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The divisions of the higher and lower vehicles should be understood concisely, as follows.

Different v iew are designated with respect to experiences of bodies, environments and objects, which arc comprised by body, speech and mind.

As for what is "experienced" or not: whatever system one upholds — whether one is a beginner or a tenth-level bodhisattva or somewhere in between - there is nothing to debate, because there is no

disputing1 what is directly perceived [by any given individual].

For that reason, disputes arise about what [is experienced] wiih respect to how those experiences are characterized2.

To be precise, there are five ways [in which experiences are characterized by those who experience them]. The firsi case is exemplified as follows.

(0 When the image o f a black snake appears in water, some people apprehend it as an actual snake, are afraid, and avoid it.

1 Lit., there is no exaggeration (sgro) or deprecation (skur)2 Lit., "with respect to how the defining characteristics of those eppearances exist".

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(ii) Some people know it to be trn image of a snake. Although they know it is not a real snake, they sec the reflection as having the potential to do harm, and will have resort to some way o f counteracting [that potential].

q'ajai w^l(iii) Some people it is an image that is not composed o f materia) elements, so they know that it has no potential to function [as a substantial entity]. However, because o f having previously been afraid [of

such things as snakes], they will not be able to touch or tiead3 [on the image].

(iv) Some people know that it has no functional potential because it is a reflection, and in order to

quickly dispel their hesitation, will fearlessly4 touch and step upon It.

(v) Some people, knowing the image for what it is, have no thought o f avoiding or pursuing it, and do not do anything.

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3 rdzi bo

4 brtul shugs', read zhugs.

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The philosophical systems of the different vehicles correspond [to the aformenlioned examples]. The first case is the Shravakayana. Here, the phenomena of suffering and the origination o f suffering exist both relatively and ultimately, and arc held to exist as substantial entities. For that reason, they are viewed as actually existing, and are subject to acceptance and rejection. This is similar to seeing the reflection of a snake as a substantial entity, and then avoiding it.

Among what are knowD as the "four modes o f existence“, in this system we have three: ultimate

existence, deceptive5 existence, and the substantial existence o f both.

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The second example corresponds to the Madhyamika system o f the Great Vehicle. [According to the Madhyamaka,] appearances are ¡ike magical illusions, because they are not truly established as substantial entities. However, just as the illusion of poison 6 has functional potency, if they arc not managed with skillful means, the phenomena o f delusion which are like magical illusions can function harmfully, but if they are [managed with skillful means], they can be beneficial. Thus, since [phenomena] exist deceptively as substantial entities7, [Madhyamaka] maintains that one should accept and avoid them. This is similar to saying that although the snake is [just] a reflection, it nonetheless a substantial entity endowed with functional capacity8. In this system, among the four

5 kun rthob literally means "covered over", i.e.. disguised or deceptive. It could also translated as "relative" (as in relative truth), but since there arc some problematic philosophical nuances in that term, 1 have chosen to do with kun rdzob what the Tibetans did with its Sanskrit equivalent samvpti —translate it more or less literally.6 Lit., an illusory poison {dug sgyu ma).7 rdzas sv yod pa. Note that in this translation rdias and dngos po arc both translated as "substantial entity" or "substantial entitles".8 by a ba b y td pa'i rdzas. By a ba byedpa here is taken to mean by a byed nus p a (Sanskrit arihakriyd), which 1 have generally translated as "functional capacity".

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types o f existence, “ultimate existence" is negated, but we still have "deceptive existence" and "nominal existence".

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The third example belongs to the ascetical outer tantros9, Kriya and Yoga [According to the outer tamras], apparent phenomena are without any substantial reality, because they are like illusions. Even though they are without the fault [of existing substantially], because o f one’s previous [habit] o f fear, one cannot deal [directly] with them, but one c o d coll upon an external force.10 This is similar to knowing that the reflection o f a snake is not a problem, but still not being able to touch it. In this system, among the four types o f existence, ultimate existence and deceptively substantial existence are negated. There is, however, deceptive nominal existence. On the basis o f [the definition] of the two truths held in common [with the Madhyamaka], one understands that there is no substantial existence in deceptive reality, and attains e beginner's slight understanding o f the view o f equality, which realizes the inseparability of ultimate and deceptive realities.

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9 p h yipa thub p a rgyud\ often dkn‘ thub is used instead o f thvb pa , hence the translation as "ascctical"10 Lit., another hero {dpo' bo gzhan).

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The fourth is the inner tantra of Mahayoga. Having for the most pan realized the iUusion-liko nature of deluded phenomena, and in order to quickly prepare oneself for the view o f equality, one engages in extraordinary activities In much the same way that, in order 10 quickly dispel one's fear of b mere reflection [which looks like] a snake, one would fearlessly tread upon it In this system, apprehension of the nominal existence o f deceptive reality is mostly eliminated, and as one becomes for the most part freo o f duaJistic apprehension o f the two truths, one acquires an intermediate understanding of the inseparability of the two truths.

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The fifth is the view of the Great Perfection. Here one realizes that if [the snake] is illusory, then avoidance, fear, and actually stepping on it arise from the view of clinging to [the appearance of the snake] as substantially existent. One realizes (r/ogs) that what is illusory is not something to act upon; one does iiotstop anything, or try to do anything. In this system, one perfects one’s understanding of the illusion-like nature of phenomena. In realizing (rig) that appearances are without defining characteristics, one is freed of even the most subtle apprehension of ultimate and deceptive realities, and is thus freed of all views. Conventionally speaking, this is the realization (dgongs pa) o f equality, the coalescence (dbyer wed) of ultimate and deceptive reality.

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What uctually appears [i.e., the illusory appearance of a snake] arises by the power of habitual tendencies, and is not quick to disappear. Clinging, on the other hand, arises due to mistaken conceptions that are accidental, and is easy to eliminate. That [clinging] arises from the apprehension of characteristics, and that [apprehension of characteristics] arises from seeing things as substantially existent (dngos por ha ba). If one eliminates1'these three concepts (riogpa ), even if naturally arising thoughts [ngo bo nyid kyi rtog pa] do not cease, one will not see the (rwo truths] as separate11.

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Here some might say, "Madhyamika texts do not difTereniiate the two truths on the ultimate level, and the texts o f Secret Mantra do not eliminate appearances." Let us explain this. Someone who conceives the defining characteristics of the two truths as truly existent and investigates knowable objects [in that context] will never be able to give up dualistic mind. For when [such a person] determines that "the two truths are inseparable", he has not let go o f his intention, which is that deceptive phenomena exist as mere illusions. Thus, when he establishes the non-duality of dharmata, he gives rise to dualistic thought.

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" Lit., reverses (log pa)12 Lit, one will not give rise to a view o f two tnnhs (bden pa gnyis su ha ba ml 'byvng ngo).13 ?7?

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When determining that phenomena are like illusions on the level of deceptive reality, the term "¡Uusioo-like" is used because the elaboration of "ultimate existence”, which is imputed by the Shravaka and Yogachara systems, has been pacified. However, saying "illusion-like" does not mean that phenomena are devoid of functionality in deceptive reality. Here, wben [the mode o f existence of phenomena] is determined, one brings directly to mind the defining characristics o f deceptive entities, and then resolves that those are not really established as things thai exist Thus, at this point,

one's mind has not given up [concepts of the] two systems 14 [of relative and ultimate truth]. Thus wbat this amounts to is an appearance— a property-possessor (chos can)— that is posited as a substratum o f characteristics [mishan p h i] . As long there arises in the mind [a notion] o f the absence o f that [propeny-possessor's] property or o f the absence o f elaboration with respect to a substratum characteristics, and as long [the property-possessor] is perceived to exist as a mere illusion, die mind that clings to the characteristics o f phenomena has not ceased. Such a person cannot be said to have the view o f greai equality.

Thus the investigation of objects o f knowledge by means o f focusing on the distinction*5 between the two realities was taught as an antidote for persons excessively attached to substantial entities. However, the essence of phenomena is without the characteristics o f the two [realities]. Whoever stops apprehending characteristics becomes free of clinging, and thus no longer craves or wishes for anything, regardless o f what happens. That is called "the view o f great equality".

14 tshul gnyis. Rongzom Pandita’s point here may also be simply that one has not rid oneself of conceptual ambivalence— ie ., one still equivocates between the notion that something exists and the notion that it does not exist.

15 rkya bar ??

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No

Again someone will ask, "Isn't mere appearance deceptive [reality]?” This is just what was discussed earlier—someone who apprehends what appears to them as deceptive reality [also] clings to idea that the absence o f elaboration regarding [that] appearance is ultimate reality. However, to ask whether a mind which does not apprehend the two truths as truly existent apprehends them as the same or different is like asking whether the son of a bnrrcn woman is blue or white. Another question: "Well, how do you establish your tradition?" We jusi refute your inferior views, and do not establish anything else. That is, conventionally speaking, the "view o f great cquaJity". There is no clinging whatsoever to any view.

The Black Snake Discourse, by Dharmabhadra.

' r & c

16 Should this read zhes or is it like zhe bo or zlie 'dotfl

8