Rozman Vitual Alliance

Unraveling the Japan-South Korea “Virtual Alliance”: Populism and Historical Revisionism inthe Face of Conflicting Regional StrategiesAuthor(s): Gilbert Rozman and Shin-wha LeeSource: Asian Survey, Vol. 46, No. 5 (September/October 2006), pp. 761-784Published by: University of California PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/as.2006.46.5.761 .

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761

Asian Survey

, Vol. 46, Issue 5, pp. 761–784, ISSN 0004-4687, electronic ISSN 1533-838X.© 2006 by The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Please direct all requestsfor permission to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of CaliforniaPress’s Rights and Permissions website, at http://www.ucpress.edu/journals/rights.htm.

Gilbert Rozman is Musgrave Professor of Sociology at Princeton Uni-versity, Princeton, New Jersey, U.S.A. Shin-wha Lee is Associate Professor in the Department ofPolitical Science and International Relations at Korea University, Seoul. Email:

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[email protected]

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UNRAVELING THE JAPAN-SOUTH KOREA “VIRTUAL ALLIANCE”

Populism and Historical Revisionism in the Face of Conflicting Regional Strategies

Gilbert Rozman and Shin-wha Lee

Abstract

Domestic politics combined with strategic repositioning toward the U.S. setback ties between Japan and South Korea in 2004–05. Despite the NorthKorean nuclear crisis and the challenge of shifting great power relations inAsia, as well as closer economic and cultural bilateral ties, politicized forcesare pulling the two countries apart.

Keywords: Japan-South Korean relations, populism, historical revisionism,national identities, Northeast Asia

Japan-South Korean ties plunged in early 2005 with scantprospect for recovery under the leadership of Prime Minister Koizumi Juni-chiro and President Roh Moo-hyun, respectively. This was contrary to the ex-pectations of the administration of George W. Bush, which calculated thatalarm over North Korea’s nuclear challenge and nervousness over the rise ofChina would help to produce the long-desired triangular alliance requiringstrengthened ties between the other two states.

1

To understand what happened

1. Gilbert Rozman, “Japan and South Korea: Should the U.S. Be Worried about Their NewSpat in 2001?”

Pacific Review

15:1 (2002), pp. 1–28.



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ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLVI, NO. 5, SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2006

and its consequences, we review events in 2004–05, providing our interpretationof how national identity politics in each country intersected with internationalrelations.

In retrospect, Japan-South Korean relations have generally improved, withincreasing economic ties and people-to-people contacts over the past decades.South Korea’s democratization process has also contributed to ameliorating thebilateral relationship. We argue that the lack of political legitimacy of SouthKorean military regimes during the Cold War led political leaders to utilizeanti-communism and anti-Japanese sentiment as sources of legitimacy. Demo-cratically elected leaders such as Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh were ableto develop closer ties with Japan without the moral burden of their predeces-sors, as seen in Kim’s opening up the country to Japanese cultural imports(banned since Korea’s independence in 1945) and Roh’s advocating forward-looking relations with Japan.

2

In 2002–04 there were many positive signs: suc-cessful co-hosting of the World Cup, an unexpectedly easy opening of Korea toJapanese culture, the “Korea wave” sweeping Japan as television dramas andmovies captivated large audiences, upbeat negotiations to conclude a free tradeagreement (FTA) in 2005, and frequent security talks as part of trilateral coor-dination with the U.S. To much fanfare, a new style of shuttle summitry beganwith “no necktie” meetings in Jeju, Korea, in July 2004 and Kagoshima, Japan,in December. Yet, although Roh promised not to raise the “history issue” andKoizumi took credit for better South Korean ties as the foremost achievementof his administration in Asia, domestic political strategies in the two countriesdefied the optimistic images repeated in the media.

Taking a broader look at the politics of anxiety and assertiveness in 2004–05,we discern a more profound set of forces at work in Japan and South Korea,linking unresolved matters from deep in the past to rising uncertainty aboutthe future. As economic and cultural ties draw the two countries closer together,these politicizing forces pull them apart. In this paper, we identify a differentlogic, linking domestic politics and international agendas. It highlights Koi-zumi’s singled-minded commitment to pay annual visits to the Yasukuni Shrine,where Class A war criminals convicted at the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal areenshrined. This is seen as part of a worldview that encourages nationalist sen-timents designed to allow Japanese to feel prouder of their history. Our analy-sis also points to Roh’s growing obsession with publicly “outing” those whocollaborated with Japanese imperialism. He has pressed Koreans to reconsiderthe compromises made by his predecessors who led Korea in the 1950s to

2. Brad Glosserman and Scott Snyder, “A Target of Opportunity for Northeast Asia,”

PacNet

Newsletter, no. 25, June 30, 2005,

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http://www.csis.org/pacfor/pac0526.pdf

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; Yoichiro Sato,“Japan Should Apologize Again to South Korea,” ibid., no. 34A, August 17, 2005,

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http://www.csis.org/pacfor/pac0534A.pdf

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GILBERT ROZMAN AND SHIN-WHA LEE

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1980s. Supported by a new wave of politicians free from past cautions, Rohand Koizumi have both been determined to realize a nationalist domestic plat-form, one that carries the prospect of strong reverberations in mutual perceptionsof the two nations. Yet, even as domestic populism and growing nationalismdrew attention in 2004, observers failed to anticipate the intensity and rapidityof the spillover into bilateral relations that would occur in 2005.

We consider both Roh and Koizumi populists and historical revisionists whosedomestic political goals drive their foreign policy. Although the deteriorationof Japanese-South Korean ties burst into the open only from the end of Febru-ary to June that year, we can discern an accelerating process from the first halfof 2004 in the politics of each country and in their strategic approaches toNortheast Asia that set a collision course in motion. Below, we trace back to 2004the use of populism in each country for electoral purposes (i.e., April electionsfor the National Assembly in South Korea and July polls for the upper houseof the Diet in Japan). We then examine the reactions in each nation towardthe other as populism spilled over and diplomatic relations rapidly soured in thefirst half of 2005. By the leaders’ June 20 summit in Seoul the spotlight hadfocused on historical matters, and the meeting brushed aside all other issuesof regional and global importance, including the North Korean nuclear threat,the U.S. alliance system in Asia, the rise of China, the pursuit of a bilateralFTA, and the promise of the first East Asian Summit in Kuala Lumpur thatDecember.

In November relations deteriorated further. Roh lectured Koizumi again atthe Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Busan, Korea. InDecember Roh and Chinese President Hu Jintao refused to hold an annualmeeting with Koizumi at the ASEAN

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3 summit. Roh also canceled shuttlediplomacy designed for frequent and unreserved meetings between heads ofthe two countries. Yet, however pessimistic the situation, the pull of commoninterests on these pressing issues and of grassroots cultural integration beneaththe surface of political calculations offers reason for hope about the overallcourse of bilateral relations. This is not the misplaced optimism for a triangu-lar alliance earlier embraced by U.S. leaders; nor does it suggest that Koi-zumi’s successor Abe Shinzo, who is more personally committed to historicalrevisionism, and Roh will be able to repair the ruptured relationship. But wesee limits to the populism and historical revisionism favored of late as morestrategic foreign policy calculations rise to the fore.

In addition to the argument that domestic politics is trumping strategicthinking about Asia, we also consider whether another strategic logic is atwork. For each country, this would signify a repositioning vis-à-vis the U.S.Under this logic, Japan, rather than directly facing Asia, would switch its na-tional priority to focus on the U.S.—to the exclusion of most of its regionalties. Likewise, South Korea would recenter its foreign relations on Northeast



764


Asia in general, so that ties to the U.S. as well as Japan might become some-what expendable. After presenting our primary domestic argument, we look atwhether this logic applies and if so, how it requires an adjusted analysis.

Dynamics of “Intermestic” Politics in Japan and South Korea

Through the 1980s, ruling parties in Japan and South Korea clung to foreignpolicies based on continued dependency on their bilateral alliance with theU.S. and persistent dangers from established enemies in Northeast Asia, i.e.,the Soviet Union and North Korea. In Seoul, ruling regimes repeatedly warnedthat internal political opposition would cause confusion and put Korea at riskfrom the country’s external security environment. Although Japan and SouthKorea were joined to a common ally and rapidly becoming economically inte-grated, bilateral relations remained problematic because of a wide gap overhow to handle the legacy of Japan’s colonial rule.

3

Discontent was felt in bothcountries because of limited general foreign policy options and the unresolveddiscord in bilateral relations. Neither Japan’s conservatives nor its progres-sives showed much interest in having closer ties to South Korea—the formerbecause better relations would require historical candor unacceptable to the rightwing and the latter because of greater sympathy for North Korea and close tieswith the pro-North Korean Residents’ League (Chosen Soren) in Japan. Simi-larly, the South Korean political scene saw little empathy with Japan. The pub-lic’s anti-Japanese sentiment was not muffled by the authoritarian regimes;indeed, feelings ran high because there were frequent reminders of the Japa-nese occupation and war atrocities, and Japanese leaders remained uncontrite.Thus, in neither country did national elections ride on efforts to convince pub-lic opinion of one or another party’s superiority in managing ties across theSea of Japan/East Sea.

After the end of the Cold War, which was characterized by the East-Westideological confrontation, nationalism in the countries of Northeast Asia has,in stages, become a ticket to domestic political success. The surge in anti-American sentiment together with profound political rifts among generationalgroups in South Korean society greatly contributed to Roh’s unexpected presi-dential victory in December 2002. As concern was rising in Japan over thethreat of North Korean weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the rise ofChina, Abe became prime minister in September 2006 after leaving no doubtthat he would stand tall against both of these countries. Abe, who is consideredeven more hawkish than Koizumi on Asian foreign policy issues, is currently

3. Victor D. Cha,

Alignment Despite Antagonism: The U.S.-Korea-Japan Security Triangle

(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1999).




765

popular, raising concerns that Japan’s relations with South Korea and Chinacould further deteriorate.

4

While some voices appeal for “East Asian community” spirit, boosted by newinitiatives toward cultural understanding and economic cooperation to coun-teract the rise of nationalism and deteriorating diplomatic relations,

5

others ex-ploit raw nerves about security dilemmas in the region. Even as Japan’s recentmilitary focus causes new concerns in South Korea because it could contributeto an arms race and place Seoul at the center of intensifying regional tensions,the South’s recent eagerness to engage the North and draw closer to China israising alarm in Japan, challenging the U.S.-centered alliance framework. Incontrast, Japanese politicians see few reasons to replace Tokyo’s strong bilat-eral security framework with the U.S., which is sufficient to maintain theirpersonal political agenda as well as Japan’s national security.

In Japan, the Korean Peninsula has become a compelling foreign policyconcern with the potential to affect votes. This has occurred over three stages.In the first half of the 1990s, the political left turned away from North Korea,whose nuclear ambitions and refusal to reform alienated many citizens in anew regional context, drawing them toward the democratizing and economi-cally growing South. At the end of the decade, the Japanese political rightseized on Kim Dae-jung’s promise to set aside contention over history. Kimvisited Japan in October 1998 both to resolve the history issue and to fix Japan’shopes on South Korea (Tokyo’s aid in response to the 1997–98 financial crisisdid much to bolster Japan’s image among Koreans).

6

Despite these shifts, SouthKorea did not yet figure significantly in Japanese politics. Then, a rapid suc-cession of events over four years altered the political landscape. Only since2000—and especially after the outbreak of the North Korean nuclear crisis inOctober 2002—has Korea mattered in Japanese politics.

The Kim Dae-jung government’s sunshine policy and the historic inter-Koreansummit in 2000 left Japanese feeling isolated as the South, with some U.S.support as well as Chinese and Russian backing, pressed for inter-Korean rec-onciliation. In 2001 U.S.-South Korean relations suffered as the Bush admin-istration delayed lending its support to the sunshine policy and pressed Japanto assist in limiting China’s quest for regional leadership, if not containingChina. In 2002 Bush labeled North Korea as part of what he called the “axis ofevil”; later, the U.S. exposed the North’s highly enriched uranium (HEU) pro-

4. “Profile: Shinzo Abe,” BBC News,

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http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/

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, ac-cessed October 31, 2005.

5. Miyao Takahiro, “Natshonarizumu to Ajia Kyodotai” [Nationalism and Asia community],

Sekai Shuho

[World News Weekly], September 7, 2004, pp. 46–47.6. Mike M. Mochizuki, “Japan: Between Alliance and Autonomy,” in

Strategic Asia 2004–05:Confronting Terrorism in the Pursuit of Power

, eds. Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills (Seattle:National Bureau of Asian Research, 2004), pp. 103–37.



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gram and suspended fuel oil shipments as the second nuclear crisis put a brakeon momentum from Koizumi’s September 2002 visit to Pyongyang.

7

In 2003as the U.S. attempted trilateral coordination, Japan favored use of pressureagainst the North and supported the tough U.S. stance in the six-party nucleardisarmament talks (involving the two Koreas, the U.S., China, Japan, and Rus-sia). South Korea sought to concentrate on dialogue and concessions.

As the talks stalled for a year following the third round in June 2004, thedebate continued to widen the divide among Japanese leaders, arousing angryemotions at home over the failure to make progress, especially on the abduc-tion issue.

8

Seoul remained optimistic that the North was ready to make sub-stantive progress if only the U.S. would seek a compromise that guaranteedthe DPRK security and normalized relations, including access to foreign eco-nomic assistance. In June 2005, Seoul took the lead in enticing Pyongyanginto a fourth round of talks. This ended with a Joint Statement of Principlesissued in September; South Korea’s increased activism persisted as the fifthround, focused on implementation, began in November. Although Tokyo waslargely sidelined in this process, its officials held discussions with the NorthKoreans and managed to restart bilateral talks in November, which soon endedin failure.

Dealing with Pyongyang and Washington was splitting Seoul from Tokyo.For instance, Abe’s popularity is widely seen as being partly driven by his out-spoken position on North Korea: he has pushed for Pyongyang to come cleanon Japanese abductees and demanded sanctions against the North.

9

Underthese circumstances, the public in both Japan and South Korea began to focuson foreign policy in their immediate neighborhoods. Especially in Japan, thefate of the abductees and their families produced an outpouring of articles. Con-trarily, South Korean public attitudes toward the North, which had been soft-ened under the sunshine policy and particularly since the June 2000 summit,continuously supported a reconciliation policy despite the crises over Pyong-yang’s purported nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs.

10

Some SouthKoreans argued that these programs were only bargaining chips used against

7. Gilbert Rozman, “Japan’s North Korean Initiative and U.S.-Japanese Relations,”

Orbis

47:3(Summer 2003), pp. 527–39.

8. After Kim Jong-il identified five abductees as alive and others as dead, an uproar in Japancalled for first bringing all abductees and their family members to Japan and then to reveal whetherand how others had died, amid suspicion that some had not yet been identified. Japan has longclaimed that at least 11 Japanese nationals were kidnapped by North Korean agents in the 1970sand 1980s; the issue has been at the center of troublesome relations between the two countries.

9. See BBC News, “Profile.”10. Shin-wha Lee, “International Organizations and the Inter-Korea Peace Process: Traditional

Security Versus Nontraditional Security,” in

Inter-Korean Relations: Problems and Prospects

, ed.Samuel S. Kim (New York: Palgrave, 2004), ch. 10, pp. 175–96.




767

the U.S., not military weapons that could be used against Koreans.

11

Politi-cians came to recognize in both South Korea and Japan that their president orprime minister, respectively, would be judged to an unprecedented degree onhis foreign policy leadership. At the same time, parliamentary elections could beaffected by how well the leader faced the domestic spillover of foreign affairs.Not surprisingly, “intermestic” politics, the dynamic interrelationship betweendomestic politics and foreign policies (i.e., Koizumi’s and Roh’s respectiveneeds to play national identity politics to retain domestic support) have becomeespecially important to politicians in both countries who find their positionsvulnerable to changes in the external environment.

Both Roh and Koizumi had calculated in 2003 that it would be prudent torefrain from criticizing the Bush administration. After his election, Roh wasplagued by Pentagon warnings over North Korea and distrust from global in-vestors who believed South Koreans—including himself—had become anti-American. Koizumi cast his lot with the Bush administration when the IraqWar made a choice necessary and also in May, when a decision had to bemade on dealing with the DPRK nuclear crisis. While many South Koreansand Japanese were uneasy about U.S. “unilateral” foreign policy, there wastacit, bipartisan agreement at a time of danger not to arouse dissident publicopinion. Similarly, in the delicate six-party talks South Korean political lead-ers were hesitant about openly venting any displeasure with their northerncounterparts. Frustration over the limits in foreign policy discourse left anopening for indirect ways for the public to express resentment and politiciansto try to manipulate them.

In early 2004, as a U.S. presidential election loomed, it appeared likely thatregional diplomacy would be dormant. Having taken the helm in their respec-tive countries promising to break the logjam of politics as usual, Koizumi andRoh faced challenging circumstances. They were in need of a diplomatic ini-tiative to try to resolve the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula that wouldnot disrupt the subtle balance of foreign relations focused on the six-partytalks.

This was the background to 2004 election strategies in both countries. Atfirst elections for the National Assembly of South Korea in April and for theupper house of the Diet in Japan in July appeared far removed from foreign re-lations. But last-minute initiatives by Roh and Koizumi along with their polit-ical allies suddenly changed the scenario, revealing political parties striving tocapitalize on changing images of cross-sea ties or their historical consequencesto garner electoral support. Japanese debated a new initiative toward NorthKorea even as they searched for ways to vent their anger against the abduction

11. Victor D. Cha, “Korea: A Peninsula in Crisis and Flux,” in

Strategic Asia 2004–05

, pp. 139–61.



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of Japanese citizens, while Koreans focused on the Japanese colonial legacyand Tokyo’s “unrepentant” foreign policy as a subject with potentially wide-ranging significance for South Korea. This trend became more prominent inearly 2005, particularly in the Korean political arena, as cross-sea relationswere hurt by the issuing of controversial Japanese history textbooks, renewedattention to the disputed islets Dokdo/Takeshima, and Koizumi’s annual visitsto the Yasukuni Shrine.

National Assembly and Upper House Elections

Korean Politics in 2004

In the period 2001–03, emotionalism over dealing with North Korea focusedon a ready target. For many South Koreans in the “386 generation” (in their30s, attending college in the 1980s, and born in the 1960s) who supported thesunshine policy and were used to blaming the U.S. for thwarting Koreandemocratization in the 1980s, it was easy to chastise America for blockingprogress with the North. To the 386 generation, with no observed memory ofthe Korean War, the 1980 Gwangju Incident

12

is more significant as a symbolof the democratization movement. Many Koreans at the time suspected thatthe U.S. was more concerned about its own security interests than Korean de-mocracy.

13

Anti-American sentiment burst into the spotlight in 2001–02, espe-cially after the accidental deaths of two Korean teenage girls run over by aU.S. armed vehicle. Although Roh’s election victory was attributable to suchsentiment, he took pains during his first year as president to avoid arousing itfurther, particularly noting the continued importance of the U.S.-Korean secu-rity alliance amid North Korea’s nuclear threats.

14

The Uri Party, formed in December 2003 by former members of Kim Dae-jung’s Millennium Democratic Party loyal to Roh, found a convenient outletin President Roh’s determination to establish a truth commission on Korea’smodern history. The Presidential Committee for the Inspection of Collabora-tions with Japanese Imperialism (PCIC) was established in May 2005 by spe-cial law, with the aim of revealing “the actual state of collaborations in the

12. This was a violent 10-day clash in May 1980 between South Korean special forces anddemonstrators who demanded democratic elections and an end to martial law in Gwangju, SouthJolla Province.

13. Jang Jip Choi, “The Future of U.S.-Korean Relations: A Reflection on the So-Called Anti-American Sentiment in South Korea,”

East-West Wire

, September 1, 2003, East West Center,

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http://www.eastwestcenter.org/events-en-detail.asp?news_ID

�

145

�

.14. Shin-wha Lee, “South Korea’s Strategy for Inter-Korean Relations and Regional Security

Cooperation,” in

Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation: National Interests and Regional Order

, eds.Seng Tan and Amitav Acharya (Armonk, N. Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 2004), ch. 7, pp. 106–26.




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period of Japanese imperialism in Korea.”

15

Various non-governmental organi-zations (NGOs), energized against past human rights abuses, were calling forbelated exposure of those who had worked on behalf of the colonizers andwho were seen as having gained an unfair advantage in the postwar era and hav-ing supported the assault on democratic rule that ensued. Even as Roh pursuedcloser ties with Japan, he welcomed this effort to struggle against Koreanswho had exploited their past association with that country.

However, the tight grip of conservatives, led by the opposition Hannara Party(Grand National Party, GNP), on the National Assembly constituted a formi-dable barrier. Still, the progressives put the issue in the spotlight by bringing abill up for a vote in the National Assembly to expose the collaborators. Theynamed a large number of fresh candidates for the April 2004 elections sup-posedly unblemished by such associations. In the face of this moral and polit-ical challenge, the conservative side acquiesced in the vote on the bill and foundmore new blood of its own. Yet, it remained tarred by the image of an oldergeneration, among whom were prominent descendants of families associatedwith colonial rule.

One could argue that by arousing public moral indignation, some from thehypocrisy seen in the motion of the president’s impeachment in March 2004that shunted Roh to the sidelines and some from further exposure of corrup-tion, the Uri Party was able to achieve an “electoral shock.” The National As-sembly election of April that year was fought on the grounds of morality, givingpopulism a chance to eclipse other approaches and contributing to a surge inthe number of Uri assembly members from 47 to 152, a bare majority of the299 total members.

16

Even if nationalism regarding the U.S. (claiming equalbilateral partnership) and Japan over the historical legacy was really symbolicof more wide-ranging nationalist concerns in the elections of December 2002and April 2004 and domestic political issues also mattered considerably, thepoliticization of foreign relations had become part of Korean electoral politics.If the nationalist card was not as decisive a factor as it had been 14 monthsearlier, it still was seen as helpful in bringing the Uri Party to a resounding vic-tory in the National Assembly elections. This also secured Roh’s hold on poweronce the impeachment was dismissed by the Constitutional Court on May 14.

Earlier conservative Japanese leaders had forged personal ties with conser-vative Koreans, many of whom spoke Japanese essentially as natives and camefrom families of some influence in the era of Japanese occupation. The 2004elections spelled the death knell of these Korean “pipes,” influential politicians

15. PCIC, at

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http://www.pcic.go.kr:8088/pcic/english.htm

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, “Introduction.”16. Byung-Kook Kim, “The Politics of National Identity: The Rebirth of Ideology and Drifting

Foreign Policy in South Korea,” in Jonathan D. Pollack, ed.,

Korea: The East Asian Pivot

(New-port, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2006), pp. 79–20.



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who served as links between the two governments. The new power holders, whocome from the periphery of Korean society, tend to be more nationalistic andliberal, seek closer ties with North Korea, and emphasize more independencefrom U.S. influence.

The victory of Roh’s Uri Party in the April elections revitalized the discus-sion on launching a truth commission. The Korean government has insisted thatthe new law, designed to identify Japanese collaborators and confiscate theirunjustly acquired property, will not be construed as anti-Japanese. Yet, theelection campaign saw much talk of the “descendents of the pro-Japanese,” in-cluding accusations against Park Geun-hye, head of the GNP and daughter ofthe late President Park Chung-hee, a Japanese-trained military officer.

17

AfterRoh resumed office, he soon found that his popularity was waning; his timidforeign policy could not win enthusiasm from the young Uri activists in theAssembly.

Resuming the pursuit of collaborators with a law on July 14 that initiated akind of campaign for historical rectification, Roh and Uri took the offensive.On August 15, National Independence Day, Roh pointed to the necessity ofsettling accounts with the past. However, the Uri Party’s “Japanese collabora-tor witch hunt” caught one of its own: in August it was revealed that UriChairman Shin Ki-nam’s father was a Japanese military policeman. As con-cealment of his father’s activities became more problematic than his father’srecord, Shin resigned. His resignation suggested that in a society where theson or the daughter should be responsible for the wrongdoings of the father,Korea’s current struggle over digging up the past will help to define its future.

To counter possible negative fallout in Japan over this law and other inci-dents related to historical and current events, many observers stressed that cul-tural and people-to-people exchanges should trump these frictions betweenthe two countries. The recent “Korea boom” or “Korean wave” in Japan showsno sign of ebbing and holds out hope of overcoming the lingering historical con-sciousness.

18

Japanese have become so enamored of Bae Yong-jun, the leadingactor in a Korean television drama, that he is referred to as “Yon-sama,” i.e.,“the honorable Mr. Yon.”

19

Anticipation had been rising that the two nationscan develop this unique phenomenon, sprung from a single TV drama, into anopportunity to advance their cultural exchanges, mutual understanding, andultimate reconciliation.

Despite such appeals to common values and interests, distrust of Japan hasbeen one of the factors driving political calculations at this time of anxiety.

17. Kuroda Katsuhiro, “Kankoku ni ‘Mirai Shiko’ wa Nai” [There is no “future thinking” inSouth Korea],

Voice

(Tokyo), May 2004, pp. 145–51.18.

Tokyo Shimbun

[Tokyo Newspaper], July 3, 2004, p. 25.19. Japanese refer to him as Yon, because their language has no way of writing Yong.




771

Even when Koizumi took the initiative with North Korea along lines approvedby Seoul, the South Korean media were filled with warnings that Japan’s mo-tives were suspect. These views filtered back into Japan.

20

Indeed, the SouthKorean quest for purity casts doubt on half a century of postwar domestic pol-itics. On December 29, 2004, the National Assembly finally passed the speciallaw by which the PCIC was founded to investigate collaborators with the Jap-anese and to expose them and their offspring (in 1949 a prior commission hadbeen disbanded). The goal of completing unfinished business with regard tothe 36 years of Japanese occupation seemed, however, secondary to the objec-tive of revealing and in some way righting the injustice of postwar authoritar-ian politics and society. As noted above, during that period inequality restedheavily on what were regarded as unfair initial advantages. The term chosenfor those tainted by the past is the “pro-Japan faction.” There were, of course,voices warning that these “truth-finding” acts would not bring normalcy or im-prove national security. By the end of 2004, there were growing signs that SouthKorean-Japan relations could be sharply set back by actions bound to widenthe existing huge gap. Given Koizumi’s own populist inclinations and deter-mination to capitalize on nationalist causes regardless of fallout in the nationsthat had been Japan’s victims, the potential was enormous for events in Japanto become a spark that could incite the already aroused South Korean nation.

Japanese Politics in 2004

In 2002 Japanese were growing angrier about evidence of North Korean ab-ductions of ordinary citizens. This intensified in the fall after Kim Jong-il ad-mitted abductions had occurred but failed to provide evidence about abducteeswho had died or allow family members of the five who had returned to Japanto leave the North. As emotions grew more heated in 2003–04, it was clearthat they were not helpful in resolving the nuclear crisis or satisfying the Japa-nese public that their leaders had solutions to the problem. With Koizumieager to bolster support for the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in the upperhouse elections, another approach to handling the tense regional situationmight prove useful. If that failed, emotions could again be exploited: the ab-duction issue far exceeded the nuclear problem as a focus for media reportingand public anger.

In the spring of 2004, Koizumi, facing a personal scandal over his failure tomake payments into the national pension plan, wanted to divert national atten-tion on the eve of an election. He had earlier proved adept at playing on na-tionalism to boost his popularity; this time his gamble in visiting Pyongyang

20. Kang Songyun, “Nihon no Taiboku Dokuji Gaiko Kankoku ga Utagau ‘Fujun na Izu’,”[“Impure intentions” which South Korea suspects in Japan’s peculiar diplomacy toward the North],

Sentaku

[Choice], January 2003, pp. 108–09.



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before the July elections drew close scrutiny across Japan. Critics accused theprime minister of hastily arranging the trip to bring back family members ofJapanese who had been held hostage in order to shift attention away from hisdomestic agenda and problems. Trying to create an emotional surge that couldbring the LDP success and himself another two years in office, parts of thepress alleged that he had acted dangerously, ignoring the national interest aswell as sound advice from diplomats and high officials, as well as irritating hisallies in the Bush administration.

21

Koizumi supposedly used the “revisit NorthKorea card” after it became clear that he had failed to pay into the pension sys-tem and had settled for a curt reception at the expense of serving the nationalinterest.

22

In the first day after Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang, a survey found that com-pared to a week earlier public support for his cabinet had climbed nine pointsto 54%.

23

If editorial response varied, the trip appeared to have accomplishedthe critical goal of giving a pre-election boost to the LDP and its leader. Yet,editorial pages revealed that the only enthusiasm came from the political left.Supporters argued that Koizumi had put normalization talks back on track andexpressed hopes that personal ties would bring rapid resolution of problems.

24

If praise for the second Pyongyang summit fell short of that for the first, therewas no mistaking that the same extravagant hopes were quick to appear inpublic discourse.

In contrast, criticisms of the second Koizumi visit to Pyongyang came notonly from the right but increasingly from a wide political spectrum. The trip wasderided as a huge mistake that brought no success of any consequence. Sometook the view that it revealed Japan as weak because the trip violated the prin-ciple of alternating visits by political leaders. The assistance provided was costly.Moreover, the visit caused an emotional backlash at home when organizationsof hostage families responded angrily. Finally, critics warned that the summitmeant that Japan was abandoning for the foreseeable future its trump card ofeconomic sanctions that supposedly would pressure the North to change course.

25

Speculation was rife on the motives for Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang. Theweekly journal

Shukan Daiyamondo

asserted that—along with waning Koi-

21. Sakurai Yoshiko and Sato Katsumi, “Kokueki Hoki no Guko ga Kyushutsu no Michi oTozashita” [The folly of forsaking national interests has closed the path of deliverance],

Gendai

[Modernity] (Tokyo), July 2004, pp. 39–47.22. Kunihira Osami, “Maboroshi ni Owatta Yokoda Megumi san Shosoku Joho” [News of

Ms. Yokoda Megumi, which ended in an illusion], ibid., July 2004, pp. 130–35.23. Hiraiwa Shunji, “Rokusha Kyogi no naka de Nihon no Yakuwari ga Zodai” [Japan’s role

is increasing in the six-party meetings],

Ronza

[Seat of Discussion] (Tokyo), July 2004, p. 32.24.

Asahi Shimbun

, May 23, 2004, p. 17;

Nihon Keizai Shimbun

[Japan Economic Newspaper],May 23, 2004, p. 3; and

Mainichi Shimbun

, May 24, 2004, p. 11.25.

Sankei Shimbun

[Sankei Newspaper], May 24, 2004, p. 3.




773

zumi fever—the pension law and dispatch of troops to Iraq with little explana-tion had eroded LDP support. Koizumi had bartered with coalition partnerKomeito, acceding to its demand to put priority on pensions in return for acqui-escence in sending the Self-Defense Forces to Iraq. The journal said Koizumihad urgently sought the photos of a joyous family reunion for returned hostageHitomi Soga Jenkins prior to the elections. Such criticisms insinuated thatJapan’s prime minister acted strictly for his own narrow political ambitions.

26

The election results were inconclusive. The LDP fell short of its target, butnot so far as to threaten Koizumi’s claim to deserve another two years as partyhead and prime minister. The opposition Minshuto (Democratic) Party did wellbut did not break the hold on power of the LDP and its coalition partners; Min-shuto’s mix of left and right politicians delivered no clearcut message on policytoward the Korean Peninsula. Koizumi was free to renew his nationalist appealswithout regard to their impact—not only in China but also in South Korea.

Accusations against Koizumi’s “selfish” aims in going to Pyongyang sug-gest a parallel with critics’ remarks on Kim Dae-jung’s trip in June 2000. Kim’ssecret payment of about $500 million to the North that year was equated withan estimated $100 million in food and medical assistance from Japan, as wellas Tokyo’s promises not to resort to sanctions and to reopen normalizationtalks. Critics also argued that Koizumi failed to gain broad American under-standing of his diplomatic change of direction and may have endangered bilat-eral relations with the U.S.

27

When the Bush administration responded withunderstanding, recognizing that his trip would have little impact, this argumentcould not be sustained.

Many on the right now insisted that the time had come for sanctions againstthe North. After a second fruitless bilateral working group meeting in Septem-ber 2004 when the North failed to deliver on its promise to investigate and re-port on the circumstances of the acknowledged deaths of eight hostages, theycalled for cutting off the flow of money, restricting trade, and denying NorthKorean ships access to Japanese ports.

28

Many soured on Pyongyang’s eva-sive, even deceptive responses (such as handing over the supposed remains ofone hostage, which turned out to be incorrectly identified).

Outspoken Japanese seized on the abduction revelations by Kim Jong-il toblame politicians, bureaucrats, and media who had downplayed the serious-ness of the issue earlier, seemingly in haste to normalize relations with the

26. Suzuki Toichi, “Sangiin no tameni Kitachosen o Tsukatta Shusho no Ningensei” [Theprime minister’s human nature in cultivating North Korea for members of the upper house],

Shu-kan Daiyamondo

[Weekly Diamond], July 17, 2004, pp. 104–06.27. Shigemura Toshimitsu, “Kim Jong-il no Kosaku ni Maketa Nitcho, Nanboku Shuno

Kaidan no Shinjitsu” [The truth about the Japan-North Korea and North-South summit talks whichfailed due to the maneuvering of Kim Jong-il],

Sekai Shuho

, June 22, 2004, pp. 6–9.28. “Editorial,”

Yomiuri Shimbun

, September 27, 2004, p. 3.



774


North and provide it with assistance.

29

These critics charged that by showingweakness while pressing for peace and reconciliation at any price, the reputedleft-leaning establishment was perpetuating Japan’s status as a nation still crip-pled by its 1945 defeat. There was no longer any excuse not to revise the Con-stitution and use tools available to Japan such as economic sanctions againstthe North. Words such as “pro-North Korea faction” and “traitor” appeared in theright-leaning media.

30

By the beginning of 2003, the struggle for future lead-ership of the LDP focused on whether this outlook would be embraced. Stand-ing tough against the North—regardless of the ups and downs in the six-partytalks and in Koizumi’s back-channel discussions with Pyongyang officials—suggested a purity of spirit long missing in Japan. Not only did Koizumi notdisavow this emotional use of the North Korea issue, fueling the growing pop-ularity of Abe Shinzo, he kept the option open of offering his own support.

Shifting attention from the five returnees to the eight family members leftbehind and then to the fate of the hostages declared to have died or others sus-pected of having ended up in the North’s hands left no room for strategic think-ing sought by others in the six-party talks. Nor was there an avenue directly topursue normalization as part of a comprehensive approach sought by thosewith higher hopes for bilateral relations.

31

Some observers, believing that thehigh pitch of public emotions in Japan kept pressure on the North, were await-ing the moment when sanctions would be advisable.

32

Little attention was paidto the widening gap with South Korea, where many observers considered theU.S. and Japanese approaches to be too aggressive. Officials searched forways to entice the North Koreans back to the six-party talks as well as to anew round of bilateral meetings. Long before South Korea in June 2005 madeits offer to provide the North with electricity,

33

the gap was widening betweenthe contrasting postures of Japan and South Korea toward the nuclear crisis.Despite efforts to find common ground with the U.S., South Korean leadersopposed calls for sanctions, claiming that they would complicate efforts toresolve the nuclear standoff.

34

29. “Seiji Joho Kapuseru” [Political information capsule],

Sentaku

, January 2003, p. 49.30. Inagaki Takeshi, “‘Kitachosen Zoku’ no Dammatsuma” [The hour of death of the ‘North

Korean tribe’], Shokun [Gentlemen] (Tokyo), December 2002, pp. 74–78.31. Izumi Hajime, “Nozomareru Nitcho Seijoka Kosho no Saikai” [Reopening of Japan-North

Korean normalization negotiations which can be hopeful], Ajia Jiho [Asia Times], September2004, pp. 2–3.

32. “Nitcho Jitsumusha Kyogi no Arikata Minaoshie” [Toward reexamining the state of theJapan-North Korean working level meetings], Jiji Top Confidential (Tokyo), October 5, 2004, p. 13.

33. New York Times, July 14, 2005, p. A8.34. “Han-Mi Yangkook, Ilbonewi Daebuk Jejae Baneae” [Korean-U.S. responses to Japan’s North

Korean stance], Yonhap News Agency, Seoul, December 17, 2004, �http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/news/20041217/221700000020041217052202K4.html�.



GILBERT ROZMAN AND SHIN-WHA LEE 775

There were some signs of trouble in 2003–04 beneath the surface of coordi-nated efforts to show a united front toward the North led by the U.S. and de-spite Koizumi’s and Roh’s claims that bilateral relations were proceedingwell. Talk that Japan and South Korea could become allies came only fromthose in Japan who overlooked the anxiety on the other side.35 Little attentionwas given to what Japan still had to do to gain the confidence of Koreans. In-deed, many on the Japanese right felt threatened by the patriotic tone of SouthKorean enthusiasm for the North, blaming it on biased education without weigh-ing the impact in the South of Japanese or U.S. policy.36

One example was the campaign in late April and May 2004 to awaken Japa-nese to the import of the Roh impeachment effort, seen by many as a “politicalcoup d’état.” Led by the daily Sankei Shimbun, the campaign agonized overthe retreat of the old guard in the National Assembly with longstanding ties toJapan and expressed doubt over politicians’ promises that no change in for-eign policy would ensue. Warnings were issued about purported dangers fromthe Seoul government, whose election results were, according to one extremeview, in accord with instructions from the North.37 The distrust in this campaigncontrasted with the blasé attitude of most Japanese, who were reassured in 2004by the “shuttle diplomacy” of Koizumi and Roh that emphasized the impor-tance of South Korea-Japan relations.

In fact, the two leaders’ domestic and bilateral strategies were inherently con-tradictory. Some in Japan noted this, accusing Roh of resorting to anti-Japanesethemes to smash his conservative opponents while counting on the Japanesepublic to retain its strong pro-Korea mood. In meetings with Koizumi, Roh didnot touch on past problems in bilateral relations, but at home he rekindled asense of shame over history and called for a special commission to investigatethe suppression of democracy in Korea.38 Meanwhile, Koizumi stood firm inhis stance that the “history card” could no longer be used by Chinese andKoreans. He catered, through his cabinet appointments, to those who believedthat a “normal” Japan is one whose prime minister visits the Yasukuni Shrineand has no problem with textbooks that whitewash the war and occupationrecord of Japan. As relations with China, Russia, and North Korea worsenedin 2004, Koizumi took credit for ties with South Korea without regard to thetroubles that were brewing.

35. Shigemura Toshimitsu, “Rekishi-Sozosuru Nikkan Mirai Shiko” [Japan-South Korea fu-ture intentions which are creating history], Sekai Shuho, July 1, 2003, pp. 22–25.

36. Sankei Shimbun, September 27, 2004, p. 17.37. Ibid., April 19, 2004, p. 5; ibid., May 1, 2004, p. 17.38. “Roh Moo-hyun ‘Hannichi Rosen’ de Yoron wa Boso Sunzen da” [Just before public opin-

ion runs wild through Roh Moo-hyun’s “anti-Japanese path”] THEMIS (Tokyo), November 2004,pp. 100–01.



776 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLVI, NO. 5, SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2006

Deteriorating South Korea-Japan Ties in 2005

In January 2005, the second term of Bush’s administration began. Few doubtedthat this was a relief to Koizumi and a disappointment to Roh. In FebruaryNorth Korea declared that it was a nuclear power and would remain one. Thiswas a blow to the Japanese side, where talk of sanctions was spreading; it wasalso a wake-up call for the South Korea side, which redoubled its pursuit ofenticements for the North. Given the reticence of the revamped Bush foreignpolicy team to suggest a compromise and the extreme rhetoric from Pyong-yang, anxieties in Asia and America were on the rise. Against this backdrop,Tokyo made its priority for the year the reform of the United Nations SecurityCouncil, including the addition of Japan as a new permanent member. Seoulchose as its priority a more active foreign policy with the goal of strategicallyrepositioning South Korea vis-à-vis the U.S. and Japan to become a “bal-ancer” in Northeast Asia. Even before these unprecedented claims to powerreached a peak in March, it was difficult to miss the widening divide betweenthe two neighbors in their reach for new status.

In late February, the inflammatory territorial issue of Dokdo/Takeshima wasreignited. The assembly of Shimane Prefecture, located on the Japanese coastfacing South Korea, voted to declare an annual “Takeshima Day.” This fol-lowed the precedent of the 1981 Diet decision to declare an annual “NorthernTerritories” day, which served to rally support for the return of four islandsfrom the Soviet Union/Russia. When questioned about the disputed, uninhab-ited Takeshima/Dokdo islets between South Korea and Japan, Ambassador toSeoul Takano Toshiyuki reiterated Japan’s claim. Thus, Dokdo became the tip-ping point for Korean anger directed at Japan. During the annual remembranceof the March 1 movement against Japanese colonialism a few days later, Rohlambasted Japan for its handling of a wide range of history issues. Koreanswere energized after years of restraint to vent their anger against what they re-garded as provocations over historical and related territorial questions, whilethe Japanese were shocked that such minor incidents without central govern-ment coordination or intent should unleash a fury. Over the next months, thedownward spiral in relations continued. Roh’s letter to the Korean people ofMarch 23 called into question the entire process of normalization with Japan.Demonstrations in April in Chinese cities over the history issue left Japanesefeeling beleaguered by a seeming combination of Chinese and Koreans. TheJune 20 summit in Seoul between Roh and Koizumi may have sustained theschedule of shuttle diplomacy, but the mood was tense. In the first half of2005, these depressing developments riled both nations.

The second half of 2005 brought little amelioration. On September 11, Koi-zumi won a resounding victory in a daring snap election. On October 17, he




made another visit to the Yasukuni Shrine. Two weeks later, he named a newcabinet that included two hardliners toward Asia, Abe Shinzo and Aso Taru,who became chief cabinet secretary and foreign minister, respectively. On theother hand, Roh, saddled with an apparently too radical agenda, saw his pop-ularity plummet at home, including the complete defeat of the Uri Party inby-elections in October. Neither side met the other’s basic demands over thehistory issue.

Why were signs of trouble long overlooked in the years before 2005? First,public opinion in South Korea and Japan had long been antagonistic; lingeringsuspicions, especially among Koreans with memories of ruthless colonial rule,were regarded as a residue that would take time to disappear. Throughout thepast century, the Japanese people have been disliked, if not hated, by the Koreanpeople because of these cultural memories. In turn, many Japanese have longtended to look down on Koreans as “rough, uncouth, and backward people.”39

Even after the success in co-hosting the 2002 World Cup, over 40% of Japa-nese and 60% of South Koreans did not feel very friendly to the other country.About 83% of Koreans asserted that the controversial Japanese history text-books approved for middle school use in 2001 had hurt relations.40 A poll takenat the start of 2005 in celebration of the “Year of Friendship between Koreaand Japan” reported that 56% of Japanese consider South Korea to be an allyand 29% deem it a rival. In contrast, 63% of South Koreans see Japan as a com-petitor and only 29% as a friend.41

Second, leaders in each country found it convenient to accentuate the posi-tive. Japanese had been accustomed to downplaying Korean media criticismsand did so again, aware that most major Korean newspapers were harshly crit-ical of Roh, accusing him of being too soft on a traditional adversary. Roh,elected amid a wave of anti-Americanism, was fearful in the context of theNorth Korean nuclear crisis and fragile economic climate to antagonize eitherthe U.S. or Japan.

Third, there was positive news on people-to-people ties, suggesting a genu-ine break with the past. Most notable was the growth of travel, with 10,000Koreans a day visiting Japan and 20,000 Japanese visiting Korea.42 Moreover,the logic of realists, concentrating on threats, and liberals, looking at eco-nomic statistics, left no doubt that Japan and South Korea were bolstering

39. Korea Herald, December 14, 2004, p. 10.40. “Kaigai niokeru Tainichi Yoron Chosa Kekka” [The results of public opinion polls abroad

on Japan], Gaiko Forum [Diplomacy Forum], November 2004, p. 61.41. “More Japanese See Korea as Friend Than Foe: Poll,” Chosun Ilbo [Chosun Daily News],

January 4, 2005.42. “Ilbonkwa Jamae Kyeolyon Whalwungwharul Wihan Jwadamhyo” [A roundtable talk for

enhancing sisterhood with Japan], Globalization Review, January 30, 2004, �http://webzine.klafir.or.kr/read.htm?middle_title_no�69�.




their bilateral relations.43 Only those who followed Korean perceptions ofJapan and the shifting, politicized search for national identity in each countrywould have come to a different conclusion. Grassroots tendencies were morepromising than ever, but national leadership was behaving in a manner thatdefied claims to be bringing the nations closer together.

Korean ViewsMany in Korea are convinced that Koizumi is responsible for the deteriorationin ties and that he has been acting under the influence of a plan for revising theJapanese view of history that contradicted past assurances to Korea and hadthreatening implications for the future. The Korean public is wary that Japa-nese have not acknowledged past misconduct and still doubtful about thenature of future Japanese conduct. Indeed, many South Koreans have been in-furiated by what they perceive as Japan’s intention in school textbooks towhitewash its World War Two atrocities, including the forced sexual servicesof Korean women (known as “comfort women”) for Japanese soldiers duringthe war.44 Koizumi’s repeated visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, as well as Japa-nese claims over Dokdo, have also strained political and diplomatic relationswith Korea.

In this context, bilateral friction has erupted in a series of incidents thathave inflamed national politics on both sides. In January 2005, the KoreanForeign Ministry’s disclosure of declassified documents on the 1965 Korea-Japan normalization accord angered Korean victims of Japanese colonial rule,sparking talk of potential compensation lawsuits against Tokyo. The documentsreveal that the Park Chung-hee government agreed never to make further com-pensation demands, either at the government or the individual level, after receiv-ing an $800 million package of grants and soft loans from Japan. Althoughthis disclosure is unlikely to force the reopening of negotiations, it could causefriction if Korean civic groups press claims for compensation from individualsagainst Japan. Meanwhile, Japan was reported to have opposed the disclosurefor fear of its impact on normalization talks with North Korea.45

The deterioration of bilateral relations became serious in late February 2005when the island dispute rose to the fore. The Dokdo/Takeshima controversy,together with anger over the textbook issue and Koizumi’s continued shrinevisits, spurred an infuriated Korean public to nationwide anti-Japanese protests.

43. Tae-hyo Kim and Brad Glosserman, eds., The Future of U.S.-Korea-Japan Relations: Bal-ancing Values and Interests (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International StudiesPress, 2004).

44. “Kaigai niokeru Tainichi Yoron Chosa Kekka,” Gaiko Forum, p. 61; “Seoul Protests Japa-nese History Text,” JoongAng Daily (Seoul), August 27, 2004 �http://service.joins.com/�.

45. Korea Herald, January 18, 2005, p. 16.




These became entangled in domestic politics. On March 1, President Roh calledon Japan to make a sincere apology and offer compensation for its past wrong-doings. On March 23, he declared a virtual diplomatic war: “Now, the SouthKorean government has no choice but to sternly deal with Japan’s attempt to jus-tify its history of aggression and colonialism and revive regional hegemony.”46

Although Roh’s resolute statements, including criticism of Koizumi for theshrine visits, sparked some public support, his increasingly forceful approachhas been read by some observers as a “revolutionary shift in Seoul’s diplo-macy.”47 Roh’s March speech at a military academy, where he stressed SouthKorea’s balancing role in the geopolitics of Northeast Asia, can be understoodin the same vein. This statement was interpreted in part as reflecting the gov-ernment’s concern and dissatisfaction with Japan’s increasing military capa-bility and nationalistic posture, bolstered by the U.S. Some analysts took Roh’sspeech to mean that if Tokyo were to weaken its relationship with Seoul, Japanwould risk Korea advancing its ties with Beijing at the expense of Tokyo andWashington.48

Koreans are sharply divided over Roh’s statements. Liberal and indepen-dent-minded citizens have supported the basic direction and candor of the Rohadministration; conservatives have warned that Korea might be unprepared forthe diplomatic burden caused by the president’s reckless remarks. At issue iswhether the nation has the power and capability to back up Roh’s words. AmidAmerican doubts over the balancer role, in June—in advance of the 2005 Korea-U.S. summit—Deputy Foreign Minister Chun Young-woo described the U.S.as the “ultimate balancer” in Northeast Asia. Roh also stressed that his bal-ancer policy was designed to counter Japan’s efforts to boost its regional mili-tary capability and would not undermine South Korea-U.S. relations.49

Editorials in Japanese newspapers linked Roh’s statement to a rising senseof danger within his administration and a desperate effort to show the SouthKorean people that he was not helpless in international affairs.50 The Koreanmood remained unchanged even after Roh went to the White House on June10 for support in one last effort to reengage North Korea. This was followedby a promising visit to Pyongyang by his unification minister. The June 20 sum-mit with Koizumi ignored the negotiating challenges of the North returning to

46. Korea Times, March 24, 2005.47. Ibid.48. Erich Marquardt, “The Importance of Strong Relations between Japan and South Korea,”

in The Power and Interest News Report, April 6, 2005 (Chicago), �http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac�.

49. “S. Korea Urges New U.S. Effort toward N. Korea,” United Press International, �http://washingtontimes.com/upi-breaking/20050601-055132-2773r.htm�.

50. “Kankoku Daitoryo Ensetsu ni ‘Hanpatsu’ Tomadoi” [At a loss to “respond” to the speechof the Korean president], Jiji Top Confidential, March 11, 2005, p. 17.




the six-party talks in July as Roh “lectured” Koizumi incessantly about his-tory. While the North Korean nuclear crisis and great power relations couldhave been expected to draw South Korea and Japan closer together for realistreasons, their leaders unexpectedly were turning back to history to address looseends for political purposes.

Even amid quarrelsome bilateral relations in the year, a June poll showedthat 71.2% of Koreans considered Japan a country with which they needed tomaintain close ties based on economic and regional security interests. Theyounger the respondent cohort, the more its members favored closer bilateralties in the national interest: 80.3% in their 20s, 72.1% in their 30s, 72.6% intheir 40s, 68.4% in their 50s, and 58.8% in their 60s and older.51 Furthermore,on August 15, the 60th anniversary of the end of World War Two (and ofGwangbokjol, Korean liberation from Japanese rule), Koizumi apologized toChina and South Korea for Japan’s war wrongdoings. At a Gwangbokjol cere-mony,52 Roh refrained from explicit remarks deploring colonial rule—unlikein the previous two years. These episodes reflect the limits of nationalism,populism, and historical revisionism, yet they do not point the way back tomutual trust.53

Japanese ViewsMost Japanese were shocked by the March statements from Seoul harshly crit-ical of their country. The media, whether they supported Koizumi’s annualvisits to the Yasukuni Shrine or not, had little positive to say about calls to re-open the normalization agreement of 1965 and other unexpected demands byRoh. Analysts put the blame squarely on Roh and his populist methods, insist-ing that his approach to Japan was not a principled response but a calculatedappeal to lingering emotionalism in order to regain public support. If little no-tice was taken when in 2004 Roh turned to hunting down those who had col-laborated with Japan to boost the Uri Party’s popularity, his decision a yearlater to make a direct assault on the Japanese government made a strong im-pression. Critics charged that he was aiming to boost his ratings. Sometimesnoting that Koizumi also was displaying a strong populist streak and hadcaused some offense,54 they did not spare Roh from the bulk of the criticism.

51. Yet, only 23.8% of Koreans regard Japan as a neighbor with which they should maintain agood relationship in all aspects: only 14.3% of those in their 20s were in favor, while 29.9% ofthose in their 60s or older were in favor. See “Han-Il Kukkyo Jungsangwha 40 Junyon YeoronJosa: Ilkwa Kwankye, Kukike Ddaryaya 71%” [South Korean-Japan 40th anniversary of normal-ization public opinion survey], Munwha [Culture] Daily News (Seoul), June 20, 2005, re-quotedfrom �http://kr.blog.yahoo.com/dokdo92/2188.html�.

52. New York Times, August 16, 2005, p. A4.53. Shigemura Toshimitsu, “Rekishi–Sozosuru Nikkan Mirai Shiko,” pp. 22–25.54. Yomiuri Shimbun, June 8, 2005, p. 4.




One line of interpretation in Japan was that their country was Roh’s mostconvenient target. Given the fear that the increasingly fragile alliance with theU.S. would break apart, Roh exercised a lot of self-restraint in getting his fol-lowers not to demonstrate against the unpopular dispatch of troops to Iraqunder U.S. pressure. Worried that North Korea would harden its position andplunge the peninsula into a tense situation that could create a war scare, Rohtook pains not to arouse the public against increasingly provocative statementsfrom Pyongyang as well as against the U.S. posture, which was deemed toorigid. In the first months of 2005, Roh was seen in Japan as nervous that thetwo adversaries were hardening their positions on the nuclear crisis, leavingSouth Korea with little recourse. It seemed helpless to narrow the gap. Thepresident appeared to Japanese observers to be lashing out at their country inan attempt to offer Koreans some release of pent-up emotions and restore hisfading authority.

Roh has tended to focus more on public opinion at home than on the viewsof diplomats. Japanese Korea watchers think that he flustered these officialswith provocative claims—including the balancing role for Korea—implyingthat Seoul was planning to distance itself from the U.S. and change the powermap of Northeast Asia. Roh was accused of “amateurism” in diplomacy, espe-cially by losing restraint toward Japan.55 Most irksome to the Japanese was thesupport Roh garnered inside Korea, where his views found a receptive audi-ence.56 Yet, as noted above, other poll results showed there remained a prag-matic base in Korea desirous of maintaining stable ties. In September someJapanese opposition candidates charged that Koizumi’s failed Asian diplo-macy should lead voters to abandon the LDP. But the prime minister turnedthe elections into a referendum from which to “punish” LDP members who haddefied him and galvanize support for his reform plans. Problems with SouthKorea were not in the forefront, and Koizumi could continue on his earliercourse in international relations.

Charges that Roh is exploiting emotionalism toward Japan for populist rea-sons may overestimate his longing for approval, without adequately recogniz-ing his ideological fixation on what many in South Korea regard as historicaljustice. Behind the dispute, some in Japan recognize that the number one focusfor many Koreans is the legality of the treaty of annexation that abrogatedKorean sovereignty until 1945.57 This was not resolved in the 1965 normaliza-tion treaty. In 1995 the Korean National Assembly passed a bill declaring that

55. Asahi Shimbun, June 17, 2005, p. 4.56. A joint Japanese-Korean survey in May 2005 to mark the 40th anniversary of the normal-

ization of relations found that the number of South Koreans who distrust Japan had climbed fromabout 75% in 2002 to over 90%. Yomiuri Shimbun, June 10, 2005, p. 1.

57. Mainichi Shimbun, June 21, 2005, p. 15.




the 1910 annexation was not legal, but Japan refused to change its position, in-sisting that it was. In March 2005, Roh revived the issue, calling on Japan totake moral responsibility for the occupation. In the context of domestic historyand international relations, Roh is building a new historical framework thatdirectly contradicts the framework that many Koizumi supporters seek to es-tablish in their quest to make Japan a “normal” country. It is hard to see howthe simultaneous search in the two countries for a more assertive and proudnational identity focused on the past can be reconciled.

If Japanese continue to take the legalistic position that these issues were set-tled in 1965—and show no inclination to reopen talks with South Korea—thenthey need to understand that North Korea will drive a hard bargain over thesame issues. The optimism generated by the Pyongyang Declaration of Sep-tember 2002 when Koizumi visited Kim Jong-il was premised on an economi-cally desperate North agreeing in isolation to both diplomatic language anddevelopmental assistance along the lines Tokyo had established with other vic-tim nations, beginning with South Korea. This raised the hope that at last Japanwould realize the end of “postwar history.” Since then Japan has become moreisolated within Asia on historical matters. Should Japanese negotiators beginto meet with their North Korean counterparts in search of common languagefor diplomatic normalization, it seems likely that the region’s moral supportwould go to Pyongyang.

Viewing the growing rift in the light of historical revisionism popular withthe rising generation of leaders, observers find little reason for optimism. Oneexception is the emerging tendency among ordinary citizens to accept their closeneighbors without the old signs of emotionalism or discrimination.58 Howevercritically they perceive each other’s national identity, people are growingaccustomed to living side by side in close interaction.

Japanese who are committed to improving bilateral relations highlight theprogress already made in recognition of shared values. For instance, formerAmbassador to the Republic of Korea Ogura Kazuo praises cultural exchangeswhile warning that Korea’s 386 generation, the nucleus of Roh’s support, re-mains largely in the lower economic strata and could be easily inflamed againstJapan.59 He assumes that somehow, a deepening of exchanges can change thisoutlook. As a diplomat, Ogura neither blames Roh for lighting fires that arousehis followers nor criticizes Koizumi for causing provocations that undercut themessage of shared values that the exchanges are trying to convey. Even non-diplomats are generally resigned to vague appeals for cooperation, leaving itto the vocal right in Japan to assail Roh as needlessly causing trouble and tothe vocal left in South Korea to accuse Koizumi of willfully provoking their

58. Ibid., June 21, 2005, p. 14.59. Asahi Shimbun, June 20, 2005, p. 8.




country. Few had any hope that either leader could rebuild trust and good will,and expectations for Abe start at a very low level.

Even as Koizumi capped his tenure by visiting the Yasukuni Shrine on themost sensitive date of August 15, Abe was already meeting with South Koreanand Chinese representatives to see if his expected term as prime minister couldstart with fresh hopes. Some suggested that because his nationalist credentialswere unquestioned he could dispense with multiple Yasukuni visits. Yet, givenhis emphasis on national pride and constitutional revision, prospects for rec-onciliation were dim. With Roh’s term continuing to early 2008, Abe’s start inSeptember 2006 did nothing to dispel the gloom that had settled over Japanese-South Korean relations.

ConclusionsIn 2004 the foreign policy options for Japan and South Korea were quite lim-ited. After years of rising hope and political promises that the time had at lastarrived when abnormal dependency on the U.S. would cease, the reality wasdisappointing. National leaders and parliamentary majorities struggled with ini-tiatives that offered some semblance of taking charge. What mattered more wasnot success in handling the external environment but persuasion of a domesticaudience, with electoral consequences. Governmentally, Japan and its body pol-itic have veered to the right and South Korea and its body politic have movedtoward the left. (Many in the South no longer view North Korea as a threat.)Yet, surprising parallels can be discerned in the nature of the challenge thatwas faced and in some of the responses that were tried in the two countries.

The predominant sense in bilateral relations was futility. As seen even bydomestic critics, the problem was less the two national leaders than the inter-national environment. Both nations were squeezed between the brinkmanshipof Kim Jong-il and the assertiveness of George W. Bush. Fearful of undermin-ing alliances made all the more essential by the region’s security crisis, Rohand Koizumi had little choice but to dispatch troops to Iraq in proof of theirloyalty to the U.S., even if this was another reminder of their nations’ depen-dency. In the background, the meteoric rise of China was raising a new specterof dependency in Japan and frustrating its plans for regional influence. For-eign policy offered little cheer.

Political debates have grown increasingly emotional in both countries. Japan’sfrustrations are many, and Koizumi came to power appealing to nationalismrather than pragmatism to address them. Although the tone changed brieflywhen he went to Pyongyang in September 2002 and Moscow in January 2003,the trend has been to insist more stubbornly on Japan’s point of view. Simi-larly, frustration in South Korea gave rise to emotionalism, especially when Rohrode a wave of anti-American sentiment to election as president in December




2002. The next year, the nuclear crisis left Koizumi and Roh cautious aboutoffending foreign nations, but becoming participants in six-party talks begin-ning that August did not suppress rising fears of impotence. Consequently,South Korean and Japanese leaders both needed outlets for the surge in na-tional emotions: the fear of an unknown, insecure future and the conviction ofentitlement to redress past injustices. These responses can be seen in the harshJapanese reaction to the abduction issue and in the South Korean quest to ex-pose collaborators. South Korea’s publication in January 2005 of diplomaticmaterials on normalization 40 years earlier, and the contentious response bycitizens of both countries, is a case in point.

Besides the argument that Koizumi and Roh are each driven by fierce de-termination to change their own societies and by domestic politics that driveinternational relations, a separate logic holds that each is preoccupied with U.S.relations. Koizumi views the alliance with America as critical to a foreign pol-icy that faces Asia from a position of strength. In contrast, Roh deems the U.S.alliance to be a mixed blessing, limiting Seoul’s emergence as a power in Asiaand curbing its initiatives to reunite the Korean Peninsula. In the larger strate-gic picture, bilateral relations are secondary to linkages to U.S. power. Yet, thisstrategic calculus should not be construed as some sort of independent forcedistinct from the “intermestic politics” we have discussed above. In fact, it maybe best seen as an outgrowth of national identity politics, which limits the stra-tegic options available. Given the domestic agendas of both Roh and Koizumi,it was not easy for either to balance ties with the U.S. or Asian neighbors.

The nuclear crisis and great power relations could have been expected todraw South Korean and Japan closer together for realist reasons, toward an“alliance” to face a more threatening future. Instead, the politics of nationalidentity unexpectedly led the two nations back to history to address loose endsand in the process win domestic support for their respective top leaders. Fromthe 1950s to the 1980s, the LDP under the Yoshida doctrine staked its legiti-macy above all on rapid economic growth. Now the LDP leaders are strivingto reposition the party, to keep it in power indefinitely by promising to defendJapan through strong national security. In turn, South Korean anticommunismhas lost so much ground that the National Assembly is debating whether toabolish the National Security Law. The ruling Uri Party is trying to end the fre-quent turnover in political parties by establishing itself as the champion of uni-fication. With Japan and South Korea moving in opposite directions along thepolitical spectrum, bilateral relations at the government level are becoming moredifficult. Yet, there are compelling reasons to work together. New challengesare arising in the efforts to promote regional cooperation and to entice NorthKorea into the emerging region and a lasting security framework, while ulti-mately fostering confidence through a joint forward-looking approach betweenSouth Korea and Japan.



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Rozman Vitual Alliance