Rothschild Whitt

AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

THE COLLECTIVIST ORGANIZATION: AN ALTERNATIVE TORATIONAL-BUREAUCRATIC MODELS*

JOYCE ROTHSCHILD-WHITT

Cornell University

American Sociological Review 1979, Vol. 44 (August):509-527

During the 1970s the U.S. has witnessed the emergence of a wide range of organizations thatexplicitly reject the norms of rational-bureaucracy and identify themselves as "alternativeinstitutions" or "collectives." Grounded in an extensive study of the practices of workercollectives, this paper seeks to identify some of the structural commonalities which link thesenew work organizations and to develop a theoretical framework for understanding them. First,the ideal-type features of collectivist democracy are delineated and contrasted with thecharacteristic features of bureaucracy. The ideal-type approach allows us to assess theseorganizations not as failures to achieve bureaucratic standards they do not share, but as effortsto reahze wholly different values. Second, constraints and social costs that inhibit therealization of organizational democracy are discussed. It is in the conceptualization ofalternative forms of organization that organizational theory has been weakest, and it is here thatthe experimentation of collectives may broaden our understanding.

This article represents a first approach selves as ''alternative institutions." Theto a model of collectivist organization, a emergence of these contrabureaucraticmodel that is premised on the logic of sub- organizations calls for a new model ofstantive rationality rather than formal ra- organization that can encompass their al-tionality. To date, theories of orga- ternative practices and aspirations,nizational action have assumed, explicitly Max Weber delineated four types of so-or implicitly, that norms of formal ration- cial action: traditional, affectual, instru-ality prevail (Thompson, 1967). Indeed, in mentally rational, and value rational. Thea modern society they almost always do. first three forms of social action corre-This decade, however, has given rise to a spond respectively to traditional, charis-wide array of work organizations that matic, and legal-rational bases of au-self-consciously reject the norms of thority, with each type of authority imply-rational-bureaucracy and identify them- ing a particular type of organization to

implement its aims. But the last type ofsocial action, value-rationality, has no

*Direct all communications to: Joyce counterpart in his typology of authorityRothschild-Whitt; New York State School of Indus- ^^^ organization. Some recent scholarsZl t l^ iS tY°H85?™'" ''"'^"^''^ '"'• have begun to look to Weber's missing

I would like to thank William Foote Whyte, J. type, value-rational authority, to under-Allen Whitt, Robert Stern, Charles Perrow, Carole stand certain kinds of professional andPateman, Rosabeth Kanter, Howard Aldrich and the c h u r c h o rgan iza t ions (SatOW, 1975;anonymous reviewers of the ASR for valuable Wood 1978)comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this . ' . . . . . ,paper. In addition, I would like to acknowledge the ^ value-rational orientation to social ac-support of the New Systems of Work and Participa- tion is marked by a "belief in the Value fortion Program at ILR, Cornell University (NIMH jts own sake . . . independent of its pros-grant #MH 29259-03) during the completion of this ^.j^ ^f SUCCess" (Weber, 1968:24). It iswork. A previous version of this paper was . , , , .. 4.1. • • • • ••presented a? the Ninth World Congress of Sociology evidenced by actions that put mtO practicein Uppsala, 1978. people's convictions. For Weber (1968:37)

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510 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

natural law is one of the purest instancesof value-rational legitimacy.

The tension between substantive orvalue-rational action on the one hand, andformal or instrumentally-rational actionon the other, was well recognized by MaxWeber. For Weber, formal rationality andits main locus of expression in bureau-cracy would come to dominate modernsociety, but it would be continually "con-fronted by the inevitable conflict betweenan abstract formalism of legal certaintyand [the] desire to realize substantivegoals" (Weber, 1954:226). The modernlegal order could not exclude a substan-tive theory of natural law any more thanthe modern bureaucracy could eliminateall moral values. In Weber's view, theconflict between formal and substantivejustice has no ultimate solution (Bendix,1962:391-438). Nevertheless, in hisclassic statement on bureaucracy, Weber(1946:196-244) sets forth the char-acteristics of this mode of organization asif it could eliminate all substantive, non-formal considerations, and contrasts thisideal-type conception of bureaucracy withpatrimonial administration. The polar op-posite of the monocratic,. formal bureau-cracy drawn by Weber would be a fullycollectivized democracy which turned onprinciples of substantive rationality.

Just as the ideal of bureaucracy, in itsmonocratic pure type, is probably not at-tainable (Mouzelis, 1968); so the ideal ofdemocracy, in its pure and complete form,is probably never achieved. In practice,organizations are hybrids.

This paper aims to develop an ideal-type model of collectivist-democraticorganization. It is an attempt to delineatethe form of authority and the correspond-ing mode of organization that follows fromvalue-rational premises. As such it isgrounded in observations of counter-bureaucratic organizations which aspire tobeing "collectives," or in Weberianterms, which have explicitly rejectedinstrumentally-rational social action infavor of value-rational behavior. Theideal-type approach allows us to under-stand these new forms of organization, notonly in terms of bureaucratic standardsthey do not share, but in terms of thealternative values they do hold (cf. Kanter

and Zurcher, 1973). Further, the use of anideal-type permits us to locate actualorganizations along a continuum.

Constraints and social costs that inhibitthe realization of organizational democ-racy will be addressed in the latter half ofthis paper.

Research Settings and Methods

During the 1970s the United States haswitnessed an impressive proliferation ofwhat have popularly come to be termedalternative institutions. Alternative in-stitutions may be defined in terms of theirmembers' resolve to build organizationswhich are parallel to, but outside of, estab-lished institutions and which fulfill socialneeds (for education, food, medical aid,etc.) without recourse to bureaucratic au-thority.

Parallel, oppositional organizationshave been created in many servicedomains—e.g., free medical clinics, freeschools, legal collectives, alternativemedia collectives, food cooperatives, re-search collectives, communes. Grassrootscooperative businesses are proliferating aswell, especially in fields with relativelylow capitalization needs such as restau-rants, bookstores, clothing manufactureand retail, auto repair, housing construc-tion, alternative energy installation,newspapers, and so forth. They are bur-geoning at a renfiarkable rate. For in-stance, in 1967 there were about 30 freeschools in the United States. By 1973there were over 800 documented freeschools (New Schools Exchange Direc-tory, 1967; 1973). A 1976 directory locatessome 5,000 alternative organizationsnationwide, and does not even claim to beexhaustive (Gardner, 1976). These collec-tively owned and managed work en-terprises represent one of the enduringlegacies of the antiauthority movements ofthe 1960s.'

' Gardner (1976) estimates that about 1,000 newalternative institutions are being created annually inthe U. S. This is his best estimate, but the kind ofevidence that would be needed to compute actualrates of creation and of dissolution is not yet avail-able. However, the historical record is instructive.The nineteenth century and the first third of thetwentieth century saw at least 700 cases of produc-

THE COLLECTIVIST ORGANIZATION 511

Little social scientific research has beendevoted to this social development. Someresearch studies describe one or anotherof these alternative work organizations,but few point to commonalities which linkthem. This paper identifies some of thestructural commonalities and attempts todevelop a general organizational frame-work of collectivist-democracy in whichspecific cases may be understood.

The organizational properties formu-lated in this paper are grounded in com-parative data from different types of col-lectivist organizations. Glaser and Strauss(1967) have argued that theory generatedfrom data, namely, grounded theory, willhave more power to predict and explainthe subject at hand than will theory ar-rived at through speculation or logical de-duction.

Following the comparative researchstrategy of Glaser and Strauss (1967), Iselected for study five collectivist workorganizations that were as varied aspossible: a free medical clinic, a legal col-lective, a food cooperative, a free school,and an alternative newspaper.- All are lo-cated in a medium-sized city in California.Although they differ greatly as to the typeof product or service they provide, orga-nizational size, funding sources, technol-ogy utilized, and so forth, they are unifiedby the primacy each gives to developing acoUectivist-democratic form of organiza-tion.

Participant observation was conductedin each of the research settings ranging induration from six months to two years per

ers" cooperatives (Aldrich and Stern, 1978). Thesewere in many ways the forerunners of the contempo-rary wave of collectives and cooperatives discussedin this paper. Historically, cooperatives have comein distinct waves—the 1840s. the 1860s, the 1880sand the 1920s-1930s. Their longevity has variedwidely between industries (Aldrich and Stern, 1978).Those of the nineteenth century had a median dura-tion of less than ten years, while more than half ofthe worker cooperatives of the 1920s and 1930s (par-ticularly in the plywood industry and in the refusecollection industry) are still in operation today(Jones, 1979). Since the current wave of collectivesis largely a post-1970 phenomenon and is still on therise, it is too early to say how long it will last.

- All persons and organizations have been givenfictitious names in this paper. For a more detailedaccount of the research sites and methods seeRothschild-Whitt (1976; 1978).

organization. Observational material wasamplified by structured interviews withselected members of each of the orga-nizations, with a mean interview time of2-V-i hours. This was followed by ques-tionnaire surveys to the membership ofthree of the organizations under study.

Each theoretical point in the paper isgrounded in numerous instances from theempirical material. I have tried to selectthose few that seem most characteristic ofthe data. Of course, no number of illustra-tions can ever constitute a "proof." Thetheoretical formulations in this workshould be assessed for their logical consis-tency, clarity, integration, and especiallyfor the extent to which they are found tobe generic properties of collectivist orga-nizations.

The Collectivist Organization:Characteristics

CoUectivist-democratic organizationscan be distinguished from bureaucraticorganizations along at least eight dimen-sions. Each of these characteristics will betaken up in turn, and a summarizing chartwill follow.

Authority.When we re talking about collectives, we'retalking about an embryonic creation of a newsociety. . . . Collectives are growing at aphenomenal rate all over this country. Thenew structures have outgrown the science ofanalyzing them. Sociology has to catch upwith reality. . . . Collectivism is an attempt tosupplant old structures of society with newand better structures. And what makes our'ssuperior is that the basis of authority is radi-cally different. (Staff member. AlternativePaper)

The words of this activist get right to theheart of the matter: authority. Perhapsmore than anything else, it is the basis ofauthority that distinguishes the collectivistorganization from any variant of bureau-cracy. The coUectivist-democratic orga-nization rejects rational-bureaucratic jus-tifications for authority. Here authorityresides not in the individual, whether onthe basis of incumbency in office or exper-tise, but in the collectivity as a whole.

This notion stems from the ancientanarchist ideal of "no authority." It is


premised on the belief that social ordercan be achieved without recourse to au-thority relations (Guerin, 1970). Thus itpresupposes the capacity of individualsfor self-disciplined, cooperative behavior.Indeed, collect ivist organizat ionsroutinely emphasize these aspects ofhuman beings. Like the anarchists, theiraim is not the transference of power fromone official to another, but the abolition ofthe pyramid in toto: organization withouthierarchy.

An organization cannot be comprised ofa collection of autonomous wills, eachpursuing its own personal ends. Some de-cisions must be binding on the group.

Decisions become authoritative in col-lectivist organizations to the extent thatthey derive from a process in which allmembers have the right to full and equalparticipation. This democratic ideal, how-ever, differs significantly from concep-tions of "democratic bureaucracy" (Lip-set et al., 1962), "representative bureau-cracy" (Gouldner, 1954), or even repre-sentative democracy. In its directlydemocratic form, it does not subscribe tothe established rules of order and pro-tocol. It does not take formal motions andamendments, it does not usually takevotes, majorities do not rule, and there isno two-party system. Instead there is a"consensus process" in which all mem-bers participate in the collective formula-tion of problems and negotiation of deci-sions.^ All major policy issues, such ashiring, firing, salaries, the division oflabor, the distribution of surplus, and theshape of the final product or service, aredecided by the collective as a whole. Onlydecisions which appear to carry the con-sensus of the group behind them, carry theweight of moral authority. Only these de-cisions, changing as they might with theebb and flow of sentiments in the group,are taken as binding and legitimate. Theseorganizations are collectively-controlled

by their members or workers: hence thename collectivist or coUectivist-democratic organization.

In Weberian terms, we are concernedhere with organizations which aspire andclaim to be free of Herrschaft.* They areorganizations without domination in thatultimate authority is based in the collectiv-ity as a whole, not in the individual. Indi-viduals, of course, may be delegated care-fully circumscribed areas of authority, butauthority is delegated and defined by thecollectivity and subject to recall by thecollectivity.

Rules. Collectivist organizations alsochallenge the bureaucratic conception thatorganizations should be bound by a for-mally established, written system of rulesand regulations. Instead, they seek tominimize rule use. But, just as the mostbureaucratic of organizations cannot an-ticipate, and therefore cannot cir-cumscribe, every potential behavior in theorganization, so the alternative organiza-tion cannot reach the theoretical limit ofzero rules. Collectivist organizations,however, drastically can reduce thenumber of spheres of organizational ac-tivity that are subject to explicit rule gov-ernance.

In the most simple of the collectivistorganizations in this study, the free highschool, only one explicit organizationalrule was formulated: no dope in school.This rule was agreed upon by a plenarymeeting of the school's students and staffprimarily because its violation was per-ceived to threaten the continued existence

' As organizations grow beyond a certain size theyare likely to find purely consensual processes of de-cision making inadequate, and may tum to directvoting systems. Other complex, but neverthelessdemocratic, work organizations may sustain directdemocracy at the shop floor level, while relying uponelected representative systems at higher levels of theorganization (cf. Edelstein and Warner, 1976).

" Actually, Weber did recognize the possibility ofdirectly democratic organization, but he dealt withthis only incidentally as a maiînal type case (Weber,1968:948-52; 289-92). Although Weber's three typesof legitimate domination were meant to be com-prehensive, both in time and in substance, asMommsen (1974:72-94) points out, it is difficult tofind an appropriate place for modern plebiscitariandemocracy in Weber's scheme. Weber did come toadvocate the "plebiscitarian leader-democracy," butthis was a special version of charismatic domination(Mommsen, 1974:113). He did not support "democ-racies without leadership"" (fuererlose Demokratien)which try to minimize the domination of the few overthe many because organization without Herrschaftappeared Utopian to him (Mommsen, 1974:87). Thusit is difficult to identify the acephalous organizationsof this study with any of Weber"s three types ofauthority.


of the school. Other possible rules alsowere discussed at the Free School, rulesthat niight seem self-evident in ordinaryschools such as "each student should takeX number of classes" or "students arerequired to attend the courses for whichthey are registered," but these did notreceive the consensual backing of theschool's members.

In place of the fixed and universalisticrule use which is the trademark of bureau-cracy, operations and decisions in alterna-tive organizations tend to be conducted inan ad hoc manner. Decisions generally aresettled as the case arises, and are suited tothe peculiarities of the individual case. Nowritten manual of rules and proceduresexists in most collectives, though normsof participation clearly obtain. While thereis little attempt to account for decisions interms of literal rules, concerted efforts aremade to account for decisions in terms ofsubstantive ethics. This is like Weber's(1968:976-8) Kadi justice and far removedfrom the formal justice that informsrational-bureaucratic action.

One of the chief virtues of extensiverule use in bureaucracy is that it permitspredictability and appeal of decisions. Thelack of universalistic standards in prebu-reaucratic modes of organization invitedarbitrary and capricious rule. In bureau-cracy decisions could be calculated andappealed on the basis of their corre-spondence to the written law. In collec-tivist organizations, however, decisionsare not necessarily arbitrary. They arebased on substantive values (e.g., equal-ity) applied consistently, if not univer-sally. This permits at least some calcula-bility on the basis of knowing the substan-tive ethic that will be invoked in a particu-lar situation.

Social control. From a Weberian pointof view, organizations are tools. They areinstruments of power for those who headthem. But what means does the bureau-cracy have of ensuring that lower-levelpersonnel, people who are quite distantfrom the centers of power, effectively willunderstand and implement the aims ofthose at the top? This issue of social con-trol is critical in any bureaucracy. Perrow(1976) examines three types of social con-trol mechanisms in bureaucracies: direct

supervision, standardized rules, andselection for homogeneity. The first typeof control, direct supervision, is the mostobvious. The second is far less obtrasive,but no less effective: standardized rules,procedures, and sanctions. Gouldner(1954) showed that rules can substitute fordirect supervision. This allows the orga-nization considerable decentralization ofeveryday decision making, and even theappearance of participation, for ih& prem-ises of those decisions have been carefullycontrolled from the top. Decentralized de-cision making, when decisional premisesare set from the top via standardizedrules, may be functionally equivalent tocentralized authority (cf. Blau, 1970;Bates, 1970; Perrow, 1976).

Collectivist organizations generally re-fuse to legitimate the use of centralizedauthority or standardized rules to achievesocial control. Instead, they rely uponpersonalistic and moralistic appeals toprovide the primary means of control, asSwidler (1979) demonstrates in her exam-ination of free schools. In Etzioni's (1961)terms, compliance here is chiefly norma-tive. One person appeals to another, "doXfor me," "do X in the interest of equal-ity," and so forth.

The more homogeneous the group, themore such appeals can hold sway. Thus,where personal and moral appeals are thechief means of social control, it is impor-tant, perhaps necessary, that the groupselect members who share their basicvalues and world view. All five of the al-ternative organizations in this study triedto do that. At the Law Collective, for in-stance, I asked how they decide whetherto take in a new member:

They have to have a certain amount of pastexperience in political work . . . [ , ] some-thing really good and significant that checksout . . . . Secondly, they have to share thesame basic assumptions as far as politicsgoes and they have to be willing to accept thecollective way of doing things . . . .

Such recruitment criteria are not at all un-common or hidden in alternative workorganizations.

In Perrow's (1976) terms alternativeorganizations eschew first- and second-level controls, but accept third-level con-trols. Third-level controls are the most


subtle and indirect of all: selection of per- tive does not provide a life-long ladder tosonnel for homogeneity. On this level so- ever-higher positions. Work may be vol-cial control may be achieved by selecting unteer or paid, and it may be part-time orfor top managerial positions only people full-time or even 60 hours per week, but itwho "fit in"—people who read the right is not conceptualized as a career. Bureau-magazines, go to the right clubs, have the cratic career advancement (based onright style of life and world view. This is seniority and/or achievement) is not aalso true in collectivist organizations, meaningful concept in collective workWhere people are expected to participate organizations, for there is no hierarchy ofin major decisions (and this means offices. Therefore, there can be no indi-everyone in a collective and high-level vidual advancement in positional rankmanagers in a bureaucracy) consensus is (though there may be much change incrucial, and people who are likely to chal- positions).lenge basic assumptions are avoided. A Collectivist work organizations gener-person who reads the Wall Street Journal ally recruit competent and skilled person-would be as suspect in applying for a posi- nel even though their selection criteriation at the Law Collective, as a person explicitly emphasize friendship networks,who reads the New Left Review would be political values, and personality traits. Toat ITT. Both kinds of organizations utilize illustrate, during the year in which theselection for homogeneity as a mechanism Free Clinic was observed, four fiill-timefor social control. staff positions were filled, and between

Social relations. Impersonality is a key nine and 65 applications were received forfeature of the bureaucratic model. Per- each position. Yet each of the four posi-sonal emotions are to be prevented from tions went to a friend of present staffdistorting rational judgements. Relation- members. The relevant attributes citedships between people are to be role-based, most frequently by the staff making thesesegmental, and instrumental. Collectivist decisions were: articulation skills, abilityorganizations, on the other hand, strive to organize and mobilize people, politicaltoward the ideal of community. Relation- values, self-direction, ability to workships are to be wholistic, affective, and of under pressure, friendship, commitmentvalue in themselves. The search for com- to the organization's goals, cooperativemunity may even become an instance of style, and relevant experience. Thesegoal displacement, as when, for example, selection criteria are typical of alternativea free school comes to value community organizations. In spite of their studied ne-so highly that it loses its identity as a gleet of formal criteria of competenceschool and becomes a commune (see, (e.g., certification), alternative orga-e.g., Kaye, 1972). nizations often attract highly qualified

Recruitment and advancement. Bu- people.'' In many ways, their selectionreaucratic criteria for recruitment and ad- criteria are well suited to their needs forvancement are resisted in the collectivist multitalented and committed personnelorganization. Here employment is not who can serve a variety of administrativebased on specialized training or certifica- and task-oriented functions and who aretion, nor on any universalistic standard of capable of comanaging the organization incompetence. Instead, staff are generally cooperation with others,recruited and selected by collectives on Incentive structure. Organizations usethe basis of friendship and social-political different kinds of incentives to motivatevalues. Personality attributes that are seen participation. Most bureaucratic work-as congruent with the collectivist mode of places emphasize remunerative incentivesorganization, such as self-direction and and few employees could be expected tocollaborative styles, also may be con- donate their services if their paycheckssciously sought in new staff (see, e.g.,Torbert, 1973). ' A dissertation conducted in the San Francisco

Employment does not constitute the I'^t ^""T"^ that free school teachers there have• ^ . . r. . 11 .̂ - • higher degrees from more prestigious universitiesbeginning of a career in collectivist orga- than their public school counterparts (McCauley,nizations in the usual sense, for the collec- I97i; 148).


were to stop. Collectivist organizations on these organizations, whose motives on thethe other hand, rely primarily on purpos- face of it would appear to be whollyive incentives (value fulfillment), secon- idealistic, also have material incentivesdarily on solidary incentives such as for their participation,friendship, and only tertiarily on material For example, staff members at the Freeincentives (Clark and Wilson, 1961). Ac- Clinic suspect that some volunteers do-cording to Etzioni (1961), this kind of nate their time to the clinic "only to looknormative compliance system tends to good on their applications to medicalgenerate a high level of moral commitment school." Likewise, some of the collegeto organization. Specific structural mech- students who volunteered to teach at theanisms which produce and sustain orga- Free School believed that in a tight mar-nizational commitment are identified by ket, this would improve their chances ofKanter (1972a). Because collectivist work getting a paid teaching job. And, for all theorganizations require a high level of com- talk of community at the Food Co-op,mitment, they tend to utilize some of these many members undoubtedly joined simplymechanisms as well as value-purposive because the food was cheaper. Becauseincentives to generate it. Indeed, work in material gain is not part of the acceptablecollectives is construed as a labor of love, vocabulary of motives in these orga-and members may pay themselves very nizations, public discussion of such mo-low salaries and may expect each other to tives is suppressed,continue to work during months when the Nonetheless, for staff members as wellorganization is too poor to afford their as for volunteers, material incentivessalaries. coalesce with moral incentives. At the

Alternative organizations often appeal Law Collective, for instance, legal work-to symbolic values to motivate people to ers often used their experience there tojoin and to participate actively. The range pursue the bar, since California law allowsof these values is considerable. At the eligibility for the bar through the alterna-Free Clinic, for instance, a member de- tive means of apprenticing under an attor-scribes motivation: ney for three years. At the Alternative

^ , . , ^. Newspaper, a few staff members confidedOur volunteers are do-gooders. ••.• They getsatisfaction from givmg direct and immediatesatisfaction from givmg direct and immediate . .. \. .help to people in need. This is why they Journalistic experience. .work here '^^^ members of alternative institutions

often deny the existence of material con-While at the Alternative Newspaper, the siderations and accept only the idealisticfollowing is more illustrative: motivations. In the opinion of one long-

Our motives were almost entirely political, time staffer at the Alternative Paper:We were moving away from a weathermen i don't think anyone came for purely jour-type position, toward the realization-that the nalistic purposes, unless they're masochists.revolution will be a very gradual thing. . . . i mean it doesn't pay, the hours are lousy.We wanted to create a base for a mass left. and the people are weird. If you want profes-To activate liberals and open them up to left sional journalistic experience you go to apositions. To tell you the truth, the paper straight paper,was conceived as a political organ. j ^ ^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^ -^ ^gj^^. Alternative

At the Food Co-op it is the value of com- institutions generally provide woefully in-munity that is most stressed, and the adequate levels of remuneration by theCo-op actively helps to create other standards of our society. But, it does notcommunity-owned and controlled institu- impugn the motives of participants to rec-tions in its locale. ognize that these organizations must

However, we should guard against an provide some material base for theiroverly idealistic interpretation of partici- members if they are to be alternativepation in alternative organizations. In places of employment at all.these organizations, as much as any, there At the Free Clinic full-time staff were allexists an important coalescence cf mate- paid $500 per month during 1974-1975, atrial and ideal interests. Even volunteers in the Law Collective they were paid a base


of $250 per month plus a substantial sup-plement for dependents, and at the Alter-native Paper they received between $150and $300 per month, in accordance withindividual "needs." These pay levelswere negotiated in open discussion of thecollectives as a whole, as were decisionsregarding the entire labor process. If thesewage levels appear exploitative, it is acase of self-exploitatlon. It is the subsis-tence wage levels which permit the youngorganization to accumulate capital and toreinvest this surplus in the organizationrather than paying it out in wages. Thisfacilitates the growth of the organizationand hastens the day when it may be able topay higher salaries.*"

Many collectives have found ways tohelp compensate for the meager salariesthey pay their members. The Law Collec-tive stocked food so that members couldeat at least a meal or two per day at theoffice for free. The collective also main-tained a number of cars that its memberscould share, thereby eliminating the needfor private automobile ownership. FreeClinic staff decided to allow themselvescertain fringe benefits to compensate forwhat they regarded as underpaid work:two weeks of paid vacation time eachyear, plus two additional weeks of unpaidvacation (if desired); one day off everyother week; and the revised expectationthat staff would regularly work a 28-30rather than 40-hour week. But these arecompensations or supplements for a gen-erally poor income, and like income, theydo not motivate people to work in alterna-tive organizations, they only make workthere possible.

First and foremost, people come towork in an alternative organization be-cause it offers them substantial controlover their work. Collective control means

*• The self-exploitation common in collectivistorganizations and the justifications for it (e.g., au-tonomy, control over the workplace, self-expressionin woiik) are similar to that of the small entrepre-neur. It may be that as economic concentration andoligopolistic control over markets renders traditionalenterpreneurial activity obsolete, collectively-ownedenterprises may grow. For, in many ways, collec-tivist efforts evoke the old entrepreneurial spirit, buttoday it may require the intense work and self-sacrifice of many people rather than just one to makea fledging enterprise viable.

that members can structure both theproduct of their work and the work pro-cess in congruence with their ideals.Hence, the work is purposeful to them. Itis not infrequently contrasted with alienat-ing jobs that they have had, or imagine, inbureaucracies:

A straight paper would have spent a third ofa million dollars getting to where we are nowand still wouldn't be breaking even. We'vegotten where we are on the sweat of ourworkers. They've taken next to no moneywhen they could have had 8,000 to 15,000 instraight papers doing this sort of job. . . .They do it so they can be their own boss. Sothey can own and control the organizationthey work in. So they can make the paperwhat they want it to be. . . . (interview,member of Alternative Newspaper)

Social stratification. In the ideal-typebureaucracy, the dimensions of socialstratification are consistent with one an-other. Specifically, social prestige andmaterial privilege are to be commensuratewith one's positional rank, and the latter isthe basis of authority in the organization.Thus, a hierarchical arrangement ofoffices implies an isomorphic distributionof privilege and prestige. In this way,hierarchy institutionalizes (and justifies)inequality.

In contrast, egalitarianism is a centralfeature of the coUectivist-democraticorganization. Large differences in socialprestige or privilege, even where they arecommensurate with level of skill or au-thority in bureaucracy, would violate thissense of equity. At the Free Clinic, forinstance, all full-time staff members werepaid equally, no matter what skills or ex-perience they brought to the clinic. At theLaw Collective and Alternative News-paper pay levels were set "to each accord-ing to his need." Here salaries took ac-count of dependents and other special cir-cumstances contributing to need, butexplicitly excluded considerations of theworth of the individual to the organiza-tion. In no case I observed was the ratiobetween the highest pay and the lowestpay greater than two to one.

In larger, more complex, democraticorganizations wages are still set, and wagedifferentials strictly limited, by the collec-tivity. For exanlple, in the 65 production


cooperatives that constitute the Mondra- teamwork or task sharing, and the diffu-gon system in Spain pay differentials are sion or demystification of specializedlimited to a ratio of three to one in each knowledge through internal education,firm (Johnson and Whyte, 1977). In the Ideally, universal competence (of theworker-owned and managed refuse collec- collective's members) would be achievedtion firms in San Francisco, the differen- in the tasks of the organization. It is thetial is only two to one, or less (Russell, et amateur-factotum then who is ideallyal., 1979; Perry, 1978). Schumacher suited for the collectivist organization. In(1973:276) reports a seven to one ratio be- the completely democratized organiza-tween the highest and the lowest paid at tion, everyone manages and everyoneScott Bader, a collectively-owned firm in works. This may be the most fundamentalEngland. The cooperatively-owned way in which the collectivist mode ofplywood mills in the Pacific Northwest organization alters the social relations ofpay their members an equal wage (Bern- production.'stein, 1976:20-1). By comparison, the This alteration in the division of labor iswage differential tolerated today in perhaps best illustrated by the FreeChinese work organizations is 4:1; in the School, an organization in which adminis-United States it is about 100:1. trative functions were quite simple, and

Prestige, of course, is not as easily undifferentiated. The Free School had noequalized as is pay. Nonetheless, collec- separate set of managers to administer thetivist organizations try in a variety of ways school. Whenever administrative tasksto indicate that they are a fraternity of were recognized, "coordination meet-peers. Through dress, informal relations, ings" were called to attend to them; thesetask sharing, job rotation, the physical were open to all interested teachers andstructureof the workplace, equal pay, and students. Coordinators were those whothe collective decision-making process were willing to take responsibility for aitself—collectives convey an equality of particular administrative task (e.g., plan-status. As Mansbridge (1977) observes of ning curriculum, writing a press release,collectives, reducing the sources of status organizing a fund-raiser). A coordinatorinequality does not necessarily lead to the for one activity was not necessarily amagnification of trivial differences, coordinator for another project. Further,Likewise, decreasing the material differ- the taking on of administrative tasks wasentials between individuals in a collec- assumed to be a part-time commitmenttivist organization does not ordinarily which could be done along side of one'sproduce a greater emphasis on status dis- other responsibilities. Coordinators, then,tinctions. WQYQ self-selected, rotated, and part-time.

Differentiation. A complex network of No one was allowed to do administrationspecialized, segmental roles marks any exclusively. By simplifying administrationbureaucracy. Where the rules of scientific and opening it up to the membership-at-management hold sway, the division of large, the basis and pretense of speciallabor is maximized: jobs are subdivided as expertise was eliminated,far as possible. Specialized jobs require The school even attempted to breaktechnical expertise. Thus, bureaucracy down the basic differentiation betweenushers in the ideal of the specialist-expert students and staff, regarding students notand defeats the cultivated, renaissance as clients but as members with decision-man of an earlier era (Weber, 1946:240-4).

In contrast, differentiation is minimized ' industrial organizations in China have im-in thp rnllprtivi«t nraaniyatinn Work PJemented similar changes m the division of labor,in tne collectivist organization. \VorK ^^^^ ^^^^ considered an essential part of trans-roles are purposefully kept as general and forming the social relations of production. Theirwholistic as possible. They aim to elimi- means for reducing the separation of intellectualnate the division of labor that separates work from manual work and administration fromintellectual workers from manual work- performance tasks were similar to those used by the

. . . , , . ^ I r _r alternative work organizations reported m thisers, admimstrative tasks from perform- p̂ pen team work, internal education, and role rota-ance tasks. Three means are commonly tion. For specific points of comparison seeutilized toward this end: role rotation, Bettleheim (1974) and Whyte (1973).


making rights and responsibilities. TheFree Clinic also tried to integrate itsclients into the organization. For instance,it created spaces on its board of directorsfor consumers of medical care and re-cruited many of its volunteers from theranks of its patients.

Most alternative organizations are morecomplex than the Free School. They can-not assume that everyone in the organiza-tion knows how (or would want to knowhow) to do everything. Thus, they mustdevelop explicit procedures to achieveuniversal competence. Such procedures,in effect, attack the conventional wisdomof specialized division of labor and seek tocreate more integrated, multifaceted work

The Alternative Newspaper, for exam-ple, utilizes task sharing (or team work),apprenticeships, and job rotations towardthis end. Instead of assigning one full-timeperson to a task requiring one person,they would be more likely to assign acouple of people to the task part-time. In-dividuals' allocations of work often com-bine diverse tasks, such as 15 hours writ-ing, 15 hours photography, and 10 hoursproduction. In this way, the distribution oflabor combines satisfying tasks with moretedious tasks and manual work with intel-lectual work. People do not enter thepaper knowing how to do all of these jobs,but the emphasis on task sharing allowsthe less experienced to learn from themore experienced. Likewise, if a task hasfew people who know how to perform itwell, a person may be allocated to appren-tice with the incumbent. Internal educa-tion is further facilitated by occasional jobrotations Thus, while the Alternativei'aper must perform the same tasks as anynewspaper, it attempts to do so withoutpermitting the usual division of labor intospecialties or its concomitant monopoliza-tion of pxnprtkf-

Minimizing differentiation is difficultand time consuming. The AlternativePaper, for instance, spent a total of fifteenhours and forty minutes of formal meetingtime and many hours of informal discus-SlOn m planning one systematic job rota-tion. Attendance at the planning meetingswas 100%. The time and priority typicallydevoted to internal education 'inTolIec'

tivist organizations makes sense only if itis understood as part of a struggle againstthe division of labor. The creation of anequitable distribution of labor and wholis-tic work roles is an essential feature of thecollectivist organization.

Table 1 summarizes the ideal-type dif-ferences between the collectivist mode oforganization and the bureaucratic.»Democratic control is the foremost char-acteristic of collectivist organization, justas hierarchal control is the defining char-acteristic of the smoothly-running bureau-cracy. Thus, collectivist-democratic orga-nization would transform the social rela-tions to product ion. Bureaucracymaximizes formal rationality precisely bycentralizing the locus of control at the topof the organization; collectives decentral-ize control such that it may be organizedaround the alternative logic of substantiverationality.

'f Democracy: Constraints and

Various constraints limit the actual at-tainment of democracy, and even to theextent that the collectivist-democraticideal is achieved, it may produce socialcosts that were unanticipated. This sec-tion outlines some of the more importantof these constraints and social costs.

Judgments about the relative impor-tance of the listed social costs are intri-

8 The eight dimensions discussed here are clearlyinterrelated, a point not explored herein. However,' is evidence from bureaucracies that they are

somewhat independent (Hall, 1963). That is, an

ships between these variables may be elusive. Forinstance, of seven propositions offered by Hage^'^^^^ '" ^" axiomatic theory of organizations, six

Â '"PP*"^^'^ by the organizations in this° " ^ ' however, that higher complexity pro-

cluces lower centralization, was contradicted by theevidence of this study, although it has received em-pineal support in studies of social service bureauc-

^" '^^^ ^ ). Hage

treme scores the extent relationships may no longerhold or may actually be reversed. This is an impor-^ limitation to bear in mind, especially as we begin

^ organizations, such as the ones in this


1. Comparisons of Two Ide^ Types of Oiganization

Dimensions Bureaucratic OrganizationCollectivist-DemocraticOrganization

1. Authority

2. Rules

3. Social Control

4. Social Relations

5. Recruitment andAdvancement

6. Incentive Structure

7. Social Stratification

8. Differentiation

1. Authority resides in individuals byvirtue of incumbency in officeand/or expertise; hierarchalorganization of offices. Com-pliance is to universal fixedrules as these are implementedby office incumbents.

2. Formalization of fixed and univer-salistic rules; calculability andappeal of decisions on the basisof correspondence to the for-mal, written law.

3. Organizational behavior is subjectto social control, primarilythrough direct supervision orstandardized rules and sanc-tions, tertiarily through theselection of homogeneous per-sonnel especially at top levels.

4. Ideal of impersonality. Relationsare to be role-based, segmentaland instrumental.

5.a. Employment based on spe-cialized training and formal cer-tification.

5.b. Employment constitutes acareer; advancement based onseniority or achievement.

6. Remunerative incentives are pri-mary.

7. Isomorphic distribution ofprestige, privilege, and power;i.e., differential rewards byoffice; hierarchy justifies in-equality.

8.a. Maximal division of labor:dichotomy between intellectualwork and manual work and be-tween administrative tasks andperformance tasks.

8.b. Maximal specialization of jobsand functions; segmental roles.Technical expertise is exclu-sively held: ideal of thespecialist-expert.

1. Authority resides in the collectiv-ity as a whole; delegated, if atall, only temporarily and subjectto recall. Compliance is to theconsensus of the collectivewhich is always fiuid and opento negotiation.

2. Minimal stipulated rules; primacyof ad hoc, individuated deci-sions; some calculability possi-ble on the basis of knowing thesubstantive ethics involved inthe situation.

3. Social controls are primarily basedon personalistic or moralisticappeals and the selection of ho-mogeneous personnel.

4. Ideal of community. Relations areto be wholistic, personal, ofvalue in themselves.

5.a. Employment based on friends,social-political values, personal-ity attributes, and informally as-sessed knowledge and skills.

5.b. Concept of career advancementnot meaningful; no hierarchy ofpositions.

6. Normative and solidarity incen-tives are primary; material in-centives are secondary.

7. Egalitarian; reward differentials, ifany, are strictly limited by thecollectivity.

8.a. Minimal division of labor: ad-ministration is combined withperformance tasks; division be-tween intellectual and manualwork is reduced.

8.b. Generalization of jobs and func-* tions; wholistic roles. Demys-

tification of expertise: ideal ofthe amateur factotum.

cately tied to cultural values. Alternativeorganizations may be mistakenly assessedwhen seen through the prism of the normsand values of the surrounding bureau-cratic society.

Time. Democracy takes time. This isone of its major social costs. Two-waycommunication structures may producehigher morale, the consideration of more

innovative ideas, and more adaptive solu-tions to complex problems, but they areundeniably slow (Leavitt, 1964:141-50).Quite simply, a boss can hand down abureaucratic order in a fraction of the timeit would take a group to decide the issuedemocratically.

The time absorbed by meetings can beextreme in democratic groups. During the


early stages of the Alternative News-paper, for instance, three days out of aweek were taken up with meetings. Be-tween business meetings, political meet-ings, and "people" meetings, very littletime remained to do the tasks of the orga-nization. Members quickly learn that thisis unworkable. Meetings are streamlined.Tasks are given a higher priority. Even so,constructing an arrangement that bothsaves time and ensures effective collectivecontrol may prove difficult: Exactly whichmeetings are dispensable? What sorts ofdecisions can be safely delegated? Howcan individuals still be held accountable tothe collectivity as a whole? These sorts ofquestions come with the realization thatthere are only 24 hours in a day.

There is a limit, however, to howstreamlined collectivist meetings can get.In the end, commitment to decisions andtheir implementation can only be assuredin collectives through the use of thedemocratic method. Unilateral decisions,albeit quicker, would not be seen as bind-ing or legitimate. With practice, planningand self-discipline, groups can learn to ac-complish more during their meeting time.But once experience is gained in how toconduct meetings, time given to meetingsappears to be directly correlated withlevel of democratic control. The FreeClinic, for instance, could keep its weeklystaff meetings down to an average of onehour and fifteen minutes only by permit-ting individual decision making outside-the-meeting to a degree that would havebeen unacceptable to members of the Al-ternative Paper, where a mean of fourhours was given over to the weekly staffmeeting.

Homogeneity. Consensus, an essentialcomponent of collectivist decision mak-ing, may require from the outset substan-tial homogeneity. To people who wouldprefer diversity, this is a considerable so-cial cost.

Bureaucracy may not require muchhomogeneity, partly because it does notneed the moral commitment of its em-ployees. Since it depends chiefly on re-munerative incentives to motivate workand since in the end it can commandobedience to authority, it is able to unitethe energies of diverse people toward

organizational goals. But, in collectiveswhere the primary incentives for partici-pation are value-purposive and thesubordinate-superordinate relation hasbeen delegitimated, moral commitmentbecomes necessary. Unified action ispossible only if individuals substantiallyagree with the goals and processes of thecollective. This implies a level ofhomogeneity (in terms of values) unaccus-tomed and unnecessary in bureaucracy.^

Consequently, collectivist orga-nizations also tend to attract a homoge-neous population in terms of social ori-gins. At the Alternative Paper full-timestaff members came from families wherethe mean parental income was about$29,000. A random sampling of the generalmembership of the Food Co-op (consist-ing of 1,100 people) reveals an averageparental income of $19,500, while themost active members of the Co-op, thestaff and board, show a mean parental in-come of $46,0(X). In addition to being offinancially privileged origins, people in al-ternative organizations tend to come fromwell-educated families. In both of theabove organizations, over half of themothers had at least some college; fatherson the average had acquired somegraduate or professional training beyondthe B.A. Thus, the need for substantialagreement on the values, goals and pro-cesses of the collective, in effect, has lim-ited their social base. This is an importantconstraint to members who would like to

"* Organizations which are homogeneous in thissense probably register substantial agreement overorganizational goals (or what Thompson and Tuden[1959] call "preferences about outcomes"), but reg-ister considerable disagreement about how to getthere ("beliefs about causation"). In such cases,Thompson and Tuden predict that organizations willreach decisions by majority judgment. A collegiumtype of organization, they maintain, is best suited forsolving judgmental problems. This would require allmembers to participate in each decision, route perti-nent information about causation to each member,give each member equal influence over the finalchoice, require fidelity to the group's preferencestructure, and designate as ultimate choice the judg-ment of the majority. On all but the last point theycorrectly describe collectivist work organizations.Further, as they point out, the social science litera-ture does not contain models of this type of organiza-tion as it does for bureaucracy (Thompson and Tu-den. 1959:200).


broaden the base of their social move- ion are minimized in the formulation of ament. consensus, private jokes and intimate

This is also an important constraint in communications are used to give personalorganizations with heterogeneous popula- support during the meetings. Suchtionsof employees. For example, Intema- avoidance patterns have the unintendedtional Group Plans, a Washington, D.C. consequence of excluding the not fully-insurance company, is in the process of integrated member, withholding informa-trying to democratize its ownership and tion from the group, and violating thegovernance structure (ZwerdUng, 1977). norms of open participation. Further,To many of its employees who do not these same fears of confiict and avoidanceshare collectivist values, democratization patterns are in evidence even in groupsmay only mean added time and responsi- which are highly sensitive to these issuesbility; and they may wish to retain the and in which many members have beentraditional separation of managers and trained in group process (Mansbddge,workers. 1979).

To guard against this problem and to The constancy of such feelings in all ofensure that all members profess collec- the groups I observed suggests that theytivist values, alternative organizations are rooted in the structure of collectivisttend to recruit very selectively. The Law decision making. Although participantsCollective, for instance, instituted a pro- generally attribute conflict and avoidancebationary period of six months on top of to the stubborn, wrongheaded, or other-its careful selection procedures. wise faulty character of others, it may be

In sum, cultural homogeneity makes an inherent cost of participatory-reaching and abiding by a consensus democracy.easier, but it may constrain the social base Structural tensions inherent in collec-of collectivist organization. tivist organization render confiict difficult

Emotional intensity. The familial, face- to absorb. First, the norm of consensualto-face relationships in collectivist orga- decision making in collectives makes thenizations may be more satisfying than the possibility of conflict all the moreimpersonal relations of bureaucracy, but threatening because unanimity is requiredthey are also more emotionally threaten- (where a majoritarian system can in-ing. The latter may be expedenced as a stitutionalize and absorb conflicting opin-social cost of participatory organization, ions). Second, the intimacy of face-to-face

Interpersonal tension is probably en- decision making personalizes the ideasdemic in the directly democratic situation, that people espouse and thereby makesand members certainly perceive their the rejection of those ideas harder to bearworkplaces to be emotionally intense. At (while a more formal bureaucratic system,the Law Collective a member warns that to the extent that it disassociates an idea"plants die here from the heavy vibes." from its proponent, makes the cdticism ofAt the Alternative Newspaper I observed ideas less interpersonally risky),headaches and other signs of tension be- Nondemocratic individuals. Due tofore meetings in which devisive issues prior experiences, many people are notwould be raised. A study of the New En- very well-suited for participatory-gland town meeting found citizens report- democracy. This is an important con-ing headaches, trembling, and even fear straint on its development,for one's heart as a result of the meetings. The major institutions of our society.Altogether, a quarter of the people in a such as educational institutions, combinerandom sample of the town spontaneously to reinforce ways of thinking, feeling, andsuggested that the conflictual character of acting that are congruent with capitalist-the meetings disturbed them (Mansbddge, bureaucratic life and incompatible with1979; 1973). collectivist odentations. For example.

To allay these fears of conflict, Jules Henry (1965) has shown how thetownspeople utilize a vadety of protective norms of capitalist culture becomedevices: cdticism is concealed or at least the hidden curriculum of the schoolsoftened with praise, differences of opin- system. Even at the preschool level, the


qualities of the bureaucratic personalityare unconsciously, but nevertheless con-sistently, conveyed to children (Kanter,1972b). In fact, Bowles and Gintis (1976)argue that the chief function of the entireeducational apparatus is to reproduce thedivision of labor and hierarchal authorityof capitalism.

In the face of these behavior-shapinginstitutions, it is very difficult to sustaincollectivist personalities. It is asking, ineffect, that people in collectivist orga-nizations constantly shift gears, that theylearn to act one way inside their collec-tives and another way outside. In thissense, the difficulty of creating and sus-taining collectivist attributes and behaviorpatterns results from a cultural dis-juncture. It derives from the fact that al-ternative work organizations are asyet isolated examples of collectivism in anotherwise capitalist-bureaucratic context.Where they are not isolated, that is, wherethey are part of an interlocking network ofcooperative organizations, such as theMondragon system in Spain (Johnson andWhyte, 1977) this problem is mitigated.

In their present context the experienceof the alternative institutions has shownthat selecting people with collectivist atti-tudes does not guarantee that these atti-tudes will be effectively translated intocooperative behavior (see, e.g., Swidler,1976; Taylor, 1976; Torbert, 1973).

Nevertheless, a number of recent casestudies of democratic workplaces, one ofthe worker-owned refuse collection com-panies (Russell et al., 1979; Perry, 1978)and one of a women's health collective(Bart, 1979), reveal that the experience ofdemocratic participation can alterpeoples' values, the quality of their work,and ultimately, their identities. In a com-parative examination of many cases ofworkers ' par t ic ipat ion, Bernstein(1976:91-107) finds democratic con-sciousness to be a necessary element foreffective workers' control to take place.

Fortunately, the solution to this prob-lem of creating democratic consciousness(and behavior) may be found in the demo-cratic method itself. In this vein, Patemanhas amassed a considerable body of evi-dence from research on political socializa-tion in support of the classical arguments

of Rousseau, Mill, and Cole. She con-cludes:

We do learn to participate by participatingand . . . feelings of political efficacy aremore likely to be developed in a partici-patory environment. . . . The experience ofa participatory authority structure might alsobe effective in diminishing tendenciestoward non-democratic attitudes in the indi-vidual. (1970:105)

Elden (1976) provides further empiricalsupport for Pateman's position that par-ticipation enhances feelings of political ef-ficacy. If bureaucratic organizationsthwart the sense of efficacy that would beneeded for active participation in democ-racy (see Blumberg, 1973:70-138), thencollectivist-democratic organizationsmust serve an important educative func-tion, if they are to expand beyond theircurrently limited social base.'"

Environmental constraints. Alternativeorganizations, like all organizations, aresubject to external pressures. Becausethey often occupy an adversary positionvis-a-vis mainstream institutions, suchpressures may be more intense. Extra-organizational constraints on the devel-

'" To Pateman (1970) the theory of participatory-democracy rises or falls on this educative function.But other social scientists (see especially, Argyris,1974) remain unconvinced that participation incollectivist-democratic processes of organization canproduce the desired changes in peoples' behavior.For Argyris, unilateral, defensive, closed, mutuallyprotective, non-risk-taking behavior, what he callsModel I behavior, is nearly universal: it permeatesnot only western bureaucracies but also counter-bureaucracies such as alternative schools as well ascollectivist organizations in contemporary China andYugoslavia. Change in organizational behavior can-not be expected to follow from fundamental changein the mode of production; for Model I behavior isrooted in the pyramidal values of industrial cultureand in the finiteness of the human mind as an infor-mation processing machine in the face of environ-mental complexity.

Contrarily, I am arguing that where people do nothave participatory habits, it is because they generallyhave not been allowed any substantive control overimportant decisions. Nondemocratic (pyramidal)habits are indeed a problem for democratic groups,but they are not a problem that a redistribution ofpower could not resolve. Admittedly, the evidence isnot yet conclusive on this issue, but much of it doesindicate that the practice of democracy itself devel-ops the capacity for democratic behavior among itsparticipants (see especially, Blumberg, 1973; Pate-man, 1970).


opment of collectivist organizations may organization into creating a special job tocome from legal, economic, political, and handle correspondence and personal visitscultural realms. of officials (Lindenfeld, 1979).

It is generally agreed among free Alternative organizations often strive toschoolers, for instance, that building and be economically self-sustaining, but with-fire codes are most strictly enforced for out a federated network of other coopera-them (Kozol, 1972; Graubard, 1972). This tive organizations to support them, theyis usually only a minor irritant, but in ex- cannot. Often they must rely on estab-treme cases, it may involve a major dis- lished organizations for financial support,ruption of the organization, requiring This acts as a constraint on the achieve-them to move or close down. One small, ment of their collectivist principles. Forcollectively-run, solar power firm was instance, in order to provide free services,forced to move its headquarters several the Free Clinic needed and received fi-times through this sort of legal harass- nancial backing from private foundationsment. At one site, the local authorities as well as from county revenue-sharingcharged over a hundred building "viola- funds. This forced them to keep detailedtions" (Etzkowitz, 1978). An even more records on expenditures and patient visitsfar-reaching legal obstacle is the lack of a and to justify their activities in terms ofsuitable statute for incorporating outsiders'criteria of cost-effectiveness,employee-owned and controlled firms. In less fortunate cases, fledging demo-The Alternative Newspaper, for example, cratic enterprises may not even get off thehad to ask an attorney to put together ground for failure to raise sufficient capi-corporate law in novel ways in order to tal. Two recent attempts by employeeensure collective control over the paper. • ̂ groups to purchase and collectively man-

The law can be changed but the more age their firms reveal the reluctance ofubiquitous forces against collectivism are banks to loan money to collectivist en-social, cultural, and economic. In fact, al- terprises, even where these loans wouldternative organizations often find that bu- be guaranteed by the government. Fromreaucratic practices are thrust on them by the point of view of private investors, col-established institutions. The Free School, lective ownership and management mayfor example, began with an emphatic pol- appear, at best, an unproven method oficy of absolutely no evaluative records of organizing production, and at worst, astudents. In time, however, it found that dangerous method.'în order to help its students transfer back For a consistent source of capital, col-into the public schools or gain entrance lectivist enterprises may need to developinto college, it had to begin keeping or cooperative credit unions as the Mondra-inventing records. The preoccupation of gon system has done (Johnson and Whyte,other organizations with records and 1977) or an alternative investment fund. Indocuments may thus force record keeping many collectives, the unpaid (or poorlyon a reluctant free school. In another free paid) labor of the founders forms the ini-school, the presence of a steady stream of tial capital of the organization, enablinggovernment communications and inspec- some measure of financial autonomy. Intors (health, building, etc.) pushed the any case, the larger issue of organization-

environment relations remains problema-" The result of this effort was a two-tiered struc- fic, particularly when we are consider-

ture: the paper was incorporated as a general cor- ing co l lec t iv i s t -democra t ized Orga-poration and a trust, which owns all the stock in the nizations in a capitalist-bureaucratic con-paper. Each six months of full-time work is worth tpvt 13one voting share in the trust. This grants ultimatecontrol of the paper to the staff, past and present.Immediate control is exercised by the board of di- '- See, the abortive attempts to raise capital forrectors of the corporation, which consists of the cur- employee-ownership at Kasanofs Bakery, The Bos-rently working staff. As a member of the paper said, ton Phoenix, April 26, 1977, and at the Colonial Press"the structure is neither graceful nor simple, but it in Clinton, Massachusetts.• . . guarantees that the working staff will maintain " Organization-environment relations are alwayseditorial control, and makes it nearly impossible ever reciprocal. In part, the low wages, hard work andto sell the paper." intense personal involvement that make coHectivist


Individual differences. All orga- cialized jobs accompany expertise. Peoplenizations, democratic ones notwithstand- are expected to protect their expertise,ing, contain persons with very different Indeed, this is a sign of professionalism,talents, skills, knowledge, and personality and it is well-known that the monopoliza-attributes. Bureaucracies try to capitalize tion of knowledge is an effective instru-on these individual differences, so that ment of power in organizations (Weber,ideally people with a particular expertise 1968; Crozier, 1964). For this very reason,or personality type will be given a job, collectivist organisations make every at-rewards, and authority comensurate with tempt to eliminate differentials in knowl-it. In collectives such individual dif- edge. Expertise is considered not the sac-ferences may constrain the organization's red property of the individual, but anability to realize its egalitarian ideals. organizational resource. In collectives.

Inequalities in influence persist in the individually-held skills and knowledge aremost egalitarian of organizations. In demystified and redistributed throughbureaucracies the existence of inequality internal education, job rotation, task shar-is taken for granted, and in fact, the exer- ing, apprenticeships, or any plan they cancise of power is built into the opportunity devise toward this end.' 'structure ofpositions themselves (Kanter, The diffusion or demystification of1977). However, in collectivist orga- knowledge, while essential to helpnizations, this may be less true. Here, equalize pattems of influence, involves cer-precisely because authority resides in the tain trade-offs. Allowing a new person tocollectivity as a unit, the exercise of influ- learn to do task X by rotating her/him toence depends less on positional opportuni- that job may be good for the developmentties and more on the personal attributes of of that person, but it may displace an ex-the individual. Not surprisingly, members peHenced person who had received awho are more articulate, responsible, en- sense of satisfaction and accomplishmentergetic, glamorous, fair, or committed in job X. Further, encouraging novices tocarry more weight in the group.'^ John learn by doing may be an effective form ofRice, a teacher and leader of Black Moun- pedagogy, but it may detract from thetain (a group that "seceded" from the quality of goods or services that the orga-educational system and anticipated the nization provides, at least (theoretically)free school movement) argued that Black until universal competence in the tasks ofMountain came as close to democracy as the organization is reached,possible: the economic status of the indi- Even in the collectivist organizationvidual had nothing to do with community that might achieve universal competence,standing. But beyond that, "the dif- other sources of unequal influence wouldferences show up . . . [;] the test is made persist (e.g., commitment level, verbalall day and every day as to who is the fluency, social skills).'* The most a demo-person to listen to" (Duberman, 1972:37). cratic organization can do is to remove the

Some individual differences are ac- bureaucratic bases of authority: positionalcepted in the collectivist organization, but rank and expertise. The task of anynot all, particularly not differences in coUectivist-democratic workplace, and itknowledge. In bureaucracy differences of is no easy task, is to eliminate all bases ofskill and knowledge are honored. Spe- individual power and authority, save

those that individuals carry in their per-son.

organizations seem so costly may be due to costsimposed by the environment. Conversely, collec-tivist organizations rely upon goods and servicesproduced by the surrounding bureaucratic orga- ' ' 'A case study of the demystification of skills in anizations, e.g., light bulbs, fast food chains. collectivist work organization is provided by Bart

'* Swidler (1976) vividly describes the extent to (1979).which members of a free school will literally ransack "• Mansbridge (1977) observes that even the mosttheir private lives to locate sources of glamour that genuinely democratic organization will accept somewill enhance their sense of worth and influence in the measure of inequality of influence in order to retaingroup. individual liberties.


Collectlvlst-democracy(direct)

Conclusion

Horizontalbureaucracy

Complex,self-managed(representative

democracy)

Figure 1. Range of Organizational Forms

Hierarchicalbureaucracy

The organizations in this study are ad-mittedly rare and extreme cases. To theextent that they reject received forms oforganization, they present an anomaly.For precisely this reason they are of greattheoretical significance. By approachingthe polar opposites of bureaucracy, theyallow us to establish the limits of orga-nizational reality. The parameters appearto be far wider than students of orga-nizations have generally imagined. Oncethe parameters of the organizational fieldhave been defined, concrete cases can beput into broader perspective. Professionalorganizations, for example, while consid-erably more horizontal than the strictlyhierarchical bureaucracy (Litwak, 1961),are still far more hierarchal than thecollectivist-democratic organization.Thus, we may conceive of the range oforganizational possibilities illustrated inFigure 1.

By contrasting collectivist democracyand rational bureaucracy along eight con-tinuous dimensions, this paper has em-phasized the quantitative differences be-tween the two. In many ways, this under-states the difference. At some point dif-ferences of degree produce differences ofkind. Fundamentally, bureaucracy andcollectivism are oriented to qualitativelydifferent principles. Where bureaucracy isorganized around the calculus of formalrationality, collectivist-democracy turnson the logic of substantive rationality.

If, in the Weberian tradition, we takethe basis of authority as the central featureof any mode of organization, then orga-nizations on the right half of Figure 1empower the individual with authority (onthe basis of office or expertise), whileorganizations on the left side grant ulti-mate authority only to the collectivity as awhole unit. Moreover, if, following

Marx's lead, we take the division of laboras the key to the social relations of pro-duction, organizations on the right side ofthe diagram maintain a sharp division be-tween managers and workers, while orga-nizations on the left side are integrative:those who work also manage. Departuresof this magnitude from established modesof organization may be considered a "so-cial invention" (Coleman, 1970).

Organization theory has for the mostpart considered only the right half of thisspectrum, and indeed, the vast majority oforganizations in our society do fall on theright side of the continuum. Still, we gainperspective on these organizations by put-ting them into a broader fi-ame of refer-ence. With the proliferation of collectivistorganizations both in this society and inothers (e.g., China, Spain, Yugoslavia),we will need an alternative model of orga-nization, one which they themselves as-pire toward, by which to assess their im-pact and success. To wit, collectivistorganizations should be assessed not asfailures to achieve bureaucratic standardsthey do not share, but as efforts to realizewholly different values. It is in the con-ceptualization of alternative forms oforganization that organizational theoryhas been weakest, and it is here that theexperimentation of collectives willbroaden our understanding.

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