Aff Blocks

AT: Permanent Digital Memory Good

DIGITAL REMEMBERING UNDERMINES BIOLOGICAL FORGETTING WHICH IS NECESSARY FOR LEARNING AND DECISION-MAKINGViktor Mayer-Schonberger, Professor Internet Regulation-Oxford, 2009, Delete: the virtue of forgetting in the digital age, p. 116-9Why exactly we, like Jane, have difficulties sequencing events with the perspective of time in mind is not yet clear. One possible key to understanding this seeming deficiency of ours is human forgetting. By letting our memory of past events fade over time, we already have in place a perfectly functioning mechanism that puts these in a temporal perspective. Because biological forgetting is built into our human physiology, through the millennia of human evolution we never had to develop an alternative cognitive ability to correctly valuate events in our past. Such an explanation fits with how evolution generally works, as a pragmatic and conservative process. Preference is given to the tried and tested method, the one that already works, rather than a more complex (and thus potentially error-prone) alternative. In our case, this may have left us with biological forgetting, rather than the ability for a detailed cognitive understanding of time past. As we undermine biological forgetting through the use of digital memory, we make ourselves vulnerable to indecision or incorrect judgment, just like Jane. This is the curse of digital remembering. It goes much beyond the confines of shifts in information power, and to the heart of our ability as humans to act in time. In Borges' short story, Funes cannot help remembering every detail of every moment of his life. Incapable of forgetting, Funes remains forever caught in his memories, unable to think. "To think," Borges writes, "is to ignore or forget differences, to generalize, to abstract. Since his accident, Funes is condemned to only see the trees, and never the forest. In the teeming world of Ireneo Funes there was nothing but particulars." Perfect remembering for Borges threatens to afflict its victim with a never-receding cacophony of information from which no clear abstract thought emerges, that thus imprisons those afflicted like Marcel Proust in his Search of Lost Time -- whereas human forgetting is the very quality that lets us rise above the particular to grasp the general. Without our ability to forget, whenever faced with a decision we would always recall all our past decisions, resulting in potential indecision, much as how AJ, the woman with near perfect memory, describes it. "I remember good, which is very comforting," AJ says. "But I also remember bad -- and every bad choice. And I really don't give myself a break. There are all these forks in the road, moments you have to make a choice, and then it's ten years later, and I'm still beating myself up over them. I don't forgive myself for a lot of things. Your memory is the way it is to protect you. I feel it just hasn't protected me. [...] Most people have called what I have a gift, but I call it a burden." And later, in her recently published autobiography, AJ writes "Though people tend to think of forgetting as an affliction and are disturbed by the loss of so much memory as they age, I've come to understand that there is a real value to being able to forget a good deal about their lives. Seen this way, forgetting is not an annoying flaw but a life-saving advantage. As we forget, we regain the freedom to generalize, conceptualize, and most importantly to act. Take Jane, before reading her old emails, she saw John as a friend. Her mind had forgotten the old conflict, precisely because it was no longer important, because the value of its memory was superseded by later and contradicting events. A relatively crude mechanism, biological forgetting led Jane to assume that John and she were friends. Digital memory on the other hand had brought back forgotten information, causing Jane to become conflicted in her judgment, lose decisiveness, and be in danger of perhaps choosing inaccurately. Moreover, forgetting may be instrumental for the process of learning. As organizational learning expert William Starbuck writes, learning something completely new requires that one first "unlearns" the old and obsolete. Biological forgetting is a tremendously simple and elegant way of such unlearning. In contrast, digital memory may keep our remembering of existing knowledge so current that are ability to learn is inhibited. Thus, as we expand the use of external memory through digital remembering, we endanger human reasoning a number of ways. Three of them I have already mentioned. First, external memory may act as a memory cue, causing us to recall events we thought we had forgotten. If human forgetting is at least in part a constructive process of filtering information based on relevance, a recall triggered by digital memory of an event that our brain has "forgotten" may undermine human reasoning. Second, comprehensive digital memory may exacerbate the human difficulty of putting past events in proper temporal sequence. Third, digital remembering may confront us with too much of our past and thus impede our ability to decide and act in time (similar to what AJ and Funes experienced), as well as to learn. The fourth danger is that when confronted with digital memory that conflicts with our human recollection of events, we may lose trust in our own remembering. As outlined in chapter 2, humans remember remarkably well, but our memory does not leave stored information untouched. Recall is not like taking a book off a library shelf, which after dusting it off a bit, contains the exact same information as at the time we put it there. Recall is retrieving from a corpus of memories that is ever changing, and which is reconstructed by our mind to take into account subsequent experiences, preferences, and biases. Despite having been rewritten many times, humans trust their memories, and thus trust in the past they remember. At times, this leads to disconcerting situations in which two people have two very different recollections of a past event. We find such situations annoying, and our brain helps us overcome them by tending to focus on the parts our memories have in common, rather than those that differ. Such divergences of the past we remember will happen much more frequently and bluntly when we are confronted with digital memory that deviates from our own recollection. Who should we trust in such a situation -- our mind of the external memory? Logic tells us the latter, although our intuition tempts us to believe in ourselves. As digital remembering relentlessly exposes discrepancies between factual bits and our very own human recall, what we may lose in the process is the trust in the past as we remember it.

DIGITIZED MEMORY UNDERMINES PERSONAL AUTONOMY AND GROWTHMeg Leta Ambrose, et al, Fellow Computer Science, University of Colorado, 2013, "Redemption: the Future of Forgiveness in the Internet Age", Santa Clara Computer & High Technology Law Journal, 29 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech L.J. 99, p. 114-5Autonomy, creativity, and liberty are promoted when an individual is allowed to re-define himself, to change, to be something other than popular perceptions of him. In his book, Delete, professor and privacy expert Viktor Mayer-Schonberger explains that "digital memory" denies the possibility of individual evolution; our past transgressions, such as reckless behaviors characteristic of our teenage years, become conflated with the more commendable accomplishments of our adult life. n91 If forgiveness is tied to change, digital memory impedes forgiveness because "there may be little incentive to actively work on escaping one's caste and breaking out of one's mold."

AT: OppressionTurn: Permanent Digital memory is bad because SUBSTITUTING DIGITAL MEMORY FOR BIOLOGICAL MEMORY MAKES US VULNERABLE TO TYRANNYViktor Mayer-Schonberger, Professor Internet Regulation-Oxford, 2009, Delete: the virtue of forgetting in the digital age, p. 120-1Of course, this may not necessarily be all bad. As I have suggested, human memory is not perfect; frequently it fails us. In such situations digital memory may be beneficial, since we may force ourselves when memory discrepancies arise to trust digital memory rather than our own. Trusting the past as we remember it would be replaced by trusting the past as it is reflected in digital memory. While requiring great discipline, it offers the advantage of converging memory -- that the past we trust in is the same others trust as well. But trusting digital memory more than our own human recollection exposes us to yet another challenge; what if external memory itself (digital memory in particular) is not unalterable, but can be modified after the fact, and thus does not necessarily represent an accurate rendition of a past event? If we all trust the same source, we are all equally vulnerable to its alterability. Exercising control over a society's past is a hallmark of dictatorial regimes -- even if that entails forging public documents. For example, in the Soviet Union, graphic artists were tasked with retouching disgraced comrades out of public photographs, thereby erasing evidence of their presence -- even their existence -- from shared external memory. Written more than a century ago, George Orwell's 1984 lays out in eloquent and shocking detail what happens to a society in which the past is no longer controlled by each individual, but made malleable by the central authorities of the ruling regime. In such a society, Orwell explains, "history is continuously re-written. This day-to-day falsification of the past, carried out by the Ministry of Truth, is as necessary to the stability of the regime as the work of repression and espionage carried out by the Ministry of Love [...] The past is whatever the records and the memories agree upon. And since the Party is in full control of all records and in equally full control of the minds of its members, it follows that the past is whatever the Party chooses to make it. It also follows that though the past is alterable, it never has been altered in any specific instance. For when it has been recreated in whatever shape is needed at the moment, then this new version is the past, and no different past can ever have existed." If we replace the trust in our past with the trust in digital memory, dictatorial regimes will no longer have to control our minds. Controlling the externalized memory of our collective past will suffice. And Orwell's dystopian vision may become much more likely. ALTERING DIGITAL MEMORY FEASIBLEViktor Mayer-Schonberger, Professor Internet Regulation-Oxford, 2009, Delete: the virtue of forgetting in the digital age, p. 121Altering external memories no longer requires sophisticated graphic artists as in the Soviet Union, or eloquent censors as in Orwell's 1984. Wikipedia, the impressive online encyclopedia hundreds of millions use frequently, can be altered by anybody who so desires. Many errors are quickly spotted, but by far not all of them -- as a growing list of cases demonstrates. With widely available digital photo software like Adobe Photoshop Elements, even the most casual users can alter a digital image to make faces smile when they did not, or to retouch dimples and wrinkles. In fact, a small cottage industry of services now exists that offers to retouch ex-spouses out of holiday photos and group shots. Thus, in the world of digital memory, no longer is it only Big Brother that can alter the past -- it is everyone. Tyranny outweighs negative impacts because it oppresses all people and harms more than the negative

AT: CensorshipTurn: RTBF censors more because FAILURE TO PROTECT DATA PRIVACY CAUSES PEOPLE TO NOT DISCLOSE INFORMATION -- TURNS ALL THE EXPRESSION IMPACTSMeg Leta Ambrose, Fellow-Harvard Berkman Center for Internet and Society, 2013, "It's About Time: Privacy, Information, Life Cycles, and the Right to Be Forgotten," Stanford Technology Law Review, Winter, 16 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 369, p. 398Whether a Preservationist or Deletionist, the above persistence research shows that intervention is necessary to promote either perspective; a lack of intervention represents another perspective in and of it itself. While all information that lands online will not remain there forever, more information finds itself online and may land on a site that maintains its content for a very long time. This information may be truly harmful to reputation and identity, but also may (have) create(d) a norm of non-disclosure that negatively impacts society on a larger scale. The engagement in self-presentation, according to David Velleman, is what it means to be a person. "The person conceives of himself as dynamic and as trying to improve himself morally." n195 Just the threat of digital permanence may prevent what John Stuart Mill called "experiments in living." n196 Without control of self-presentation and room for experimentation, moral autonomy suffers. In order to prevent this type of self-stagnation, limiting access to or deleting personal information from the past has been proposed. Combating permanent information with a right to delete results in take it or leave it options for policy-makers -- they must choose to either support access and expression or privacy and reinvention. Instead, I suggest a more nuanced analysis of old information. Determining whether self-stagnation harms caused by access to personal information, or a lack of control over the flow of personal information, outweigh the value of the aged information requires a closer look at how information changes.

LACK OF DIGITAL PRIVACY PROTECTIONS HAS A CHILLING EFFECTViktor Mayer-Schonberger, Professor Internet Regulation-Oxford, 2009, Delete: the virtue of forgetting in the digital age, p. 110-1Yet Stacy did not criticize the state, and it was not the government that prevented her from getting a teacher's certificate. Rather it was an expression -- the "drunken pirate" photo on her web page -- intended for her friends, but received by a private third party (her supervisor). Perhaps some would argue that this lesson serves her well -- that she should grow up and stop posting silly pictures on the Internet. But what behavior can we reasonably expect will keep us out of trouble? I would not have thought that Stacy's picture with pirate hat and mug in hand was so offensive as to prevent her from getting her teacher's certificate; neither had Stacy. But once we realize that information can reach anyone, we'll err on the side of caution, and if in doubt censor ourselves rather than risk incalculable damage. Of course, this is not new. In the analog age, however, information remained more compartmentalized, harder to access by unintended recipients, and was more deniable. Digital remembering, on the other hand, makes much more information accessible to many more recipients for vastly different purposes, while being perceived as undeniably precise and objective. Stacy's case highlights how the power derived from access to information can lead one to consider self-censorship, a behavior prompted by the accessibility of digital remembering. Andrew Feldmar's case stresses another element. He failed to realize the durability of digital remembering. He got in trouble not because somebody else read his article, but because somebody else read his article years after he had written it. If in hindsight Stacy should have self-censored after considering who, in addition to her friends, might access her web site, Andrew should have constrained his writing based on an unforeseeable future. This makes Andrew's case even more troubling. If we have to imagine how somebody years -- perhaps decades into the future -- may interpret and weigh our words, we would be even more careful in formulating them. If Stacy's case is part of a spatial version of Bentham's panopticon, in which she does not know who watches her but must assume she is watched by everybody, Andrew's story exemplifies an even more constraining temporal panopticon. Will our children be outspoken in online equivalents of school newspapers if they fear their blunt words might hurt their future career? Will we protest against corporate greed or environmental destruction if we worry that these corporations may in some distant future refuse doing business with us? In democracies, individuals are both citizens and consumers. They engage in economic transactions, and take sides on public issues. At times, they may find themselves opposing what their transaction partners may advocate. In the analog world, if a person wasn't particularly outspoken, one could easily do both: engage and oppose a transactional partner. Take automobile companies. One can easily buy a car and still advocate for higher emission standards opposed by car manufacturers. Suppose transactional partners knew our views much more precisely. Would they still transact with us, offer us the best price, perhaps even employ us? Just the thought that they might not, may constrain our willingness to act as consumers, let alone citizens. AT: Freedom of Speech/ Civil Rights

TURN: RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN ESSENTIAL TO INDIVIDUAL'S PARTICIPATIING IN SOCIETY AND CONTRIBUTING THEIR SPEECHLilian Mitron & Maria Karyda, Professors at University of Aegean-Department of Information & Communication System Engineering, 2012, "EU's Data Protection Reform and the right to be forgotten -- A legal response to a technological challenge?" paper presented in the 5th International Conference of Information Law and Ethics, [http://www.academia.edu/5350559/EU_s_Data_Protection_Reform_and_the_right_to_be_forgotten_-A_legal_response_to_a_technological_challenge], p. 7-10Perfect and precise remembering affects the claim of individuals to live and act without leaving permanent traces or shadows and in this perspective interferes with a crucial element of information privacy. Information storage ad perpetuum affects a right that is at the very centre of the informational privacy: the right to informational self-determination, the right to control the use of her own information25. Due to the persistency of information and the absence of forgetting individuals are steadily confronted with their past26. They cannot escape it or re-create their present and/or future27. Andrade emphasizes the relationship of the right to be forgotten and the identity perspective by arguing that the right to oblivion serves not only to be hidden from society but also as an instrument through which individuals correct and re-project their images to society [Andrade 2011]. As everyone depends upon others and their perceptions to engage in social or professional transactions, long-lasting or perpetual information that brands a person, affects often irrevocably - relationships, social status, current and future employment that person. A lost or damaged reputation may have serious impact on the ability of a person to engage in communicative processes and in the final analysis - in society. Persons are not only deprived from the opportunity of a new start: Accessibility and durability of information may lead to self-censorship and (digital but not only) abstinence from activities28: if every act or opinion expressed can be easily recorded and recalled, persons may hesitate to act and to participate in social and public life, which in turn affects the development of democratic citizens [Blanchette and Jonhson 2003].

The Internets elitarian bias and radicalism precludes a healthy public sphereKuebler 11 (Johanne Kuebler, contributor to the CyberOrient journal, Vol. 5, Iss. 1, 2011, Overcoming the Digital Divide: The Internet and Political Mobilization in Egypt and Tunisia, http://www.cyberorient.net/article.do?articleId=6212)

While the question of universal access to the Internet remains problematic in practice, it can be argued that the Internet as an inherently interactive medium can reinsert the lost social aspect into Habermas' public sphere, meaning that individuals engage in direct, critical dialogue (Norris 2001). This claim rests on the assumption that the Internet's audience is radically different than that of the mass media, that Internet users are the rational, debate-loving citizens characteristic of the public sphere. However, studies have pointed to shortcomings of the Internet, mainly in terms of universal access and unrestricted discussions, because access tends to be dependent on the economic situation, education and ethnicity (Cheeseman Day et al. 2005). In addition, the Internet is far from radically changing the media consumption habits of its users because Internet publishers often post mass-media content (Cavanagh 2007:62). Furthermore, Internet enthusiasts struggle with the fact that the Internet still has a strong elitarian bias, especially in developing countries. While the Internet has become increasingly widespread in the Western world, ten years ago it used to be characterised by a "strong bias toward affluent males with a high degree of cultural capital," and therefore this new public space was considered to be highly elitist (Dahlgren 2001:47). In its exclusive character, the early Internet is actually close to the Habermasian prototype of the bourgeois public sphere. However, while limitations for participation in Habermas' model are supposedly temporary, conceptions of online life as an "online citizenry" is not supposed to be universal and is synonymous to an intellectual vanguard (Katz 1997). This category of Internet users is politically aware and actively involved in online communities using the Internet's interactive and participative tools. Since the Internet access in developing countries is even more restricted to an elite than in Western countries, the conception of the netizen as an avant-garde might be even more accurate. However, while Katz points to values such as libertarian ideals, individuality, materialism, tolerance, anti-authoritarianism and a belief in rational debate, nowadays groups with anti-liberal positions such as radical Islamists know very well how to use the Internet for their purposes. For example, the Muslim Brothers have recently started to use 'wikis' to document their own history on the Web[1] (Morozov 2010). If the once praised "new middle class" in authoritarian Arab countries clings to their political positions, the massification of education in the contemporary Muslim world and elsewhere has led to the emergence of new actors and the Internet provides them with a platform to express their beliefs outside of established authority structures (Anderson 2003:47; Eickelman 1992).AT: Constitution

1. The Constitution is only a moral guide in the US, so it doesnt mean that RTBF ought not be a right in all other places2. Just because it cannot be implemented in the US, it doesnt mean it ought not. 3. AT: Freedom of Speech

AT: Right To InformUSING SPEECH AND PUBLIC RIGHT TO KNOW TO TRUMP INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY PRODUCES A PANOPTICON BEYOND IMAGINATIONLilian Mitron & Maria Karyda, Professors at University of Aegean-Department of Information & Communication System Engineering, 2012, "EU's Data Protection Reform and the right to be forgotten -- A legal response to a technological challenge?" paper presented in the 5th International Conference of Information Law and Ethics, [http://www.academia.edu/5350559/EU_s_Data_Protection_Reform_and_the_right_to_be_forgotten_-A_legal_response_to_a_technological_challenge], p. 16In this context a balance should be also struck between the right not to be confronted with the past and the (social and scientific) requirements for preserving collective memory. The right to be forgotten risks to clash with the (historical) interest of archiving every available information. In this perspective we have to take into account the changes in the perceptions and methods of historical research and collective memory. It seems to be an interdisciplinary interest on recording every-day life46. Availability and storage capacity have contributed to the trend to archive every available information for possible future use. Apparently, the right to be forgotten cannot be synonymous with a right of a total erasure of history. However, on the other side the interests of social and historical inquiry does not legitimize keeping every piece of personal information regardless the rights and interests of the persons affected. Appealing constitutionally embedded freedom of speech should not, however, serve as a pretence or excuse for extensive data collection, retention and use through Online Network Sites and Search Engines producing a panopticon beyond anything Bentham ever imagined47.PUBLIC RIGHT TO THE INFORMATION FADES WITH TIMECecile de Terwange, Law Professor, University of Namur, Belgium, 2012, "Internet Privacy and the Right to Be Forgotten/Right to Oblivion", Monograph: VII International Conference on Internet, Law & Politics, February, [], p. 111This right is in conflict with the right to information, time being the criterion to resolve the conflict. The right to oblivion must give priority to the requirements of the right to information when the facts revealed present a topical interest for disclosure, so interest is linked to the newsworthiness of the facts. This occurs when a decision pronounced by a court or a tribunal is part of judicial news. It is then legitimate to refer to this decision, mentioning parties names (except if they are minors, in which case different rules of protection apply). But with time, when it is no more a question of news or current events, and as long as there is no longer a justification for re-disclosure of the information as news, the right to oblivion overrides the right to information. There may still be mention of the case, but this should not include parties names or specific details. So the newsworthiness of a case tips the balance in favour of the right to disseminate instead of the right to oblivion, but as soon as it is no longer newsworthy, the scales tip the other way.

EU'S RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN CONTAINS EXEMPTIONS TO PROTECT INFORMATION THAT HAS IMPORTANT SOCIAL VALUE OR IS IN THE PUBLIC INTERESTRobert G. Larson, Professor of Journalism, U. Minnesota, 2013, "Forgetting the First Amendment: How Obscurity-Based Privacy and a Right to be Forgotten are Incompatible with Free Speech," Communication Law and Policy, 18 (1), 91-120, p. 105-6Despite the apparent strength of the European Commissions proposed right to be forgotten, some limitations and exceptions exist. Retention of personal data is permitted for reasons of public interest in the area of public health,110 for compliance with legal obligations, and where the controller no longer needs the personal data for the accomplishment of its task but they have to be maintained for purposes of proof.112 Retention is also permitted for historical, statistical and scientific research purposes,113 but only in two situations:(a) these purposes cannot be otherwise fulfilled by processing data which does not permit or not any longer permit the identification of the data subject; or (b) data enabling the attribution of information to an identified or identifiable data subject is kept separately from the other information as long as these purposes can be fulfilled in this manner.114A further exemption exists for exercising the right of freedom of expression, 115 which provides for the processing of personal data carried out solely for journalistic purposes or the purpose of artistic or literary expression in order to reconcile the right to the protection of personal data with the rules governing freedom of expression.116 And although the terms freedom of expression, journalistic purposes, and artistic or literary expression are not defined, item 121 of the recitals explains that:"This should apply in particular to processing of personal data in the audiovisual field and in news archives and press libraries . . . . Member States should classify activities as journalistic . . . if the object of these activities is the disclosure to the public of information, opinions or ideas, irrespective of the medium which is used to transmit them. They should not be limited to media undertakings and may be undertaken for profit-making or for non-profit making purposes."This expansive description of journalistic activities would appear to cover virtually all public disclosures, as it is arguably the purpose of every public disclosure to disseminate information, opinions or ideas. But such a broad exemption would eviscerate the earlier privacy protections, and it is inconceivable that the European Commission dedicated 119 pages to the creation of rights which are powerless in the face of a two-paragraph exception. It may be that the proposed General Data Protection Regulation is intended as a consumer protection, limiting data brokers and related practices while allowing individuals more freedom. If that is the case, however, one wonders why that fact was not made clear in the accompanying explanatory memorandum.AT: Criminals dont take responsibility

RIGHT TO OBLIVION NECESSARY TO HOLD PERPETRATORS MORALLY ACCOUNTABLEBjorn Krondorfer, Professor of Religion - St. Mary's University, 2008, "Is Forgetting Reprehensible? Holocaust Remembrance and the Task of Oblivion," Journal of Religious Ethics, 36:2, p. 254-5Despite the perpetrators lack of risk-taking, which is evidenced in the historical record, it is important on conceptual and moral grounds to hold on to the possibility that they are capable of truly recognizing their culpability. Oddly, the notion of oblivion as the life force of memory may help to comprehend the discrepancy between historical record and moral claim. If the refusal of perpetrators to remember and thereby acknowledge their moral failure is indeed rooted in their past blindness as well as in the powerful force of shame in the present, then oblivion is necessary for perpetrators to continue living with themselves in a post-genocidal present. Put differently, oblivion on the part of perpetrators is the refusal of a memory that requires the acknowledgment of ones own moral failure. It is ultimately a resistance to the spillage of shame. Paradoxically, such a refusal or resistance on the part of the perpetrator renders him human (rather than a monster). It is in his humanness (because he wants to continue living and be perceived as a basically decent person) that he cannot accept the crushing weight of shame. It is here that the perpetrator is granted his moral agency, even if he failed such agency. In their failed humanity, perpetrators emerge in their subjectivity not outside the human condition (as monsters), but within. This observation leads to a counterintuitive conclusion: for perpetrators to be morally accountable, they must be granted the right to be human and hence the right to oblivion.The consequences are disturbing. As much as one may wish a genocidal perpetrator to admit culpability, it might be unrealistic to expect from him a demonstration of his ability for human compassion by asking him not to forget. Suspending the role of oblivionthat which assists in his efforts of self-preservationwould be to take away his identity, his life. Having to face ones shame, without protective mental operations, has the power to wipe out a persons existential grounding. If not suicide, then social death would be the unavoidable outcome. From a victims perspective, this may be a risk worth taking, since one can legally and morally argue that genocidal perpetrators have forfeited their rights to life anyway. From a perpetrators perspective, the means to circumvent a memory that would lead to recognizing the face of the other and to acknowledging their own shameful agency is to resist such memory or to perceive it as an external force imposed on them by the victors.What a functioning justice system can do in a post-genocidal situation is to enforce the true naming of the crime and prosecute the true nature of the crime, and hence establish a documented and archival remembrance. What it cannot do is to coerce a perpetrator into remembering rightly. Although the moral demand for individual perpetrators to remember rightly and repent publicly cannot be abandoned, to ask them to reveal their humanness by willingly not to forget the totality of memory (that is, to recall the human faces of their victims as well as their own human choices) means, in fact, to require them to grow beyond themselves, to become exceptionally human. Such exceptional cases exist, but rarely. If the perpetrators remember rightly, Volf suggests in his theological wrestling with remembering, forgetting, and forgiving, the memory of their wrongdoing will help restore their guilty past and transform it into the soil on which a more helpful future can grow (Volf 1996, 131). The empirical evidence flouts such theological hope, and the generation of perpetrators usually goes to the grave without public repentance. The task of remembering rightly, then, will have to fall onto other peopleOnly irrelevant links will be removed from the internet, not crimes and suchKravets, 14; Senior Editor at Ars Technica; Google has removed 170,000-plus URLs under right to be forgotten edict; Oct. 10, 2014; http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/10/google-has-removed-170000-plus-urls-under-right-to-be-forgotten-edict/ Google says it has removed 170,706 URLs in the wake of a European high court ruling in May requiring search engines to take down inadequate, irrelevant, or no longer relevant materials from search results upon request by EU citizens. In all, the search giant said it has already been asked to remove about half a million URLs from its search results, and it has removed about 42 percent of them, according to its latestTransparency Reportpublished Thursday. "In evaluating a request, we will look at whether the results include outdated or inaccurate information about the person," the report said. "Well also weigh whether or not theres a public interest in the information remaining in our search resultsfor example, if it relates to financial scams, professional malpractice, criminal convictions or your public conduct as a government official (elected or unelected). Our removals team has to look at each page individually and base decisions on the limited context provided by the requestor and the information on the webpage. Is it a news story? Does it relate to a criminal charge that resulted in a later conviction or was dismissed?" The European Court of Justiceruledin May that European residents have the "right to be forgotten"to make Internet search engines remove links that contain information deemed incomplete or inaccurate.

AT: Forgetting Bad"FORGETTING" KEY MAKING LIFE BEARABLECecile de Terwange, Law Professor, University of Namur, Belgium, 2012, "Internet Privacy and the Right to Be Forgotten/Right to Oblivion", Monograph: VII International Conference on Internet, Law & Politics, February, [], p. 114Recently, the right to be forgotten has been at the heart of intense debates, related in the press, in official reports, political statements, and in blogs, etc. The concern expressed is about the appropriateness of extending the existing right to be forgotten in response to the situations born from the development of the Internet environment. According to the French CNIL president, what is at stake with the rethinking of the right to oblivion is to bring back a natural function, forgetting, that renders life bearable.

FORGETTING NECESSARY FOR LIFE IN GENERALViktor Mayer-Schonberger, Professor Internet Regulation-Oxford, 2009, Delete: the virtue of forgetting in the digital age, p. 21-2Forgetting is not only central to our human experience, it is important for many other living beings, perhaps for life in general. In fact, the difficulty of remembering may be an implicit result for the second law of thermodynamics, one of the most fundamental rules of nature. It states that in our universe (as a thermodynamic system) randomness is bound to increase. There is nothing we can do about it. Of course, we can deliberately eliminate some of that randomness -- for example, by putting gas molecules back into a sealed container. But doing so requires effort -- energy in physicists' terms -- which lead to more overall randomness (not inside the container but outside it) than we had when we started. Creating memory is producing some kind of order within our brain, which requires energy. Forgetting, on the other hand, can also be random, devoid of high energy-consuming ordering. Fundamentally, therefore, physics also tells us that remembering, unlike (random) forgetting, is always costly. FORGETTING NECESSARY FOR GOOD DECISION MAKING -- MUST BE ABLE TO CHALLENGE PERMANENT DIGITAL REMEMBERINGViktor Mayer-Schonberger, Professor Internet Regulation-Oxford, 2009, Delete: the virtue of forgetting in the digital age, p. 12-4Forgetting plays a central role in human decision-making. It lets us act in time, cognizant of, but not shackled by, past events. Through perfect memory we may lose a fundamental human capacity -- to live and act firmly in the present. Jorge Luis Borges' short story Funes, the Memorius lays out the argument. Due to a riding accident, a young man, Funes, has lost his ability to forget. Through ferocious reading, he has amassed a huge memory of classic works in literature, but fails to see beyond the words. Once we have perfect memory, Borges suggests, we are no longer able to generalize and abstract, and so remain lost in the details of our past. What Borges only hypothesized, we now know. Researchers have recently published the case of AJ, a 41-year-old woman in California, who does not have the biological gift of forgetting. Since she was 11, she remembers practically every day -- not in the sense of a day that passed, but in astonishing, agonizing detail. She remembers what exactly she had for breakfast three decades ago; she recalls who called her and when, and what happened in each episode of the television shows she watched -- in the 1980s. She does not have to think hard. Remembering is easy for her -- her memory is "uncontrollable, and automatic" like a movie "that never stops." Instead of bestowing AJ with a superb facility, her memory repeatedly restricts her ability to decide, and to move on. It seems that those that have the capacity to store and recall unusual amounts of what they experience, feel and think, would like to be able to turn off their capacity to remember -- at least temporarily. They feel shackled by their constantly present past, so much so that it constrains their daily lives, limits their decision-making ability, as well as their capacity to forge close ties with those who remember less. The effect may be even stronger when caused by more comprehensive and easily accessible external digital memory. Too perfect a recall, even when it is benignly intended to aid our decision-making, may prompt us to become caught up in our memories, unable to leave our past behind, and much like Borges' Funes, incapable of abstract thoughts. It is the surprising curse of remembering. Forgetting is not just an individual behavior. We also forget as a society. Often such societal forgetting gives individuals who have failed a second chance. We let people try out new relationships, if their previous ones did not make them happy. In business, bankruptcies are forgotten as years pass. In some instances, even criminals have their convictions expunged from their record after sufficient time has passed. Through these and many similar mechanisms of societal forgetting, of erasing external memories, our society accepts that human beings evolve over time, that we have the capacity to learn from past experiences and adjust our behavior. Despite the central importance of forgetting for humans, the monumental shift we are experiencing in the digital age, from a default of forgetting to one of remembering, so far this phenomenon has received limited attention. Back in 1998, J.D. Lasica wrote a remarkable piece in the online magazine Salon, titled "The Net Never Forgets," and concluded that "our pasts are becoming etched like a tattoo into our digital skins." More recently, Liam Bannon, as well as Jean-Francois Blanchette and Deborah Johnson, have begun to uncover the dark side of the demise of forgetting. In this book, I explore remembering and forgetting over human history and into the digital age, by examining what is at stake, and by evaluating and suggesting potential remedies. This book cannot canvass all aspects of forgetting and its relationship to individuality, dignity, choice, and our ability to evolve over time; neither can it provide a silver bullet solution. But it makes what I believe is a simple yet powerful argument: the shift from forgetting to remembering is monumental, and if left unaddressed, it may cause grave consequences for us individually and for society as a whole. Such a future, however, is not inevitable. It is not technology that forces us to remember. Technology facilitates the demise of forgetting--but only if we humans so want. The truth is we are causing the demise of forgetting, and it is up to us to reverse that change.

DECREASING TRUST IN THE PAST CAUSES PEOPLE TO IGNORE IT ALTOGETHERViktor Mayer-Schonberger, Professor Internet Regulation-Oxford, 2009, Delete: the virtue of forgetting in the digital age, p. 126There is one final wrinkle regarding time. As I have suggested, digital remembering may prompt us to cease trusting our human memory, preferring digital memory instead. This way, digital memory is elevated to the primary source of reconstructing the past: easy to use and comprehensive, as well as seemingly more accurate and objective than the fallible memory of the forgetful human mind. But more so than atoms, information bits are malleable --- as I mentioned, they can easily be changed, and thus history altered. What happens when people realize that the past can no longer be trusted? Perhaps the answer to this question may be similar to the one asking how people will live with digital memory that never forgets, thereby denying change. If our past -- constructed from digital memory -- is no longer trustworthy, and no longer useful, we might disregard it. In the best of worlds, this leads us back to human forgetting (and human remembering), perhaps with an infrequent but valuable use of digital memory -- and this I would cheer. But things might not turn out that well. We may enter a time in which -- as a reaction to too much remembering, with too strict and unforgiving a link to our past -- some may opt for the extreme and ignore the past altogether for the present, deciding to live just in the moment. AT: Burden/ Not implementable

1. Just because something is not implementable, doesnt mean that it ought not to be. Pre-Fiat2. AT: Inaccurate InformationAT: Solvency deficitRTBF is key to privacyWhy Journalists Shouldn't Fear Europe's 'Right to be Forgotten' By John Hendel a journalist; JAN 25 2012: Available online at: http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/01/why-journalists-shouldnt-fear-europes-right-to-be-forgotten/251955/// EY

Today the European Commission released its official data protection rules, which will go into effect in all 27 countries of the European Union during 2014 pending European Parliament approval. Among the many new directives is an enshrined version of Europe's controversial "right to be forgotten." I first wrote about our transatlantic divide over privacy and the nature of this proposed right nearly a year ago, back when the European Union announced its intentions to "clarify" what the right meant. It seemed as if the EU was saying that any individual could ask Google to take down links to unflattering stories. Surely all people suffer from some unknown horror embarrassing them online, from an old photo or comment, up to a Gawker post. The Internet owns us. Our social networks, our blog comments, our quotes in newspapers, our Yelp ratings, Amazon reviews, e-mails, all our personal data, from our birthday to our home state, the Internet knows. But should it always? Or do we Internet users bear an innate "a right to be forgotten" online? It's natural for people to want to control their online reputations. Unfortunately, the right to be forgotten, in its initial conception, would have granted that power in broadly dangerous ways. Now, the right to be forgotten is about to become reality, but don't worry just yet. The right itself has evolved since its inception -- and in the best ways possible. "Another important way to give people control over their data: the right to be forgotten," declared Viviane Reding, vice president of the European Commission and EU justice commissioner, at the Digital Life Design conference in Munich on Jan. 22. "I want to explicitly clarify that people shall have the right -- and not only the 'possibility' -- to withdraw their consent to the processing of the personal data they have given out themselves. The Internet has an almost unlimited search and memory capacity. So even tiny scraps of personal information can have a huge impact, even years after they were shared or made public. The right to be forgotten will build on already existing rules to better cope with privacy risks online."

Neg BlocksImpact Limiter1. 4.2 billion people dont have internetRoberto A Ferdman, Roberto A. Ferdman is a reporter for Wonkblog covering food, economics, immigration and other things. He was previously a staff writer at Quartz and this is from Washington post so its reliable guys just believe it itsmeeeThe world wide web still isn't all that worldwide. An exhaustive new study by McKinsey & Company (really, it's 120 pages long) about the barriers to Internet adoption around the world illuminates a rather surprising reality: 4.4 billion people scattered across the globe, including 3.2 billion living in only 20 countries, still aren't connected to the Internet. The sheer number of people unconnected in some countries is staggering. India is home to nearly a quarter of the world's offline population; China houses more than 730 million; Indonesia 210 million; Bangladesh almost 150 million; and Brazil nearly 100 million. Even in the United States, 50 million people don't use the Internet (though, as my colleague Caitlin Dewey points out, many of those who are offline in the United States are offline by choice). But adjusting for size, and instead looking at the percentage of people in certain countries that still aren't connected to Internet, shows that quite a few places have very little internet penetration at all. In Myanmar, 99.5 percent of the population is offline; in Ethiopia, almost 98 percent; in Tanzania, more than 95 percent; and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, just under 95 percent. Most of the world's offline population, some 64 percent, live in rural settings, where poor infrastructure, health care, education, and employment, impede Internet adoption, the study says. In India, for instance, roughly 45 percent of the population lives without electricity, making Internet access all the more unthinkable. But it's a marker of inequality, too.Thus any impacts they have are limited to a minority of the world populace.2. This one sucks dont read itCivil rights implies the need for a societal relationFindlaw organization of legal professionals that provide accurate legal information along with legal advice http://civilrights.findlaw.com/civil-rights-overview/what-are-civil-rights.html itsmee"Civil rights" are the rights of individuals to receive equal treatment (and to be free from unfair treatment or "discrimination") in a number of settings -- including education, employment, housing, and more -- and based on certain legally-protected characteristics.Historically, the "Civil Rights Movement" referred to efforts toward achieving true equality for African-Americans in all facets of society, but today the term "civil rights" is also used to describe the advancement of equality for all people regardless of race, sex, age, disability, national origin, religion, or certain other characteristics.And the right to be forgotten pretends these societal relations dont exist, degrading the concept of rightsTessa Mayes 18 March 2011 Tessa Mayes is an investigative journalist and filmmaker. She writes on the media, privacy, freedom and the law.She works for the Guardian which is a reliable news source http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/libertycentral/2011/mar/18/forgotten-online-european-union-law-internet itsmeeBeing forgotten might sound appealing for some, but making a right out of it [the right to be forgotten] degrades the concept of rights. Instead of being something that embodies the relationship between the individual and society, it pretends [it] that relationship doesn't exist. The right to be forgotten is a figment of our imaginations.

AT: Solvency

The right to be forgotten is invoked after the data collected is processed and it has served its purpose, so the risk of harm is still thereBert-Jaap Koops Professor of Regulation and Technology, TILT Tilburg Institute of Law, Technology, and Society, Tilburg University, The Netherlands. The research leading to this article has received funding from the European Community's Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreement n 216483 for the project PrimeLife. December 2011 http://script-ed.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/koops.pdf#?1#?1#WebrootPlugIn#?1#?1#PhreshPhish#?1#?1#agtpwd itsmeeThe first is that the right in this guise can be invoked only after use, i.e. when the data no longer serve the purpose for which the data were collected. But harm can also occur during the period of legitimate processing, or before the expiry date set by the user has elapsed. The risk of harm may be less during legitimate and timely processing; after all, the debate about the right to be forgotten is triggered by increasingly long retention of outdated data where there is a higher risk of unfair judgement. Nevertheless, if users were to set, as I expect them to, rather longish expiry dates for their footprints, and if third parties set longer expiry dates for shadows, the risk that data cause harm to data subjects during legitimate processing may be non-negligible. A right to be forgotten focusing only on outdated data does not address this risk.

The right to be forgotten burdens individuals further and doesnt solve privacy issuesJeff Ausloos Legal Researcher KU Leuven - Interdisciplinary Centre for Law and ICT (ICRI), 2012, The Right to be Forgotten- Worth Remebering? NishaR- Just like the binary consent-framework in most privacy-regulations nowadays, the right to be forgotten, arguably, is insufficient to deal with privacy issues on the Net. If a person does not agree with a privacy policy, he/she simply can not use [it] the product or service.46 Introducing a right to be forgotten only postpones this illusion of choice. Additionally it burdens the individual even more and offers a wild card for more privacy-intrusive uses. The individual will often be frustrated by defences like the subject had the right to delete.RTBF policies unworkable unreasonable and wrong Alex Hern, The Guardian, Wednesday 30 July 2014 04.56 EDT, Lords describe Right to be Forgotten as 'unworkable, unreasonable, and wrong', http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jul/30/lords-right-to-be-forgotten-ruling-unworkable // EYThe European Unions right to be forgotten ruling is unworkable, unreasonable, and wrong in principle, according to a report by a committee of the House of Lords. Published on Wednesday, the Lords Home Affairs, Health and Education EU Sub-Committees report strongly criticised the court of justice of the European Union for its ruling, which created a requirement for firms such as internet search provider Google to remove outdated information. The committee argued that not only was the ruling problematic, the 1995 directive it was based on is itself out-dated, and calls on the government to continue its fight to ensure that the updated Regulation no longer includes any provision on the lines of the Commissions right to be forgotten or the European Parliaments right to erasure. It is crystal clear that the neither the 1995 Directive, nor the CJEUs interpretation of it reflects the incredible advancement in technology that we see today, over 20 years since the Directive was drafted, said the committee chairman, Baroness Prashar. Anyone anywhere in the world now has information at the touch of a button, and that includes detailed personal information about people in all countries of the globe. The committee gave two main reasons for finding the ruling unworkable. The first, according to Prashar, is that it does not take into account the effect the ruling will have on smaller search engines which, unlike Google, are unlikely to have the resources to process the thousands of removal requests they are likely to receive. Secondly, we also believe that it is wrong in principle to leave search engines themselves the task of deciding whether to delete information or not, based on vague, ambiguous and unhelpful criteria, and we heard from witnesses how uncomfortable they are with the idea of a commercial company sitting in judgement on issues like that. In early July, Wikipedias founder Jimmy Wales weighed in against the CJEU, warning that Google must not be left to censor history.

RTBF = opposite effectJamie Bartlet, July 17th, 2014, the Telegraph, Jamie Bartlett is the Director of the Centre for the Analysis of Social Media at the think tank Demos. He specialises in online culture and the dark net. He is currently writing a book on internet subcultures to be published in 2014 by William Heinemann., 'Right to be forgotten' is having the opposite effect, // EY The thinking behind the ruling is understandable. There are lots of good reasons why inaccurate or deeply personal information about people shouldnt be in the public domain. There are, however, many more objections. Should we really have a 'right' to be forgotten? And as I argued here, its not smart to allow a baffled lawyer working for corporate Google decide what should or should not be in the public domain.. But the most significant challenge to this odd ruling is an eminently practical one: it's going to backfire. First off, Google for all its might cant actually make things on the internet disappear. It doesnt control websites, it just presents them to you. It can make information harder to find, but if you [can still find it] know your way around the net, its not that hard. But more damaging, there is a new website trying to list all the links that Google has been asked to forget. "Hidden From Google" takes tip-offs about disappeared sites and lists them all here. Right to be Forgotten, is, therefore, going to have the precise opposite effect. For example, we now know that someone, somewhere has requested articles by Robert Peston be de-listed, and articles about George Osbornes brother converting to Islam. Even a 2011 article about French office workers have an art war on their windows using post-it stickers. I'd never heard of any of this before someone decided I needed to not know about it. To make matters worse, according to the tech magazine Tech Dirt, Google which has not hidden its dislike of this ruling has taken to informing newspapers and media outlets if any of their links are being removed. The Right to be Forgotten has been greeted with dismay by journalists, civil liberties groups and the large cluster of computer programmers and coders who happily spend their own time building software to defend free expression online like whoever is behind Hidden From Google. So expect more sites like it soon. The upshot is if you want to be forgotten in the age of the Internet, the best thing to do is usually just sit back quietly and allow it to drift off into obscurity along with the deluge of nonsense pumped out each day online. Rather than being disappearing, links will be conveniently listed and given a new lease of life: neither gone nor forgotten.

Other mechanisms solve erasure Bowcott 13, Britain seeks opt-out of new European social media privacy laws, 'Right to be forgotten' laws, giving users rather than services such as Facebook control of personal data will save billions of euros and thickets of red tape. So why is Britain resisting? Owen Bowcott, legal affairs correspondent The Guardian, Thursday 4 April 2013 07.30; online at: http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/apr/04/britain-opt-out-right-to-be-forgotten-law // EYIndividuals, he said, should approach data controllers directly to ask for material to be removed. Facebook, which has a billion users, has a social reporting mechanism that allows users to request that material is taken down from other accounts on the site, Allan said. "Our users like the mechanism."We think the most responsible service providers will offer the right to erasure. Where people are dealing with irresponsible service providers it may be that the national data protection authorities take action." A different legal development that could be equally far-reaching emerged in a UK court of appeal judgment this year in the case of Tamiz vs Google, which ruled that, in principle, the internet search engine may also be a publisher and therefore liable to defamation proceedings for material on a blog hosted on one of its platforms.

The contents not gone - non uniqueEuropean Commission, the court of justice of the EU and the right to be forgotten, 1 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (OJ 1995 L 281, p. 31). 2 For the purposes of this document, references to EU citizens include also non-EU data subjects who fall within the scope of European Unions data protection law. 3 Case C-131/12 of 13 May 2014 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Espaola de Proteccin de Datos, Mario Costeja Gonzlez. http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/factsheets/factsheet_rtbf_mythbusting_en.pdf // EYThe courts judgment only concerns the right to be forgotten regarding search eengine results involving a persons name. This means that the content remains unaffected by the request lodged with the search engine, in its original location on the internet. It also means that the content can still be found through the same search engine based on a different query.

AT: RTBF needed

RIGHT TO HAVE DATA DELETED EXISTS NOWBert-Jaap Koops, Technology Professor-Tilburg Institute of Law, 2011, "Forgetting Footrpints, Shunning Shadows. A Critical Analysis of the "Right to be Forgotten" in Big Data Practice," Scripted, Vol. 8, Issue 3, December, [http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1986719], p. 237As a right to have data deleted in due time which might mean: after use, when no longer relevant, when an expiry date elapses, or when the drawbacks of retention start outweighing the advantages the right to be forgotten already seems part of the current data-protection framework. After all, data subjects have the right to see personal data deleted when they are no longer relevant or inaccurate, or following a justified objection.45 This right can be invoked against the data controller: the one who, alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data.46 This will typically be a public or private organisation, but it can also be an individual, for example, in Web 2.0 applications.

LIMITED RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN EXISTS NOW -- IT'S A NON-ISSUEMeg Ambrose, Professor Communication-Georgetown U., 2013, "Speaking of Forgetting: Analysis of Possible Non-EU Responses to the Right to be Forgotten and Speech Exception," Telecommunications Policy TPRC 2013, [http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2238602], p. 15The legal interests associated with data collected through automated surveillance online are far from established, but there has been a general movement to grant users greater rights to participate in how data about them is collected, processed, and used. Many have argued that the E.U. DP Regulation should only grant this type of right to be forgotten: user participation in the principle of data minimization to ensure its deletion after the original purpose for collection has been fulfilled (see e.g., Bernal, 2011; Ausloos, 2012). A number of data controllers and services already offer this type of user participation, (see e.g., Google Dashboard, BlueKai, Suicide Machine), which is why Jeffrey Rosen (2012) calls this aspect of the right to be forgotten a non-issue.There are better ways to achieve protection which are more effectiveJeff Ausloos Legal Researcher KU Leuven - Interdisciplinary Centre for Law and ICT (ICRI), 2012, The Right to be Forgotten- Worth Remebering? NishaRThe right only comes after the collection and can only prevent further (harmful) processing and dissemination. To really solve the issue, it is necessary to strike at the root. Many solutions have been proposed over the years. Worth mentioning in this context are: awareness-raising[footnoteRef:1], transparency, clearer privacy notices[footnoteRef:2], data-minimisation, stricter control on the purpose limitation principle, anonymisation[footnoteRef:3], transparency, encryption, etc. The goal of each of these measures is to prevent (potentially harmful) information to be shared in the first place. But, in an everincreasing social Internet, where many features depend on disclosing personal data[footnoteRef:4], ex post measures are needed as well. [1: ] [2: ] [3: ] [4: ]

AT: Identity1. Past defines identity as well. Past actions are part of who you are. By deleting information you diminish part of their identity.2. SINCE IDENTITY IS A SOCIAL CONSTRUCT -- PEOPLE HAVE AN INTEREST IN UNREDACTED INFORMATION ABOUT OTHERSNorberto Nuno Gomes de Andrade, 2012, "Oblivion: The Right to be Different ...from Oneself. Reproposing the Right to be Forgotten," Monograph VII International Conference on Internet, Law & Politics, [http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2033155], p. 130Perfect and complete control over one's identity projection and construction is not only undesirable, but also impossible. As a social construct, personal identity encompasses ones self-perception (ipse, how a person perceives herself) and the way one is perceived by others (idem, how a person is perceived and represented by others).32 In other words, our personal identity is also (and inexorably) constructed by third persons, shaped by the perceptions that others have of us. There is thus an inevitable dialogue between the individual and others in building a personal identity. This means that requests for deleting information regarding ones personal identity must also take into account the interests that others (as a collective) may have in keeping the information available and the corresponding identity traces alive.

AT: PrivacyTURN: INCREASES THE BURDEN ON THE INDIVIDUAL WITHOUT PROTECTING PRIVACYJef Auloos, Interdisciplinary Centre for Law & ICT, Belgium, 2012, "'The Right to be Forgotten' Worth Remembering?", Computer Law and Security Review, 28 (2012) 143-152, p. 147Just like the binary consent-framework in most privacy regulations nowadays, the right to be forgotten, arguably, is insufficient to deal with privacy issues on the Net. If a person does not agree with a privacy policy, he/she simply cannot use the product or service. Introducing a right to be forgotten only postpones this illusion of choice. Additionally it burdens the individual even more and offers a wild card for more privacy-intrusive uses. The individual will often be frustrated by defences like the subject had the right to delete.

RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN OFFERS LIMITED PROTECTIONSJef Auloos, Interdisciplinary Centre for Law & ICT, Belgium, 2012, "'The Right to be Forgotten' Worth Remembering?", Computer Law and Security Review, 28 (2012) 143-152, p. 146First of all, the right to be forgotten seems to presuppose a contractual relationship. As will appear later in this article, it can/should only be applied in situations where the individual has consented to the processing of personal data. The concept is not suitable to cope with privacy issues where personal data is (legally) obtained without the individuals consent. Additionally, it is important to remember the right only provides an ex post solution to privacy issues.AT: Forgetting Good

RIGHT TO DELETE INFORMATION DISTORTS ACCURACY OF SEARCHESNorberto Nuno Gomes de Andrade, 2012, "Oblivion: The Right to be Different ...from Oneself. Reproposing the Right to be Forgotten," Monograph VII International Conference on Internet, Law & Politics, [http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2033155], p. 131Another argument used by preservationists is the one of objectivity. In the judicial dispute between the Spanish Data Protection Authority and Google, as described previously, the search engine refused to remove the links claiming that, if done systematically, this would compromise the objectivity of the Internet and the transparency of the search engine. Internet users would be able to remove factual information from the Internet, thereby altering the list of results provided by search engines, rendering them imprecise and incomplete.AT: Freedom

BIGGEST THREAT TO FREE SPEECH ON THE INTERNETJeffrey Rosen, Law Professor-George Washington University, 2012, "The Right to be Forgotten," Stanford Law Review, February, 64 Stan. L. Rev. 88, p. 88At the end of January, the European Commissioner for Justice, Fundamental Rights, and Citizenship, Viviane Reding, announced the European Commissions proposal to create a sweeping new privacy rightthe right to be forgotten. The right, which has been hotly debated in Europe for the past few years, has finally been codified as part of a broad new proposed data protection regulation. Although Reding depicted the new right as a modest expansion of existing data privacy rights, in fact it represents the biggest threat to free speech on the Internet in the coming decade. The right to be forgotten could make Facebook and Google, for example, liable for up to two percent of their global income if they fail to remove photos that people post about themselves and later regret, even if the photos have been widely distributed already. Unless the right is defined more precisely when it is promulgated over the next year or so, it could precipitate a dramatic clash between European and American conceptions of the proper balance between privacy and free speech, leading to a far less open Internet.RTBF limits our freedom because the government has control over informationSchwartz; journalist for RStreet; The right to be forgotten and the quagmire of global Internet regulation; Sept 2, 2014; http://www.rstreet.org/2014/09/02/the-right-to-be-forgotten-and-the-quagmire-of-global-internet-regulation/ itsmeeBut there is a movement underway to put Internet governance under the jurisdiction of a new body under the umbrella of the United Nations. That would put the Internet more firmly under government control, opening the door for restrictive regimes to have an even tighter control over the flow of information across the net. The fear is that laws such as the right to be forgotten are only the beginning of a new era of a fragmented Internet in which countries can control and restrict the flows of information that the Internet blew open.AT: Oppression/FairnessRTBF is biased against the poorDouzinas, 07; Professor of Law; Human Rights and Empire; 2007; http://books.google.com/books?id=aJp8AgAAQBAJ&pg=PA40&lpg=PA40&dq=douzinas+rights+lead+to+the+external+convergence+of+people+based+on+self interest&source=bl&ots=lG3ZZrzfsr&sig=c4jOoEZhZn1cmd5q6J4A16Ji1Nc&hl=en&sa=X&ei=EmxEVLThB8WU8QHduYHoCw&ved=0CB4Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q&f=false The legal mentality teaches us to respect others as right-holders whose legitimate claims will be honored as much as ours. But this is also their greatest limitation. Private rights lead to the external convergence of people based on self-interest. They keep the two selves separate, the relationship superficial, temporary, they offer an inadequate type of identity. The legal person is far too abstract, the law far too formal. The real human person becomes an abstraction a point of locating a bundle of rights and duties. His concrete traits and needs are irrelevant to the law. Poverty offers a good example of the underlying problem. Lack of assets in the midst of a society of riches based on property rights makes the poor feel excluded, shunned, scorned, by everyone.8 The recognition offered by the abstract right to property, by the potential to hold property, is clearly inadequate. As Anatole France put it, the law in its majesty punishes both the rich and the poor for stealing bread and sleeping under bridges. Hegel agrees: If life can be preserved by stealing a loaf, this certainly constitutes an infringement of someones property, but it would be wrong to regard such an action as common theft.9 While the poor have full legal rights and the dignity and respect legal recognition offers, they cannot make them real. The only way the law helps a person in need is by recognizing his rights without giving him, however, the means for satisfying them or the resources necessary for turning potential right into actual satisfaction of needs. Caught between [the universal rights] laws recognition of abstract equality and its indifference towards their material inequality and concrete needs, the poor are the best examples of the failings of legal rights as a tool for identity recognition and construction.

RTBF is used by privileged policymakers to sugarcoat histories of oppression and corruptionSophie Curtis, 2014. Sophie is a technology reporter at the Daily Telegraph. She previously worked for a number of specialist technology publications including Techworld and eWeek Europe. [Politician, paedophile and GP claim 'right to be forgotten' The Telegraph. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/google/10833894/Politician-paedophile-and-GP-claim-right-to-be-forgotten.html]NMSSince the ruling an ex-politician seeking re-election, a man convicted of possessing child abuse images and a doctor seeking to remove negative reviews from patients, are reported to be among the first to send takedown notices to Google. Privacy is a universal right that must be protected, but this overreaching judgment is far more likely to aid the powerful in attempts to rewrite history, than afford individuals more influence over their online identities. Last June the EU's advocate general argued that search engine suppression of legitimate public domain information "would amount to censorship". The ruling, in a case brought by a Spanish citizen about links to the auctioning of his home that appeared in search results, allows individuals to petition search engine operators a term that, as well as Google, could also include Facebook, Microsoft, Baidu, Yandex, DuckDuckGo and more to remove content they consider "inadequate, irrelevant, or no longer relevant". What's more, it puts companies in the nearly impossible position of deciding what information meets this vague threshold. Holding intermediaries responsible for determining what information is in the public interest is dangerous and unworkable: more than 100 billion searches occur each month on Google alone, which could in theory be subject to review-on-demand for adequacy and relevance, rather than accuracy or lawfulness. The unprecedented burden the court seeks to place on online intermediaries would damage the internet for all users, especially those in Europe. Online innovation stemming from the internet, from search engines to social media, has been made possible by protecting intermediaries, not by incentivising them to censor information. The individuals with the motivation and resources to pursue complaints are likely to be those political and business elites about whom the public interest should demand unfettered search results. And companies will face pressure to remove whatever is asked of them rather than face the legal costs of challenging illegitimate requests. Among the most troubling implications of the judgment are its impact on political speech and processes. Potential candidates for public office will now have a means of curating their own bespoke search results to ensure that only flattering information remains readily available to the public. The ruling is not limited to those embarrassing photos we wish we could banish from social media but includes news stories and other items of critical importance to an honest accounting of history.

The government has the power to arbitrarily decide which requests to answer and which not to. Schwartz, 14; journalist for RStreet; The right to be forgotten and the quagmire of global Internet regulation; Sept 2, 2014; http://www.rstreet.org/2014/09/02/the-right-to-be-forgotten-and-the-quagmire-of-global-internet-regulation/EYThere are already clear indicators and examples that some governments are moving toward tighter regulation of the Internet. Within the past year, Russia has codified existing police practices into law by passing legislation that blocks websites, restricts electronic foreign financial transactions, heaps a series of new regulations on popular blogs and allows the government to put people in prison for retweeting extremist material. Most recently, the Duma passed a law that restricts the personal data of Russian citizens from being stored on servers outside of Russia which, if enforced, will effectively ban the use of websites ranging from Facebook to Amazon unless they locate all data centers in Russia. The Russian government has wasted no time capitalizing on the right to be forgotten ruling to further censor the global Internet. The Russian Public Chamber submitted a recommendation to the Duma calling for the introduction of a right to be forgotten that would affect not only Russian search engines, but also foreign ones like Google and Yahoo. Many open Internet activists are actively hopeful that we can find a third way, a solution that violates neither rights to privacy nor free speech. But unfortunately, when two parties are actively working toward conflicting ends, it becomes a zero-sum game. No law will simultaneously accommodate Russias desire to censor information and the United States desire to protect free speech. As Laura DeNardis put it at Internet Governance Forum-USA in July, one persons right to privacy is another persons censorship. And while we all sit around waiting for a silver-bullet solution, Russia will be sending people to prison for retweeting. The hope is that encouraging a multi-stakeholder approach to Internet governance will result in a coordinated international effort to enforce an open Internet based on shared values of transparency, interoperability, reliability and security. The current structure of the Internet is shaped by a complex interplay of diverse actors: private sector companies, ordinary individuals, advocacy groups, NGOs and, of course, governments. But there is a movement underway to put Internet governance under the jurisdiction of a new body under the umbrella of the United Nations. That would put the Internet more firmly under government control, opening the door for restrictive regimes to have an even tighter control over the flow of information across the net. The fear is that laws such as the right to be forgotten are only the beginning of a new era of a fragmented Internet in which countries can control and restrict the flows of information that the Internet blew open.

RTBF is used by the government to cover up misuse of powerAfef Abrougui, Oct 13, 2014. Abrougui is a Tunis based consultant and researcher focusing on ICTs and human rights, particularly freedom of expression and the right to privacy on the internet. She has previously worked for the local news website Tunisia Live, the free speech NGO Index on Censorship and the Institute for War and Peace Reporting. [Will the Right to Be Forgotten Inspire Repressive Regimes to Expand Internet Censorship? Global Voices, http://globalvoicesonline.org/2014/10/13/will-the-right-to-be-forgotten-inspire-repressive-regimes-to-expand-internet-censorship/]NMSAlthough its implementation is currently only limited to Europe, the right to be forgotten ruling could inspire repressive regimes to expand their Internet filtering practices. It will be used by other governments that arent as forward and progressive as Europe to do bad things, Googles CEO Larry Page warned in late May. In an email interview, Dhouha Ben Youssef, a Tunisian net freedom and privacy advocate wrote that she agreed with Page. These governments will take advantage from this directive. Powerful people will be able to hide disgraceful actions for their own e-reputation. For example, politicians could ask for the removal of posts that criticize their policies and power misuse, Ben Youssef explained. It will largely impact the investigative journalism emerging in the region.

RTBF is abused by politicians who are running for reelection and have a history of autocratic and corrupt rule, causing similar regime in the futureAfef Abrougui, Oct 13, 2014. Abrougui is a Tunis based consultant and researcher focusing on ICTs and human rights, particularly freedom of expression and the right to privacy on the internet. She has previously worked for the local news website Tunisia Live, the free speech NGO Index on Censorship and the Institute for War and Peace Reporting. [Will the Right to Be Forgotten Inspire Repressive Regimes to Expand Internet Censorship? Global Voices, http://globalvoicesonline.org/2014/10/13/will-the-right-to-be-forgotten-inspire-repressive-regimes-to-expand-internet-censorship/]NMSThe right to be forgotten and the UAEs decree No. 5/2012 have one dangerous point in common: they both restrict[s] the dissemination of authentic content for the purpose of protecting the privacy rights of others. In the Arab region the aim appears to be to conceal evidence of misconduct by politicians and public officials. While in the EU the right to be forgotten is supposedly aimed at protecting private individuals, the fact that former EU politicians are entitled to exercise the right to be forgotten is troubling. The Internet and the world should not forget the disgraceful acts and corruption of politicians once they leave office. We have all seen how public officials are tempted again by power shortly after they leave office. Former French president Nicolas Sarkozy recently announced his political comeback despite corruption allegations against him. In Tunisia, where I work as a freelance journalist, officials who served under the former autocratic and corrupt rule of Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali are making a comeback to the political scene and running for legislative and presidential elections.

FRAMEWORK BLOCKSA/T Util 1. Its impossible to predict consequences under util any action has risk of offense; it collapses into the prohibition of all actions. **************2. Util is arbitrary consequences cant be predicted fully************3. Even if we can exactly predict, there are always different layers of consequences; if I save a baby, it would be utilitarian in the short term, but if it grows up to be Hitler it wouldnt be. Its inconsistent in the way we evaluate consequences ************4. Every end state leads to another end state; we dont know what end state to evaluate.

5. Happiness is subjective. Everybody has their own conception of well-being or happiness so happiness cant be normative and universal

6. We cant quantify pain and pleasure. Swimming and debating are qualitatively different and theres no unit of measurement for comparisonthese values are incommensurable making utility nonsensical. ************

7. off of the state obligation argument: States have to be distributive rather than aggregativethats why they have a constitution to define parameters of government action.

8. Util is epistemically useless and nonsensical because theres an infinite amount of happiness and unhappiness. Therefore, we cant use util because we cant increase happiness, its infinitely regressive **************

A/T Deontology

1 If humans were capable of deducing a universal reason for action, then we wouldnt have different philosophers arguing over what is right. We would have reached a consensus.

2 Fallacy of Origin we can say morality is deduced from reason without holding reason is in itself valuable.

3 Reasons cant ever be universalized; because they are informed by our experiences which arent universal. If I am good at soccer, I have reason to become a soccer player, but I cant universalize that to everyone because the world would be far worse off if everyone played soccer. reject this framework because its not applicable in the real life

4 Deontology is contradictory. It would be immoral to kill a Hitler because killing is always bad, which is contradictory because he would presumably kill many more people if you didnt.

5 No britelinewe couldnt order drinks from a waiter using your framework because that would be using him as a means to an end. Lack of a briteline means you reject their framework because it paralyzes actionwe dont know when its applicable to a situation.

6 There is no brightline to autonomy violations; if I take away your backpack, violating your autonomy, you still have the autonomy to take away my backpack; there is no inherent violationA/T Practical Reason

1. Practical reason isnt sufficiently normative. Silverstein 04[footnoteRef:5] [5: Silverstein, Matthew. Korsgaard on Normativity. Columbia/NYU Graduate Conference in Philosophy. 2004. pg. 4.]

Despite this misunderstanding, though, Parfits objection still stands. Even if Korsgaards notion of normative force is not reducible to motivating force, it remains unsatisfyingly subjective. Consider her claim that the term reason refers to a sort of reflective success. Reflective success may be required for us to act for a reason, butParfit argueswe can have a reason to act without successfully reflecting (or even reflecting at all). If my friend is in pain, then I have a reason to run to his aid, even if his need never enters my mind. For Parfit, a good reason has normative force whether we confront that force during deliberation or not. Moreover, we can successfully reflect on a set of considerations and then act accordingly without having a good reason to do so. Thus, reflective success seems to be neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for a consideration to count as a reason for action. According to Parfit, full-blooded normativity or justification involves more than justification from the agents own, first-person perspective; and if Korsgaards theory reduces the former to the latter, she has lost the normativity in her attempt to discover its source.

2. Fallacy of Origin we can say morality is deduced from reason without holding reason is in itself valuable.

3. Autonomy is not an end in itself, only a means. Kymlicka 90[footnoteRef:6] [6: Will Kymlicka, University of Toronto philosopher, CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, 1990, p.210]

If we are to understand the value people see in their projects, we have to look to the ends which are internal to them. I do not pursue my writing for the sake of my freedom. On the contrary, I pursue my writing for its own sake, because there are things which are worth saying. Freedom is valuable because it allows me to say them.

A/T Korsgaard1. Korsgaards account of moral motivation is undermined by overwhelming neuroscientific evidence. Schroeder 10 writes[footnoteRef:7] [7: TIMOTHY SCHROEDER (Assoc Prof of Philo @ Ohio State), ADINA L. ROSKIES (Assoc prof of philo @ Dartmouth), AND SHAUN NICHOLS (Prof of Philo @ U Arizona). Moral Motivation. InThe Moral Psychology Handbook, Doris, J. and S. Stich (eds.) Oxford University Press. 2010. http://commonsenseatheism.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/Schroeder-et-al-Moral-Motivation.pdf]

What, then, is left? The cognitivist holds the view that moral motivation begins with occurrent belief. In particular, it begins with beliefs about what actions would be right. The cognitivist holds that, at least in cases of morally worthy action, such beliefs lead to motivation to perform those actions, quite independently of any antecedent desires. The cognitivist is happy to call this motivational state a desire, but thinks of it as entirely dependent upon the moral belief that created it. The cognitivist position has recognizable afnities to familiar positions in the philosophical literature (e.g. Korsgaard, 1994; McDowell, 1998: ch. 4; Smith, 1994). These philosophers, of course, hold that much more is going on in the mind of a morally worthy agent than the simple picture painted by our cognitivist. They generally agree[s], however, that morally worthy action is not dependent upon antecedent desires, but stems in the rst instance from ones judgments. On the cognitivists view, Jens desires are not irrelevant to her action, but they are not the initiating engines of her action either. Instead, her desires are mere data that she considers (perhaps) in coming to be motivated. Given what is available to her, perhaps she comes to believe that it would be right to give the homeless man money, and it never occurs to her to even consider her desires. This consideration of the rightness of giving money to the homeless man motivates Jen to give him some money, and she does. Because she is moved by the right sort of belief, her action has moral worth. []Of our four caricature theorists, it is obviously our cognitivist who is most likely to have [has] difculties accommodating the neuroscientic evidence. Although it was pointed out earlier that the theoretical possibility exists that moral cognition can lead directly to moral motivation independently of the reward system (and so independently of desire), this theoretical possibility proves to be problematic upon closer inspection. We begin with evidence from Parkinson disease. As will be familiar to many, Parkinson disease is a disorder that results in a number of effects, including tremor, difculty in initiating movement, and (if taken to its limit) total paralysis. Parkinson disease is caused by the death of the dopamine-producing cells of the substantia nigra pars compacta (the SNpc in Figure 3.1), the very cells that make up the reward systems output to the motor basal ganglia. Thus, on the interpretation of the reward system advocated earlier, Parkinson disease is a disorder in which intrinsic desires slowly lose their capacity to causally inuence motivation. As it turns out, Parkinson disease impairs or prevents action regardless of whether the action is morally worthy or not, regardless of whether it is intuitively desired or intuitively done out of duty, regardless of whether the individual trying to act gives a law to herself. Thus Parkinson disease appears to show that intrinsic desires are necessary to the production of motivation in normal human beings, and this would seem to put serious pressure on the cognitivists position. The cognitivist might allow that intrinsic desires must exist in order for motivation to be possible, but hold that intrinsic desires normally play no signicant role in producing motivation. After all, Parkinson disease shows that intrinsic desires are necessary for motivation, but it does not clearly reveal the role played by intrinsic desires in producing motivation when the desires exist. If sustainable, this would be just a minor concession, and so it is well worth investigating. What might motivation of the cognitivists sort look like, if desires play no substantive role in it? It was suggested in the previous section that it might look like motivation that stems directly from activity in the higher cognitive centerslike motivation that stems from choosing a law for ones action, in other words. And it turns out that motivation derived from higher cognitive centers independently of desire is possiblebut also that the only known model of it is pathological. It is the sort of motivation found in Tourette syndrome. Tourette syndrome is a disorder characterized by tics: eye blinks, shoulder jerks, barks, obscenities, profanities, and so on. Something like 7090% of sufferers report that they often voluntarily produce their tics, because the effort of not ticcing is unpleasant and often doomed to failure in any case. But a typical sufferer from Tourette syndrome will also report that tics are quite capable of forcing themselves out regardless of how fiercely they are resisted. Tourette syndrome appears to be caused by a dysfunction in the motor basal ganglia, in which the motor basal ganglia inhibit most motor commands initiated by perceptual and higher