Rommel, the Fox of the Desert, Now Faces Crucial Test in U. S. Drive in Tunisia •---- *5

America's 67th Week of War 185th Week of World War II

By Blair Bnlles. American troops led bv a tough commander. Lt. Gpp. George Smith Patton. Jr.,

re-entered the airport town of Gafsa last week, and a new chapter of the Tunisian War. eminently favorable to the United Nations, was under way.

The Afrika Korps is headed toward the sea. and it is possible that the Allies now have the chance to finish what the 8th Army began at the Battle of El Alamein last, October 23—the annihilation of Field Marshal Rommel's trooos. The Rth Army chased Rommel from El Alamein to Tunisia and thus released the Suez and Near East from the Nazi threat, but the men of Gen. Sir Bernard Montgomery did not have the pleasure of trapping the old German fox. Now the American forces, aided by French, have the opportunity to wedge Rommel between themselves, the Gulf of Gabes and the 8th Army, ranged along the Mareth Line It is all a question of time.

In Russia the Red Armies campaigning in the still cold regions of the 55th parallel battered their way toward Smolensk, the keystone of the Axis military structure for the Central Russian front.

For the first time since 1941 Soviet*! soldiers last week crossed to the western side of the Dnieper River, as a step in the Smolensk campaign. In the south, however, where the winter is vanishing, the Reds are giving way to the Nazis, who. from taking Kharkov, now have moved on to Belgorod in a slow and bloody retracing of their retreat earlier In the winter across the Ukraine. Tire Soviet Embassy here reported during the week that the Germans have moved 25 fresh divisions into Southern Russia during the past month. 'On the other side of the world the Japs have kept a quiet which cannot last long.

* * * *

African Front The United States now has a trinity

of hard eggs holding commanding mili- tary positions on widely-separated global fronts. In China there is Lt. Gen. Joseph Stilwell, “Vinegar Joe." In the South- west Pacific there is Admiral William F. Halsey, who knocked the stuffing out of the Japs around Guadalcanal. Now' in Tunisia there is Lt. Gen. Patton, hard, profane, who fights to W’in and who has sworn off smoking and drinking until he sets foot in Tunis city (held now' by the Axis forces under Col. Gen. Jurgen von Amim). “Old Blood and Guts.” they call Patton. He entered the Army as a

cavalry officer and was transferred to the mechanized forces. For the tankmen his philosophy is: “Go forward. Alw’ays go forw’ard. Go until the last shot is fired and the last drop of gasoline is gone, and then go forward on foot.” He com-

manded the American task force land- ing at Casablanca last November, when he gave this order: "We shall attack and attack until we are exhausted, and then wre shall attack again.”

Last week the Allied high commander decided to try this general on one of the

most important com-

ErrorCaused bat assignments Near Disaster available now—com-

mander of the Amer- ican ground forces in Tunisia. They had been in charge of Maj. Gen. Lloyd R. Fredendall. but he had suffered only misfortune, which reached its climax in the recent Rommel drive to the edge of Algeria. It was disclosed last week by a spokesman for the American forces in Tunisia that an error in intelligence contributed to the American loss of the battle which let Rommel move so far westward. “We were convinced,” a

spokesman said, “that the Germans would make their main effort at Pichon, instead of further south as Faid, as they did. For this reason a strong American combat team was kept in the mountains northwest of Pichon in order to counter this thrust.” So when Rommel hit through Faid on February 14. little stood In his w’ay.

That is one of the prices of inexperi- ence. For three weeks the Americans have been heading back toward the points in the Tunisian interior they gave up when Rommel let go at them. On Tuesday Patton became commander of the Central Tunisian forces, which in- clude the 1st United States Armored Di- vision and the 1st and 34th Infantry Divisions. On Wednesday those troops entered Gafsa without the loss of a man.

Only scattered small-arms fire greeted American infantry approaching the town's outskirts, after 155-mm. how- itzers opened the assault by knocking out an Italian artillery battery and waves

of American medium bombers pounded the withdrawing enemy on congested roads eastward. Engineers cleared the way by making the minefields innocuous.

The capture of Gafsa put Patton's forces 130 miles from the 8th Army, prodding the Mareth Line. 100 miles from the coastal town of Sfax and 90 miles from the coastal town of Gabes. A day later the American forees entered El Guetar. 12 miles east of Gafsa. At El Guetar the roads lrom Sfax and from Gabes meet. American troops assisted by French forces at once headed along the Sfax road toward Sened, 28 miles from El Guetar. South of Gafsa a

French force working its way around the vast salt marsh of Chott Diend is approaching another road to Gabes. It is a period of heavy rains of Central Tunisia, and the soldiers who took El Guetar had often to wade through new

streams.

Rommel now fares a trying time. He must, rieridp whether to use his tanks

against the 8th Rommel Now Amy which at the

In Tough Spot proper moment will assault the Mareth

Line as it assaulted the El Alamein Line last October 23, or against the Patton divisions. A successful thrust by Gen. Pattons forces in the Gabes direction would compel Rommel either to abandon the Mareth stronghold or to take on at.

the same time the 8t.h Army and the Patton fighters.

In order to delay the final rendering of the Tunisian account for as long as

possible, the Axis armies in Tunisia's north last week continued the tactics they have consistently followed—squeez- ing the 1st Army, which guards that sec-

tor for the Allies, out of its advanced positions. During the past four months the Axis has taken about 20 miles from the Allies. Once the Allies held Te- bourba and Mateur—easy places from whirh to strike Bizerte and Tunis in pro- pitious weather From Tcbnurba they have been shoved back to Medjez-el-Bab. From Mateur they were shoved back to

Ferijenane. from Sedjenane to Tamera end last week they were pushed out of Tamera. Now the 1st Army is 45 miles from Bizerte.

As in all tropical regions, thp weather is gptting ready to play a new role in the Tunisian war. Next week will bring

a full moon and its pale glow could assist Montgomery in massing for attack with an opportunity of his own men

seeing what they were doing but out of sight of the Afrika Korps perched on

the high ground of the Matmata Hills of : the Mareth Line. The bombardment of

El Alamein began the day before full moon.

The full moon also would help the night fighters and bombers patrolling the skies above the Mediterranean com-

munications lines of the Axis. * * * *

Russian Front The Dnieper River rises in West

Central Russia not far from the Volga's source, and then meanders in great sweeping bends far to the south, where it flows into the Black Sea. A few months after the German attack on Russia in June, 1941. the Axis held all the land west of the Dnieper. The Rus- sian offensive of last winter did not endanger the Nazi hold on this stream. Now, however, it is a different story. The Reds are stronger in 1943 than in 1942 and the Germans are weaker than they were a year ago. A week ago this re- view' recorded the capture of Vyazma by the Reds from the Axis. Since then the Red forces have been hammering along the rail line from Vyazma to Smolensk. Tuesday they crossed the Dnieper. They have captured Izdeshkovo. 25 miles west of Vyazma. Red patrols have operated within 50 miles of Smolensk.

In Central Ukraine it is a different story. The Axis forces which seemed a

month ago to be re-

Germans Fight tiring westward to-

To Protect Oil *ard a line along the Southern Dnieper

now are hammering toward the east once more. The Germans are reinforced. They can be supplied by railways and roads which are in fair running condi- tion w'hile the railways and roads in the Russian-held regions are battered and broken by the fighting that has taken place around them during the past four months. The Axis is making the supreme effort to hold the Donets Basin. It is a rich area. Its possession keeps the Reds far away from the oil fields of Rumania, whose bombing would height- en the troubles of the oil-hungry Ger- mans.

The new Ukrainian battleline stretches, roughly, from Kursk to Rostov—both cities taken by the Reds in their mighty winter offensive. Fifty miles northeast of Kharkov the German high command claimed the recapture of Belgorod. Twenty-two miles southeast of Kharkov the Germans forced the Reds back in the Chuguev area. The Germans last week put new air units, motorized in- fantry outfits and tank detachments into the battle for mastery of the upper reaches of the Donets River, w’hich winds up north of Kharkov.

Across the long face of Russia the bat- tle has many different characteristics. While it goes woll for the Axis around Kharkov, the Reds are threatening the Axis base of Bryansk. Troops fighting stiff battles south of Vyazma captured the railway station of Milyatinsky- Zavod. 80 miles north of Bryansk on the Bryansk-Vyazma Railway, Eighty miles south of Bryansk the Reds are hammer- ing at the Axis-held town of Sevsk. Bryansk and Sevsk mark the bounds where the long tongue of isolated Axis territory running up to Orel joins the mas.'? of Axis territory in Russia. The capture of Bryansk by the Reds and the development of an offensive from Sevsk to Bryansk would snip off Orel and the Axis forces holding Orel. That is a cam-

paign of the future. Everywhere the war 1 goes slowly—in Tunisia, toward Smo-

lensk, toward Bryansk. Field Marshal ; Semeon Timoshenko's campaign on the i northern front has not yet brought him

to Staraya Russia. * * * *

European Front An encouringing indication that, all is

not well in Germany came last week from the Third Reich via Stockholm. When copies of the Essener National Zeitung reached that capital, the Swed- ish readers saw in it the news that Essen has been put under martial law as a result of recent destructive assaults by the RAF on the Krupp armament works there. An official appeal has been made to the populace to preserve order and the newspaper, taking cognizance of the fact that the Krupp works are fUied with laborers imported under duress from the conquered countries of Europe, said: "It can L.' assumed that enemy agents are harbored among the many foreigners in our midst. They be- lieve the hour has come to cause unrest by spreading wild rumors." The jitters

I have struck Germany. Resistance in France continued to

flare dramatically last week. but. it had small effect in itself toward diverting the Germans from their battlefields. German SS troopers led French motor- ized police into the hills of Haute Savoie, close to Lake Geneva, to hunt for sev- eral thousand well-armed young French- men who were hiding out in defiance of a Nazi ultimatum to surrender. In rebellious flight from the German labor draft, the youths reportedly were led by former French officers and generals. Late m the week, however, the rebels were reported coming down from the hills, w here they could get no food.

Secretary of State Hull last week warned that the war will be long. In expressing that sentiment he echoed British Foreign Secretary Eden Gen. Francisco Franco, the Spanish caudillo, told the Cortes m Madrid last week he thought the war would last six or seven years. 1

--

Hunch Strategy Hitler’s Ideas Have Cost Germany Her Chance

By Constantine Brown. Until the outbreak of the war there

were only two types of strategists: The professional strategists—army and navy officers who had spent a lifetime study- ing military and naval matters—and the armchair strategists.

The success of the professionals de- ; pended a great deal on their personal ability and on the co-operation received from the home front. The civilian au-

thority was shoved into the background. Men like David Lloyd George and

Georges Clemenceau had great powrer at home and frequently suggested to the j army or the navy high command cer-

tain operations—which were generally flops, such as the Dardanelles and Salon- ika expeditions—but on the whole they could not direct strategy.

The job was left in the hands of pro- fessionals. The political men had only the power to select the best available j professional for the job. And after | many mistakes had been made, the Allies chose Marshal Foch who did j not do a bad job.

The armchair strategists were men

with a perfunctory knowledge of military matters, but frequently possessed with a strong intuition. They expounded their views in writing or by making speeches in Parliament or at cabinet meetings. Sometimes their views were

taken into consideration by the pro- fessionals, but that did not occur often.

The most that was said in their favor was that when a certain operation failed, they shouted, ‘‘I told you so,” and enjoyed a brief moment of prestige.

New Breed of Strategists. The present global war has developed

another breed of strategist which may best be described as “hunch strategists.” These men would be put in the arm-

chair class were it not for the fact that they find themselves at the head of nations and holding a tremendous power.

The best type of this brand is Adolf Hitler, who in the last war succeeded after four years of intense fighting to rise to the rank of a corporal in the Imperial German Army. He never went higher because his commanding officers did not think he had enough military ability to command a squad on his owm.

The dictator of Germany took over

the over-all Nazi military operations as

soon as the war started. Plans for the invasion of Poland and of Western Europe had been prepared by the pro- fessionals long before the Fuehrer un-

leashed the Second World War. The campaigns between September,

1939, and June, 1941, were performed with clocklike precision. All the glory for these remarkable military operations went to the Fuehrer, whom his propa- ganda machine described as a second Caesar or Napoleon. Hitler's gang back in Germany was saying that the Fuehrer could, in fact, teach a few things to the former Emperor of France.

So long as the conquest of Western Europe went without a hitch everything was all right. But from the moment the British were too slow-minded to

accept defeat and the invasion of Britain did not succeed, Hitler began to follow his hunches. In the past his political hunches had proved correct.

A Bitter Pill.

The failure of the Nazis to cross the Channel was a bitter pill for the Fuehrer. The German armies had run roughshod over most of continental Europe. But in doing so Hitler acquired some power- ful enemies. His failure to reach Lon- don was a severe blow to his prestige, and in the meantime his diplomacy had not worked particularly well. All the peace trial balloons he had sent to

England—including, some say, Herr Hess —were punctured by the British. He antagonized the powerful Catholic world and the people of the United States began to awaken to the danger of a

Nazi victory and indications in the summer of 1941 were that sooner or

later America would be at war with the Reich. And Hitler began playing hunches. He decided to attack Russia against the advice of his generals. This, at least, is the view of most competent professional military observers in Amer- ica and England.

The Fuehrer's reasoning was based on

his hunch that the rest of the world was more bitterly opposed to com-

munism than it. was to the Nazi menace. The Vatican and Catholics through-

out the world wrere incensed at the intolerance of the Nazi regime; true, but Hitler thought they opposed the Soviet regime and communism even

more strongly. The people of the United States were

equally as outspoken against the rising power of the Reich. But they, too, he reasoned, were more concerned with the Communist danger, particularly since Russia had become Germany's ally in 1939 and had shown that it was

determined to swallow- up such small independent states as the Baltic na-

tions, Poland and Finland. Generals Were Opposed.

According to reliable sources Hitler ordered his generals to start prepara- tions for an offensive against Russia in March of 1941.

The generals who did not like this "strategic hunch" of the Fuehrer pointed out that the risks of attacking Russia were great unless the resistance of the Red armies could be crushed before the Russian winter set in.

In other words, they believed an attack on Russia might be a good idea—they were not looking toward face-saving victories for the Fuehrer, but were

worried about a strong Russia on their flanks—provided Russia could be de- feated in a few’ months.

There was a difference of opinion among members of the German high command. Some leaders like Von Rund- stedt, Von Brauchitsch and particularly Reiehmarshal Goering were definitely opposed to fighting Russia while Britain s'ill "lived." Others such ns Von Bock J and Keitel thought operations could J be concluded before the beginning of i the winter of 1941.

As usual when there were arguments the final word was Hitler's and he ordered the attack, fully convinced that before the pnd of October he wmuld hoist the stvastika In the Kremlin.

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POSTWAR PLANS PREPARED IN SECRET STUDIES! Russian-Born Economist Directs State Department's Research

By Richard G. Massock, Associated Press Writer.

While talk of postwar planning grows apace, a full-grown Government plan- nery is fabricating a peace program for the world, as the United States Govern- ment would like it.

It consists of the divisions of political and economic studies in the State De- partment, its site is in a department annex and its chief is the precarious, rotund. Russian-born economist. Dr. Leo Pasvolsky. as little known to the world as the policies that he is forming for it.

The plans are taking shape in a secrecy as profound as the win-the-war strategy of the generals and the admirals. They are confided only to those members of Congress who ask about them, to Presi- dent Roosevelt and to the highest State Department officials. None of the plan- ners will talk of his work to an outsider.

Yet the all-important basis for the United States Government’s negotiations with the statesmen of the United Na- tions is being laid there in carefully stu- died and documented files. The plan- ning machinery was set up three months ago. Forearmed with the reports and recommendations of hand-picked col- laborators, Undersecretary of State Sum- ner Welles already has begun to urge a

joint discussion of postwar policies among the nations.

Welles Deplores Delay.

Failing to begin such organized study and discussion now," Welles said in a

recent speech, "there is danger that di- vergent view's and policies may become crystallized, to the detriment of the com-

mon war effort, and to the detriment of efforts to bring about a peace that will be more than a brief and uneasy inter-

DR. LEO PASVOLSKY.

lude before another even more horrible and more destructive war.’’

In other words, an anonymous official explained, unless the nations, big and small, now united in the fight against Hitlerism, agree on the main points of the postwar settlement, from boundaries to air bases, national rivalries may pre-'' dominate after the victory and spoil the peace.

For that reason, the United States is preparing to go into all kinds of ques- tions, geographic, ethnic, economic and social, with a fistful of arguments for its

fiercest attack against the Soviet forces. Even the generals who had opposed following the hunch of the Fuehrer did their utmost to break the resistance of the Russians.

And the worst happened. The winter caught, the Nazis totally unprepared. Skis had not been constructed for their planes. Improvised contraptions were

attached to the bombers and fighters, but they caused such vibrations when the speed of the planes reached 170 miles an hour that the efficiency of the Nazi aviation was greatly reduced. The pilots did not master the art of land- ing on ice or in deep snow and many planes were wrecked and their pilots and bombardiers killed.

The Nazi forces expected to spend the winter cozily in houses in the prin- cipal Russian cities. They had no woolen clothes or heavy furred topcoats. Neither did they have furred boots. The result was that many of the Nazi soldiers fell victim to the subzero cold.

The fieldmarshals who had been dubious about the Russian adventure from the beginning began to showr their discontent and warned the Fuehrer that he was jeopardizing the Reich's chances of winning the war. They were re-

moved from command and sent to posts from which their voices could no longer be heard.

The hunch strategist of the Nazi forces was determined to put his plans through. His hunches had failed him In the past, but he could see no reason

why they should fail him again. The only concession he made to his pro- fessionals at headquarters was that In-

stead of throwing against the Red armies only Germans, as had been the case in the 1941 campaign, he agreed to order Rumanian, Hungarian, Italian, Croat and Slovak divisions into battle.

Since the second campaign against Russia began only once or twice has the Fuehrer been away from the battle front. The strategic plans wrere his own

and their execution was performed under his strict supervision.

The second Russian campaign was

even a worse flop than the first. The only redeeming feature, as far as the Germans are concerned, rested in the fact that more ‘'allies'’ than Germans were killed, wounded and taken pris- oners.

Hitler Abandons Strategy. With the last failure against Russia,

Hitler is reliably reported to have abandoned his hunch strategy and placed in charge of all military opera- tions professional men who know what must be done. He expects that these men will now repair the damage done

by his "hunches" and has withdrawn to Berchtesgaden where he is kept in- formed about the course of operations on the Russian front.

The generals now in supreme com-

mand on all fronts are expected to remedy the situation. The new cam-

paign against Russia is conducted by them as an offensive-defensive opera- tion. Now that the damage has been done they must attempt once more to cut off the oil supplies from the Russian armies, before they decide finally to withdraw to defensive positions close to the German borders.

side. Preparing the data and the argu- ments are a staff of more than 60 drafting officers of the State Department. But few of them are diplomats. Most of them are former college instructors, rec-

ognized as authorities in some field of history, geography, political, economic or social science.

No hard and fast program, like the 14 points of Woodrow Wilson, is the aim.

The planners recognize that Prime Minister Winston Churchill of Great Britain, Premier Joseph Stalin of Soviet Russia, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek of China and the many smaller govern- ments in exile will have their own ideas.

Seek Full Understanding. For instance, the higher-ups in Wash-

ington may consider that Germany's in- dustrial and political power should be decentralized under Allied control for a

considerable period after the war. But should Germany be partitioned into a

lot of small states, as Lord Robert Van- sittart has proposed in Great Britain?

Welles, or perhaps some one else, orders the planners to study the problem from all angles, weigh the advantages, the disadvantages, the difficulties, the prob- able repercussions, in the light of historic precedents and experience. On the basis of this study, the American statesmen

may form a tentative decision, and be ready, if necessary, to answer a counter-

proposal with the statement. "We think it would be inadvisable for this reason,” and lay all the data on the table.

Already proposals have been made to disarm potential aggressors, set up an

international police force and re-educate the Germans, the Italians and the Jap- anese.

How have such experiments operated in the past? How are they mast likely to succeed in the prospective aftermath of World War I-I? Those are questions on

which the professors in the State Depart- ment are working.

Their chief, Pasvolsky, 49-vear-old special assistant to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, may have a particular in- terest in his work because his native city, Pavlograd, is in the Kharkov sector long occupied by the Germans.

Pasvolsky Is Naturalized.

Brought from Russia by his parents in 1905. at the age of 12, he was naturalized six years later, At the age of 16 he was

editor of a Russian language newspaper in New York, taking over the job at the death of his father.

Graduated from the City College in New York, in 1916, he took graduate work at Colombia and the University of Geneva, became a writer on interna- tional and financial relations and event- ually was a research economist for the Brookings Institution in Washington, where he received his Ph. D. degree in 1936.

Peace conferences attracted him from his youth. He managed to attend the Parts conference of 1919 and the arms

limitation conference at Washington in 1921 as a journalist. He was an observer for Brookings at the world economic conferences in Geneva in 1927 and 1930 and in London in 1933. Shortly after that he went to the United States Bu- reau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce as an economist and transferred to the State Department, In the same capacity, In 1939.

4

Invasion Task Vast Force and Supplies

Will Be Required By John Grover.

Invasion of Europe this year covers

a multitude of possibilities. The whole coastline of Europe, from

Norway’s north coast to the Greek- Turkish border (except Spain and Port- ugal!, is enemy territory.

Confine the promised invasion to West- ern Europe and the possibilities no less than the tasks of the invaded still are enormous.

There is no specific, authoritative data on the requirements of an invasion force, its size or its objective. These are secrets locked in the minds and papers of probably less than a dozen top-drawer Allied strategists.

It is possible, however, to speculate broadly on the basis of known facts about the North African Invasion and the Nazi defenses of “Festung Europa” —Fortress Europe.

Against a French North African force totaling not more than 500,000 regulars, foregin legion and native troops, the Allied commanders felt it prudent to throw not less than 500,000 British and United States troops.

The 500,000 defense troops in North African were in part won over to the Allied cause before the landings. All of them were ill-equipped and had no sources of supply. The coastal defenses were less than adequate by modern standards.

The western defenses of Na«i Europe are no such soft touch. The Nazis have an estimated 1,680,000 combat troops backed by 840,000 service of supply forces In the area from Norway to the south of France.

It will be three years In June since they began fortifying the Frtnch and Norwegian coasts and the Lowlands against expected counterattack. The Dieppe “dress rehearsal’’ proved the Nazis aren't napping.

The known pattern of German de- fenses makes complete control of the air a prerequisite of any successful in- vasion attempt.

Germany's coastal fortifications are manned by tough combat troops trained to stall any landing attempt until inter- mediate and reserve pools can be rushed up over rail-and-road networks to wipe out the invading forces.

Success of the invasion depends on

smashing the transport facilities from the air to prevent the support forces sending quick aid to the beach defenders.

Germany’s air activity has been at a minimum lately. This suggests the Nazis are husbanding plane strength, perhaps to meet an invasion. What strength the Nazis have must at least be doubled by the Allied air forces, to assure air control so the bombers can do their necessary chores.

The 10,000 Dieppe raiders were chop- ped to pieces by forward beach defenses. Prime Minister Churchill told Commons the raiders reported 50 per cent casual- ties. Of the 5,000 Canadians who par- ticipated. 3.350 became casualties.

For safety and certainty in establish- ing an invasion beachhead, it is figured that at least 100.000 men must be thrown ashore on a relatively narrow front. And these would have to be followed by successive waves of troops to exploit the original landing.

In North Africa four separate land- ings were launched at once. Similar diversions would be required in a con- tinental invasion, to prevent quick mass- ing of enemy strength at one threatened point.

Exclusive of Norway, any major in- vasion attempt would require not less than 500.000 men, plus 1.000,000 more in immediate reserve in England, That is figuring from the basis of the troops landed in Africa, against lesser oppo- sition.

Norway, with 225,000 Germans in oc- cupation, might be invaded with fewer troops, because aid from the Norwegians could be expected, and troops from the support pools could not be shifted as quickly over Norwegian distances.

On any basis of figuring, a continental invasion is certain to require staggering quantities of constantly flowing supplies and men that dwarf any United Nations unit so far in action in any theater.

Eden (Continued From Page B-l.l

unhappy precedent of "non-intervention" was set. High policy in Britain decided on non-intervention in the Spanish civil war and it was Eden's duty to help pre- serve the pathetic sham of the non-in- tervention committee which masked the participation of Hitler and Mussolini In that opening battle of the present con- flict.

Under the shadow of the approaching disaster of Munich, Eden again broke with the Conservatives, who were in power. He resigned as Foreign Minister on February 19, 193fi, announcing to the House that it was not over the Mediter- ranean agreement reached with Italy, which he was known to have opposed, but over an ever more grave issue. This stirred a flood of speculation all over the world. The curious did not have long to wait. A few weeks later the Nazis in- vaded Austria and appeasement was made that much more difficult. This meant for Eden a definite break with Neville Chamberlain. If he had stayed on, of course, he would inevitably have borne the stigma of Munich.

With the outbreak of the war In 1939 he was made Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs and in a quiet, in- conspicuous way did much to co-ordinate the war effort of the motherland and the members of the British common- wealth. Then when France fell and Chamberlain was hustled off the stage to make way for Churchill. Eden be- came War Minister. It was a trying interlude preceding his return to the foreign office.

Today Eden has a look of maturity that was lacking five years ago. The trials that he has been through show plainly in his face. He has been through the fiery furnace and that ordeal has given him a strength which he may not have had before. Above all, having been through two wars, he is determined to try to find a decent footing for » long peace.

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