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Rome Wars With Pyrrhus, 280-272 B.C.

As early as 285 B.C., the Greek city of Thurii on the IonianSea appealed to the Senate for help against the very sameLucanian hill tribes who had made alliance with Rome to de-spoil the Samnites. The men of these tribes and others inBruttium raided every year the fields and homes of the pros-perous Greeks, but now their attacks grew more severe as theirpopulation swelled and needs that could not be satisfied byherding sheep and goats on upland pastures expanded. Afterdebate in the Senate, the conscript fathers dispatched ConsulGaius Fabricius Luscinus in 282 B.C. to overawe the Lucaniansand garrison Thurii. A small fleet of ten ships under LuciusValerius Flaccus sailed on to Tarentum across the Ionian Seato investigate a report that leaders of that large and importantGreek city were making war preparations to resist Roman en-croachment. When the Tarentines attacked the fleet and sankor captured the ships, then insulted and abused envoys dis-patched to seek restitution, the conscript fathers reasonedthat they had no other option but to field a consular armyunder Lucius Aemilius Barbula to teach the insolent Greeksmanners. This he did in 281 B.C. by devastating the nearbycountryside and forcing the Tarentines to close their gates.

At once, the Greeks sent urgent messages to King Pyrrhusof Epirus across the Adriatic Sea for help. He was the son ofAlexander of Epirus, brother-in-law of Alexander the Great.Intending to accomplish in the western Mediterranean whatthe Macedonian conqueror had done in the East, Pyrrhuslanded on Italian soil in spring 280 B.C. with 20,000 infantry,5,000 cavalry, and 50 elephants, the first of those great beaststo appear west of the Adriatic Sea. Great joy swept the streetsof Tarentum at this sight. But the city fathers soon realizedthat they had exchanged one master for another. The kingassumed command of all city defenses, manned the citadelthat guarded the harbor with his own soldiers, and recruitedyoung Tarentines as auxiliaries to his army.

In 280 B.C., Pyrrhus marched out to confront the legionsof Consul Publius Valerius Laevinus at Heraclea. Althoughthe Greeks still relied upon the antiquated phalanx formation,the tactic of striking the Romans suddenly on the flank withcavalry as Alexander the Great had done to massive Persianarmies won the battle. Never having seen elephants, Romansoldiers gave way prematurely before those raging beasts andleft 7,000 dead on the field. Pyrrhus could not annihilate thesurvivors because Valerius Laevinus fell back on Venusia onthe Appian Way in Apulia to join the proconsul AemiliusBarbula in a strong hilltop encampment.

The stubborn resistance of the legions and death of 4,000of his own men in the battle alarmed Pyrrhus. Still, he shookoff nagging doubts and marched along the Appian Way and

into Campania to rouse, so he thought, the Greek cities of thatregion to join him. He was nonplussed when both Capua andNeapolis closed their gates and few inhabitants of the regionwillingly provided forage and supplies. Behind came the le-gions of Valerius Laevinus and Aemilius Barbula, careful tokeep to the high ground to negate his advantage in elephantsand cavalry. Learning from scouts that another consular armywas fast approaching from Rome and fearing to be caught in ahammer and anvil attack by forces each as numerous as hisown, he returned to the vicinity of Tarentum. Once again un-certainty clouded his mind so that, unlike Alexander the Greatwho never settled for half a conquest, he received Luscinus asenvoy and agreed to release Roman captives without ransom.

Pyrrhus’ hope that magnanimity so soon after victorywould convince the conscript fathers that friendship with apowerful king was preferable to war was soon dispelled. Hisenvoy the wise Cineas received a cold reception in Rome foroffer of alli-ance in ex-change forGreek au-tonomy, re-turn of allland andproperty tothe Samniteas well asLucan iantribes, andP y r r h u s ’continuedoccupationof southItaly. The unspoken intention of the king, not conveyed byCineas but understood by the conscript fathers, was that allItaly south of Latium would be linked to Pyrrhus’ holding inGreece in a great Hellenic empire. The Senate decided that, asat the height of the Great Samnite War, every able-bodied manshould be put under arms.

Stung by the rejection of his offer, Pyrrhus marched againin spring 279 B.C. up the Appian Way into Apulia to threatenand besiege Roman strongholds at Luceria and Venusia. AtAusculum, he met the legions of consuls Publius SulpiciusSaverrio and Publius Decius Mus, grandson of the first herowho had devoted himself to the gods, and in a ferocious battlethat lasted two days, again vanquished the Romans. Count-ing Decius Mus and 6,000 men dead on the field, SulpiciusSaverrio saved the rest by retreating to high ground and tak-

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Locri. Because of this sacrilege, it was alleged, a storm aroseto sink many transport ships carrying men and supplies backto Tarentum. The superstitious peoples of south Italy decidedthat Fortune lay on the side of the Romans.

When Pyrrhus moved the next spring to confront ConsulManius Curius Dentatus at Malventum in south Samnium be-fore Consul Lucius Cornelius Lentulus Caudinus, who hadsmashed a Samnite army in the Caudine Forks and gone on tocampaign in Lucania, could return with his legions, althoughhe attacked the camp of Dentatus at night in an attempt tostrike terror with stampeding elephants, the stratagem back-fired. Roman soldiers trapped the trumpeting monsters in theconfined space of the camp and hamstrung them with swordcuts.

Hotly pursued, Pyrrhus fled to Tarentum. Realizing allwas lost, he suddenly departed for Epirus, leaving only a smallgarrison to help the Tarentines keep their liberty. Vengefully,the Senate sent envoys to treat with the king’s enemies inGreece and stir opposition to his aggrandizements. Two yearslater, he was killed in the city of Argos by a roof tile throwndown by a woman. As for the Tarentines and the Epirotegarrison in the citadel, they held out until 272 B.C., then sur-rendered. All south Italy belonged to Rome.

ing refuge in a prepared camp. Without the reserves of man-power the Romans could call upon, Pyrrhus gazed out over3,500 lifeless Greeks and remarked to Cineas, “Another suchvictory over the Romans and we are undone.”

Suddenly, Pyrrhus made an error as fatal as Pontius’ deci-sion not to destroy the Roman army trapped between theCaudine Forks. He should have pressed the enemy hard nowthat he had the tactical advantage and consolidated his holdon south Italy by firming up alliances with Samnites andLucanians. His inability to storm fortified Roman camps andwalled cities discouraged him from penetrating onto the Latiumplain, so that he listened to an appeal by Greeks in the Siciliancity of Syracuse to repel an attempt by Carthaginian forces toseize the entire island. If only he could oust the north Africantraders from their foothold there, he reasoned, he might furtherisolate the Romans and compel them to come to terms.

With Pyrrhus and his army gone to Sicily and forces leftby the king to protect Tarentum confined to the south, theRomans marched in summer 278 B.C. against the Samnites,Lucanians, and Bruttians and reinforced garrisons in southernports, especially Rhegium facing Sicily. The Carthaginiansfinanced Roman construction of a coastal fleet to blockadeTarentum and harass Greek ships. By diplomacy, Luscinus

won back the Greeks ofHeraclea and other citieswho were considering join-ing Pyrrhus. Tarentine terri-tory was tightly invested.

Having wasted time andresources in Sicily and failedto oust the Carthaginians,the king crossed back overin autumn 276 B.C. intoBruttium and promptly madea second great mistake. Helost the favor of the gods bypillaging the temple of thegoddess Persephone at

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