Russia‐NATO relations after the Kosovo crisis: Strategic implications

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Russia‐NATO relations afterthe Kosovo crisis: StrategicimplicationsVicktor Gobarev aa Historian in the Russian Federation's MilitaryHistory InstitutePublished online: 18 Dec 2007.

To cite this article: Vicktor Gobarev (1999) Russia‐NATO relations after theKosovo crisis: Strategic implications, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 12:3,1-17, DOI: 10.1080/13518049908430401

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KOSOVO AFTERMATH

Russia-NATO Relations after the KosovoCrisis: Strategic Implications

VICKTOR GOBAREV

In the wake of the Kosovo crisis, relations between Russia and NATO willnever be the same. Profound changes have occurred and will continue tooccur in that relationship, which are likely to have unforeseen consequencesfor both parties.

It is paradoxical indeed that, despite Russia's wholly negative attitudetoward NATO's war against Yugoslavia (that is how Russians term NATO'sKosovo intervention), the dramatic changes brought about by it have adouble-edged nature. While, on the one hand, they may still propel Russiaand NATO toward the brink of future confrontation, they could alsopromote cooperation of the sort never experienced before. The mostdramatic episode of the crisis, which began with Russian paratroopersseizing the Pristina airport and ended with hasty negotiation over Russianparticipation in the occupation of Kosovo (as if it was impossible for bothsides to settle the issue beforehand), vividly illustrates the paradox.

If, in fact, this is the case, and Russian-NATO relations are at acrossroads, it is imperative we understand where Russia and NATO nowstand in relation to one another, strategically and geo-politically. Specifically,what are their goals and intentions? Are they compatible? How do they planto achieve them? And what prospects do both parties face in the near anddistant future? In the current system of international relations andinternational security, the West seems more preoccupied with China and theMuslim world than with its relations with a politically and economicallyweakened Russia. Yet, this perception conflicts directly with severalundeniable realities. First, it is virtually impossible to found and guaranteeEuropean security without Russian participation if only because NATOborders Russia and not China. Second, NATO has expanded and will likelycontinue to expand to include former Soviet satellites and republics, but notChinese autonomous regions. Third, Russia remains the only country in theworld that can destroy the United States and any NATO country in a nuclear

The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol.12, No.3 (September 1999) pp.1-17PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

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2 THE JOURNAL OF SLAVIC MILITARY STUDIES

confrontation, however unlikely it may be. Given these realities, good sensealone argues that the governments (and even parliamentarians) in NATOcountries pay considerably more attention than they currently do to thedevelopment of sound working relationships with Russia.

Many conduits exist for the development of political relations betweenthe West and Russia besides those offered by NATO. These include theUnited Nations, the G-8 Forum, the European Union, and routine bilateralrelations. What is unique about Russian-NATO ties is the opportunity theyoffer for the fostering of both political-military and military relationsbetween the NATO and Russia. Even more important perhaps are theopportunities those ties provide for cooperation, wherever possible,between the military structures and armed forces of NATO nations on theone hand and the Russian military leadership and armed forces on the other.

This essay explores the strategic (geopolitical, geostrategic, political-military, military, international, theater security, and military-technical)aspects of Russian-NATO relations. Within this context, it focuses primarilyon the Russian perspective and policy on the matter and, where relevant,highlights the different views and attitudes toward NATO of the Russiangovernment, parliament (Duma), opposition political parties and forces, themilitary establishment, and the general public.

A wide range of basic issues collectively form the basis for howRussian-NATO relations are developing strategically. These include:• Russian national interests as perceived by the Russians themselves;• Russian policy toward political and military cooperation with NATO on

European and global security issues;• Russian military doctrine and strategic (military) thought;• Russian strategic planning (both nuclear and conventional) and how it is

reflected in Russian contingency planning, force deployment, andmilitary training; and

• Military-technical matters (the revolution in military affairs and newweapons technology, prospects for a renewed arms race between theNATO and Russia, and current and potential Russian reactions to NATOglobal dominance in high technology weapons as demonstrated duringthe NATO air campaign against Yugoslavia.

All require careful consideration as to how they bear on the overarchingissue.

Russian National Interests vis-a-vis NATO and Yugoslavia

While disagreeing on almost everything else, the Russian government,parliament, all major political parties, and the general public do agree on

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RUSSIAN-NATO RELATIONS AFTER KOSOVO 3

certain fundamental issues. Foremost among these is that Russia hasimportant, some say even vital, national interests in Yugoslavia and theBalkans as a whole. What are these interests? First, a Russian presence inthe Balkans, especially military, is a prerequisite if Russia is to remain agreat power, at least on a European scale. Second, a Russian presence in theBalkans is equivalent to Russia remaining in Europe. Geopolitically, manyamong the Russian elite and average citizenry perceive that they, theRussians, are being squeezed out of Europe. This means that Europeanintegration and Europe's relative economic prosperity (particularlycompared with economic collapse in Russia and all countries of the formerSoviet Union), and, even more important, European security systems are allbeing implemented without Russian participation.

Worse still from the Russian view, the European security system is beingdeveloped solely under the auspices of NATO. Thus, the Kosovo crisis (andBosnia for that matter, although to a lesser extent) provides Russia with anopportunity, possibly one of the last, to play a vital role in the fate of Europeand its emerging regional security system.

Third, Yugoslavia is the only remaining Russian ally in Europe, exceptperhaps Belarus. Russian-Yugoslav (Serb and Montenegrin) ties representan historic, 1,500 year-long alliance that began with the first joint militarycampaigns of the Eastern and Southern Slavs long before the year 1000. Thealliance endured the long 500 years when the Turks oppressed the Serbs andMontenegrins, a period when Russia represented the only hope of liberationfor their fellow Orthodox Slavic brothers. The Russians made crucialcontributions to the ultimate liberation of Serbia in the nineteenth centuryand entered World War I because the Austro-Hungarian Army invaded itsjunior partner, Serbia. During World War II, the Soviet Union continued thissupport in the form of military and political assistance to Tito's PartisanMovement.

Today, however, two traditional Russian national interests areconflicting. On the one hand, Russia perceives that she is obliged to defendher traditional, time-tested ally, Serbia. On the other hand, Russia wishes tobecome an integral part of what was previously termed Europeancivilization and what is now called the Euro-Atlantic community, whosemain political, security, and military pillar has been and remains NATO. Todate, the Russian government and its President, Boris Yeltsin personally,have favored the latter interest, so much so that few special Russian-Serbties now exist between the Russian political and business elite and theirSerbian counterparts.

The cold, hard reality is that the Russian government cannot be viewedas an ally of Yugoslavia. Prior to and during the NATO air campaign againstSerbia, Russia provided only humanitarian assistance to Yugoslavia and

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refused to provide military assistance. Indeed, the NATO command shouldappreciate the fact that the Russians did not deliver their S-300 air defensesystem to Yugoslavia, especially since it is widely considered to be superiorto the US Patriot system. For example, at the very beginning of the conflict,Russian President Yeltsin declared, 'Russia has unspecified extrememeasures at its disposal but will not use them.' Thereafter, both NATO andYugoslavia welcomed Russia as the chief and most strategically importantmediator of the conflict. Throughout these negotiations, ViktorChernomyrdin, President Yeltsin's envoy, in effect, sided with the NATOposition in the dispute.

The subsequent claims by NATO's military command that the aircampaign defeated Yugoslavia and its armed forces now seems erroneoussince, after signing an agreement with NATO, Yugoslavia withdrew itsbattered but almost intact forces and material from Kosovo. For example,the Russian General Staff now estimates that NATO killed slightly over 500Yugoslav troops and destroyed only 13 Yugoslav tanks during the conflictand not the 5,000-10,000 troops and 130 tanks claimed by NATOheadquarters.

Why then did Yugoslavia back down during the conflict? It did soprimarily because of Russia's position, or more precisely, because of theposition the Russian government adopted. While publicly castigating theNATO actions, acting on behalf of President Yeltsin, Chernomyrdin pushedthe Yugoslav President Milosevic into accepting NATO's demands, almostwithout amendment. For example, Yeltsin began his speech to the RussianFederal Assembly on the state of the country by sharply criticizing NATO.He then added, 'The tragic mistake of the American leadership should notresult in a prolonged crisis in the US-Russian partnership.' He also stressedthe fact that Russia would not allow itself to be drawn into the conflict.

Subsequently, Yugoslavia's feeling of being left with no allies took itstoll. For Yugoslavia, the most bitter reality was its realization that Russia,their only hope in the David and Goliath battle against the NATO,abandoned them and even joined NATO in its demand that Yugoslaviacapitulate. (In truth, even China failed to render any practical assistance toYugoslavia except to transfer intelligence data on NATO forces to theYugoslavs. Many Russian military experts are convinced this was the realreason why NATO bombed the Chinese Embassy, which was recognized asan intelligence gathering center).

However, the Russian government's denunciations of NATO actionsagainst Yugoslavia, including President Yeltsin's frequent blasts, were sosevere that many Westerners mistakenly perceived them as genuine. In turn,they blamed the Russians for supporting a 'bloody dictator' and at least notdelivering Milosevic into NATO hands.

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The truth, however, was quite the opposite. The Russian government didindeed deliver him or at least his policies. Had the Russian government ormilitary actually helped Yugoslavia, Milosovic would have never accededto NATO demands. Long after war's end, both NATO and the Serbs haveargued over whose propaganda campaign and psychological warfaremeasures were more effective. The answer is, 'Neither!' In the last resort, itwas the Russian government's propaganda campaign that 'beat them all'.President Yeltsin, envoy Chernomyrdin, and their close circle misled notonly both the Serbs and the West, but also the Russian population. And, inthis case, one should note that the parliament, virtually all Russian politicalparties, and the vast majority of average Russians strongly condemned theNATO air war against Yugoslavia.

Quite naturally then, two obvious questions arise. Simply stated, 'Whilehelping NATO to avoid a ground war, which most presume would not becasualty-free, did the Russian government act in accordance with Russia'sperceived national interests?' And, 'if not, what impelled Russia to violateits national interests?' It would be very easy but unconvincing to arguesimply that the Russian national interest of fostering close cooperation withNATO was the driving force behind the Russian government's sophisticatedmeasures designed to end the war on NATO terms. The real answer,however, is far more complex.

The real answer is that, during the Kosovo crisis, the interests of Yeltsinand his inner circle and NATO's strategic interests happened to accord withone another. It is important to realize that this may not be the case in a futurecrisis. Candidly stated, the personal interests of largely corrupt politicalleaders in contemporary Russia have very little to do with either realRussian national interests or Western strategic concerns, particularly wherethey concern broad and substantive joint cooperation with the West.

The next time such a crisis occurs heavily corrupted Russian leadersmay simply decide to whip up anti-Western hysteria in Russia for the sakeof their own personal popularity. The sad fact is that, even though the endhappened to accord with both Russian and NATO interests, the wrongpeople helped the West. The people were wrong because their policies andpersonal behavior have discredited and undermined the very idea of a free,market-oriented, and democratic society in Russia and instead have fosteredcreation of a Mafia-ridden, closed, undemocratic, and corrupt society.

Finally, personal as well as national interests shaped the Russianresponse to the NATO action against Yugoslavia. Taken as a whole, theRussian government decided that it was in Russia's national interest tocompel the Serbs to bow to the NATO demands but did so after considerableinternal struggle. It is abundantly clear that the majority of Russia'spopulation, not to mention the majority in the Duma and major opposition

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parties may not share the Russian government's understanding of Russiannational interests.

The Impact on Russian Policy Toward Political and MilitaryCooperation with NATO on European and Global Security Issues

After signing the May 1997 Russian-NATO Founding Act, two rathersuccessful years have ensued, particularly in terms of the near exemplarycooperation between NATO and Russian peacekeepers on the ground inBosnia. The Kosovo crisis, however, has now dealt a severe blow toRussian-NATO relations, and Russia has suspended cooperation at all levelsand in all realms except the Bosnia and Kosovo occupations. The recentHelsinki Agreement has permitted Russian and NATO representatives toresume their work in the Permanent Joint Council. However, Russianmilitary officials and their representatives who arrived at NATOheadquarters in Brussels immediately after reaching the agreement tookpains to stress that military cooperation extended only to the KFOR(Kosovo Force) mission. To this end, Russian generals and officers wouldwork only at the NATO military headquarters in Mons, Belgium.

This stance and, in particular, the surprise march by the Russianmechanized column to Pristina airport have underscored the disenchant-ment of the Russian military with what they perceive as NATOaggressiveness, offensiveness as opposed to defensiveness, outrightbullying, and arrogance toward Russia. Although largely symbolic innature, the bold military march to Pristina airport indicated that the Russianmilitary is still a force to be reckoned with. Although some NATOgovernments have formally expressed considerable displeasure and evenanger over the Russian gambit, in private, many NATO officers admit thatthey admired the way their Russian colleagues executed the dash to Pristina.

Much ink has been spent discussing whether or not Russian PresidentYeltsin was involved in the decision making concerning the seizure ofSlatina airport at Pristina, and, in broader and more alarming terms, whetherhe and the Russian government exercised requisite power over theseemingly uncontrolled or uncontrollable Russian military. What people donot understand, however, is that rather than being an intellectual, Yeltsin iscunning to the extreme. Once again, both Westerner and Russianunderestimated him. He was certainly informed about the plan, which wasclearly an initiative of the Russian high military command, he approved it,and then he stepped aside to wait and see whether it would succeed. Once itwas clear that the measure had succeeded, Yeltsin stepped forward amid theconfusion and claimed full responsibility for the decision. Thus, theprincipal confused person, Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov, was

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victimized in the confusion not by the Russian military, but instead byPresident Yeltsin himself.

Had the adventure failed, Yeltsin would have quickly identifiedscapegoats among the Russian military. Although Marshal Igor Sergeev,Russia's Minister of Defense, was also informed, the General Staff workedout the details of the operation. Despite rumored sharp contradictionsbetween Sergeev and General of the Army Anatolii Kvashnin, the Chief ofGeneral Staff (which did in fact exist), like its predecessor the Soviet Army,the Russian military lacks the Napoleonic tradition of non-subordination topolitical leadership and military seizures of power. The most charismaticRussian military leaders, such as Generals Lebed and Nikolayev, havealways been forced into early retirement. It remains to be seen, however,whether any of those retirees can re-emerge to be elected as President of theRussian Federation.

The mutual distrust characterizing current relations between NATO andthe Russian military can be dispelled only by honest cooperation betweenboth sides on the ground, such as in peacekeeping operations in Kosovo,and even then it will only gradually fade. Here the almost flawlesscooperation between the Russian brigade and NATO forces in Bosnia (thebrigade is subordinated to a US division) serves as a fine example. Virtuallyall US divisional and senior commanders who experienced operations inBosnia and collaborated with the Russian brigade highly valued theircooperative experiences and praised the performance of the Russian brigadeand its soldiers.

The Russian peacekeeping contingent in Kosovo, which is operatingwithin the four NATO sectors of responsibility, also represents a full-fledged brigade. This brigade is an airborne force that will ultimatelynumber around 3,600 paratroopers. About 600 of these Russian soldierscontrol the crucial KFOR airport at Pristina. Additionally, three Russianliaison officers are subordinated to NATO Allied Forces CommandSouthern Europe in Naples, and about a dozen Russian officers areoperating in the KFOR headquarters in Pristina. The NATO command issatisfied by the fact that Russia is not allowed to deploy its troops in aseparate sector. The main intent of the NATO military command is tosubordinate the Russian brigade to a single operational command system.

While single command exists on the ground in Kosovo, a parallelcommand conduit exists in that the Russian brigade is also commanded (foradministrative purposes) by the Russian military delegation near Mons,Belgium. Thus, in administrative terms, the brigade remains under Russianpolitical and military control, while NATO exercises operational controlover the brigade. The Russian federal budget for 1999 and 2000 is supposedto finance the Russian brigade's administration and operations, but this is

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going to be a difficult issue because of Russia's parlous economic situation.Although many criticized Russia for moving its 200 paratroopers from

positions in Bosnia without the consent of the NATO command, because ofthe on-the-job peacekeeping training and peacekeeping experience theyobtained in Bosnia, these troops are the soundest portion of the new Russiancontingent in Kosovo. The Russian Kosovo contingent also includes somesenior, mid-level, and junior officers and also some non-commissionedofficers and reservists who have had previous experience in peacekeepingor as United Nations observers. Therefore, the great majority of the RussianKFOR force lacks proper peacekeeping training and belongs to the regulararmy's combat force. This has prompted genuine concern about how thesetroops will behave in the complex peacekeeping environment of Kosovo,and how they will fulfill their peacekeeping functions while avoidingunrestricted military response in the event of hostile actions. If experiencein Bosnia is any guide, there should be considerable gradual on-the-jobtraining.

The fact that virtually all of the Russian KFOR's troops are from theelite airborne troops, which are far better disciplined and more efficient thanother segments of the Russian Armed Forces, should help the Russianpeacekeepers adapt rather quickly to the harsh and demanding conditions inKosovo. Organizationally, the Russian KFOR brigade consists of fiveairborne battalions. Four of these will deploy to the American, French, andGerman sectors, while the remaining one protects Slatina airport for use byall KFOR participants.

As far as Russian deployments are concerned, one battalion of theRussian KFOR Brigade is from the airborne division located in Tver inwestern Russia. Two other battalions have been formed from other airborneunits located in the Urals and Siberia Military Districts. The final two wereformed in Riazan' and Tula, cities near Moscow, where the most combat-ready airborne division has been stationed for decades. However, thatdivision formed only one rather than two battalions, because the second (thefifth in the brigade) was formed from military cadets of the elite Riazan'airborne military school. Approximately 30 per cent of the Russian KFORsoldiers are former paratroopers that have fresh experience serving in theairborne forces.

Serious problems are unlikely to occur in the relations between theRussian and NATO peacekeeping contingents in Kosovo once remainingdifferences are resolved in the NATO and Russian approaches to theproblem. Thus far, three issues have caused the greatest disagreementamong the occupying parties. These were the subordination of Russiantroops stationed in the NATO zone of responsibility; the role of the Russia-NATO Permanent Joint Council in resolving questions concerning the

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peacekeeping operation; and the Russian request for full representation innot only in the French, German and American sectors but also in the Britishsector.

Although these questions have been or are being resolved, other factorscould complicate Russia-NATO military copperation in the region. Theseinclude unprovoked attacks on the Russian contingent by KLA (KosovoLiberation Army) or Kosovar Albanians, including rogue units formed bymercenaries or volunteers from Muslim countries (especially Islamicradicals with combat experience in Afghanistan and Chechnia) and soldiersfrom Western countries who may consider the Russian soldiers to be theirsworn enemies.

Unprovoked attacks on the NATO and other KFOR units might be madeby rogue Kosovar Serb groups (there is no sign of any organized Serbresistance planned in Kosovo) and even individuals disenchanted byNATO's efforts. This could include either KLA members and Albaniansseeking revenge or attempting to reverse the tide and ethnically cleanseKosovo of Serbs by terror and intimidation.

Provocation could be launched by other underground groups seeking tosabotage relations between NATO and the Russian portion of KFOR, forexample, by Islamic radical terrorist groups who might attack the NATOsoldiers while disguised as Serbs and Russian soldiers while disguised asethnic Albanians; and occasional attacks on any part of the KFOR byvarious criminal bands, including organized crime and drug traffickers'syndicates, as well as criminal groups from Albania proper, who are nowfree to circulate in Kosovo.

Even considering all of these real or potential difficulties that KFORfaces, the end of the Yugoslavia war provides an unprecedented occasion forRussian-NATO cooperation. For the first time, Russia and NATO aresimultaneously conducting two major complex peacekeeping operations,and they are doing so together. If these large-scale cooperative efforts on theground in Bosnia and Kosovo are a success, there may be far-reachingstrategic consequences, not just for the restoration but also for thedeepening of overall Russia-NATO political and military cooperation on alllevels. If realized, this could make a very positive contribution to Europeanand global security.

NATO as Perceived by Russian Military Doctrine and StrategicThought

The first prerequisite in the formulation of any country's national securitydoctrine, military doctrine, and, by extension, military strategy is definingnational security to include military threats and real or potential enemies

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from which a threat can emanate. At the same time, this also involvesdetermining the enemy's strategic and military potential and identifyingprimary, less important, and secondary threats and enemies in order ofpriority. After satisfying these prerequisites, the country must determineappropriate directions and patterns for developing its resources in themilitary, economic, infrastructure, political, social, and other realms.Simultaneously, the country develops feasible and appropriate responses tonational security threats, determines suitable strategies to meet the threat,and works out other associated strategic issues.

In Russia, the end result of this formal process produces nationalsecurity and military doctrines. In terms of methodology and result, thisprocess accords roughly with the formulation of national security strategyand military strategy in the United States and the majority of other NATOcountries. As far as Russia is concerned, its national security strategy andmilitary strategy, as well as its national security and military policies, arerather flexible elements that are worked out in accordance with the moreformal national security and military doctrines.

During the first few years after the fall of the Soviet Union, in whatrepresented a dramatic reversal of the tense confrontations of the Cold War,the Russian government barely perceived NATO as a potential threat toRussia in the foreseeable future. The Russian government adopted the post-Cold War rendition of its military doctrine during the first half of the 1990s.Later still, it worked out its first formal national security doctrine, which dealtwith broader, and not just military, threats to Russia. In these documents, thepotential NATO threat occupied the fifth and final place on the priority list ofRussian national security concerns. The first two concerns featured ethnicconflicts in the territories of the former Soviet republics into which Russiaperceived it could be drawn and armed separatist movements on the territoryof the Russian Federation. The war in Chechnya, civil war in Tadjikistan, andarmed conflicts in the Transcaucasus region (Georgia, Abkhazia, and northernOssetia) all seemed to prove how correct were these initial theoreticalpostulates of Russia's national security and military doctrines.

However, the NATO expansion campaign begun and led by the Clintonadministration in the mid-1990s dramatically changed the geostrategicsituation. Nevertheless, President Yeltsin and his government resisteddomestic pressure and remained reluctant to make any changes in Russiandoctrines and governmental policy toward NATO. Hence, cooperationbetween Russia and NATO survived the first wave of the NATO expansion.Key to this survival was lukewarm Russian belief in the oft-proclaimeddefensive intentions of the Alliance.

The war in Yugoslavia, however, dealt a decisive blow against theRussian perceptions of NATO as the least likely adversary. At the very

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moment NATO bombs and cruise missiles rained down on Yugoslavia, theRussians altered their priority list of perceived threats to their nationalsecurity drastically and literally overnight. Since then, Russian hasprominently featured NATO as the primary and by far the most seriousthreat to not only Russian national interests but also to the very existence ofthe Russian Federation as an independent and sovereign state.

Although the formal process is not yet complete, the Russiangovernment and military are revising their national security doctrine andmilitary doctrines to identify NATO as Russia's main national securitythreat. Simultaneously, they are assessing new military and other responses,checks and balances that they hope will be adequate to meet this newperceived threat. These responses loom large when compared to the ratherlimited responses formulated to deal with various armed separatist activitiespreviously perceived as the principal threat to Russia. In late April 1999,Marshal Sergeev, the Russian Minister of Defense, declared that thedoctrinal revisions would require several months of work. However, giventhe notoriously slow work pace of the present Russian bureaucracy,including the military, the new national security and military doctrinesshould appear late in 1999.

The current Russian government has believed and apparently stillbelieves that Russia's national interests would be better protected throughcooperation rather than not confrontation with the NATO. However, evenPresident Yeltsin, the most pro-Western leader Russia has ever known,cannot help but be afraid of the clearly offensive character of NATO.Russians were already suspicious of NATO's newly adopted formal strategy(which Russians call a doctrine) and apparently believed that NATO testedthis strategy deliberately and successfully in Yugoslavia.

A fundamental tenet of every country's national security policy ormilitary doctrine is its right and obligation to protect its national interestsagainst any form of aggression. In the wake of the NATO bombing ofYugoslavia, for the first time since Hitler's devastating invasion in 1941, theRussians have perceived what they view as a direct threat to their nationalsovereignty and, hence, security. The fact that NATO did not formallydeclare war on the Yugoslav Federation makes the situation even moreanalogous to German arrogance in 1941, when Hitler attacked Yugoslaviaand Russia without bothering to declare war. Both the Russian elite andordinary people believe that NATO simply beat Serbia to humiliate Russiaand teach it a lesson.

Many Russians are also now convinced that the NATO Alliance is notgoing to cease flexing it muscles after defeating Yugoslavia. In the popularview, the most likely candidates for future NATO attacks are the formerSoviet republics where separatist movements are on the rise. Situations such

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as these always provide opportunities to justify intervention onhumanitarian grounds. Thereafter, many fear that NATO will unleashbombing on Russia itself to punish it for the efforts it has undertaken to endseparatist movements in such regions as the northern Caucasus (Chechnyaand Dagestan). They then ask themselves 'And what then?' Could nuclearnightmare follow involving the mutual destruction of Russia and the NATOcountries? The same situation would apply to Belarus if NATO bombs startto fall on it as the result of a NATO attempt to punish its President,Alexander Lukashenko. If this did occur, could even President Yeltsinhimself prevent the Russian military from retaliating in nuclear fashion?The clear answer is, 'Probably not.' Given Russia's conventional militaryweakness, any retaliation would undoubtedly have to be nuclear.

In fact, nuclear doctrine is the most vital element of the RussianFederation's national security doctrine and military doctrine. The more thatRussia's conventional forces deteriorate, the more importance emphasis thestate and military place on its nuclear forces. Justifying their decision byNATO's refusal to abandon its 'no first use of nuclear weapons' policy, theRussian have informally and quietly reached the same conclusion. Theyreason that they have to preserve their right to retaliate with nuclear strikesif Russia is attacked and they are unable to repulse the ensuing invasionwith conventional forces. The fact is that, in its economically debilitatedstate and near constant economic crisis, Russia cannot rely on itsconventional forces in the event of a major war. Therefore, we can expectthat, when published, the new edition of the Russian national securitydoctrine and military doctrine will no longer mention no first use of nuclearweapons.

The idea of nuclear deterrence as the primary guarantor of Russia'sindependence and even superpower status and nuclear forces as the core ofRussia's Armed Forces in garnering ever more support from the Russianpolitical and military establishment. No doubt, the concepts wereprominently featured during the 29 April 1999 meeting of the RussianFederation's Security Council, which was called to discuss matters relatingto Russia's nuclear weapons complex and its future improvement. Thesession adopted two presidential decrees and one new program whosecontents remain unknown.

There has also been considerable discussion in official circles aboutresurrecting tactical nuclear weapons that were put to rest in storagefacilities after the unilateral but reciprocal initiatives adopted by the SovietUnion and the US in 1991. President Yeltsin subsequently broadened thesedecisions in 1992. However, at the last G-8 Forum in Cologne, Russiaconfirmed that it would comply with all commitments regarding armscontrol, including both unilateral and legally binding obligations. Therefore,

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is highly unlikely that, at that Security Council meeting, Russia reached anydecision to 'unfreeze' some of its tactical nuclear weapons. Insteaddiscussions have focused on the use of strategic nuclear weapons foroperational and tactical purposes, for example, to destroy operational andtactical targets such as large mechanized columns, aircraft carriers, andairfields. It is also possible that the Security Council discussed the issue ofdeveloping a new generation of nuclear munitions, including their design,testing, and production. Should the Russians deploy these weapons, the newgeneration of nuclear warheads would be less expensive as compared tothose currently deployed.

No other war since World War II has so dramatically changed Russianmilitary thinking and strategic thought than the war in Yugoslavia. Therewere no more watchful students of the NATO air campaign againstYugoslavia than the Russian military. Russian military specialists carefullyscrutinized NATO strategy and tactics and the use of new technologicalweaponry such as precision guidance systems, soft bombs, laser guidedmissiles and bombs, stealth technology, and electronic intelligencegathering. They paid special attention to the ever-increasing role ofaerospace and satellites in contemporary and future warfare.

Given the bad and even catastrophic Russian economic situation and theclearly insurmountable problems Russia faces in financing its military-industrial complex, armed forces, and research and development projects, itwould not stand a chance in a new arms race with NATO should it occur asa sad consequence of the war in Yugoslavia. The only way that Russia cancatch up with the West in the revolution in military affairs is to work hardto introduce more economical technologies and perhaps resort toasymmetric weapons, while also striving to extend the service lives ofSoviet-era weapons. Russian strategists indicate that any attempt tointroduce asymmetric weapons will also require the integration ofasymmetric responses to possible NATO aggression into Russia's revisedmilitary doctrine.

The search for and cooperation with allies to defeat potential aggressionforms an integral part of Russia's national security and military doctrinesand associated military policy. In reality, the Russian Federation has onlyfive true military allies, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, andTajikistan, all of which are members of the military structure of theCommonwealth of Independent States (CIS). All are in relatively pooreconomic condition. Belarus is the only one of these states located inEurope. Thus, in a strategic sense, only Belarus can be considered a full-fledged and totally committed military ally of Russia.

However, the geopolitical map of the world has never been fixed, sincealliances come and go. Today, the Russian-Belarus Union exists in an

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embryonic state. Tomorrow, in October perhaps, after Leonid Kuchma, thehighly unpopular President of Ukraine, loses his presidential race, a newSlavic Union of Ukraine, Russia and Belarus may emerge. Alternatively, alarger Eurasian Union may take shape made up of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus,Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Armenia, and Tajikistan.

NATO may, in fact, play a greater role than it realizes in the fate of thisnew Slavic Union by driving other Slavic and non-Slavic states intoRussia's embrace. Worse still, NATO may unwittingly prompt Russia toseek allies outside of the former Soviet Union borders. Put bluntly, the moreRussia is pushed out of Europe and neglected by the Alliance, the moreRussia will tend to seek closer relations with the People's Republic ofChina. Ironically, in the meantime, the West has been treating China withmuch greater respect and attention than Russia. As far as most Russians areconcerned, there has never been much affection between them and theChinese. Many current Russian military leaders grew up as militaryprofessionals stationed in distant garrisons scattered along the long Sino-Soviet border during the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s, when anatmosphere of tense confrontation shrouded the border region. On thewhole, Russians have always longed to be an integral part of Europe as theyin fact were before the October 1917 revolution.

Nowadays, almost a decade has passed since the Soviet Union's demise,there are still many in NATO governments who look at Russia and see theSoviet Union. If this stereotype endures, Russia may have no choice but tojoin ranks with China. Although recent Western claims that Russia hasoffered a military pact to China are patently false, close military-technological cooperation has begun between the two countries. However,even during the height of the NATO air campaign against Yugoslavia and inthe aftermath of NATO's bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade,China and Russia undertook neither any joint action nor conducted anyserious discussions on creation a military alliance. Ultimately, the only forcethat might impel these two Eurasian giants to unite is fear that the UnitedStates and NATO are going to destroy them both. So far, while NATOcountries have done little to dispel the worse fears of non-CommunistRussia, they have actively sought engagement with, if not appeasement of,Communist China.

Russian Strategic Planning (Nuclear and Conventional) in the Wakeof the War in Yugoslavia

While changes in Russian national security doctrine and military doctrinebased on perceptions of the war in Yugoslavia are months away, Russianstrategic planning bodies, and first and foremost, the General Staff, have

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been quick to take into account NATO's new military policy and posture.The General Staff has done so in several ways.

First, Russian military authorities have sharply altered their contingencyplans applicable to a major war or local armed conflicts. Since the war inYugoslavia ended, Russian strategic contingency plans have almostexclusively focused on possible Russian military responses in the event ofa surprise 'disarming' NATO air attack by both conventional and nuclearmeans. This is a longstanding aim. The primary concern for both Soviet andRussian strategic planners has always been and remains neutralization ofany first nuclear strike by the United States and NATO.

Since the end of the Yugoslav War, Russian military planners are payingas much attention to countering a US or NATO first-strike withconventional weaponry as they used to pay to nuclear options. In fact, afterYugoslavia, they view the conventional attack as the more likely scenario.This was evidenced by the strategic military exercise conducted by Russiain June 1999, codenamed 'Zapad 99', which was the first such exerciseconducted in many years. It was not coincidental that the exercise's themewas the repelling of a massive space missile attack or powerful missile-and-bombing offensive by an armed coalition of Western countries againststrategically important military targets and economic regions in EuropeanRussia. During the exercise, special attention was paid to the ability toobtain timely warning of the missile launches and air raids.

Second, Russian military experts are developing and testing newstrategic planning concepts, the most important of which is the concept of'the regional group of forces'. The agreement to create the first such groupmade up of some Russian and virtually all Belarussian forces was reachedduring the visit of Marshal Sergeev to Minsk at the end of April 1999. Thisjoint regional group of forces is currently being formed, and itseffectiveness has recently been tested during Exercise 'Zapad 1999'. Thegroup's theater of operations centered on Russia's northwest, including theKaliningrad region and Belarus.

The exercise scenario assumed escalating tensions in and around theBaltic States and a regional war with the numerous NATO forces cutting offKaliningrad and invading Russia and Belarus. In response the Russian andBelarussian regional group of forces, whose headquarters was in Vitebsk,northern Belarus, counterattacked against 'the aggressor' and forced itsunits to withdraw from occupied areas of Belarus and Russia.

One of the principal tasks of the exercises was to test the ability of theRussian and Belarussian military to operate jointly in a coalition. Notably,the combined force demonstrated a remarkable degree of cohesion duringthe exercises. One of the primary reasons for this cohesion was the fact thatmost of the Belarussian officers had earlier served in the Soviet Army.

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Third, the Russian General Staff is reconfiguring its strategic militarystructure and force deployments in the aftermath of the war in Yugoslavia.Specifically, since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, General Staffplanners have been concerned about the possible vulnerability of theMoscow Military District, which is located adjacent to Russia's westernborder. After NATO began its strategic bombing campaign againstYugoslavia, a half-forgotten idea of establishing a new Smolensk MilitaryDistrict in order to create a buffer zone between the State border and theRussian capital once again resurfaced. A similar idea has surfaced for thesame reason; to form an Archangel'sk Military District by subdividing thevast Leningrad Military District into two smaller parts. The General Staff isalso considering the redeployment of some forces from the eastern to thewestern regions of the country. Finally, 5,000 paratroopers are being addedto increase the number of elite airborne forces, largely because 3,600airborne troopers were dispatched to Kosovo and because of pure necessity.

Fourth, Russian military planners are adjusting their nuclear planning tomeet post-Yugoslav War realities. The General Staff now envisions thatlimited nuclear strikes could be possible against the territory of neighboringcountries as a retaliatory measure if that country plays host to aggressortroops preparing to invade Russia. This scenario was played out on mapsduring strategic exercise 'Zapad 99', which was conducted from 21-26 June1999. During the same exercise, strategic bombers carrying nuclearweapons conducted 15-hour flights with air refueling and flew into thenorthern Polar region. Once there, they fired cruise missiles that strucktargets somewhere in southern Russia. The exercise tested the capability ofRussia's strategic nuclear forces to deliver nuclear strikes in response to anall-out attack against Russia.

Fifth, Russian military authorities are adjusting troop combat training ina direct response to the NATO bombing campaign in Yugoslavia and lessonslearned from that war. For example, special attention is now being paid toimproving the training of air defense forces (PVO Strany). In particular,PVO and other force air defense forces are concentrating their training onshooting down cruise missiles of the type that NATO forces usedextensively in Yugoslavia. General Kornukov, the Commander of theRussian Air Forces, to whom the air defense forces are currentlysubordinated, said that additional air defense exercises have been plannedfor July and August 1999. These include air defense Exercise 'CombatCooperation 99', which will be conducted on the Ashuluk training groundin the Astrakhan region from 23-27 August. Belarussian air defense unitswill participate in the exercise.

Sixth, while planning the deployment of military materiel and placingprocurement orders with relevant departments of the Ministry of Defense

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and military-industrial complex, the Russian General Staff is giving priorityto weapons systems that can defeat a major high intensity air campaign suchas NATO forces conducted against Yugoslavia. For example, the GeneralStaff plans to test and subsequently deploy its new R-400 air defensesystem, which it believes is unrivaled in the world. The principal mission ofthis system is to repel any air offensive against Russia by hostile air forcesemploying high-precision weapons. This new generation state-of-the-art airdefense missile has several rather than a single warhead, which permitssimultaneous destruction of several enemy aircraft by means of a singlelaunch.

While commenting on the results of a session of the government'sDefense Industry Commission, then Russian Prime Minister SergeiStepashin declared that the Russian government is working on plans tomodernize the entire armed forces and equip it with new weapons systems.Stepashin stated that, during his visits to defense plants in the Urals, he hadseen new military technologies being developed by Russian designers andconstructors that will define twenty-first century weaponry. However, theseprograms as well as the development of the other high-tech weaponssystems will no doubt be limited by severe financial constraints.

Conclusion

For over 50 years, NATO's raison d'etre has been principled and purposefuldefensiveness in the self-proclaimed service of maintaining Europeansecurity and stability. By religiously adhering to that posture, the Alliancesuccessfully deterred the twin specters of conventional invasion andpossible global conflict and, coincidentally, outlived the demise of both theSoviet Union and the Cold War. So credible were NATO declarations ofpeaceful intent that the Alliance managed to allay the fears of those it hadvanquished and embarked virtually unopposed on a modest expansion to theEast.

In light of those remarkable achievements, it is indeed ironic that, by anact of war or simple passion, NATO may have jeopardized the very peacethat it struggled so long and hard to achieve. The unanswered questionlooms, 'Whether the wisdom that guided the world through the Cold Warwill prevent it from entering another?'

NOTE

This article was supported by the Ford Foundation sponsored project 'Keeping the Peace in theCIS' based at the Royal Institute of International Studies, London; the director of the project isDr Roy Allison, head, Russia and Eurasia Programme of the RIIS.

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Documents

Russia‐NATO relations after the Kosovo crisis: Strategic implications