Rousseau

Gentle Savages and Fierce Citizens against Civilization: Unraveling Rousseau's ParadoxesAuthor(s): Matthew D. MendhamReviewed work(s):Source: American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 55, No. 1 (January 2011), pp. 170-187Published by: Midwest Political Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25766261 .

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Gentle Savages and Fierce Citizens against Civilization: Unraveling Rousseau's Paradoxes

Matthew D. Mendham Emory University

Rousseau seems to argue, on one hand, that moderns are luxurious, lazy, weak, and soft, in opposition to primitive

hardiness, vigor, ferocity, and rustic virtue. On the other hand, he depicts modern life as cruel, frenzied, competitive, and

harsh, in opposition to primitive gentleness, idleness, abundance, and spontaneity. Is Rousseau, then, simply an imaginative ideologue, forwarding wildly opposed and oscillating characterizations of these eras, merely to be contrarian? This article

attempts to demonstrate a degree of coherence in his analyses, by focusing on the various sociopolitical contexts he discusses, and the various moral characterizations and norms which apply to each of these contexts. Building upon a half-century of interpretations, it offers an innovative logical typology of Rousseau s social thought?in terms of social complexity, environmental resources, and normative foundation?which may explain many of his central paradoxes.

ousseau's many paradoxes and at least apparent contradictions have been noted since the first re

JL X^sponses to his first significant work. Here we will focus upon two clusters of antitheses with significant im

plications for the overall tenor of his social thought. On one hand, we find praises for "sensitivity, gentleness, sen

timentality, and compassion," apparently in keeping with his reputation as a proto-romanticist or vanguard intel lectual of the modern Left. On the other hand, we find

comparable enthusiasm for "manliness, courage, hard

ness, and patriotism," apparently in keeping with his

reputation as a stern moralist or classical republican (cf. Melzer 1990, 91 ).2 Discerning whatever possible coher ence may lie behind such dualisms and paradoxes seems essential to grasping his fundamental intentions. These

particular antitheses become especially relevant in view of

recent scholarly inquiries into the Enlightenment theory of "doux commerce" According to this theory, the increase

of commerce?meaning both economic exchange and

broader social interaction?would make societies more

doux (gentle, mild, calm, peaceable, soft, and/or sweet: see Hirschman [1977] 1997, 56-63; 1985, 43). It was ad

vocated by Jean-Franc;ois Melon, Montesquieu, Voltaire, David Hume, and indeed a strong majority of the lead

ing intellectuals of the time. Although Rousseau has been

rightly singled out as a uniquely vigorous opponent of doux commerce (Rosenblatt 1997,1-45; Wokler 2001, 56,

91), the ways in which he opposed it are more problem atic and complex than has been supposed. For instance, his many appeals to primitive ways of life seem chiefly intended to discredit the urbane lifestyles celebrated by doux commerce, yet we find a peculiar duality in these

Matthew D. Mendham is Post-Doctoral Fellow, the Program in Democracy and Citizenship and the Department of Political Science, Emory University, Atlanta, GA 30322 ([email protected], [email protected]).

A previous version of this article was presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association. For their helpful comments, I thank Vittorio Hosle, Michael Zuckert, Jennifer Herdt, Mary Keys, Shmulik Nili, and three anonymous reviewers. For their

generous support, I thank the University of Notre Dame, the Intercollegiate Studies Institute, and the Notre Dame Institute for Advanced

Study.

References to Rousseau's works list section divisions, followed by the page number in an English translation, then in the Pleiade edition. The following abbreviations have been used. For modern editions of Rousseau: EPW = Rousseau 1997a; LPW = 1997b; CW = 1990-; OC = 1959-1995. For frequently cited works of Rousseau: Conf. = Confessions (CW:5/OC:l); DOI = Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality among Men, or Second Discourse (EPW/OC:3); DPE = Discourse on Political Economy (LPW/OC:3); DSA = Discourse on the Sciences and Arts, or First Discourse (EPW/OC:3); E = Emile, or On Education (Rousseau 1979/OQ4); EOL = Essay on the Origin of Languages (LPW/OC:5); Julie = Julie, or the New Heloise (CW:6/OC:2); LA = Letter to M. d'Alembert on the Theatre (Rousseau 1960/CW:10/OC:5); LR = Last Reply (EPW/OC:3); PF = "Political Fragments" (CW:4/OC:3); Rev. = Reveries of a Solitary Walker (CW:8/OC:l); RJJ = Rousseau Judge of Jean-Jacques: Dialogues (CW:l/OC:l); SC = Of the Social Contract (LPW/OC:3). Translations have occasionally been modified.

American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 55, No. 1, January 2011, Pp. 170-187

?2010, Midwest Political Science Association DOI: 10.111 l/j.l540-5907.2010.00468.x

170



UNRAVELING ROUSSEAU'S PARADOXES 171

lines of criticism. On one hand, moderns are said to be

luxurious, lazy, weak, and soft, in opposition to images of

primitive hardiness, vigor, ferocity, and rustic virtue. On

the other hand, modern life is said to be cruel, frenzied,

competitive, and harsh, in opposition to primitive gentle ness, idleness, abundance, and spontaneity. Is Rousseau,

then, simply an imaginative ideologue, forwarding wildly

opposed and oscillating characterizations of these eras,

merely in revolt against the spirit of his age? This article attempts to unravel Rousseau's central

paradoxes, with special reference to gentleness and sever

ity. It begins with some of the most influential general

interpretations of his work, and comes to focus on the

surprising amount of moral variety among "savages" he

describes. In the process, it synthesizes and expands upon

previous interpretations, offering an innovative typology of the character types he most prominently depicts, and

differentiating certain clusters of moral tendencies and

norms which he considers proper to (or characteristic

of) differing sociopolitical contexts. As scholars who have

previously offered more limited typologies have acknowl

edged (e.g., Todorov 2001, 3), some of the categories can

only be offered as helpful tools which we may bring to

the texts, rather than all-encompassing, fixed categories Rousseau self-consciously posited. Yet I do contend that

this typology, which systematically depicts several funda

mental contrasts and tensions,2 can serve as an illuminat

ing prolegomenon, or first approach, to Rousseau's so

cial thought. Accordingly, it does not attempt to displace

prior interpretations, or pronounce definitively whether

Rousseau should ultimately be understood as coherent or

contradictory. Rather, it provides a clear schematization

of aspects of his work which are plausibly perceived as

revealing some degree of tension, thereby facilitating a

greater degree of awareness, precision, and rigor in future

discussions of his coherence. By laying the groundwork for more systematic comparisons of precivilized, civilized, and ideal forms of life in Rousseau, we will also be bet

ter positioned to explain his full response to doux com

merce?and with it, his basic stance toward modernity as

he perceived it. Finally, this endeavor may be of intrinsic

value in offering sustained explorations of some of his

most acute psychological and sociopolitical observations, as well as his various conceptions of virtue and of the

good life.

2At this formal level, my reading is perhaps closest to O'Hagan, who understands Rousseau as offering a "recurring tension" at the

heart of a "unitary systematic project" (O'Hagan 1999, chap. 1; 2004, 73-76). O'Hagan's tension, however, is between a morality of the senses and one of duty, which overlaps only minimally with

my typology.

Men or Citizens?

During the last half-century, most scholars who have

ventured to interpret Rousseau's general teaching have

defended its fundamental unity. Some have done so with

out clear acknowledgement of any deep tensions within

his thought?a task which can seem plausible enough so long as one, in practice, focuses chiefly or exclusively on a single aspect of it, such as the romanticism of his

autobiographical writings or the republican virtue of his

political writings. Other scholars have, more plausibly, at

tempted to show how his many apparent contradictions

might somehow be consistent expressions of some deeper

principle,3 or how one principle or stance can be judged to be his truest or most fundamental, despite substantial

and largely unintended incompatibility among the ideals

he praises.4 For our purposes, we will focus upon those

who have shown how Rousseau presents multiple ways of life or kinds of society which are largely incompatible, some of which are nonetheless comparably defended by him. A seminal version of this approach is Judith Shklar's

Men and Citizens, which argues that Rousseau presents two radically opposed Utopias as "equally valid" (Shklar

1969, 4). She explains how one of Rousseau's main in

fluences, Archbishop Fenelon, had used a similar tactic, which need not be self-contradictory since these Utopias are offered more in the service of diagnosing "the emo

tional diseases of modern civilization" than as empirical or attainable alternatives. Rousseau's models of "a tran

quil household" and "a Spartan city" are not meant to be

reconciled, but to show how each meets "the inner psy chic needs of men for inner unity and social simplicity," unlike the modern attempts to be half natural and half

social, thus rending the self and generating neither true

3 For Straussians, Rousseau's many obvious contradictions clearly indicate, for the careful and philosophical reader, a deep underly

ing unity: see esp. Strauss (1953, 252-94), Masters (1968), Melzer

(1990), and Marks (2005).

4Esp. Cassirer ([1932] 1989). Todorov seems close to Cassirer in

considering the autobiographical ethic an intrusion of Rousseau's

personal imperfections and misfortunes, rather than a genuine ideal (Todorov 2001, 2002; discussed in note 13 below). Wok ler maintains a thesis of fundamental unity, while allowing for

chronological shifts and development ([1995] 2001, 32-33, 68, 72, 79, 125-26). Starobinski claims to "discover the images, ob

sessions, and nostalgic desires" governing Rousseau, but allows

for fundamentally inconsistent positions and great shifts across

time ([1957] 1988, xi, 13-15, 34, 45-48, 162-63, 201-12, 228-29, 273-77). Neuhouser maintains that the three "principal texts of

Rousseau's philosophical project" (i.e., the Second Discourse, So

cial Contract, and Emile) constitute "a single, coherent system of

thought," even though contradictions maybe more common in his

other works (2008,18-19).



172 MATTHEW D. MENDHAM

"men" nor true "citizens" (Shklar 1969,1-6,31n4,57-58, 213; see E I, 39-40/248-49f).

There can be little doubt that Shklar's distinction is illuminating, at least preliminarily.5 We might high light, for instance, Rousseau's stark contrast of (on one

hand) the true citizen's radical subordination of domes tic life and repudiation of contemplative and univer

salist religiosity with (on the other hand) village life's embrace of sweet, "unspoiled family love," which even al lows gentle Christianity to flourish (Shklar 1969, 12-32,

160-61). Along these lines, Shklar's distinction may help us understand Rousseau's recurring contradictions be tween apparently sincere praises and forceful disparage

ment of cosmopolitanism (DOI II, 174/178; "Geneva

Manuscript" 1.2, CW 4:81/OC 3:287; cf. Todorov 2001,

26-30). Unlike the citizen, whose duties do not extend be

yond the national borders, the cosmopolitan is not bound to any particular polity, but to humanity as a whole. De

spite Rousseau's occasional praise for cosmopolitanism, it is clear that he saw patriotic fervor to be deeply neces

sary in the cultivation of citizen virtue, which is largely understood as love of the polity's common good over pri vate goods (DPE 15-16,20-21/254-55,259-60f; "Geneva

Manuscript" 1.2, CW 4:79/OC 3:284). And since patri otism and cosmopolitanism are virtually impossible to

combine in the same soul?and fully impossible to com

bine among an entire people?he seems to have found it necessary to preach patriotism one-sidedly in civic

contexts.6 This civic virtue is pursued through radical dedication to the polity's general will (DPE 13/252; DSA

I, 13/14f)> and generates a deep harmony among one's

fellows, while naturally tending toward utter indiffer ence and harshness to foreigners (E I, 39/248f; SC IV.8, 146-47/464-65). However, an alternative vision of a more

private moral virtue is also prominent in his writings, and this defines virtue as the strength of will necessary to conquer one's passions, which naturally values and serves humanity as such (E V, 441/812f; cf. Reisert 2003, 8f, 107-13, 135). In another relevant contrast, within the

5Neuhouser rejects the contrast of man and citizen as "mutually exclusive ideals" (2008, 19-24, 155-61, 172-73, 252-60), but due to the significant theoretical efforts he requires to reconcile the accounts of rationality and moral motivation in Emile and Social Contract (236-60), the categories must remain valuable prima facie. A fuller answer to Neuhouser is offered in Mendham (2009, section 4.7).

6"Patriotism and humanity, for example, are two virtues incompat ible in their energy, and especially among an entire people_This compatibility has never been seen and never will be, because it is

contrary to nature, and because one cannot give the same passion two aims" (Letters Written from the Mountain I, CW 9:149n/OC 3:706n). On "an entire people," cf. DPE 16/255; E IV, 312n/632n; Letter to Beaumont, CW 9:52/OC 4:967. On the tension between

patriotism and humanity, see DPE 15/254; Kelly (2003, 95-96).

Figure 1 The Shklarian Model

Man Citizen

political sphere he insists upon severely prosecuting the wicked (in the manner of the Spartans and early Ro

mans), lest one indirectly become cruel to the innocent.

Regarding personal virtue, though, he tends toward a

(proto-Kantian) maxim of "severity toward oneself and

gentleness [douceur] toward others."7 We may thus di

agram a basic dichotomy of Rousseau's thought along Shklar's lines (Figure 1).

Nonetheless, in depicting these two "psychological poles" (Shklar 1969, 31), we might question whether Shklar has adequately depicted that of "man." For equally formidable cases have been made that Rousseau's genuine alternative to his political ideal is the radically individu

alistic, proto-romantic "solitary dreamer." This aspect of his thought is emphasized by many writers, including those influenced by Leo Strauss. In Arthur Melzer's The

Natural Goodness of Man, which is plausibly understood as the leading comprehensive Straussian interpretation, we find a largely dichotomous reading of the alternatives which Rousseau presents to civilized, divided human

ity: "the political solution" and "the individualistic solu tion" (Melzer 1990, 91-108; see also Salkever 1978, 208,

223). On such readings, Rousseau is seen as rigorously consistent in his ultimate meaning, since he subtly indi cates that his political solution?and with it, his many pronouncements in favor of virtue?ought to be read as

merely intended for popular consumption.8 The one life which is currently available to moderns, and which re ceives true justification according to his most fundamen tal theoretical or philosophical principles, is that which he most boldly revealed in the Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality (Strauss 1953, 264; Conf.

7For the political sphere, see LR 64n/72n; E IV, 253/548; SC II.5; cf. Letters Written from the Mountain III, CW 9:186/OC 3:753f; Marks (2007, 735-37). For the personal virtue, see DOI Dedica tion 121/199; "Fragments on God and Revelation," CW 12:160/OC 4:1038; RJJII, 179/891; cf. Metaphysics of Morals in Kant (1996, AK 6:385, 393). 8 For the Straussian distinction between writings or claims intended

for popular audiences and those intended for philosophers, as ap plied to Rousseau, see Strauss (1947, 466n36; 1953, e.g., 258nl5, 261n20, 265-66, 280, 288-89). For the most sophisticated recent

interpretation along these lines, see Kelly (2003, e.g., 37, 44-49, 64-65, 127-33, 140-71). We will return to other commentators influenced by Strauss who attempt to avoid this dichotomous read

ing (e.g., Cooper, Marks), but the interpretation here described as "Straussian" is the closest to Strauss himself.




IX, 314/407). This is also very nearly the life in which

he himself indulged in his later years?one of sponta neous, sentimental delight, shorn of human attachments, transcendent moral principles, and their corresponding

obligations and burdens.9 While not entirely neglecting Shklar's idea of "man"?that is, the domestic and virtu

ous life of Emile and Julie?such readings would generally agree with Melzer in seeing this romanticization of do

mestic virtue and attachments as mere popularizations of Rousseau's genuine individualistic solution. On this

reading, the latter solution is only attainable by someone

with extraordinary intellectual gifts.10 If Shklar's distinction between citizen and man cor

responds to Rousseau's contrast between civic virtue and

domestic moral virtue, the Straussian distinction be

tween the political solution and the individualistic solu

tion largely corresponds to Rousseau's contrast between

"virtue" and "goodness." Unlike the demanding and

harsh standard of virtue, this "goodness" is humanity's natural endowment (E II, 92/322; IV, 237/525; "Letters

to Malesherbes" II, CW 5:575/OC l:1135f; Strauss 1953,

290; 1959,49-50). It is the healthy and natural expression of love of oneself (amour de soi), which?apart from the

corruption of society and the development of pernicious self-love or vanity (amour-propre)?tends toward one's

simple self-interest with a minimum of harm to others, due to the influence of pity (DOI Preface, 127/126; I,

152-54/154-57; Note XV, 218/219). For our purposes,

perhaps the most revealing contrast of the ethics of good ness with that of virtue is found in Rousseau's conflicting

pronouncements regarding harm. For, in his teachings re

lated to virtue?and especially political virtue?relevant

others make binding claims upon us and not to overcome

one's passions and dedicate oneself to them constitutes a

severe harm (DSA II, 17/18; Observations, EPW 46/OC

3:51; LR 81/91; Preface to Narcissus, EPW 97/OC 3:965; LA 16, 117/262, 337f/15, 107). In his teachings related

to goodness, however, the avoidance of direct and pal

pable harms to others, insofar as this can be reconciled

with one's self-preservation, appears to be humanity's sole

moral requirement (DOI I, 154/156). It seems to be the

latter standard to which the autobiographical Rousseau

9For Rousseau's intentional subversion of virtue through his the

oretical teachings on goodness, see esp. Melzer (1990, 90, 101-6,

258) and Strauss (1947, 482; 1953, 282, 290-91; 1959, 51-53). Cf. Gourevitch's Epicurean interpretation (2001,213-15,218-19) and Masters's view that Rousseau's teaching on conscience is his sin

cere, personal view, but is of "radically restricted" importance, and

should not be considered part of his fully political or philosophical teaching (1968, 76-77, 84-86, 91).

10See Strauss (1959,53); Masters (1968,90,96,254); Salkever (1978, 223-26, 223n64, 225n70); Melzer (1990, 90-92, 113, 279-81); Cooper (1999, 172-79; 2008, 152-63, 176); Marks (2005, 70).

Figure 2 The Straussian Model

Individualistic solution:

The solitary Dreamer

Political solution:

The virtuous Citizen

appeals. In surrendering himself to the sweet reveries of

solitude, he asks for nothing from society and thus may offer it nothing in return.11 In this way he seems to sug

gest that duties differ objectively and to a very large extent,

depending on ones social circumstances.12 Along these

lines, then, we may depict a second Rousseauian contrast

(Figure 2). One reason for choosing either the Shklarian or the

Straussian dichotomy as the most accurate overall in

terpretation is that Rousseau himself characteristically frames his contrasts in a radically dualistic fashion. In

this he follows a distinguished line of powerful rhetori

cians such as Augustine?who are often, for this very reason, guilty of overstating their dichotomies (cf. Rist

1994,310; Letter to Beaumont, CW 9:29/OC 4:937f). Thus

if it remains the case that both dualisms illuminate ba

sic elements of his thought, we might prefer a model

which incorporates them both. And since they both in

clude a similar "Citizen" category, we need only consider

whether the solitary Dreamer and the domestically vir

tuous member of the village or the family might sensibly be distinguished, deciphered as significant for Rousseau, and placed alongside each other. Here we may find the

work of Jonathan Marks helpful, since he has recently established that Rousseau repeatedly praises a "middle

way" between the solitary individual and the collectivized

Citizen (2005, 7-11, 54-88). Marks finds that although some of Rousseau's most prominent and well-known

formulations are framed dichotomously, his considered

11 For enthusiastic depictions of how he began "systematically sur

rendering to his sweet idleness [douce oisivete']" see RJJII, 126/822; Rev. VII, 57/1060. At times, though, he displays regret regarding his lack of moral dedication (e.g., Conf. X, 426/509; Rev. VI, 56/1059).

On the advantages of the solitary state for never wanting or need

ing to harm anyone, see "Letters to Malesherbes" II, CW 5:576/OC

1:1137; Conf. IX, 382/455; EII, 105n/340-41n.

12The apparent contradiction regarding the ethics of harm is par

tially explained by the concept of a "conditional duty" or what Hosle terms an "implicative imperative," which is not a matter of

subjective preference but objectively requires that "under condi tions A you must do B" (see Hosle 1998,48). As Rousseau puts it: "Outside of society, isolated man, owing nothing to anyone, has

a right to live as he pleases. But in society, where he necessarily lives at the expense of others, he owes them the price of his keep in work. This is without exception" (E III, 195/470; see also Julie V.3, 464/566f; Letter to Beaumont, CW 9:59/OC 4:976; EOL IX, 278n/406n).




Figure 3 A Synthesis of the Shklarian and Straussian Models

Solitary Existence

Individual solution:

Solitary Dreamer

Independent Association

Domestic solution:

Moral Human

Interdependent Multitude

Political solution: Citizen

judgments frequently prescribe a social life based around

the tribe or the family to be the ideal situation. In such

a middle state of "independent commerce," one may at

tain many of the sweet pleasures and cultivations of social

life, while avoiding the radical interdependence and con

comitant servility of advanced societies (Marks 2005, 12,

61-65, 77-82; see also Plan for a Constitution for Corsica, CW ll:134-35/OC 3:914-15). The virtuous and domes

tically sentimental life possible under such circumstances

would seem to constitute "the happiness of the moral

human" (E III, 177/444; V, 442-46, 474/814-820, 859). Whereas for Marks (as for many other recent commen

tators) this model based on Emile is clearly Rousseau's

genuine ideal,13 we will suspend such final judgments. Instead, we will adopt Marks's argument for our own

purposes and suggest that insofar as Rousseau variously recommends a middle state of limited societies in addition

to the two better-known extremes, we may schematize his

thought as tripartite (cf. O'Hagan 1999, 19-20, 26-27,

272). Rousseau himself suggests a three-tiered distinction soon after his famous "man or citizen" dichotomy, by say

ing that a father, in educating his son, "owes to his species men; he owes to society sociable men; he owes to the state

citizens" (E I, 49/262; see Figure 3).

13Whereas most of the leading works of a generation ago took

either the Second Discourse or the Social Contract as Rousseau's

most fundamental work, a rising trend is to take Emile as the

most fundamental. Rousseau's claim that Emile is his "greatest and best book" (RJJ I, 23/687) is quoted to this end by Marks (2005,4), Cooper (1999, 4,18), and Dent (1988,1, see also 79-82; 1998, 63n6); cf. Todorov (2001, 65; 2002, 181). Conversely, some have downgraded the life of the Citizen because it is no longer available to modern men (Todorov, 2001, 12-13, 25, 30, 55; cf.

2002, 180). The life of absolute solitude has been downgraded because Rousseau expresses deep regrets about his final condition

(Todorov 2001,31-32,57-58; 2002,97,103-5; Marks 2005,70-74; Neuhouser 2008, 85-86), or because the peculiarities of his life and personality ought not to be confused with his "fundamental

thought" in its "maturity and perfection" (Cassirer [1932] 1989,40; see also 95-96, 128; cf. Todorov, 2002, 99-101, 104; Reisert 2003,

22, 22n). In contrast with these trends, Melzer argues that Emile

does not apply to philosophers and is addressed to an inhabitant of modern France, where citizenship is no longer possible (1990, 92,

277-81).

In addition to combining the insights of the Shklarian

and Straussian approaches, this model links Rousseau's

various moral prescriptions explicitly to three socio

political contexts, thus enabling a better explanation of his

apparently contradictory pronouncements. For Rousseau

is, in one sense, a radically political and even determin

istic thinker, maintaining that characteristic mentalities

and habits naturally flow from certain social conditions, and that certain moral norms and obligations are proper to those conditions (cf. Starobinski [1957] 1988, 292). In

terms of our themes of gentleness and severity, we find

a clear continuum of the rigor of moral demands across

these social conditions. The Citizen, in addition to being the harshest of these three to outsiders, is also called to be

the harshest to himself. He is not to find his happiness in

contemplative delights, and may take pleasure only secon

darily (at best) in domestic ones. He must instead find his

pleasures chiefly through immersion in all things public, and in deriving his delight from identification with the

harmony and well-being of the community.14 Accord

ingly, it is with regard to this social state?and not his

moral teaching in general?that we find Rousseau mak

ing his most radically "constructivist" pronouncements. For, given the naturally asocial (or at least apolitical) char

acter of humans and the aggressively competitive nature

of amour-propre among any large group of interdepen dent people, one must offer a correspondingly radical

solution to minimize social interdependence and channel

amour-propre toward communally salutary ends. Insti

tuting such a people thus requires, "so to speak, changing human nature" (SC II.7, 69/381; cf. E I, 40/250; DOI

II, 177/182; DPE 4-5/242-43). In the formation of the

"moral human" Emile, by contrast, Rousseau's depiction

differs, speaking of "the natural man living in the state of

society" (E III, 205/483; Reisert 2003,21-22,118-19), and

of allowing natural potentials of "becoming social" to de

velop in due course (EIV, 290/600; "Moral Letters" V, CW

12:196/OC 4:1109). Emile combines a fundamentally cos

mopolitan disposition and will, with rich domestic and

neighborly associations, and extraordinary physical vigor.

Although he is typically gentle, this vigor and dedication

enable him to forcibly defend the weak or his country when situations require (cf. Julie 1.57, 128/157; E V, 446,

456-57, 472-75/820, 834-35, 857-60). In addition, the

methods applied to Emile's education seem much gentler than those applied to the Citizen, since Emile is spared

14DPE 15-16, 20-21/254-55, 259-60f; "Geneva Manuscript" 1.2, CW 4:79/OC 3:284. Marks plausibly argues that Shklar exaggerates the extent of the Citizen's subordination of private freedoms and

pleasures; but they nonetheless remain "more narrowly circum

scribed than Emile's or the savage's" (2005, 82, 170n35; see E V,

363/700).




from any commands of a guardian, from the terrors of a wrathful religion, and from regular immersion in the

martial glories of his fatherland. Throughout his extreme

social isolation during his boyhood and adolescence, he is spared from the unnatural and premature expansion of his passions. Thus when he comes to adulthood, the duties of virtue he learns are far less burdensome to him. At this

point, nonetheless, the high degree of severity he requires in relation to himself is especially evident?in his need for natural religiosity, deep moral inspiration, and voluntary submission to his tutor (E IV, 324-26, 442-49/650-53,

814-24)?if he is to overcome his burgeoning passions when socially necessary (E V, 444-45/817-18; cf. Cohen

1997, 137n41).15 By final contrast, the autobiographical Rousseau chafes at all constraint and eventually surren

ders himself to every natural impulse. He nonetheless

maintains a dogged confidence that?despite his many

prior interactions with society?he alone has maintained

the soul of original, natural humanity, and that his nat

ural goodness has been expressed in his deeper, abstract

preferences even when social pressures led him to betrayal or abandonment (Cooper 1999, 194).

Diagnostic or Prescriptive?

Having distinguished three alternative ideals offered by Rousseau, may we be said to have outlined every fun

damental social state or moral life he sketches? A fur

ther glance at existing interpretations may call this into

question. Although what I have called the Shklarian and

Straussian paradigms may be among the best-known

overall interpretations, other commentators have focused

upon the "human types" or "cast of characters" presented

by Rousseau, and have come across a broader array of pos sibilities (Cooper 1997, 51; cf. Todorov 2001, 3). Tzvetan

Todorov, for instance, follows a different methodology than that employed here, and finds that there are three

main ways of life praised by Rousseau: (1) the Citizen, (2) the physical and solitary individual, and (3) the moral and

universal individual (Todorov 2001,18). These ways con

verge nicely with what we have depicted, but in addition

Todorov posits a distinction between the "state of soci

ety," out of which each of these lives flow, and the "state

of nature." Whereas the difference between the state of

nature and the state of society constitutes a crossing from

one stage to another, the contrast of lives following upon the state of society constitutes an alternative (Todorov

2001, 13). However, Todorov does not consider the state

15 These and other contrasts of the Citizen and the Moral Human are developed and defended in Mendham (2009, sections 4.1-2,

4.6-7).

of nature fully among the human ways of life, since on

his reading of Rousseau, "The notion of a state of nature

is only a mental construct, a fiction intended to help us

comprehend reality, not a simple fact" (Todorov 2001,10; see also 13, 47-48; 2002, 82-84).

A still more comprehensive picture is offered by Lau rence Cooper, who deciphers five human types repre

senting "the fundamental alternatives that are or have

been available to humanity" (1999, 5If; see also 17-26,

51-59; 2008, 139-40, 148-49, 166-69, 175-76). Again

converging with our analysis above, among these types are (1) "the virtuous citizen of the ancient, austere po lis," (2) "the Jean-Jacques of the Reveries and selected

other autobiographical depictions," and (3) "Emile," a

natural man living in the state of society (1999, 51).16 In addition, Cooper posits?like Todorov, but as a once

possible alternative? (4) "the inhabitant of the pure state

of nature": a "savage" who is "asocial and pre-moral" (1999,51,54). And finally but least admirably, we find (5) "the divided, corrupt social man, exemplified most com

monly by the bourgeois but most perfectly (according to

Rousseau) by the vain, malicious philosophers who con

spired against Jean-Jacques" (1999, 51).17 Among these, it is only the divided social man who has in no sense a

good or natural life, since he "lacks both moral and psy

chological integrity, [living] in contradiction with nature

in the deepest sense" (1999, 52; cf. 1). If we combine Cooper's savage and his divided social

man with Todorov's distinction between stages and alter

natives, we may conclude that both the savage and the

divided social man represent stages, with the latter being the usual historical outcome of the former (cf. Cooper 1999, 52; Neuhouser 2008, 65, 117). This suggests, in

turn, that if we are to understand properly the world

historical alternatives presented by Rousseau, we must

carefully investigate not only the lives he endorses as con

temporary alternatives, but also his broader (and often

critical) philosophy of history. Here we approach better

trodden interpretive territory, since his basic philosophy

161 have altered Cooper's numbering for my own purposes, but this

should not distort his argument since he presents the characters in

no particular order (1999,51n26). For his pictorial schematization

of the types, indicating the relation of each to nature?Cooper's main intention?see 49-50n22. Although Cooper's five types come

closest to the six posited below, his logical schema has minimal

correspondence to mine.

17 In view of the typology offered by Cooper, it becomes evident that Melzer also discusses the savage and the bourgeois (in addition to the natural man of the "individualistic solution" and the Citizen of the "political solution," discussed above). Nonetheless, since Melzer

does not employ the methodology of delineating each of the major social types in Rousseau, he is not led to bring each of these types to the forefront together, and consider their interrelations, in the

manner of Todorov and Cooper.




Figure 4 A Dualistic Model of the Philosophy of History

Primitive "Civilized"

Peaceful Savage Frenzied, oppressive social Man

of history is apparently presented systematically in the

Second Discourse, a relatively brief and frequently read

work. According to the best-known version of its histor

ical narrative, humans had lived for ages untold in iso

lated self-sufficiency, living entirely in the moment from

the spontaneous fruits of the earth (DOI I, 143/144), with a childlike peacefulness in relation to others, whom

they had no vested interest in harming. Their needs were

minimal, purely physical, and thus easily satisfied; their

days were spent freely enjoying humanity's natural lazi ness in a "delicious indolence" (DOI 1,134/135; 150/152; II, 1870192; Note X, 208/211; EOL IX, 272n/401n; "The State of War," LPW 169/OC 3:605). This idyllic state was

brought rapidly to a close, however, due to various acci

dental and external causes, such as the seizure of private property and the founding of states, thus forcing others to leave the natural state for the sake of survival (DOI II, 1730178; E III, 193/467; "The State of War," LPW

167/OC 3:603). The "civilization" that was then quickly established is characterized by vanity, fierce ambition, and cruel exploitation. Its feigned order and violent essence

may best be exemplified by war, in which "more mur

ders were committed in a single day's fighting, and more

horrors at the capture of a single town, than had been committed in the state of Nature for centuries together over the entire face of the earth" (DOI II, 174/179; see also "The State of War," LPW 162-63,167/OC 3:608-10,603). Rousseau's philosophy of history thus seems to suggest a

fundamental historical dualism (Figure 4).

Regardless of the ultimate historical status of the state of nature, Rousseau is quite clear that there can be no re turn en masse to the forests and the savage state (DOI

Note IX, 203-4/207-8f). This provides further justifica tion for not modeling it alongside the three alternatives he

prescribes, in various ways, for his contemporary readers. An additional complication arises in considering whether Rousseau's primitive history can be adequately character ized as a single stage. Arthur Lovejoy and Jonathan Marks are among the more careful scholars who have insisted

upon the significance of a middle historical stage, be tween what we may call the "primitive" stage of the "pure state of nature" and the stage of advanced civilization.18

18See Lovejoy (1923, esp. 165-67, 179-82); Marks (2005, 54-88); see also Masters (1968,166-75); Gourevitch (1988,36-37); Melzer

Rousseau refers to this middle stage as "nascent society," in which comparative judgments, amour-propre, and the

development of reason and foresight have been set in mo

tion, with deeply ambivalent consequences for humanity, which we will explore below (DOI II, 162-67/165-71). Even with the beginnings of amour-propre, however, an

intensive social interdependence could not exist before

the invention of agriculture and metallurgy (168/17 If; cf.

EOLIX, 272/400). And it is interdependence which seems

to be the decisively negative turning point, since as long as humans applied themselves only to tasks and arts "that

did not require the collaboration of several hands, they lived free, healthy, good, and happy as far as they could

by their Nature be, and continued to enjoy the gentle sweetness of independent association [des douceurs d'un commerce independant]..." (DOI II, 167/171; see Melzer

1990, 70n2, 74-81,108,290).19 Although Rousseau's dis

cussion of this middling stage is terse and?like the "mid

dle way" represented by Emile?often overlooked, he ex

plicitly states that it occupied "a just mean between the indolence of the primitive state and the petulant activity of our amour-propre, [and thus] must have been the hap piest and the most durable epoch" (DOI II, 167/171; cf.

Marks 2005, 64-65; Melzer 1990, 70; Masters 1968, 168,

171-75). It seems significant enough to include in our

basic model, then, and upon consideration, these three

stages seem to be differentiated by precisely the same so

cial structures which differentiate the three prescriptive types. Although some scholars have previously identified

parallels between a descriptive type and a prescriptive type (e.g., Marks 2005, 70-71, 77-79), to my knowledge none have anticipated the following systematic analysis (Figure 5).

We must pause to explain the terminology, since Rousseau's usage of "savage" seems looser than his un

derlying concepts (cf. E II, 108n/345n; DOI II, 166/170). On one hand, he is remarkably clear in distinguishing the two states in question. The earliest state of humanity,

which occurs in "the pure state of nature" or "the prim itive state" (DOI I, 141-42, 159/142-43, 162), is one in

which a human might meet another "perhaps no more

than twice in their life" (144/146; cf. II, 161/164f). In some passages these terms are explicitly contrasted with a nascent state of society, which is characterized by "inde

pendent association," and exemplified by "most" of the

"Savage Peoples who are known to us" (DOI Exordium,

(1990, 63, 70). Cooper is aware of this "tribal society' (1999, 17, 31-32, 44, 50, 188n5), but does not integrate it into his five-type model discussed above, perhaps because he does not find it to reveal anything pivotal about the relation of nature to the good life.

19For alternative translations of this phrase, see EPW167; CW 3:49; Marks (2005, 61,168nll); Rosenblatt (1997, 78).




Figure 5 The Basic Sociopolitical Typology

Solitary existence Independent association

Interdependent multitude

Descriptive, Diagnostic

Primitive

(solitary-Savage) Savage

(social-Savage)

Frenzied,

oppressive "Civilized"

Prescriptive, Constructive

Individual solution:

Solitary dreamer

Domestic solution:

Moral Human

Political solution: Citizen

132/132; I, 157/160; II, 166f/170; Note XV, 218/219). On the other hand, perhaps due to the polemical require

ments of the Second Discourse in contrasting noncivilized

life favorably with civilized life, his terminology regarding these peoples is far less clear, referring to them indiscrim

inately as "Savage," in dualistic opposition to "civilized"

(DOI 1,157/159f; Marks 2005,101). By contrast, we shall see below how the Essay on the Origin of Languages uses

"Savage" in a narrower, technical sense, referring to a

minimally socialized people who subsist chiefly by hunt

ing. Partially on this basis, then, I introduce "Primitive"

as a noun to refer to people of the solitary, primitive state.

When applying Rousseau's broader use of "Savage" in an

instance which clearly refers to one or another social state, I will add a prefix: "solitary-Savage" or "social-Savage." For his overarching category of "Savage," I will often sub

stitute "noncivilized."

The plausibility of this model hinges largely upon a distinction between diagnostic (or descriptive, or critical) and prescriptive (or constructive) teachings in Rousseau.

This distinction is central to Kant and later Kantian

interpreters of Rousseau, while also appealed to by non-Kantian interpreters, such as the Straussians.20 Put

simply, the two early Discourses are understood as diag

nosing the ills of modern society, in terms so bleak they often seem hopeless; whereas later works (including Julie,

Emile, and the Social Contract) propose various remedies

for those ills, none of which involve a return to the state

of nature. Some disputes properly remain regarding how

unqualifiedly this distinction may be applied, such as the

extent to which the patterns exemplified in the diagnos tic thought are retained and reapplied in the prescrip tive thought (Marks 2005, 70-79, 113-15; cf. Todorov

2001, 18). Nevertheless, the model seems accurate inso

far as it suggests a clear distinction between a philosophy of history?depicting the usual course of human social

20For Kant, see "Conjectural Beginning of Human History" and

Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (in 2007, AK 8:116-17 and 7:326-27, respectively).

development and moral decline?and a series of pro

posals for radically breaking from this process and thus

avoiding its "civilized" end. We have seen how, in his

most prominent narrative, Rousseau attributes the rise of

civilization to accidental factors which are external to hu man nature (DOI Preface, 124/122f; 1,137f, 159/138,162;

EIV, 212/491). Nonetheless, he simultaneously maintains

that this process has unfolded with overwhelming uni

formity, and in accordance with human capacities which

he acknowledges to be latent. This has drawn intelligent criticism from the beginning.21

However his persuasiveness on this point may be

challenged, we have seen that he does not believe re

turning to an earlier, spontaneous social state is an op tion. Thus for any prescriptive solution, breaking from

the course of civilization requires a mind and will power ful enough to transcend the usual course of thought and

life in instituting a new way. If this were not daunting

enough, certain highly favorable social conditions also

seem to be required. In the case of the political solution, "the Legislator" along the lines of Lycurgus is required? someone who is able to "persuade without convincing." This, in turn, requires a people who are minimally social

ized, and thus remain malleable.22 Any robust form of the

21As Charles Bonnet, a well-known Genevan naturalist, objected: "All that results immediately from the faculties of man, should it not be said to result from his nature7.... It would be as unreasonable

to complain that these faculties, in developing, have given birth to

that state, as it would be to complain that God has given man such

faculties" ("Letter from M. Philopolis," CW 3:123). See Rousseau's

replies at "Letter to Philopolis," EPW 224/OC 3:232; cf. DOI II, 167/171. Marks appeals to this exchange as evidence that Rousseau did not sincerely believe his exoteric position, that the natural must be equated with the original (2005, 28-33, 98).

22SC II.7-10, III.8; Considerations on the Government of Poland II,

LPW180/OC 3:956; Conf. XII, 543-44/648-49; cf. DOI II, 175/180.

Interestingly, for polities to flourish over time and experience rela

tions of sweetness, a moderate degree of harshness in the natural

environment also seems required (SC III.8,101/416; Plan for aCon

stitutionfor Corsica, CW ll:136/OC 3:914; LA 60-61, 93/295-96, 319/54-55, 85).



Ij8 MATTHEW D. MENDHAM

domestic solution seems to require a brilliant and benev

olent manipulator of circumstances, such as Wolmar or

Emile's tutor (Shklar 1969, 127-64); alongside a divinely

inspiring paragon of female virtue, such as Julie or Sophie; as well as a moderate degree of decency in one's govern ment and a robust degree of isolation from advanced and

urban societies. Finally, the individual solution?in addi

tion to presupposing a person of formidable brilliance?

seems to require a still higher degree of rustic isolation

(cf. DOI Note IX, 203-4/207-8f).

Hard or Soft Primitivism?

The six-type model above seems useful as a first approach to Rousseau's teachings on the social forms and moral

possibilities of human life. For those concerned with the

issues of gentleness and severity, however, certain com

plications soon emerge regarding Rousseau's diagnos tic thought?complications with deep implications for

his critique of civilization and its most intensified form,

modernity. We have seen how, in the images of the Second

Discourse which would prove so influential in later cults

of sentimentality and romanticism, Rousseau appeals to

a peaceful and idle primitive existence as a device for

exposing the frenzied, unnatural oppressions of self and

others which are typical of civilization. It has accordingly been observed that Rousseau nowhere uses the term "no

ble savage" with which he is often associated, and that his

image of humans in the pure state of nature is not re

motely "noble" in the usual sense (Melzer 1990, 55nl3). Nevertheless, it is equally striking that in the Discourse on the Sciences and the Arts and in several other writ

ings, he offers far different images of early humanity?as

thoroughly vigorous, stern in their morals, and at times

pitiless in their fury and vengeance. Such images are in

voked to expose, not the excess harshness or cruelty of

civilized and modern life, but rather its softness, weak

ness, and decadence. In short, at first and second glance, Rousseau seems to engage in a blatant form of philo

sophical self-indulgence, seeking to have it both ways in

describing the softness and severity of both civilization

and savagery, and in evaluating the moral status of both

softness and severity. Otherwise put, he seems to insist,

somehow, that savage life is to be seen as simultaneously soft, hard, and thus praiseworthy, while civilized life is also

soft, hard, and yet despicable. We can put a finer point on the problem by invoking Arthur Lovejoy and George Boas's distinction between two traditions which they term

"hard primitivism" and "soft primitivism." The soft va

riety was exemplified in many paeans to "the Golden Age

under the Saturnian dispensation," during which humans

enjoyed abundant security, leisure, and simple pleasures, bestowed by Nature as a gentle and indulgent mother

(Lovejoy and Boas 1935, 10-11, 27-28, 46-47, 64-65,

304-14). By contrast, hard primitivism paid tribute to

the constant overcoming of physical hardship, poverty, and threats from harsh climates and predatory animals;

among the "rude, hardy fellows" of this tradition were the

Scythians, the Getae, and later the Germans (Lovejoy and

Boas 1935, 9-11, 70-73, 315-67). The most immediately apparent solution would be

to find in Rousseau's solitary-Savage the bases for soft

primitivism, and to find in his social-Savage those of

hard primitivism. In the later state, amour-propre has

been awakened, and thus pride, the drive for honor, and the need to be loved and praised superlatively by all (DOI I, 152/154; Note XV, 218/219; E IV, 213f/493; RJJ I, 9-10/669-70; II, 112-13/805-6). One then came to

judge any intentional wrong not only as physical harm, but also as "contempt for his person," and "vengeances became terrible, and men bloodthirsty and cruel" (DOI II,

166/170). Jealousy springing from new ideas of compara tive merit, beauty, and romantic attraction also provided

powerful new kindling for explosions of social violence

(DOI II, 165-66/169-70; cf. E V, 429-3 l/796-98f). In

deed, Rousseau was led to reason philosophically toward a gentler, prehistorical, primitive state precisely because

of the historical and ethnographical evidence which de

picted the cruel vengeances of humans in this middling

stage:

This is precisely the state reached by most of the

Savage Peoples known to us; and it is for want

of drawing adequate distinctions between ideas, and noticing how far these Peoples already were

from the first state of Nature, that many hastened to conclude that man is naturally cruel and that

he needs political order to be made gentle [a be

soin de police pour Vadoucir], whereas nothing is as gentle [si doux] as he in his primitive state

when, placed by Nature at equal distance from

the stupidity of the brutes and the fatal enlight enment of civil man, and restricted by instinct

and reason alike to protecting himself against the harm that threatens him, he is restrained by

Natural pity from doing anyone harm, without

being moved to it by anything, even after it has

been done to him. (DOI II, 166/170)

We may note here in passing Rousseau's frequent ap

peals to historical and ethnographical evidence regarding the social-Savage state, which deeply undermine the view




that he is indifferent to empirical evidence.23 Among this

vast range of sources, he takes a special interest in the

Caribs, who seem to provide decisive evidence for certain

softer elements of the noncivilized?and perhaps even the

primitive?state: "it is all the more ridiculous to portray

Savages as constantly murdering one another in order to

satisfy their brutality, as this opinion goes directly counter

to experience, and as the Caribs, which of all existing Peo

ples has so far deviated least from the state of Nature, are

in fact also the most peaceful in their loves and the least

given to jealousy..." (DOI 1,156/158). Rousseau's claim

that the Savage soul yields itself "to the sole sentiment of

its present existence, with no idea of the future," is also

based partially on observations of the Carib, who "sells

his Cotton bed in the morning and comes back weep

ing to buy it back in the evening, not having foreseen

that he would need it for the coming night" (143/144).24 This may reflect the profound indifference of all noncivi

lized people to all but repose and freedom, in contrast to

the citizen's frenzied pursuits of power and reputation?

concepts which must have no meaning for a Carib (DOI

II, 187/192f). Nevertheless, a complete dichotomy between a soft

primitivism grounded in the earliest humans and a hard

primitivism grounded in the social-Savage is far from ade

quate. For, just as the above examples of Carib immediacy

23 One finds a common failure to distinguish between the pure,

primitive state of nature?about which Rousseau reasons (at least

chiefly) philosophically rather than empirically?from the mid

dling, savage state. This may largely account for the error of Shklar

in claiming that Rousseau was "utterly uninterested in history, past or future" (1969,1; see also 6,17n3), and that of Todorov in main

taining that "the state of nature" is "only a mental construct, a

fiction" and "purely imaginary" (2001, 10, 13; cf. 48, 57; 2002, 82-84). Contrast the excellent argumentation of Kelly, who con

cludes that it seems essential to Rousseau's project, not that his

account of the pure state of nature is historically correct or that it

is not so, but that it perhaps could have been so (2006, esp. 79-80;

other more balanced estimations of the combination of logical and

empirical elements in the Second Discourse are offered by Meek

1976, 78-79; Lovejoy 1923, 169nl; Cooper 1999, 17-18, 41-42).

24The account of the sold bed derives from a Jesuit, Jean Baptiste du Tertre, who defended the natural goodness of the Caribs in Histoire

generale des Antilles habiteespar les Francois (1667). For du Tertre's

influence on Rousseau, see Pire (1956,359); DOI Note VI, 195/200; cf.OC 3:1321-22,1346, and Hulme and Whitehead( 1992, esp. 129,

131). It may seem strange that Rousseau singles out the Caribs as

being closest to the primitive state, given their reputation for be

ing unusually cruel to outsiders, ambitiously warlike, and frequent eaters of beast and human flesh (Abulafia 2008, 125-26; cf. Buf fon in OC 3:1345, on 171nl). This reputation is based originally on the fearful testimony of the Tamos, a larger and vastly more

peaceable group. Perhaps the Tainos were, nonetheless, excluded

from consideration as closest to the state of nature due to their

intensive practices of agriculture, extensive trade, advanced crafts

manship of canoes, and hierarchical power structures (cf. Abulafia

2008, 117-23). For the conflicting biases brought by all European observers of the new world, see Meek (1976,37); Weber (2005,41).

are used to show that some softer aspects of primitive life are retained in the later Savage state, the Caribs are also

appealed to in establishing a certain hardness which seems

to apply even to the earliest states. The reason why Caribs

(like Africans) live in "the most profound security" with

regard to ferocious beasts, is that they have realized they surpass such beasts in skill more than the beasts surpass them in strength (DOI I, 136/136-37, 137n). The prob lem of such beasts may suggest that nature is not as gentle a mother as is sometimes suggested, and human use of

stones, sticks, and arrows is often required to compensate. More generally, Rousseau frequently depicts life in

or near the original state of nature as requiring and gen

erating an extraordinary hardiness in comparison with

civilized humanity. In keeping with the traditions of hard

primitivism, he appeals to the toughening effects of in

clement weather, changes of seasons, and fatigue from es

caping ferocious beasts (DOI I, 135/135; II, 161f/165). In

such a setting those without robust constitutions perish, and those with strong constitutions give birth to similarly endowed children who undergo the same travails, thus

acquiring "all the vigor of which the human species is

capable" (1,135/135; see also 157/160; Note XII, 215/217; EOL X, 279/407; E 1,59/277). Their physical capacities re

garding self-preservation?in sharp distinction from the

organs concerning softness (la molesse), sensuality, and

delicacy?become exceedingly fine-tuned. This reason

ing is confirmed by travelers' reports of "most Savage

Peoples," which express astonishment at their strength and acute senses of sight, hearing, and smell (DOI I,

140/140; Note VI, 194-95/199-200). Rousseau similarly observes that although civilized man, with advanced ma

chinery in hand, can easily overcome the savage, if they were both unarmed it would be a still more unequal contest in the savage's favor (I, I35/135f). At the same

time, since primitive man's passions are minimal, and

his reason and amour-propre are uncultivated, there are

no temptations to disobey the "gentle voice [douce voix]" of pity, and he will naturally seek his own good with

the least possible harm to others, being fierce only oc

casionally and as preservation requires (DOI Preface,

127/125f; I, 135-36, 152-54/136-37, 154-57; Note IX,

198f/203). Thus vengeance is only mechanical and im

mediate, seldom leading to bloodshed; for such reasons

Rousseau declares them "fierce [farouches] rather than

wicked" (154/157).25 By comparison, we have seen above

25Cf. EOL IX, 267-68/395-96, which explains how conditions of

uncertainty, fear, and weakness made it necessary for each man

of "the first times" to be "a ferocious [feroce] animal" (267/395). Here, too, ferocious is contrasted with wicked: "Someone who has

never reflected cannot be clement, or just, or pitying; nor can he

be wicked and vindictive" (268/395f). In view of the comment




how in social-Savages, amour-propre makes outbursts of

vengeance more intense and less limited by mere self

preservation, and thus these outbursts may be described

as "cruel" rather than (the more beast-like) "fierce."26

Unfortunately, while one might outline the soft and

hard elements of Rousseau's primitivism with some con

fidence, it seems far less clear how these elements cohere.

His primary account in the Second Discourse seems to

be one of an overwhelmingly abundant and secure orig inal state (DOI I, 134/134f), which was interrupted by accidental and foreign causes. At the same time, among the difficulties with which "nascent man" is "soon" pre sented are ferocious beasts and the height of trees (II,

16If/165), and these would seem to harden the hu

man condition from nearly the beginning. According to

Jonathan Marks, we ought to infer that, for Rousseau, these harsher aspects of life?requiring foresight and

hardening to circumstances?are present from the very

beginning. And thus we must also infer that in his genuine

teaching, nature and human nature are essentially dishar

monious (Marks 2005,5-7,26-28; cf. Cooper 1999,189). Marks further argues that Rousseau's depiction of a lush

and idyllic state of nature must therefore be a form of

satire, intended to undermine his previously stated defi

nition of "nature" as equivalent to origins and therefore

independent of history and circumstance (Marks 2005,

15-38, 93-104).

on lack of reflection, this seems to converge with the category of

the first state of nature in the Second Discourse. However, in the

Essay, families existed in these first times (267/395), and the rise of sweeter sentiments and mutual taming occurs with a mixture

between families (277, 278/405f, 406), rather than with the rise of families due to fixed settlements, as in the Second Discourse

(DOI II, 164/167f). These contrasts seem to derive largely from the differing theological assumptions of the two works, with the Discourse hypothetical!/ excluding the divine bestowal of "lights and Precepts," and accordingly positing a lengthy primitive state

void of lasting sociality (DOI Exordium, 132/132). The later and unpublished Essay claims to "reconcile the authority of Scripture with ancient records," positing a relapse after Noah's Flood "into

the dull barbarism they would have been in if they had been born of the earth" (EOL IX, 271/399, cf. 269/397). On these differing assumptions, see Duchet and Launay (1967, 428-29); Gourevitch (1986, 125-26,137).

26Although the DOI II, 166/170 passage (quoted above) actually says that "vengeances became terrible, and men bloodthirsty and

cruel," I have restated Rousseau's ultimate position here as sug

gesting that vengeances (not men as such) became cruel. In addi

tion, "cruel" here should be taken as a momentary indifference to

another's suffering in a moment of rage, rather than a fixed and

positive delight in another's suffering. The passage should probably be taken as rhetorically overstating the cruelty of the social-Savages of whom we have records, accepting the extreme evaluations of

one's interlocutors for the sake of argument before charging them

with fallaciously inferring original humanity from these records (cf. "Idea of the Method in the Composition of a Book," EPW 301/OC 2:1243).

However, it is also possible that Rousseau posits two

different kinds of primitive states, with one being con

siderably softer than the other, and this possibility can

be supported by the Essay on the Origin of Languages. There Rousseau derides European philosophers for pro

jecting their own "barren and harsh" conditions onto

the first men, since humans (like all animals) surely had

their origins in the far more abundant and accommo

dating South (EOL VIII, 266/394). These lush and fertile climates allow men to live more easily, and thus with

out one another (IX, 272, 277/400, 405; cf. II, 253/380; PF X, 56-57/532-33). This may converge with the claim

in the Second Discourse that as humanity spread, "diffi

culties multiplied together with men," leading them to

different sorts of terrain and climates, and thus different

ways of life (DOI II, 162/165; cf. Note XVII, 221/222). It may be, then, that to whatever extent one inhabited a Southern climate with a low population, ones condi

tions were quite "prodigal," whereas population pressures

may have forced many to the more "miserly" North (cf. EOL X, 279/407). Alternatively, higher population would

at least lead to greater scarcity within the South, making "the height of trees" (DOI II, 161/165) newly problematic. For such reasons, we may suggest that, for Rousseau, al

though an unqualifiedly soft primitive existence was prob

ably quite rare, and although certain soft elements are

incorporated in perhaps any life prior to nascent society and especially civilization, there are some solitary, prim itive states which seem predominantly soft, while others seem predominantly hard.27 In order to avoid confusion

with Rousseau's normatively loaded uses of the terms

"soft" (mow, molle) and "hard" (dur), we will henceforth

dub those primitive existences which predominantly align with Lovejoy and Boas's category of "soft primitivism" as

"Idyllic Primitives," and those predominantly aligning with their "hard" category as "Vigorous Primitives."

Sweet or Cruel Savagery?

In addition to these harsher aspects of solitary life, any strict dichotomy between a soft primitive state and a hard

social-Savage state is further undermined by the obser

vation that the romantic love made possible by nascent

27Marks thus seems to underestimate the role of climate in arguing that the peaceful, easily satisfied state depicted in the First Part of the Second Discourse "probably never existed, since nature is harsh and

does not leave human beings in peace" (2005, 37, emphasis added; see 34-37). Consider also Rousseau's later attempt to establish a

colony of rabbits, amid conditions which might be described as

predominantly soft (Rev. V, 44/1044).



UNRAVELING ROUSSEAU'S PARADOXES l8l

society is not solely a tale of jealousy and violence. Af

ter a chain of events led from increased interaction to

increased rationality, the use of tools, and finally the

development of huts, families could be established and

differentiated (DOIII, 164/167). The habit of living to

gether then gave rise to "the first developments of the

heart... the sweetest [les plus doux] sentiments known

to man, conjugal love and Paternal love" (164/168).28 The rise of such ideas and sentiments is said to tame

humans (166/169). In the Essay, Rousseau similarly de

picts youths' initial interactions with new, sweeter sights outside their family, which render the heart "less savage": "Beneath old oaks... spirited young people gradually for

got their ferociousness [ferocite], little by little they tamed

one another; in striving to make themselves understood

they learned to make themselves intelligible" (EOL IX,

277/406). The cultivation of romantic love thus seems to

increase sweetness as well as severity, and this paradox is

not lost on Rousseau. Indeed, "at the least obstacle" this

"tender and sweet [tendre et doux] sentiment" becomes

an "impetuous frenzy," "and the gentlest [la plus douce] of all passions receives sacrifices of human blood" (DOI

II, 165/169). In addition to these outbursts regarding the

beloved, we also find at this stage the first historical ana

logue to the insider-outsider distinction exemplified on a

broader scale by Rousseau's model of the patriotic Citi

zen: "Hence the apparent contradictions one sees in the

fathers of nations. Such naturalness and such inhumanity, such ferocious ways [moeurs si feroces] and such tender

hearts, so much love for their family and aversion toward

their species. All their sentiments concentrated among their near ones were therefore the more energetic" (EOL

IX, 268/396).29 Thus the state of independent association

is marked by the cultivation of human capacities for the

sweeter and gentler sentiments, and at the same time a

vast increase in the stakes of threats to the enjoyment of one's beloveds?whether by romantic competition or

tribal outsiders' encroachments?which leads to intense

28This is part of the reason the leading studies of amour-propre

clearly establish that it is not simply evil (as many accounts would have it), but simultaneously the source of the greatest human evils

and the highest human possibilities and goods. See Dent (1988, esp. 4, 20-25, 52-58, 76, 85; 1998, 63-64); Cooper (1999, esp. 114-72); Neuhouser (2008, esp. 9-11, 53, 59-70, 119, 156, 187-88, 218-19,

250, 267).

29Explaining merely apparent contradictions in the moeurs of an

cient times is a common theme among social thinkers associated

with historicism. Ferocity or cruelty is commonly the more negative pole, but several thinkers would place greatness or magnificence of

soul?rather than Rousseau's affection?as the more positive pole. See esp. Vico ([1744] 2001, ?38, 272, 991); Mill ([1836] 1977, 130-31); and Nietzsche ([1887] 1994, 1.11, 26). For many early

modern observations on the violence or cruelty of the ancients, see

Rahe(1994, 235-51).

expressions of cruelty unknown in more primitive life.

Rousseau nonetheless considers this stage "the golden

age," since meetings with outsiders so rarely occurred:

"Everywhere the state of war prevailed, yet the whole

earth was at peace" (269/396). And although this aspect of his thought is by no means clearly developed, it may be that it is these harder attributes of both primitive and

later savage life to which Rousseau appeals in the firsr

Discourse and the polemics which followed it. In criticiz

ing the luxurious softness of modern humanity, he there

appeals to the rude, rustic virtues of such (often despised)

peoples as the Scythians, the early Persians, the Spartans, and the Goths (DSA I, 11/11-12; Letter to Grimm, EPW

58/OC 3:65). Such virtues include a vigorous endurance

of pain, martial strength, true courage, "good faith, hospi

tality,30 justice, and... a great horror of debauchery..."

(LR66/74f).31 In contrast to these conflicting psychological devel

opments, certain material attributes of nascent society lead straightforwardly to softening. Due to a more settled

life, the sexes begin to establish different ways of living, with the women becoming more sedentary, while "both

Sexes... began to lose something of their ferociousness

and vigor" as a result of "their slightly softer [ un peu plus

molle] life" (DOIII, 164/168). Through such factors as the

mastering of useful animals (162/166) and the rise of me

chanical conveniences, the body is continually weakened

in comparison with primitive life (164f/168; cf. DSA II,

20-21/22-23). And just as our domesticated animals are

smaller and less vigorous than wild ones, so also humans

are enervated from our "soft [molle] and effeminate way of life" (DOI I, 138f/139).

Whereas the Second Discourse here anticipates the

ominous rise of modern luxury, the Essay focuses upon an economic practice which enables much of the leisure we have found in the primitive state, in combination with

the broader social sentiments of nascent society. There

Rousseau precisely defines "three stages of man consid

ered in relation to society," where "everything is seen to

be related in its principle to the means by which men

provide for their subsistence, and as... a function of the

climate and of the nature of the soil." Namely, "The sav

age is a hunter, the barbarian a herdsman, civil man

a tiller of the soil" (EOL IX, 272/400).32 Although the

30See "The Levite of Ephraim," CW 7:356/OC 2:12126 Rev. IX, 87171097; cf. Montesquieu [1748] 1989, XX.2.

31 Cf. DSA 1,7/8; II, 20-22/22-24. For the sense in which these traits are natural, see Cooper (1999,108-12).

32This three-stage model is also related to languages (see EOL V,

257/385). There is a less formal but still evident distinction among the savage, barbarian, and civilized states in the Second Discourse




Essay claims to investigate "the first men" (269/396) and

"the first times" (cf. 267n/395n), it either bypasses or re

vises the Discourses primitive state, since the Essay's "first

men" are united in families, and apparently must engage in hunting, herding, or farming, in contrast to the Dis

course's mere gathering of the spontaneous fruits of the

earth.33 Apparently having already commenced the cycle of human industry responding to new needs, the greater number of people, who were "less active and more peace

able," stopped this frenzied cycle "as soon as they could"

by gathering and taming cattle (271/399). Thus pastoral life was born, which Rousseau praises as "the most self

sufficient art," since it "almost effortlessly" provides hu mans with food, clothing, and tents. "[F]ather of repose and of the indolent passions" (271f/400), pastoral life en

abled countless hours of the romantic taming we have

depicted, since "time had no other measure than enjoy ment and boredom" (277/406). For such reasons, it seems

plausible that at least the majority of people in nascent

society enjoyed "the gentle sweetness of independent as

sociation" as herdsmen, and the tenor of their lives was

predominantly soft in both labor and social (i.e., familial) relations. We might finally note that it is of such pastoral

images that Rousseau drew many of his most grandil oquent images, of which he himself was the fondest.34

Accordingly, a more accurate moniker for him and his

theoretical progeny may be "the gentle barbarian," rather

than "the noble savage." However, in the same pages we are introduced to

Rousseau's most severe human type?at least among the

as well. In claiming that metallurgy and agriculture gave rise to

civilization, Rousseau writes that certain peoples "seem to have

remained Barbarians as long as they engaged in one of the Arts

without the other" (DOI II, 168/171f; cf. Note VI, 194/199; SC III.8, 101f/415f; PF XVI, 75/560). See also Montesquieu ([1748] 1989, XVIII. 11). On the mode of subsistence in Enlightenment stadial theories, see Meek (1976, esp. 76, 90-93f); Weber (2005, 40).

33Discussed in note 25 above. It is noteworthy that Rousseau's

primitive, spontaneous "fruits" of the earth do not include animals, since humans are not originally carnivorous (DOI Note V, 194/199; contra Meek 1976,84,86f). The incompatibility of hunting with the primitive state may be further reinforced by the claim that hunting is not at all favorable to population growth, quickly depleting its land of prey. Thus all of "the fathers of large nations" were farmers or shepherds rather than hunters, and hunting should be regarded "less as a primary means of subsistence than as a supplement to the

pastoral state" (EOLIX, 271, 271n/399, 399n).

34See Conf. XI, 491/586; "The Levite of Ephraim," CW 7:356/OC 2:1212f. Pastoral images are associated with romance and the con

flict within Rousseau's soul, as when he describes his intoxica tions during the writing of Julie: "and behold the grave Citizen of Geneva, behold the austere Jean-Jacques, nearly forty-five years old, suddenly becoming the extravagant shepherd again" (Conf. IX, 358f/427).

noncivilized. In contrast with the "less active and more

peaceable majority":

The most active, the most robust, those who were

always on the move could only live off fruit and

the hunt; so they became hunters, violent, blood

thirsty and, in time, warriors, conquerors, and

usurpers. History has stained its records with the

crimes of these first Kings; war and conquests are nothing but manhunts. Once they had con

quered, it only remained for them to devour

men. This is what their successors learned to

do_Of the three ways of life available to man?

hunting, herding, and agriculture?the first de

velops strength, skill, speed of body, courage and cunning of soul, it hardens [endurcit] man

and makes him ferocious [feroce]. (EOL IX,

271/399)35

Such a life of hardened and habitual bloodthirstiness does

not seem to be paralleled among the noncivilized humans

depicted in the Second Discourse.36 It is not immediately clear how this textual difference should be explained. It

may simply be that the purpose of the Discourse is to indi cate the origins of inequality, and accordingly it can only

rapidly outline the intermediate forms of society which are depicted at length in the Essay (cf. Duchet and Launay 1967,434,423).371 would also suggest, more speculatively, that since the Essay began as a fragment of the Discourse, but was probably not completed until around 1761, the

Essays more impartial and descriptive tone may indicate a shift away from the harsh and somber Discourse.38 The

35 See the remarks on meat eating and cruelty in E II,

153-55/411-14; Julie IV.10, 372f/453; RJJ II, 114/808. Cf. Julie on the desensitizing impact of dueling (Julie 1.57, 130/160). On the other hand, Emile is introduced to hunting to distract him from the more dangerous passions of his burgeoning sexuality (see EIV,

320-21/644-45).

36The origin of hunting is briefly mentioned in the Discourse, but the hunters' lifestyle is not described. Also, unlike the Es say's psychological interpretation, the Discourse points to climate

and terrain: "In forests [humans] made bows and arrows, and be came Hunters and Warriors..." (DOIII, 162/165; similarly, PF X,

56/532). It may be that the most active, potentially warlike people were drawn to the harsh environment of the forest, or that the harsh

environment of the forest quickly led to the dominance of the most active, potentially warlike people. 37 Consider also the differing theological assumptions of the two

works (note 25 above), which allow the Essay to essentially omit the solitary stage.

38Gourevitch also observes how the Essay is more descriptive and less critical than the Second Discourse (1986, 140). Without men

tioning the Essay, Rousseau does seem to distance himself from the Discourse when he blames Diderot for giving it a "harsh [ dur]




polemical thesis of the Discourse required it to depict non

civilized life as characteristically soft and gentle, especially

during its most properly natural phase, which is more

primitive (and thus gentle) than the lives of most con

temporary savages. It may be for this reason that it some

times blurs the distinction between the solitary Primitive

and the social-Savage (cf. Masters 1968,171-74). By con

trast, the Essay may be seen as partially undermining the polemics of the Discourse, since in dwelling at length upon the delights of the Barbarians' sociability, it empha sizes an exception to the layer of the Discourse which was

directed against society as such. And in clearly depict

ing a habitually bloodthirsty yet preagricultural human

type, the Essay may naturally dampen the longing which

the Discourse evoked for noncivilized life as a whole.39

Whatever the reasons for this textual difference, the Dis

course's closest approximation to the bloodthirsty hunters

is found after the invention of landed property and agri culture, when those who were stronger, more skillful, and

more ingenious employed various stratagems which rad

ically heightened inequality (DOI II, 169f/174; PF VII, 49/522). This eventually led to a class war in which the

rich "had scarcely become acquainted with the pleasure of

dominating than they disdained all other pleasures..." (DOI II, 171/175f). Although the Second Discourse thus seems to consign thoroughgoing viciousness to civilized

peoples, the polemics following the First Discourse had ul

timately conceded the presence of certain vices among the

noncivilized. In contrast to the "reasonable" and "mod

est" ignorance which Rousseau finds essential to ancient

virtue, "There is a ferocious and brutal ignorance, born

of a wicked heart and a deceitful mind; a criminal igno rance even of the duties of humanity, which multiplies the

vices, degrades reason, depraves the soul, and renders men

similar to beasts..." {Observations, EPW 49/OC 3:54).

Peoples exemplifying such vices despicably feed their self

indulgence, ambition, and idleness "with the sweat, the

blood and the toil of a million wretches" (LR 72/82; cf. Let

ter to Grimm, EPW 54/OC 3:62). Such images of vile, non

civilized hardness are rare in Rousseau, but as we can see

from the immediately above, even these could be readily

tone" and "dark air" (Conf. VIII, 326n/389n). For the Essay's begin

ning as a fragment of the Discourse, see Duchet and Launay (1967, 436-37). For the probable date of the Essay's relevant sections, see

Meek (1976, 90-91); Starobinski (OC 5:cci-ccii). 39 All of this being said, the hunter-Savages do not seem to be af

flicted by the interdependence and inequality which divide civilized

peoples among themselves. In this way, even they would parallel the

Citizen in exemplifying the "essential" moral trait?being "good to

the people with whom one lives" (cf. E I, 39/249).

Figure 6 The Detailed Sociopolitical Typology of Noncivilized Humans

Solitary existence Independent association

Images of softness: under abundant,

harmonious conditions

Idyllic Primitive:

spontaneous contentment,

peacefulness, docility

Social-Savage, or Barbarian:

sweet and gentle; occasional bursts of

cruelty

Images of severity: under scarce, violent

conditions

Vigorous Primitive: exertions for

sustenance; occasional bursts of ferocity

Hunter-Savage: bloodthirsty, habitual violence to beasts and

_humanity_

applied to expose the genealogy and character of civilized

privilege.40 Figure 6 may schematize Rousseau's images of the

softness and severity of noncivilized life. The dotted line

indicates a distinction which is not as explicit or readily

implicit in Rousseau as the distinctions indicated by solid

lines. His apparent vagueness here could be partially ex

plained insofar as the groups on either side of the dotted

line are similar in social complexity and historical locus,

differing only in the favorability of their natural and social

environments.

Soft or Harsh Civilization?

If we turn briefly to Rousseau's depictions of advanced

civilization and modernity,41 we might find that the

bulk of modern humanity is similarly dichotomized into

those under conditions of abundance and softness, and

those under conditions of scarcity and severity. Impor

tantly, however, these favorable conditions are attained not through the spontaneous abundance of the earth or

the pastoral harnessing of animals, but through advanced

40 By contrast, Adam Smith's depiction of savages in general seems

far closer to Rousseau's hunter-Savages. For Smith, savages typi

cally encounter very harsh conditions which give rise to hard and

austere virtues, cultivating an extreme endurance of pain, along with strong drives for vengeance and cruelty against their enemies.

The latter capacities are often concealed, but are "all mounted to

the highest pitch of fury" (Smith [1759-90] 1982, V.2.8-13,204-9; cf. 1.5, 23-26; III.3.34-38, 152-52; VII.ii.4.2, 306; [1776] 1981,

V.i.g.10, 794). Cf. Rasmussen's claim that the ultimate ground of

Smith's defense of commercial societies?despite his concessions

to Rousseau regarding their moral and political drawbacks?lies in

Smith's harsher depiction of "the poverty, dependence, and inse

curity that characterized most previous ages" (2006, 620-21, 626).

41 These points have been developed at length in Mendham (2009, chaps. 2-3). An abbreviated version of chapter 3 is available as

Mendham (forthcoming).



I#4 MATTHEWD. MENDHAM

Figure 7 The Comprehensive Sociopolitical Typology

I. Solitary existence II. Independent

association Interdependent multitude

A. Descriptive: Under abundant,

harmonious, or

privileged conditions

IA. Idyllic Primitive:

spontaneous contentment,

peacefulness, docility

HA. Social-Savage, or

Barbarian: sweet and

gentle socially; occasional bursts of

cruelty

IMA. "Civilized" Elites:

physically soft;

habitually "polite" to

peers or superiors;

habitually harsh to

inferiors

B. Descriptive: Under scarce,

violent, or

oppressive conditions

IB. Vigorous Primitive: exertions

for sustenance; occasional bursts of

_ferocity_

MB. Hunter-Savage:

bloodthirsty, habitual

violence to beasts and

humanity

1MB. "Civilized"

Commoners: physically

deprived, socially

degraded, habitually knavish

C Prescriptive: Decisive breaks

from the usual course of

civilization

IC. Solitary Dreamer:

heeds only naturally

gentle, properly

voluptuous, immediate impulses; association may be sweet if void of all

obligation

IIC Moral Human:

virtuous self-command

enables domestic

sweetness, communal

and cosmopolitan

dedication, and

occasional, moderate

_severity_

IIIC Citizen:

virtue as conformity to

the general will;

patriotic delight in

public goods; harsh

indifference to

foreigners

economic luxuries necessarily acquired at the expense of

the multitude (DOI I, 137/138; Note IX, 199/203f). To the extent that a people has become civilized and inter

dependent, their interests are fundamentally at odds with

each other, and the great majority of individuals will be

deprived of necessities and degraded into habitual de

ceit, betrayal, and theft (cf. PN 101-2n/970n). However,

given the intensity of Rousseau's polemics against moder

nity, and his concession of certain elements of ferocity and cruelty in noncivilized life, it is striking that he does not portray his elite contemporaries as ferocious or ac

tively cruel. Rather, he grants much of the descriptive con

tent of doux commerce theory, conceding that commer

cial wealth, cross-cultural interaction, and higher learning have made their partakers more polite and less violent in

key respects (e.g., DSA I, 7/7; Observations, EPW 47/OC

3:52; LR 65/74). Yet he interprets such gentleness as result

ing not from higher moral conviction or more elevated

sentiments, but rather from physical softness, psycholog ical weakness, and moral indifference (LR 70/79; "Moral

Letters" II, CW 12:181-82/OC 4:1089-90; EIV, 335/665). In addition, given the workings of the established state ap

paratus and economic system, they simply have no need for the vigorous ferocity of much noncivilized life (cf. E

IV, 236n/524n; Conf. VII, 274/327). Instead, they need

only remain largely indifferent to the sufferings of the

masses, which is naturally combined with contempt or

disdain for them (EIV, 224-25/507-9; "On Wealth," CW

ll:8-16/OC 5:471-81). In these ways, Rousseau's funda mental charge against his elite contemporaries is not their

cruelty but their "harshness" or "hardness" (durete: "Let

ters to Malesherbes" IV, CW 5:582/OC 1:1145). Although

refraining from charging the elite moderns with ferocity or active cruelty is a significant concession on its face, Rousseau ultimately faults them for, on one hand, an ex

cessive softness which makes them incapable of vigorous acts, and on the other hand, a lack of authentic senti

ment which makes them incapable of the sweet, intimate,

spontaneous relations of social-Savages and Barbarians.

Conclusion

A final diagram (Figure 7) summarizes the major dis

tinctions and social types described above. This analysis suggests the great extent to which Rousseau finds our

morals to be shaped by our surroundings, in terms of

social complexity (the horizontal dimension), the favora

bility of our environmental resources (the descriptive ele ment of the vertical dimension), and whether a far-seeing intellect had decisively broken with the usual course of civ

ilization (the prescriptive element of the vertical dimen

sion). This schema builds upon and confirms the status

of the main characters previously identified by Rousseau

scholars (who find between two and five types). Without

claiming to definitively identify each social type depicted

by Rousseau, it draws attention to additional characters which are theoretically pivotal, and which are neglected or undertheorized in previous analyses. Moreover, each of




these characters has been placed within a typology which

attempts to show the interrelation of many of Rousseau's

fundamental social principles in a more systematic man

ner than has previously been attempted. To be sure, some

of these social types and principles are more evident and

fundamental than others in Rousseau's thought. Accord

ingly, this typology is offered to spur conversation rather

than to conclude it. Yet it is hoped that even in provoking

disagreement, it might enhance the clarity and rigor of our reflections by bringing several basic types and prin

ciples systematically to the forefront.

For instance, by framing the various types as arising from our sociopolitical surroundings, this analysis may

suggest a particular understanding of Rousseau's teach

ings on perfectibility and the possibilities of human life.

Rousseau probably coined the term "perfectibilite" (cf. Wokler 1978, 127-28, 134n93), and it became a funda

mental social premise for legions of later progressive and

radical reformers, suggesting the prospects for indefinite

social improvement. For Rousseau, perfectibility is the

only faculty which is undeniably unique to humans; with

"the aid of circumstances," it successively develops all

our other faculties (DOI I, 142/142). Thus, our survey of

the extraordinary range of human types, and the environ

mental circumstances which give rise to them, can be read

as a study of the implications of perfectibility. Rousseau's

broader anthropology of the possible is regularly used to

expose the moderns' complacency in believing their own

petty baseness is the pinnacle of human possibility (DOI Note X, 210/212f; SC III. 12; Considerations on the Gov

ernment of Poland II, 179f/956; PF XIII, 64/544). In such

ways Rousseau is a true father of progressive perfectibility, but in several other ways he differs from this legacy of his.

Notably, he reflected so extensively upon the nature and

advantages of noncivilized life chiefly because he main

tained that, through the strong passions resulting from

interaction and interdependence, advanced civilizations

must with overwhelming regularity fall into devastating forms of corruption, degradation, and mutual exploita tion. Ironically to civilized ears, much of this degrada tion is blamed upon the unfolding of perfectibility itself,

which "perfects... human reason, while deteriorating the

species," and develops virtues in a few, while overcom

ing the many with vices (DOI I, 159/162; II, 184/189; see also DSAII, 16/18; DOI 1,15117154; E III, 204/483; Conf. VIII, 326/388). It is for such reasons that even Rousseau's

most thoroughly developed and optimistically prescribed human types?the Solitary Dreamer, the Moral Human,

and the Citizen?must be highly selective in their devel

opment of human faculties, and highly secluded from the

false delights and sophistications of civilized modernity. Overall, in Rousseau's analysis, once human perfectibility has moved beyond its rudimentary stages, it allows for

human possibilities which are indeed very high in their

greatness and purity, but exceedingly narrow in the social

and cultural conditions which enable them. More generally, by interpreting Rousseau's appar

ently conflicting remarks carefully according to sociopo litical context, we can discern many consistencies un

derlying his inconsistencies. In analyzing the social types which emerge, we might also find that Rousseau shows a

surprising degree of impartiality in openly depicting vari ous nonmodern weaknesses, while at least observationally and implicitly acknowledging certain modern strengths. Furthermore, our analysis may reveal a degree of mod

eration in his moral stances, in both their critical and

prescriptive expressions. For, despite all his bravado in

praising the hard sternness of the Citizen or the Vigorous Primitive, he consistently repudiates anybloodthirstiness, lust for domination, and universal hard-heartedness.

Similarly, despite all his romanticism in praising the idle

ness and abundance of the Idyllic Primitive or the pas toral Barbarian, he consistently repudiates any softness

attained through human exploitation, or of frivolous lux

ury, or of failure to execute any duties appropriate to one's

sociopolitical condition.

Yet though his various social types display moral

moderation and phenomenological integrity, there may remain a degree of arbitrariness in his appeals to them.

It is, for instance, rhetorically compelling to expose Civ

ilized Elite softness through the image of the Vigorous Primitive, the stern Barbarian, or the ancient Citizen.

But it would require a more careful and sustained anal

ysis to show that those moderns who enjoy a substan

tial degree of economic security, leisure, and refinement

due to economic and technological progress are charac

teristically softer in less appealing ways than the Idyllic Primitive, or harsher in more deplorable ways than the

hunter-Savage. Typically, Rousseau's approach is to criti

cize a modern weakness by appeal to an inverse primitive

strength, whereas a more impartially philosophical ap

proach would surely compare strengths against strengths and weaknesses against weaknesses. For such reasons, our

analysis?insofar as it is convincing?can only be consid

ered a prolegomenon to future discussions of Rousseau's

coherence, rather than a demonstration of it. Some mys

tery shall always remain in explanations of how he ap

pealed to both gentle savages and fierce citizens in his

campaigns against modern civilization.

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