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G.R. No. 104879 May 6, 1994

ELIZALDE MALALOAN and MARLON LUAREZ, petitioners,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS; HON. ANTONIO J. FINEZA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 131, Regional Trial Court of

Kalookan City; HON. TIRSO D.C. VELASCO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 88, Regional Trial Court of Quezon

City; and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Alexander A. Padilla for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for the People of the Philippines.

REGALADO, J.:

Creative legal advocacy has provided this Court with another primae impressionis case through the present petition

wherein the parties have formulated and now pose for resolution the following issue: Whether or not a court may take

cognizance of an application for a search warrant in connection with an offense committed outside its territoria

boundary and, thereafter, issue the warrant to conduct a search on a place outside the court's supposed territoriajurisdiction. 1

The factual background and judicial antecedents of this case are best taken from the findings of respondent Court of

Appeals 2 on which there does not appear to be any dispute, to wit:

From the pleadings and supporting documents before the Court, it can be gathered that on March 22, 1990, 1st Lt.

Absalon V. Salboro of the CAPCOM Northern Sector (now Central Sector) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan

City an application for search warrant. The search warrant was sought for in connection with an alleged violation of P.D

1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions) perpetrated at No. 25 Newport St., corner Marlboro St., Fairview

Quezon City. On March 23, 1990, respondent RTC Judge of Kalookan City issued Search Warrant No. 95-90. On the sameday, at around 2:30 p.m., members of the CAPCOM, armed with subject search warrant, proceeded to the situs of the

offense alluded to, where a labor seminar of the Ecumenical Institute for Labor Education and Research (EILER) was then

taking place. According to CAPCOM's "Inventory of Property Seized," firearms, explosive materials and subversive

documents, among others, were seized and taken during the search. And all the sixty-one (61) persons found within the

premises searched were brought to Camp Karingal, Quezon City but most of them were later released, with the

exception of the herein petitioners, EILER Instructors, who were indicated for violation of P.D. 1866 in Criminal Case No

Q-90-11757 before Branch 88 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, presided over by respondent Judge Tirso D.C

Velasco.

On July 10, 1990, petitioners presented a "Motion for Consolidation, Quashal of Search Warrant and For the Suppressionof All Illegally Acquired Evidence" before the Quezon City court; and a "Supplemental Motion to the Motion for

Consolidation, Quashal of Search Warrant and Exclusion of Evidence Illegally Obtained.

On September 21, 1990, the respondent Quezon City Judge issued the challenged order, consolidating subject cases but

denying the prayer for the quashal of the search warrant under attack, the validity of which warrant was upheld; opining

that the same falls under the category of Writs and Processes, within the contemplation of paragraph 3(b) of the Interim

Rules and Guidelines, and can be served not only within the territorial jurisdiction of the issuing court but anywhere in

the judicial region of the issuing court (National Capital Judicial Region);. . .

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Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said Order under challenge, having been denied by the assailed Order of

October 5, 1990, petitioners have come to this Court via the instant petition, raising the sole issue:

WHETHER OR NOT A COURT MAY TAKE COGNIZANCE OF AN APPLICATION FOR A SEARCH WARRANT IN CONNECTION

WITH AN OFFENSE ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED OUTSIDE ITS TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION AND TO ISSUE A WARRANT TO

CONDUCT A SEARCH ON A PLACE LIKEWISE OUTSIDE ITS TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION.

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent Court of Appeals rendered judgment, 3 in effect affirming that of the trial court, by denying due course to

the petition for certiorari and lifting the temporary restraining order it had issued on November 29, 1990 in connection

therewith. This judgment of respondent court is now impugned in and sought to be reversed through the present

recourse before us.

We are not favorably impressed by the arguments adduced by petitioners in support of their submissions. Their

disquisitions postulate interpretative theories contrary to the letter and intent of the rules on search warrants and which

could pose legal obstacles, if not dangerous doctrines, in the area of law enforcement. Further, they fail to validlydistinguish, hence they do not convincingly delineate the difference, between the matter of (1) the court which has the

competence to issue a search warrant under a given set of facts, and (2) the permissible jurisdictional range in the

enforcement of such search warrant vis-a-vis the court's territorial jurisdiction. These issues while effectively cognate

are essentially discrete since the resolution of one does not necessarily affect or preempt the other. Accordingly, to

avoid compounding the seeming confusion, these questions shall be discussed seriatim.

I

Petitioners invoke the jurisdictional rules in the institution of criminal actions to invalidate the search warrant issued by

the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City because it is directed toward the seizure of firearms and ammunition allegedlycached illegally in Quezon City. This theory is sought to be buttressed by the fact that the criminal case against

petitioners for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 was subsequently filed in the latter court. The application for

the search warrant, it is claimed, was accordingly filed in a court of improper venue and since venue in criminal actions

involves the territorial jurisdiction of the court, such warrant is void for having been issued by a court without

jurisdiction to do so.

The basic flaw in this reasoning is in erroneously equating the application for and the obtention of a search warrant with

the institution and prosecution of a criminal action in a trial court. It would thus categorize what is only a special crimina

process, the power to issue which is inherent in all courts, as equivalent to a criminal action, jurisdiction over which is

reposed in specific courts of indicated competence. It ignores the fact that the requisites, procedure and purpose for theissuance of a search warrant are completely different from those for the institution of a criminal action.

For, indeed, a warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely constitutes process. 4 A search warrant is

defined in our jurisdiction as an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines signed by a judge

and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property and bring it before the court. 5 A

search warrant is in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special and peculiar remedy

drastic in its nature, and made necessary because of a public necessity. 6

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In American jurisdictions, from which we have taken our jural concept and provisions on search warrants, 7 such

warrant is definitively considered merely as a process, generally issued by a court in the exercise of its ancillary

jurisdiction, and not a criminal action to be entertained by a court pursuant to its original jurisdiction. We emphasize this

fact for purposes of both issues as formulated in this opinion, with the catalogue of authorities herein.

Invariably, a judicial process is defined as a writ, warrant, subpoena, or other formal writing issued by authority of law;

also the means of accomplishing an end, including judicial proceedings, 8 or all writs, warrants, summonses, and orders

of courts of justice or judicial officers. 9 It is likewise held to include a writ, summons, or order issued in a judicialproceeding to acquire jurisdiction of a person or his property, to expedite the cause or enforce the judgment, 10 or a

writ, warrant, mandate, or other process issuing from a court of justice. 11

2. It is clear, therefore, that a search warrant is merely a judicial process designed by the Rules to respond only to

an incident in the main case, if one has already been instituted, or in anticipation thereof. In the latter contingency, as in

the case at bar, it would involve some judicial clairvoyance to require observance of the rules as to where a criminal case

may eventually be filed where, in the first place, no such action having as yet been instituted, it may ultimately be filed

in a territorial jurisdiction other than that wherein the illegal articles sought to be seized are then located. This is aside

from the consideration that a criminal action may be filed in different venues under the rules for delitos continuados o

in those instances where different trial courts have concurrent original jurisdiction over the same criminal offense.

In fact, to illustrate the gravity of the problem which petitioners' implausible position may create, we need not stray far

from the provisions of Section 15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court on the venue of criminal actions and which we quote:

Sec. 15. Place where action to be instituted.

(a) Subject to existing laws, in all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the

municipality or territory wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place.

(b) Where an offense is committed on a railroad train, in an aircraft, or any other public or private vehicle while inthe course of its trip, the criminal action may be instituted and tried in the court of any municipality or territory where

such train, aircraft or other vehicle passed during such trip, including the place of departure and arrival.

(c) Where an offense is committed on board a vessel in the course of its voyage, the criminal action may be

instituted and tried in the proper court of the first port of entry or of any municipality or territory through which the

vessel passed during such voyage, subject to the generally accepted principles of international law.

(d) Other crimes committed outside of the Philippines but punishable therein under Article 2 of the Revised Pena

Code shall be cognizable by the proper court in which the charge is first filed. (14a)

It would be an exacting imposition upon the law enforcement authorities or the prosecutorial agencies to unerringly

determine where they should apply for a search warrant in view of the uncertainties and possibilities as to the ultimate

venue of a case under the foregoing rules. It would be doubly so if compliance with that requirement would be under

pain of nullification of said warrant should they file their application therefor in and obtain the same from what may

later turn out to be a court not within the ambit of the aforequoted Section 15.

Our Rules of Court, whether of the 1940, 1964 or the present vintage, and, for that matter, the Judiciary Act of 1948 12

or the recent Judiciary Reorganization Act, 13 have never required the jurisdictional strictures that the petitioners' thesis

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would seek to be inferentially drawn from the silence of the reglementary provisions. On the contrary, we are of the

view that said statutory omission was both deliberate and significant. It cannot but mean that the formulators of the

Rules of Court, and even Congress itself, did not consider it proper or correct, on considerations of national policy and

the pragmatics of experience, to clamp a legal manacle on those who would ferret out the evidence of a crime. For us to

now impose such conditions or restrictions, under the guise of judicial interpretation, may instead be reasonably

construed as trenching on judicial legislation. It would be tantamount to a judicial act of engrafting upon a law

something that has been omitted but which someone believes ought to have been embraced therein. 14

Concededly, the problem of venue would be relatively easier to resolve if a criminal case has already been filed in a

particular court and a search warrant is needed to secure evidence to be presented therein. Obviously, the court trying

the criminal case may properly issue the warrant, upon proper application and due compliance with the requisites

therefor, since such application would only be an incident in that case and which it can resolve in the exercise of its

ancillary jurisdiction. If the contraband articles are within its territorial jurisdiction, there would appear to be no further

complications. The jurisdictional problem would resurrect, however, where such articles are outside its territoria

jurisdiction, which aspect will be addressed hereafter.

3. Coming back to the first issue now under consideration, petitioners, after discoursing on the respective

territorial jurisdictions of the thirteen Regional Trial Courts which correspond to the thirteen judicial regions, 15 inviteour attention to the fact that this Court, pursuant to its authority granted by

law, 16 has defined the territorial jurisdiction of each branch of a Regional Trial Court 17 over which the particular

branch concerned shall exercise its

authority. 18 From this, it is theorized that "only the branch of a Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the

place to be searched could grant an application for and issue a warrant to search that place." Support for such position is

sought to be drawn from issuances of this Court, that is, Circular No. 13 issued on October 1, 1985, as amended by

Circular No. 19 on August 4, 1987.

We reject that proposition. Firstly, it is evident that both circulars were not intended to be of general application to all

instances involving search warrants and in all courts as would be the case if they had been adopted as part of the Rulesof Court. These circulars were issued by the Court to meet a particular exigency, that is, as emergency guidelines on

applications for search warrants filed only in the courts of Metropolitan Manila and other courts with multiple salas and

only with respect to violations of the Anti-Subversion Act, crimes against public order under the Revised Penal Code

illegal possession of firearms and/or ammunitions, and violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. In other words, the

aforesaid theory on the court's jurisdiction to issue search warrants would not apply to single-sala courts and other

crimes. Accordingly, the rule sought by petitioners to be adopted by the Court would actually result in a bifurcated

procedure which would be vulnerable to legal and constitutional objections.

For that matter, neither can we subscribe to petitioners' contention that Administrative Order No. 3 of this Court,

supposedly "defining the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts," was the source of the subjectmatter jurisdiction of, as distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction by, the courts. As earlier observed, this

administrative order was issued pursuant to the provisions of Section 18 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the pertinent

portion of which states:

Sec. 18. Authority to define territory appurtenant to each branch. The Supreme Court shall define the territory over

which a branch of the Regional Trial Court shall exercise its authority. The territory thus defined shall be deemed to be

the territorial area of the branch concerned for purposes of determining the venue of all writs, proceedings or actions,

whether civil or criminal, . . . . (Emphasis ours.)

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Jurisdiction is conferred by substantive law, in this case Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, not by a procedural law and, much

less, by an administrative order or circular. The jurisdiction conferred by said Act on regional trial courts and their judges

is basically regional in scope. Thus, Section 17 thereof provides that "(e)very Regional Trial Judge shall be appointed to a

region which shall be his permanent station," and he "may be assigned by the Supreme Court to any branch or city or

municipality within the same region as public interest may require, and such assignment shall not be deemed an

assignment to another station . . ." which, otherwise, would necessitate a new appointment for the judge.

In fine, Administrative Order No. 3 and, in like manner, Circulars Nos. 13 and 19, did not per se confer jurisdiction on the

covered regional trial court or its branches, such that non-observance thereof would nullify their judicial acts. The

administrative order merely defines the limits of the administrative area within which a branch of the court may exercise

its authority pursuant to the jurisdiction conferred by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. The circulars only allocated to the three

executive judges the administrative areas for which they may respectively issue search warrants under the specia

circumstance contemplated therein, but likewise pursuant to the jurisdiction vested in them by Batas Pambansa Blg,

129.

Secondly, and more importantly, we definitely cannot accept the conclusion that the grant of power to the courts

mentioned therein, to entertain and issue search warrants where the place to be searched is within their territoriajurisdiction, was intended to exclude other courts from exercising the same power. It will readily be noted that Circula

No. 19 was basically intended to provide prompt action on applications for search warrants. Its predecessor,

Administrative Circular No. 13, had a number of requirements, principally a raffle of the applications for search warrants

if they had been filed with the executive judge, among the judges within his administrative area. Circular No. 19

eliminated, by amendment, that required raffle and ordered instead that such applications should immediately be

"taken cognizance of and acted upon by the Executive Judges of the Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, and

Municipal Trial Court under whose jurisdiction the place to be searched is located," or by their substitutes enumerated

therein.

Evidently, that particular provision of Circular No. 19 was never intended to confer exclusive jurisdiction on saidexecutive judges. In view of the fact, however, that they were themselves directed to personally act on the applications

instead of farming out the same among the other judges as was the previous practice, it was but necessary and practica

to require them to so act only on applications involving search of places located within their respective territoria

jurisdictions. The phrase above quoted was, therefore, in the nature of an allocation in the assignment of applications

among them, in recognition of human capabilities and limitations, and not a mandate for the exclusion of all other

courts. In truth, Administrative Circular No. 13 even specifically envisaged and anticipated the non-exclusionary nature

of that provision, thus:

4. If, in the implementation of the search warrant properties are seized thereunder and the corresponding case is

filed in court, said case shall be distributed conformably with Circular No. 7 dated September 23, 1974, of this Court, andthereupon tried and decided by the judge to whom it has been assigned, and not necessarily by the judge who issued

the search warrant. (Emphasis supplied.)

It is, therefore, incorrect to say that only the court which has jurisdiction over the criminal case can issue the search

warrant, as would be the consequence of petitioners' position that only the branch of the court with jurisdiction over

the place to be searched can issue a warrant to search the same. It may be conceded, as a matter of policy, that where a

criminal case is pending, the court wherein it was filed, or the assigned branch thereof, has primary jurisdiction to issue

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the search warrant; and where no such criminal case has yet been filed, that the executive judges or their lawfu

substitutes in the areas and for the offenses contemplated in Circular No. 19 shall have primary jurisdiction.

This should not, however, mean that a court whose territorial jurisdiction does not embrace the place to be searched

cannot issue a search warrant therefor, where the obtention of that search warrant is necessitated and justified by

compelling considerations of urgency, subject, time and place. Conversely, neither should a search warrant duly issued

by a court which has jurisdiction over a pending criminal case, or one issued by an executive judge or his lawful

substitute under the situations provided for by Circular No. 19, be denied enforcement or nullified just because it wasimplemented outside the court's territorial jurisdiction.

This brings us, accordingly, to the second issue on the permissible jurisdictional range of enforcement of search

warrants.

II

As stated in limine, the affiliated issue raised in this case is whether a branch of a regional trial court has the authority to

issue a warrant for the search of a place outside its territorial jurisdiction. Petitioners insistently answer the query in the

negative. We hold otherwise.

1. We repeat what we have earlier stressed: No law or rule imposes such a limitation on search warrants, in the

same manner that no such restriction is provided for warrants of arrest. Parenthetically, in certain states within the

American jurisdiction, there were limitations of the time wherein a warrant of arrest could be enforced. In our

jurisdiction, no period is provided for the enforceability of warrants of arrest, and although within ten days from the

delivery of the warrant of arrest for execution a return thereon must be made to the issuing judge, 19 said warrant does

not become functus officio but is enforceable indefinitely until the same is enforced or recalled. On the other hand, the

lifetime of a search warrant has been expressly set in our Rules at ten days 20 but there is no provision as to the extent

of the territory wherein it may be enforced, provided it is implemented on and within the premises specifically described

therein which may or may not be within the territorial jurisdiction of the issuing court.

We make the foregoing comparative advertence to emphasize the fact that when the law or rules would provide

conditions, qualifications or restrictions, they so state. Absent specific mention thereof, and the same not being

inferable by necessary implication from the statutory provisions which are presumed to be complete and expressive of

the intendment of the framers, a contrary interpretation on whatever pretext should not be countenanced.

A bit of legal history on this contestation will be helpful. The jurisdictional rule heretofore was that writs and processes

of the so-called inferior courts could be enforced outside the province only with the approval of the former court of first

instance. 21 Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act, the enforcement of such writs and processes no longer needs the

approval of the regional trial court. 22 On the other hand, while, formerly, writs and processes of the then courts of firstinstance were enforceable throughout the Philippines, 23 under the Interim or Transitional Rules and Guidelines, certain

specified writs issued by a regional trial court are now enforceable only within its judicial region. In the interest of clarity

and contrast, it is necessary that said provision be set out in full:

3. Writs and processes.

(a) Writs of certiorari, prohibition mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction issued by a regional tria

court may be enforced in any part of the region.

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(b) All other processes, whether issued by a regional trial court or a metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court o

municipal circuit trial court may be served anywhere in the Philippines, and, in the last three cases, without a

certification by the judge of the regional trial court. (Emphasis ours.)

We feel that the foregoing provision is too clear to be further belabored or enmeshed in unwarranted polemics. The rule

enumerates the writs and processes which, even if issued by a regional trial court, are enforceable only within its judicia

region. In contrast, it unqualifiedly provides that all other writs and processes, regardless of which court issued thesame, shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. As earlier demonstrated, a search warrant is but a judicial

process, not a criminal action. No legal provision, statutory or reglementary, expressly or impliedly provides a

jurisdictional or territorial limit on its area of enforceability. On the contrary, the above-quoted provision of the interim

Rules expressly authorizes its enforcement anywhere in the country, since it is not among the processes specified in

paragraph (a) and there is no distinction or exception made regarding the processes contemplated in

paragraph (b).

2. This is but a necessary and inevitable consequence of the nature and purpose of a search warrant. The Court

cannot be blind to the fact that it is extremely difficult, as it undeniably is, to detect or elicit information regarding the

existence and location of illegally possessed or prohibited articles. The Court is accordingly convinced that it should notmake the requisites for the apprehension of the culprits and the confiscation of such illicit items, once detected, more

onerous if not impossible by imposing further niceties of procedure or substantive rules of jurisdiction through

decisional dicta. For that matter, we are unaware of any instance wherein a search warrant was struck down on

objections based on territorial jurisdiction. In the landmark case of Stonehill, et al. vs. Diokno, et al., 24 the searches in

the corporate offices in Manila and the residences in Makati of therein petitioners were conducted pursuant to search

warrants issued by the Quezon City and Pasig branches of the Court of First Instance of Rizal and by the Municipal Courts

of Manila and Quezon City, 25 but the same were never challenged on jurisdictional grounds although they were

subsequently nullified for being general warrants.

3. A clarion call supposedly of libertarian import is further sounded by petitioners, dubiously invoking theconstitutional proscription against illegal searches and seizures. We do not believe that the enforcement of a search

warrant issued by a court outside the territorial jurisdiction wherein the place to be searched is located would create a

constitutional question. Nor are we swayed by the professed apprehension that the law enforcement authorities may

resort to what could be a permutation of forum shopping, by filing an application for the warrant with a "friendly" court

It need merely be recalled that a search warrant is only a process, not an action. Furthermore, the constitutiona

mandate is translated into specifically enumerated safeguards in Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure for

the issuance of a search warrant, 26 and all these have to be observed regardless of whatever court in whichever region

is importuned for or actually issues a search warrant. Said requirements, together with the ten-day lifetime of the

warrant 27 would discourage resort to a court in another judicial region, not only because of the distance but also the

contingencies of travel and the danger involved, unless there are really compelling reasons for the authorities to do so.Besides, it does seem odd that such constitutional protests have not been made against warrants of arrest which are

enforceable indefinitely and anywhere although they involve, not only property and privacy, but persons and liberty.

On the other hand, it is a matter of judicial knowledge that the authorities have to contend now and then with local and

national criminal syndicates of considerable power and influence, political or financial in nature, and so pervasive as to

render foolhardy any attempt to obtain a search warrant in the very locale under their sphere of control. Nor should we

overlook the fact that to do so will necessitate the transportation of applicant's witnesses to and their examination in

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said places, with the attendant risk, danger and expense. Also, a further well-founded precaution, obviously born o

experience and verifiable data, is articulated by the court a quo, as quoted by respondent court:

This court is of the further belief that the possible leakage of information which is of utmost importance in the issuance

of a search warrant is secured (against) where the issuing magistrate within the region does not hold court sessions in

the city or municipality, within the region, where the place to be searched is located. 28

The foregoing situations may also have obtained and were taken into account in the foreign judicial pronouncementthat, in the absence of statutory restrictions, a justice of the peace in one district of the county may issue a search

warrant to be served in another district of the county and made returnable before the justice of still another district or

another court having jurisdiction to deal with the matters involved. 29 In the present state of our law on the matter, we

find no such statutory restrictions both with respect to the court which can issue the search warrant and the

enforcement thereof anywhere in the Philippines.

III

Concern is expressed over possible conflicts of jurisdiction (or, more accurately, in the exercise of jurisdiction) where the

criminal case is pending in one court and the search warrant is issued by another court for the seizure of personalproperty intended to be used as evidence in said criminal case. This arrangement is not unknown or without precedent

in our jurisdiction. In fact, as hereinbefore noted, this very situation was anticipated in Circular No. 13 of this Court

under the limited scenario contemplated therein.

Nonetheless, to put such presentiments to rest, we lay down the following policy guidelines:

1. The court wherein the criminal case is pending shall have primary jurisdiction to issue search warrants

necessitated by and for purposes of said case. An application for a search warrant may be filed with another court only

under extreme and compelling circumstances that the applicant must prove to the satisfaction of the latter court which

may or may not give due course to the application depending on the validity of the justification offered for not filing thesame in the court with primary jurisdiction thereover.

2. When the latter court issues the search warrant, a motion to quash the same may be filed in and shall be

resolved by said court, without prejudice to any proper recourse to the appropriate higher court by the party aggrieved

by the resolution of the issuing court. All grounds and objections then available, existent or known shall be raised in the

original or subsequent proceedings for the quashal of the warrant, otherwise they shall be deemed waived.

3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was filed in or resolved by the issuing court, the interested party

may move in the court where the criminal case is pending for the suppression as evidence of the personal property

seized under the warrant if the same is offered therein for said purpose. Since two separate courts with differentparticipations are involved in this situation, a motion to quash a search warrant and a motion to suppress evidence are

alternative and not cumulative remedies. In order to prevent forum shopping, a motion to quash shall consequently be

governed by the omnibus motion rule, provided, however, that objections not available, existent or known during the

proceedings for the quashal of the warrant may be raised in the hearing of the motion to suppress. The resolution of the

court on the motion to suppress shall likewise be subject to any proper remedy in the appropriate higher court.

4. Where the court which issued the search warrant denies the motion to quash the same and is not otherwise

prevented from further proceeding thereon, all personal property seized under the warrant shall forthwith be

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transmitted by it to the court wherein the criminal case is pending, with the necessary safeguards and documentation

therefor.

5. These guidelines shall likewise be observed where the same criminal offense is charged in different informations

or complaints and filed in two or more courts with concurrent original jurisdiction over the criminal action. Where the

issue of which court will try the case shall have been resolved, such court shall be considered as vested with primary

jurisdiction to act on applications for search warrants incident to the criminal case.

WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed judgment of respondent Court

of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23533 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 102140 April 22, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.ROLANDO MANLULU AND DANTE SAMSON, accused-appellants.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Celso P. De Las Alas for accused-appellants.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

GERARDO ALFARO, a NARCOM agent, was stabbed and shot with his service pistol in a drinking spree. He died in the

hospital the following day. His drinking partners, Rolando Manlulu and Dante Samson, were haled to court for his violentdeath.

The prosecution charges that Manlulu and Samson conspired in the murder of Agent Alfaro. The accused on the other

hand invoke self-defense. They also insist that the non-issuance of a search warrant and warrant of arrest should nullify

their arrest and consequently exclude from judicial consideration the evidence thus obtained.

But the trial court was not convinced. It found accused Dante Samson and Rolando Manlulu "guilty beyond reasonable

doubt as principals in the crime of Murder defined and penalized under Article 248 of The Revised Penal Code with the

mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender on the part of Dante Samson and no mitigating circumstance modifying

the commission of the offense on the part of Rolando Manlulu." 1 As a result, accused Dante Samson was sentenced to aprison term of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months

and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, while accused Rolando Manlulu, to twelve (12) years, five (5

months and eleven (11) days of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and one (1

day of reclusion perpetua as maximum. They were also sentenced jointly to indemnify the offended party P30,000.00 as

compensatory damages and P10,410.00 for hospitalization and funeral expenses, and to pay the costs.

Upon review, the appellate court raised their penalties to reclusion perpetua and certified the case to this Court

pursuant to Sec. 13, Rule 124, of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. 2

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Testifying for the prosecution, Wally Manlapaz, a.k.a. Crisanto Meneses, narrated that at around ten o'clock in the

evening of 29 May 1986, he and accused Dante Samson and Rolando Manlulu were having a drinking spree in an alley

along Quirino Avenue, Paco, Manila. They were later joined by Agent Gerardo Alfaro who had a .45 cal. pistol tucked to

his waist. When Alfaro arrived he blurted out, "Dito may kumakatalo sa aking tao." 3 At twelve o'clock midnight, the

group transferred in front of the house of Manlapaz and continued to drink. There Samson suddenly stabbed Alfaro in

the chest with a 6-inch double-bladed knife while boasting, "Dapat sa iyo manahimik na." 4 Alfaro at this time was

"somewhat bent because he was already drunk." 5 Manlulu then followed suit and stabbed Alfaro in the abdomenseveral times with an ice pick they used to chip ice. Samson grabbed the .45 cal. service pistol of Alfaro and shot him in

the neck. When Alfaro slumped on the pavement, both accused fled, with Samson holding Alfaro's handgun. After a few

seconds, both accused returned and got Alfaro's wristwatch and wallet. 6

Noel Pagco, another witness for the prosecution, recounted that at the time of the shooting he was outside the alley

where the accused and the deceased were drinking. After hearing a gunshot coming from the direction of the alley, he

saw Dante Samson and Rolando Manlulu coming out the alley, the former tucking a gun in his waist and sporting a

watch on his right wrist, and the latter holding an ice pick. 7

As already adverted to, both accused invoke self- defense. According to Samson, while they were drinking, and aftertaking ekis pinoy, 8 Alfaro said he had a "prospect" and invited them to go with him. Thinking that "prospect" meant

they were going to rob somebody, Samson excused himself by saying that he had just been released from prison, and

had yet to fetch his wife. Alfaro, apparently resenting Samson's unwillingness to join them, drew his gun and pointed it

to Samson who parried it saying: "Pare, wala tayong biruan ng ganyan. Baka pumutok iyan." But Alfaro repeatedly

pointed the gun to him. Every time he did, Samson would push the gun aside. Fearful that it might go off, he held the

gun and tried to ward it off, resulting in a struggle for its possession. He got hold of the ice pick on top of the drum and

stabbed Alfaro instinctively. Manlapaz tried to separate them; as a consequence, Samson dropped the ice pick. As

Samson and Alfaro continued to wrestle for the possession of the gun, they fell on the ground and the gun accidentally

went off hitting Alfaro in the neck. Rattled, Samson immediately fled. He then fetched his wife from Malate, proceeded

to Pasay City, and sent word to his father who later accompanied him to surrender to Capt. Pring of the HomicideDivision of the Western Police District. When he fled, he left behind Alfaro's gun. 9

Rolando Manlulu corroborated the testimony of his co-accused. He added that he picked up the ice pick when it fell, and

fearing that he might be the next victim should Alfaro succeed in shooting Samson, he (Manlulu) stabbed Alfaro severa

times with the ice pick, then dropped it, and ran away. He looked back and saw Samson and Alfaro fall on the pavement

Almost simultaneously, the gun went off. 10

Patrolman Reynaldo Perez recounted that at around seven o'clock in the evening of 30 May 1986 he, together with

some other officers, arrested Manlulu on the information given by Manlapaz. He said that he seized from Manlulu the

.45 cal. pistol and Casio wristwatch said to belong to Alfaro, 11 and that Manlulu verbally confessed to the commissionof the crime. Patrolman Perez however admitted on cross- examination that when he arrested Manlulu and seized from

him the handgun as well as the wristwatch, he (Perez) was not with any warrant nor did he inform the accused of the

latter's right to counsel. Perez added that at that time Manlulu was under the influence of liquor. 12

Dr. Marcial Ceido, Medico-Legal Officer of the Western Police District, confirmed that Alfaro sustained nine (9) wounds

four (4) of them fatal, i.e., a gunshot wound in the neck; a penetrating stab wound probably caused by a bladed weapon

and two (2) stab wounds probably caused by an ice pick. 13

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In this appeal, accused Manlulu and Samson would want us to believe, first, in their version of the incident, and next

that they acted in self-defense.

The account of the appellants does not inspire belief. A review of the testimony of Manlapaz, who admittedly had drunk

a little too much, reveals that his story tallies not only with some accounts of accused Samson and Manlulu but also with

the findings of Dr. Ceido. Hence, except for the actual attack on the victim, the testimonies of Samson and Manlulu

square with that of Manlapaz, including the conversation that took place. Thus we give credence to the testimony of

Manlapaz that Samson used a bladed weapon and not an ice pick in stabbing Alfaro, contrary to what Samson wouldwant us to believe. This version of Manlapaz is consistent with the necropsy report of Dr. Ceido which states that the

deceased had a penetrating stab wound which could have been caused by a bladed weapon. That Manlulu according to

Manlapaz used an ice pick in repeatedly stabbing Alfaro was not only admitted by Manlulu on the witness stand but is

confirmed likewise by the medical findings of Dr. Ceido.

If Manlapaz was indeed too drunk to recall the events that transpired before the actual killing, then in all probability he

could not have remembered the weapons used by the accused. Certainly, eyewitness Manlapaz could not have been so

drunk as to muddle those incidents which impute guilt to the accused and recall only those which are consistent with

their innocence.

Similarly, we cannot disregard those portions of the testimonies of the two accused which tend to confirm the narration

of Manlapaz. Expectedly, the accused will refute the statements tending to establish their culpability. Hence, they have

to differ in some respects from the narration of Manlapaz. Since it appears from the testimony of Manlapaz that he had

not yet reached that degree of intoxication where he would have otherwise lost control of his mental faculties, we find

his version to be credible as it conforms with the autopsy report and admissions of both accused. 14 Thus, we sustain

the factual findings of the trial court and reject the version of the defense. But, even if we consider the theory of the

accused thus far if only to satisfy them, still they cannot elude the consequences of their felonious acts. By invoking self

defense, the accused admit killing Alfaro. The burden of proof is thus shifted to them. Their duty now is to establish by

clear and convincing evidence the lawful justification for the killing. 15 In this regard, they have miserably failed.

The three (3) requisites for self-defense are: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of

the means employed to prevent or repel it; and, (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending

himself. 16 For self- defense to prosper, it must be positively shown that there was a previous unlawful and unprovoked

attack that placed the life of the accused in danger which forced him to inflict more or less severe wounds upon his

assailant, employing therefore reasonable means to resist said attack. 17

Here, at the outset, the two accused have already failed to show that there was unlawful aggression on the part of

Alfaro. A gun aimed at the accused, without more, is insufficient to prove unlawful aggression. For unlawful aggression

to be appreciated in self-defense, there must be an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof,

and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude. 18

Even the means employed to repel or prevent the supposed attack was not reasonable. For, even if we disregard the

gunshot wound which Samson claims to have resulted from an accidental firing, the victim also suffered seven othe

stab wounds, three of which were fatal, one of which was admittedly inflicted by Samson, while the other two, by

accused Manlulu. Definitely, it was not necessary to stab, more so repeatedly, the victim. Considering their relative

positions as they drank - each within the other's reach all that was necessary was for the two accused to band

together and overpower the lone victim with their bare hands, assuming the deceased was indeed pointing his gun at

one of them. A stab wound may not necessarily be fatal and thus enable the victim to fire his gun. But a firm grasp by

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the two accused of the victim's arm holding the gun, or of the gun itself, could prevent the victim from shooting them.

At any rate, the number of wounds suffered by Alfaro indicates a determined effort of both accused to kill the victim,

which negates self- defense. 19

Furthermore, their flight from the scene of the crime is a strong indication of their guilt. 20 Indeed, a righteous individua

will not cower in fear and unabashedly admit the killing at the earliest opportunity if he were morally justified in so

doing. A belated plea suggests that it is false and only an afterthought made as a last ditch effort to avoid the

consequences of thecrime. 21 If the accused honestly believed that their acts constituted self-defense against the unlawful aggression of the

victim, they should have reported the incident to the police, instead of escaping and avoiding the authorities until they

were either arrested or prevailed upon to surrender. 22

The reliance of the accused on the Constitution however is warranted. Certainly, the police authorities should have first

obtained a warrant for the arrest of accused Rolando Manlulu, and for the search and seizure of his personal effects. The

killing took place at one o'clock in the morning. The arrest and the consequent search and seizure came at around seven

o'clock that evening, some nineteen hours later. This instance cannot come within the purview of a valid warrantless

arrest. Paragraph (b), Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that the arresting officer must

have "personal knowledge" of an offense which "has in fact just been committed." In the instant case, neither did PatPerez have "personal knowledge," nor was the offense "in fact just been committed." While Pat. Perez may have

personally gathered the information which led to the arrest of Manlulu, that is not enough. The law requires "persona

knowledge." Obviously, "personal gathering of information" is different from "personal knowledge." The rule requires

that the arrest immediately follows the commission of the offense, not some nineteen hours later. This is not any

different from People v. Cendana 23 where the accused was arrested one day after the killing of the victim, and only on

the basis of information obtained by the police officers. There we said that the "circumstances clearly belie a lawfu

warrantless arrest."

However, the flaw, fatal as it may be, becomes moot in view of the eyewitness account of Manlapaz which we find to be

credible. Hence, in spite of the nullification of the arrest of accused Manlulu, and the exclusion of real evidence, i.e., the.45 cal. service pistol of Agent Alfaro and his Casio wristwatch, as well as his extra-judicial confession which was taken in

violation of the provisions of the Constitution, still the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the accused beyond

reasonable doubt. After all, the illegality of the warrantless arrest cannot deprive the state of its right to prosecute the

guilty when all other facts on record point to their culpability. 24

While we confirm the factual findings of the trial court, which were affirmed by the appellate court, we nevertheless

differ from the conclusions drawn that treachery and conspiracy attended the killing of Alfaro. Indeed, there is serious

doubt as to whether treachery could be appreciated against the two accused. There is nothing on record to show that

both accused deliberately employed means tending to insure the killing of Alfaro without risk to themselves arising from

the defense which the latter might make. It must be noted that Alfaro set the mood of the evening with a threateningtone that someone in the group was provoking him. Clearly, the attack on Alfaro who was then armed with a .45 cal.

revolver by Samson who on the other hand was merely armed with a knife could not have been so sudden as to catch

the former off-guard. In fact, Manlapaz testified that after Samson's initial attack on Alfaro the latter was even able to

push Samson back. 25 Even Manlulu, who impulsively stabbed the victim, only picked up the ice pick they were using to

chip ice. Taking into account the attendant circumstances, our minds cannot rest easy in appreciating the aggravating

circumstance of treachery. Hence, the two accused may only be convicted of simple homicide.

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There was no conspiracy likewise in the killing of Alfaro. Settled is the rule that neither joint nor simultaneous action per

se is a sufficient indicium of conspiracy. 26 The evidence shows that it was the victim who chanced upon Manlapaz and

the two accused drinking, and decided to join them. Accused Manlulu was not even armed when he went to the drinking

spree. We have often said that conspiracy must be established beyond reasonable doubt. Here, the prosecution failed to

show that Manlulu and Samson conspired to kill Alfaro. There being no conspiracy, each is liable for his own acts.

The penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal 27 the range of which is twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20)

years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law to accused Rolando Manlulu, there being no mitigating nor aggravatingcircumstance, the maximum of his penalty shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal, which is

fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, while the minimum

shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision mayor, the range of which is six (6) years and one

(1) day to twelve (12) years, in any of its periods.

As regards accused Dante Samson, although he is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the

same is offset by reiteracion or habituality he having previously been convicted once of robbery and thrice of theft 28

within ten (10) years prior to this incident, each time serving sentence therefor, which further bars him from availing of

the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. 29 Consequently, he should be sentenced to reclusion temporal

medium the range of which is fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4)months. Furthermore, being a habitual delinquent as defined in the last paragraph of Art. 62 of The Revised Penal Code

30 he should serve an additional penalty within the range of prision mayor maximum to reclusion temporal minimum

31 And, as correctly determined by the appellate court, the civil liability of both accused is increased from P30,000.00 to

P50,000.00. In addition, both accused are liable to indemnify the heirs of their victim in the amount of P10,410.00 for

hospitalization and funeral expenses.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is modified as follows:

(a) ROLANDO MANLULU is found guilty of HOMICIDE and is sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of eight (8)

years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) monthsand one (1) day of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum;

(b) DANTE SAMSON is found guilty of HOMICIDE and is sentenced to a straight prison term of fourteen (14) years, ten

(10) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal medium and, for being a habitual delinquent, is ordered to

serve an additional penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum; and

(c) ROLANDO MANLULU and DANTE SAMSON are directed jointly and severally to pay the heirs of Gerardo Alfaro the

amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P10,410.00 as death and funeral expenses, with costs.

SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No. 90628 February 1, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

JOSE RAYRAY Y AREOLA, accused-appellant.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

After offering to sell 2.9452 grams of marijuana to a stranger in San Fernando, La Union, who turned out to be the Chief

Administrative Officer of the Regional Integrated National Police (INP) Command stationed in Baguio City, accused-

appellant Jose Rayray y Areola was arrested, tried and subsequently convicted of violation of Sec. 4, Art. II of R. A. No.

6425.

The antecedents as found by the trial court: At nine forty-five in the morning of 12 September 1986 P/Lt. Ramon

Ancheta was at the Friendly Shop located at Ortega St., San Fernando, La Union, when accused-appellant Jose Rayray y

Areola approached him offering to sell marijuana. Making the latter believe that he was interested in buying, Lt. Ancheta

asked where the merchandise was and accused-appellant responded by taking marijuana wrapped in komiks from his

pocket. Catching sight of the marijuana fruiting tops and marijuana cigarette being offered him, Lt. Ancheta immediatelyidentified himself as a police officer, arrested accused-appellant and brought him to the San Fernando Police Station

where he was turned-over to the desk officer, Sgt. Carmelito Leyga, who entered the details of the arrest in the police

blotter.

Accused-appellant denied making the offer to sell and instead testified that he was at Dodies' Fishing Supply at Ortega

Street with his friend Bonifacio Chan to buy fish hooks when he was suddenly tapped on the shoulder by somebody who

whispered, "Don't try to involve somebody." After being ordered to undress, he was made to face the stranger who was

holding something wrapped in paper and which he tried to pass off as that of accused-appellant by saying, "You are

selling marijuana." Afterwards, accused-appellant was forced into a tricycle, brought to the municipal jail and there

incarcerated for no reason.

On 29 August 1989, rejecting the defense of frame-up and invoking the presumption of regularity in the performance of

official duties in favor of the prosecution, Judge Benito A. Dacanay declared accused-appellant guilty of the offense

charged and sentenced him to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00. 1

Hence, this recourse to us. But for reasons set forth below, the appeal should be denied.

Accused-appellant argues that his arrest was illegal because P/Lt. Ancheta had no authority to arrest persons in San

Fernando, La Union, being then assigned at the Regional INP Command in Baguio City. 2

We cannot yield to appellant's view that just because Lt. Ancheta was assigned in Baguio City he could not arrest

persons caught in the act of committing a crime in some other place, especially so where he was the intended victim. A

policeman cannot callously set aside his essential duty of apprehending criminal offenders and of keeping peace and

order on the shallow excuse that he is not in his place of assignment. His responsibility to protect the public by

apprehending violators of the law, especially one caught in flagrante delicto is not limited by territorial constraints. It

follows him wherever he goes. Moreover, Sec. 5, par. (a), Rule 113, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure

authorities a warrantless arrest, otherwise called a citizen's arrest, "when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has

committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense." Thus, although officially assigned in Baguio

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City, Lt. Ancheta's act of arresting accused-appellant (after the latter offered to sell him marijuana in San Fernando, La

Union) is justified not only by his duty as a law enforcer but also by Sec. 5 of Rule 113, which authorizes instances of

warrantless or citizens' arrests.

Second, accused-appellant takes exception to the fact that the trial judge accepted the uncorroborated testimony of

P/Lt. Ancheta over his which was in fact corroborated by two other witnesses.

The argument is without merit. No rule exists which requires that a testimony has to be corroborated to be adjudgedcredible. 3 Witnesses are to be weighed, not numbered, 4 hence, it is not at all uncommon to reach a conclusion of guilt

on the basis of the testimony of a single witness and despite the lack of corroboration where such testimony is found

positive and credible by the trial court. In such a case, the lone testimony is sufficient to produce a conviction. 5 For

although the number of witnesses may be considered a factor in the appreciation of evidence, preponderance is not

necessarily with the greatest number 6 and conviction can still be had on the basis of the credible and positive testimony

of a single witness more so when such testimony proceeds from the positive narration of a police officer who, in

addition, has to his credit the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and obedience to law. 7

Narration of an incident by prosecution witnesses who are police officers and who are presumed to have regularly

performed their duties is credible. 8

In the case at bench, while details of accused-appellant's offense came from the lone testimony of P/Lt. Ancheta, that of

the defense is admittedly corroborated by the testimonies of witnesses Gabriel Galvez and Bonifacio Chan. However

such fact failed to render the version offered by the defense more credible and believable than that of the prosecution.

Apart from the fact that both Galvez and Chan are not entirely disinterested witnesses, being a companion in the fishing

business 9 and close friend or barkada of accused-appellant, 10 respectively, a review of their respective testimonies vis

a-vis that of accused-appellant reveals certain points which render their corroboration not so reliable, as correctly

concluded by the court a quo.

Accused-appellant testified that in the morning of 12 September 1986 while packing fish in the house of Junior Galvez

(also known as Gabriel Galvez), he suddenly remembered that somebody from Pangasinan requested him to buy fishhooks and that was why he asked permission from Galvez to go to Dodies Fishing Supply at Ortega Street. 11 However,

Junior Galvez testified that it was he himself who asked accused-appellant to buy the fish hooks and that he did so in the

same morning in question. 12 Secondly, Galvez testified that he was informed about the arrest of accused-appellant by

the latters grandmother, an old woman called Isten (not presented as a witness). 13 However, Bonifacio Chan claimed

that it was from him that Gabriel Galvez learned of the incident. 14 Third, while Bonifacio Chan corroborated accused-

appellant's defense by claiming to have witnessed the alleged frame-up, it is curious to note that Chan did not even lift a

finger to help accused-appellant (his supposed close friend) while the latter was allegedly being ordered to undress and

forced into a vehicle by an "unknown man" in civilian clothes for no apparent reason. Instead, Chan appeared unaffecfed

by his friend's fate for he just went home after the incident 15 and did nothing except to inform Galvez (who even

denied that he learned about the incident from Chan) about the arrest, who in the same manner, likewise did nothing byway of succor. 16 If the story about the alleged frame-up is true, a friend as Chan claims himself to be would do

everything in his power to assist his friend and not abandon him as Chan practically did. It even appears from the

records that Bonifacio Chan initially refused to testify for the defense (by refusing to receive the subpoena being served

on him) and denied any knowledge about the incident, nay, even his close association with accused-appellant. 17

Third, accused-appellant argues that there was misappreciation of evidence since the judge who decided the case was

not the one who conducted the trial. 18

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Again, we cannot ascribe any merit to the argument since it is now well recognized that the fact that the judge who

heard the evidence is not himself the one who prepared, signed and promulgated the decision, but some other judge in

his place, constitutes no compelling reason to jettison his findings and conclusions 19 and does not per se render it

erroneous. 20 The trial judge's assessment of the credibility of a testimony is not to be anchored solely on how the

witness conducted himself on the witness stand. Aside from the danger of being misled by appearance inherent in such

a case, a judge is supposed to render a decision on the basis of the evidence before him, i.e., records and all. Although

an undeniable tool in arriving at the correct decision, the failure of the trial judge to observe the witnesses testify on the

stand in no way affects the validity of the judgment rendered or ipso facto condemns it as erroneous more so where thejudgment appears to be fully supported by the evidence on record as in the case at bench.

Finally, with respect to accused-appellant's contention that his constitutional rights were violated during the custodia

investigation conducted by the San Fernando Police, we can only say that although he was admittedly not informed of

his constitutional rights, much less assisted by counsel during the interrogation, such did not paralyze the cause for the

prosecution because the confession allegedly elicited from him that the subject marijuana was indeed confiscated form

him 21 does not constitute the whole fabric of the evidence for the prosecution. It should be remembered that accused

appellant's attempt at selling marijuana was succinctly and clearly detailed by the positive testimony of P/Lt. Ancheta as

earlier pointed out. Thus, although the alleged admission is inadmissible in evidence having been obtained from

accused-appellant without the assistance of counsel, the act constituting the offense (offer to sell marijuana) wasnevertheless credibly established by the prosecution coupled with the presentation of the corpus delicti 22 of the

offense making accused-appellant's conviction inevitable.

But, a modification in the penalty imposed on accused-appellant is called for in view of the amendments introduced by

R.A. No. 7659. 23 The court a quo sentenced accused-appellant to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00

However, under Sec. 20 of R.A. No. 6425 (The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) as amended by Sec. 17 of R.A. No. 7659, the

illegal sale of marijuana is now penalized with reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to

P10,000.00 if the marijuana unlawfully sold is 750 grams or more; otherwise, if the quantity is less than 750 grams, the

penalty shall range from prision correccional to reclusion temporal 24 without fine. Since the amount of marijuana

confiscated from accused-appellant is only 2.9452 grams, the proper imposable component penalty is prisioncorrectional to be applied in its medium period in view of the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty shall be taken; from the medium period of prision

correctional, which is two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months, while the

minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which is arresto mayor the range of which is one (1)

month and one (1) day to six (6) months.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, La Union, Br. 28, declaring accused-appellant

JOSE RAYRAY Y AREOLA guilty of violating Sec. 4, of Art. II, of R.A. No. 6425 is AFFIRMED with the modification that he is

sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of six (6) months of arresto mayor maximum as minimum to four (4)

years and two (2) months of prision correccional medium as maximum.

It appearing that accused-appellant has already been detained at the New Bilibid Prisons in Muntinlupa for more than

seven (7) years; he is ordered immediately released from custody unless he is held for some other lawful cause.

SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No. 125311 March 17, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

ONYOT MAHINAY and QUIRINO CAETE, accused, QUIRINO CAETE, accused-appellant.

VITUG, J.:

Quirino Caete appeals from the decision 1 in Criminal Case No. 9304 of the Regional Trial court of Negros Oriental,

Branch 39, stationed at Dumaguete City, finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder for the

killing of Manolo Mission and imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the payment of indemnity to the

heirs of the victim in the amount of P50,000.00.

The information, filed on 18 May 1990, charging Quirino Caete and one Onyot Mahinay with the crime of murder,

reads:

That on or about 12:30 o'clock dawn of March 18, 1990, at Crossing Cawayan, Barangay Tadlong, Mabinay, Negros

Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, evident premeditation and treachery, did, then and

them willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one MANOLO MISSION with the use of a hunting knife

and icepick, with which the said accused were then armed and provided, thereby inflicting upon said MANOLO MISSION

the following wounds or injuries, to wit:

1. Stab wound about 6 cm. long epigastric area with evisceration of intestine;

2. Stab wound about 2 cm. long lower lateral side of right chest;

3. Stab wound about 1.5 cm. long right arm;

which wounds caused the death of said MANOLO MISSION shortly thereafter.

Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. 2

Quirino Caete was apprehended by the authorities on 17 May 1990 in Barangay Ambayao, Valencia, Bukidnon. His co-

accused, Onyot Mahinay, remained at large. The trial proceeded only against accused Caete who, upon arraignment

entered a plea of not guilty.

The prosecution first presented its evidence.

On 18 March 1990, the eve of the Barangay Tadlong fiesta, in Negros Mabinay, Negros Oriental, a public dance was held

Among those who were in attendance were Quirino Caete, Onyot Mahinay and Manolo Mission. Later that evening,

Joel Mission saw his uncle, Manolo Mission, arguing with Caete outside the dance hall. At about 12:30 a.m., Joel and

his uncle decided that it was time to leave. On the way home, at a street fronting the barangay hall, Manolo noticed that

they were being followed by Caete. Manolo stopped and turned to face Caete. Soon, the two figured in an argument

Suddenly, Onyot Mahinay came from behind Manolo and stabbed the latter, hitting him on the stomach. Onyot Mahinay

started to flee but Manolo made an attempt to chase him. Then, once again, Onyot Mahinay faced Manolo. The latter

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received another stab thrust, this time hitting him on his right hand. When Manolo started to walk away, Caete

followed and stabbed the already injured victim on the right side of his body and on his chest.

Joel witnessed the entire episode. Fear, however, took the better part of him, and he was unable to extend help to his

uncle during the critical moments. His proximity enabled him to hear Manolo remark, "I was hit Yo, and Quirino Caete

was chasing me." 3 The fluorescent lamps in the area illuminated the place. In the vicinity were Roman Bucog and Jose

Mait. Joel dared approach Manolo only when the two malefactors had fled. His other uncle, Peter Peras, and he brough

the wounded Manolo, using a cargo truck owned by Joel's grandfather, Basilio, to the Medicare Unit in Mabinay and,later, to the Negros Oriental Provincial Hospital where Manolo succumbed to his wounds at around seven o'clock in the

morning of 19 March 1990. 4

Another eyewitness was Roman Bucog who, together with his wife, had also come from the dance party at just about

the same time as the others. He and his wife saw at a short distance of about four arms length, Onyot Mahinay and

Manolo first engaged, evident by their gestures, in an argument. Caete, who was wearing a shirt with green stripes,

was beside Onyot Mahinay, Joel Mission and Jose Mait. There were other people at the opposite side of the road. The

fluorescent lamps and the moonlight that sufficiently illuminated the area helped Roman recognize Onyot Mahinay in

the act of stabbing Manolo. After he was stabbed, Manolo was still able to turn around in an attempt to go after his

attacker. Roman thereupon saw Caete stab Manolo on his chest causing the latter to fall to the ground. According toRoman, Caete was armed with an icepick while Onyot had with him a hunting knife.

Jose Mait testified that he was walking towards the house of Basilio Mission, Joel's grandfather, after coming from the

dance when he too saw stabbing incident. Jose first saw Onyot Mahinay strike Manolo and Manolo attempted to get to

Onyot Mahinay, Caete stabbed Manolo the right side of his body. Onyot Mahinay and Caete scampered. Jose assisted

Joel and Roman in getting Manolo onto a cargo truck to take him to a hospital.

Manolo was in a state of shock when brought to the Negros Provincial hospital. Henrissa Calumpang, a resident

physician of the hospital examined the stab wounds inflicted on the patient. Despite the prompt medical assistance

administered to him, Manolo died approximately three hours later. The Death Certificate, 5 issued by Dr. Calumpang,indicated that Manolo had died of "hypovolemic shock, irreversible; stab wound about 6 cm. long epigastric area with

evisceration of intestine; stab wound about 2 cm. long lower lateral side of right chest; stab wound about 1.5 cm. long

right arm." Dr. Calumpang's examination revealed that the stab wound in the epigastric area, about 6 cms. long, was

caused by the penetration of a sharp-pointed instrument with clean cut edges. According to the physician, there was a

possibility that two sharp-pointed bladed weapons were used in inflicting Manolo's wounds. She opined that from the

nature and location of the wounds, the relative position of the assailant could have been in front of the victim.

Basilio Mission, the older brother of Manolo, testified that prior to his death, Manolo, who had three children, was an

employee of their father working as a truck driver and receiving a monthly salary of P4,500.00. Their father shouldered

the expenses of P15,000.00 for Manolo's wake and P7,600.00 for his coffin. The family spent P10,000.00 for attorney'sfees.

The defense interposed denial when its turn to present evidence followed.

Caete admitted having been in the vicinity when the crime was penetrated but he denied any participation in the

incident. He said that he had long resided in Bukidnon and went back to Mabinay, Negros Oriental, at around four

o'clock in the afternoon of 18 March 1990 only to get some tools. Since it was the day of fiesta in Tadlong, his girlfriends

Gina and Elsie whose surnames he could not recall, invited him to attend the dance. He later met the girls at the dance

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hall. He and the two girls left party at around midnight. After a while, he saw from a distance of about five arms-length

Manolo and Onyot Mahinay having an argument. Nearby were Joel and about twenty other people. A fluorescent lamp

lighted the area. After Onyot Mahinay was heard to remark, "so you are here?," he stabbed Manolo. The latter shouted

"Oel, help!" Onyot Mahinay ran away. 6 Caete spent the rest of the night in Mabinay at the house of his parents. At

around four o'clock in the morning of 19 March 1990, after slept for about three and a half hours, Caete took a "Ceres"

passenger bus. He alighted from the bus in Tampi, San Jose, Negros en route to Cebu City where he took a boat for

Cagayan. The boat Cebu City at about seven o'clock in the evening. He was met by his parent at the pier in Cagayan and

from there, they all proceeded to Valencia, Bukidnon.

Caete was apprehended by police authorities at Barangay, Lumbayao, Valencia, Bukidnon, on 17 May 1991. He was

taken to Mabinay, Negros Oriental, where he was first confined at the municipal jail transferred, three days later, to the

provincial jail. He admitted having known Manolo quite well before he was killed since he had worked in the Mission

farm for about six years prior to taking up residence in Bukidnon. He also worked before that in the Manolo residence

for sixteen years from 1972 to 1988. Roman, with whom Onyot Mahinay stayed, was Caete's neighbor in Napasuan

Caete denied that he was with Onyot Mahinay at the dance party.

The defense presented a certificate of good moral character 7 issued by the Punong Barangay of Lumbayao, Valencia,

Bukidnon, stating that the accused was a resident of that locality. The trial court, allowed its admission "for whatever itmay be worth." 8

After the parties had rested their respective cases, the trial court, on 31 January 1996, rendered its judgment finding

accused Quirino Caete guilty of murder. It adjudged:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is rendered finding the herein accused Quirino Caete

GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder defined under the provisions of Article 248 of the Revised

Penal Code. There being no attendant mitigating circumstance, the said accused is sentenced to suffer the penalty of

RECLUSION PERPETUA and ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00)PESOS.

SO ORDERED. 9

In this appeal from the judgment, the convicted accused pleads for his acquittal, arguing that:

I

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT CONSPIRACY ATTENDED THE KILLING OF VICTIM.

II

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME

OF MURDER.

III

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THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ORDERING ACCUSED-APPELLANT TO INDEMNIFY THE HEIRS OF THE VICTIM THE SUM OF

FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS. 10

The Court finds the appeal devoid of merit.

The plea of innocence asserted by appellant brings the Court, once again, to the crucial question of credibility of

witnesses and the weight that should be given to testimonial evidence. On this issue, the Court has almost invariably

ruled that the matter of assigning value to the declaration witnesses is best done by trial courts which, unlike appellatecourts, can assess such testimony in the light of the demeanor, conduct and attitude of the witnesses at the trial stage

and thus, unless cogent reasons are shown, findings of the trial court are accorded great respect and credit. 11

Appellant would pound on the alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses; thus: (a) Roman's

testimony that Onyot Mahinay and Manolo were the ones arguing was contrary to the statement of Joel that appellant

was the one conversing with Manolo while Jose, in his case, even failed to testify on the point; (b) the statement that

left the dance hall alone and later went with Joel contradicted the latter's testimony that he was with his uncle in going

home; (c) according to Joel, Roman was very near, in fact, just in front of Manolo and appellant trying to pacify them,

and yet Roman declared having hidden behind a fishbox, 12 and (d) whereas Joel claimed that he was quite close to his

uncle, he, however, did not do anything to help him when he needed it most.

Inconsistencies, even if true, on negligible details do not destroy the veracity of testimony. Variations in the declaration

of witnesses in respect of collateral or incidental matters do not impair the weight of testimony, taken in its entirety, to

the prominent facts, 13 nor per se preclude the establishment of the crime and the positive identification of the

malefactor. 14 Antithetically, minor incoherences can even serve to strengthen the credibility of witnesses and often are

taken to be badges of truth rather than indicia of falsehood. Variance in the statement of witnesses substantially erases

suspicion that the testimony given has been rehearsed. 15 It is, in fact, when the testimony appears to be totally flawless

that a court can rightly have some misgivings on its veracity. 16 Besides, different persons have different reflexes that

may produce varying reactions, impressions and recollections since no two individuals are alike in terms of powers of

perception and recollection. 17 One testimony may be replete with details not found in the other but, taken as a whole,the versions can well concur on material points.

Greatly significant was the fact that prosecution witnesses Joel, Roman and Jose had all positively attested to having

actually seen Onyot Mahinay and appellant Caete stab Manolo. The conditions of visibility appeared to be favorable

even according to appellant himself. Nothing was shown to indicate that the witnesses were biased. Neither could their

relationship with the victim derail their credibility for it should not be lightly supposed that a relative of the deceased

would callously violate his conscience to avenge the death of a dear one by blaming it on somebody known by him to be

innocent.

Joel's failure to help his uncle in the face of danger certainly would not, in consequence, negate the value of hiseyewitness account nor imply that he deviated from the truth. No standard form of behavioral response, quite often

said, could be expected from everyone when confronted with a startling or frightful occurrence. 18 Joel was apparently

terrified by what he saw, and fear had been known to render people immobile and helpless particularly, such as here, in

life and death situations. 19

The congruence between the testimonial and the physical evidence leads to the inevitable conclusion that the

prosecution did not prevaricate its case. 20 Mere denial by an accused, particularly when not properly corroborated or

substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, cannot prevail over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on

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affirmative matters. 21 Denial being in the nature of negative and self-serving evidence is seldom given weight in law. 22

Positive and forthright declarations of witnesses are often held to be worthier of credence than the self-serving denial of

an accused. 23

The trial court correctly held that the Crime committed was murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The

victim was unarmed and defenseless when appellant attacked him. Although appellant's co-accused was the one who

stabbed him first, Manolo was already in a defenseless position. He might have realized the danger confronting him but

counter attack from his end was simply unlikely he was effectively made defenseless by the initial assault of OnyotMahinay that caused the evisceration of his intestines. There could be treachery even when the victim had been warned

of danger or initially assaulted frontally, but was attacked again after being rendered helpless with no means to defend

himself or to retaliate 24 Treachery was correctly appreciated, its two conditions having concurred; i.e., (1) the

employment of means of execution that gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate, and

(2) the means of execution were deliberately and consciously adopted. 25

Conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence, for it may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before,

during, and after the commission of the crime, which, if all taken together, would reasonably be strong enough to show

a community of criminal design. 26

The concerted action of the appellant and Onyot Mahinay evinced the presence of conspiracy. There was an overt act on

the part of the appellant showing that he joined Onyot Mahinay in his intent to perpetrate the crime. After Onyot

Mahinay had rendered the victim helpless, appellant himself stabbed him as if wanting to be sure that Onyot Mahinay's

criminal act would be so pursued to its intended culmination, i.e., the victim's death. Nevertheless, even if it were to be

assumed that conspiracy was not established, appellant's liability would not be less than that adjudged by the court a

quo since his own overt act of stabbing the victim had put him under the law to be himself a principal by direct

participation. 27

The Court finds, however, the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation alleged in the information not to have

been sufficiently proven. The premeditation to kill should be plain and notorious. In the absence of clear and positiveevidence proving this aggravating circumstance, mere presumptions and inferences thereon, no matter how logical and

probable, would not be enough. 28 The trial court has thus correctly imposed reclusion perpetua, the medium period of

reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, the penalty imposable for murder at the time of its commission. The

medium period of the penalty is imposed in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance. 29 In conformity

with prevailing jurisprudential law, the trial court correctly awarded the amount of P50,000.00 as death indemnity to the

heirs of the victim. 30 Regrettably, however, this court cannot grant actual damages absent competent and adequate

proof therefor. In People vs. Degoma and Taborada 31 reiterated in People vs. Cordero, 32 we held:

. . . Of the expenses allegedly incurred, the Court can only give credence to those supported by receipt and which appea

to have been genuinely incurred in connection with the death, wake or burial of the victim. Thus, the Court cannot takeaccount of receipts showing expenses incurred before the date of the slaying of the victim; those incurred after a

considerable lapse of time from the burial of the victim and which do not have any relation to the death, wake or burial

of the victim; those incurred for purely aesthetic or social purposes, such as the lining with marble of the tomb of the

victim; those which appear to have been modified to show an increase in the amount of expenditure . . .; those

expenditures which could not be reasonably itemized or determined to have been incurred in connection with the

death, wake or burial of the victim; those which, nonetheless, would have been incurred despite the death, wake and

burial of the victim, the death, wake and burial being merely incidental; and those which were not in fact shouldered by

the immediate heirs of the victim, such as plane tickets by relatives or in-laws . . . . 33

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In People vs. Alvero, Jr., 34 this Court deleted the award by the trial court of unearned income to the heirs of the victim

viz:

Anent the RTC's award of P600,000.00 to cover the victim's unearned income, we hereby rule that the same should be

deleted. The trial court arrived at this amount as . . . it has been established that Victor Alvaran at the time he was killed

was only 21 years old, single, a seaman, employed by the International Shipping Corporation, earning P2,000.00 a

month. After 50 years, or at the age of 70, which is the average span of life of men in our country, he would have earnedP1,200,000.00 or a net income (after expenses) of P600,000.00, but for his untimely death. (OR, 154, Rollo, 31.) Such a

conclusion is rather sweeping, to say the least. There is no evidence to prove that at the time of his death, Alvaran had

an existing contract with the International Shipping Corporation, his alleged employer. While Victoria Alvaran, (TSN, 29

August 1984, 5.) the victim's sister, testified on the matter of Victor's employment, she did not, however, testify as to

whether the latter was a seaman serving on a domestic vessel or a vessel engaged in foreign trade; whether such

employment was probationary or regular; or whether the contract of employment was still existing at the time of his

death. There is, as well, no competent proof to show that the victim was on vacation. The Prosecution should have

therefore presented the latter's contract of employment or any evidence that may have proven the nature and duration

of his employment. The rule in this jurisdiction is that the measure of the loss or damage that dependents and intestate

heirs of the deceased may sustain by reason of the latter's death is not the full amount of the deceased's earnings, butthe support they received or would have received from him had he not died. 35

WHEREFORE, the herein assailed decision finding appellant Quirino Caete guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime

of murder, imposing on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to pay civil indemnity ex delicto in the

amount of P50,000.00 is AFFIRMED. Costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-8455. February 27, 1956.]

GAUDENCIO MANIGBAS, ET AL., Petitioners-Appellees, vs. JUDGE CALIXTO P. LUNA, ETC., ET AL., Respondents. JUDGE

CALIXTO P. LUNA, Respondent-Appellant.

D E C I S I O N

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

On July 13, 1954, Gaudencio Manigbas and eleven others were charged with murder before the Justice of the Peace

Court of Rosario, Batangas by Captain Epigenio Navarro, commanding officer of a constabulary detachment stationed in

Alangilang, Batangas, Batangas. The complaint was later amended by including one Miguel Almario.

Three days after the filing of the original complaint, counsel for the accused moved that they be granted bail for their

provisional liberty and, on July 19, 1954, the court issued an order wherein, after reconsidering its previous order

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