Rule 7 (Outline, Case Digest & Full Text).pdf

8/10/2019 Rule 7 (Outline, Case Digest & Full Text).pdf

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Outline: Rule 7 - Parts of a Pleading CIVIL PROCEDURE

mmeikimouse

Lesson for August 23, 2014

Saturday

Parts of a Pleading

Parts of a pleading - Rule 7

a) Caption - Sec. 1, Rule 7

b) Signature and address - Sec. 3, Rule 7

- Republic v. Kenrick Development Corp., G.R. No. 149576, August 8, 2006

c) Verification and certification against forum shopping - Secs. 4 & 5, Rule 7

- Robern Development Corp. v. J. Quitain, G.R. No. 135042, September 23, 1999

- Huibonhoa v. Concepcion, G.R. No. 153785, August 3, 2006

- Montes v. CA, G.R. No. 143797, May 4, 2006

- Far Eastern Shipping Co.v. CA, G.R. No. 130068, October 1, 1998

- Valmonte v. Alcala, G.R. No. 168667, July 23, 2008

i. Requirements of a corporation executing the verification/certification of non-forum shopping

- National Steel Corp. v. CA, G.R. No. 134468, August 29, 2002

- Kaunlaran Lending Investors Inc. v. Uy, G.R. No. 154974, February 4, 2008

d) Effect of the signature of counsel in a pleading


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Case Digest: Rule 7 - Parts of a Pleading CIVIL PROCEDURE

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Signature and address - Sec. 3, Rule 7

REPUBLIC vs KENRICK DEVELOPMENT CORP.

G.R. No. 149576, August 8, 2006

Facts:

Kenrick Development Corporation constructed a

concrete perimeter fence around some parcels of land

located behind the Civil Aviation Training Center of the Air

Transportation Office (ATO). As a result, the ATO was

dispossessed of its land. Respondent justified its action

with a claim of ownership over the property. It presented

three TCTs issued in its name and which allegedly

originated from TCT registered in the name of Alfonso

Concepcion.

The Registrar of Deeds had no record of the

TCTs. The land covered by respondents titles was also

found to be within Villamor Air Base in Pasay City.

The OSG filed a complaint before the RTC forrevocation, annulment and cancellation of certificates of

title in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines (as

represented by the LRA) against respondent and Alfonso

Concepcion.

Respondent filed its answer which was

purportedly signed by Atty. Onofre Garlitos, Jr. as counsel

for respondent.

During the pendency of the case, the Senate Blue

Ribbon Committee and Committee on Justice and Human

Rights conducted a hearing in aid of legislation on the

matter of land registration and titling. The legislative

investigation looked into the issuance of fake titles and

focused on how respondent was able to acquire them.

Atty. Garlitos, respondents former counsel, was

summoned. He testified that he prepared respondents

answer and transmitted an unsigned draft to

respondents president, Victor Ong. The signature

appearing above his name was not his. He authorized no

one to sign in his behalf either. And he did not know who

finally signed it.

The Republic promptly filed an urgent motion onto declare respondent in default due to its failure to file a

valid answer; since the person who signed the answer was

neither authorized by Atty. Garlitos nor even known to

him, the answer was effectively an unsigned pleading.

Pursuant to Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, it was

a mere scrap of paper and produced no legal effect.

RTC ordered the answer stricken from the

records and, declared respondent in default.

CA found Atty. Garlitos statements in the

legislative hearing to be unreliable since they were not

subjected to cross-examination. It concluded that he

assented to the signing of the answer by somebody in his

stead. This supposedly cured whatever defect the answer

may have had. CA granted respondents petition for

certiorari. It directed the lifting of the order of default

against respondent and ordered the RTC to proceed to

trial with dispatch. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA err in reversing the trial

courts order which declared respondent in default for its

failure to file a valid answer. Yes, it did.

Held:

A signed pleading is one that is signed either by

the party himself or his counsel. Section 3, Rule 7 is clear

on this matter. It requires that a pleading must

be signed by the party or counsel representing him.

Therefore, only the signature of either the party himself

or his counsel operates to validly convert a pleading from

one that is unsigned to one that is s igned. Counsels

authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to him.He may not delegate it to just any person.

The signature of counsel constitutes an

assurance by him that he has read the pleading; that, to

the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is

a good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed

for delay. Under the Rules of Court, it is counsel alone, by

affixing his signature, who can certify to these matters.

The preparation and signing of a pleading

constitute legal work involving practice of law which is

reserved exclusively for the members of the legal

profession. Counsel may delegate the signing of a

pleading to another lawyer but cannot do so in favor of

one who is not. The Code of Professional Responsibility

provides: Rule 9.01 A lawyer shall not delegate to any

unqualified person the performance of any task which by

law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in

good standing.

A signature by agents of a lawyer amounts to

signing by unqualified persons, something the law

strongly proscribes. Therefore, the blanket authority

respondent claims Atty. Garlitos entrusted to just anyonewas void. Any act taken pursuant to that authority was

likewise void. There was no way it could have been cured

or ratified by Atty. Garlitos subsequent acts. No doubt,

Atty. Garlitos could not have validly given blanket

authority for just anyone to sign the answer. RTC correctly

ruled that respondentsanswer was invalid and of no legal

effect as it was an unsigned pleading.

Respondent insists that even if it were true that

its answer was supposedly an unsigned pleading, the

defect was a mere technicality that could be set aside. To

summarily brush them aside may result in arbitrariness

and injustice. Like all rules, procedural rules should be

followed except only when they may be relaxed to relieve

a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the


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degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the

prescribed procedure. In this case, respondent failed to

show any persuasive reason why it should be exempted

from strictly abiding by the rules.

As a final note, the Court cannot close its eyes to

the acts committed by Atty. Garlitos in violation of the

ethics of the legal profession. Thus, he should be made to

account for his possible misconduct.

Petition is hereby GRANTED.

Verification and certification against forum shopping -

Secs. 4 & 5, Rule 7ROBERN DEVELOPMENT CORP. vs. J. QUITAIN

G.R. No. 135042, September 23, 1999

Facts:

Robern is the registered owner of a parcel of land

which the National Power Corporation (NPC) is seeking to

expropriate. The property forms part of a proposed low-

cost housing project. NPC filed a Complaint for Eminent

Domain against Robern. Instead of filing an answer,

Robern countered with a Motion to Dismiss, alleging (a)

that the Complaint suffered a jurisdictional defect for not

showing that the action bore the approval of the NPC

board of directors; (b) that Nemesio S. Caete, who

signed the verification and certification in the Complaint,

was not the president, the general manager or an officer

specifically authorized under the NPC charter (RA 6395);

(c) that the choice of property to be expropriated was

improper, as it had already been intended for use in a

low-cost housing project, a public purpose within the

contemplation of law; and the choice was also arbitrary,

as there were similar properties available within the area.NPC filed a Motion for the Issuance of Writ of

Possession based on PD No. 42. NPC deposited 6,121.20

at PNB.

RTC denied the petitioner's Motion to Dismiss.

Robern filed a Motion for Reconsideration, pointing out

that (a) the issues raised in the Motion to Dismiss could

be resolved without trial, as they could be readily

appreciated on the face of the Complaint itself vis--vis

the applicable provisions of law on the matter; and (b) the

grounds relied upon for dismissing the Complaint did not

require evidence aliunde. RTC denied the Motion.

Robern filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the

Order arguing among others that Section 15-A of RA 6395

was virtually amended when Caete was allowed to

verify and sign the certificate of non-forum shopping in

regard to the Complaint for expropriation filed by NPC.

NPC filed a Motion to Implement the Writ of Possession.

In spite of Roberns opposition, RTC issued a Writ of

Possession. Before counsel for the petitioner received any

order from the trial court directing the implementation of

the Writ of Possession, NPC occupied the disputed

property.

Before the CA. Robern assailed the Writ on the

following grounds: (a) patent on the face of the

complaint were its jurisdictional defect, prematurity and

noncompliance with RA 6395; and (b) the issuance of the

Writ of Possession was irregular, arbitrary and

unconstitutional, as the trial court had yet to fix the

appropriate value for purposes of taking or entering

upon the property to be expropriated.

CA upheld the RTC. The verification and

certification of the Complaint by someone other than thepresident or the general manager of NPC was not a fatal

jurisdictional defect. It was enough to allege that the

expropriating body had the right of eminent domain. The

issues of whether the expropriation was properly

authorized by the board of directors and whether

Caetes verification and certification of the Complaint

was likewise authorized were evidentiary and could be

ruled upon only after the reception of evidence.

Hence, this Petition.

Roberns argument: RTC did not acquire

jurisdiction over the case because, (1) Atty. Caete who

signed the verification and certification of non-forum

shopping was neither the president nor the general

manager of NPC; and (2) under Section 15-A of RA 6395,

only the NPC chief legal counsel, under the supervision of

the OSG is authorized to handle legal matters affecting

the government power corporation.

NPCs argument: Caete, as its regional legal

counsel in Mindanao, is authorized to prepare the

Complaint on its behalf.

Issue:

Whether or not the verification and certification

by Atty. Caete is valid.

Held:

SC found the disputed verification and

certification to be sufficient in form.

Verification is intended to assure that the

allegations therein have been prepared in good faith or

are true and correct, not mere speculations. Lack of

verification is merely a formal defect that is neither

jurisdictional nor fatal. Its absence does not divest the

trial court of jurisdiction. The trial court may order the

correction of the pleading or act on the unverified


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pleading, if the attending circumstances are such that

strict compliance with the rule may be dispensed with in

order to serve the ends of justice.

The certificate of non-forum shopping directs the

plaintiff or principal party to attest under oath that (1)

no action or claim involving the same issues have been

filed or commenced in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial

agency and that, to the best of the plaintiff's knowledge,

no such other action or claim is pending; (2) if there is

such other pending action or claim, a complete statement

of its present status shall be made; and (3) if it should be

learned that the same or a similar action or claim has

been filed or is pending, the plaintiff shall report this fact

to the court where the complaint or initiatory pleading

was filed. This rule is rooted in the principle that a party-

litigant shall not be allowed to pursue simultaneous

remedies in different forums, as this practice is

detrimental to orderly judicial procedure. AdministrativeCircular No. 04-94, which came before the 1997 Rules of

Court, is deemed mandatory but not jurisdictional, as

jurisdiction over the subject or nature of the action is

conferred by law.

The questioned verification stated that Atty.

Caete was the acting regional legal counsel of NPC at the

Mindanao Regional Center in Iligan City. He was not

merely a retained lawyer, but an NPC in-house counsel

and officer, whose basic function was to prepare legal

pleadings and to represent NPC-Mindanao in legal

cases. As regional legal counsel for the Mindanao area,

he was the officer who was in the best position to verify

the truthfulness and the correctness of the allegations in

the Complaint for expropriation in Davao City. As internal

legal counsel, he was also in the best position to know

and to certify if an action for expropriation had already

been filed and pending with the courts.

Atty. Caete was not the only signatory to the

Complaint; he was joined by Doromal, OIC-assistant

general counsel; and Pablo -- both of the NPC Litigation &

Land and Land Rights Dept. They all signed on behalf ofthe solicitor general in accordance with the NPC charter.

Their signatures prove that the NPC general counsel and

the solicitor general approved the filing of the Complaint

for expropriation. Clearly then, the CA did not err in

holding that the Complaint was not dismissible on its face,

simply because the person who had signed the

verification and certification of non-forum shopping was

not the president or the general manager of NPC.

CA decision, affirmed.


Secs. 4 & 5, Rule 7

HUIBONHOA vs. CONCEPCION

G.R. No. 153785, August 3, 2006

Facts:

A complaint for accounting and damages was

filed by respondent Angel D. Concepcion, Sr. against

petitioner Veronique T. Huibonhoa with the RTC of

Cabanatuan City and prayed for the issuance of a

preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory

injunction to immediately restrain Huibonhoa from

performing her job as manager of Poulex Supermarket,

among others.

On the same day the complaint was filed, Judge

Annang issued a TRO effective for 72 hours.

Huibonhoa, along with fellow stockholders of

CHAS, Inc., filed an intra-corporate and derivative suit andcomplaint for injunction with a prayer for temporary

restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to

prevent respondent Concepcion, Sr. and his agents from

interfering with the management and operations of the

Poulex Supermarket.

Then, Huibonhoa filed an Urgent Manifestation

and Motion Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam, seeking the

issuance of an order certifying the expiration of the TRO.

Thus, Judge Annang issued on the same day an order

declaring the expiration of the temporary restraining

order but at the same time directing the continuous

closure of the supermarket.

Respondent Concepcions complaint for

accounting and damages was raffled to Branch 28 of the

RTC-Cabanatuan City. Huibonhoa filed a petition for

certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which sought to

annul the orders of Judge Annang for having been issued

with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack and/or

excess of jurisdiction.

Huibonhoas prayer for the issuance of a

temporary restraining order was granted. The CAResolution enjoined respondents from implementing

and/or enforcing the assailed orders of Judge Annang,

including but not limited to the prevention of the breaking

of the padlock and reopening of Poulex Supermarket, and

interference by respondent Concepcion and his agents

with the operations of the supermarket.

CA- dismissed Huibonhoas petition for certiorari

assailing the twin orders of Judge Annang on the grounds

of pre-maturity and forum shopping. CA believed that the

two actions had the same object of nullifying the TRO

issued by Judge Annang.


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Petitioners arguments:

- Civil Case No. 4068-AF was filed not for the

purpose of defeating the TRO issued by Judge

Annang but on account of the acts of disturbance

and attempted forcible take-over by respondent.

- the petition for certiorari was filed with CA to

enjoin or prohibit acts pursuant to the

implementation of the orders of Judge Annang,

Issue:

Whether or not the filing of petition for certiorari

constitute forum shopping

Held:

No.There is forum shopping when, as a result of

an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a

favorable opinion, other than by appeal or certiorari in

another. There can also be forum shopping when a partyinstitutes two or more suits in different courts, either

simultaneously or successively, in order to ask the courts

to rule on the same or related causes and/or to grant the

same or substantially the same reliefs on the supposition

that one or the other court would make a favorable

disposition or increase a partys chances of obtaining a

favorable decision or action.

To determine whether a party violated the rule

against forum shopping, the most important question to

ask is whether the elements of litis pendentia are present

or whether a final judgment in one case will result to res

judicata in another. Otherwise stated, to determine forum

shopping, the test is to see whether in the two or more

cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights or causes

of action, and reliefs sought.

A plain reading of the allegations in the

complaint in Civil Case No. 4068-AF and those in the

petition for certiorari filed with the CA would preclude

the Court from affirming the CA finding that petitioner

had engaged in forum shopping.

Not all the elements of litis pendentia concur.Civil Case No. 4068-AF is a derivative suit and complaint

for injunction instituted by the stockholders of the

aforementioned corporations while the petition for

certiorari was instituted by petitioner in her capacity as

manager of Poulex Supermarket. The complaint in Civil

Case No. 4068-AF alleges different causes of action,

including those relating to interference by respondent

Concepcion in the operations of the supermarket and

causing damages to the corporations and the stockholders

arising from such unlawful interference. The petition for

certiorari aims to nullify the two orders of Judge Annang

on the ground that they were issued with grave abuse of

discretion since only the designated special commercial

court has jurisdiction to hear and decide intra-corporate

controversies.

A resolution on the merits of the petition for

certiorari would necessarily have to discuss the authority

of respondent Judge Annang to take cognizance of the

case, which was allegedly an intra-corporate matter, and

the issuance of the mandatory injunction, which was

allegedly not sanctioned by any rule. These are the main

issues raised in the petition for certiorari but are not

raised as issues in Civil Case No. 4068-F.

The reliefs sought in the two actions are also

different. In Civil case 4068-F, aside from the main action

for a permanent injunction, complainants therein also

claimed damages. In the petition for certiorari, Huibonhoa

sought the prevention of the implementation of the

assailed orders of Judge Annang.

The only common thread between the two

actions is with respect to the TRO sought to preventrespondent Concepcion from interfering with the

operations of the supermarket, but said relief is only

incidental and does not constitute the main cause of

action in both cases.

However, the Court cannot take favorable

action on the petition of Petitioner. In the light of the

supervening events, particularly the dismissal of Civil

Case No. 4065, the instant petition has clearly become

moot and academic and, therefore, deserves to be

dismissed.


Secs. 4 & 5, Rule 7

MONTES vs CA

G.R. No. 143797, May 4, 2006

Facts:

An administrative complaint was filed by

complainants Imelda D. Rodriguez and Elizabeth

Fontanilla against Carlito L. Montes( petitioner), Chief of

the Legal Division of DOST, for grave misconduct and

conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service.

Rodriguez and Fontanilla alleged that while

Montes was in the process of adducing evidence against

Rodriguez and the DOST Secretary in the complaint for

misconduct he had filed against them before the

Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption

(PCAGC), Montes produced a tape recording of a private

conversation he had had with the DOST Secretary.

Montes admitted that he had taped the conversation at


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the DOST Secretarys Office without the DOST Secretarys

knowledge and consent. Montes publicly played the illegal

tape recording during the hearing. Montes likewise

admitted that he had also recorded a private conversation

he had with Fontanilla at the DOST Office in Taguig which

was without the knowledge and consent of Fontanilla.

The Ombudsman found Montes guilty of grave

misconduct and suspended him for 1 year without pay.

The Ombudsman held that Montes taping of his

conversations with Fontanilla was prohibited by the Anti-

Wiretapping Law.

The Ombudsman denied Montes MR and

affirmed the decision. Hence, Montes filed a petition for

certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure with prayer for temporary restraining order

before the Court of Appeals.

CA- dismissed outright Montes petition for being

procedurally infirm. Specifically, the appellate court notedthat Montes failed: a) to state the specific date when he

received a copy of the Ombudsmans Decision; b) to

attach duplicate originals or certified true copies of the

challenged Decision and Order; and c) to provide an

explanation why the copy of his petition was not served

personally upon therein respondent DOST Secretary.

On motion for reconsideration, however, the

appellate court issued a Resolution requiring the

Ombudsman to file his comment. Notably, the appellate

court considered Montes motion for reconsideration

abandoned in a Resolution in view of the commencement

of the instant petition. Meanwhile, the DOST Secretary

issued the assailed suspension order.

Petitioners argument:

- the implementation of the suspension order is

premature considering the pendency of his petition

before the appellate court. He further states that there is

no law or provision mandating the immediate execution

of the Ombudsmans decision in an administrative case

where the penalty imposed is suspension for 1 year.

Respondent Ombudsman and DOSTs argument:

- the filing of the instant petition is a violation of the

proscription against forum-shopping

- they argue that the execution of the suspension order

despite the pendency of an appeal is allowed under

Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 14-A-00.

Issue:

Whether or not the instant petition for

prohibition with prayer for TRO of Montes constitutes

forum shopping.

Held:

YES. We find that Montes transgressed the

proscription against forum shopping.

There is forum shopping when a party seeks to

obtain remedies in an action in one court, which had

already been solicited, and in other courts and other

proceedings in other tribunals. Forum shopping is also the

act of one party against another when an adverse

judgment has been rendered in one forum, of seeking

another and possibly favorable opinion in another forum

other than by appeal or the special civil action of

certiorari; or the institution of two or more acts or

proceedings grounded on the same cause on the

supposition that one or the other court would make a

favorable disposition.

In the case at bar, when Montes filed the petition

for prohibition against the suspension order, his motion

for reconsideration of the dismissal of his petition forcertiorari was still pendingbefore the CA. In fact, Montes

motion for reconsideration has not been fully resolved.

Montes petition for certiorari prayed, among

others, that the appellate court issue an order "restraining

the Honorable Secretary, Department of Science and

Technology from implementing the order.

Montes motion for reconsideration likewise

prayed that the implementation of the suspension for one

year from the service without pay of the herein petitioner

be restrained.

In the present petition, Montes prays that an

order be issued to restrain the Honorable Secretary, DOST

from implementing the Suspension Order on the herein

petitioner.

Clearly, the relief sought from the appellate court

is the same as the relief prayed for in the present

petitionthat is, that an order be issued restraining the

DOST Secretary from implementing the Ombudsmans

Order. In filing the instant petition without awaiting the

resolution of his pending motion before the appellate

court, Montes asked for simultaneous remedies in twodifferent fora. This act is censurable and serves as a

ground for the dismissal of the instant case with

prejudice.

In this regard, the Court notes that Montes

implicitly confirmed that he committed forum shopping

by stating that he had to file the instant petition before

this Court in view of the denial of his motion for

reconsideration before the appellate court. Montes failed

to consider that the same implementation of the

suspension order which impelled him to abandon his

motion for reconsideration also rendered the instant

petition academic.

As the present petition is one for prohibition

which is a preventive remedy, worthy of note is the fact,


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that the suspension order has already been

implemented. The act sought to be enjoined having

taken place already, there is nothing more to restrain.

Thus, the instant petition has been unmade as a mere

subject matter of purely theoretical interest.


Secs. 4 & 5, Rule 7

FAR EASTERN SHIPPING CO. vs CA

G.R. No. 130068, October 1, 1998

Facts:

M/V PAVLODAR flying under the flagship of USSR,owned and operated by Far Eastern Shipping Company

arrived at the port of Manila from Vancouver, British

Columbia.

Captain Abellana was tasked by Philippine Ports

Authority to supervise the berthing of the vessel.

Appellant Gavino was assigned by appellant MPA to

conduct docking maneuver for the safe berthing of the

vessel.

Gavino boarded the vessel and stationed himself

in the bridge with the master of the vessel, Victor

Kavankov, beside him.

When the vessel was already about 2,000 feet

from the pier, Gavino ordered the anchor dropped.

Kavankov relayed the orders to the crew of the vessel.

The left anchor were dropped, however the anchor did

not take hold as expected. Before the right anchor and

additional shackles cold be dropped, the bow rammed

into the apron of the pier causing considerable damage to

the pier. The vessel sustained damage too.

The PPA through the Sol Gen filed before the RTC

of Manila a complaint for sum of money against FarEastern Shipping, Captain Gavino and MPA praying that

they be held jointly and severally liable to pay the plaintiff

for damages.

RTC ordered the defendants jointly and

severally to pay the PPA.

Defendants appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed

the findings of the court a quo except that it found no

employer-employee relationship existing between private

respondents MPA and Captain Gavino.

Neither Far Eastern Shipping nor MPA was happy

with the decision of the CA and both of them elevated

their respective plaints to the Supreme Court via separate

petitions for review on certiorari.

In G.R No. 1300068 (separate petition of Far

Eastern), Far Eastern imputed that the CA seriously erred

in in not holding Captain Gavino and MPA as parties solely

responsible for the resulting damages sustained by the

pier.

On the other hand, in G.R No. 130150, MPA avers

that respondent courts error consisted in disregarding

and misinterpreting the Customs Admin Order which

limits the liability of MPA. The MPA asseverates that it

should not be held solidarily liable with Capt. Gavino as

there is no employee-employer relationship existing.

Upon motion by Far Eastern in G.R No 130150,

the case was consolidated with G.R No. 130068.

Note: Certification against non-forum shopping is

not part of the issues raised in this case. However, the

court simply expressed its displeasure and

disappointment with the conduct of the parties as regards

to the certification. Thus, SC made a discussion on thematter.

Held:

G.R No 130068 (petition of Far Eastern),

commenced with the filing by Far Eastern through counsel

on Aug. 22, 1997 of a verified motion for extension of

time to file its petition for thirty days. Said motion

contained a certification against forum shopping signed

by Atty. Tria as affiant with an undertaking that no action

or proceeding with the same issues is pending in other

court. Far Eastern filed its petition on September 26, 1997

bearing another verification and certification against

forum shopping executed by one Teodoro Lopez with the

same undertaking that no action of proceeding with the

same issues is pending in other court.

MPA in G.R No 130150 also filed a petition on

August 29, 1997 and revealed in its certification that it has

not commenced any other action of proceeding involving

the same issues with the court but there is an action or

proceeding pending in the court entitled Far Eastern

Shipping vs PPAInasmuch as MPAs petition in G.R No. 130150

was posted by registered mail on August 29, 1997 and

taking judicial notice of the average period of time it takes

local mail to reach its destination, by reasonable

estimation it would be fair to conclude that when Far

Easten filed its petition on Septermber 26, 1997, it would

already have received a copy of the former and would

then have knowledge of the pendency of the other

petition initially filed with the first division. It was

therefore incumbent upon Far Eastern to inform the court

of that fact through its certification against forum

shopping. For failure to make such disclosure, it would

appear the aforequoted certification in GR 130068 is


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defective and could have been a ground for dismissal

thereof.

Furthermore, the certification against forum

shopping is to be executed by the petitioner and not by

counsel. It is the petitioner who is in the best position to

know whether he or it actually filed or caused the filing of

a petition in that case. Hence, a certification against

forum shopping by counsel is a defective certification.

Clearly equivalent to non-compliance and constitutes a

valid cause for dismissal.

Hence, the initial certification appen ded to the

motion for extension of time to file petition executed in

behalf of Far Eastern by Atty. Tria is procedurally

deficient. But considering that it was a superfluity at that

stage of the proceeding, the court shall disregard the

error. Besides, the certification subsequently executed by

Teodoro Lopez in behalf of Far Eastern cures that defect

to a certain extent.


Secs. 4 & 5, Rule 7

VALMONTE vs ALCALA

G.R. No. 168667, July 23, 2008

Facts:

Petitioner filed an ejectment suit against Alcala

before the MTC.

Petitioner alleged that they are the

unregistered owners of the Apartment located in Paco,

Manila, as the petitioner is one of the heirs and

successors-in-interests of the registered owners of the

property.

Since petitioners were migrating to the United

States they offered apartment no. 1411 for lease to therespondent; the latter accepted the offer.

Due to respondents subsequent failure to pay

the agreed rentals despite written demand, petitioners

filed a complaint for unlawful detainer before the MTC.

As the petitioners were already a US resident,

they signed the required certification of non-forum

shopping before a notary public in the state of

Washington and had it authenticated by the Philippine

Consulate General.

MTC ruled in favour of the petitioners.

Respondent appealed the MTC decision to the RTC which

reversed the MTC ruling.

Petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the

CA and formally manifested that to comply with the

verification they were in the meantime submitting a

photostatic copy of the verification as the original was still

in the Philippine Consulate for authentication. Indeed, on

Apil 8, 2005 petitioners submitted to the CA the original

authenticated certification.

CA issued a resolution on the same day, April 8,

2005 dismissing the petition due to the failure of

petitioners to attach the complaint and other material

portions of the record.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration by the

CA denied the motion reasoning that while the

verification was executed on March 17, 2005, the petition

is dated March 31, 2005. Petitioners could not have

actually read and understood the petition or attested to

the truth of the contents because at the time they

executed the verification the petition was still inexistent.

Issue:Whether or not the court erred in ruling that the

variance between the dates of the verification and the

petition mean that they did not actually read the petition

before it was filed in the court.

Held:

Petition is meritorious. The CAs conclusion

results from an overly technical reading of the verification

and from a failure to appreciate the circumstances of the

parties litigating in Philippine courts while they are

overseas.

We should not lose sight of the reality that

pleadings are prepared and signed by the counsel at the

instructions of the client; the latter merely provides the

supporting facts of the pleading and, as needed, verifies

that the allegation are true and correct. In short, the

pleading and the verification are prepared separately and

a variance in their dates is a matter that may be

satisfactorily explained. To demand the litigants to read

the very same documents that is to be filed before the

courts is to rigorous a requirement. What the rulesrequire is for a party to read the contents of a pleading

without any specific requirement on the form or manner

in which the reading is to be done.


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mmeikimouse

Requirements of a corporation executing the

verification/certification of non-forum shopping

NATIONAL STEEL CORP. vs CA

G.R. No. 134468, August 29, 2002

Facts:

Dispute arose between petitioner and

respondent union regarding the grant of Productivity and

Quality Bonus and Fiscal Year-End incentive award.

Representative of NSC and the union appeared

before a voluntary arbitrator. The latter issued a decision

ruling that the demand for productivity and quality bonus

is without merit while the demand for distribution of

year-end incentive award is in order.

The NSC filed a petition for review with the Court

of Appeals.

The CA issues a resolution dismissing the

companys petition for review on the ground that Atty.Padilla, one of the counsels of record of the petitioner is

not a real party in interest but a retained counsel with

mere incidental interest and therefore not the petitioner

or principal party required by law to certify under oath to

the facts or undertakings.

Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied.

Issue:

Whether or not the signature of petitioners

counsel be deemed sufficient for the purposes of Revised

Circular Nos. 28-91 and AO No. 04-49?

Held:

NSCs counsel of record was duly authorized to

represent them not only before the voluntary arbitrator

but also to prepare the petition for review filed before the

court of appeals.

The Corporation has no powers except those

expressly conferred on it by the corporation code. In turn,

a corporation exercises said powers through its board of

directors or authorized agents.While it is admitted that the authorization of

petitionerscounsel was submitted to the appellate court

only after the issuance of its resolution dismissing the

petition based on non-compliance with the aforesaid

circular, we hold that in view of the peculiar

circumstances of the present case and in the interest of

substantial justice, the procedural defect may be set

aside.

Requirements of a corporation executing the

verification/certification of non-forum shopping

KAUNLARAN LENDING INVESTORS INC. vs. UY

G.R. No. 154974, February 4, 2008

Background of the case:

Sometime in 1987, her son Jose, nephew Virgilio,

and Wilfredo agreed to establish a business of buy and

sell of second-hand motor vehicles in which Virgilio would

be the manager, Wilfredo would scout for a financier, and

Jose would provide the security for any loan. Through the

efforts of Wilfredo, Lelia (Branch Manager of FEBTC and

owner of Kaunlaran [KLII]) agreed to arrange for the grant

of a loan. Wilfredo thus asked Jose (with SPA from his

mother) to turn over the TCTs of the 2 parcels of land in

Quezon City owned by Loreta to serve as security for the

loan.

Jose entrusted the TCTs to Wilfredo who thenturned it over to Lelia. The loan forms were sent by

Wilfredo to Loretas residence for her signature. After

Jose examined the forms, Loreta signed them.

While Jose and Virgilio were in Manila to canvass

prices of second-hand motor vehicles, Magno (manager of

KLII) brought to Loretas residence another set of loan

forms together with a blank Solidbank check drawn from

the account of KLII and a check voucher, explaining (in the

presence of Arlene, Joses wife) that the new set of loan

forms would be sent to Manila and that the proceeds

would be promptly delivered to her residence once she

affixes her signature on the said check and voucher. When

Jose learned about it, he confronted Magno and was told

that the documents were already sent to Lelia. Virgilio

and Jose tried to withdraw the application and the TCTs

but Lelia told them that it was no longer possible. Lelia

admitted having applied the loan proceeds amounting to

P800,000 to Wilfredos personal debt to her. Upon

verification with the RD, the loan was annotated on

Loretas TCTs. Hence, the complaint.

Facts:

Respondent Loreta filed a complaint before the

RTC Dagupan for annulment of real estate mortgage and

related documents plus damages against the petitioners,

along with WIlfredo and Magno. She alleged that said

documents were absolute nullities due to the absence of

consideration and vitiated consent.

After the defendants submitted their Answer

with Counterclaim, the trial court rendered judgment

declaring as valid and legal the subject documents.

All parties appealed except for Magno who died

in 1991, including Lelia. KLIIs appeal was only to the non -

award of damages to it.


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mmeikimouse

The CA reversed the trial court decision,

declaring the subject documents as null and void. MR

having been denied, hence, this petition filed by KLII and

Lelia.

Loreta moves for the dismissal of the petition

due to defective verification and certificate of non-forum

shopping.

Issue:

Whether or not the president of KLII was

authorized to sign the verification and certification of non-

forum shopping on its behalf

Held:

NO. For failure of KLII to present proof that its

president, Rolando Tan, was authorized to sign the

verification and certificate of non-forum shopping on its

behalf, the petition must be denied.In case of a corporation, it has long been settled

that the certificate [of non-forum shopping] must be

signed for and on its behalf by a specifically authorized

officer or agentwho has personal knowledge of the facts

required to be disclosed.

x x x x

Consequently, without the needed proof from the board

of directors, the certificate would be considered

defective. Thus, xxx even the regular officers of a

corporation, like the chairman and president, may not

even know the details required in a certificate of non-

forum shopping; they must therefore be authorized by

the board of directors just like any other officer or agent.

Disposition:

The merits of the petition, however, justify the

relaxation of the rule on verification and certificate of

non-forum shopping, for from a review of the records

Loreta has not proven by preponderance of evidence thatshe was deceived into signing the documents required for

the release of the proceeds of the loan.

The petition is GRANTED. The decision of the

Court of Appeals dated April 11, 2002 is SET ASIDE, and

the decision of Branch 41 of the RTC Dagupan City in Civil

Case No. D-9136 dated March 3, 1994 is REINSTATED.


11/59

Full Text Cases: Rule 7 - Parts of a Pleading CIVIL PROCEDURE

mmeikimouse

G.R. No. 149576 August 8, 2006

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Land

Registration Authority, Petitioner,

vs.

KENRICK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CORONA,J.:

The Republic of the Philippines assails the May 31, 2001

decision1and August 20, 2001 resolution of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52948 in this petition for review under

Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

This case stemmed from the construction by respondent Kenrick

Development Corporation of a concrete perimeter fence around

some parcels of land located behind the Civil Aviation Training

Center of the Air Transportation Office (ATO) in 1996. As a

result, the ATO was dispossessed of some 30,228 square metersof prime land. Respondent justified its action with a claim of

ownership over the property. It presented Transfer Certificate of

Title (TCT) Nos. 135604, 135605 and 135606 issued in its name

and which allegedly originated from TCT No. 17508 registered in

the name of one Alfonso Concepcion.

ATO verified the authenticity of respondents titles with the

Land Registration Authority (LRA). On May 17, 1996, Atty. Jose

Loriega, head of the Land Title Verification Task Force of the

LRA, submitted his report. The Registrar of Deeds of Pasay City

had no record of TCT No. 17508 and its ascendant title, TCT No.

5450. The land allegedly covered by respondents titles was also

found to be within Villamor Air Base (headquarters of the

Philippine Air Force) in Pasay City.

By virtue of the report, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),

on September 3, 1996, filed a complaint for revocation,

annulment and cancellation of certificates of title in behalf of

the Republic of the Philippines (as represented by the LRA)

against respondent and Alfonso Concepcion. It was raffled to

Branch 114 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City where it was

docketed as Civil Case No. 96-1144.

On December 5, 1996, respondent filed its answer which was

purportedly signed by Atty. Onofre Garlitos, Jr. as counsel for

respondent.

Since Alfonso Concepcion could not be located and served with

summons, the trial court ordered the issuance of an alias

summons by publication against him on February 19, 1997.

The case was thereafter punctuated by various incidents relative

to modes of discovery, pre-trial, postponements or

continuances, motions to dismiss, motions to declare

defendants in default and other procedural matters.

During the pendency of the case, the Senate Blue Ribbon

Committee and Committee on Justice and Human Rights

conducted a hearing in aid of legislation on the matter of landregistration and titling. In particular, the legislative investigation

looked into the issuance of fake titles and focused on how

respondent was able to acquire TCT Nos. 135604, 135605 and

135606.

During the congressional hearing held on November 26, 1998,

one of those summoned was Atty. Garlitos, respondents former

counsel. He testified that he prepared respondents answer and

transmitted an unsigned draft to respondents president, Mr.

Victor Ong. The signature appearing above his name was not his.

He authorized no one to sign in his behalf either. And he did not

know who finally signed it.

With Atty. Garlitos revelation, the Republic promptly filed anurgent motion on December 3, 1998 to declare respondent in

default,2predicated on its failure to file a valid answer. The

Republic argued that, since the person who signed the answer

was neither authorized by Atty. Garlitos nor even known to him,

the answer was effectively an unsigned pleading. Pursuant to

Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court,3it was a mere scrap of

paper and produced no legal effect.

On February 19, 1999, the trial court issued a resolution granting

the Republics motion.4It found respondents answer to be

sham and false and intended to defeat the purpose of the rules.

The trial court ordered the answer stricken from the records,

declared respondent in default and allowed the Republic topresent its evidence ex parte.

The Republic presented its evidence ex parte, after which it

rested its case and formally offered its evidence.

Meanwhile, respondent sought reconsideration of the February

19, 1999 resolution but the trial court denied it.

Aggrieved, respondent elevated the matter to the Court of

Appeals via a petition for certiorari5seeking to set aside the

February 19, 1999 resolution of the trial court. Respondent

contended that the trial court erred in declaring it in default for

failure to file a valid and timely answer.

On May 31, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed

decision. It found Atty. Garlitos statements in the legislative

hearing to be unreliable since they were not subjected to cross-

examination. The appellate court also scrutinized Atty. Garlitos

acts after the filing of the answer6and concluded that he

assented to the signing of the answer by somebody in his stead.

This supposedly cured whatever defect the answer may have

had. Hence, the appellate court granted respondents petition

for certiorari. It directed the lifting of the order of default

against respondent and ordered the trial court to proceed to

trial with dispatch. The Republic moved for reconsideration but

it was denied. Thus, this petition.

Did the Court of Appeals err in reversing the trial courts order

which declared respondent in default for its failure to file a valid

answer? Yes, it did.

A party may, by his words or conduct, voluntarily adopt or ratify

anothers statement.7Where it appears that a party clearly and

unambiguously assented to or adopted the statements of

another, evidence of those statements is admissible against

him.8This is the essence of the principle of adoptive admission.

An adoptive admission is a partys reaction to a statement or

action by another person when it is reasonable to treat thepartys reaction as an admission of something stated or implied

by the other person.9By adoptive admission, a third persons

statement becomes the admission of the party embracing or

espousing it. Adoptive admission may occur when a party:
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(a) expressly agrees to or concurs in an oral statement made by

another;10

(b) hears a statement and later on essentially repeats it;11

(c) utters an acceptance or builds upon the assertion of

another;12

(d) replies by way of rebuttal to some specific points raised by

another but ignores further points which he or she has heard the

other make13

or

(e) reads and signs a written statement made by another.14

Here, respondent accepted the pronouncements of Atty.

Garlitos and built its case on them. At no instance did it ever

deny or contradict its former counsels statements. It went to

great lengths to explain Atty. Garlitos testimony as well as its

implications, as follows:

1. While Atty. Garlitos denied signing the answer, the fact wasthat the answer was signed. Hence, the pleading could not be

considered invalid for being an unsigned pleading. The fact that

the person who signed it was neither known to Atty. Garlitos nor

specifically authorized by him was immaterial. The important

thing was that the answer bore a signature.

2. While the Rules of Court requires that a pleading must be

signed by the party or his counsel, it does not prohibit a counsel

from giving a general authority for any person to sign the answer

for him which was what Atty. Garlitos did. The person who

actually signed the pleading was of no moment as long as

counsel knew that it would be signed by another. This was

similar to addressing an authorization letter "to whom it mayconcern" such that any person could act on it even if he or she

was not known beforehand.

3. Atty. Garlitos testified that he prepared the answer; he never

disowned its contents and he resumed acting as counsel for

respondent subsequent to its filing. These circumstances show

that Atty. Garlitos conformed to or ratified the signing of the

answer by another.

Respondent repeated these statements of Atty. Garlitos in its

motion for reconsideration of the trial courts February 19, 1999

resolution. And again in the petition it filed in the Court of

Appeals as well as in the comment

15

and memorandum itsubmitted to this Court.

Evidently, respondent completely adopted Atty. Garlitos

statements as its own. Respondents adoptive admission

constituted a judicial admission which was conclusive on it.

Contrary to respondents position, a signed pleading is one that

is signed either by the party himself or his counsel. Section 3,

Rule 7 is clear on this matter. It requires that a pleading must

be signedby the party or counsel representing him.

Therefore, only the signature of either the party himself or his

counsel operates to validly convert a pleading from one that isunsigned to one that is signed.

Counsels authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to

him. He may not delegate it to just any person.

The signature of counsel constitutes an assurance by him that he

has read the pleading; that, to the best of his knowledge,

information and belief, there is a good ground to support it; and

that it is not interposed for delay.16

Under the Rules of Court, it

is counsel alone, by affixing his signature, who can certify to

these matters.

The preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal work

involving practice of law which is reserved exclusively for themembers of the legal profession. Counsel may delegate the

signing of a pleading to another lawyer17

but cannot do so

in favor of one who is not. The Code of Professional

Responsibility provides:

Rule 9.01 A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified

person the performance of any task which by law may only be

performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.

Moreover, a signature by agents of a lawyer amounts to signing

by unqualified persons,18

something the law strongly proscribes.

Therefore, the blanket authority respondent claims Atty.

Garlitos entrusted to just anyone was void. Any act taken

pursuant to that authority was likewise void. There was no way

it could have been cured or ratified by Atty. Garlitos subsequent

acts.

Moreover, the transcript of the November 26, 1998 Senate

hearing shows that Atty. Garlitos consented to the signing of the

answer by another "as long as it conformed to his draft." We

give no value whatsoever to such self-serving statement.

No doubt, Atty. Garlitos could not have validly given blanketauthority for just anyone to sign the answer. The trial court

correctly ruled that respondents answer was invalid and of no

legal effect as it was an unsigned pleading. Respondent was

properly declared in default and the Republic was rightly

allowed to present evidence ex parte.

Respondent insists on the liberal application of the rules. It

maintains that even if it were true that its answer was

supposedly an unsigned pleading, the defect was a mere

technicality that could be set aside.

Procedural requirements which have often been disparagingly

labeled as mere technicalities have their own validraison d

etrein the orderly administration of justice. To summarily brush

them aside may result in arbitrariness and injustice.19

The Courts pronouncement inGarbo v. Court of Appeals20

is

relevant:

Procedural rules are [tools] designed to facilitate the

adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are thus

[enjoined] to abide strictly by the rules. And while the Court, in

some instances, allows a relaxation in the application of the

rules, this, we stress, was never intended to forge a bastion for

erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberality in

the interpretation and application of the rules applies only inproper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances.

While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is

equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance

with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy

administration of justice.
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Like all rules, procedural rules should be followed except only

when, for the most persuasive of reasons, they may be relaxed

to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the

degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the

prescribed procedure.21

In this case, respondent failed to show

any persuasive reason why it should be exempted from strictly

abiding by the rules.

As a final note, the Court cannot close its eyes to the actscommitted by Atty. Garlitos in violation of the ethics of the legal

profession. Thus, he should be made to account for his possible

misconduct.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The May 31,

2001 decision and August 20, 2001 resolution of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52948 are REVERSEDand SET

ASIDEand the February 19, 1999 resolution of the Regional Trial

Court of Pasay City, Branch 114 declaring respondent in default

is herebyREINSTATED.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Commission on Bar

Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for thecommencement of disbarment proceedings against Atty. Onofre

Garlitos, Jr. for his possible unprofessional conduct not befitting

his position as an officer of the court.

SO ORDERED.
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G.R. No. 135042 September 23, 1999

ROBERN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.

JUDGE JESUS V. QUITAIN, Regional Trial Court of Davao City,

Br. 15; and NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, respondents,

PANGANIBAN,J.:

Expropriation proceedings are governed by revised Rule 67 of

the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which took effect on July 1,

1997. Previous doctrines inconsistent with this Rule are deemed

reversed or modified. Specifically, (1) an answer, not a motion to

dismiss, is the responsive pleading to a complaint in eminent

domain; (2) the trial court may issue a writ of possession once

the plaintiff deposits an amount equivalent to the assessed

value of the property, pursuant to Section 2 of said Rule, without

need of a hearing to determine the provisional sum to be

deposited; and (3) a final order of expropriation may not be

issued prior to a full hearing and resolution of the objections and

defenses of the property owner.

The Case

Before us is a Petition under Rule 45, challenging the Decision of

the Court of Appeals1 promulgated February 27, 1998 and its

Resolution promulgated July 23, 1998 in CA-GR SP-46002, which

(1) dismissed the action for certiorariand preliminary injunction

filed by Robern Development Corporation ("Robern" for brevity);

and (2) effectively affirmed the Orders (dated August 13, 1997;

September 11, 1997; and November 5, 1997) and the Writ of

Possession (dated September 19, 1997), all issued by the

Regional Trial Court of Davao City in Civil Case No. 25356-97.

The assailed Decision disposed as follows:2

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant

petition is ordered DISMISSED. Costs against

the petitioner.

In its assailed Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied

reconsideration in this manner:3

There being no compelling reason to modify,

reverse or reconsider the Decision renderedin the case dated February 27, 1998[;] the

Motion for Reconsideration posted by

petitioner on March 23, 1998 is DENIED, it

appearing further that the arguments raised

therein were already considered and passed

upon in the aforesaid Decision.

The Facts

The following facts are undisputed.

1. Robern is the registered owner of a parcel of land with an

area of about 17,746.50 square meters, which the NationalPower Corporation ("NPC" for brevity) is seeking to expropriate.

The property forms part of a proposed low-cost housing project

in Inawayan, Binugao, Toril, Davao City.

2. On June 6, 1997, NPC filed a Complaint for Eminent Domain

against Robern.4Instead of filing an answer, petitioner

countered with a Motion to Dismiss,5

alleging (a) that the

Complaint suffered a jurisdictional defect for not showing that

the action bore the approval of the NPC board of directors; (b)

that Nemesio S. Caete, who signed the verification and

certification in the Complaint, was not the president, the general

manager or an officer specifically authorized under the NPC

charter (RA 6395); (c) that the choice of property to beexpropriated was improper, as it had already been intended for

use in a low-cost housing project, a public purpose within the

contemplation of law; and the choice was also arbitrary, as there

were similar properties available within the area.

3. Before this Motion could be resolved, NPC filed a Motion for

the Issuance of Writ of Possession based on Presidential Decree

No. 42. On July 9, 1997, NPC deposited P6,121.20 at the

Philippine National Bank, Davao Branch, as evidenced by PNB

Savings Account No. 385-560728-9.6

4. In its Order of August 13, 1997, the trial court denied

petitioner's Motion to Dismiss in this wise:

This refers to the motion to dismiss. The

issues raised are matters that should be

dealt with during the trial proper. Suffice it

to say that [NPC] has the privilege as a utility

to use the power of eminent domain.

The motion is denied for lack of merit. The

pre-trial conference shall be on August 27,

1997 at 2:30 P.M.7

5. On September 2, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion for

Reconsideration, pointing out that (a) the issues raised in theMotion to Dismiss could be resolved without trial, as they could

be readily appreciated on the face of the Complaint itself vis--

visthe applicable provisions of law on the matter; and (b) the

grounds relied upon for dismissing the Complaint did not require

evidence aliunde.

6. On September 11, 1997, the trial court denied the Motion. as

follows:

The . . . motion [of the

petitioner] for

reconsideration is denied

for lack of merit. Findingthe . . . motion [of NPC]

to be meritorious[,] let a

writ of possession issue.8

7. On September 22, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion for

Reconsideration of the Order of September 11, 1997, arguing

among others that Section 15-A of RA 6395 was virtually

"amended" when Caete was allowed to verify and sign the

certificate of non-forum shopping in regard to the Complaint for

expropriation filed by NPC.

8. Without awaiting the outcome of the Motion for

Reconsideration, NPC filed a Motion to Implement the Writ ofPossession.

9. On September 19, 1997, in spite of petitioner's opposition,

the trial court issued a Writ of Possession as follows:


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WHEREAS, the applicant National Power

Corporation in the above-titled case has

presented to this Court a petition praying for

the issuance of a Writ of Possession of the

affected property of the . . . Robern

Development Corporation, described

hereinbelow, as follows:

TCT No. Total Area in Area Affected in

Square Meter Square Meter

T-251558

(T-141754) 11,469.00 3,393.00

T-251559

(T-141755) 10,000.00 2,124.00

T-251556

(T-14152) 30,000.00 3,402.00

T-251555 45,000.00 8,827.50

TOTAL 97,371.00 17,746.50 Total

affected area

WHEREAS, on September 11, 1997 the court

issued an Order granting the issuance of a

Writ of Possession in favor of the . . .

National Power Corporation for the

immediate possession and control of the

parcels of land owned by the [petitioner] as

aforestated for the construction Mantanao-

New-Loon 138 KV Transmission Line Project

to be undertaken by the petitioner affecting

17,746.50 sq. m. of the 97,371.00 sq. meters

as shown above.

NOW THEREFORE, you are hereby

commanded to place [NPC] in possessionand control of the affected property

consisting 17,746.50 [s]quare [m]eters of the

total area of 97,371.00 square meters

described above and to eject therefrom all

adverse occupants, Robern Development

Corporation and [all other] persons . . .

claiming under it.9

10. On November 5, 1997, before counsel for the petitioner

received any order from the trial court directing the

implementation of the Writ of Possession, NPC occupied the

disputed property.

11. In a Petition for Certioraribefore the Court of Appeals (CA),

Robern assailed the Writ on the following grounds: (a) patent on

the face of the complaint were its jurisdictional defect,

prematurity and noncompliance with RA 6395; and (b) the

issuance of the Writ of Possession was irregular, arbitrary and

unconstitutional, as the trial court had yet to fix the

"appropriate value for purposes of taking or entering upon the

property to be expropriated."

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court on the following

grounds.

First, the verification and certification of the Complaint by

someone other than the president or the general manager of

NPC was not a fatal jurisdictional defect. It was enough to allege

that the expropriating body had the right of eminent domain.

The issues of whether the expropriation was properly authorized

by the board of directors and whether Caete's verification and

certification of the Complaint was likewise authorized were

evidentiary and could be ruled upon only after the reception of

evidence.

Second, whether the disputed property could still be

expropriated even if it had already been intended to be used in a

low-cost housing project and whether the choice of that lot was

arbitrary and erroneous, given the availability of similar

properties in the area, were factual issues that would entail

presentation of evidence by both parties.

Third, the allegation in the Complaint that NPC sought to acquire

an easement of right-of-way through the disputed property did

not preclude its expropriation. Section 3-A of the NPC charter

allowed the power company to acquire an easement of right-of-

way or even the land itself if the servitude would injure the land.

Fourth, the issuance of the Writ of Possession was proper in

view of NPC's compliance with Section 2, Rule 67 of the 1997

Rules of Civil Procedure, by depositing with the Philippine

National Bank an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the

disputed property.

Fifth, certiorariwas not the proper remedy, as the Order

sustaining the right to expropriate the property was not final

and could still be appealed by the aggrieved party. The

availability of appeal ruled out certiorari.

Hence, this Petition.10

The Issues

In their Memorandum,11

petitioner raises the following

issues:12

I WHETHER OR NOT THE QUESTIONED

ORDER OF THE RESPONDENT JUDGE DATED

SEPTEMBER 11, 1997 DIRECTING THE

ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF POSSESSION IS

UNCONSTITUTIONAL, HIGHLY IRREGULAR,

ARBITRARY, AND DESPOTIC.

II WHETHER OR NOT THE COMPLAINT FILED

IN THE INSTANT CASE IS DISMISSIBLE ON ITSFACE FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION, BEING

FLAWED WITH PREMATURITY, AND

VIOLATIVE OF RA 6395.


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III WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF

APPEALS MADE A FINDING NOT BORNE OUT

BY THE COMPLAINT, THUS IT EXCEEDED ITS

JURISDICTION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF

JURISDICTION.

IV WHETHER OR NOT THE CHOICE OF THE

PROPERTY TO BE EXPROPRIATED IS

ARBITRARY.

Simply stated, the petition raises the following issues:

1. Were there valid grounds to dismiss the Complaint?

2. Was the Writ of Possession validly issued, considering that the

trial court had not conducted any hearing on the amount to be

deposited?

This Court's Ruling

The Court of Appeals was correct in its rulings, but in the interestof substantial justice, the petitioner should be given an

opportunity to file its answer.

First Issue:

Grounds for Dismissal

Jurisdiction

Petitioner contends that the trial court did not acquire

jurisdiction over the case because,first, Atty. Caete who signed

the verification and certification of non-forum shopping was

neither the president nor the general manager of NPC;

and second, under Section 15-A of RA 6395, only the NPC chief

legal counsel, under the supervision of the Office of the Solicitor

General is authorized to handle legal matters affecting the

government power corporation. On the other hand, NPC argues

that Caete, as its regional legal counsel in Mindanao, is

authorized to prepare the Complaint on its behalf.

We find the disputed verification and certification to be

sufficient in form. Verification is intended to assure that the

allegations therein have been prepared in good faith or are true

and correct, not mere speculations.13

Generally, lack of

verification is merely a formal defect that is neither jurisdictional

nor fatal. Its absence does not divest the trial court ofjurisdiction.

14 The trial court may order the correction of the

pleading or act on the unverified pleading, if the attending

circumstances are such that strict compliance with the rule may

be dispensed with in order to serve the ends of justice.

The certificate of non-forum shopping directs the "plaintiff or

principal party" to attest under oath that (1) no action or claim

involving the same issues have been filed or commenced in any

court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and that, to the best of

the plaintiff's knowledge, no such other action or claim is

pending; (2) if there is such other pending action or claim, a

complete statement of its present status shall be made; and (3)

if it should be learned that the same or a similar action or claimhas been filed or is pending, the plaintiff shall report this fact to

the court where the complaint or initiatory pleading was

filed.15

This rule is rooted in the principle that a party-litigant

shall not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in

different forums, as this practice is detrimental to orderly

judicial procedure.16

Administrative Circular No. 04-94, which

came before the 1997 Rules of Court, is deemed mandatory but

not jurisdictional, as jurisdiction over the subject or nature of

the action is conferred by law.17

In this case, the questioned verification stated that Atty. Caete

was the acting regional legal counsel of NPC at the Mindanao

Regional Center in Iligan City. He was not merely a retainedlawyer, but an NPC in-house counsel and officer, whose basic

function was to prepare legal pleadings and to represent NPC-

Mindanao in legal cases. As regional legal counsel for the

Mindanao area, he was the officer who was in the best position

to verify the truthfulness and the correctness of the allegations

in the Complaint for expropriation in Davao City. As internal

legal counsel, he was also in the best position to know and to

certify if an action for expropriation had already been filed and

pending with the courts.

Besides, Atty. Caete was not the only signatory to the

Complaint; he was joined by Comie P. Doromal, OIC-assistant

general counsel; and Catherine J. Pablo both of the NPCLitigation & Land and Land Rights Department. They all signed

on behalf of the solicitor general in accordance with the NPC

charter.18

Their signatures prove that the NPC general counsel

and the solicitor general approved the filing of the Complaint for

expropriation. Clearly then, the CA did not err in holding that the

Complaint was not dismissible on its face, simply because the

person who had signed the verification and certification of non-

forum shopping was not the president or the general manager

of NPC.

Legal Standing and

Condition Precedent

Next, petitioner asserts that NPC had no legal standing to file the

expropriation case, because the Complaint did not allege that its

board of directors had authorized its filing. It added that under

Section 6, RA 6395, only the board was vested with the

corporate power to sue and be sued.

The National Power Corporation explains that, like other

corporate officers and employees whose functions are defined

by the board, Atty. Caete is authorized to file the expropriation

case. Even if he is not the general counsel, he has residual

authority to prepare, verify and certify the Complaint for

expropriation.

We rule for the private respondent. Rule 67, Section 1 of the

Rules of Court, provides:

Sec. 1. The complaint. The right of

eminent domain shall be exercised by the

filing of a verified complaint which shall state

with certainty the right and purpose of

expropriation, describe the real or personal

property sought to be expropriated, and join

as defendants all persons owning or claiming

to own, or occupying, any part thereof or

interest therein, showing, so far aspracticable, the separate interest of each

defendant. . . . . .


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The foregoing Rule does not require that the Complaint be

expressly approved by the board of directors of a corporation. In

any event, such authorization is a factual issue that can be

threshed out during the trial. As held by the appellate court,

"the issue of whether or not the expropriation proceedings

[were] authorized by the Board of Directors or that those who

signed the complaint [were] authorized representatives are

evidentiary in character determinable only in [the] trial proper."

Prematurity of the Complaint

The same ruling applies to the argument alleging prematurity of

the Complaint. Petitioner's insistence that NPC must secure the

approval of the provincial board and the municipal council is

unfounded. Section 3(j), RA 6395, merely requires that the

Complaint be filed in the same manner as an expropriation case

of the national, the provincial or the municipal government. At

bottom, all that is needed is compliance with Rule 67 of the

Rules of Court and theprevailingjurisprudence on

expropriation.

Defenses and Objections

Petitioner avers that the Complaint should be dismissed,

because the subject property was already committed to be used

in a low-cost housing project. Besides, there were other

available properties in the area. Finally, the Complaint allegedly

sought only an easement of a right-of-way, not essentially an

expropriation.

We disagree. Petitioner's argument in this case is premised on

the old rule. Before the 1997 amendment, Section 3 of Rule 67

allowed a defendant "in lieu of an answer, [to] present in a

single motion to dismiss or for other appropriate relief, all of his

objections and defenses to the right of the plaintiff to take hisproperty . . . ." A motion to dismiss was not governed by Rule 15

which covered ordinary motions. Such motion was the required

responsive pleading that took the place of an answer and put in

issue the plaintiffs right to expropriate the defendant's

property.19

Any relevant and material fact could be raised as a

defense in a condemnation proceeding, such as that which

tended to show that (1) the exercise of the power to condemn

was unauthorized, or (2) there was cause for not taking

defendant's property for the purpose alleged in the petition, or

(3) the purpose for the taking was not public in character.20

This old rule found basis in the constitutional provisions on the

exercise of the power of eminent domain, which were deemedto be for the protection of the individual property owner against

the aggressions of the government.21

Under the old rule, the

hearing of the motion and the presentation of evidence

followed.

However, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure no longer

requires such extraordinary motion to dismiss. Instead it

provides:

Sec. 3. Defenses and objections. . . . .

If a defendant has any objection to the filing

of or the allegations in the complaint, or anyobjection or defense to the taking of his

property, he shall serve his answer within

the time stated in the summons. The answer

shall specifically designate or identify the

property in which he claims to have an

interest, state the nature and extent of the

interest claimed, and adduce all his

objections and defenses to the taking of his

property. . . . . .

In his book on remedial law, Justice Florenz D. Regalado writes

that the old Rule was a "bit confusing as the previous holdings

under that former provision also allowed the filing of anothermotion to dismiss, as that is understood in Rule 16, to raise

additionally the preliminary objections authorized by that Rule."

Further, an answer, which is now required, gives more

leeway. First, even if it still applies the omnibus motion rule, it

allows amendments to be made within ten days from its

filing.22

Second, the failure to file an answer does not produce

all the disastrous consequences of default in ordinary civil

actions, because the defendant may still present evidence as to

just compensation.23

When petitioner filed its Motion to Dismiss, the 1997 Rules of

Civil Procedure had already taken effect. Statutes regulating

procedure in the courts are applicable to actions pending andundetermined at the time those statutes were passed.

24New

court rules apply to proceedings that take place after the date of

their effectivity.25

On April 8, 1997, the Court en bancissued a

Resolution in Bar Matter No. 803, declaring that the revisions in

the Rules of Court were to become effective on July 1, 1997.

Accordingly, Rule 16, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, does not

consider as grounds for a motion to dismiss the allotment of the

disputed land for another public purpose or the petition for a

mere easement of right-of-way in the complaint for

expropriation. The grounds for dismissal are exclusive to those

specifically mentioned in Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of

Court, and an action can be dismissed only on a ground

authorized by this provi

Documents

Rule 7 (Outline, Case Digest & Full Text).pdf