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Rule of Reasonable Construction

Every statute has a purpose, an objective. If the literal meaning collides

with the reason of enactment of the statute then the intention of the law

should be taken up so that the actual meaning of the statute can be

properly understood. This rule mainly stresses upon the intention of thelegislature to bring up the statue and the sensible and not the prima facie

meaning of the statute. This helps us clear the errors caused due to faulty

draftsmanship. However this rule also has its own limitations. The intent of 

the statute is in itself a surmise and the rule is usually avoided to

complete the quest for interpretation unless the intent in itself can be

interpreted properly.

In R v Allen[1]  The defendant was charged with the oence of bigamy

under s.!" of the #ences $gainst the %erson $ct &'(&. The statute states

)whosoever being married shall marry any other person during the lifetimeof the former husband or wife is guilty of an oence). *nder a literal

interpretation of this section the oence would be impossible to commit

since civil law will not recognise a second marriage any attempt to marry

in such circumstances would not be recognised as a valid marriage.

 The court applied the rule of reasonable construction and held that the

word )marry) should be interpreted as )to go through a marriage

ceremony). The defendant)s conviction was upheld.

+itation-& (1872) LR 1 CCR 367

InRamji Missar v. State of Bihar[2] in construing section 6 of the Probation of

Offenders Act, 1958, the Supreme Court laid down that the crucial date on which the age of

the offender had to be determined is not the date of offence, but the date on which the

sentence is pronounced by the trial court An accused who on the date of offence was below

21 years of age but on the date on which the judgment pronounced, if he was above 21

years, he is not entitled to the benefit of the statute. This conclusion reached having regard

to the object of the Act. The object of the Statute is to prevent the turning of the youthfuloffenders into criminals by their association with the hardened criminals of mature age within

the walls of the prison. An accused below 21 years is entitled to the benefit of the Act by

sending him under the supervision of the probation officer instead of jail.

Citation:[2] AIR 1963 SC 1088: (1963) Supp 2 SCR 745

InAnnapurna Biscuit Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, U P.,[3]Sales

Tax was fixed at two per cent, of the turnover in the case of “cooked food” under section 3A

of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948. The appellant firm engaged in the business of biscuit

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manufacture and sale. Whether biscuits though intended for human consumption, can be

construed as “cooked food” and liable to be taxed as per the notification issued under the

said provision. Held that if an expression is capable of a wider meaning, the question

whether the wider or narrower meaning should be accepted depends on the context of the

statute. Here biscuit was not covered within the words ‘cooked food’. However, where the

precise words used are plain and unambiguous the court is bound to construe them in their

ordinary sense and not to limit plain words in an Act of Parliament by consideration of policy

which has to decided not by court but by Parliament itself.

+itation [3] AIR 1981 SC 1656