RULING DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS€¦ · 06-05-2020 · Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [Doc. # 26] is denied. I. Background A. COVID-19 Pandemic Because the existence

UNITEDSTATESDISTRICTCOURTDISTRICTOFCONNECTICUT

TRE MCPHERSON, PATTIKATE WILLIAMS-VOID,JOHN DOE, JOHN ROE, and THOMAS CAVES, onbehalf of themselves and all others similarlysituated, Plaintiffs, v.NEDLAMONTandROLLINCOOK, in their officialcapacities, Defendants.

CivilNo.3:20cv534(JBA)May6,2020

RULINGDENYINGDEFENDANTS’MOTIONTODISMISS

Plaintiffs,whoarebeingheldinConnecticutDepartmentofCorrectionfacilities,seek

reliefunder28U.S.C.§2241and42U.S.C.§1983onbehalfof themselvesandallothers

similarlysituated.TheybroughtthisactiononApril20,2020,claimingtheongoingCOVID-

19 pandemic places them at unreasonable risk of infection. Defendantsmove to dismiss

Plaintiffs’ complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. For the reasons that follow,

Defendants’MotiontoDismiss[Doc.#26]isdenied.

I. Background

A. COVID-19Pandemic

BecausetheexistenceandrapidspreadoftheongoingglobalCOVID-19pandemicis

wellknown,theCourtwilldiscussonlythosefactsmostrelevanttothemotiontodismiss.

As of May 5, 2020, there have been 29,973 reported cases of COVID-19 in the state of

Connecticut,and2,556deaths.CASESINTHEU.S.,CentersforDiseaseControlandPrevention

(“CDC”), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/cases-updates/cases-in-us.html

(lastaccessedMay6,2020).

“COVID-19isthoughttospreadmainlythroughclosecontactfromperson-to-person

inrespiratorydropletsfromsomeonewhoisinfected.Peoplewhoareinfectedoftenhave

symptomsofillness,”but“[s]omepeoplewithoutsymptomsmaybeabletospreadvirus.”

Case 3:20-cv-00534-JBA Document 37 Filed 05/06/20 Page 1 of 26

2

HOW COVID-19 SPREADS, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/how-covid-

spreads.html (last accessedMay5, 2020). It also “maybepossible that a person can get

COVID-19bytouchingasurfaceorobjectthathasthevirusonitandthentouchingtheirown

mouth,nose,orpossiblytheireyes.”Id.“ThevirusthatcausesCOVID-19isspreadingvery

easilyandsustainablybetweenpeople.”Id.

“The bestway to prevent illness is to avoid being exposed to this virus.” HOWTO

PROTECT YOURSELF & OTHERS, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/prevention.html (last

accessedMay5,2020).ToavoidcontractingCOVID-19,theCDCrecommendstakingcertain

precautions,including1)“[w]ash[ing]yourhandsoftenwithsoapandwaterforatleast20

secondsespeciallyafteryouhavebeeninapublicplace”;2)“[a]void[ing]closecontactwith

peoplewhoaresick,eveninsideyourhome”;3)“[p]ut[ting]distancebetweenyourselfand

otherpeopleoutsideyourhome,”including“[s]tay[ing]atleast6feet(about2arms’length)

fromotherpeople,”avoiding“gather[ing]ingroups,”and“[s]tay[ing]outofcrowdedplaces

andavoid[ing]massgatherings”;4)usinga“clothfacecover”wheneveryou“havetogoout

inpublic,”althoughsuchacoveris“notasubstituteforsocialdistancing”;5)“cover[ing]your

mouthandnosewithatissuewhenyoucoughorsneeze”andimmediately“wash[ing]hands

with soap and water for at least 20 seconds”; and 6) “[c]lean[ing] AND disinfect[ing]

frequentlytouchedsurfacesdaily,”including“tables,doorknobs,lightswitches,countertops,

handles,desks,phones,keyboards,toilets,faucets,andsinks.”Id.

“Keepingdistancefromothersisespeciallyimportantforpeoplewhoareathigher

riskofgettingverysick.”Id.“Olderadultsandpeoplewhohavesevereunderlyingmedical

conditions like heart or lung disease or diabetes” are believed to be at “higher risk for

developing serious complications from COVID-19 illness,” based on currently available

informationandclinicalexpertise.Id.AccordingtotheCDC,“thoseathigh-riskforsevere


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illness fromCOVID-19” include:1) “People65yearsandolder”;2) “Peoplewho live ina

nursinghomeorlong-termcarefacility”;and3)“Peopleofallageswithunderlyingmedical

conditions, particularly if not well controlled.” (Id.) Such underlying medical conditions

include“chroniclungdiseaseormoderatetosevereasthma[,]...seriousheartconditions[,]

...severeobesity[,]...diabetes[,]...chronickidneydiseaseundergoingdialysis[,]...liver

disease,” and “[p]eople who are immunocompromised,” from a variety of conditions

“including cancer treatment, smoking, bone marrow or organ transplantation, immune

deficiencies,poorlycontrolledHIVorAIDS,andprolongeduseofcorticosteroidsandother

immuneweakeningmedications.”PEOPLEWHOAREATHIGHERRISKFORSEVEREILLNESS,Centers

for Disease Control and Prevention, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-

extra-precautions/people-at-higher-risk.html(lastaccessedMay5,2020).

AsofMay6,2020, theConnecticutDepartmentofCorrection(“DOC”)reports that

358 of its staff members and 478 of its inmates have contracted COVID-19. COVID-19

TRACKER,ConnecticutStateDepartmentofCorrection,https://portal.ct.gov/DOC/Common-

Elements/Common-Elements/Health-Information-and-Advisories (last accessed May 6,

2020).Thereare100inmateswhohavetestedpositiveforCOVID-19currentlyhousedat

NorthernCorrectionalInstitution(“NorthernCI”),towhichDOChasbeenmovinginmates

whotestpositive,and336inmateshavealreadybeen“medicallycleared”andreturnedto

their original facility. Id.1 Six inmates have died from COVID-19. Id. Plaintiffs allege that

DefendantshavetakeninsufficientstepstolimitthespreadofCOVID-19inDOCfacilitiesand

havedeprivedthemofmeanstoself-protect.

1AttheMay4,2020oralargument,DefenseCounselrepresentedthat,asofthatdate,

116inmateswereundergoingmedicalquarantineatNorthernCIandanothereightinmateshadbeenhospitalized.


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B. ConnecticutStateCourtsDuringCOVID-19Pandemic

ThepartiesdisputethedegreetowhichtheConnecticutstatecourtsremainopenand

available during the COVID-19 pandemic. Six Connecticut Superior Court courthouses

remain open in some capacity during the pandemic. LIST OFCOURTHOUSESWHEREPRIORITY

LEVEL I BUSINESS FUNCTIONS WILL BE HANDLED DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC, State of

Connecticut Judicial Branch, https://jud.ct.gov/HomePDFs/CourthousesOpened.pdf?v4

(lastaccessedMay5,2020).ThosesixcourthousesareopenonlyonMondays,Wednesdays,

andFridays.REDUCEDDAYSOFOPERATIONATSTATECOURTHOUSES,StateofConnecticutJudicial

Branch, https://jud.ct.gov/HomePDFs/Reduced_Days_Courthouses.pdf (last accessedMay

5,2020).Thecourtswhichareopenarehearingonly“Priority1BusinessFunctions,”which

includes “Criminal arraignments of defendants held in lieu of bond and all arraignments

involvingdomesticviolencecases”butapparentlydoesnotincludeothercriminalmatters

orcivilhabeaspetitions.COVID-19INFORMATIONFROMTHECONNECTICUTJUDICIALBRANCH,State

ofConnecticutJudicialBranch,https://jud.ct.gov/COVID19.htm(lastaccessedMay5,2020).

Plaintiffsassertthat“allhearingdatesforcriminalcasesinwhichthedefendantis

incarceratedhavebeencontinuedenmassefromwhenthepandemicbeganinMarchtothe

endofMayorbeginningofJune”andthat“sentencemodificationhearingssimplyarenot

happeningduringthispandemic.”(Pls.’Opp.toMot.toDismiss[Doc.#34]at7.)Defendants

cite three habeas petitionswhichwere “opened” on April 29, 2020 and two emergency

motionsfiledinexistinghabeaspetitionswhichwereruledonduringthepandemic,(Defs.’

Mem.Supp.Mot.toDismiss[Doc.#26-1]at11n.11,12),butPlaintiffsrespondthatthose

are “the only habeas petitions opened in the entire state of Connecticut sinceMarch 12,

2020,”incontrastwithan“averageof50-60new”habeascasespermonthoverthepastten

years.(Pls.’Opp.at9.)

OnApril3,2020,theConnecticutCriminalDefenseLawyersAssociation(“CCDLA”)

andcertainindividualsfiledacomplaintandmotionforatemporaryorderofmandamusin


5

the Connecticut Superior Court against Governor Lamont and Commissioner Cook.

Complaint, Connecticut Criminal Defense Lawyer’s Ass’n v. Lamont et al. (hereinafter

“CCDLA”),No.UWYCV206054309S(Conn.Super.Ct.Apr.3,2020).Thedefendantsinthat

actionmovedtodismissthecomplaint,assertingavarietyofjurisdictionalarguments.Oral

argumentwasheardbytelephoneonApril15,2020,andthemotiontodismisswasgranted

onApril 24, 2020.OrderRegardingMotion toDismiss,CCDLA et al. v. Lamont et al., No.

UWYCV206054309S(Conn.Super.Ct.Apr.24,2020).

C. Parties

Plaintiffs, who brought this action on April 20, 2020, are five individuals held at

facilitiesoftheConnecticutDepartmentofCorrection.

PlaintiffTreMcPhersonwasa“pretrialdetaineeatBridgeportCorrectionalCenter

heldforlackofa$5,100bond,”(Compl.[Doc.#1]¶9),buthehasbeenreleasedfromDOC

custodysincethefilingofthisaction.PlaintiffPattikateWillliams-Voidis“apretrialdetainee

at York Correctional Institute held for lack of a $75,000 bond.” (Id. ¶ 10.) “She has

hypertensionandhasbeendiagnosedaspre-diabetic.”(Id.)PlaintiffJohnDoeis“abovethe

ageof70andisaprisonerservingasentenceofincarceration,”andhe“hasHIVandhepatitis

C,andrequiresregulardialysisforkidneydisease.”(Id.¶11.)Mr.Doeis“house[d]...witha

cellmate.”(Id.)PlaintiffJohnRoeis“abovetheageof50andisaprisonerservingasentence

ofincarceration.”(Id.¶12.)Mr.Roe“hasHIV”andis“house[d]...inanopendormitorywith

morethanninetyotherpeoplesleepinginbunkbedsincloseproximitytooneanother.”(Id.)

Plaintiff Thomas Caves is “a prisoner serving a sentence of incarceration at Corrigan-

RadgowskiCorrectionalInstitute.”(Id.¶13.)Heis“house[d]...withacellmateandhiscell

isnotcleaned.”(Id.)Mr.Caves“sharesshowers,phones,andcommonspacewithmorethan

eightyothermenhousedinhisunit,”oneofwhom“contractedCOVID-19andfellill...[and]

wassimplylockedinhiscell,withhiscellmate,for15days.”(Id.)


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PlaintiffsallegethatPlaintiff JohnRoe“attemptedto fileagrievanceregardingthe

circumstancesthatledtohisinfectionwithCOVID-19andsubsequentcustody,butwastold

therewerenoformsavailableand‘wedon’tdothose’here”atNorthernCI.(Pls.’Opp.at15

(quotingEx.11toPls.’Opp(RoeDecl.)[Doc.#34-11]¶X).)PlaintiffsalsoallegethatPlaintiff

JohnDoe“filedaninitialgrievance.”(Id.)Defendantsmaintainthattheyhavereceivedno

grievancesfromanyofthenamedplaintiffsandthattheDOCgrievanceproceduresremain

openandfunctionalduringtheCOVID-19pandemic.(SeeExs.N(BennetDecl.),O(CottaDecl.

andBasley-MotleyDecl.)toDefs.’Mot.toDismiss[Docs.##26-15,26-16].)

Plaintiffspropose“twoclassesthattogethercompriseallindividualscurrentlyheld

inDOCfacilities:thePre-adjudicationClassofthoseincarceratedpeopleheldwhileawaiting

adjudicationoftheircharges,andthePost-adjudicationClassofthoseincarceratedpeople

whoareservingacriminalsentence.”(Compl.¶1.)Eachproposedclasscontainsa“medically

vulnerable” subclass, made up of “all individuals 50 and older and those with medical

conditionsthatplacethematheightenedriskofsevereillnessordeathfromCOVID-19.”(Id.)

DefendantNedLamontisthegovernorofthestateofConnecticut.(Id.¶14.)Governor

Lamontissuedinhisofficialcapacity.(Id.)DefendantRollinCookisthecommissionerofthe

ConnecticutDOCandisalsosuedinhisofficialcapacity.(Id.¶15.)“GovernorLamontand

thestateofConnecticutcontrolandoperatetheDOCfacilitiesthrough”CommissionerCook,

who “has immediate custody over” the named plaintiffs “and all other putative class

members.”(Id.¶¶14-15.)

II. Discussion

Defendantsmovetodismissthishybridaction,broughtunder28U.S.C.§2241and

42U.S.C.§1983,onthegroundsthattheCourtlacksjurisdictionbecausePlaintiffshavenot

exhaustedtheirremedies.Specifically,DefendantscontendthatPlaintiffsarebarredfrom

bringingtheir§2241habeaspetitionbecausethey“havefailedtoexhaustavailablestate

courtremedies,”andthatPlaintiffsarebarredfromassertingclaimsunder42U.S.C.§1983


7

because they have failed to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the Prison

LitigationReformAct(“PLRA”).(Defs.’Mem.Supp.Mot.toDismissat1).

In the alternative and in the event that the Court concludes it has jurisdiction,

DefendantsasktheCourttoapplytheYoungerabstentiondoctrineand“declinetoexercise

jurisdiction over these claims because they implicate various state judicial orders and

mittimuses, impacting pending criminal pretrial matters, including detention and bond

orders,aswellasthestatemandamusactionbroughtbythesamecounsel.”(Id.)

TheCourtwilladdresseachargumentinturn.

A. Section2241Exhaustion

Plaintiffschallengethe“conditionsofconfinementatDOCfacilitiesacrossthestate”

ofConnecticut,whichtheyassert“createaheightenedandunreasonableriskofCOVID-19,”

throughawritofhabeascorpusbroughtpursuantto28U.S.C.§2241.(Compl.¶1.)Asa

threshold matter, the Court must determine whether § 2241 is the proper vehicle for

Plaintiffs’petition,asDefendantsasktheCourtto“treatthisasitreallyis:aPetitionfora

writofhabeascorpusbystateinmatesvia§2254.”(Defs.’Mem.Supp.Mot.toDismissat4.)2

TheCourtwillthenconsiderwhatexhaustionrequirementappliestoPlaintiffs’petitionand

whetherthatrequirementmaybeexcusedinthiscase.

The Second Circuit has set forth a framework for determining which petition a

prisonermaybringinseekinghabeasrelief.The“ordinaryvehicle”forastateprisoneris28

U.S.C.§2254, “underwhichsuchaprisonermayhavehissentencevacatedorsetaside.”

2 As the Court will later address, this distinction is significant, because § 2254

specifically mandates that a court may not grant a petition unless the “applicant hasexhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State” or “there is an absence ofavailableStatecorrectiveprocess.”28U.S.C.§2254(b)(1)(A).Incontrast,§2241“doesnotbyitsowntermsrequiretheexhaustionofstateremediesasaprerequisitetothegrantoffederalhabeasrelief.”U.S.exrel.Scrantonv.StateofN.Y.,532F.2d292,294(2dCir.1976).Instead, habeas petitions brought under § 2241 are subject to a “judicially createdexhaustionrequirement.”Theodoropoulosv.I.N.S.,358F.3d162,167(2dCir.2004).


8

Carmonav.U.S.BureauofPrisons,243F.3d629,632(2dCir.2001)(discussingdistinction

betweenhabeaspetitionsbroughtpursuantto§2255andthosebroughtunder§2241).In

contrast,“awritofhabeascorpusunder§2241isavailable”toaprisoner“whodoesnot

challengethelegalityofhissentence,butchallengesinsteaditsexecutionsubsequenttohis

conviction.” Id.; see alsoChambers v. United States, 106 F.3d 472, 474 (2dCir. 1997) (“A

challenge to the execution of a sentence, however, is properly filed pursuant to Section

2241.”);Kingsleyv.BureauofPrisons,937F.2d26,30n.5(2dCir.1991)(explainingthata

federal prisoner’s habeas petition “seeking [to] vacate, set aside, or correct the initial

sentence” is properly brought under § 2255, where “challenges to the length,

appropriatenessorconditionsofconfinementareproperlybroughtunder28U.S.C.§2241”).

TheSecondCircuithasalsoofferedexamplesofwhatqualifiesasachallengetothe

“execution”ofaprisoner’ssentence.Ithasexplainedthata§2241petitionmaybeusedto

challenge “such matters as the administration of parole, computation of a prisoner's

sentencebyprisonofficials,prisondisciplinaryactions,prisontransfers,typeofdetention

andprisonconditions.”Jiminianv.Nash,245F.3d144,146(2dCir.2001);seealsoDhinsav.

Krueger,917F.3d70,81(2dCir.2019)(explainingthata§2241application“providesthe

propermeans”to“challengetheexecutionofasentence,includingchallengestodisciplinary

actions, prison conditions, or parole decisions” (internal quotation marks omitted));

Gonzalez v. United States, 792 F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 2015) (stating that § 2241 could,

theoretically,beusedtoattacktheexecutionofarestitutionorder);Adamsv.UnitedStates,

372F.3d132,135(2dCir.2004)(statingthata§2241petitionmaybeusedtoseekrelief

from,amongotherthings,“prisonconditionsinthefacilitywhereheisincarcerated”).

Here,Plaintiffsare challenging thecurrenthealthconditionsof their confinement,

which, theyclaim,havebecomeunconstitutionalbecauseoftheCOVID-19pandemicrisk.


9

Theyarenotattackingtheirunderlyingsentences.Assuch,§2241isthepropervehiclefor

theirpetition.3

HavingconcludedthatPlaintiffshaveproperlybroughttheirhabeaspetitionunder

§2241,theCourtnowaddressestheapplicableexhaustionrequirement.

Aspreviouslynoted,§2241“doesnotbyitsowntermsrequiretheexhaustionofstate

remediesasaprerequisitetothegrantoffederalhabeasrelief.”U.S.exrel.Scranton,532F.2d

at294.However,“[a]lthoughnotastatutoryrequirement,Section2241hasbeeninterpreted

asrequiringapetitionertoexhaustavailablestatecourtoradministrativeremediespriorto

seeking any relief thereunder in federal court.”Robinson v. Sposato, No. CV-11-0191 SJF,

2012WL1965631,at*2(E.D.N.Y.May29,2012)(citingCarmona,43F.3dat632–34);see

3Atoralargument,DefenseCounselnotedthatothercircuitshaveheldthatprisoners

maynotuse§2241tobringconditionsofconfinementclaims.Indeed,eightoftheelevencircuits that have addressed the issue have concluded that claims challenging prisonconditionscannotbebroughtina§2241habeaspetition,butmustinsteadbebroughtunder§1983.CompareWilbornv.Mansukhani,795F.App’x157,162-63(4thCir.2019)(notingthat“[t]heSupremeCourthasnotdefinitivelyaddressedwhetheraclaimchallengingthepetitioner’splaceofconfinementiscognizableinapetitionforwritofhabeascorpus”andholdingthat“conditions-of-confinementclaimsarenotcognizableinhabeasproceedings”);Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 933–34 (9th Cir. 2016) (concluding that conditions-of-confinementclaimsfalloutside“thecoreofhabeascorpus”andthusmustinsteadbebroughtin a civil rights claim); Spencer v. Haynes, 774 F.3d 467, 469–70 (8th Cir. 2014) (same),Cardonav.Bledsoe,681F.3d533,537(3dCir.2012)(same);Davisv.Fechtel,150F.3d486,490(5thCir.1998)(same);McIntoshv.U.S.ParoleComm’n,115F.3d809,811–12(10thCir.1997)(same);Grahamv.Broglin,922F.2d379,381(7thCir.1991)(same);andMartinv.Overton,391F.3d710,714(6thCir.2004)(same);withAamerv.Obama,742F.3d1023,1036(D.C.Cir.2014)(holdingthatprisonerscanbringhabeasclaimschallengingtheformoftheirdetention);Adamsv.UnitedStates,372F.3d132,135(2dCir.2004)(statingthata§2241petitionmaybeusedtomayseekrelieffrom,amongotherthings,“prisonconditionsinthefacilitywhereheisincarcerated”);andMillerv.UnitedStates,564F.2d103,105(1stCir.1977)(holdingconditions-of-confinementclaimsarecognizableunder§2241).

However, as Defense Counsel acknowledged, the Second Circuit has adopted andrepeatedlyreaffirmeditsminorityviewthat“[u]nder§2241,aprisonermaychallengetheexecutionofhissentence.”Roccisanov.Menifee,293F.3d51,57(2dCir.2002).ThisCourtdoesnothavelicensetodisregardthisbindingcircuitprecedent.


10

also U.S. ex rel. Scranton, 532 F.2d at 294 (“[D]ecisional law has superimposed such a[n

exhaustion] requirement in order to accommodate principles of federalism.”); Foster v.

Murphy, 686 F. Supp. 471, 474 (S.D.N.Y.1988) (explaining that “courts have engrafted a

requirementofexhaustion”upon§2241).

Courts in thiscircuithave“interpreted [§2241] torequireapetitioner toexhaust

available state court remedies before seeking relief . . . in federal court.”Henry v. United

States,No.11-CV-391KAM,2014WL7075800,at*3(E.D.N.Y.Dec.12,2014);seealsoDeLee

v. Conway, No. 9:16-CV-0799 (BKS), 2016 WL 3823808, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. July 12, 2016)

(“Section2241doesnotexplicitlyrequiretheexhaustionofstatecourtremedies,butcourts

haverequiredexhaustiontoaccommodatetheprinciplesoffederalism.”).

Tosatisfy§2241’sexhaustionrequirement,apetitionermust“raiseallclaimsinstate

courtprior to raising them in a federal habeas corpuspetition,” and, indoing so, “‘fairly

present’ each claim for habeas relief in ‘each appropriate state court (including a state

supreme court with powers of discretionary review), thereby alerting that court to the

federalnatureoftheclaim.’”DeLee,2016WL3823808,at*3(quotingBaldwinv.Reese,541

U.S.27,29(2004)).Putotherwise,petitioner“mustgivethestatecourtsonefullopportunity

to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State’s

establishedappellatereviewprocess.”O’Sullivanv.Boerckel,526U.S.838,845(1999).

Here, Plaintiffs acknowledge that they have not fully exhausted their state court

remedies.AlthoughPlaintiffsbroughtaparallelactioninConnecticutstatecourt,whichwas

ultimatelydismissed,seeCCDLA,No.UWYCV206054309S(Conn.Super.Ct.Apr.24,2020),

theyhavenotrepresentedthattheyhaveappealedorintendtoappealthisdecision.Having

concededthattheyhavenotsatisfied§2241’sexhaustionrequirement,Plaintiffsinsteadask

theCourttoapplyanexceptionit.(SeePls.’Opp.at4-5.)

Because§2241’sexhaustionrequirementisa judicial invention, it is“amenableto

judge-madeexceptions.”Rossv.Blake, 136S.Ct.1850,1857 (2016); seealsoMcCarthyv.


11

Madigan,503U.S.140,144(1992)(“WhereCongressspecificallymandates,exhaustionis

required.ButwhereCongresshasnotclearlyrequiredexhaustion,soundjudicialdiscretion

governs.”(citationsomitted));Bastekv.Fed.CropIns.Corp.,145F.3d90,94(2dCir.1998)

(“Statutoryexhaustionrequirementsaremandatory,andcourtsarenotfreetodispensewith

them. Common law (or ‘judicial’) exhaustion doctrine, in contrast, recognizes judicial

discretiontoemployabroadarrayofexceptions[.]”).

There are generally three bases for waiver of a judicially crafted exhaustion

requirement.“First,exhaustionmaybeunnecessarywhereitwouldbefutile,eitherbecause

agencydecisionmakersarebiasedorbecausetheagencyhasalreadydeterminedtheissue.”

Washington v. Barr, 925 F.3d 109, 118 (2d Cir. 2019) (addressing judicially crafted

exhaustionrequirementapplicabletoControlledSubstanceActchallenges).“[U]nduedelay,

ifitinfactresultsincatastrophichealthconsequences,couldmakeexhaustionfutile.”Id.at

120.Second,“exhaustionmaybeunnecessarywheretheadministrativeprocesswouldbe

incapable of granting adequate relief,” including situations where “the relief the agency

might provide could, because of undue delay, become inadequate.” Id. at 119-20. Third,

“exhaustionmaybeunnecessarywherepursuingagencyreviewwouldsubjectplaintiffsto

undueprejudice.”Id.at119.

Here, Plaintiffs contend that § 2241’s exhaustion requirement should be waived,

becausethey“willsufferanirreparableinjurywithoutimmediatejudicialrelief,anditwould

befutiletoseekstaterelief.”(Pls.’Opp.at5.)Theyexplainthattheymaysuffercatastrophic

healthconsequencesifrequiredtoexhaust,as“[w]ithoutimmediaterelief,Plaintiffscould

contract[COVID-19]and,withindays,sufferseverephysicalinjury,illness,orevendeath,

harmthatcertainlywouldbeirreparable.”(Id.)PlaintiffsfurtherassertthattheConnecticut

statecourtsystemisnotcurrentlyabletooffersuchimmediaterelief.Theystatethat“[o]nly

six[state]courtsacross[Connecticut]arecurrentlyoperating,”thatthesecourtare“open

onlyforseveralhoursonMondays,Wednesdays,andFridays,”andthatthesecourtare“no


12

longer [conducting] any criminal hearings other than arraignments.” (Id. at 5-6 (citing

REDUCEDDAYSOFOPERATIONATSTATECOURTHOUSES);seealsoEx.2(DagostineE-mail)toPls.’

Opp. [Doc. # 34-2] at 2 (“For Criminal Matters, the priority 1 business functions are

arraignments involving incarcerateddefendants, anddomesticviolencearraignments.All

othercase[s],withlimitedexceptions...arenotbeingheardduringthistime.”).)Plaintiffs

alsoprovideane-mailfromtheConnecticutJudiciary’sDeputyDirectorofCriminalMatters

statingthat“[c]asesinvolvingincarcerateddefendants”aretobecontinued“outtolateMay

andJune,”(DagostineE-mailat3),aswellasane-mailfromtheDeputyChiefClerkofthe

CriminalDivisionrespondingtoanemergencysentencemodificationrequeststatingthat

“SentenceModificationsarenotPriority1mattersandwillnotbehearduntilcourtsopen

upforregularbusiness,”(Ex.3(RomanoDecl.)toPls.’Opp.[Doc.#34-3]at2).Additionally,

Plaintiffsassertthatthedocketingofhabeaspetitionshascometoastandstill.Theycontend

theConnecticutstatecourtsystemtypicallydocketsfiftytosixtyhabeaspetitionspermonth,

butasofApril29,2020,onlythreehabeaspetitionshavebeen“openedintheentirestateof

Connecticut since March 12, 2020—i.e., since the pandemic began.” (Pls.’ Opp. at 9).4

Plaintiffs elaborated on this point at oral argument, further noting that the deadline for

responsivepleadingshasbeensetonemonthfromtheirfiling,duringwhichtimeapetitioner

couldcontractCOVID-19andsufferseriousandevenfatalconsequences.Plaintiffsconclude

fromthisthatit“remainsvirtuallyimpossibleforincarceratedpeople—particularlythose

whodonothavealreadyengaged,activelawyersontheirlongstandingcases,andeventhose

4Plaintiffsdescribethehabeasprocesstoinvolve:

Mailingapetitionto the(closed)Rockvillecourthouse;having it forwardedfromRockvilletoHartford,againviamail,atwhichpointaclerkwillreviewitonaWednesdayorFridaybetween9a.m.and1p.m.andthen—assumingithasbeenmarkedontheenvelopeasan“emergency,”—ajudgemayreviewittodeterminewhetherahearingshouldbeheld.

(Pls.’Opp.at9n.9.)


13

who do—to obtain relief in state court,” and thus argue that exhaustion of state court

remediesshouldbeexcusedgiventhefast-movingnatureoftheCOVID-19pandemic.(Id.at

11.)

DefendantspaintadifferentpictureoftheConnecticutstatecourtsystem.Defendants

assertthatthe“courtsareopenandarecurrentlyhearingandprocessinginmaterequests

forreleaseviaavarietyofjudicialmechanisms,”andthat“[s]everalinmateshavealready

filedactionsinstatecourtforreleasebasedonsimilarclaimsrelatedtoCOVID-19andthese

claimsarebeingactedupon.”(Defs.’Mem.Supp.Mot.toDismissat10.)Defendantsidentify

onehabeasactionbroughtbyMr.RobertDay“wherewithinseven(7)daysthepetitioner’s

habeasmotionwasfiled,objectedto,andthepresidingjudge...renderedadecision.”5(Id.

(citingRobertDay#253376v.Comm’rofCorr.,No.CV17-4008971-S(Conn.Super.Ct.Apr.

20,2020)).)DefendantsalsodrawtheCourt’sattentiontotheparallelCCDLAclassaction

broughtinstatecourt,notingthat“veryfactthatthesameattorneyswereabletofilesuch

anactioninstatecourtcompletelyrefutesanyclaimthatthestatecourtsare‘closed.’”(Defs.’

Mem.Supp.Mot.toDismissat5.)

Considering the above, theCourt concludes that §2241’s exhaustion requirement

shouldbewaived in lightof theextraordinarycircumstancespresentedby theCOVID-19

pandemic.Plaintiffshaveadequatelydemonstratedthatthestatecourtsystemisoperating

atsuchadiminishedcapacitythatitmaynotbeabletotimelyrespondtoamassivevolume

ofemergencyhabeaspetitions—anumberpotentiallyinthehundredsorthousands,given

thesizeoftheputativeclass—intheurgentmannerthatthosepetitionsrequire.6Asother

5Plaintiffsnotethat“Mr.Day,whohasmultiplemedicalconditionsthatwouldput

himatriskofsevereillnessfromCOVID-19,firstfiledahabeaspetitioninJuly2017,”andhis“emergency motion for bond pending habeas, filed April 13, was denied for failure todemonstratelikelihoodofprevailingontheunderlyinghabeasclaim.”(Pls.’Opp.at10.)

6Plaintiffsallege,“[o]ninformationandbelief,thereareatleast11,840peopleintheproposedClasses.”(Compl.¶76.)


14

courtshavenoted,COVID-19ishighlycontagiousandthe“fatalityrateamongtheriskiest

population is about fifteen percent.”Medeiros v. Martin, No. CV 20-178 WES, 2020 WL

2104897,at*1(D.R.I.May1,2020);seealsoPimentel-Estradav.Barr,No.C20-495RSM-BAT,

2020WL2092430,at*3(W.D.Wash.Apr.28,2020)(“Inthehighestriskpopulations,the

casefatalityrateisabout15%.”(internalquotationmarksremoved)).Giventherealityof

thedisease,whichisspreadinginConnecticutprisons,andtheconsequenceofpotentially

catastrophichealthoutcomes,theCourtconcludesthatexhaustionofstateremedieswould

befutile,because,undercurrentconditions,Plaintiffsareatsubstantialriskofcontracting

thediseasepriortocompletingtheexhaustionprocess.

Thisconclusion is reachedwith full recognitionof theConnecticut judiciary’sbest

efforts inthe faceofanunprecedentedglobalpandemic.Thefederalcourtsystem,too, is

significantly limited in itsoperationsdueto thispublichealthemergency.See InreCourt

Operations Under the Exigent Circumstances Created by COVID-19, UNITEDSTATESDISTRICT

COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT (Apr. 27, 2020),

http://www.ctd.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/4-27-20-COVID-19-Superseding-General-

Order-Re-Court-Operations__0.pdf (ordering that all in-court and in-person civil and

criminalproceedingscheduledtocommenceonorbeforeJune15,2020aretobecontinued).

Infact,oralargumentsinthismatter,normallyheldinacourtroom,hadtobeconductedvia

videoteleconference,withmanyparticipantslogginginfromtheirhomes.Butgiventhelife-

and-death consequences at stake, prudence warrants allowing Plaintiffs to continue

pursuingthisactioninfederalcourt,whetherornottheyhavefullyavailedthemselvesof

theremediesavailableinthestatecourtsystem.

As such, the Court concludes that Plaintiffsmay seek habeas relief under § 2241

withoutexhaustingstatecourtremedies.


15

B. PLRAExhaustion

Plaintiffsalsoseektochallengetheconditionsoftheirconfinementunder42U.S.C.§

1983, and so are subject to a mandatory statutory exhaustion requirement, which

Defendantscontendhasnotbeensatisfied.

A prisoner is limited in his or her ability to bring a § 1983 claim by the Prison

LitigationReformActof1996(“PLRA”),Pub.L.No.104–134,110Stat.1321(1996),which

expresslyrequiresthat“[n]oactionshallbebroughtwithrespecttoprisonconditionsunder

section1983ofthistitle,oranyotherFederallaw,byaprisonerconfinedinanyjail,prison,

or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are

exhausted.”42U.S.C.§1997e(a).“[T]hePLRA'sexhaustionrequirementappliestoallinmate

suitsaboutprisonlife,whethertheyinvolvegeneralcircumstancesorparticularepisodes,

andwhethertheyallegeexcessiveforceorsomeotherwrong.”Porterv.Nussle,534U.S.516,

532(2002).

In contrast to the judicially-created exhaustion requirement governing § 2241

petitions, the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement may not be excused under any judicially

createdexceptiondoctrine.SeeRoss v.Blake, 136S.Ct.1850,1855 (2016) (rejecting “an

unwritten ‘special circumstances’ exception” to the PLRAwhichwould have “permit[ed]

some prisoners to pursue litigation even when they have failed to exhaust available

administrativeremedies.”)TheSupremeCourthasbeenclearthatthePLRA“establish[eda]

mandatory exhaustion regime[], foreclosing judicial discretion” and barring “a court . . .

[from]excus[ing]afailuretoexhaust,eventotake...[special]circumstancesintoaccount.”

Ross,136S.Ct.at1856-57;seealsoBoothv.Churner,532U.S.731,741n.6(2001)(“[W]e

will not read futility or other exceptions into statutory exhaustion requirements where

Congress has provided otherwise. . . . Here,we hold only that Congress has provided in

§1997e(a)thataninmatemustexhaustirrespectiveoftheformsofreliefsoughtandoffered

throughadministrativeavenues.”).


16

Butwhile thePLRA’sexhaustionrequirement ismandatory,42U.S.C.§1997e(a)’s

“edict contains one significant qualifier: the remedies must indeed be ‘available’ to the

prisoner.”Ross,136S.Ct.at1856.TheSupremeCourthasillustratedthreecircumstances

whereanadministrativeremedyisnot“available,”thusabsolvingtheprisonerofpursuing

exhaustion:

First, . . . an administrative procedure is unavailable when (despite whatregulationsorguidancematerialsmaypromise)itoperatesasasimpledeadend—withofficersunableor consistentlyunwilling toprovideany relief toaggrievedinmates....Next,anadministrativeschememightbesoopaquethatit becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use. In this situation, somemechanismexiststoproviderelief,butnoordinaryprisonercandiscernornavigateit....[F]inally,thesameistruewhenprisonadministratorsthwartinmatesfromtakingadvantageofagrievanceprocessthroughmachination,misrepresentation,orintimidation.

Id.at1859-60.Underthisframework,thereisnoexceptionforthespecialcircumstanceof

“catastrophichealthconsequences”;aplaintiffinsteadmustestablishthattheadministrative

reviewprocessissooverburdened,inefficient,orhostileastobeeffectivelyunavailableto

remedythecomplaint.

PlaintiffsarguethattheConnecticutDOCadministrativeprocedureis“unavailable”

foravarietyofreasons.TheycontendthattheDOCgrievanceprocedure,aspromulgatedin

State of Connecticut Department of Correction Administrative Directive Number 9.6,

operatesasa“deadend”andthatitispracticallyincapableofusebecause“[e]xhaustingthe

grievance process in Connecticut takes a minimum of 75 business days, and up to 105

business days for a grievance that ‘challengesDepartment level policy.’” (Pls.’ Opp. at 18

(quotingEx.15(DirectiveNumber9.6)toPls.’Opp.[Doc.#34-15]at5-8).)Plaintiffsalso

notethat“Connecticut’sDOCdoesnothaveanemergencygrievanceprocedure”toprocess

urgentrequests.(Id.at17.)CitingtheSeventhCircuit,Plaintiffsofferthat“‘[i]fittakestwo

weekstoexhaustacomplaintthatthecomplainantisindangerofbeingkilledtomorrow,

thereisno‘possibilityofsomerelief’andsonothingfortheprisonertoexhaust.’”(Id.at19

(quoting Fletcher v. Menard Correctional Center, 623 F.3d 1171, 1173 (7th Cir. 2010).)


17

Plaintiffs contend that the same logic applieswhereadiseasemaycause seriousor fatal

health consequences well within the timeframe for exhaustion of an administrative

grievanceprocess,whichtakesaminimumofatleasttwomonths.

In the alternative, Plaintiffs argue that “prison administrators [have] thwart[ed]

inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process,” thereby making the process

unavailable. (Pls.’ Opp. at 17 (quotingRoss, 136 S. Ct. at 1860).) They state that named

Plaintiff John Roe, while under medical quarantine at Northern CI, “attempted to file a

grievance regarding the circumstances that led to his infection with COVID-19 and

subsequent custody, butwas told therewereno formsavailable and ‘wedon’t do those’

here,”(RoeDecl.¶X),andnotethat“[c]ourtsinthisCircuithavefoundthesecircumstances

sufficienttosupportaclaimthatthegrievanceprocedurewasunavailable.”(Id.(citingSmith

v.CityofNewYork,2013WL5434144,*14-16(S.D.N.Y.,Sept.26,2013)(holdingevidence

prisonerwastoldbyprisonstaff,“Wearenotabletodealwiththis,”andto“Waititout.See

whatcomes.Calmdown,”supportedclaimthatgrievanceprocesswasunavailable);Scottv.

WestchesterCty.,No.18CV7203,2020WL364251,at*5(S.D.N.Y.Jan.22,2020)(allegations

thatplaintiff“repeatedlyrequestedassistancewritingagrievancebutwaseitherignoredor

toldsomeonewouldhelphim”“plausiblysuggestprisonadministratorsthwartedplaintiff

from taking advantage of the grievance system”)).)7 Plaintiffs argue that this attempt to

exhaust administrative remedies is sufficient to excuse exhaustion for the whole class

because, for purposes of a putative class action, a single plaintiff’s allegation regarding

exhaustion“satisfiestherequirementastoallmembers.”Barfieldv.Cook,No.3:18-CV-1198

(MPS),2019WL3562021,at*8(D.Conn.Aug.6,2019);seealsoLewisv.Washington,265F.

Supp. 2d 939, 942 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (“To require each inmatewith the same grievance to

7 Additionally, Plaintiffs’ Counsel offer that anothernamedPlaintiff, JohnDoe, has

attestedthat“hehasfiledaninitialgrievance,butDefendantsrepresentthattheydonothavearecordof it,”butthat“[g]iventheexpeditedbriefingschedule,PlaintiffswereunabletohaveMr.Doesignadeclarationtothisendintimeforthisfiling[.]”(Pls.’Opp.at15.)


18

exhausttheiradministrativeremedieswouldbewasteful,andaslongasprisonofficialshave

receivedasinglecomplaintaddressingeachclaiminaclassaction,theyhavetheopportunity

to resolve disputes internally and to limit judicial intervention in the management of

prisons.”).

Defendants maintain that the grievance process is available to Plaintiffs, as the

regulations laid out in Administrative Directive 9.6 remain in effect. At oral argument,

Defense Counsel acknowledged that the state’s prisons are currently facing “unique

challenges and struggles” because of COVID-19, but affirmed that the DOC grievance

procedureisstilloperationalandstressedthatthepandemicshouldnotbecauseto“ignore

jurisdictional limitationson thecourts.”Withoutdisputing thepoint that theConnecticut

DOC lacks any emergency grievance procedure, Defense Counsel noted that the 105-day

grievancetimeframeisanupperlimitandthatit“assumestheworstofpeople”toanticipate

thatthegrievanceprocesswillconsumethemaximumamountoftime.DefenseCounselalso

arguedthatMr.Roe’sdeclarationthathe“askedthecorrectionalofficerforgrievanceforms

andwastoldtheydidn’thaveanyandtheydidn’tdothathere,”(seeRoeDecl.¶2),proves

thathedidnotexhausthisremedies,becauseAdministrativeDirective“9.6tellshimexactly

whattodoifthathappens:fileapieceofpaper,[and]stickitintheinmategrievancebox.”

TheCourtappreciatesthattheConnecticutDOCgrievanceprocedureisavailableand

capable of offering relief in ordinary times. However, these are not ordinary times. The

ConnecticutDOCgrievanceprocedure,whichlacksanemergencyreviewprocess,wasnot

setupwithapandemicinmind.AlthoughDefendants’pointthatnoteverygrievancewill

require105businessdaystoresolveiswelltaken,theimminenthealththreatthatCOVID-

19createshasrenderedDOC’sadministrativeprocess inadequate to the taskofhandling

Plaintiffs’urgentcomplaintsregardingtheirhealth.Forexample,Plaintiffshaveallegedthat

“Classmembersatcertain facilitiesdonothaveaccesstosoap”andthattheirmasks“rip

easily and are not replaced.” (Compl. ¶¶ 59, 62.) Because COVID-19 spreads “easily and


19

sustainably,” Plaintiffs risk contracting the disease while foregoing these hygienic

precautionsandattemptingtoexhausttheDOC’sadministrativegrievanceprocedure,which

occurs in four stages and involves an informal resolution process, the filing of an initial

formalcomplaint,andtworoundsofappeals.(SeeDirective9.6at5-8.)Inthiscontext,the

DOC’sadministrativegrievanceprocessisthus,“practicallyspeaking,incapableofuse”for

resolvingCOVID-19grievances.Ross,136S.Ct.at1859;seealsoFletcher,623F.3dat1173

(“Ifaprisonerhasbeenplacedinimminentdangerofseriousphysicalinjurybyanactthat

violateshisconstitutionalrights,administrativeremediesthatoffernopossiblereliefintime

topreventtheimminentdangerfrombecominganactualharmcan’tbethoughtavailable.”).

Assuch,theCourtconcludesthatadministrativeremediesforthereliefthatPlaintiffsseek

areunavailable,andthusexhaustionisnotrequiredforPlaintiffstoproceedontheir§1983

claims.8

8Havingreachedthisconclusion,theCourtneednotdwellonPlaintiffs’alternative

argumentsregardingJohnRoeandJohnDoe’sattemptsatexhaustion,butinsteadmakesafewbriefpoints.

First,PlaintiffsarecorrectthatarebuffofaPlaintiff’sattempttofileagrievancefallssquarelywithinoneofthe“unavailability”exceptionsidentifiedinRoss.See136S.Ct.at1856(explaining that administrative remedies are unavailable when “prison administratorsthwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through machination,misrepresentation,orintimidation”).Plaintiffsarealsocorrectthat,underthedoctrineof“‘vicariousexhaustion,’...thePLRA’sexhaustionrequirementissatisfiedaslongasatleastonememberof theproposedprisonerclasshasexhaustedapplicableremedies.”Barfield,2019WL3562021,at*7.

However, for thePLRA’sadministrativeexhaustion requirement tobe satisfiedbyvicariousexhaustion,oneormoreclassmembersmust“ha[ve]exhaustedhisadministrativeremedies with respect to each claim raised by the class.” Id. at *8 (emphasis added andinternalquotationmarksomitted).Here,Mr.Roehasonlystatedthathe“attemptedtogrieve[his]conditionsandtreatmentrelatedtoCOVID-19,”withoutanyfurtherspecificationastotheintendedcontentofhisclaims.(RoeDecl.¶2.)TheCourthaslittleinformationastothesubstanceofMr.Doe’spurportedadministrativefiling,ascounselhaveonlyrepresentedthathesubmittedan“initialgrievance”withoutanyexplanationofhisassertedclaims.BecausetheCourt cannotascertainwhetherMr.RoeandMr.Doe’sgrievancesencompassedeachclaim raised by the putative class, the Court is unable to apply the vicarious exhaustiondoctrineinthisinstance.


20

C. YoungerAbstention

HavingconcludedthatjurisdictionoverPlaintiffs’claimsexists,theCourtwillnow

considerwhethertheYoungerabstentiondoctrineappliestothiscase.

Youngerv.Harris,401U.S.37,41(1971),recognized“thenationalpolicyforbidding

federal courts to stay or enjoin pending state court proceedings except under special

circumstances.”Where it applies,Younger abstention ismandatory, and thus the federal

courtmay not retain jurisdiction andmust dismiss the claims governed byYounger.See

Juidicev.Vail,430U.S.327,348(1977).

The Supreme Court’s decision in Younger was driven in large part by two

considerations:(1)“thebasicdoctrineofequityjurisprudencethatcourtsofequityshould

notact,andparticularlyshouldnotacttorestrainacriminalprosecution,whenthemoving

partyhasanadequateremedyatlawandwillnotsufferirreparableinjuryifdeniedequitable

relief”; and (2) “thenotion of ‘comity,’ that is, a proper respect for state functions, . . . a

continuanceofthebeliefthattheNationalGovernmentwillfarebestiftheStatesandtheir

institutionsareleftfreetoperformtheirseparatefunctionsintheirseparateways.”Younger,

401U.S.at43-44.

DefendantsarguethatthisCourtmustabstainfromhearingPlaintiffs’claimsbecause

“Youngerabstentionisrequiredwhenthreeconditionsaremet:(1)thereisanongoingstate

proceeding;(2)animportantstateinterestisimplicatedinthatproceeding;and(3)thestate

proceedingaffordsthefederalplaintiffanadequateopportunityfor judicialreviewofthe

federal constitutional claims” (the “Middlesex conditions”). (Id. at16 (quotingDiamondD

Const.Corp.v.McGowan,282F.3d191,198(2dCir.2002)).)SeealsoMiddlesexCty.Ethics

Comm.v.GardenStateBarAss’n,457U.S.423,433-34(1982).

ButastheSupremeCourtexplainedinSprintComms.Inc.v.Jacobs,571U.S.69,81

(2013), the “three Middlesex conditions . . . [a]re not dispositive.” Rather, those three

conditions are, “instead,additional factors appropriately considered by the federal court


21

before invoking Younger.” Id. The three Middlesex conditions are alone insufficient to

warrantYoungerabstentionbecauseif

[d]ivorcedfromtheirquasi-criminalcontext, thethreeMiddlesexconditionswouldextendYoungertovirtuallyallparallelstateandfederalproceedings,atleastwhereapartycouldidentifyaplausiblyimportantstateinterest....Thatresult is irreconcilable with our dominant instruction that, even in thepresenceofparallelstateproceedings,abstentionfromtheexerciseoffederaljurisdictionisthe“exception,nottherule.”

Id.at81-82(quotingHawaiiHousingAuth.v.Midkiff,467U.S.229,236(1984)).

Thus, Younger abstention does not apply to all situations in which theMiddlesex

conditionsaresatisfied,butratheritcanapplyonlyin“thethree‘exceptionalcircumstances’

identified”inNewOrleansPublicService,Inc.v.CouncilofCityofNewOrleans,491U.S.350,

373(1989)(“NOPSI”),“butnofurther.”SprintComms.,571U.S.at82.AsNOPSImadeclear,

undertheYoungerdoctrine,“federalcourtsshouldnotenjoinpendingstate”proceedings

whichare1)statecriminalprosecutions,2)certaincivilenforcementproceedings,or3)civil

proceedingsinvolvingcertainordersuniquelyinfurtheranceofthestatecourts’abilityto

performtheirjudicialfunctions.SeeNOPSI,491U.S.at368.Onlywherethoseprerequisites

are satisfied should federal courts use the Middlesex conditions to determine whether

abstentioniswarranted.SeeSprintComms.,571U.S.at78.

Defendants suggest that the exceptional circumstances permitting Younger

abstention exist here, and thus that the Court should proceed to consider whether the

Middlesex conditions require abstention. Specifically, Defendants argue that Younger

abstentionisproperbecausePlaintiffs’claims“implicatevariousstatejudicialordersand

mittimuses, impacting pending criminal pretrial matters, including detention and bond

orders,aswellas thestatemandamusactionbroughtby thesamecounsel.” (Defs.’Mem.

Supp.Mot.toDismissat1.)

PlaintiffsrespondthatYoungerabstention is“inapplicable”becausethiscase lacks

“the sine qua non of Younger abstention: a federal plaintiff seeking to enjoin a state


22

proceeding.” (Pls.’Opp. at20-21.)Plaintiffs argue thatbecause they “havenotasked this

Courttoenjoinanyongoingstateproceeding,”butrather“haveaskedonlythattheCourt

enjoincertainactsoftheDefendants,aswellastodeclarethatDefendants’actsviolatethe

Constitution,” Younger abstention is wholly inapplicable here, and the Court need not

considertheMiddlesexconditions.(Id.at21.)Plaintiffsacknowledgethat“[a]samatterof

practicality,aruling fromthisCourtmaypreemptapendingstatecourtactionbyhaving

preclusiveeffectuponit.” (Id.)Buttheyarguethatsuch interferencewithapendingstate

courtproceedingdoesnot triggerYoungeranalysiswherethereliefrequestedwouldnot

enjoinastateproceeding.(Seeid.)

“Youngerabstention requires that . . . a federal courtmustabstain from enjoining

[certain]ongoingstate . . .proceedings.”Williamsv.Lambert,46F.3d1275,1282(2dCir.

1995)(emphasisadded);seealsoNOPSI,491U.S.at364(describingholdinginYoungeras

“that absent extraordinary circumstances federal courts should not enjoin pending state”

proceeding (emphasis added)); Sprint Comms., 571U.S. at 72 (“When there is a parallel,

pending state criminal proceeding, federal courts must refrain from enjoining the state

prosecution.” (emphasis added)); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 601 (1975)

(describingholdinginYoungeras“thatfederalinjunctionsagainst”stateproceedings“could

beissuedonlyunderextraordinarycircumstances”(emphasisadded)).

“Abstentionisnotinordersimplybecauseapendingstate-courtproceedinginvolves

the same subjectmatter.” Sprint Comms., 571 U.S. at 72 (citingNOPSI, 491 U.S. at 373).

“Parallel state-court proceedings do not detract from” the federal courts’ “virtually

unflagging”“obligationtohearanddecideacase”overwhichithasjurisdiction.Id.at77.

WhereYoungerabstentionisnotrequired,“thegeneralrulegoverns:Thependencyofan

actioninastatecourtisnobartoproceedingsconcerningthesamematterintheFederal

courthavingjurisdiction.”Id.at73(internalquotationandalterationsomitted).


23

InSprintCommunications,Inc.v.Jacobs,theSupremeCourtconcludedthatYounger

abstentionwasnotwarrantedevenwheretherelevantstateandfederalproceedings“[e]ach

seek[]reviewof”anorderofthesamestateadministrativeboardand“each[action]presents

the” samequestion, 571U.S. at 72, because the case did not fallwithin any of the three

exceptionalcircumstancesoutlinedbyNOPSI,id.at80-82.Similarly,inWilliamsv.Lambert,

theSecondCircuitCourtofAppealsconcludedthatYoungerabstentionwasnotwarranted

becausetheplaintiff“hasnotaskedthatanystateproceedingbeenjoined.”46F.3dat1282.

Rather,ifgranted,theplaintiff’srequestedrelief“wouldhaveonlytheeffectofmootingher

counterclaim [in the stateproceeding] andof allowingher to initiate a separate case for

modificationof thesupportagreement.” Id.TheWilliamscourtconcludedthatsuchrelief

“doesnotpresenttheissuesofstateandfederalcomitywithwhichYoungerisconcerned.”

Id.

Plaintiffs here ask the Court to “grant the proposed Classes’ Petition for writs of

habeascorpusandgranttheproposedClasses’requestforaninjunctionagainstDefendants.”

(Pls.’ Mot. for TRO [Doc. # 15] at 39.) Specifically, Plaintiffs seek an order requiring

Defendantsto(1)identifyandreleaseallmembersofthemedicallyvulnerablesubclasses

“absent proof of judicially-recorded findings by clear and convincing evidence that the

individualposessuchaseriousriskofflightordangertoothersthatnootherconditionscan

mitigate”;(2)“providetheseindividualswitheducationalresourcesonCOVID-19,including

instructionsthattheyshouldself-isolate”;(3)submitaplantotheCourtoutliningcertain

further mitigation efforts and evaluations regarding class members remaining in DOC

custody;and(4)reportweeklyonthemedicallyvulnerablepopulationofpersonsinDOC

custody.(Id.at39-40.)

Nonetheless Defendants suggest that Younger should apply because the relief

Plaintiffs seekwould “implicate” stateordersor “impact[]” state criminalmatters. (Defs.’

Mem. Supp. Mot. to Dismiss at 1.) Similarly, during the May 4, 2020 oral argument on


24

Defendants’MotiontoDismiss,DefendantssuggestedthatYoungerabstentionwasproper

becauseif thisCourtweretoexercise jurisdictionoverPlaintiffs’claims, itwould“thwart

and interferewithongoingprosecutions” andwould “knockout of thepicture” the state

judicialprocessbywhichindividualclassmembersmightotherwiseseeksimilarrelief.9But

PlaintiffsdonotaskthisCourttoorderthestatecourtstoacttoeffectuatethereleaseofthe

medically vulnerable subclasses. Rather, Plaintiffs ask this Court directly to order

Defendants—theGovernorandtheCommissionerofthestateDepartmentofCorrection—to

releasemembersofthemedicallyvulnerablesubclasses,withoutimposinganyrequirement

uponthestatecourtstoactinanyparticularway.

Where,ashere,parallelstateproceedingsmightbe“thwart[ed]”or“knock[ed]out”

bythefederalreliefsoughtsimplybecauseitwouldeliminatetheneedtoseekthatsame

reliefthroughastateprocess,Youngerabstentionisnotwarranted.SeeSprintComms.,571

U.S. at 72 (“[F]ederal courts are obligated to decide cases within the scope of federal

jurisdiction. Abstention is not in order simply because a pending state-court proceeding

involvesthesamesubjectmatter.”).Intheabsenceofanysuggestionthatifitweretogrant

the relief Plaintiffs seek, this Courtwould issue an injunction against any state court or

9 At oral argument, Defendants also described the relief Plaintiffs seek as

“effectively...enjoin[ing]thestatecourtproactively”byimposinga“mandatoryinjunctiontoracetoreviewpresentenced individualsandtoact if theyhadn’t insuchaway.”Butareviewof Plaintiffs’Motion forTemporaryRestrainingOrder,which seeks relief directlyfromthisCourtwithoutanysuggestionofinvolvementfromthestatecourts,makesclearthatDefendantsmischaracterizethereliefPlaintiffsseek.


25

proceeding,10Youngerabstentionisinapplicable.11SeeHelmsRealtyCorpv.CityofNewYork,

320F.Supp.3d526,538(S.D.N.Y.2018)(“Themereexistenceofparallelandrelatedfederal

and state actions does not itself justify abstention. SincePlaintiff does not in the federal

actionseektoenjoinorotherwisesupervisethestatecourts,thelimitedYoungerabstention

isinapplicable.”).

10 Defendants’ position regarding precisely which state proceedings warrant

abstention lacks clarity. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss suggested that both the statemandamusaction,CCDLA,andindividualclassmembers’statecriminalproceedingsrequirethis Court to abstain under Younger. At oral argument, Defendants suggested that theirargument for abstention is “most clear” as to the state criminal proceedings of pre-adjudicationclassmembers,butarguedthatabstentionwasalsowarrantedastothestatecriminalproceedingsofpost-adjudicationclassmemberseventhough“thewatersarestillmurky” regarding whether all such proceedings remain “pending.” Because the CourtconcludesthatYoungerabstentionisnotapplicablehereinlightofthereliefPlaintiffsseek,itneednotdeterminewhetheranyofthoseproceedingsmightwarrantYoungerabstentionwerePlaintiffsseekingtoenjointhem.

11Defendants’argumentthatabstentionisrequiredunderO’Sheav.Littleton,414U.S.488 (1974), fails for similar reasons. Abstention is proper under O’Shea where federalplaintiffs“seekaninjunctionaimedatcontrollingorpreventingtheoccurrenceofspecificevents thatmight take place in the course of future state criminal trials,” producing “anongoingfederalauditofstatecriminalproceedingswhichwouldindirectlyaccomplishthekindofinterferencethatYoungerv.Harris...andrelatedcasessoughttoprevent.”414U.S.at500.DefendantsagainmischaracterizethereliefPlaintiffsseek,suggestingthatitwould“ambushscoresofstatejudgeswhoarestatutorilychargedwithreviewingindividualbaildecisions.” (Defs.’Mem.Supp.Mot. toDismissat20.)Butagain,Plaintiffsdonotask thisCourttoorderstatejudgestoactinanyparticularway,insteadseekingdirectrelieffromthisCourtagainstDefendants,whoarenotmembersof thestate judiciary.Because the reliefPlaintiffsseekwouldnotrequirethisCourttocontrol,prevent,orauditcurrentorfuturestatecourtproceedings,O’Sheaissimilarlyinapplicable.


26

III. Conclusion

Fortheforegoingreasons,Defendants’MotiontoDismiss[Doc.#26]isDENIED.The

Courtwill proceed to consider Plaintiffs’Motion for TemporaryRestrainingOrder, as to

whichaseparateschedulewillbeissued.

ITISSOORDERED. /s/ JanetBondArterton,U.S.D.J.

DatedatNewHaven,Connecticutthis6thdayofMay2020.


Documents

RULING DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS€¦ · 06-05-2020 · Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [Doc. # 26] is denied. I. Background A. COVID-19 Pandemic Because the existence