Russian Demographics Presentation 2012 - N. KOUPRIANOVAWEB

NINA KOUPRIANOVA | RUSSIA’S NATALISM | SUMMER SCHOOL (2012), EU DEMOGRAPHICS | U. OF A CORUÑA

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“One child is good, but two are better!” — reads the

caption on a Russian natalist poster. Yet the latter

is not from the recent government drive to boost

that country’s birth rates, but was published in

1968. Such natalist advertising has actually existed

for about a hundred years, and the recent Vladimir

Putin-initiated campaign continues the tradition of

state involvement in the matters of the family.

The question of plunging birth rates in Western

Europe is normally considered only within the

framework of the modern liberal-democratic

welfare state (rather than dealing with the survival

of a certain indigenous ethnic group or groups, per

se). That is to say, the welfare state’s primary goal is

to continue replenishing its existent population of

taxpaying citizens with the next generation thereof,

because their combined wealth allows the state to

maintain many social benefits, such as healthcare,

that it offers in exchange for significant taxation

levels. In this sense, who these citizens are matters

less than whether they are paying taxes.

In a number of ways, the contemporary natalist

policies instituted by the Russian government are

also rooted in similar concerns. In fact, the most

recent example thereof was the International

Monetary Fund’s (IMF) and the World Bank’s

recommendation that Russia raise its retirement

age to 63 — from 55 for women and 60 for men —

in order to tighten fiscal policy, in light of pessimistic

demographic predictions, and meet Western

FROM HEROIC MOTHERS TO MATERNAL CAPITAL: A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF RUSSIA’S NATALISM

European countries’ standards. Specifically,

poor demographic indicators for Russia have

included high abortion and divorce rates, lowered

life expectancy, and modest birth rates since the

late 1980s-early 1990s. That said, contemporary

Russian citizens enjoy fewer government-instituted

social benefits in contrast to the Soviet period, but

the taxation level is also relatively low — a flat rate

of 13% as of 2001. Only certain types of healthcare

are covered by the state budget, and government-

issued pensions are quite small, to name just a few.

In contrast, the USSR’s social programs comprised

numerous benefits, ranging from near-guaranteed

employment and pensions to free postsecondary

education and healthcare.

Yet there is another significant reason why Russia’s

demographics have been at the center stage since

the second (2004) Putin presidency. That reason

is the specifics of the country’s geography directly

linked to geopolitics. Russia is the largest country

in the world in terms of area, literally spanning

a mari usque ad mare, and in possession of vast

natural resources, such as oil, gas, and minerals. Its

population is unevenly distributed: unsurprisingly,

the highest concentration is found in cities in the

European part of the continent, with vast areas

to the east having a lower population density. In

light of these two factors, Russia’s resource-filled

lands have been subjected to persistent outside

threat. The “Heartland” theory (1904), postulated


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by English geographer Halford Mackinder, stated

that he who controls the so-called “Heartland” (an

area which corresponds to Russian-ruled Eurasia)

controls the world. Historically, from the 1918

Allied “intervention” ( Japan, China, U.S., Britain,

France, and Canada) against the Bolsheviks in

Siberia and the Nazis’ concept of Lebensraum to

the Cold War, certain principles of the “Heartland”

theory have been present in geopolitics for over a

century. Currently, for instance, despite the warm

Sino-Russian relations in BRICS (Brazil, Russia,

India, China, and South Africa) and beyond,

some Russian demographers and journalists alike

claim that China’s enormous population represents

another potential threat, particularly in the

borderland regions. Many illegal migrants already

live and work on Russian territories in Siberia

and the Far East — with estimates ranging from

hundreds of thousands to certain sensationalist

claims as high as several million.

Therefore, natural population growth, rather than

the kind induced through immigration, as well as

questions of population density and distribution

have been the subject of concern for the Russian

government in the last decade. The former resulted

in a variety of pro-natalist policies since 2006,

the best known one being maternal capital. The

government is also investigating ways in which

ethnic Russians, left behind in the former Soviet

republics or those living in the West and elsewhere,

can develop greater ties to their homeland,

including the possibility of repatriation. The issue

of making Russia east of the Urals more attractive

for settlement is being addressed through a number

of initiatives, such as infrastructural development for

the upcoming Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

(APEC) conference on Russkii island in the Far

East in September of 2012, recent visits to the Kuril

islands by the former president Dmitrii Medvedev,

security and trade integration through SCO

(Shanghai Cooperation Organization), and others.

The History of Russia’s Natalism

Prior to discussing contemporary demographic

solutions and their sustainability, let us have a

brief look at the history of Russia’s natalism. This

country, by definition, is a contiguous empire, the

construction of which had been quite unlike the

European colonial paradigm in the sense that the

Russian expansion since the 16th century had

generally been marked by flexible pragmatism

(rather than the massive “civilizing” initiatives of

Western Europeans). As a result, the Russian

Empire was a true Vielvolkerreich, a multinational

imperium, as historian Andreas Kappeler refers

to it, into which many different peoples had been

incorporated. This imperium encompassed dozens

of ethnicities; despite the common assumption,

57% of the population was actually non-Russian.

Generally speaking, these ethnic minorities stayed

in the areas of their geographic origin (in part,

facilitated by Russia’s sheer size), some exceptions

notwithstanding (urban centers and Stalin-era

resettlement, for instance).

In the 19th-century Russian Empire, large families

were desirable for two reasons. First, much like


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elsewhere, having several children ensured that

at least some of them survived into adulthood

at a time when many detrimental health-related

factors, such as epidemics, played a prominent

role. Second, for much of the Slavic population

(Russians, eastern Ukrainians, et al), procreation

occurred within the Orthodox Christian context,

in which large family size was also preferable.

For them, there was a certain sense of shared

responsibility to having children, which was not

one of the state, but one of faith.

In the first decade after the Bolshevik Revolution

(1917), the Soviet government maintained the

policy of official discrimination against the Russians

in order to combat the so-called “great Russian

chauvinism” (in Marxist ideology, nationalism

distracted the working class from its real struggle

against the bourgeoisie). Yet in the 1930s, the state

began promoting the culture of various nationalities

comprising the USSR, as they were called, Russians

among them, realizing the mobilizing potential of

ethnic and regional nationalism.

When it comes to the question of the family, the

Soviet government exhibited a great degree of

interest in natalism, although its specific treatment

changed. Much like the pro-natalist concerns in

the modern states of the West in the interwar

period, the USSR sought to manage its citizens

on an unprecedented level, ranging from setting an

adequate level of education, culture, and taste to

dictating attitudes toward their bodies, including

the questions of hygiene and reproduction.

In the 1920s, the Bolsheviks attempted to adhere

to classic Marxism, which, in the arena of familial

relations, meant getting rid of patriarchal gender roles,

legalizing abortion, and making divorce procedures

simpler, among others. Certain radical figures, such as

Aleksandra Kollontai, viewed the family institution

and traditional Christian morality itself as remnants

of the bourgeois past that had to be discarded, with

the worker-state gaining a prominent role in raising

children communally. The state did become more

involved, but in the 1930s, the egalitarian measures

from the previous decade were replaced by top-

down traditionalism, in which the state acted as

the civilizer, including the reintroduction of ethnic

heroes and Classics in arts and education, in light of

the dramatically increased literacy level; it also made

vast improvements in the area of hygiene, fighting

diseases, and infant mortality. For the family, this

meant a return to somewhat patriarchal family values

(but not in terms of pre-revolutionary property rights

of the patriarchs), sobriety, as well as pro-natalist

propaganda coupled with a ban on abortion, difficult-

to-obtain divorces, and mockery of irresponsible

husbands. This change was especially noticeable in

visual culture. Historian David Hoffmann describes

how the late 1920s-early 1930s imagery depicted

women in a rather gender-neutral manner. By contrast,

by the mid-to-late 1930s, the emphasis on femininity

re-entered social advertising. Interestingly, despite

the traditionalist direction of such propaganda, it

frequently depicted women as the center of the family,

while men were portrayed as irresponsible and prone

to mistreating wives and children.


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(1944), as well as two other lesser medals for

similar achievements, for those women with 10 or

more living children (naturally born or adopted);

the lowest award, the medal of motherhood,

commemorated those with five or more children.

Hail the heroic mother! 1944. Source: materinstvo.ru.

Let’s treat orphans with motherly care and love. 1947. Source: materinstvo.ru.

Nursery schools and postpartum care for the worker and the peasant. 1928. Source: materinstvo.ru.

In part, this state-instituted traditionalism

was a practical solution to the drop in fertility,

perpetuating a population crisis in the 1930s,

which greatly concerned Soviet demographers. The

crisis was caused by a number of factors, including

the 1932-33 famine and the elimination of female

unemployment, as a result of industrialization and

the collectivization drive in agriculture. With women

entering the workforce in such a radical manner in

a short time period, the government took over the

role of child care, starting as early as nursery schools

(pre-kindergarten) around the tender age of two.

The next decade saw the establishment of the

heroic-mother (literally, “mother-heroine”) medal


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This type of recognition symbolized one of the ways

in which the state chose to combat the massive loss

of life (24-26 million) during the course of WWII.

After the war, the ratio of men to women was

rather skewed, which caused additional problems.

At this time, pro-natalist propaganda intensified.

By the mid-1990s, 5.5 million women had been

awarded one of the three “motherhood” medals.

Nursery schools at collective farms take care of children, while their mothers work. 1955. Source: materinstvo.ru.

It is important to note that coercive methods

(such as collectivization of peasants in the

countryside) have certainly been used to meet

the USSR’s economic and social goals. In fact,

Western historians like the aforementioned

David Hoffmann call the 1930s ban on abortion

“an effort to enforce motherhood” and argue that

Stalinist propaganda reduced the view of women

to that of mothers. Yet, there was another aspect to

natalism in this period. Many people in the USSR

shared a particular mindset, a sense of unity that

was solidified during WWII, and truly believed in

the importance of collectively contributing to one’s

country, surpassing individual whim.

“I can’t believe I wanted an abortion.” 1961. Source: materinstvo.ru.

Pro-natalist social advertising continued

throughout the majority of the Soviet period.

Many examples targeted proper child care, in

which the government played an active role, while

the mother was at work, on the way to raising

the new generation of well educated, cultured,

responsible, and healthy Soviet citizens.

Abortion was legalized once again after Stalin’s

death (1953) as part of the general Khrushchev-

era liberalization. Lower birth rates in the 1970s

have, in part, been explained by the rise in the

standard of living. Another major demographic

drop occurred toward the end of the Soviet period

— around the time of perestroika, with deaths

exceeding births shortly after the collapse of the


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USSR. In the 1990s, in addition to such detrimental

factors as lowered life expectancy, abortion and

divorce rates had been described as the highest in the

world by the United Nations. Considering the sheer

turmoil of that period, ranging from questionable

privatization of public assets during the so-called

“shock therapy” years to hyperinflation, causing

the destruction of lifetime savings, the immediate

assumption on the part of the government has been

that the steady improvement of economic conditions

would create an increase in birth rates. In 2006, Putin

made Russian demographics one of the central issues

of his presidency during his address to the nation.

BirthsDeaths

2 800 000

2 600 000

2 400 000

2 200 000

2 000 000

1 800 000

1 600 000

1 400 000

1 200 000

1 000 000

800 000

196

0

1970

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

Russian demographics 1960-2010. Source: Sergei Gubanov, “Neoindustrial’nyi konsensus Rossii i ego sistemnye osnovy,”

Ekonomist #12 (2011).

Since then, the solutions to Russia’s dire population

predictions have primarily been of economic nature,

such as the maternal-capital program, which became

operational in 2007. The latter involves various types

of subsidies for women with more than one child,

naturally born or adopted. This government-aid

package can only be spent on the child’s education,

pension investment, or the improvement of one’s

living conditions. Residential real estate in the

largest cities in Russia (Moscow, St. Petersburg, et

al) remains near the top of the most-expensive list

in the world. This factor alone impedes some people

from having more than one or two children.

In addition to direct financial aid, other programs

included socio-cultural propaganda, ranging from

billboard advertising and holidays to television shows.

One of such initiatives is the All-Russian Day of

Family, Love, and Faithfulness celebrated on July

8. This is a typical example of a contemporary state

project — established in 2008 — but with roots going

back to traditional Russian culture, named after SS.

Peter and Fevronia, medieval patron saints of marriage

and love. And while the holiday was instituted by a

secular government, its very focus points to another

player in this matter, the Russian Orthodox Church.

A traditional pillar of society, the Orthodox Church

has experienced a true revival in the last 20 years, and

has also been active in the demographic initiative.

In addition to conventional measures such as the

construction of thousands of new places of worship,

the Church has also embraced the new media,

such as social networking, to spread its message of

traditionalism. This institution sees the Russian

population decline as part of the same trend affecting

Europe (i.e. other historically Christian nations,

regardless of denomination), naming the ideology of

materialist, individualist Liberalism as the culprit.

While traditional values and large families are

also important to Russia’s indigenous Muslim

communities, such as those in the Northern

Caucasus, these minorities have not been affected

by the birth-rate decline of the majority-Russian

population, since they share stricter patriarchal values

and, in certain cases, polygamous family structure.


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In terms of current demographics, Russians comprise

more than three quarters of the population, Tartars

– about 4%, with many other ethnicities, including

various North Caucasian representatives — each

at 1-2%. Thus, it becomes obvious that it is the

ethnic Russians that are the primary targets of the

government’s pro-natalist drive. After all, they are

the founding people of the multiethnic imperium

that is the contemporary Russian Federation.

The country needs your records. Every minute, there are 3 new people born in Russia. 2009. Source: taken by author.

Results

The latest data indicate that the years of Putin’s

leadership have had some successes. However, it is

difficult to attribute them directly to the government’s

natalist policies, as a cause-and-effect, rather than the

overall stability of the first decade of the 21st century

as compared to the 1990s under Yeltsin. According

to Russia’s statistical agency, Rosstat, abortion rates

dropped considerably: from 203 abortions for every

100 live births in 1995 to 74 per 100 in 2009; of

course, overall, the rate is still quite high.

Most recently, the period of June-December 2011

exhibited positive indicators, with 951,249 births

and 943,617 deaths (the difference of 7,632). In

the first four months of 2012, there were 592,220

births as compared to 557,926 for the same time

period in 2011 (this is an increase of 34,294).

Similarly, there were 640,673 deaths as compared

to 658,665 deaths in the first third of 2011 (this is a

decrease of 17,992). If the overall trend continues,

then the annual population decline for 2012 will

be half of that for 2011.

Long-Term Prognosis

Despite such positive news, the sustainability of

these policies remains to be seen. One of the most

significant roadblocks is the time when those born

in the late 1990s — the lowest point in the above

graph — reach childbearing age and start their

own families. It would be very difficult for them to

compensate for the population loss and to create

a positive demographic trend under current socio-

cultural conditions.

Indeed, the cultural approach to demographics

mentioned above, whether that of the secular

government or of religious institutions, underscores

the importance of changing the fundamental

mindset of the people, which no amount of money

can buy. After all, the Scandinavian welfare-state


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model is often described as an ideal in terms of

social benefits and a high standard of living, yet this

region has not been able to avoid the decline of its

indigenous population. It seems that this change can

only occur through a certain return to traditionalism.

For some, the framework of a religious institution

may have a positive effect. For others, it may be of

more secular nature — one that subordinates the

individual to the community — ones’ compatriots

— for the common good of the nation, as was the

case in postwar USSR.

But traditionalism in this context is often

misunderstood as a caricature of a nuclear family,

in which the woman is tied to the home with

no opportunities in the public sphere, while the

man is the sole breadwinner. Undoubtedly, this is

unattractive to many contemporary women, who

find fulfillment outside the home, including those

wanting to start a family of their own at the same

time. Also, beyond the question of choice, only some

can afford that lifestyle. More realistically, in the

world when two incomes are an economic necessity

for most, it is the extended family that gains

prominence. Apart from the state’s increased role in

child rearing in the last hundred years, historically

this has been the case in the USSR and now in

Russia. Due to the combination of factors — close

living quarters in the urban environment, somewhat

limited geographic mobility (i.e. many people stay

in the same place for generations), and relatively

early retirement age for women, extended family

members, particularly grandmothers, have been

able to be quite involved in their grandchildren’s

lives, as the mother had the opportunity to continue

working full-time and having more children. It is

this “clan”-like, close-knit familial structure in the

modern context that also promises to be beneficial

for an upward demographic turn.

In the grand scheme of Russian history, there have

been times when the country lost millions of people

in the course of war, but was able to recover. For a

variety of reasons, the communal survival instinct

kicked in. Whether the same occurs under current

conditions — only time will tell.

Selected Sources

History

Fitzpatrick, Sheila. Everyday Stalinism: Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times: Soviet Russia in the 1930s. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.

Hoffmann, David. Stalinist Values: The Cultural Norms of Soviet Modernity, 1917–1941. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003.

Kappeler, Andreas. The Russian Empire: A Multi-Ethnic History. Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2001.

Statistics

Russian Federal Migration Service (FMS), fms.gov.ru.

Russian Federal Statistical Service (Rosstat), gks.ru.

United Nations’ statistics, unstats.un.org.

Images

Snopkov, Aleksandr, Pavel Snopkov, and Aleksandr Shkliaruk. Materinstvo i detstvo v russkom plakate. Moscow: Kontakt-kul’tura, 2006.

Posters used here: materinstvo.ru/art/6214/.

Nina Kouprianova, PhD Candidate, U. of Toronto | @: [email protected].

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Russian Demographics Presentation 2012 - N. KOUPRIANOVAWEB