Russell Acquaintance

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    Russell B. -Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge byDescription- PAS Xew $eries. v. Xl l9{O-{{, pp {O8-{28Reprinted by Gourtesy of the Editor of the Aristotelian $ociety:19{(D.t9{ |www;aristotel iansociety.org. uk.

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    108

    \I.-KNOWLET)GE By ACQUAINTANCE AND KNOW._LEDGE BY DDSCRIPTION.

    3y Bnnruxn Russpr,r,.Tttu object of the following paper is to consicrerwhat it is thubwe lrnow in cases where we know plopositions aboul; ,, 1;heso-and-so without knowing who or .what the so_ancl_sos.I'or exarnple, knolv that the candidate who gets mosb voteswill be elected, though I do not l

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    110 BERTRANDNUSSELL.connection with self-consciousness, hich we must now br.ieflyconsider.

    In introspection, we seenr to be immediately arvare ofvarying cornplexes,consisting of objecbs n various cognibiveand conative relations to ourselyes. When f see the sun,it often happens that I am &ware of my seeing the sun, naddigion to being aware of the sun I and when I desire food, &often happens that I arn arvare of my desire for food. Bub itis hard to disoover any state of nrind in which f am aware ofmyself alone, as opposed to a complex of which I am aconstiluent. The question of the nature of self-consciousnessis too hrge, and too slightly connectedwith our subjecb, o beargucd at Iength here. It is, however, very diflicult to accountfor plain facts if we assurne ha0 we do not have accluaintancerviblr ourselves. It is plain that we are not only acAu,aintcdwith the complex " Self-acquainted-with-A," bub we also knowthe proposilion " I arn acquainted wibh A. " Now here thecomplex has been analysed, and if " I " does not stand forsomething which js a direct object of acquaintance, ve shallhavc to suppose that " I " is sornething l

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    Lt2 DARTBAND,RUSSELL.things,but ', anyChing." It is hard to seo how we could.knowsuch a fact about " before unlesswe were acquaintedwith" before," nd nob merelywith actual particular casee f onegiven.object being beforeauother given object. And moredirectly: A judgmentsuchas ., this is before hat,,'whero hisjudgment is derived from awareness f a complex, oustitutean analysis,and we should no0understand the analysis f wewere ot acquaintedwith the meaningof the terrnsemployed.Thus we musb upposehat we &reacquaiutedwith the -u"oiogf " before,"aud nobmeroly with inetances f it.Thereare thus two sortsof objectsof which we &re &ware,namely, particulare and uuiversals. Among particulars Iinclude all existents, nd all complexes f which one or moreconstit.e'ts are existents, uchas this-before-that,his-above-that, the-yellowness-of-thie.Among universals include allobjects of which no^particular is a constituent. Thus the

    hardly be calledpercepts. (On the other hanrJ, niversalswibhs'hich we are acquainfedmay be dentified with concepts.)It will be seen ha0arnong he objectswith which we aroacquaintedar.enot included physical objects (as opposedosense-data),or otherpeople'sninds. Thesehing. ur" krroronto us by what I call ,, kuowledgeby description,',which wemust now consider.By a " description I me&u any phrase of the form ,,aso-and-so or ,, the so-and-so.,' A phrtse of the form

    descrip[ion. There aro va'ious problems connectodwithambiguousdescriptions,ut f pass hem by, since hey clonot

    KNOWLEDGE DY AOQUAINTANCE A'NDBY DESCRIPTION. 113

    directly concern he natter I wish to discuss. What I wish todiscusss the nature of our knowledge concerning objects incaseswhere rve know that there is an objeci answering toa definite description, hough we are not actluaitt'tetlwilh anysuch bjecb. This is a matter which is concerned xclusivelywith d.efinitedescriptions. I shall, therefore, in the sequel,speak imply of " descriptions when I mean definitedescrip-tious." Thus a descriptionrvill mean any;phrase of tho form"the so-and-Boin the singular.I shall say that an object s " known by clescriptisn whenwe know that it is " the so-and-so,".e-when rve know that thereis oneobject,and no more,having a certain property; and itwill generallybe implietl that we do not have knowledgoof thosame bjectby acquaintauce. 'We know that the man with theironmaskexisted, nd manypropositions re knownabouthim;but we do not know who he was. We know t'hat bhe candi-datewho gets most votes will be elected,and' n this casewearevery likely alsoacquainted (in the only sensen which onecanbe acquaintedwith someone else)with the rnanwho is, nfact, the candidate who will get most votes, but we do notknow which of tho canclidateshe is, i.e.we do not know anypropositionof the form " A is the candidatewho will get mostvotes whero A is one of the candidatesby name. W'e shallsay that we h&r'e " mnrely descriptive knowledge of theso-aud-so hen,although we know tha[ the so-and-so xists,and although we may possiblybe acquainted with the objectwhich is, in fact, the so-aud-so, ret we do not know any pro-position a is the so-&nd-so," here a is somethingwibh whichwoare acquainted.'Whenwo say " tho so'and-soexiste,"we meanthat there isjust oneobjectwhich is tho so-and-so. Tho proposition " a isthe so-and-so me&ns that a has the property so-and-so, ndnothing else has. " Sir JosephLarmor is the Unionist candi-doto means Sir JosephLarmor is a Unioniet candidato, udtto oneolge g." " Tho Unionisbcandidate xiatg me&ns someH

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    L14 BERTRANDRUsSELL.one s a Unionist candidate, nd no one else s." Thus,whenwo are acquaintedwith an objectwhich is the so-and-so, eknow that the so-and-so xists,but we may know that thoso-and-soexists when we are not acquaintedwith any objectwhich we know to be the Bo-and-so,nd evenwhen we are notacquaintedwith any objectwhich, n fact, s the so-and-so.

    Common words, even proper n&mes,are usually reallydescriirtions. That is to say, the thought in the mind of aperson using a proper name correctly can generally only beexpressedexplicitly if we replace the proper name by adescription. Moreover,he description equired o expresshethought will vary for different people,or for the same personat different times. The only thing constant (so long as thename s rightly used)o the object o which the name applies.But so ong as his remainsconstant,he particulardescripbioninvolved usually makes no dif ference o the truth or falsehoodof the proposition n which the name appears.Let us take some illustrations. Supposesome statementmadeabout Bismarck. Assuming hat there is such a thingas direct acquaintancewith oneself,Bismarck himself urighthave used his namedirectly to designate he particula,r personwith whom he was acquainted. In this cese, f he made ajudgmentabouthimself,he himself might be a consbituent fthe udgment. Here the propornamehas be direct usewhichit always wishes o have, as simply standing for a certainobject,and not for a description f the object. But if a personwho knew Bismarckmade a judgment about him, the case sdifferent. What this personwas acquaintetlwith were certainsense-data hich he connected rightly, we will suppose) ithBismarck's body. His body as a physical object, and stillmore his mind,were only known as tho body and the mindconnected ith these sense-data. That is, they were knownby deecription. ft is, of course, ery much a matter of chancewhich characteristics f a man'sappearance ill come nto afriend's mind when he thinks of him; thus tho descriptiou

    KNOWLEDGEBY ACQUAINTANCEAND BY DESCRIPTION. 115actually n the friend.'smind is accidental. The essentialpoiatis that he knows that tho various descriptions all apply to thosameentity, in epite of not being acquaintedwith the entibyin question.

    When we,who did not know Bismarck,make a judgmentabouthim, the description n our minds will probably be soruenore or less vaguomass of historical knowledgo-far rnore,in most cases,han is required to identify him. But, for thesake of illustration, Iet us assume hat we think of him as" the first Chancellorof the German Empire." Ifero aII thewords are abstract except " Germ&n," Tbe word " Germanwill again have different meanings for different peopie. Tosome i will recall travels in Germany, o sorne he look ofGermanyon the map, and so ou. But if we are to obtain adescriptionwhich we know to be applicable,we shall becompelled, ,tsomepoint, to bring in a reference o a particularwith which we aro acquainted. Such reference s involved inany mentionof past,presenb, nd future (as opposedo definitedates), r of here and there, or of what others have tolcl us.Thus t would seem hat, in somew&y or other, a descriptionknown to be applicable o a particular must involve somoreferenco o a particular with which we are acquainted, f ourknowledge bout he thing describecls not to be merelywhatfollows logically from the description. For example, " thomost long-liveclof men" is a descriptionwhich must applyto some man, but we can make no judgments concerningthis man which involve knowledgeabout him beyondwhatthe description ives. ff, however, e soy, the firstChancellorof the German Empire lilas an astute diplomatist," we c&nonly be assured of the truth of our judgment in virtueof somebhingwith which we are acquainted usually atestimonyheard or read. Consideredpsychologically, partfrom the iuformationwe convey o others,apart from the lbctabout the actual Bismarck, which gives impoltance to ourjudgurent,he thought we really haveconboinshe one or nlorol2

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    116 BERTRANDRUSSELL.parbiculersnvolved,and. therwiseconsistsvholly of concepts.Al l namesof places-London,England,Europe, he earth, heSolarSystem-similarly involve,whenused,descriptions hichstart from sorDeone or more particulars rvith which we areacquainted. f suspect hat even the Universe, s consideredby metaphysics,nvorvessucrra connectionwith particulars.rn logic,on the contrary,wherewe are concerned ot merervwith what doesexist,but with whate'er mighbor could existor be,no referenceo actualparticulars s involved.rt rvould seem that, wheu we make a statement aboutsomethingonly known by description,we of.benntottd,o malreour statement, oC n the form irrvolving the description, utabout he actual thing described. That is to say,whenwe sayanything about Bismarck, wo should like, if we could, tomake the judgment which Bismarckalonecan make,namely,the judgment of which he himself s a constituent. In tbiswe &re necessarilydefeated,since the actual Bisrnarck isunknown o us. But we hnow that there s an objectB calledBismarck,and that B was an astutediplomatist. We can husd,c,sct'tbehe propositionwe should like to affirm,namely, ,8w&s &n astute diplomatist,,,where B is the objectwhich wasBismarck. Wrat enablesus to communicaten spite of thevar;'ing descriptionswe employ is that we know there is atrue proposition concerning the actual Bismarck,and that

    howeverwe may vary the description so long u,s he descrip_tion is correct), the proposition described s sbill the sam-e.This proposition,which s desclibedand is kuown to be true,is what interestsus; but we are not acquainted.with theproposition tself, and d.o not know il , though we know itis true.It will be seen that there are various stages n thoremoval rom acquaintanco ith particurars Lrroros IJisrn*rckto peoplowhokrrow im, Ilisurnrck o tlr.n, who r.rrrlyrr.u,ofhir. throughhistory, ho uronwith trro r.orr ruolr,1ru .rrrgos!-livcd of men. 'rheee ro progrcssivoryurr,bor ornov.tl r,rrr

    KNOWLEDGEY AOQLTAINTTINCEND IJY DESCRIPTIONll7acquaintance with particulars, and there is a similar hierarchyin the region of universals. Many universa"ls,ike many per-ticulars, are only known to us by description. But here,as inthe case of part iculars, knowledge concerning what is hnownby description is ultimately reducible to knowledge concerningwhat is knorvn by acquaintance.

    The fundamental epistemological principle in the analysis ofpropositions containing descripbions s thisl. Euery propositionwltich we can tr,ndersta'ndmust be composed' holly of constituen'tswith, which, we d'I'e actluainted. From what has been saiclalready, t will be plain why I advocate this principle, and howI propose o meet the case of propositions which at first sightcontravene it. Let us begin with the reasons for supposingthe principle true:

    The chief reason for supposing the principle true is thab ibseemsscarcely possible to believe that we can make a udgmenbor entercain a supposition without knowing what it is that weare udging or supposing about. If we make a judgment about(say) Julius Casar, it is plain that the acbualpelson who wasJulius Casar is nob a constituent of the juclnment. But beforcgoing further, it may be well to explain whac I mean rvhen Isay thot this or that is a constituent of a judgment, ol ofa proposition rvhich we understand' To begin with jud$ments :a judgment, &s an occurrence, take to be a relation of a mindto sevelal entities, namely, the entities which compose rvhat isjurlgecl. If , e.g., judge thab A love's B, the judgnrent as anevent consists in the existence, at a certain moment, of aspecific our-berm relation, called' udging, between me and Aancl ove arrd B. Thar is to say, at the time when I judge, thereis a cerlairr complex whose telms are nryself and A and lovoaud R, and rvhose relating relation is iutlging. (The relatiou/oooontors 03 ouc o1' he tcrms of the relation, not us rr rela,tingrolu, l ion.) My rorlsons or this viow l tavo been sc t for ih olsc-wlrrrrrr,. [rrrl I slrtl l rr0t rr: lont t l rorn herr: . Assrttnirrg tlris-

    + l'hikgophicul Eu,t't1tr "' l ' lto Nrlturo of ' l 'r ' trth."

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    118 I]ENTRANDRUSSELL.view of judgment, ho conetituents f tlre judgmentarc simplythe co'stituentsof the cornplexwhich is the udgment. Th;;,in the above ase,he consti0uents re myself and A and ovoand B and judging. But myselfand udging areconstituentsshared by all ruy judgments; thrrs the distinctiae onetituentsof the particular udgment n questionare A and love and B.Comingnow to what is meant by ,.understanding proposi-tion," f should say that there is auother relation po.uibl,between me and A aud love and B, rvhich is calieclmyxuptposinghat A loves B.* When we can suIry)osehat AlovesB, we .,understand he proposition, A loaes . Thuswe oftenunderstand proposition n casesilherewe have notenough knowledge to make a judgment. Supposing, ikejudging, is a many-term relation, of which a mind l, ouuterm. The other terms of the relation are called the con-

    stituents of the proposition supposed. Thus the principlewhich I enunciated may be restated as follows: ILlur,i era relatio*,of suTtposittgr udging occ.u,rs,lw terms to ntlti,ch,hesupptosittgr tdging mind, s c.elated,y the retatiott,of su,yltosingor judging nrust be term,swith, which, the mind, ,in guril;,on i,acquainted.This is merely to say that we cannot ruake ajudgmentor a suppositionwithout knowingwhat it is that weare making our judgment or suppositionabout. It seems ome thar the truth of this principre s evident as soonas heprinciple is understood; shall, therefore, n what follows,&ssurnehe principle, and use iu as a guide in analysingjudgments hat containdescriptions.Returning now to Julius C.rsar, assumo hat it will be+ Qf, Meinong, Ueber Arutahmen, possim,. I formerly supl_rosed,conbrary-to Mei'ong,s viow, that the relationslrip of supposing_ijfri U.mere]1 that of presentation. In tbie view r now thinki *"r"-rrlt *a,od Meinong is riglrt. BuJ ny present view depontls upou tr,u--ir,.o.,that both in judgment and i' assumptio. therc is no .i'glu ,)r:""iJJ,but the govo.al onsbituonts f thc judg*out or assumptio' a"r.en u ,uo.ry]term relotion to the mind.

    KNOWLEDGE Y ACQUAINTANCE ND BY DESCIIIPI ' ION.1I 9admitted that he himself is not a constituent of any judgnrentwhich I can make. But at this point it is necessary toexamine he view that judgments are composed of somethingcalled" ideas," and that ib is the " idea " of Julius Cesar thatis a constituenbof my judgment. I believe the plausibility of

    $is view rests upon a failure to form a right theory of descrip-tions. We may mean by my " idea " of Julius Casar thethings that I know about him, e.g., that he conquered Gaul,was assassinatedon the Ides of March, and is a plague toschoolboys. Now I am admittinS, and indeed contending, thatin order to discover what is actually in my miud.when I judgeabout Julius Cresar,we must subsbitute for the proper name atlescription made up of sorne of the things I know about him.(A description which will often serve to express my thoughtis " the man whose name was Julius C@sar." For whateverelse I ma.y have forgotten about him, it is plain that whenI mention hirn I have not forgotten that that was his name.)But although I think the theory that judgments consist ofideasmay have been suggested in some such way, yet I thinkthe theory itself is fundamentally mistaken. The view seemsto be that there is somo mental existent which may be calledthe " idea" of sornething outsido the mind of the person whohas the idea, and that, since judgment is a mental event,its constituents rnust be constibuentsof the mind of the personjudging. But in this view ideas become a veil between us andoutside things-we never really, in knowledge, attain to thethings we are supposed to be l

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    720 BEnTRANDRUsSELL.endlessegress, ince ho relationof idea to objectwill have obe explainedby supposinghat the iclea tself has an ideaof the object, and so on atl infinitum. f therefore see noreasono believe hat, when we are acquainted ith an object,there s in us somethingwhich canbe cailed he ,.idea,, of theobject. On the contrary, I hold that acquaintance s wholly arelation,not demanding ny suchconsbicuent f the mind as ssupposed y advocates f ,. id.eas.,,This is, of coursea largequestion, nd one which wourd ake us far rrom our subject-ifit wereadequately iscussed.r thereforecontentmyselfwiththo abovs ndications, nd with the corollary that, iu judging,the actual objectsconcerningwhich we judge, rather tirun ,olysupposedurely menbal ntities,are constituents f the complexwhich is the udgment.when, therefore, say hat we must substitute or ,,JuliusCesar somodesctiptionof Julius Casar, n order o discoverthe meaningof a judgment nominally aboubhim, f am notsaying that we must substi[ute an idea. Suppose ur descrip-tion is " the man whosename was Jutiw Cwsar.,,'Let ourjudgment be " Julius Cesar was agsassinated.,,Then iibecornes " the man whose name was Jurius cusar w&sassassinated." Ilere Jwlius Cusc,(,rs a noise or shape withwhich rve are acquainted, nd all the other consbituentsf thejudgment (neglecting the tenee in ,,was ') are conceltts ithwhich we are acquainted. Thus our judgment is whollyreduced b constituentswith which we al.e acquainted, ubJulius cesar hirnserf has ceased o be a constituent of ourjudgment. This, however, equires a proviso, o be furihsrexplained shortly, namely, hat ,,the man whosename wagJulius Cusar muot not, as a whole,be a cons'ituentof ourjudgment, thab is to say, this phrasemust uot, as a whole"have a rneaningwhich entere nto the judgrnent. Any righianalysis f tho udgment, herefore,must break up this phrJse,and not treat it as a subordinate omplexwhich s pariof thejudgment. The judgment " the man whosename was Jutius

    KNOWLEDGDYAoQUAINTANOE'tND Y Irlottoltll'Tl(lN.2lCcesac'wagssaseinabednray be int,erpreledae moatting Onoand only one man was called Julius Casar,and thnt onewasassassinated." lete it is plain that there is no conetibuentcorrespondingo the phrase the man whosenamew&8Ju'liusCwsat'." Thus there ie no reason to regard this phrase asexpressing constituent of the judgruent, and we have seenthat this phrasemust be brokenup if we are to be acquaintedwiih all tho constituentsof the judgment. This conclusion,whichwe have eachettrom considerationsoncerned ith thetheoryof knowledge,s also orceduponus by logicalconsidera-tions,whichmust now be briefly reviewed.It is common to distiuguish two aspects,nt'eaning and'd,enotation,n such phrasesas " the author of Waverley"' Themeaning will be a certain complex, consisbing at least) ofauthorship and Waverley with some relation; the denotatiouwill be Scott. Similarly " featherlessbipeds will have acomplexmeaning,containingas constituents he presence ftwo feet and the absence f feathers, vhile its denotation wiIIbe the olassof men. Thus when we say" Scott s the authorof Waverley or " men are the samoag eatherlessipeds,"weare assertingan identity of denotation, nd this assertion swortbmakingbecause f the diversity of meaniug.* I believethat the duality of meaningand denotation,houghcapable f atrue interpretation, s misleading if taken as fundamental.The denotation, believe,s not a constituentof the proposi-tion, except n the caseof propernames,'e' of wordswhich donot assign property o an object,but merelyand solelynameit. AntI I should hold further t'hat, in this sense, here areonly two words which are strictly proper name8of particulars,namely, I" and " this."One reason or not believing the denotation o be a cou-siituentof the propositions that we may know the proposition

    +ThisviewhasbeenrecentlyadvocatedbyMissE.E'C.Jonea,..ANew Law of Thought and it s Implications," trIind, Januaryt l0ll'

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    L22 BERTRANDUssELL.'oven when we are not acquaintedwith the denotation. Theproposition " the aubhor of lVaverley is a novelist,' wasknown to people who did not know that ,, the author of'W'averley" denoted Scott. This reason has been already,sufficiently mphasised.A second eason s that propositions oncerning,the so-,and-so arepossible venwhen . the so-a'd-so', asno denota-tion. Take, .g.,,,the oldenmountaind.oesot exist,,or ,,theround square s self-conbradictory.', f we are to preservethe duality of meaning and denotation,we have to say, withMeinong, hat there are such objectsas the goldenmountain;and he roundsquare, lthough heseobiectsdo nobhavebeing.w'e even have to admit thab the existent round square sexistent,but does not exist.* Meinong doesnot regard thisas a contradiction, ut I fail to see hat it is not one. fndeed,

    it seems o me evident that the judgment ,there is no suchobject as the round squa,re', oes nob presupposehat thereis suchan object. If this'is admitted,however,we are Ed othe oonclueionhat, by parity of form, no judgmentconcerning" the so-and-so actually involves the so-and._sos a con-stituent.MissJonest ontendshat there s rrodifficulty n admittingcohtradictorypredicatesconcerningsuch an object as ,,the

    traditional form " A is not both B andnot B,,,but in the form" no proposition s both true and false." The traditionar orruonly applies to certain propositions, amely, to those which

    * Meinong, aeberAnnahmenr2nd,d. ,Leipzig, gl0, p. l4 l.t Mind,,July, lgl0, p. 38t).

    KNOWLEDGE BY ACQUAINTANCEAa\D BY DESCRIPTION. 123attribute a predicate to a subject. 'When the law is statedofpropositions, nstead of being sbatedconcerning subjects andpredicates, t is at once evident that propositionsabout thepresent King of France or the round square can form noexception, ui are jusb as incapableof being both true andfalse as other propositions.

    Miss Jones*a,rgueshat " Scott s the author of Waverleyasserts dentity of d.enotationbetween Scottand.'thnauthar ofWaaarley. But there is some difficulty in choosing &mongalternativemeaningsof this contention. In the first place, tshould be observed that th'e att'tltm of Waaerley s not a merename, Iiko ,Scolf. Scott is merely a noise or shapo con-ventionallyused to desigaate certain person; t givesus noinformationabout that person, nd has nothing that can becalledmeaningas opposed o denotation. (I neglect the fact,consideredbove,hat evenpropernames, Ba rule, r eally standfor descriptions.) But' tlw author of Wauerleys not merely con-ventionallya name or Scott the element' f mere conventionbeiongs ere to the separatewords, he and author and o/ andWaaerley. Given what these words stand f.or, he author ofWaaerleys no longerarbibrary. When it is said that Scott sthe authorof 'Waverley,we are no stating that thesoare twonames or one man, as we should be if we said " $cotb sSir Walter." A man'gname s what he is called,but howevdrmuch Scott had been called the author of 'W'averley,thatwouldnot havemade him be the author it rvasnecessaryorhirn actually to write 'W'averley,which was a fact havingnothing o do with D&mes.

    If, then,we are asserbingdentity of denotation,we mustnot mean by denotatioruhe mere relation of a name to thething naned. In facb,t would be nearer o the truth to saythat the nr,eattingf " Scobt is the denotatiott f " the author ofWoverley." Th erelationof " Scott to Scott s that " Scotb

    * Mind,July, 1010, ,3i0.

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    724 BERTRAND RUSSELL.Ineansscott, us t as th e relation of ,,author" to the conceobwhich s so ealled s that ,,author,'means hi s concept. Thusif we distinguishnteaningand denotatiou n ,,the authorof'Waverley,"we shall have o say that ,,Scott , hasmeaningbutno t denotation. Also when we say ,,Scott is the author of'Waverley,"the nteaningof ., the author of -Waverley,,isrelevant to our assertion. For if the clenotationalone wererelevant,any other phrasewith the samedenotationwouldgive the samepropositiou. Thus " scobt is the author.ofMarmion would be the same propositionas ,, Scott is theauthorof 'Waverley.', But this is plainly not the case, incefrom the first we learn that ScottwroteMarmionand from thesecondwe lear.n hat ho wrote'Waverley, ut the first tells usnothing aboub 'Waverley and the second nothing abourMarmion. Hence the meauingof ,,the authorof W-averley,,,as opposedo the denotation,s certainlyrelevant o ,,Scoti sthe authorof 'Waverley.,,'W'ehave hus agreedhat ,. the authorof Waverley,, s not&merename,and thab ts meauing s relevant n propositions.in which c occurs. Thus f we &re to Bay, sMiss Jonesdoes,that " scol,t s the authorof 'waverley" assertsan identity ofrlonototion,e musC egard the denotation f ,,theauthorofWoverley ag the denotation f whab s ,ncantby ,,the authorof Waverley." Let us call the meaning of ,, the author ofW-averley M. Thus M is wbat ,,the aubhorof .W.averley,,means. Thenwe are to supposeha t ,,Scottis the authorofWaverley" means ,Scottis the denotationof M.', But herewe are explaining our proposition by anotherof the sameform, and thus we have macleno progress owards a realexplanation. ,,The denotabionof M,,' liko ,, the author ofWaverley,"has bothmeaningand denotation, n the theoryweare examining. If we call its meaningM,, our proporibioobecomes Scott is the denotationof M,.,, But this leadsat

    once to an endless egress. Thus the attempt to regard ourpropositionas assertingdentity of denotation reaksdown,

    KNOWLEDGE Y ACQUAINTANCE ND I}Y I) INH(]II I I 'T I0N. ]JI- I

    and ib becomes mperative to fiud some other anolysis. whettbhisanalysis has been complel,ed,we shall be able to reinberpletthe phrase " iclentity of d'euotation,"which remains obscure soIong as ib is taken as fundamental.

    The first point to observe s that, in any proposition about" the author of 'Waverley," provided Scott is nob explicitlynentioned, the denotation ibself, .a. Scott, does nob occur, butonly ttre concept of denotation, which will be represenbedbya variable. Supposewe say " the author of W'averley was tlreauthor of Marmion," we are certainly not saying that bothwere Scott-we may ltave forgotten that there was sucha person as Scotb. 'W'eare saying that there is some rnan whowas the author of 'Waverley and the author of Marmion'That is to say, there is some one who rvrote 'Waverley andI\{armion, aud no one else wrote them. Thus the identity isthat of a variable, i.e', of an indefinite subject, " somo one'"This is why we can understand propositions about " the authorof Waverley," without knowing who he was' When rve say " theauthor of 'Waverley was a poet " we mean " one and only one manwrote 'Waverley, and he was a poet " ; when we say " theauthor of Waverley was Scott " we mean " one ond only onemau wrote Waverley, and he was Scobb." Ilere the identiby isbebweena variable, i.e. an indeterminate subject (" he "), andScott; " the author of Waverley " has been analysed

    away'and no longer appears as a consbituent of the proposition'a

    The reasonwhy it is imperative to analyse away the phraso" the author of Waverley " -ay be stated as follows' It iepiain that when we say ,,the author of waverley is the authorof Marmion," the is expresses dentity' We hovo soou alsothat the common tlenotatiott', amely Scot't, s not a constitrrctrtof this propositiou, while the nwanhtgs (i f any) of " bho tru[ltrtrof waverley " and (. the author of Msrlnion " ore not idollticol,

    + The beorywhich am advocatings eoborth fulty,wilh tho_ rgiol'grounclsn its favour, in I'rincipia ldathcmatha, ol' I, Irttroduction'bhap. II I also, ess ully, in ,l/rizd llctobor' 1005'

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    128 KN.\'LEDGD v AceuArNTANcEND By DEscRIprIoN.acquaintedwith tho object. Our knowledge of physicalobjectsaud of other mincls s only knowledgeby desJriition,the descriptionsnvolved being usuallysuch as involvo sense-data. All propositionontelligible to us,wherheror not theyprimarily concernhings only known to us by description, recomposed holly of constituentswith which we areacquainted,for a constituentwith which we arenot acquainteds unintelli-gibleto us. A judgment,we found, s not compoeedf mentalconstituontscalled .,ideas,,,but consistsof a complexwhoseconstituentsare a mind and certain objects,particularsoruniversals. (Ono at least must be a universal.) When ajudgment is rightly analysed.,he objects which are con-stituentsof it must al l be objemswith which the mind whichis a constituentof it is acquainted. This conclusionorcesusto analyse escripbivehrasesoccurring n propositions,nd.osay that the objectsdenotodby such phrasesare nob con_stituents of judgments in which such phrasesoccur (unlesstheseobjectsare explicitly rnentioned). This leadsus to theview (recommendedlso on puroly ogicalgrounde)hat whonwe say , the authorof lVlarmionwas tho authorof .W.averley,,,Scott himself is not a constituentof our judgment,and thatthe judgment cannobbe oxplainodby soying thab it affirnsidontity of denotationwich diveraity of connotation. It arso,

    plainly,doesnobassorbdentity of meaning. Such udgmonts,therefore, an only be analysedby broakingup the descriptivephrases, nbroducing a variable,and making propositionalfurrctiousthe ultimate eubjects, In fact, ,. the so-and_soseuch-and-such will mean that ,.o is so_&nd-sond nothingolse io, and a is euch-and-such is capableof truth. Th;oralysisof euch udgments uvolveemany freah problems, uttho discussionof these problems is not undertaken n theproeentpeper.

    r29a

    VI._THE THEORY OF PSYCHO.PHYSICAL PARAL-LELISM AS A WORKING HYPOTHESIS INPSYCHOLOGY.

    By H. Wrluox Cenn.Ir hasalways seemed o me sirange hat at the outsetof thestudyof psychology e shouldbe calledupon to decido on atheoryof the natureof the relation of mind and body. Ib isfully admitted indeed that psychology s not acbuall.y ort-cernedwith this relation, hat the whole cluestion s a mota-physical ne, hat psychology evercanand is nobcalled uponto solve t. Psychologymerely asks that we will occeJr!theoryof this relationwithout prejuclice, uroly us u workittghypothesis.No obher cioncorokes uchu rlotrtttrd.All thosubject ciences ray -ro oitl to Dssulneheir subjcct bhut s t