abu Minyar al-QADHAFI and those of his immediate family.xiii In March 2011, Colonel Muammar Abu Minyar al-QADHAFI called the Libyan rebels “rats and stray dogs”xiv as well as “cockroaches”xv on Libyan television.

The Libyan government did not act according to UNSC Resolution 1970, and it continued to engage in “killings of protesters, arbitrary arrest and enforced disappearance of people.”xvi

As it was shown above, that would describe the situation in Libya before NATO‟s intervention. In light of the above facts, twelve years later from the unauthorized intervention in Kosovo, NATO actually decided to act under UN mandate in Libya.

United Nations Security Council Resolution

1973: The situation on the ground in Libya was

worsening and the United Nations Security Council adopted a second resolution on the situation in Libya. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 adopted March 17, 2011 was more powerful than the previous one. Obviously, if the previous one was not successful in bringing peace and security to Libya, this resolution authorized military intervention to restore peace in Libya, called for “a no-fly zone in Libya, and called for the enforcement of an arms embargo.”xvii

This United Nations Resolution does not name specific measures in operative clause 4 because those UN members involved shall decide what works best to protect civilians in Libya. In this case, the United Nations Security Council acts a legitimizing international authority, while those executing the mandate of the United Nations

Security Council would be UN member states that have notified the Secretary-General about the situation in Libya, some of which happen to be NATO members.

Operation Odyssey Dawn:

Indeed, the UN member that launched a military operation in Lybia, Odyssey Dawn, on March 19th, 2011 is the United States. In fact, Operation Odyssey Dawn benefited from the participation of various Western nations, such as Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and Turkey.xviii The two middle-east nations that took part in Operation Odyssey dawn were United Arab Emirates and Quatar. Most of these nations participated with aircraft along with the Unites States Airforce, while the United States Navy ensured the maritime control with its renowned aircraft carriers, nuclear-armed submarines and assault ships.

Even though the targets of this operation were Colonel Muammar Abu Minyar al-QADHAFI‟s military grounds and military capabilities, the United States had strong reasons to intervene in Lybia beyond protecting the civilians. Its strong military capabilities allowed it to break the ice and impose a no-fly zone over Libya in twelve days. Lybia was the United States enemy for decades, due to their different political ideology but also to Lybia‟s financing of terrorist actions targeted at US citizens. The United States real interest in Lybia is to remove Colonel Muammar Abu Minyar al-QADHAFI from power, thus allowing for a democratic regime to take over. That way, Libya would not finance terrorist activities anymore and the Western companies could more easily partner with Libyan oil companies and engage in capitalist oil business practice. Even though oil exports make-up “47% of Libya‟s GDP,”xix democratization could bring a different practice to the oil industry, and more opening to the West. Let us not forget, the United States and most Western nations are heavily-dependent on oil. Even though in the short-run the civil unrest will affect oil production, in the long-run, if the democratization of Libya will occur, the oil-dependent countries will gain more access to the precious resource, namely oil, and new free markets will emerge.

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France was also involved in Operation Odyssey Dawn. On March 10th, President Sarkozy was the first and only head of State to recognize the rebel forces grouped into the Libyan Transitional National Council “as the legitimate representative of the Libyan people.”xx The same President Nicolas Sarkozy that decided to bring France back to NATO‟s integrated military command eagerly engaged his country in the Libyan conflict. He even organized a meeting in Paris March 19th, 2011 with Western allies and Arab leaders in order to discuss plans for the no-fly zone.xxi By organizing this meeting, President Sarkozy used soft power to tackle the situation in Libya. Even though Libya was an Italian colony and not a French one, President Sarkozy took advantage of this crisis to play a leading role in helping to solve the conflict in Libya, since his popularity was low before the intervention and French Presidential elections are set for next year. During the same day, French soft power was complimented by use of hard power. French President Nicolas Sarkozy indeed ordered the French planes to strike Libyan targets during the high level meeting in Paris. Apparently, allies such as the United States and Great Britain were informed of the French intention to strike, and the French authorities states that those present at the meeting were informed of the French strikes of Libya.

Let‟s not forget the immense French influence on Northern Africa, especially on the Maghreb region. Libya‟s proximity to “the European territory and instability in this country has direct consequences on migration and the attitude of Islamic community in European countries.”xxii According to official data, between 5% and 10% of the French population, which consists of over 65 million people, is Muslim.xxiii

The United Kingdom‟s intervention is codenamed Operation Ellamy, the Canadian operation is codenamed Operation Mobile, while the French military operation is named Operation Harmattan. It could be argued that „the big absent‟ was indeed Germany, which did not directly endorse United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, opposed allied military intervention in Libya and “withdrew its naval assets in the Mediterranean from NATO command.”xxiv Defense Secretary Robert Gates openly criticized Germany in early June for not

getting involved with NATO‟s Operation Unified Protector, especially when it was more than capable to do so and when NATO-members with smaller aircraft capabilities, such as “Belgium, Denmark and Norway, are carrying out their duty in the air mission while the United States carries the burden of 75% of support missions.”xxv In response to such awaited criticism, Germany officially stated that it would not interfere in Libya due to “the risks of military action.”xxvi The matter of the fact is Germany‟s interests do not lie in Libya. The BRIC countries abstained from voting on United Nations resolutions regarding the situation in Libya.xxvii

Germany has good relationships with BRIC countries, Brazil, Russia, India and China and the fact that it did not intervene in Libya could bring it lucrative investing contracts in these countries. Also, it could continue to count on the BRIC vote if Germany ever wanted to gain a seat in the Security Council. Furthermore, German refusal to intervene in Libya is also about internal politics, because most of the German people do not agree with a possible Germany‟s military intervention in Libya as elections are bound to happen next year. Additionally, Germany‟s troops are already in Afghanistan, and it did not feel comfortable fighting on more than one front. Most of the German public is disgruntled with Germany‟s involvement in Afghanistan, so German military presence in Libya could have influenced the election results. Apart from its good relationships with the BRIC countries, Germany did not want to disturb its already established energy trade agreements with North African countries. For all of the above reasons, Germany decided it was in its own interest not help in protecting civilians in Libya and decided to follow its own path and defect from its traditional allies, namely the United States, the United Kingdom and France.

Great Britain, the United States traditional ally and trusted NATO member, decided to get involved to protect civilians in Libya. At a time when there are massive budget cuts in the United Kingdom from education and social programs, as well as from several defense programs, the principle of intervention to safeguard democracy and human rights prevails. But is this really the case with the United Kingdom? Historically, the Mediterranean Sea was “the playground” of the British. For instance, reminiscent of the British

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glorious past in that area is the Gibraltar, now a British overseas territory, and the British military bases in Cyprus. Great Britain cannot let others by themselves to secure the area. Besides, the United Kingdom is interested in removing Colonel Muammar Abu Minyar al-QADHAFI from power in order for a democratic regime to take over. Just as it was mentioned in the United States interest in Libya, a democratic regime would not finance terrorist activities anymore and the British companies could do more business with Libyan oil companies.

After these individual Western allies took action in Libya, with the exception of Germany, NATO‟s “Operation Unified Protector was launched March 27th, 2011.”xxviii The operation shall strife to implement the arms embargo, a no-fly zone, and the protection of civilians. In short, these were the specific details of United Nations Security Council 1970 and 1973.

NATO ships and aircraft “have the right to stop and search any vessel they suspect of carrying arms or mercenaries.”xxix There are several rules which have to be respected such as the one stating that “NATO ships shall not enter Libyan territorial waters.” Additionally, stressing the allied forces wish, “NATO has no intention of deploying land forces anywhere in Libyan territory.” This particular detail is very important to the allies, due to the fact that a naval and air strike helps prevent the allied casualties. A called for exception to the no-fly zone would be those planes flying for humanitarian and aid purposes, in Libyan airspace, to make sure that civilians and civilian populated areas cannot be subjected to air attack.

NATO conducted an air raid on April 30th, 2011 in which Colonel Muammar Abu Minyar al-QADHAFI‟s youngest son, Seif al-Arab and three of his grandchildren died. xxx

However, Colonel Muammar Abu Minyar al-QADHAFI‟s forces did not surrender. Amidst the heavy fighting and with only 8 of the 28 NATO allies participating in the NATO mission Unified Protector, the rebel faction‟s the Transitional National Council is running out of resources desperately need funding to continue the fight. In the midst of civil war, Colonel Muammar Abu Minyar al-QADHAFI‟s government has cut off funding for basic facilities such as hospitals and schools and the Transitional National Council

needs to come up with money to effectively deal with the humanitarian crisis and also continue the fight. That is why “Kuwait pledged $180 million to the rebel Transitional National Council, while France is ready to give $423.6 million within a week, Turkey pledged $100 million, and Italy promised $438 million to $584 million.”xxxi Additionally, the rebel Transitional National Council could also find more funding if oil tankers will be allowed to safely leave Libya and oil trade to be resumed to the benefit of the rebels. United States oil company already purchased oil with White House approval and the exchange was to take place in “Hawaii on June 8th.”xxxii

On the other side, Libya‟s defecting labor minister Ali Al-Amin Manfur was quoted by Swiss media as saying Gadhafi‟s regime is selling oil on the black market in an effort to raised badly needed cash. In another effort to help the rebels, the United Nations sanctions on Libya did not call for an oil embargo, but the Libyan National Oil Corporation was blacklisted, thus making it illegal to buy Libyan oil, with the exception of oil produced by the rebel-held Agoco. Just as it was previously mentioned, oil is of great interest to the Western allies, as the United States was the first one to exceptionally buy oil from the Libyan rebels. The motive of encouraging the rebels and thus offering them financial support by buying their oil is highly regarded, but at the same time, the United States also needs oil for consumption.

Basically, after three months of fighting, Libya is still divided in half: on the east, centered around Benghazi, there are the rebels that oppose Colonel Muammar Abu Minyar al-QADHAFI‟s rule, and they would like for Libya to be a monarchy again. On the West, centered around Tripoli, there are Colonel Muammar Abu Minyar al-QADHAFI‟s supporters. Heavy fighting has been going on in the Western city of Misrata, the eastern town of Benghazi, and Tripoli.

The Libya Contact Group was established and it is composed of the United States, France, and Britain, as well as Kuwait, Qatar, and Jordan and other 16 Middle-Eastern countries. The Libya Contact Group seems balanced since it has European members as well as Middle-East members. In any contact group, it is vital to see the other side as well, and the Middle-East countries may better comprehend Libya‟s background based on common Islamic beliefs. The

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Libya Contact Group has been organizing high-level meetings in various locations outside Libya in which the situation on the ground is discussed, including the status of the conflict, financing those fighting against Colonel Muammar Abu Minyar al-QADHAFI, and trying to find ways to resolve the ongoing situation.

On June 8th, 2011, at the NATO Defense Ministers meeting in Brussels, NATO and its partners decided that Operation Unified Partner shall continue until the end of conflict in Libya, and NATO could get involved in the post-conflict operations, but it wanted to delegate the post-conflict leading roles to regional organizations such as the African Union.xxxiii NATO intensified the raids on Libya on June 7th, 2011, and “at least 31 people were killed in 60 strikes on Tripoli during the raids.”xxxiv Amidst all of this turmoil, Colonel Muammar Abu Minyar al-QADHAFI “has been shown on Libyan television playing chess with the president of the international chess federation.”xxxv

As of June 10th, 2011 the Operation Unified Protector faces some internal difficulties which can be reflected in the fact that Colonel Muammar Abu Minyar al-QADHAFI and his forces still resist NATO allied air strikes. In that regard, Robert Gates‟ ( Secretary of Defense) speech at NATO on June 10th, 2011 was somewhat a wake-up call and his comments regarding NATO‟s Unified Protector are more than true. Indeed, “the United States does cover 75% of NATO expenses while only 4 other members reach the minimum 2% defense spending.”xxxvi

Additionally, only 8 of the 28 NATO members are involved in Operation Unified Protector in Libya. It is indeed a tough time for NATO, especially since it is also involved in Afghanistan and the domestic economic perspectives are dim. In light of economic turmoil, European countries such as “Portugal, Ireland, Greece have been facing bailouts and Spain faces a nearly 20% unemployment rate.”xxxvii On the other side of the Atlantic, the fiscal situation calls for austerity, as well. The fact that not all NATO-members with airstrike capabilities do not get involved is indeed impacting relationships among them. For instance, France and Germany, the backbone of the European Union, are currently divided over Libya. France was one of the first

countries to respond to this crisis, while Germany chose to opt out.

It has been noted that even with all of these divergent issues, there is hope “that Central Europe has not lost its profound interest in NATO remaining a strong alliance providing for its collective defense.”xxxviii

NATO’s intervention in Kosovo vs.

NATO’s intervention in Libya: how similar? Table 1.1

NAME:

OPERATION ALLIED FORCE

OPERATION

UNIFIED PROTECTOR

Dates: March 24, 1999-June

10th, 1999 Kosovo Liberation Army

– Serbia (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia)

March 23rd, 2011-Present

TNC (Transitional National Council)-Libya

Leaders: Slobodan Milosevic –

President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

Muammar Abu Minyar al-QADHAFI – leader

and guide of the Revolution of Libya

Reason for NATO’s intervention:

humanitarian intervention to end

ethnic cleansing, without UN approval

humanitarian intervention to protect civilians, UN approval

UNSC Resolution 1244, June 10th, 1999

UNSC Resolution 1970, February 24th, 2011-

sanctions against Libya UNSC Resolution 1973,

March 17th, 2011-authorized military

intervention Kosovo‟s natural

resources: nickel, lead, zinc, magnesium, lignite,

kaolin, chrome, bauxitexxxix

Libya‟s natural resources: petroleum, natural gas, gypsumxl

“13 out of the 19 member countries

contributed military aircraft to the operation, with France making the greatest contributions among the European countries in terms of deployed aircraft

assets.”xli

14 out of the 28 NATO-member

countries offered their Naval and air

operations support as of April 5th, 2011xlii

The conflict ended after three months of NATO

airstrikes.

June 8th, 2011, the NATO Unified

Protector “mission was extended until late

September.”xliii

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As the table above reveals, the NATO operation in Kosovo is somewhat similar to the NATO operation in Libya. In its history, NATO has previously intervened outside its borders in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995, Kosovo in 1999, and Afghanistan and Iraq after the September 11th attacks. Therefore, after exercising its ability to intervene, NATO was expected to finish its mission as it did in Kosovo, for exemple. However, unlike Kosovo, Libya is further South from Europe, on the other side of the Mediterranean. In Kosovo, United States involvement was vital all along during Operation Allied Force, while in Libya, although the United States carries out most of the support missions for the airstrikes, the main airstrikes are conducted by other NATO allies. During Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, more allies participated in the mission. In Libya, the number of alllies participating in the operation is reduced, keeping in mind that there are NATO allies who have airstrike capability but refuse to use it in this conflict. For exemple, Germany officially stated that it will not get involved in protecting civilians in Libya, while in Kosovo it participated in stopping human rights abuses. So one might logically ask, what is the reason why the allies are continuing the fight? A simple aspect is that the villain is Muammar Abu Minyar al-QADHAFI, an internationally renowned figure who threatened the Western NATO members with his support for terrorist acts such as hijacking United States planes and bombing German clubs.

Additionally, apart from the terrorist threat, Libya also has abundant oil reserves; from a realist‟s point of view, the one who rules Libya shall also rule its cash-bearing natural resource, thus becoming more powerful. It remains to be seen who will rule over Libya after NATO‟s Unified Protector mission. However, NATO‟s intervention in Libya is a test for the allies because as the proverb states, „friends get to know each other in times of need,‟ and apparently, NATO members need to get to know each other better before throwing themselves in the face of the enemy. Or, when they are in time of need, NATO members should act like true allies and face the threats together, and not one without the other.

3. INSTEAD OF CONCLUSIONS, THE FUTURE OF NATO, GLOBAL NATO?

Although the Atlantic charter does not

mention anything about NATO involvement outside the member countries area, article 20 of the Strategic Concept adopted in Lisbon mentions NATO engagement beyond NATO borders in article 20. Like it was previously stated, times have changed from 1949. During the time of the Cold War, NATO‟s enemy was the Soviet Union. The non-aligned countries moved out of the way of the two beligerent superpowers, while the United States and Russia made the rules of the Cold War.

The United States, one of the NATO founding members, followed its interests and brought the NATO allies into areas of interest such as Afghanistan and Iraq. In the Gulf War of 1991, the United States was the leading nation of those fighting against the Iraqi forcers led by Saddam Hussein. The war started after September the 11th was named „The War on Terror” because the enemy has changed. The enemy is not exclusively the Soviet Union and its nuclear arsenal, but the enemy transformed itself into asymmetrical threats which NATO cannot tackle on its territory. The era of globalization has come and NATO needs to adapt to meet today‟s challenges. That is one of the points of the Strategic Concepts adopted in Lisbon 2010 which was entitled „active engagement, modern defence.” The intervention in Libya has already shown us that NATO is capable of facing threats outside its territory, whether those threats are tangible or intangible. For exemple, tangible threats could be nuclear weapons, weapons of mass destruction, cyberattacks, biological weapons, terrorism and intangible ones would be those threats to NATO member countries democratic values, such as human rights abuses.

Those threats could happen anywhere on the globe and they might not be directed towards NATO members territories or citizens, but they might affect NATO members ideological views. In Kosovo, NATO intervened to stop genocide, in Afghanistan and Iraq NATO intervened according to the United States interests and to fight terrorism, and in Libya NATO intervened to remove Colonel Muammar Abu Minyar al-QADHAFI‟s from power because of serious human

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rights violations on his Libyan citizens and other interests of the Western powers. Does that mean that NATO will become the watchdog of the planet? Does that mean that if the United States will get into a war with rogue states such as Iran or North Korea, NATO will follow suit to support its ally?

There has been intense speculation about NATO going global, but indeed, what is bound to happen are regional security organizations working closely with eachother. Indeed, „the global center of political and economical gravity is shifting away from the North Atlantic towards Asia and the Pacific.”xliv China, Russia, and India are key players in today‟s international relations scene and they shift the focus away from the United States and the EU. NATO needs to establish good relationships with these key players in order to ensure security and stability.

Another aspect that needs to be kept in mind is that the Muslim world has been turned into an enemy of the West in the fight against terrorism, thus bringing NATO right at the forefront in military interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and now Libya. In the long run, NATO needs to iron its wrinkled image in the Middle-East, especially through the help of Muslim NATO-member Turkey, who has the second-largest army, after the one of the United States, in comparison with all NATO members‟ individual armies. Turkey, alongside Brazil, has been involved in negotiations with Iran regarding its nuclear-arsenal and it could prove a successful mediator between NATO and possible Middle-East partners.

With regards to Russia, the NATO-Russia Council formed in 2002 serves its purpose as forum for dialogue between NATO countries and Russia. Additionally, the Partnership for Peace program has 11 Commonwealth of Independent States members. The Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Albania and Croatia were involved in the program before becoming NATO members. Conicidentally, in the same year that the NATO-Russia Council was formed, namely in 2002, „the Collective Security Treaty Organization was formed and it includes includes Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.”xlv This organization is somewhat like NATO, but unlike NATO members,

CSTO members are not allowed to join other military and political alliances. NATO needs to effectively deal with these countries so that Russia will not feel threatened, but more so willing to cooperate with NATO.

Another regional security organization that could play a part in NATO‟s global outreach is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, comprised of „China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.”xlvi India, Iran, Mongolia and Pakistan have observer status. NATO could get closer to the SCO through bilateral cooperation with its members, especially with Russia. NATO should engage in „joint councils with powerful regional actors such as China, Japan, and India.” These countries could provide regional stability and security and foster cooperation with NATO.

„NATO’s real power derives from the fact that it combines United States military capabilities and economic power with Europe’s collective political and economic weight.” (Brezinski, 2009, p. 2-20.)

The US-NATO relationship is of extreme importance to the alliance because it represents the glue that keeps NATO strong. If this euro-atlantic bond creaks, NATO will not be as strong nor as capable to meet future challenges. In addition, the future of NATO is not only shaped by the type of missions it will carry out around the globe and the reasons why NATO will intervene in other countries‟ affairs, but it is also shaped by the amount of financial assets, military capabilities, and human resources available to do that.

Regarding NATO‟s future, Defense Secretary Robert Gates delivered a speech at the NATO headquarters in Bruxelles, June 10th, a few days before his retirement. The speech centered around NATO spending and how it relates to NATO‟s future. It was a stingy speech for some, especially for those allies that have not reached the 2% benchmark that states how much out of each NATO member country‟s GDP needs to be spent on defense. The only 5 out of the 28 NATO member countries that actually “exceed the 2% benchmark on defense spending are the United States, Britain, France, Greece, and Albania.”xlvii

This is painfully true, and what Secretary Gates is referring to is free-riding. Indeed, he pointed out that the „United States accounts for

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75% of NATO defense spending.”xlviii The concept of free-riding has been around for quite a while now and the United States was well-aware of it. Europe is indeed grateful the United States helped rebuild Europe through the Marshall Plan after Europe went through two painful World Wars. However, let‟s not forget that apart from Pearl Harbor and submarine strikes on the East Coast of the United States, the United States territory was not a battlefield of the two World Wars. „In Flanders Fields”xlix by Canadian Lieutenant Colonel John McCrae, MD was describing the war in Europe, and not the war in the United States.

Europeans did not want war to happen again, even though the Yugoslav Wars in the 1990‟s were an exception which went beyond this European wish. Besides, after World War II, Western European nations distanced themselves from the American way of administering their wealth. Western European nations chose to increase public spending and invest in public healthcare and public education while the United States privatised healthcare and education. Annual cost of attendance at Harvard University for exemple, hiked up to $60,200 for the 2011-1012 school year. Additionally, health insurance coverage is required at a cost of $1,834 per student if the student is not insured under his or her family‟s plan.l At Berlin-Humboldt University, there are no tuition fees.

Another striking difference would be the costs of healthcare in the United States and the costs of healthcare in Western European countries. In the United States, private health insurance companies have to approve patients‟ application and see if they qualify for health insurance based on their income, while in many Western European countries the costs of healthcare are much lower or cost-free. In 2000, France had “the best healthcare system in the world, according to the World Health Organization.”li Western European nations chose human security over traditional security.

Former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan underlined the fact that “human security can no longer be understood in purely military terms and it must encompass economic development, social justice, environmental protection, democratization, disarmament, and respect for human rights and the rule of law.”lii

The same former Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, pointed out that human security „encompasses human rights, good governance, access to education and health care and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfill his or her potential.”liii In the United States, around 38.54% of the US population aged 25 and over has a bachelor degree or an Associate‟s degree, master‟s degree 7.62%, and a doctorate or a professional degree 2.94%.liv In 2008, only 26 NUTS-2 regions out of the 271 regions in the European Union recorded a proportion of persons with higher education above 35%.lv These include large cities such as Brussels, London, Paris, Helsinki, Stockholm and Madrid plus Utrecht in the Netherlands, Oslo, Geneva and Zürich. NUTS-2 is an EU term that stands for Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics, “a geocode standard for referencing the administrative divisions of countries for statistical purposes.” Even though the percentage of higher education attainment is almost the same in the United States as in Europe, graduates have different amount of debt. Students who graduated college in the United States in 2009 left school with “an average debt of $24,000 according to the Project on Student Debt.”lvi The reason for that lies in the fact that the Western European nations subsidize education and healthcare more than the United States does, thus failing to increase their defense spending.

The countries that joined NATO after 2000, the former Soviet Union satellites struggled to transition to democratic forms of governance. The newest NATO members, Albania and Croatia are recovering from the Yugoslav Wars. Even though Albania was not a direct belligerent in the Balkan Wars, it witnessed a bloody rebellion in 1997 that involved foreign intervention.

Slovakia‟s Primes minister, Iveta Radicova, stated that her country‟s priority is not defense, but raising the standard of living of her constituents by reducing unemployment.lvii She correctly mentions the fact that two-thirds of Slovakians live on less than 500 euros a month but the country actively participates in NATO‟s missions in Afghanistan, Cyprus, Kosovo, and Bosnia. Slovakia is not the only NATO member in this type of situation. According to Eurostat, Romania‟s minimum wage in January 2011 was 157.2 Euros and it has a total of 2,196 troops

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carrying out missions in Libya, Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Georgia.lviii Indeed, the Eastern NATO allies need to think twice about their low defense spending because Russia is right next door. Probably also due to historical reasons and proximity to Russia, Poland seems to understand this better than the other Eastern-European allies, as it welcomed the US F-16 planes on its territory this spring.

There are several facts about Russia that could be of consideration to the eastern European NATO members. Russia conducted military exercises in which it simulated invading the Baltic Countries in the summer of 2009. Additionally, nuclear-armed “Russia‟s defense budget is also three times higher than that of the new members combined.”lix Russia may not be perceived as the big enemy that it once was, but it did go to war with Georgia in 2008 and won it in less than a week and a half. However, Europe poses no direct threat to Russia as long it does not take any aggressive steps towards it. Furthermore, in light of cooperation, “the NATO-Russia Council Cooperative Airspace Initiative (CAI) coordinated a joint NATO-Russia military exercise of a simulation of hijacked planes in Poland and above the Black Sea.”lx

Terrorism is indeed a common threat for both partners and cooperation could prepare them to face this challenge more effectively. There are also other factors which bring Europe and Russia closer, such as Europe‟s dependency on Russia‟s energy. Russia needs the economic gains from the selling of energy resources to European countries, even though Russia has also used it as a coercive power tool in instances such as the Russia-Ukraine gas crisis of 2009. Germany, a key NATO member, “decided to give up nuclear power by 2022,”lxi thus implying that it will rely more heavily on Russian energy sources such as gas and oil, as well as renewable energy produced in Germany. As long as Europe needs Russia energetically and Russia needs Europe financially, and dialogue is happening in formal forums such as the NATO-Russia Council, the likelihood of conflict is reduced.

After taking a brief look at these facts, there are some points to be made. The point is discrepancies will always exist between those who have more and those who have less to give. There needs to be a balance between ensuring

traditional security and assuring human security. United States defense Secretary Robert Gates speech urged the 23 remaining NATO allies to spend more on defense and reach that 2% defense spending benchmark so that NATO does not become irrelevant. He is right that the power of will could help the NATO allies reach that goal. However, a more imminent factor would be the United States‟ attitude and its concrete decision not to spend its taxpayer‟s money on 75% of NATO defense budget. Until then, the 23 Alliance members have time to reflect and think twice about European security when drafting the defense budgets.

The chances of NATO becoming a global alliance or a global alliance of democracies are dim, especially after briefly looking at alliances such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which have Islamic countries such as Iran as observers or communist countries such as China as members. It is very hard to establish a connection with states such as Iran that are considered rogue states by NATO-member countries such as the United States. If NATO was able to create a joint-council with a former enemy, namely Russia, then it should be able to do so with other countries, as well. That way, there would be dialogue with the other regional security organizations without the need of an expanded global NATO alliance. On April 4th, 1949, a new alliance was born in Washington, D.C. Those twelve NATO founding members signed the North Atlantic Treaty to optimize security after two long World-Wars. And they succeeded. Sixty-one years later, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization drafted a new strategic concept to adapt to today‟s times. Involved in two missions outside its member-states territory, and enlarged to 28 member-states, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has grown up and it expanded in scope and mission. Whether or not NATO will become a global alliance remains to be seen.

What has not changed since 1949 is the fact that each NATO member country has its own interests and those interests are exposed in the North Atlantic Council, at the decision-level and then in the field. The new strategic concept adopted in Lisbon in November 2010 coherently describes the new threats that face the Alliance today, and the intervention in Libya put into practice several ideas mentioned in the document.

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The operation in Libya has shown the interests of many NATO-members, and Operation Unified Protector has demonstrated several discrepancies in allied actions. Some members chose to intervene in Libya, some did not. The point is the Alliance did face some internal difficulties in effectively carrying out Operation Allied Protector due to divergent interests. However, the alliance did not give up. Despite internal struggles, NATO will continue to provide security and cooperation for its members and beyond. To conclude, NATO is the prime security

provider in the world, but it needs to protect this status by solidifying its internal cohesion and reflecting that in its missions. It is reassuring that France has joined NATO military command and that the United Kingdom is so close to the United States and implicitly a very reliable member. But the fears are about the United States not contributing as much to NATO as it does today. Will there be a Euro-Atlantic rift? Only time can tell, but for the time being NATO will continue to do what it knows best, “ensuring common defense and security.”lxii

Notes: iGareth Evans, “NATO and the responsibility to protect”. Available online at: http://www.gevans.org/speeches/speech313.html. Accessed May 30th, 2011. ii Edgar Buckley, Ioan Mircea Paşcu. “Article 5 and Strategic Reassurance,” Atlantic Council of the United States, February 23rd, 2010, pg. 4. Available online at : http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/403/Article5_SAGIssueBrief.PDF. Accessed on: June 15th, 2011. iiiUN Security Council Resolution 1674 (2006) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict. Available online at: http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/331/99/PDF/N0633199.pdf?OpenElement. Accessed on: June 7th, 2011. iv A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility. Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, UN Doc. A/59/565, at 8 (2004). Available at: http://www.un.org/secureworld/report.pdf. Accessed: June 7th, 2011. Quoted in Anne Marie Slaughter. In: The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 99, No.3, July 2005, pg. 619-639. v The responsibility to protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. Available at: http://www.iciss.ca/report-en.asp. Quoted in Anne Marie Slaughter. In: The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 99, No.3, July 2005, pg. 619-639. vi “Strategic Concept For the Defence and Security of The Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation”. Available online at: http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf. Accessed on: June 7th, 2011. vii Libya, The CIA World Factbook. Available online at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ly.html. Accessed on: June 7th, 2011. viii Libya. Encyclopedia Britannica Online. Available at: http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/39574/ Libya/46564/The-discovery-of-oil. Accessed on: June 7th, 2011. ix “Endgame in Tripoli”. In: The Economist, February 24th, 2011. Available online at: http://www.economist.com/node/18239888. Accessed on: June 7th, 2011. x Libya, The CIA World Factbook. Available online at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ly.html. Accessed on: June 7th, 2011. xi “Endgame in Tripoli”. In: The Economist, February 24th, 2011. Available online at: http://www.economist.com/node/18239888. Accessed on: June 7th, 2011. xii David Cole, “Mercenaries in Ambulances Killing Injured.” 25 February 2011. Available online at: http://www.allvoices.com/contributed-news/8300956-mercenaries-in-ambulances-killing-injured-libya. Accessed on : June 7, 2011. xiii United Nations Security Council Resolution 1970, February 26th, 2011, on Peace and Security in Africa. Available online at: http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/n11/245/58/PDF/N1124558.pdf?Open Element. Accessed on: June 8th, 2011. xiv “Bid to secure no-flying zone over Libya falters”. In: The Herald, March 16th, 2011. Available online at: http://www.herald.co.zw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=4991:bid-to-secure-no-flying-zone-over-libya-falters&catid=45:international-news&Itemid=137. Aaccessed June 8, 2011.

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RELIGION AS A FACTOR IN THE FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS OF ISLAMIC STATES

Anda-Ilona ȘERBAN, Alexandru VOLACU1

Abstract

In the present paper we study the hypothesis according to which Islamic religion influences the foreign policies of governmental actors. In order to explain their decisional functions we use methodological instruments specific to Public Choice Theory and Game Theory, interpreting the decisions made by these actors through iterated sum games played between the government and society, both in respect to internal policies and foreign policies. We argue that whilst due to the socio-cultural particularities of Islamic societies religion can be a key factor in the design process of internal policies, in what concerns foreign policies they are not significantly influenced by religion due to the different impact which these issues have on a national level, but mainly due to the difficulties experienced by citizens regarding information costs. In the second part we analyze the hypothesis from an empirical standpoint by studying the votes given by Islamic governments in the UN General Assembly between 2000 and 2010 for resolutions which specifically target an Islamic state, the conclusion being that in general, Islamic states do not vote together even in issues directly related to another Islamic state, therefore rendering implausible any assertion which supports the idea that religion plays a significant role in foreign policy decisions of Islamic states.

Keywords: foreign policy decisions, government actors, information costs, Islamic state, religion.

1 Anda-Ilona Șerban, MA Degree in Security Studies at the Faculty of Sociology and Social Work of

the University of Bucharest, BA Degree in Sociology at the Faculty of Sociology and Social Work of the University of Bucharest, BA Degree in Political Science at the Faculty of Political Science of the National School of Political and Administrative Studies. E-mail: [email protected]. Alexandru Volacu, 1st Year MA in Political Theory and Analysis at the Faculty of Political Science of the National School of Political and Administrative Studies, BA Degree in Political Science at the Faculty of Political Science of the National School of Political and Administrative Studies. E-mail: [email protected].



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1. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS

The hypothesis from which we start this paper is that religion is not a particularly relevant factor in the foreign policy decisions of Islamic states. This hypothesis is by no means original, being proposed by various authors in the field of Islamic studies, one particularly strong adept of this position being Fuller who states that “even Islamists cannot avoid the calculus of national state interests in looking at pan-Islamic issues” (Fuller, 2004, p.41) and argues that the concern shown between Arab states can be attributed to ethnical and geopolitical circumstances rather than to religious ones (Fuller, 2004, p.41). However, what we will try to provide in this paper is first of all a new framework for understanding the reasons why the hypothesis is plausible and secondly a strong empirical proof in its favor.

In theoretically arguing in favor of the hypothesis we will use a methodology specific to Public Choice Theoryi and Game Theoryii, accepting some of the premises utilized in economic sciences with regard to methodological individualismiii and instrumental rationalityiv.

However, before analyzing the rationality of the decisional mechanisms applied by governmental actors in foreign affairs from a theoretical standpoint it is imperative that we briefly overview the relation between religion and politics, specifically the reasons why the construction of an institutional system or even the simple adoption of a public policy can have a religious basis.

In Public Choice tradition the term “politics” is understood as a “conflict game” (Rae, 1969, pp.43-44) between a “plethora of groups with diverging interests” (Mueller, 2003, p.473).

Therefore, as in a large majority of research programs within the field of political sciencev, Public Choice literature generally assumes that the primary objective of politics is power.

Consequently, it is natural to assume that political actors, either them being representatives of political parties in democratic systems or representatives of a quasi-permanently entrenched governmental elite in systems where there is no alternation of power through the means of fair electoral competition have as a primary target the maximization of power.

Muslims are in no way placed outside of this pattern. As Feller points out “the state is not simply a vehicle or „prize‟ for Islamists. Islamists, as other parties and groups, seek power to be represented in the system, to gain voice, to protect them, to influence the social process, and to implement their vision of the ideal society. Control over the state is not an end but a means to the attainment of a program or agenda.” (Fuller, 2004, p.121)

In democratic systems the objective of power maximization is translated into the reason for creating political parties, which are institutions built to “control the governmental apparatus by winning elections” (Downs, 1957, p.71). In this type of system individuals, to whom the political process is ultimately reduced, become involved in partisan activities with the purpose of obtaining benefits inherent to winning political power. To gain political power however, parties must first win the electoral competition by attracting a large enough share of voters to their side. In order to achieve this objective parties must act on several dimensions to influence the individuals whom they consider to be potential voters, due to the diversity of individual decisional functions, e.g. some individuals vote according to partisan identification (Campbell et al, 1960), some individuals vote according to party ideology (Downs, 1957), some individuals vote after analyzing issue positions (McKelvey, 1975), etc. Religion can be a significant factor in influencing all types of decisional calculus as it represents an element of primary socialization through the fact that it affects “individual learning experience”, and is therefore susceptible to being considered an “explanatory variable in a positive theory of ethical behavior” (Mueller, 2003, p.325).

Moreover, in systems where there is no partisan competition for obtaining power and consequently religion cannot be considered a factor in the electoral behavior of voters because, at least de facto there is no electoral system, religion becomes, even more important for the members of the governmental apparatus as “the existence of a state religion helps to make the dictator‟s promises credible” (Mueller, 2003, p.417). In societies which are strongly rooted in religious precepts, such as Islamic societies are generally considered to be, religion can therefore represent one of the most useful tools for ensuring

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the loyalty of subjects, this being one of the two principle means, alongside repression, used by dictators in order to maintain political power (Wintrobe, 1990).

Even so, it is almost impossible to assert that religion represents a primary instrument for gaining and consolidating power in all societies. In Western Europe for instance, in spite of the fact that Lipset and Rokkan (1967) identify the state-Church cleavage as being one of the four dominant political cleavages, religion plays a rather secondary role in defining the political field. In respect to Islamic societies however, there are a series of reasons why religion could be considered as constituting a fundamental element in the formation of socio-political arrangements.

First of all, Islam is perceived in these societies as a “way of life”, being inextricably linked to the political field as “politics is a part of the everyday reality” (Hassan, 2007, p.3) and Islam acts exhaustively in all domains of reality. This derives from the historical conception of Islamic societies which considered that there is no distinction between state and Church, the notion of “secularism” first appearing in their political vocabularyvi under the pressure of a Western European cultural surge in the Middle East in the Nineteenth Century which determined significant reforms in the Ottoman Empire. This situation is still somewhat visible in the present age as notions of secular jurisdiction, secular authority or “laity” is meaningless for Islamic people (Lewis, 1988, pp.2-3) especially in some countries which “are, or claim to be, totally traditional. In Saudi Arabia, for example, there is no constitution; they say the Qur‟an is our constitution; there are no law codes, because the “Sharia is the law” (Lewis, 2010, p.51). Secondly, religion holds a particular degree of importance in these societies due to the relation between subjects and the governmental apparatus as the latter can be assimilated to a sort of depersonalized “caliph” to which Muslims must manifest at all times absolute loyalty. It can therefore be stated that “Muslims are responsible to implement Islam in politics or to politically activate in accordance with the tenets of Islam to help their caliph in achieving his mission.”(Hassan, 2007, p.3). Another important factor which links religion to politics is the accent which Islamic political philosophy places on unity and community values, unlike the mainstream of Western

philosophical thought where the accent is sooner placed on the individual‟s role in society (Brown, 1999, pp.52-59). By underlining the necessity of contributing to the community welfare, necessity which is religiously determined, individuals are being normatively obliged to have a socio-political active conduct, placing community objectives above their own.

Although the arguments in this direction are numerous, the position according to which Islam is essential for the life of each Muslim and implicitly for politics is heavily influential in the specialized literature, we consider that a further development of this idea is not required and we conclude, following Berger that “by now almost all social, economic, political or personal issues are discussed in terms of Islam, [...] being appropriated by Islamic discourse, rendering them „Islamic‟ regardless of whether they are inherently so or not.”(Berger, 2010, p.5) And following Esposito who states that “for the foreseeable future, religion will remain a significant political and social force for reform because majorities of Muslims today stress the importance of its role for the progress of their societies” (Esposito, 2010, p.195).

The influence which religion exercises on the construction of institutional arrangements can therefore be considered a particularity of political systems developed in Islamic societies, either them being democratic or autocratic / totalitarian. In this light, the hypothesis of the paper seems to be counterintuitive as it presumes that religion is not a relevant factor in the foreign policy decisions of Islamic states. Keeping this in mind, we will start the analysis from two arguments which categorically differentiate, in our opinion, foreign policies from internal policies: 1) the different importance of each policy category for governmental actors and 2) the level of popular information regarding each policy category.

In regard to the first issue, the argument is fairly straightforward and is tracked on two dimensions: a) the decisions which target foreign policy fields such as security, military affairs, economic relations with other countries, political alliances, etc. have, ex definition, a wider applicability domain than internal policies which are generally directed toward a limited number of social groupsvii. In this sense, the state benefits

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or loses more from bad foreign policies than from bad internal policiesviii and b) the stability of political regimes has an internal component and an external one. If in concern to the stability of regimes from an internal standpoint religion can have, inter alia, a decisive role (Mueller, 2003, p.295), in concern to the impact of the international relations system on the stability of regimes it does not appear to have a significant role, the main relevant factor being the interests of political and military alliances and states which are regionally or globally powerfulix.

In regard to the second issue, the difference lies in the fact that foreign policies represent complex decisions which do not visibly

affect the daily activity of citizens. From this perspective, the information costsx attached to foreign policies are, first of all, much higher than in the case of internal policies, as they involve supplementary research because the information is harder to collect, and in addition they are redundant costs because they do not have an immediate and visible impact on the activities of individuals.

By using a Game Theoretical methodology we can model both the logic of internal policy decisions as well as foreign policy decisions taken by governmental actors, an enterprise which we undertake in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2.

Figure 1. Government-Society interactions in internal policy decisions

Government

Individual “n” A B

A

-ui

1

ui - 1

n

k

k

n

-1

B - ui - 1

n

k

k

n

1

ui

-1

Source: Authors

Let us consider that in this case A is a foreign policy decision which contradicts the policy desired by the government but is in accordance with Islamic teachings and B is an internal policy decision which is in accordance with the policy desired by the government but contradicts Islamic teachingsxi (ui >0). Let us also consider that individual “n” which is faithful to religious teachings register a utility growth of one unit when the policy is in accordance with religion and a decrease in utility with one unit when the policy adopted contradicts Islamic tenetsxii. Alternatively, the utility of governmental actors fluctuates dependent on the number of individuals which choose A and are negatively affected by B, decreasing directly proportional to the

increase of1

n

k

k

n

. But as we previously argued,

due to the particularities of Islamic societies the number of n-individuals who choose A is relatively high by comparison with non-Islamic societies and the internal policy decisions, in particular those which heavily affect citizens such as economic or social issues significantly influence citizens. In addition, the term “u” does not have a significantly high value as the majority of internal policy decisions have a sectorial nature and only tangentially target all social groups.

By studying the utility values we can

observe that if 1

2 0n

k i

k

n u

the government will

choose to act according to religious teachings with the decision adopted being A and if the

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inequality 1

2 0n

k i

k

n u

is satisfied then the

government will choose B. In respect to foreign policy decision however the situation is fundamentally different if we maintain the assumption under which citizens are not well informed on foreign policy matters. This situation is modeled in Figure 2 as a game

with imperfect information, i.e. certain players do not possess information regarding the strategies used by the opponent in previous stages of the game (Harsanyi, 1995, p.297). In this case, n-individuals are not informed on the previous strategies of the government as the information costs are too expensivexiii.

Figure 2. Government-Society interaction in foreign policy decisions

Government

Individual “n”

A B

A

-ue

0

ue

0

B

-ue

0

ue

0

Source: Authors

Presuming that individuals act, in this case, in conditions of imperfect information, as they do not pay the information costs required, we can easily determine that the governmental decision will be unequivocally B. In addition, as the individual is not informed regarding the governmental decision, in this instance “n” is characterized by an indifference relation between alternatives A and B, his desire to see a fundamentally religious foreign policy or by contrast a foreign policy clear of such metaphysical constructs becoming irrelevant. Further, even when we relax the assumptions and consider that there is a small number of citizens who constantly pay the information costs on foreign policy issuesxiv the result of the social interaction still holds for two main reasons: a) in general the expression ue>ui is valid as per our previous argument, foreign policies do not usually have sectorial objectives unlike internal policies and in that case the

probability that the inequality 1

2 0n

k i

k

n u

will

be satisfied is significantly lower and b) the presupposition that there is still a relatively small

number of citizens who are informed regarding foreign policies, combined with the necessity that they are favorable to a construction of foreign policies on the basis of religion, drastically reduces the size of the first term of the inequality and determines a further reduction in the probability that it will be satisfied. The conclusion of this segment of the text is that although Islamic societies are characterized by specific socio-cultural traits which determine governmental actors to incorporate the religious tenets of the state religion into a series of internal public policies, in what concerns foreign policies, because the results are much more relevant to the government but first and foremost because citizens are unwilling to pay information costs to acquire knowledge in this field, costs which are both higher and less significant than the costs paid for acquiring information on internal policy decisions. In the next section we will try to empirically show that the hypothesis is valid and there is no clear correlation between religion and the foreign policies of Islamic governments.

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2. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

As in the empirical analysis we will only take into consideration fundamentally Islamic states it is necessary to first present the sample

studied. Thus, we specify that in this analysis we consider an Islamic state any state which has a proportion of citizens which declare themselves Muslims (regardless of the denomination) of over 85%.

Table 1. States in which the Muslim population exceeds 85%

State Percentage of Islamic Citizens Afghanistan 80% Sunni; 19% Shi‟i

Algeria 99% Sunni

Azerbaidjan 93.40%

Bangladesh 89.50%

Comores 98% Sunni

Djibouti 94.00%

Egypt 90% Sunni

Gambia 90.00%

Guineea 85.00%

Indonesia 86.10%

Islamic Republic of Iran 89% Shi‟i; 9% Sunni

Iraq 60-65% Sunni; 32-37% Shi‟i

Jordan 92% Sunni

Kuweit 70% Sunni; 30% Shi‟i

Libya 97% Sunni

Maldives 100.00%

Mali 90.00%

Morocco 98,7%

Islamic Republic of Mauritania 100.00%

Islamic Republic of Pakistan 75% Sunni; 20% Shi‟i

Saudi Arabia 100%

Senegal 94.00%

Somalia 100.00%

Syria 74% Sunni; 16% Alawi, Druze

Sultanate of Oman 75% Ibadhi; 25% Sunni, Shi‟i

Tadjikistan 85% Sunni; 15% Shi‟i

Tunisia 98.00%

Turkey 99.80%

Turkmenistan 89.00%

United Arab Emirates 80% Sunni; 16% Shi‟i

Uzbekistan 88.00%

Yemen 65% Sunni; 35% Shi‟i

Source: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/

Regarding the methodological instruments employed, we will analyze the votes given by states which are defined as Islamic according to Table 1, in the UN General Assembly during the period 2000-2010 on resolutions which specifically target an Islamic state. More exactly, we will analyze the resolutions titled “Situation of

Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran”, voted on an annual basis during 2000-2010, “Situation of Human Rights in Iraq” voted between 2000-2002 and “Situation of Human Rights in Uzbekistan” voted in 2005.

For a full comprehension of the analysis we consider that it is necessary to provide the reader

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with a short background on the institution studied, i.e. the UN General Assembly. The United Nations is the only international organization which has the purpose of ensuring global security. The objectives of the UN are, according to Article 1 of the UN Charter: to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peacexv. All UN member states are represented in the UN General Assembly – “a Parliament of

nations” – which convenes in ordinary or extraordinary sessions to discuss the most pressing issues on the global stage. Each member state has one vote. Decisions in key issues such as peace or international security, the admission of new members and the UN budget must be approved with a two-thirds majority. All other decisions are approved by simple majority. In the past few years efforts were made to impose a pattern of cooperation and consensual decision-making rather than simple majority decision-making. The resolutions passed by the Assembly are not legally-binding to member states, however they are benchmarks for the general international opinion and are invested with the moral authority of the community of nationsxvi.

Table 2. Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran (2000-2010)

Islamic States Vote In favor Against Abstain No vote

Afghanistan 0 11 0 0

Algeria 0 10 1 0

Azerbaidjan 0 11 0 0

Bangladesh 0 11 0 0

Comores 0 10 0 1

Djibouti 0 8 1 2

Egypt 0 11 0 0

Gambia 1 6 0 4

Guineea 0 7 0 4

Indonesia 0 11 0 0

Islamic Republic of Iran 0 11 0 0

Iraq 0 2 1 8

Jordan 1 4 3 3

Kuweit 0 10 0 1

Libya 0 11 0 0

Maldives 1 8 0 2

Mali 1 0 9 1

Morocco 0 9 2 0

Islamic Republic of Mauritania 1 7 0 3

Islamic Republic of Pakistan 0 11 0 0

Saudi Arabia 1 9 1 0

Senegal 0 10 1 0

Somalia 0 8 0 3

Syria 0 11 0 0

Sultanate of Oman 0 11 0 0

Tadjikistan 0 10 0 1

Tunisia 0 11 0 0

Turkey 0 0 0 11

United Arab Emirates 0 2 9 0

Turkmenistan 0 11 0 0

Uzbekistan 0 6 0 5

Yemen 0 6 0 5

Source: http://unbisnet.un.org/

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Starting with the year 2000 and on annual basis up to 2010 the UN General Assembly has debated and voted upon a resolution regarding the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran. In the 11 resolutions proposed between 2000 and 2010 the operative clauses bring to the attention of the general public the lack of cooperation between the Iranian government and the High Commissioner for Human Rights, express concern over religious discrimination toward minorities and toward the harassment, intimidation and constant persecution of human rights activists,

NGOs, political opponents, religious dissidents, political reformers, clerics, scholars, students and bloggers. The resolutions also condemn the use of torture, inhumane and degrading treatments as well as punishments like flogging or mutilation. Also, the Iranian government is called to respect the obligations which it agreed upon by accepting the International Bill of Rights, to reform the prison system, to accept a visit from the UN Special Rapporteur to evaluate the situation and to end restrictions on the freedom of speech and the freedom of conscience.

Table 3. Situation of Human Rights in Iraq (2000-2002)

State islamice Vote In favor Against Abstain No vote

Afghanistan 0 0 3 0

Algeria 0 0 3 0

Azerbaidjan 0 0 3 0

Bangladesh 0 0 3 0

Comores 2 0 1 0

Djibouti 0 0 3 0

Egypt 0 0 3 0

Gambia 0 0 3 0

Guineea 0 0 3 0

Indonesia 0 0 3 0


Iraq 0 0 0 3

Jordan 0 0 0 3

Kuweit 3 0 0 0

Libya 0 3 0 0

Maldives 3 0 0 0

Mali 0 0 2 1

Morocco 0 0 1 2




Senegal 3 0 0 0

Somalia 0 0 1 2

Syria 0 3 0 0


Tadjikistan 2 0 0 1

Tunisia 0 0 3 0

Turkey 3 0 0 0



Uzbekistan 2 0 1 0

Yemen 0 0 3 0


In 2000 the Third Committee of the GA (SOCHUM) submitted a resolution to the attention of the General Assembly regarding the situation of human rights in Iraq, which was subsequently

renewed in 2001 and 2002. First of all the resolution underlined the government‟s responsibility to ensure the welfare of its entire population. Secondly, it condemned the extreme

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and systematic violation of human rights, suppression of the freedom of thought, expression, information, association and movement through threats with arrest, imprisonment, execution and expulsion and condemns widespread use of the death penalty. In addition, the resolution demanded immediate action regarding ethnical and religious minority group‟s discrimination and the cessation of repressive practices toward Kurdish, Assyrian and Turkmen people. It also demanded the guaranteeing of political liberties

and cooperation in identifying and eventually cleaning land mined fields. The resolution A/RES/55/115 was voted on the 4th of December 2000 with 102 votes in favor, 3 against and 60 abstaining. The second resolution, A/RES/56/174, from the 19th of December 2001 was voted with 100 votes in favor, 2 against and 63 abstaining and the third resolution, from the 18th of December 2002 gathered a number of 97 votes in favor, 3 against and 77 abstentions.

Table 4. Situation of Human Rights in Uzbekistan (2005)

State islamice Vote In favor Against Abstain No vote

Afghanistan 0 1 0 0

Algeria 0 0 1 0

Azerbaidjan 0 1 0 0

Bangladesh 0 1 0 0

Comores 0 0 0 1

Djibouti 0 0 1 0

Egypt 0 1 0 0

Gambia 0 1 0 0

Guineea 0 0 1 0

Indonesia 0 1 0 0


Iraq 0 0 1 0

Jordan 0 1 0 0

Kuweit 0 1 0 0

Libya 0 1 0 0

Maldives 0 1 0 0

Mali 0 0 1 0

Morocco 0 1 0 0




Senegal 0 0 1 0

Somalia 0 0 1 0

Syria 0 1 0 0


Tadjikistan 0 1 0 0

Tunisia 0 0 1 0

Turkey 1 0 0 0



Uzbekistan 0 1 0 0

Yemen 0 1 0 0


The resolution on the situation of human rights in Uzbekistan, forwarded by the Third Committee of the GA was voted on the 16th of

December 2005 with 5 votes in favor, 39 against and 56 abstentions. The resolution condemns the events in Andijan, the disproportionate number of

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forces with which the government intervened in the region, the refusal to register opposition parties, the constraining, harassing and detaining of NGO and civil society members as well as the discrimination, harassment and persecution on the freedom of thought, conscience and religion.

The data presented in Tables 2, 3 and 4 constitute an important reference for the analysis of the relation between religion and foreign policy decisions, as the issue under discussion directly refers to an Islamic state. Theoretically, a confirmation of the important role which religion plays in foreign policies would be reflected by a general and clear tendency to vote in a single direction in all three issues exposed, i.e. in favor of the Islamic state. Even so, the data collected do not point to this fact. In regard to the condemnation of human rights violations in Iran between 2000 and 2011 there are only 12 states from a total of 32 (only 37.5%!) who voted against the resolution, in spite of the fact that it supports the blaming of an Islamic state. Also, there are 6 Islamic states who did not abstain in this case but voted in favor of condemning Iran, according to the resolution of the GA. In regard to the resolutions adopted by the GA between 2000 and 2002 to sanction human rights violations in Iraq votes are also divided (with the majority of states abstaining), leaning to a condemnation of Iraq rather than to its support. In fact only 3 states, a percent of 9.37% of the entire number of Islamic states, voted in support of another Islamic states in this case, i.e. Iraq. In regard to the resolution against human rights violations in Uzbekistan the result of the Islamic states vote is not so clearly directed against it as in the previous examples, but even in this case 10 states (31.25%), which is approximately one third do not vote against the resolution.

Considering the significance which Islam attaches to unity (Brown, 1999, p. 52) we can assert that, at least in these cases, no general voting tendency in accord with religious tenets can be identified, as the Islamic states are heavily divided in their voting patterns. Moreover, the examples given represent an optimal framework for underlining a potential unity among Islamic states as the subjects of choices are always fellow Islamic states. The situation seems to point to a contrary situation as no general consensus between Islamic states is visible.

To offer an exhaustive explanation for the voting patterns adopted by Islamic states in regard to the three problems discussed in this section is neither our objective, nor could it represent the subject of a paper relatively limited in size. Regardless of the fact that the interests which lie at the heart of the foreign policy decisional process of governmental actors from Islamic states have an economic nature, a strategic nature or a diplomatic nature, it is easy to observe that they do not have a religious nature, this case requiring a powerful cohesion in the positions adopted on the international stage from these states, cohesion which is inexistent even in situations which would ab initio favor the grouping of Islamic states around a common position, as is the case with the situations described in this analysis.

3. CONCLUSIONS

The hypothesis from which we started this

paper is that religion does not represent a significant factor in the foreign policies of Islamic states.

In the first part we provided a theoretical explanation, starting from the premises of Public Choice Theory, arguing that in spite the fact that the particularities of Islamic societies favor the proposal of religiously based internal public policies, as in democratic systems parties use religion as an instrument to attract the electorate and in systems where no democratic electoral competition exists the governmental apparatus uses religion as an instrument of consolidation and stabilization of the regime, in what concerns foreign policies the religiously based construction of decisions is illogical as citizens are not informed with respect to the policies adopted by the government on this issues due to the high information costs inherent to the process and the instrumental futility of the enterprise as well as due to the fact that foreign policy decisions impact the state on a wider scale than internal policy decisions and consequently require an approach which is more focused in the economic and military realities of the moment.

In the second part we provided a series of empirical proofs which support the above mentioned hypothesis. We tried to determine if we can identify a common position of Islamic states regarding a subject which is primarily

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important to them, i.e. the international condemnation of an Islamic state for human rights violation. In this sense we studied the votes given by Islamic states for the resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly on situations of human rights violations in the Islamic Republic of Iran (2000-2010), Iraq (2000-2002) and Uzbekistan (2005), these states being the only Islamic states against such a measure was proposed in the last decade (which is the period on which this analysis is based). The results obtained confirmed the hypothesis of the paper as we could not identify any common position of Islamic states, a powerful division existing especially in the case of Iran and Iraq.

As a concluding remark, we consider Brown‟s assertion which states that we can give

justice to the subject of Islam and politics only by avoiding to adopt one of the two methodological extremes: 1. reducing all Muslim actions to pre-existent Islamic stimulus or 2. supposing that the religious and cultural heritage of Islam has a marginal influence on the modern Muslim political thought (Brown, 1999, p.75) still valid in the present day. However, we can assert that in the light of the arguments presented in this paper, the influence of religion on the foreign policy decisions of governmental actors which represent Islamic states has a generally minimal impact, these decisions being rather the consequence of strategic, economic or diplomatic developments, in similarity with the primary decisional factors of governments belonging to non-Islamic societies

.

Notes: i Public Choice Theory is defined as the economic study of decisional processes which are not directly connected to the economic market (Mueller, 2003, p.1). ii Game Theory is a “theory of strategic interactions in social situations in which each player has to choose his moves on the basis of what he thinks the other players‟ countermoves are likely to be” (Harsanyi, 1995, p.292). iii Methodological Individualism is a “principle [...] for defining collective concepts, explaining social phenomena and/or reduce macro to micro” (Udehn, 2002, p.497). iv Instrumental rationality presupposes a preliminary analysis of all factors involved, with specific attention to the goals of the individual and the means available to him, followed by a comparison of all relevant variables and the making of a decision based on these comparisons which leads to the achievement of the best possible result for the individual. Instrumental rationality is primarily distinguished from axiological rationality (or Kantian rationality). For more details on this distinction see Miroiu (2006). v For a sociological perspective see for example Debbasch and Pontier (1995) or Braud (1997). vi Which previously also lacked a correspondent for word pairings such as spiritual-temporal, lay-ecclesiastical, religious-secular. vii Although externalities can inherently affect the entire social structure. viii Obviously this situation is not symptomatic for all possible instances as there are internal policies which affect the entire society in bloc as well as foreign policies which are only relevant at a sectorial level. However, in general, we argue that this situation is an plausible depiction of reality. ix For more details on the impact of the international system on the stability of political regimes see for example Enterline and Greig (2007). x For a discussion on this term see Downs (195, pp.265-326). xi The alternative cases, a) in which the decision is not instrumentally useful for governmental actors or in accordance with religious tenets and b) in which the decision is both instrumentally useful and in accordance with religious tenets are irrelevant as in the first case it will be undoubtedly rejected and in the second case, ceteris paribus, it will be accepted as it does not involve any utility decrease. xii It is important to underline at this point that “n” does not represent the entire society but only to a specific part of it. xiii Of course we also want to specify that in this case as well the situation does not characterize a society in its entirety, as there are individuals who pay the information costs on foreign policies. However, we maintain that the argument is generally valid as obtaining information regarding foreign policies is more difficult (and instrumentally useless) then obtaining information regarding internal policies. xiv In this case we can return to Fig. 1 with the term ui replaced by ue.

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xv Art. 1 of the Charter of the United Nations, 1945. xvi http://www.onuinfo.ro/despre_onu/principalele_organisme/.

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2010. Lipset, Martin Seymour, Rokkan, Stein. Party Systems and Voter Alignments. New York Free Press. 1967. McKelvey ,Richard. Policy Related Voting and Electoral Equilibrium. In: Econometrica. No.43 (5-6). 1975. Miroiu, Adrian. Policy fundamentals (Vol. 1): Preference and collective choices. Iasi. Polirom. 2006. Mueller, Dennis C. Public Choice. New York. Cambridge University Press. 2003. Rae, Douglas. Decision-Rules and Individual Values in Constitutional Choice. In: American Political Science

Review, No.63, 1969. Undehn, Lars.. The Changing Face of Methodological Individualism. In: Annual Review of Sociology, No. 28.

2002. Wintrobe, Ronald. The Tinpot and the Totalitarian: An Economic Theory of Dictatorship. In: American Political

Science Review, No.84, 1990.

http://www.onuinfo.ro/despre_onu/principalele_organisme/

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OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS

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Keynote Address at the National Democratic Institute's 2011 Democracy Awards Dinner

Hillary Rodham CLINTON

Secretary of State Andrew W. Mellon Auditorium

Washington, DC November 7, 2011

Thank you. Well, it’s a great pleasure for me to be here this evening. And I thank my friend and my predecessor, Madeleine Albright, for not only that kind introduction, but for her extraordinary leadership, and in particular of NDI. Thanks also to Shari Bryan and Ken Wollack for inviting me here today. And I want to begin by wishing an Eid Mubarak to Muslims here tonight and around the world.

I think it’s important to recognize that back when the streets of Arab cities were quiet, the National Democratic Institute was already on the ground, building relationships, supporting the voices that would turn a long Arab winter into a new Arab Spring. Now, we may not know where and when brave people will claim their rights next, but it’s a safe bet that NDI is there now, because freedom knows no better champion. More than a quarter-century old, NDI and its siblings in the National Endowment for Democracy family have become vital elements of America’s engagement with the world.

And tonight I want particularly to congratulate the winners of NDI’s 2011 Madeleine Albright Award, the women of Appropriate Communication Techniques for Development. Women risked everything to demand their rights for the Egyptian people, and they deserve those rights extended to them. And so we’re grateful for their work, and we hope to see the rights that they’ve fought for and advocated for enshrined in Egypt’s new constitution, and we’re proud to support efforts like these through our Middle East Partnership Initiative. (Applause.)

Now, tonight it’s also a singular, special honor for me to join with you in remembering three friends of NDI, three people I was lucky enough to call my friends as well: Geraldine Ferraro, a trailblazing pioneer, who lived to the fullest her conviction that women belong at the heart of democracy; Chuck Manatt, a passionate chairman of the Democratic National Committee, who understood that some things are too important to belong to any one party, and with his counterpart at the RNC, Frank Fahrenkopf, put together a bipartisan coalition to found the National Endowment for Democracy; and of course the indomitable, unforgettable Richard Holbrooke. Now, Richard has many reasons why those of us here tonight applaud and remember him. He died just four days before the desperate act of a Tunisian fruit vendor set the Arab uprisings in motion. And I often wonder what Richard would have made of all that has happened since. I’m sure he would have had a lot to say and even more that he wanted to do to promote the principles that we all cherish. And so these three individuals are very worthy of the awards that you have granted them this evening.

And what a year 2011 has been for freedom in the Middle East and North Africa. We have seen what may well have been the first Arab revolution for democracy, then the second, then the third. And in Yemen, people are demanding a transition to democracy that they deserve to see delivered. And Syrians are refusing to relent until they, too, can decide their own future.

Throughout the Arab world this year, people have given each other courage. Old fears have melted away and men and women have begun making their demands in broad daylight. They have given many of our diplomats courage, too, and I want to single out someone who is here with us tonight.

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When our Ambassador to Syria was mobbed, assaulted, and threatened, just for meeting with peaceful protestors, he put his personal safety on the line to let the Syrian people know that America stands with them. And he said he was inspired by their bravery. And as he drove into Hama, a city under assault by Asad’s regime, the people of that city covered his car with flowers. Please join me in giving our own warm welcome to Ambassador Robert Ford and his wife and fellow Foreign Service Officer, Alison Barkley. (Applause.) Thanks to you, Robert, and to you, Alison, for your dedicated service to our country.

Now, in Tunis, Cairo, and a newly free Tripoli, I have met people lifted by a sense that their futures actually do belong to them. In my travels across the region, I have heard joy, purpose, and newfound pride.

But I’ve also heard questions. I’ve heard skepticism about American motives and commitments, people wondering if, after decades of working with the governments of the region, America doesn’t—in our heart of hearts—actually long for the old days. I’ve heard from activists who think we aren’t pushing hard enough for democratic change, and I’ve heard from government officials who think we’re pushing too hard. I’ve heard from people asking why our policies vary from country to country, and what would happen if elections bring to power parties we don’t agree with or people who just don’t like us very much. I’ve heard people asking America to solve all their problems and others wondering whether we have any role to play at all. And beneath our excitement for the millions who are claiming the rights and freedoms we cherish, many Americans are asking the same questions.

Tonight, I want to ask and answer a few of these tough questions. It’s a fitting tribute to people like Gerry Ferraro and Richard Holbrooke and Chuck Manatt. They liked to pose difficult questions and then push us to answer them. And in Richard’s case, that meant even following me into a ladies’ room in Pakistan one time. (Laughter.) As we live this history day by day, we approach these questions with a large dose of humility, because many of the choices ahead are, honestly, not ours to make. Still, it’s worth stepping back and doing our best to speak directly to what is on people’s minds.

So let me start with one question I hear often: Do we really believe that democratic change in the Middle East and North Africa is in America’s interest? That is a totally fair question. After all, transitions are filled with uncertainty. They can be chaotic, unstable, even violent. And, even if they succeed, they are rarely linear, quick, or easy.

As we saw in the Balkans and again in Iraq, rivalries between members of different religions, sects, and tribes can resurface and explode. Toppling tyrants does not guarantee that democracy will follow, or that it will last. Just ask the Iranians who overthrew a dictator 32 years ago only to have their revolution hijacked by the extremists who have oppressed them ever since. And even where democracy does takes hold, it is a safe bet that some of those elected will not embrace us or agree with our policies.

And yet, as President Obama said at the State Department in May, ―It will be the policy of the United States to promote reform across the region and to support transitions to democracy.‖ We believe that real democratic change in the Middle East and North Africa is in the national interest of the United States. And here’s why.

We begin by rejecting the false choice between progress and stability. For years, dictators told their people they had to accept the autocrats they knew to avoid the extremists they feared. And too often, we accepted that narrative ourselves. Now, America did push for reform, but often not hard enough or publicly enough. And today, we recognize that the real choice is between reform and unrest.

Last January, I told Arab leaders that the region’s foundations were sinking into the sand. Even if we didn’t know exactly how or when the breaking point would come, it was clear that the status quo was unsustainable because of changes in demography and technology, high unemployment, endemic corruption and a lack of human rights and fundamental freedoms. After a year of revolutions broadcast on Al Jazeera into homes from Rabat to Riyadh, going back to the way things were in December 2010 isn’t just undesirable. It’s impossible.

The truth is that the greatest single source of instability in today’s Middle East is not the demand for change. It is the refusal to change. That is certainly true in Syria, where a crackdown on small,

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peaceful protests drove thousands into the streets and thousands more over the borders. It is true in Yemen, where President Saleh has reneged repeatedly on his promises to transition to democracy and suppressed his people’s rights and freedoms. And it is true in Egypt. If—over time—the most powerful political force in Egypt remains a roomful of unelected officials, they will have planted the seeds for future unrest, and Egyptians will have missed a historic opportunity.

And so will we, because democracies make for stronger and stabler partners. They trade more, innovate more, and fight less. They help divided societies to air and hopefully resolve their differences. They hold inept leaders accountable at the polls. They channel people’s energies away from extremism and toward political and civic engagement. Now, democracies do not always agree with us, and in the Middle East and North Africa they may disagree strongly with some of our policies. But at the end of the day, it is no coincidence that our closest allies—from Britain to South Korea—are democracies.

Now, we do work with many different governments to pursue our interests and to keep Americans safe—and certainly not all of them are democracies. But as the fall of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt made clear, the enduring cooperation we seek will be difficult to sustain without democratic legitimacy and public consent. We cannot have one set of policies to advance security in the here-and-now and another to promote democracy in a long run that never quite arrives.

So for all these reasons, as I said back in March, opening political systems, societies, and economies is not simply a matter of idealism. It is a strategic necessity. But we are not simply acting in our self-interest. Americans believe that the desire for dignity and self-determination is universal—and we do try to act on that belief around the world. Americans have fought and died for these ideals. And when freedom gains ground anywhere, Americans are inspired.

So the risks posed by transitions will not keep us from pursuing positive change. But they do raise the stakes for getting it right. Free, fair, and meaningful elections are essential—but they are not enough if they bring new autocrats to power or disenfranchise minorities. And any democracy that does not include half its population—its women—is a contradiction in terms. Durable democracies depend on strong civil societies, respect for the rule of law, independent institutions, free expression, and a free press. Legitimate political parties cannot have a militia wing and a political wing. Parties have to accept the results of free and fair elections. And this is not just in the Middle East. In Liberia, the leading opposition party is making unsubstantiated charges of fraud and refusing to accept first round voting in which it came in second. And this is already having harmful consequences on the ground. We urge all parties in Liberia to accept the will of the people in the next round of voting tomorrow. That is what democracy anywhere requires.

And that brings me to my second question. Why does America promote democracy one way in some countries and another way in others? Well, the answer starts with a very practical point: situations vary dramatically from country to country. It would be foolish to take a one-size-fits-all approach and barrel forward regardless of circumstances on the ground. Sometimes, as in Libya, we can bring dozens of countries together to protect civilians and help people liberate their country without a single American life lost. In other cases, to achieve that same goal, we would have to act alone, at a much greater cost, with far greater risks, and perhaps even with troops on the ground.

But that’s just part of the answer. Our choices also reflect other interests in the region with a real impact on Americans’ lives—including our fight against al-Qaida, defense of our allies, and a secure supply of energy. Over time, a more democratic Middle East and North Africa can provide a more sustainable basis for addressing all three of those challenges. But there will be times when not all of our interests align. We work to align them, but that is just reality.

As a country with many complex interests, we’ll always have to walk and chew gum at the same time. That is our challenge in a country like Bahrain, which has been America’s close friend and partner for decades. And yet, President Obama and I have been frank, in public and in private, that mass arrests and brute force are at odds with the universal rights of Bahrain's citizens and will not make legitimate calls for reform go away. Meaningful reform and equal treatment for all Bahrainis are in Bahrain’s interest, in the region’s interest, and in ours—while endless unrest benefits Iran and extremists. The government has recognized the need for dialogue, reconciliation, and concrete reforms. And they have committed to provide access to human rights groups, to allow peaceful protest, and to ensure that

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those who cross lines in responding to civil unrest are held accountable. King Hamad called for an independent commission of inquiry, which will issue its report soon. And we do intend to hold the Bahraini Government to these commitments and to encourage the opposition to respond constructively to secure lasting reform.

We also have candid conversations with others in the neighborhood, like Saudi Arabia—a country that is key to stability and peace – about our view that democratic advancement is not just possible but a necessary part of preparing for the future.

Fundamentally, there is a right side of history. And we want to be on it. And—without exception—we want our partners in the region to reform so that they are on it as well. Now, we don’t expect countries to do this overnight, but without reforms, we are convinced their challenges will only grow. So it is in their interest to begin now.

These questions about our interests and consistency merge in a third difficult question: How will America respond if and when democracy brings to power people and parties we disagree with?

We hear these questions most often when it comes to Islamist religious parties. Now, of course, I hasten to add that not all Islamists are alike. Turkey and Iran are both governed by parties with religious roots, but their models and behavior are radically different. There are plenty of political parties with religious affiliations—Hindu, Christian, Jewish, Muslim—that respect the rules of democratic politics. The suggestion that faithful Muslims cannot thrive in a democracy is insulting, dangerous, and wrong. They do it in this country every day.

Now, reasonable people can disagree on a lot, but there are things that all parties, religious and secular, must get right—not just for us to trust them, but most importantly for the people of the region and of the countries themselves to trust them to protect their hard-won rights.

Parties committed to democracy must reject violence; they must abide by the rule of law and respect the freedoms of speech, religion, association, and assembly; they must respect the rights of women and minorities; they must let go of power if defeated at the polls; and in a region with deep divisions within and between religions, they cannot be the spark that starts a conflagration. In other words, what parties call themselves is less important to us than what they actually do. We applaud NDI for its work to arrive at a model code of conduct for political parties across the political spectrum and around the globe. We need to reinforce these norms and to hold people accountable for following them.

In Tunisia, an Islamist party has just won a plurality of the votes in an open, competitive election. Its leaders have promised to embrace freedom of religion and full rights for women. To write a constitution and govern, they will have to persuade secular parties to work with them. And as they do, America will work with them, too, because we share the desire to see a Tunisian democracy emerge that delivers for its citizens and because America respects the right of the Tunisian people to choose their own leaders.

And so we move forward with clear convictions. Parties and candidates must respect the rules of democracy, to take part in elections, and hold elective office. And no one has the right to use the trappings of democracy to deny the rights and security of others. People throughout the region worry about this prospect, and so do we. Nobody wants another Iran. Nobody wants to see political parties with military wings and militant foreign policies gain influence. When members of any group seek to oppress their fellow citizens or undermine core democratic principles, we will stand on the side of the people who push back to defend their democracy.

And that brings me to my next question: What is America’s role in the Arab Spring? These revolutions are not ours. They are not by us, for us, or against us, but we do have a role. We have the resources, capabilities, and expertise to support those who seek peaceful, meaningful, democratic reform. And with so much that can go wrong, and so much that can go right, support for emerging Arab democracies is an investment we cannot afford not to make.

Now, of course, we have to be smart in how we go about it. For example, as tens of millions of young people enter the job market each year, we recognize that the Arab political awakening must also deliver an economic awakening. And we are working to help societies create jobs to ensure that it

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does. We are promoting trade, investment, regional integration, entrepreneurship, and economic reforms. We are helping societies fight corruption and replace the old politics of patronage with a new focus on economic empowerment and opportunity. And we are working with Congress on debt relief for Egypt and loan guarantees for Tunisia so that these countries can invest in their own futures.

We also have real expertise to offer as a democracy, including the wisdom that NDI has gleaned from decades of working around the globe to support democratic transitions. Democracies, after all, aren’t born knowing how to run themselves. In a country like Libya, Qadhafi spent 42 years hollowing out every part of his government not connected to oil or to keeping him in power. Under the Libyan penal code, simply joining an NGO could be punishable by death. When I traveled last month to Libya, the students I met at Tripoli University had all sorts of practical, even technical, questions: How do you form a political party? How do you ensure women’s participation in government institutions? What recommendations do you have for citizens in a democracy?

These are questions NDI and its kindred organizations, many of whom are represented here tonight, are uniquely qualified to help new democracies answer. NDI has earned a lot of praise for this work, but also a lot of pushback that stretches far beyond the Arab world. In part, this resistance comes from misconceptions about what our support for democracy does and does not include.

The United States does not fund political candidates or political parties. We do offer training to parties and candidates committed to democracy. We do not try to shift outcomes or impose an American model. We do support election commissions, as well as nongovernmental election monitors, to ensure free and fair balloting. We help watchdog groups learn their trade. We help groups find the tools to exercise their rights to free expression and assembly, online and off. And of course we support civil society, the lifeblood of democratic politics.

But in part, the pushback comes from autocrats around the world wondering if the next Tahrir Square will be their capital square, and some are cracking down when they should be opening up. Groups like NDI are no strangers to pressure, and neither are the brave local groups you partner with. And I want you to know that as the pressure on you increases, our support will not waver.

And I want to offer a special word of thanks for NDI’s efforts to empower women across the Middle East and beyond. Just last week, the World Economic Forum released a report on the remarkable benefits countries see when they bridge the social, economic, and political gap separating women from men, and helping them get there is a priority for the State Department and for me personally. Graduates of NDI training programs designed to help women run for office now sit in local councils and parliaments from Morocco to Kuwait.

But we all know a great deal of work lies ahead to help all people, women and men, find justice and opportunity as full participants in new democratic societies. Along with our economic and technical help, America will also use our presence, influence, and global leadership to support change. And later this week, I am issuing new policy guidance to our embassies across the region to structure our efforts.

In Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, we are working to help citizens safeguard the principles of democracy. That means supporting the forces of reconciliation rather than retribution. It means defending freedom of expression when bloggers are arrested for criticizing public officials. It means standing up for tolerance when state-run television fans sectarian tensions. And it means that when unelected authorities say they want to be out of the business of governing, we will look to them to lay out a clear roadmap and urge them to abide by it.

Where countries are making gradual reforms, we have frank conversations and urge them to move faster. It’s good to hold multi-party elections and allow women to take part. It’s better when those elections are meaningful and parliaments have real powers to improve people’s lives. Change needs to be tangible and real. When autocrats tell us the transition to democracy will take time, we answer, ―Well, then let’s get started.‖

And those leaders trying to hold back the future at the point of a gun should know their days are numbered. As Syrians gather to celebrate a sacred holiday, their government continues to shoot people in the streets. In the week since Bashar al-Asad said he accepted the terms of an Arab League

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peace plan to protect Syrian civilians, he has systematically violated each of its basic requirements. He has not released all detainees. He has not allowed free and unfettered access to journalists or Arab League monitors. He has not withdrawn all armed forces from populated areas. And he has certainly not stopped all acts of violence. In fact, the regime has increased violence against civilians in places like the city of Homs. Now, Asad may be able to delay change. But he cannot deny his people’s legitimate demands indefinitely. He must step down; and until he does, America and the international community will continue to increase pressure on him and his brutal regime.

And for all of Iran’s bluster, there is no country in the Middle East where the gulf between rulers and ruled is greater. When Iran claims to support democracy abroad, then kills peaceful protestors in the streets of Tehran, its hypocrisy is breathtaking and plain to the people of the region.

And there is one last question that I’m asked, in one form or another, all the time: What about the rights and aspirations of the Palestinians? Israelis and Palestinians are not immune to the profound changes sweeping the region. And make no mistake, President Obama and I believe that the Palestinian people—just like their Arab neighbors, just like Israelis, just like us—deserve dignity, liberty, and the right to decide their own future. They deserve an independent, democratic Palestinian state of their own, alongside a secure Jewish democracy next door. And we know from decades in the diplomatic trenches that the only way to get there is through a negotiated peace—a peace we work every day to achieve, despite all the setbacks.

Of course, we understand that Israel faces risks in a changing region—just as it did before the Arab Spring began. And it will remain an American priority to ensure that all parties honor the peace treaties they have signed and commitments they have made. And we will always help Israel defend itself. We will address threats to regional peace whether they come from dictatorships or democracies. But it would be shortsighted to think either side can simply put peacemaking on hold until the current upheaval is done. The truth is, the stalemate in the Arab-Israeli conflict is one more status quo in the Middle East that cannot be sustained.

This brings me to my last and perhaps most important point of all. For all the hard questions I’ve asked and tried to answer on behalf of the United States, the most consequential questions of all are those the people and leaders of the region will have to answer for themselves. Because ultimately, it is up to them. It is up to them to resist the calls of demagogues, to build coalitions, to keep faith in the system even when they lose at the polls, and to protect the principles and institutions that ultimately will protect them. Every democracy has to guard against those who would hijack its freedoms for ignoble ends. Our founders and every generation since have fought to prevent that from happening here. The founding fathers and mothers of Arab revolutions must do the same. No one bears a greater responsibility for what happens next.

When Deputy Secretary Bill Burns addressed the National Endowment for Democracy over the summer, he recounted the story of an Egyptian teenager who told her father a few years back that she wanted to spend her life bringing democracy to Egypt. ―Good,‖ her father said, ―because then you will always have a job.‖ (Laughter.)

Now, we should never fall prey to the belief that human beings anywhere are not ready for freedom. In the 1970s, people said Latin America and East Asia were not ready. Well, the 1980s began proving them wrong. In the 1980s, it was African soil where democracy supposedly couldn’t grow. And the 1990s started proving them wrong. And until this year, some people said Arabs don’t really want democracy. Well, starting in 2011, that too is being proved wrong. And funnily enough, it proved that Egyptian father right, because we all still have a job to do.

So we have to keep at it. We have to keep asking the tough questions. We have to be honest with ourselves and with each other about the answers we offer. And we cannot waver in our commitment to help the people of the Middle East and North Africa realize their own God-given potentials and the dreams they risked so much to make real.

And on this journey that they have begun, the United States will be their partner. And of the many tools at our disposal – the National Endowment and NDI and all of the family of organizations that were created three decades ago to help people make this journey successfully – will be right there.

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I heard Madeleine say when she introduced me that I defend NDI. Well, I do. And I also defend IRI. I defend those organizations that we have created, that the American taxpayers pay for, who try to do what needs to be done to translate the rhetoric and the calls for democracy into the reality, step by step. And we have to be reminded from time to time that it truly is – or at least can seem to be – a foreign language. Like some of you, I’ve met with the young people who started these revolutions. And they are still passionate, but perhaps not clear about what it takes to translate that passion into reality within a political system.

So there are going to be a lot of bumps along this road. But far better that we travel this path, that we do what we can to make sure that our ideals and values, our belief and experience with democracy, are shared widely and well. It’s an exciting time. It’s an uncertain time. But it’s a good time for the United States of America to be standing for freedom and democracy. And I thank you all for making that journey possible. Thank you very much. (Applause.)

http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/11/176750.htm

http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/11/176750.htm

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STATEMENT ON LIBYA

Following the working lunch of NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs with non-NATO contributors to Operation Unified Protector

Today, we, the Foreign Ministers of the Allies and operational partners participating in NATO-

led Operation Unified Protector (OUP) in support of the enforcement of UNSC Resolution 1973, met

in Berlin to discuss the situation in Libya and our joint efforts in support of broader international

community objectives with regard to Libya. The valuable contributions made by OUP partners

demonstrate broad-based support for this operation. NATO will continue to coordinate its actions in

close consultation with the United Nations, other regional actors and international organizations

We deplore the continuing violence and atrocities in Libya perpetrated by the regime against

its own people, which have resulted in a very serious humanitarian situation, particularly in cities under

siege. We underline the need for the regime to restore water, gas, electricity and other services to

areas that have been brutalized by regime forces and to permit full, safe and unhindered

humanitarian access to all the people of Libya in need of assistance. Qadhafi and his regime have

lost all legitimacy through their comprehensive and repeated refusal to abide by UNSC Resolutions

1970 and 1973.

We welcome the outcome of the first meeting of the Contact Group which took place

yesterday in Doha and strongly endorse its call for Qadhafi to leave power and its steadfast

commitment to implement UNSCRs 1970 and 1973. We commend its role in providing wider political

guidance for international efforts in Libya, recognizing that the political direction of the military

mission is executed by the North Atlantic Council, with the indispensable involvement of its OUP

partners. We reiterate our adherence to the strong commitments made at the London Conference by

the international community to help end the violence and to support the Libyan people and their

legitimate aspirations.

NATO-led forces are taking robust action to protect civilians and civilian-populated areas

under threat of attack in Libya and enforcing the No-Fly Zone and arms embargo authorized by

UNSCR 1973. We pay tribute to the skill, bravery and professionalism of our men and women in

uniform carrying out this difficult task. We will continue to adapt our military actions to achieve

maximum effect in discharging our mandate to protect civilians and civilian-populated areas. To this

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end, we are committed to provide all necessary resources and maximum operational flexibility within

our mandate. A high operational tempo against legitimate targets will be maintained and we will

exert this pressure as long as necessary and until the following objectives are achieved:

1. All attacks and threats of attack against civilians and civilian-populated areas have ended;

2. The regime has verifiably withdrawn to bases all military forces, including snipers,

mercenaries and other para-military forces, including from all populated areas they have

forcibly entered, occupied or besieged throughout all of Libya, including Ajdabiyah, Brega,

Jadu, al Jebal al Gharbiyah, Kikla, Misrata, Nalut, Raslanuf, Yefrin, Zawiyah, Zintan and

Zuara;

3. The regime must permit immediate, full, safe and unhindered humanitarian access to all the

people in Libya in need of assistance.

We remain committed to the full implementation of UNSC Resolutions 1970 and 1973. In

carrying out our mission, we reaffirm our support to the sovereignty, independence, territorial

integrity and national unity of Libya. We reiterate our strong support for the development of a

transparent political solution as the only way to bring an end to the crisis and build lasting peace in

Libya and a better future for the Libyan people.

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RESOLUTION 1937 (2010)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 6375th meeting, on

30 August 2010

United Nations S/RES/1937 (2010)

Security Council Distr.: General 30 August 2010

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions on Lebanon, in particular resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 1559 (2004), 1680 (2006), 1701 (2006), 1773 (2007), 1832 (2008) and 1884 (2009) as well as the statements of its President on the situation in Lebanon,

Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon to extend the mandate of UNIFIL for a new period of one year without amendment presented in a letter from the Lebanese Foreign Minister to the Secretary-General of 20 July 2010 and welcoming the letter from the Secretary-General to its President of 11 August 2010 (S/2010/430) recommending this extension,

Reaffirming its commitment to the full implementation of all provisions of resolution 1701 (2006), and aware of its responsibilities to help secure a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution as envisioned in the resolution,

Calling upon all concerned parties to strengthen their efforts to implement all provisions of resolution 1701 (2006),

Expressing deep concern at all violations in connection with resolution 1701 (2006), in particular the latest grave violation of 3 August 2010 highlighted in the Secretary-General’s letter of 11 August 2010 and looking forward to the rapid finalization of UNIFIL’s investigation with a view to preventing such incidents in the future,

Emphasizing the importance of full compliance with the prohibition on sales and supply of arms and related materiel established by resolution 1701,

Recalling the utmost importance that all parties concerned respect the Blue Line in its entirety and encouraging the parties to accelerate their efforts in coordination with UNIFIL to visibly mark the Blue Line,

Recalling the relevant principles contained in the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel,

Commending the active role and dedication of the personnel of UNIFIL, notably of its Commander, and expressing its strong appreciation to Member States that contribute to UNIFIL and underlining the necessity that UNIFIL have at its disposal all necessary means and equipment to carry out its mandate,

Recalling the request from the Government of Lebanon to deploy an international force to assist it to exercise its authority throughout the territory and reaffirming UNIFIL’s authority to take all necessary

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action in areas of operations of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities, to ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind and to resist attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its mandate,

Welcoming the efforts of the Secretary-General to keep all peacekeeping operations, including UNIFIL, under close review and stressing the need for the Council to pursue a rigorous, strategic approach to peacekeeping deployments,

Calling upon member States to assist the Lebanese Armed Forces as needed to enable it to perform its duties in line with resolution 1701,

Determining that the situation in Lebanon continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

1. Decides to extend the present mandate of UNIFIL until 31 August 2011;

2. Commends the positive role of UNIFIL, whose deployment together with the Lebanese Armed Forces has helped to establish a new strategic environment in southern Lebanon, welcomes the expansion of coordinated activities between UNIFIL and the Lebanese armed forces and calls on further enhancement of this cooperation;

3. Welcomes the deployment of an additional brigade of the Lebanese armed forces on 1 August 2010 and calls on the Government of Lebanon to further increase the Lebanese Armed Forces deployed in Southern Lebanon, consistent with resolution 1701 (2006);

4. Strongly calls upon all parties concerned to respect the cessation of hostilities, to prevent any violation of the Blue line and to respect it in its entirety and to cooperate fully with the United Nations and UNIFIL;

5. Deplores strongly the recent incidents involving UNIFIL peacekeepers, emphasizes the importance of not impairing the ability of UNIFIL to fulfil its mandate under Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) and calls on all parties to abide scrupulously by their obligation to respect the safety of UNIFIL and other United Nations personnel and to ensure that the freedom of movement of UNIFIL is fully respected, in conformity with its mandate and its rules of engagement;

6. Urges all parties to cooperate fully with the Security Council and the Secretary-General to make tangible progress towards a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution as envisioned in resolution 1701 (2006), and emphasizes that more work remains to be done by the parties to advance the full implementation of resolution 1701 (2006);

7. Urges the Government of Israel to expedite the withdrawal of its army from northern Ghajar without further delay in coordination with UNIFIL, which has actively engaged Israel and Lebanon to facilitate such a withdrawal;

8. Reaffirms its call for the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani River of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and UNIFIL;

9. Welcomes the efforts being undertaken by UNIFIL to implement the Secretary-General’s zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse and to ensure full compliance of its personnel with the United Nations code of conduct, requests the Secretary-General to continue to take all necessary action in this regard and to keep the Security Council informed, and urges troop-contributing countries to take preventive and disciplinary action to ensure that such acts are properly investigated and punished in cases involving their personnel;

10. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to report to the Council on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006), every four months, or at any time as he deems appropriate;

11. Welcomes the conclusions of the Joint DPKO-UNIFIL Technical Review presented in the letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council dated 12 February 2010 (S/2010/86) and calls for their rapid implementation;

12. Stresses the importance of, and the need to achieve, a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, based on all its relevant resolutions including its resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November

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1967, 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973, 1515 (2003) of 19 November 2003, and 1850 (2008) of 16 December 2008;

13. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

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RESOLUTION 2009 (2011)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 6620th meeting, on

16 September 2011

United Nations S/RES/2009 (2011)

Security Council Distr.: General 16 September 2011

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Libya,

Reaffirming its previous resolutions 1674 (2006) and 1894 (2009) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, 1612 (2006), 1882 (2009), 1998 (2011) on children in armed conflict, and 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009) 1889 (2009),and 1960 (2010) on women, peace and security,

Recalling its decision to refer the situation in Libya to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, and the importance of cooperation for ensuring that those responsible for violations of human rights and international humanitarian law or complicit in attacks targeting the civilian population are held accountable,

Strongly condemning all violations of applicable human rights and international humanitarian law, including violations that involve unlawful killings, other uses of violence against civilians, or arbitrary arrests and detentions, in particular of African migrants and members of minority communities,

Also strongly condemning sexual violence, particularly against women and girls, and the recruitment and use of children in situations of armed conflict in contravention of applicable international law,

Considering that the voluntary and sustainable return of refugees and internally displaced persons will be a critical factor for the consolidation of peace in Libya,

Stressing that national ownership and national responsibility are key to establishing sustainable peace and the primary responsibility of national authorities in identifying their priorities and strategies for post-conflict peace-building,

Recalling the letter of the Secretary-General of 7 September 2011 (S/2011/542) and welcoming his intention to dispatch, at the request of the Libyan authorities, an initial deployment of personnel, to be led by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General,

Taking note of the letter of 14 September 2011 from Dr. Mahmoud Jibril, Prime Minister of the National Transitional Council of Libya, to the Secretary-General,

Expressing its gratitude to the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy to Libya, Mr. Abdel-Elah Mohamed Al-Khatib, for his efforts to find a sustainable and peaceful solution in Libya,

Reaffirming that the United Nations should lead the effort of the international community in supporting the Libyan-led transition and rebuilding process aimed at establishing a democratic, independent and united Libya, welcoming the contributions in this regard of the Secretary-General’s 26 August high-

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level meeting of regional organisations and the 1 September Paris Conference, and welcoming also the efforts of the African Union, Arab League, European Union and the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation,

Expressing concern at the proliferation of arms in Libya and its potential impact on regional peace and security,

Recalling its resolutions 1970 (2011) of 26 February 2011 and 1973 (2011) of 17 March 2011,

Recalling its determination to ensure that assets frozen pursuant to resolutions 1970 (2011) and 1973 (2011) shall as soon as possible be made available to and for the benefit of the people of Libya, welcoming steps taken by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) and Member States in this regard, and underscoring the importance of making these assets available in a transparent and responsible manner in conformity with the needs and wishes of the Libyan people,

Mindful of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security under the Charter of the United Nations,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, and taking measures under its Article 41,

1. Takes note of the developments in Libya, welcomes the improved situation there, and looks forward to stability in Libya;

2. Looks forward to the establishment of an inclusive, representative transitional Government of Libya, and emphasises the need for the transitional period to be underpinned by a commitment to democracy, good governance, rule of law and respect for human rights;

3. Emphasises the importance of promoting the equal and full participation of women and minority communities in the discussions related to the political process in the post-conflict phase;

4. Welcomes the statements of the National Transitional Council appealing for unity, national reconciliation and justice, and its call for Libyans of all beliefs and backgrounds to refrain from reprisals, including arbitrary detentions;

5. Encourages the National Transitional Council to implement its plans to:

(a) protect Libya’s population, restore government services, and allocate Libya’s funds openly and transparently;

(b) prevent further abuses and violations of human rights and international humanitarian law and to put an end to impunity;

(c) ensure a consultative, inclusive political process with a view to agreement on a constitution and the holding of free and fair elections;

(d) ensure the safety of foreign nationals in Libya, particularly those who have been threatened, mistreated and/or detained; and

(e) prevent the proliferation of man-portable surface-to-air missiles, small arms and light weapons, and meet Libya’s arms control and non-proliferation obligations under international law;

6. Notes the National Transitional Council’s calls to avoid acts of reprisals including against migrant workers;

7. Calls upon the Libyan authorities to promote and protect human rights, including those of people belonging to vulnerable groups, to comply with their obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law and human rights law, and calls for those responsible for violations, including sexual violence, to be held accountable in accordance with international standards;

8. Strongly urges the Libyan authorities to ensure the protection of diplomatic personnel and premises in accordance with Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961;

9. Expresses its resolve to assist the people of Libya to achieve these goals, and urges all Member States to assist the people of Libya as appropriate;

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10. Urges all Member States to cooperate closely with the Libyan authorities in their efforts to end impunity, in accordance with Libya’s international obligations;

11. Calls upon the Libyan authorities to comply with the international obligations of Libya, including obligations set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, in accordance with international law, and further calls upon the Libyan authorities to honour extant contracts and obligations, in accordance with this and other relevant resolutions, and the law applicable to such contracts and obligations;

UN MANDATE

12. Decides to establish a United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), under the leadership of a Special Representative of the Secretary- General for an initial period of three months, and decides further that the mandate of UNSMIL shall be to assist and support Libyan national efforts to:

(a) restore public security and order and promote the rule of law;

(b) undertake inclusive political dialogue, promote national reconciliation, and embark upon the constitution-making and electoral process;

(c) extend state authority, including through strengthening emerging accountable institutions and the restoration of public services;

(d) promote and protect human rights, particularly for those belonging to vulnerable groups, and support transitional justice;

(e) take the immediate steps required to initiate economic recovery; and

(f) coordinate support that may be requested from other multilateral and bilateral actors as appropriate;

ARMS EMBARGO

13. Decides that the measure imposed by paragraph 9 of resolution 1970(2011) shall also not apply to the supply, sale or transfer to Libya of:

(a) arms and related materiel of all types, including technical assistance, training, financial and other assistance, intended solely for security or disarmament assistance to the Libyan authorities and notified to the Committee in advance and in the absence of a negative decision by the Committee within five working days of such a notification;

(b) small arms, light weapons and related materiel, temporarily exported to Libya for the sole use of United Nations personnel, representatives of the media and humanitarian and development workers and associated personnel, notified to the Committee in advance and in the absence of a negative decision by the Committee within five working days of such a notification;

ASSET FREEZE

14. Decides that the Libyan National Oil Corporation (LNOC) and Zueitina Oil Company shall no longer be subject to the asset freeze and other measures imposed in paragraphs 17, 19, 20 and 21 of resolution 1970 (2011) and paragraph 19 of resolution 1973 (2011);

15. Decides to modify the measures imposed in paragraphs 17, 19, 20 and 21 of resolution 1970 (2011) and paragraph 19 of resolution 1973 (2011) with respect to the Central Bank of Libya, the Libyan Arab Foreign Bank (LAFB), the Libyan Investment Authority (LIA), and the Libyan Africa Investment Portfolio (LAIP) as follows:

(a) funds, other financial assets and economic resources outside of Libya of the entities mentioned in this paragraph above that are frozen as of the date of this resolution pursuant to measures imposed in paragraph 17 of resolution 1970 (2011) or paragraph 19 of resolution 1973 (2011) shall remain

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frozen by States unless subject to an exemption as set out in paragraphs 19, 20 or 21 of that resolution or paragraph 16 below;

(b) except as provided in (a), the Central Bank of Libya, the LAFB, the LIA, and the LAIP shall otherwise no longer be subject to the measures imposed in paragraphs 17 of resolution 1970 (2011), including that States are no longer required to ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic resources are prevented from being made available by their nationals or by any individuals or entities within their territories, to or for the benefit of these entities;

16. Decides that in addition to the provisions of paragraph 19 of resolution 1970 (2011), the measures imposed by paragraph 17 of that resolution, as modified by paragraph 15 above and paragraph 19 of resolution 1973 (2011), do not apply to funds, other financial assets or economic resources of the Central Bank of Libya, the LAFB, the LIA and the LAIP provided that:

(a) a Member State has provided notice to the Committee of its intent to authorize access to funds, other financial assets, or economic resources, for one or more of the following purposes and in the absence of a negative decision by the Committee within five working days of such a notification:

(i) humanitarian needs;

(ii) fuel, electricity and water for strictly civilian uses;

(iii) resuming Libyan production and sale of hydrocarbons;

(iv) establishing, operating, or strengthening institutions of civilian government and civilian public infrastructure; or

(v) facilitating the resumption of banking sector operations, including to

support or facilitate international trade with Libya;

(b) a Member State has notified the Committee that those funds, other financial assets or economic resources shall not be made available to or for the benefit of the individuals subject to the measures imposed in paragraph 17 of resolution 1970 (2011) or paragraph 19 of resolution 1973 (2011);

(c) the Member State has consulted in advance with the Libyan authorities about the use of such funds, other financial assets, or economic resources; and

(d) the Member State has shared with the Libyan authorities the notification submitted pursuant to this paragraph and the Libyan authorities have not objected within five working days to the release of such funds, other financial assets, or economic resources;

17. Calls upon States to exercise vigilance when acting pursuant to paragraph 16 above and to give due consideration to the use of international financial mechanisms to promote transparency and prevent misappropriation, in light of the challenges that yet remain for the Libyan authorities;

18. Requests the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to work with the Libyan authorities on an assessment of Libya’s public financial management framework, which would recommend steps to be taken by Libya to ensure a system of transparency and accountability with respect to the funds held by Libyan governmental institutions, including the LIA, LNOC, LAFB, LAIP and Libyan Central Bank, and further requests that the Committee be informed of the results of that assessment;

19. Directs the Committee, in consultation with the Libyan authorities, to review continuously the remaining measures imposed by resolutions 1970 (2011) and 1973 (2011) with respect to the Central Bank of Libya, the LAFB, the LIA and the LAIP, and decides that the Committee shall, in consultation with the Libyan authorities, lift the designation of these entities as soon as practical to ensure the assets are made available to and for the benefit of the people of Libya;

NO FLY ZONE AND BAN ON FLIGHTS

20. Takes note of the improved situation in Libya, emphasises its intention to keep the measures imposed by paragraphs 6 to 12 of resolution 1973 (2011) under continuous review and underlines its readiness, as appropriate and when circumstances permit, to lift those measures and to terminate

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authorization given to Member States in paragraph 4 of resolution 1973 (2011) in consultation with the Libyan authorities;

21. Decides that the measures in paragraph 17 of resolution 1973 (2011) shall cease to have effect from the date of this resolution;

COOPERATION AND REPORTING

22. Requests the Secretary-General to report on implementation of this resolution in 14 days from adoption, and every month thereafter, or more frequently as he sees fit;

23. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

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CALL FOR PAPERS

Romanian Journal of International Relations and Security Studies announces the launch of the call for applications for its third number, due to appear in March 2012.

Theme:

Security complexes - units of analysis of the security dynamics

The analysis of the security complexes frames a comprehensive understanding comprising the debate of two main theoretical approaches: traditionalists - who resume the subject to the military-political problems - and the advocates of a broadening of the agenda, including non-traditional areas such as: economic, social or environmental. Hence, it is necessary to align the much larger agenda of security studies in the aftermath of the Cold War with the theory of the Security Complex, in order to analyze it in the context of the emergent international order, be it chaos or stability.

The topic becomes all the more relevant as the level of interactions on a global scale is growing, multi-dimensionally connecting more and more sectors which, theoretically, makes all issues security-related to be inter-dependent. In other words, interconnectivity raises questions related to decision-making process concerning response capabilities adapted to the current international environment.

Moreover, concepts such as the “identity dimension” and the “regional perspective”, important features in the analysis of Security Complexes, are lacking from the broader theoretical interpretation. Proof of the doubtless need of focusing on new concepts is the explicit increase in the number of case studies, assessments of conflict areas as a ground base for building analytical instruments and thorough research projects.

Thus, the trajectory which the current undertakings are heading to is being put forward, for the purpose of answering to some possible epistemological and decisional dilemmas.

Thematic suggestions for authors: Levels of analysis (pinpointing the actors, the objects of reference and the dynamics of the

interaction which operates in the field of security).

The Traditional approach versus the Broadening of the field of security studies.

Strategic Studies – specialization within the framework of the security studies.

Branches of security (objects of reference, actors, threats, vulnerabilities).

Security Complexes versus Security Regimes (R.Jervis, for example The Gulf Cooperation Council) versus Security Communities (K.Deutsch).

The role of regional identities in defining security issues.

The analysis of inter-dependent force between states: positive (between states there is cooperation/neutrality) or negative (for example, triangular rivalry Iran-Iraq-Saudi Arabia).

Analyses at the regional level (comparative studies between regions), as:

The shaping of lasting regional patterns in security relations.

The shaping of external intervention patterns in these regions (methods of identifying, models of formation etc.).

The analysis of the relation between the theory of regional security and the multi-dimensional security agenda.

Authors can choose a subject from the above list, yet personal researches are encouraged too.

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Please send the abstract until January 20th, 2011, together with the CV of the author,

institution/organization they represent, status (student, graduate, lecturer, professor) and e-mail address.

Deadline for final document is February 20th, 2011.

Note to authors:

Articles must have a minimum of 4000 words and should not exceed 8000-9000 words (references included).

Authors are also invited to submit reviews on this topic.

Articles submitted must be original and unpublished.

Main Text: Times New Roman 12, spacing 1.5.

Language of publication is English.

Copyrights of the collaborators are associated with the Center for International Relations and Security Studies, so that the texts can be used in other publications. Authors will be notified in this case.

More information about writing rules can be found in the Author Guideline, which can be found on the website of the Romanian Center for International Relations and Security Studies: www.centrulriss.com.

Please send your application to : [email protected]

http://www.centrulriss.com/

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