Republic of the Philippiness;anbiganba!,an

Quezon City***

FIFTH DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Plaintiff,

- versus-SB-19-CRM -0048 to 0049For: Violation of Section 3(e) ofRepublic Act No. 3019, as amended

FRANCISCO N. MAMBA, JR., et at,Accused.

Present:Lagos, b Chairperson,Mendoza-Arcega andCorpus-Mafialac, JJ.

Prom ulgated:

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RESOLUTION

CORPUS - MANALAC, J.:

At bench for resolution I is the Motion to Quash Informations forInordinate Delay dated June 18, 2019 filed by all the accused, except RodolfoV. Cardenas/ and Ramon Aytona,' praying for the dismissal of theInformations filed against them on the ground of inordinate delay incurred bythe Office of the Ombudsman in the conduct of the investigation and resolutionof these cases.

It was averred that they were criminally charged in these cases for theirinvolvement in the alleged "Fertilizer Fund Seam." It pertains to the purchaseof fertilizers through the program initiated and funded by the NationalGovernment in 2004, which failed. The program was directly managednationwide by then Department of Agriculture Undersecretary Jocelyn "JocJoc" Bolante, who had full control of the manner by which the items were tobe purchased and delivered while the local officials merely acted as formal

1As per Order dated July 5,2019, the motion was submitted for resolution; these accused include FranciscoN. Mamba, Jr. and William N. Mamba who both posted cash bail bond on June 4, 2019 (Records, Volume 2,page 44); Anabel S. Turingan, Frederick G. Baligod, Juliana Filipina F. Padilia, Jose O. Palacpac, Leticia A. Acob,Teresita V. Espinosa, Merlina B. Dayag, and Petra B. Delos Santos posted their respective cash bail bondsbefore the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan City, Isabela on June 7, 2010 (Records, Vol. 2, p. 260)2 Cases dismissed per Minute Resolution dated July 3, 2019 on account of his death (Records, Vol. 2, p. 307)--1

31n Crim. Case No. SB-19-CRM-0048, posted cash bail bond on July 19, 2019. rVl1/I'.{t/

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parties rather than real contracting parties. They had no control on the products,brands and specifications purchased. Only one product brand was to bepurchased, i.e. Liquid Organic Fertilizers from Feshan Philippines, Inc.Allegedly, notwithstanding the Commission on Audit observation on June 16,2004, it was only on May 2011, or after seven (7) years after that theOmbudsman Field Investigators came out with their accusation against them.The Special Panel on Task Force Abono Cases submitted its Resolution to theOmbudsman only on July 10,2017. Thus, an unreasonable delay offourteen(14) years was incurred in the investigation of these cases.

The long delay of inaction by the prosecutors allegedly trampled upontheir Constitutional right to speedy trial citing the cases of Torres v.Sandiganbayan' and Cagang v. Sandiganbayan? They advance theResolution of this Court in People vs. Leonard Martin, Sr., et aI., docketed asCriminal Case No. SB-CRM-0369, dated July 16, 2018, dismissing theInformation on account of unexplained delay in its filing after five(5) years ofpreliminary investigation and four (4) years of fact- finding. That there are nocomplex issues in these cases that could warrant such delay.

On July 15,2019, the prosecution filed its Comment and/or Oppositionthereto, arguing that mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is notsufficient to invoke inordinate delay.

It contends that while it appears that a considerable time had lapseduntil the case was filed, the same was not inordinate and the right of theaccused to speedy disposition of the case was not violated. Citing the case ofDela Pena v. Sandiganbayani it explains that the Supreme Court en bancenumerated the factors that may be considered and balanced in determininginordinate delay as follows: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for thedelay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert by the accused; and (4) the prejudicecaused by the delay. In these cases, the accused failed to allege or prove thatthey were prejudiced by the alleged delay. Banking on the case of Spouses Uyv. Adriano,' the claim of prejudice must have conclusive factual basis; thepassage of time alone, without significant deprivation of liberty or impairmentof the ability to defend oneself, is not absolute evidence of prejudice. Finally,in the case of Cagang v. Sandiganbayanf the period of fact-findinginvestigation was excluded for purposes of determining the length of delay,hence, the seven (7) year period spent in fact-finding is excluded.

4 G.R. No. 221562-69, October 5, 20165 G.R. Nos. 206438 and 206458, July 31, 20186 G.R. No. 144542, June 29, 20017 G.R. No. 159098, October 27,20068 Supra, Note 3

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RULING

After a careful evaluation of the records as well as the respectiveallegations of the parties, the Court resolves to deny the motion.

Procedurally, inordinate delay is not one of the grounds to quash anInformation under Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, Section 3 thereof provides,viz:

Sec. 3. Grounds. - The accused may move to quash the complaintor information on any of the following grounds:

(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;(b) That the court trying the case has no jutisdiction over the offensecharged;(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the personof the accused;(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to doso;(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a singlepunishment for various offenses is prescribed by law;(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute alegal excuse or justification; and(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted ofthe offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed orotherwise terminated without his express consent.

Whereas, Section 2 of the same Rule clearly provides that the motion"xxx shall distinctly specify its factual and legal grounds. The court shallconsider no ground other than those stated in the motion, except lack ofjurisdiction over the offense charged." Further, Item Ill,2(b)(iv) ofthe RevisedGuidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases provides that a "[m lotionto quash information when the ground is not one of those stated in Sec. 3, Rule117" is considered a "prohibited motion and shall be denied outright before thescheduled arraignment without need of comment and/or opposition." 9 Neither

9 A.M. No. lS-06-10-SC, which took effect on September 1, 2017Item Ill, 2(b) of the Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases provides that: r(VI'xxxx

(b) Prohibited Motions. - Prohibited motions shall be denied outright before the scheduledarraignment without need of comment and/or opposition.

The following motions are prohibited:i. Motion for judicial determination of probable cause.ii. Motion for preliminary investigation filed beyond the five (S)-day reglementary period in inquest

proceedings under Sec. 6, Rule 112, or when preliminary investigation is required under Sec. 8, Rule 112, orallowed in inquest proceedings and the accused failed to participate in the preliminary investigation despitedue notice.

iii. Motion for reinvestigation of the prosecutor recommending the filing of information once theinformation has been filed before the court (1) if the motion is filed without prior leave of court; (2) when

Ill. Procedurexxxx

2. Motions

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could it be treated as a meritorious motion under the Revised Guidelines forContinuous Trial of Criminal Cases as the grounds thereof are limited to thoseprovided in Item III(2)(c).1O

The accused, however, is not left without recourse. Jurisprudence 11 tellsthat the remedy of an aggrieved party in criminal complaints before theOmbudsman where its finding is tainted with grave abuse of discretion is tofile a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court. However,the records of these cases are bereft of any showing that they availed of suchremedy at the opportune time.

On this nick alone, the motion to quash should be denied outright. Evengiving due course thereon, the motion is not impressed with merit.

preliminary investigation is not required under Sec. 8, Rule 112; and (3) when the regular preliminaryinvestigation is required and has been actually conducted, and the grounds relied upon in the motion arenot meritorious, such as issues of credibility, admissibility of evidence, innocence of the accused, or lack ofdue process when the accused was actually notified, among others.

iv. Motion to quash information when the ground is not one of those stated in Sec. 3, Rule 117.v. Motion for bill of particulars that does not conform to Sec. 9, Rule 116.vi. Motion to suspend the arraignment based on grounds not stated under Sec. 11, Rule 116.vii. Petition to suspend the criminal action on the ground of prejudicial question, when no civil casehas been filed, pursuant to Sec. 7, Rule 111.

10 Item Ill, 2(b) of the Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases provides that:

Ill. Procedurexxxx

2. MotionsXxxx

(c) Meritorious Motions. - Motions that allege plausible grounds supported by relevant documents and/orcompetent evidence, except those that are already covered by the Revised Guidelines, are meritoriousmotions, such as:

i. Motion to withdraw information, or to downgrade the charge in the original information, or toexclude an accused originally charged therein, filed by the prosecution as a result of a reinvestigation,reconsideration, and review;

ii. Motion to quash warrant of arrest;iii. Motion to suspend arraignment on the ground of an unsound mental condition under Sec. l1(a),

Rule 116;iv. Motion to suspend proceedings on the ground of a prejudicial question where a civil case was

filed prior to the criminal case under Sec. l1(b), Rule 116;v. Motion to quash information on the grounds that that facts charged do not constitute an offense,

lack of jurisdiction, extinction of criminal action or liability, or double jeopardy under Sec. 3, par. (a), (b), (g),and (i), Rule 117;

vi. Motion to discharge accused as a state witness under Sec. 17, Rule 119;vii. Motion to quash search warrant under Sec. 14, Rule 126, or motion to suppress evidence; andviii. Motion to dismiss on the ground that the criminal case is a Strategic law Suit Against Public

Participation (SLAPP) under Rule 6 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases.xxxx

Motions that do not conform to the requirements stated above shall be considered unmeritoriousand shall be denied outright.

11 Tirol v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 135913, November 1999; Kuizon v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 140619-24, March 9,

2001; Acuna v. Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, G.R. No. 144692, January 31, 2005 ItVI

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The movants claim that the Office of the Ombudsman incurred delay inthe investigation and resolution of their case for eleven (11) years.

The Court disagrees.

Following the recent ruling in Cagang.'! the Supreme Court held thatfact- finding investigations are no longer included in the period for thedetermination of inordinate delay. It starts only upon the filing of the formalcomplaint and the subsequent conduct of the preliminary investigation. In theinstant cases, the count only starts on November 28, 2011 when the FieldInvestigation Office (FIO) of the Office of the Ombudsman was submitted forpreliminary investigation up to the filing of the Informations in Court on April5,2019. Thus, accused's allegation of an eleven (11)-year delay is erroneous.

Moreover, a review of the material dates of these cases reveal thatalthough there may have been delay in the disposition of the cases, such delayis not capricious, whimsical nor arbitrary that would render rights nugatoryconsidering the magnitude of the Php728 Million Fertilizer Seam. Hereunderis the timeline of investigation, viz:

July 9,2004 Field Investigation Office (FIO) initially conductedfact-finding investigations; 13

June 25, 2007 The Task Force Abono submitted to thenOmbudsman Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez aConsolidated Investigation Report relative to thePhp728 Million Fertilizer Fund Seam including thesubject matters of the instant cases; 14

July 6, 2007 FIO Assistant Ombudsman Me1chor Arthur H.Carandang recommended the approval of the saidReport; 15

June 1,2011 The Task Force Abono, FIO filed its Complaint datedMarch 31, 2011 against herein accused before theOffice of the Ombudsman on June 1,2011, docketedas OMB-C-C-11-0779-L·16 .,

November 10,2011 Fact-finding investigation was completed, theInvestigation Report and the Complaint was approvedby Ombudsman Conchita Carpio Morales; 17

November 28, 2011 The FIO Complaint was submitted for PreliminaryInvestigation; 18

12 Supra, Note 313 Records, Vol. 1, p. 73, paragraph 614 Id., pp. 71-10715 Id., p. 10716 ld., pp. 46-6917 ld., p. 107

18 Paragraph 5 of the Comment and/or Opposition dated July 15, 2019, p. 2 thereof

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April 19,2012

April 24, 2012

April 25, 2012

July 10,2017

July 28,2017

January 10, 2018

January 22, 2018

February 7, 2018

February 5, 2019

April 5, 2019

Frederick G. Baligod, Anabel Turingan, Petra BatinDelos Santos, Rodolfo Cardenas, Juliana Filipina F.Padilla, Letecia Agustin Acob, Jose O. Palacpac filedtheir respective Counter-Affidavit; 19

Francisco N. Mamba, Jr., William N. Mamba,Medina B. Dayag filed their respective Counter-Affidavitr'"

Teresita Espinosa filed her Counter-Affidavit;"

The Office of the Ombudsman issued a Resolutionfinding probable cause against the accused andrecommending the filing of Information againstthemr?,

Ombudsman Conchita Carpio Morales approved thesaid Resolution dated July 10,2017.23

GIPO III Afieso submitted a draft Order modifyingthe Resolution issued on July 10, 2017 on the ground"that respondent Ramon Aytona was inadvertentlyincluded in par. a(ii) in the. enumeration ofrespondents sought to be indicted for violation ofSection 3(e) of RA 3019 for the unnumberedDisbursement Voucher (DV) dated July 2,2004. Asdiscussed in the Resolution, Aytona's activeparticipation in the transaction was only with respectto DV No. 401-04-04-024. Likewise, the dismissal ofthe complaint as to respondents Redentor H. Antolinand Julie M. Gregorio was not expressly stated in thedispositive portion. ,,24

Ombudsman Conchita Carpio-Morales approved theaforesaid Order relative to the case.2S

Ombudsman Carpio-Morales approved and signedthe Informations=

Newly appointed Ombudsman Samuel Martirezsigned the Informations'?

The two (2) Informations of the instant cases werefiled before the Sandiganbayan."

19 Id., 20-2320 Id., 19-2021 Id., p. 2022 Id., pp. 9-4423 Id., p. 3524 Id., p. 4025 Id., p. 4326 Id., p. 127 Id., p. 428 Id., pp. 1-4 (SB-19-CRM-0048); Vol. 2, pp. 5-8

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From the filing of the Complaint on November 28, 2011, it was only onApril 25, 2012 that the last Counter-Affidavit [Espinosa] was filed, while theOrder to file Counter-Affidavit to Aytona was returned unserved.i" As it looks,it may be reasonable to deduct said intervening period from the timeline ofpreliminary investigation. Meanwhile, the scope of the facts, the number ofrespondents, as well as the complexity of the issues posed and the layers ofreviewing authorities understandably took time for the Office of theOmbudsman to complete the evaluation of the case. An examination of theInformations filed also shows that apart from their approval by OmbudsmanCarpio-Morales on February 7, 2018, they also bear the signature on February5,2019 of Ombudsman Martirez who was appointed Ombudsman on July 26,201830 that finally signaled the filing of the Informations. Meaning to say, thetransition of leadership in the Office of the Ombudsman also justifiably tooktoll on the time spent before the Informations reached the Court.

Amidst the supposed delay, the accused did not file before the Office ofthe Ombudsman any motion or letter during the preliminary investigation,seeking the early resolution of the case filed against them and signifying thatthey are not waiving their right to the speedy disposition thereof. This is inaddition to the fact that there was nothing on record that would show that theyfiled a motion for reconsideration to the Resolution dated July 10,2017 findingprobable cause against them, or that they raised the issue of inordinate delay.They did nothing and just waited for the Informations to be filed in Court,which is construed as an abdication of such right.

While there may have been "institutional delay" in the disposition of thecase by the Office of the Ombudsman as referred to in Cagang," the sameshould not be taken against the right of the State to prosecute and protect itsinterest under the circumstances. In the said case, the Supreme Courtelucidates in this wise:

The reality is that institutional delay [is] a reality that thecourt must address. The prosecution is staffed by overworked andunderpaid government lawyers with mounting caseloads. x x x.

Institutional delay, in the proper context, should not be takenagainst the State. Most cases handled by the Office of theOmbudsman involve individuals who have the resources and whoengage private counsel with the means and resources to fullydedicate themselves to their client's case. More often than not, theaccused only invoke the right to speedy disposition of cases whenthe Ombudsman has already rendered an unfavorable decision. The

cl

~/29 Id., p. 2330 Duterte appoints Samuel Martirez as Ombudsman, July 26, 2018,Rapler.comhttps:/Iwww.rappler.comlnation/208006-duterte -appoints-samuel-martirez--new-ombudsman.31 Supra, Note 3

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prosecution should not be prejudiced by private counsels' failure toprotect the interests of their clients or the accused's lack of interestin the prosecution of their case.

The Php728 Million Fertilizer Seam is of such magnitude that the rightof the State to prosecute should not be unreasonably prejudiced on a belatedlyraised issue of "inordinate delay" in investigation. As affirmed in the same caseof Cagang, the State is entitled to due process and to be heard in its case asmuch as the accused, viz:

The State is as much entitled to due process as the accused. In Peoplev. Leviste:

[I]t must be emphasized that the state, like any other litigant,is entitled to its day in court, and to a reasonable opportunity topresent its case. A hasty dismissal such as the one in question,instead of unclogging dockets, has actually increased the workloadof the justice system as a whole and caused uncalled-for delays inthe final resolution of this and other cases. Unwittingly, theprecipitate action of the respondent court, instead of easing theburden ofthe accused, merely prolonged the litigation and ironicallyenough, unnecessarily delayed the case in the process, causing thevery evil it apparently sought to avoid. Such action does not inspirepublic confidence in the administration of justice.

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the motion is herebyDENIED for lack of merit. The arraignment of the accused on August 16,2019 at 8:30 in the morning shall proceed as scheduled.

SO ORDERED.

MARYANN E. C Ri US - MANALACAssoc ate Justice

WE CONCUR:

~;'-:GOSAssociate Justice

Chairperson

MARIA T'h-;;b~~~~~~F_~ RCEGA