Ryan Christopher Rodems, Response to Florida Bar Complaint No. 2013-10,271 (13E)

Via Email: [email protected], and U.P.S. Ground, Tracking No. IZ64589FP298520203

September 21, 2012

Theodore P. Littlewood Jr., Bar Counsel Attorney Consumer Assistance Program The Florida Bar 651 East Jefferson Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-2300

Re: Ryan Christopher Rodems; The Florida Bar File No. 2013-10,271 (13E)

Dear Mr. Littlewood:

This letter is to acknowledge receipt by mail yesterday, September 20, 2012, of Mr. Rodems' response dated September 17,2012 in the above captioned Bar complaint. Mr. Rodems' response is forty-six (46) pages long, which significantly exceeds the 25 page limit set forth in your letter to Rodems of September 13,2012. Your letter included a Notice, Mailing Instructions,. that states in very large type, "Please limit your submission to no more than 25 pages including exhibits."

Enclosed is a copy of the forty-six (46) page response I received from Mr. Rodems. If this is the same response Mr. Rodems provided you, I ask that you not accept this response, which exceeds the Bar's 25 page submission limit by twenty-one (21) pages, almost twice the limit.

This flagrant violation of the rules is typical of Mr. Rodems' behavior and should not be permitted. Mr. Rodems' forty-six (46) page response contains an onerous amount of information for me to review, and to formulate into a rebuttal. I abided by the Bar's rules in making my complaint, which was 25 pages, and Mr. Rodems must be held to the same standard.

If you permit Mr. Rodems to submit a forty-six (46) page response, then I ask for leave to submit a forty-six (46) page rebuttal, with an additional ten days time to do so. I request that you toll time from today until such time that you notify me ofyour decision. Thank you.

Sincerely, \.

,. eilJoGil 1

092 SW 5th Loop Ocala, Florida 34481

cc: Ryan Christopher Rodems, letter only, by u.S. Postal Service first class mail.

BARKER, RODEMS & COOK PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION

ATTORNEYS AT lAW

CHRIS A. BARKER Telephone 813/489·1001 501 East Kennedy Boulevard, Suite 790 RYAN CHRISTOPHER RODEMS Facsimile 813/489·1008WILLIAM ]. COOK Tampa, Florida 33602

September 17,2012

Theodore P. Littlewood, Jr., Esquire Attorney Consumer Assistance Program The Florida Bar 651 East Jefferson Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2300

Re: Complaint by Neil J. Gillespie against Ryan Christopher Rodems The Florida Bar File No. 2013-10,271(13E)

Dear Mr. Littlewood:

I am in receipt of your letter dated September 13,2012, requesting my written position regarding Neil J. Gillespie's September 10, 2012 inquiry/complaint. I have also enclosed, as requested, the disclosure form mandated by Rule 3-7.1, Rules Regulating the Florida Bar.

I. Introduction

As a result of my defense of two clients -- my law partner and my law firm -- in a civil action filed by Mr. Gillespie in August 2005, Mr. Gillespie filed a bar grievance against me in 2007. See TFB No. 2007-11,162(13D). I am enclosing the November 19, 2007 letter from Susan B. Bloemendaal, Chief Branch Discipline Counsel, in which she found there was "il1sufficient evidence of a violation of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar to warrant further proceedings." Exhibit 1.

Many of the issues raised in Mr. Gillespie's September 10, 2012 complaint were raised in 2007. Many of the other issues were raised by Mr. Gillespie with the various courts, and all were rejected.

In fact, Mr. Gillespie moved so many times -- unsuccessfully -- to disqualify me as counsel, the presiding judge entered an Order, stating:

THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon the Plaintiffs motion, filed July 9,2010. This is the third time that the Plaintiff has motioned to disqualify Defendant's counsel, despite having been informed in an order issued May 12,2006 that this issue had been DENIED WITH PREJUDICE. "With prejudice" that means that the motion in question is "finally disposed ..

Theodore P. Littlewood, Jr., Esquire September 17, 2012 Page 2

. and bars any future action on that claim." Moreover, because ofthe doctrine ofres judicata this motion must be DENIED.

The Plaintiff is again noticed (as he has been in two previous Court orders) that repeat filings attempting to revisit the same issue can be found to rise to the level of a sanctionable offense.

The Clerk of Court is ORDERED to never accept another pleading from the Plaintiff that indicates an attempt to disqualify Defendants' counsel, as this matter has been DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Exhibit 2.

All of Mr. Gillespie's clainls in the lawsuit were dismissed by summary judgment or judgnlent on the pleadings. Mr. Gillespie was sanctioned for filing frivolous pleadings, and held in contempt at least twice. Mr. Gillespie was at one time represented by an attorney, Robert Bauer, Esquire. Mr. Gillespie thereafter filed a bar grievance against him. Mr. Gillespie was then represented by Mr. Castagliuolo, Esquire, and Mr. Gillespie also grieved him.

The lawyers have not been the only targets. During the litigation, Mr. Gillespie moved to disqualify Judge Nielsen, Judge Isom, Judge Barton, Judge Cook and Judge Arnold. At one point, Mr. Gillespie moved to have Fidel Castro appointed a judge ad litem. That was also denied. Exhibit 3.

Mr. Gillespie was found on November 15,2010 to be Plaintiff "all abusive litigant" and was barred "from filing any paper witll this court which is not signed by an attorney duly licensed to practice law in the State of Florida." Exhibit 4. A copy of the motion preceding that Order is attached as Exhibit 5.

Eventually, the only issue remaining in the litigation was my clients' judgment agaillst Mr. Gillespie. He defied numerous court orders to appear for deposition, eventually leading to the issuance of a writ of bodily attachment.

During the deposition of Mr. Gillespie at tIle Hillsborough County Courthouse, during which he was represented by an attorney he chose, we agreed to resolve our judgment for sanctions against Mr. Gillespie. The settlement agreement was executed by Mr. Gillespie before a notary public, and while he was represented by counsel. Inlmediately thereafter, Judge Arnold attended a hearing in which the settlement was announced and the case was dismissed witll prejudice.

Theodore P. Littlewood, Jr., Esqllire September 17, 2012 Page 3

II. Response to Inquiry/Complaint Form

Mr. Gillespie's September 10, 2012 complaint is disorganized and disjointed, thereby making a point-by-point response difficult; I will quote Mr. Gillespie's claims and respond to them. Although I have diligently attempted to respond to each of the allegations, in the event my response does not specifically address a point, please do not construe it to be an agreement with the allegation. If you deem that my response inadequately addresses any claim, please advise and I will supplement my response with additional information.

A. "Represented his partner/firm against nle, a former client on a 'substantially related' matter." [Page 2]

This issue was raised in the litigation by Mr. Gillespie and rejected nunlerous times. Exhibit 2. This was also raised and rejected in the 2007 bar il1quiry/grievance. Exhibit 1. I trust that I need not provide any further response.

B. "Represented his partner/firm at ex parte hearings and mislead [sic] the Court." [Pages 2 and 7]

All hearings were properly noticed. Mr. Gillespie failed to attend at least one duly noticed hearing and voluntarily left another. I did not at any time mislead the Court.

C. "His exercise of independent professional judgment was materially limited by conflict." [Page 2]

On each claim Mr. Gillespie raised, my clients prevailed. Mr. Gillespie, on the other hand, was held in contempt, sanctioned, and ultimately, ordered not to file any more papers pro see Exhibit 4. I had no conflict, as proven by Mr. Gillespie's numerous failed attempt to disqualify me, and I suggest my professional judgment was proper, as proven by the results.

D. "Lack of Candor Toward The Tribunal; Rodems failed to correct earlier false testimony." [Page 2]

This claim, at least in part, was previously made by Mr. Gillespie to the Florida Bar and rejected. Exhibit 1. At all times, I provided an accurate statement of the facts.


E. "Misused discovery and obtained sanctions thorough a pattern of racketeering activity." [Pages 2 and 13]

The sanctions against Mr. Gillespie awarded by the trial court due to his frivolous pleadings were affirnled on appeal. Any discovery I sought was proper. Mr. Gillespie's allegations tllat I "misused discovery witll the llelp of the presiding judges" are baseless, but any such claim should have been made through the judicial process. The appellate courts, not the Florida Bar, are charged with reviewing a trial court's decisions.

F. "Disrupted the tribunal to inlproperly influence and prejudice the Court." [Page 2]

I did not at any time "disrupt the tribunal."

G. "Disparaged, hunliliated, and discriminated against nle on tile basis of disability." [Page 2]

I did not disparage Mr. Gillespie; nor did I humiliate him or discriminate against llim on the basis of any disability. During tIle litigation, Mr. Gillespie acted in a manner that caused him to be sanctioned and held in contempt.

III. Conclusion

As a result of the manner in which I defended my clients in litigation, Mr. Gillespie filed a bar grievance against me in 2007, and the Chief Branch Discipline Counsel disposed of it withollt even requiring a response from me. Over five years later, and in broad strokes, Mr. Gillespie recites his jaundiced version of the litigation, again complaining about the manner in which I defended my clients.

Notably, when Mr. Gillespie's actions during the litigation violated Orders, rules of conduct and statutes, tIle Court sanctioned him and held him in contempt. It is clear, therefore, that the Court monitored the conduct of the litigants.

Apparently having failed to obtain any relief fronl the Court, Mr. Gillespie has decided to ask the Florida Bar to more or less review the Court's handling of the litigation. As the "Inquiry Concerning A Florida Lawyer Pamphlet" states, "[t]he lawyer discipline system's primary focus is on ensuring that lawyers act ethically in dealing with their own clientsG If you are involved in a contested legal matter, and you believe the opposing lawyer has acted improperly, the matter should be addressed through court proceedings prior to making an inquiry with the Bar, if possible."


http://www.floridabar.org/TFB/TFBConsum.nsf/48e76203493b82ad852567090070c9b9/c5b7d24 7aOc9c45a85256b2fO06c6186?OpenDocument

The Florida Bar should disnliss the inquiry/complaint as unfounded. Sllould you require further information about my conduct in the litigation, I request that you contact Judge James D. Arnold at 813/272-6991 or Judge Martha J. Cook at 813/272-7225.

RCR/so Enclosures cc: Mr. Neil J. Gillespie (w/enclosures)

-----------------------

Pursuant to Rule 3-7.1(f), Rules of Discipline, yOll must execute the appropriate disclosure paragraph below and return the form to this office by September 28, 2012. The rule provides that the nature of the charges be stated in tIle notice to your firm; however, we suggest that you attacll a copy of the complaint.

CERTIFICATE OF DISCLOSURE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 17 )r, 201 ~a true copy of iliefuregcingd~clo~re~sfumi~edt.o~I~~~~~~~~~~6~~n~~~o_tam~b~of Iny present law firm of l<ll.""Y a.O C , and, if different, to , a member 0 the law finn of

, with which I was associatedat the tin1e of the act(s) giving rise to the COl11plaint in The Florida Bar File No. 013.. 10,271 (13E).

CERTIFICATE OF DISCLOSURE (Corporate/Government Employment)

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this day of ,201_, a true copy of the foregoing disclosure was furnished to , my supervisor at (name of agency), with which I was associated at the time of the act(s) giving rise to the complaint in The Florida Bar File No. 2013-10,271 (13E).

Ryall Christopher Rodems

CERTIFICATE OF NON-LAW FIRM AFFILIATION (Sole Practitiol1er)

I HEREBY CERTIFY to The Florida Bar on this day of , 201_, that I am not presently affiliated with a law firm and was not affiliated with a law firm at the time of the act(s) giving rise to the complaint in The Florida Bar File No. 2013-10,271 (13E).

Ryan Christopher Rodems

THE FLORIDA BAR l\1A1LING ADDRESS: PHYSICAL ADDRESS:

JOHN F. HARKNESS, JR. 5521 'VEST SPRUCE STREET AIRPORT l\IARRIOTT HOTEL 813/875-9821 EX~CUT1V£ DiRECTOR SUITEC..49 SUITEC...49 wwW.FLABAR.ORG

TAl\IPA, FL 33607..5958 TA1\IPA, FL 33607..5958

November 19, 2007

Neil Gillespie 8092 SW 115th Loop Ocala, Florida 34481

RE: ~quiry/Complaintregarding Ryan Christopher Rodems TFB No. 2007-11,162 (13D)

Dear Mr. Gillespie:

The above-referenced file was closed by letter dated May 15, 2007. The basis for closing the file was the non-receipt of additional infonnation requested in our letter to you dated March 7, 2007. You state that you responded to the request by correspondence dated April 18, 2007; ho\vever a review ofour files indicates that no additional correspondence was received from you prior to Jllne 22, 2007.

We have carefully reviewed all infonnation you provided relating to yOllf complaint against Mr. Rodems. You 11ave made a nunlber of allegations ofmisconduct against Mr. Rodems. You allege that: 1) he has ellgaged in a conflict ofinterest by representing Barker, Rodelns & Cook, P.A. in tIle civil suit in \vhich you are the plaintiff; 2) that he filed a frivolous and retaliatory counterclaim for libel in the civil suit; 3) that he threatened to present criminal charges against you to gain an advantage in the civil suit; 4) tI1at he made a misrepresentation to the court ill a pleadil1g (Verified Request for Bailiff and for SaIlctions); and 5) that he lied to the judge in a letter dated October 12, 2006.

Mr.. Rodems fonnerly represented YOll in a consunler law action. In 2005, )'OU filed a civil suit against Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A. and William Cook, alleging fraud and breach of contract in connection \vitl\ that representation. You have alleged that Mr. Rodems' represelltation of the defendal1ts constitutes a conflict of interest in violation ofBar lules. Mr. Rodems has not engaged in a conflict .of interest by defending himself and the law fitm against your allegations ofwrongdoing.. You waived tIle conflict by initiating civil action and disciplinary proceedings. Moreover, Rule 4-1.6(c)(2) allows an attolney to reveal infolmation relating to the representation to the extent tIle lawyer reasonably believes necessary to defend .himself in a controversy between the lawyer and client. Rule 4-1.6(c)(4) silnilarly allows the lawyer to reveal such information to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client.

EXHIBIT I

Neil Gillespie November 19, 2007 Page 2

You have alleged that Mr. Rodems fIled a counterclaim for libel against you in retaliation for your filing of a Bar complaint against Mr. Cook. You assert that the libel claim is ilnproper pursuallt to tIle holding ofTobkin v. Jarboe. TobkiIll10lds that an individual ,vho files a complaint against an attolney in \vhiclll10 probable cause is found, is afforded absolute ilmnunity from a sllbsequellt defanlation action by the attorney. The libel claim asserted by tIle Defendants in the civil suit js based on allegedly false statements made by you in a letter dated July 25, 2005 and is not based on any Bar complaint. There is no evidence to conclude that the clailu was filed in retaliation for your filing of a Bar complaint Concel11ing yOll allegation that the claim is frivolous, this is an issue for the trial court in the pending civil case.

You have alleged that Mr" Rodelns accused you ofcriminal extoltion in his "Answer, Affilmative Defenses and Counterclaim" in order to gain an advantage in the civil suit. Paragraphs 57 and 67 allege that the Defendants considered your threat of a Bar cOlnplaint al1d lawsuit if they did not meet your demand for paYlnent ·"to be extortion under section 836.05, Fla. Stat. (2000)." We cannot conclude that the statement and citation to the Florida Statutes rise to the level ofa violation ofBar rules. Rule 4-3.4(g), Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, prohibits a lawyer from presenting, participating in presellting, or threatening to present criminal charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter. Altll0ugh YOllr demand is labeled "extoliionate," the language used does not state an intention to present crilninal charges against you. We cannot infer this intention from the language used.

You also allege that Mr. Rodems made a false statemellt ofmaterial fact to the court in the "Defendant's Verified Reqllest for Bailiff and for Sanctions" \vhen he stated tIlat you had threatened to physically assault him ill Judge Nielsen's cllambers on April 25, 2006. In the pleading, Mr. Rodems qlloted you as saying, fir am going to slam you up agail1st the \vall in Judge Nielsen's chambers." Mr. Rodems went on to state that he asked you \vhether you were threatening him physically or metaphorically and you said "metaphoricaIly.lI According to the transcript you provided ofyonr consensually recorded telephone conversation with Mr. Rodems, you stated, III will see you on the 25th and I will sIanl you against the wall like I did before." You went 011 to clarify that you meallt the statement metaphorically and not physically. It appears that the pleading fairly represents your telephone conversation and \ve therefore cannot conclude that it was materially misleading. .

Y011 fulther allege that Mr. Rodenls lied to the judge in a letter dated October 12, 2006 \Vllen he stated that he llad not heard from you regarding a proposed order. YOll provided a transcript of your consensually recorded telephone conversation with Mr. RodenlS on October 11, 2006, which you claim proves that Mr. Rodems was lying. It is apparent from the transcript that you and Mr. RodeIll:s discussed many aspects of the litigation, but the transcript does not clearly reflect a discussion about a proposed Order. Based on the information provided, we calmot conclude that Mr. Rodems' letter was intentionally misleading.

Neil Gillespie ~overnber19,2007

Page 3

After evaillatillg your complaint agail1st the above-referenced attolney, we find that there is insufficient evidence of a violation of the Rules Regulatillg The Florida Bar to warrant further proceedings. Accordingly, our file in this TIlatter ,viii remain closed. The records regarding this Inquiry/Complaint will be destroyed one (1) year fronl today. OUf disposition ofyour complaint l1as no effect on any other legal remedy you may have.

Sincerely,

SVB/elnh

cc: Ryan Christopher Rodems wI copy of Inquiry/Complaint received June 22, 2007

The FloridaBar ~oo7~ II, /hc(13o) ~. S'//::J 07

Inquiry/ComplaintFonn

Attorney·s Name: ~~:...:.-~~~~~~~--:

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JUN 22 ZOOl 10 PART ONE: (Read instructions on reverse side.)

Your Name: file,} a'lIe VJre, Address: .~<? f~ <{LU ./1/;%£(j(y? City: C1 ca· 69 State: -L-R.....a..-__ Phone: &S') ~S't 78'p 7 Zip Code: ,2 l/LJ e/ t

ACAP Reference No. ~J.,XIJ~~_IV-.;;..~ _

Address: Lt¢o I-YA- A>i/ey /)I). !:u;/c.. '2./l.-eJ

City: 7/l14,oA . State: ...:-rl_L, _

Phone: SJ3: Hrt'l-/60 I Zip Code: 3.36/).;(.

PART TWO: (See reverse, part two.) The specific thing or things I am complaining about are:

PART THREE: (See reverse, part tht"ee.) l"'he witnesses in support of my allegations are: [see attached sheet).

PART~ee reverse, part four.}FU.

I did I d no circle one or the other) attempt to use ACAP to resolve this situation. To attemp 0 resolve this matter, I did the following:

~ Rirz: Cet:l~,e:~!lt::i~ 11:t~ ;';SG :fd;::: e;/ft!dl;jijf:J~Ft:iJMrf U<~Jy7fcA~&<e- v~.)'h" It- EINt,d; I3tllZ. «ole> l>~LV/~e I ]i cu"'! MJ-r /hItthl.'PlJ-fc j,v dC~

PART FIVE (See reverse, part five.): Under penalty ofperjury, I declare the foregoing facts are truel correct and complete.

THE FLORIDA BAR p r:r;t=" ,en JUN 2 1 2007

LEGAL U\vlo;,luN TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA Ju.ue 2.0( ?~O 7

Date •

Neil J. Gillespie ~092 SW 11Sth Loop Ocala, Florida 34481

Telepllone: (352) 854..7807

June 20, 2007

The Florida Bar:

This is a cOlnplaint against Tampa lawyer Ryan Christopher Rodems, bar ID 110.

947652, for unethical behavior during his appearance in a civil lawsuit styled Neil J. Gillespie v. Barker, Rodenls & Cook, P.A. and William J. Cook, case no. 05-CA...7205, Circuit Civil, Hillsborough County. I am the plaintiffsuing my fanner lawyers for fraud, breach ofcontract, and breach of fiduciary dUtyl. In retaliatioll Mr. Rodems COllntersued me for libel over a previous bar complaint, and accused me of felony extoliion for utilizing The Florida Bar's Attorl1ey Consumer Assistance Program (ACAP) in a goodfaith effort to resolve my dispute witlloUt litigation. Accompanying this letter is a signed, sworn il1qully/conlplaint fOlm, witness list, and supporting exhibits.

Note: Anumber ofMr. Rodems' unethical acts violate one or more rules of professional conduct. Therefore the Inisconduct and the corresponding rule violations are not all inclusive.

Tl1is complaint against Mr. Rodems alleges the following unethical acts:

1. Conflict ofInterest violation ofRule 4-1.9(a), 4..1..9(b), Rule 4-1.7, Rule 4-1.10(a) Lawyer as witness, violation ofRllle 4-3.7. Threat to reveal client confidences; intimidation ofa witness

Mr. Rodems' representation afhis firm and Mr, Cook in the above captioned lawsuit is a prohibited conflict of interest. Mr. Rodems has a direct conflict of interest with me, Mr. Rodems' law film and his law partner, William J. Cook, are defendants in my lawsuit against them for fraud and breach ofcontract. I aln their fonner client. A copy of the civil complaint (filed August 11, 2005) accompanies this complaint. (Exhibit A).

Mr. Rodems' first appearance in this lawsuit was August 29, 2005 when he filed Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Strike. (Exhibit B). On JanllalY 13, 2006, Judge Nielsen found a cause of action for fraud and breach ofcontract. (Exhibit C).

1 Breach offiduciary duty ,vas added April 30, 2007, by attorney Robert W. Bauer.

The Florida Bar Page - 2 of 13 June 20, 2007

The contract which is the subject ofthe lawsuit is a contingent fee agreemellt between myself and Mr. Rodems' law firm. Mr. Rodems is now trying to disavow tIle contingent fee agreement between me and his law firm.

Rule 4-1.9(a) states that a lawyer who has f01"111erly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interest of the fOlmer client unless the f011ner client COl1sents after consultation. (I do not consent). In my lawsuit against Mr. Rodems' finn and Mr. Cook, they represented my interest in a contillgent fee contract beginning November 3, 2000. Now with the commencelllent of this lawsuit, Mr. Rodenls is representing 11is own filnl's il1terest in the contract, and taking a position materially adverse to me, their former client.

This is wllat West's Florida Statutes Annotated states tInder Conunent (Vol. 35, pp. 354-355): "After termination of a client..lawyer relationship, a lawyer may llot represent another client except in confolmity with this rule. The principles in Rule 4-1.9 detelmine whether tIle interests ofthe present alld fOlmer client are adverse. Thus, a lawyer could not properly seek to rescind on bellalf ofa new client a contract drafted on behalf ofthe fOlmer client." (underline added). '~When a lawyer has been directly involved a specific transaction, subsequent representation of other clients with materially adverse interests clearly is prohibited." (underline added). In the instant matter, the contract between me and Mr. Rodems' firm is a specific transaction directly involving his firm and Mr. Cook who 110W have materially adverse interests to me. Thus Mr. Rodems' representation ofhis finn and Mr. Cook is cleal'ly prohibited.

Furthermore, the comment to Rule 4-1.7 states tllat a lawyer ordinarily may not act as advocate against a person the lawyer represents in some other matter, even if it is wl10lly urn-elated. (p. 330). If tIle probity ofa lawyer's own conduct in a transaction is in serious question, it may be difficult or inlpossible for the lawyer to give a client detached advise. (pp. 330-331). And a suit charging fraud entails conflict to a degree not involved in a suit for a declaratory judgment concerJllng statutory interpretation. (p. 331). In the instant matter, the underlying la\vsuit charges Mr. Cook and llis law film with fraud and breach of contract, and a cause ofaction has been sustained.

Rule 4-1.10(a) states that while lawyers are associated ill a fiml, none of them shall knowingly represent a client when any 1 ofthem practicing alone would be prohibited fronl doing so by rule 4-1.7, 4-1.8(c), 4.. 1.9, or 4-2.2. A firm of lawyers is essentially 1 la\vyer for purposes of the rules governing loyalty to the client or from the premise that each lawyer is vicariously bound by the obligation of loyalty owed by eacillawyer with whom the lawyer is associated.

Rule 4-3.7(a) states that a lawyer shalillot act as advocate at a trial in Wl1ich the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness on behalf of the client. In the ongoing civil lawsuit, Mr. Rodems will certainly be called as a witness, both on the fraud and breach of

The Florida Bar Page .. 3 of13 June 20, 2007

contract issues, alld his own misconduct since his appearance as counsel, on his threat to reveal client confidences, peljury to Judge Nielsen, aIId other matters herein.

Mr. Rodems threatened to disclose confidential inforluation obtained in his firm's prior representation ofme, although he did not yet make the disclosure. Mr. Radems' threat to reveal client confidences was for the purpose of intimidating me as a witness, to force me to drop my civil lawsuit against his law firm and law partner.

On March 3, 2006, Ryan Christopher Rodenls telephoned me at home and threatened to reveal confidential infom1ation about my payment for medical treatment. Mr. Rodems leatned this confidential informatioll fronl Mr. Cook. The infonnation was not public knowledge, and was known only to my lawyers. Mr. Rodems' threat was nlemorialized by a voice recording which has been transcribed. A copy of the transcript accompanies this cOlnplaint as Exhibit Q.

Rule 4~ 1.9(b) states that a lawyer Wl10 has f011uerly represented a client in a matter sIlall not thereafter use illfonnation relating to the representation to the disadvantage ofthe fOl1ner client. On MarcIl 3, 2006, Mr. Rodems announced his threat to use confidential informatioll acquired in" his firm's prior representation ofme to my disadvantage. This is what Mr. Rodems said: (relevant p011ion) (Exhibit Q, beginning on page 9)

"MR. RODEMS: Didn't you at one time purcIlase a car so that yOll could get the cash rebate to get some dental work done? We're going to get to the discovery, anyho\v, so just tell me, did that really happen?

MR. GILLESPIE: What?

MR. RODEMS: Did you purchase a car so that you could get the cash rebate to get some dental work done?

MR. GILLESPIE: Listen, this is WIlY you need to be disqualified.

MR. RODEMS: No, I mean, that's -- because I know that? Because I know that to be a fact?

MR. GILLESPIE: You know it to be a fact from your previous representation of me.

MR. RODEMS: Well, you know, see that's-

MR. GILLESPIE: If it is -- if it's a fact, anyway.

MR. RODEMS : Yau need to study tIle rules and regulations of the Florida Bar because when you make

The Florida Bar Page - 4 of 13 JUlIe 20, 2007

MR. GILLESPIE: I think, I think I bought a car so I would have sOlnething to drive. I don't know why you buy cats, but that's why I bought it.

MR. RODEMS: Well-

MR. GILLESPIE: If it had some other benefits, that's different.

MR. RODEMS: I understand that car was repossessed shortly after you bought it 80

MR. GILLESPIE: No, it wasn't repossessed.

MR. RODEMS: Okay. Well, then you can probably drive that dow!1 to the 11earing tllen on the 28th.

MR. GILLESPIE: No, it was voluntarily turned in because after 911 attack tIle job that I was in dried up.. I."

2. Frivolous Libel Counterclahn, violation ofRule 4-3.1, Meritorious claims and contentions.. Mr. Rodems brought a fi:ivolous, retaliatory libel counterclaim over nIY previous bar complaint against Mr. Cook. I made a written complaint about Mr. Cook to the bar on June 7, 2004. Susan Bloemendaal wrote me on February 9, 2005 that the objective evidence was insufficient to SUppOlt a finding ofmisconduct on bellalfof Mr. Cook. Once the complaint process was completed, I wrote to JaIl Mackechnie, president ofAmscot Corporation, who was an interested party. I told Mr. Mackechnie about my dispute with Mr. Cook and that my bar complaint was not stlccessful. My letter to AnIscot, dated July 25, 2005, was written during the time period when Mr. Cook's file was a public record. That time period ended February 9, 2006.

Mr. Rodems is very anglY over my letter about a bar complail1t. On March 3, 2006, Mr. Rodems tllfeatened me during a telephone call about the letter. This is what Mr. Rodems said: (Transcript, Exhibit Q)

MR. RODEMS: "I mean, it was kind of bizarre that you would even send that letter, but you did, so now you will have to pay for that." (Transcript, page 9, line 1).

Mr. Rodems has made good on Iris threat to nlake me "pay for tllat" by commencing a frivolous, retaliatory libel counterclaim.

The Counterclaim for Libel was served JanualY 19, 2006, in Mr. Rodelns' Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and Counterclaim. (Exhibit D). The counterclaim is active and ongoing, and I have retained and paid attolney Robert W. Bauer of Gainesville to defel~d

the counterclaim.

(a) The counterclaim is contrary to the holding of Tobkin v. Jarboe, 710 So.2d 975.


On July 12, 2006, Kennetll Lawrence Marvin, Director, Lawyer Regulation, The Florida Bar, wrote me and provided a copy ofFlorida Supreme COUlt case Tobkin v. Jarboe, 710 So.2d 975 (1998), which holds that an unsuccessful complainant cannot be successfully sued for defamation. (Exhibit E).

Specifically, Tobkin applies to this case because my letter to Atllscot is dated July 25, 2005, and is afforded absolute il11ffiunity fl.·onl a defamation action by the complainedagainst attorney because it was written after the grievance procedure ran its natural course. During the course of the bar's investigation I did not publicize the complaint. After the bar concluded its investigation, I informed Amscot that my conlplaint against Mr. Cook was unsuccessful. On May 4, 2005, Susan BloemendaaI, ChiefBranch Disciplillary Counsel, wrote (in palt): "This file will therefore renlain closed and is scheduled for destruction on February 9, 2006.u Mr. Cook's file was a public record pursuant to chapter 119 Florida Statutes from February 9, 2005 through February 9, 2006. TIle timing ofmy letter to Arnscot was lawful, and is afforded absolute immunity from a defamation action by the complained..against attolney. (Tobkin v. Jarboe, 710 So.2d 975).

Tobkin 110lds that for the sake ofmaintaining the high standards of the profession and disciplining those who violate the Canons ofLegal Ethics, one who elects to enjoy the status and benefits as a member ofthe legal profession must give up cel1ain tigIlts or causes ofactioll which, in this instance, is the right to file an action against a complainant who lodges an unsuccessful complaint \vith the Grievance Committee ofTIle Florida Bar.

Tobkin holds that inherent in tIle decision was the court's recognition ofthe strong public policy reasons for encouraging individuals with knowledge of attorney luisconduct to step forward and present such evidence so that the bar may callY out its disciplillaly duties. The court acknowledged the possibility that groundless or baseless conlplaints against attorneys may sometimes be filed by individuals. However, bar complainants must be encouraged to step forward with legitinlate complaints, which will furtller the impOl1ant public policy ofdisciplining attollley misconduct.

Tobkin recognizes tlle inequitable balance ofpower that may exist between an attolney who brings a defamation action and the client who must defend against it, which in tum creates the potential fol' attorney intimidation ofbar conlplainants. Attolneys schooled in the law have the ability to pursue defamation litigation thrOllgh their own means and with minimal expense when compared with tIle bar cODlplainants. Conversely, the cost of litigation coupled with the risk of liability in defending against such "an action could be enough to discourage an individual from bringing a meritorious complaint. The mere possibility of chilling valid complaints would undelmine public confidence in the bar's ability to regulate and discipline unethical members.

Tobkin holds that recognizing an absolute immunity for a complainant WI10

follows The Florida Bar grievance procedures when filing a complaint will prevent any chilling effect on bar complaints while at the same time adequately protect attoll1eys. If

The Florida Bar Page - 6ofl3 June 20, 2007

an individual files a complaint against an attorney and the Bar Grievance Committee finds probable cause to believe the attolney is guilty ofmisconduct justifying disciplinaly action, then the attolney is clearly in no position to complain about the absolute ilnmunity afforded the complainant Ho,vever, ifa baseless bar complaint is filed against an attorney and the Bar Grievance Committee returns a finding of no probable cause, then public exoneration is a suitable remedy for any negative effects created by the public awareness that a complaint lIas been lllade against tllat attorney. Granting a cOlnplainant absolute immunity when filing a complaint against a Inelnber ofthis statefs integrated bar is essential in order for the legal profession, and the cou11, to adequately police its members and discipline those who violate tIle ethical standards ofthe legal profession. The net result will benefit both tIle legal profession and the public.

In the instant case, The Florida Bar did not return a finding of"no probable cause". Instead, Susan Bloelnendaal \vrote the following on February 9, 2005:

"Mr. Gillespie, tIle bar has carefully reviewed all the information and documents provided by you and Mr. Cook. Based UpOll this review, it is the bar's position that the objective evidence is insufficient to support a finding ofmise011duct on behalfofMr. Cook.u (Exhibit F).

Ms. Bloemendaal's "objective evidence" finding is a lower standard of . exoneration that that of "no probable cause". It should be noted that Ms. Bloemelldaal took over investigation oftIle original complaint from Assistant Staff Counsel William Thompson. Given the circumstances, a reasonable person could infer that she forced him out because he refused to ignore Mr. Cook's misconduct

(b) The libel counterclaitn is contrary to the holdil1g ofNodar v. Galbreath, 462 So.2d 803 (Fla. 1984). Tampa attolney David M. Snyder notified Mr. Rodems by letter on September 7, 2006, that the counterclaim for libel "...has little chance ofultimate" success given the limited distribution and privileged nature of the ptlblication complained of. See e.g. Nodar v. Galbreath, 462 So.2d 803 (Fla. 1984).~~ (Exhibit G).

(c) Mr. Rodelns brought the libel counterclaim for the purpose of intimidation, to force me to drop my lawful claim against his law firnl and Mr. Cook. On four separate occasions Mr. Rodems llas offered to drop the libel counterclaim ifI drop my claim against lliln. Mr. Rodems made the following offers:

(i) By letter dated Septenlber 14, 2006, Mr. Rodelns offered to drop tIle libel counterclaim: "We would agree, however, to a walk away. That is, each party dismisses all claims with prejudice, each party to bear l1is or its OWll attorneys' fees· and costs." (Relevant portion). (Exhibit H).

(ii) By letter dated Octob~r 5, 2006. (Exhibit I).

(iii) By discussion with Traveler's ofFlorida Insurance COlnpallY.

The Florida Bar Page -7 ofl3 June 20, 2007

(iv) By letter dated February 7, 2007. (Exhibit J).

(d) Mra Rodems demands mOlley from Iny insurance company. Mr. Rodems tried to take money fiaom my hOnleO\Vners insurance can-ier, Travelers ofFlorida. He demanded $4,500.00 to settle his libel claim, which amounts to $1,500.00 each for mIn and his two law partners. In effect, Mr. Rodelns admits that his professional reputation as a lawyer is wOlih Ollly $1,500.00. Mr. Rodems makes this admission during our phone call of October II, 2006. (Exhibit K). Mr. Rodems' initial demand to Travelers was $10,000.00, which is $5,000.00 less than the jurisdictional demand in his counterclaim. The following is from the transcript, beginning on page 7, line 3:

MR. GILLESPIE: Well, on the matter of Travelers itls -- they told me that YOll called them and demanded they pay you ten thousand dollars; is that 14ight? Did you call them and demand ten thousand dollars from them?

MR. RODEMS: I don't remember exactly the amount.

MR. GILLESPIE: That's what they said.

lVIR. RODEMS: Well, ifthatts -

MR. GILLESPIE: They said they spoke with you. Yau dOll

tt remember whether you demanded ten thousand dollars from them?

MR. RODEMS: It may have beell ten thousand. I mean, I did make a demand. We have -

MR. GILLESPIE: It may have been ten thousand, but you're not Sllre?

MR. RODEMS: It l11ay have been, yeah.

MR. GILLESPIE: If it wasn't ten thousand how much \vas it?

MR. RODEMS: I'll tell you what, let me look at my notes because I think I have some notes 011

this. Give me just a second, I'm going to have to pull up a document. Yup, yup, yup.

The Florida Bar Page .. 80f13 June 20, 2007

MR. GILLESPIE: Okay. So you, Ryan Rodems, called up Travelers, I guess you spoke with Ms. Kaufmann?

MR. RODEMS: Yes, sir.

MR. GILLESPIE: A11d you deluanded that they pay yOll ten thousand dollars for what purpose now?

MR. RODEMS: To settle the COullterclaims.

MR. GILLESPIE: To settle the counterclaim. Okay. Which hasn't even been found the basis of yet, we're still waiting on the Motion to Dismiss. Okay. And then I understand, and yOll can correct me if I'm wrong, that within a short time you dropped that offer to forty-five h'undred?

MR. RODEMS: COll-ect

MR. GILLESPIE: Okay. You haven't answered any discovery ofmine about what your actual damages were.

MR. RODEMS: Yeah, we did respond to the discovely.

MR. GILLESPIE: I don't have any response for that. But anyway, I'm not going to argue with you, Ijust want to establish those facts. I have told Travelers not to pay you a dinle.

In my view what you're doing is extoliion. It's the same thing you did to Amscot and it's certainly not going to happen in tllis case. Now, ifthey \vant to represent me by defending the case, fine. But ifall they're going to do is make a nuisance payment because they know about what your company is about, then I'm not going to

- agree to tl1at.

(e) Our family is at risk of losing our llome. Because Mr. Rodems tried to extract money from Travelers Insurance Company, Travelers sent us a notice oflIon-renewal for homeowners insurance. Because our mOltgage requires us to maintain honleowners insurance, unless we can locate another carrier, we will be in technical default on our n10rtgage and therefore could lose our home.

The Florida Bar Page - 90f13 June 20, 2007

3. False Accusation ofEXtOl1ion, violation ofRule 4~3t4(g), Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel. Mr. Rodems lIas accused me of crin1inal extortion for particIpating in TIle Florida Bar's Attorney Consulner Assistance Prograll1 (ACAP). Mr. Rodems accused me of criminal extortion in his Answer, Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim, paragraphs 57 and 67. (Exllibit D). When I moved to strike tllis absurd accusation fi·om Defendants' libel counterclaim, Mr. Rodems moved for sanctions under Section 57.1 05(1), Florida Statutes. Mr. Rodems is demanding attolneys' fees from me because I objected to his false claim ofextortion.

Mr. Rodems asserts. that"my participation in ACAP is " ... exto11ion under section 836.05, Fla. stat. (2000) and the holdings of Carricarte v. State, 384 So.2d 1261 (Fla. 1980); Cooper v. Austin, 750 So.2d 711 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000); Gordon v, Gordon, 625 So.2d 59 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); Berger v. Berger, 466 So.2d 1149 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)."

Mr. Rodems violated Rule 4-3.4, FairJ1eSS to Opposing Party and Counsel. Rule 4..3.4 states~ A lavvyer shall not: (g) present, participate in presenting, or threaten to present criminal charges solely to obtain an advantage ill a civil matter. Paragraphs 57 and 67 of Mr. Rodenls' Answer, Affirnlative Defenses and Counterclainl present criminal charges solely to obtain advantage in a civil matter contrary to Rule 4-3.4(g).

The Florida Bar should be aware that Mr. Rodems and his law partners are notorious throughout Florida for engaging in antics which include throwing a cup ofcoffee in the face oftheir opponents' counsel during a mediation2

, and claiming that the other side engaged in criminal extortion against them3

•

About the tirrie I retained the law film Alpert Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook P.A~, the S1. Petersburg Times repolted that Jonathan Alpert threw a 20 ounce cup of coffee in the face ofattorney Alnold Levine during mediation in a season ticket holder dispute, (Exhibit L). Alpert, Barkel~ RodenlsJ Ferrel1tino & Coo~ P.A., represented the Bues' fans, and A1nold Levitle l'epresented tIle Tampa Bay Buccaneers. According to stories published in the 81. Petersburg Times, Alpelt was ranting and raving when he threw a 20 ounce cup ofcoffee in the face ofLevine, who then sued Alpert for civil damages and ~led a battery complaint with Tanlpa Police. The St. Petersburg Times also reported that Jonathan Alpert atmounced in court that he had asked police to investigate "tllreats and/or extortion" by the Bucs' lawyer At·nold Levitle. Tampa police detectives reviewed the extortion complaint, which l1amed Levine, Bucs general manager Riell McKay and Edward and Bryan Glazer. (Exhibit M). The purpose ofpresellthlg the ctiminal charges against the Hues was to obtain advalltage in a civil matter contrary to Rule 4-3.4(g). The St. Petersburg Tinles repolted that Alpert's finn received $180,000.00 in attorneys' fees and $30,000.00 ill costs. (Exhibit N).

2St. Petersburg Tunes, June 6,2000, CCAttomey's suit says he received coffee in the face" 3 St. Petersburg Tnnes, June 10, 2000, "Hues accused ofextortion"


Presenting criminal charges to obtain advantage in a civil matter is Mr. Rodems' modus operandi; Mr. Rodems accused me of felony extoltion in his libel counterclaim. On March 7, 2006, I offered my surrender to State Attorney Mark Ober on the accusation ofexto11ion, but he has not replied. See the witness list, exhibits AA through DD.

I also contacted The Florida Bar about Mr. Rodems accusation, and it does not agree. On July 12, 2006, The Director ofLawyer Regulation, Kenneth Lawrence Marvin, wrote me that "Those questions illvolve a legal conclusioll ofcriminal law and I am not in a position to answer them." (Exhibit E).

As to a legal conclusion of criminal law, Mr. Rodems does not practice criminal lavv, nor do his partners. But any lawyer should know that criminal intent is needed to sustain an accusation of exto11ion, and that making a good-faith effoli to resolve a matter under ACAP is evidence of nlY intent to comply with the law, not commit a crime.

4. False Accusation ofThreat ofViolence, violation ofRule 4-3.4(g) Dishonesty, Lack of Candor Toward the Cou11, violation of Rule 4 M 3.3 Improper Influence ofDecision Maker, violation ofRule 4-3.5(a) Disruption of Tribunal, violation ofRule 4-3.5(c)

(a). Mr. Roden1s' perjury resulted in the recusal ofJudge Nielsen. Mr. Rodems .knowing made a false statement ofmaterial fact to the COllli, prohibited by Rule 4-3,3(a)(I). On March 6, 2006, Mr. Rodems filed Defendants' Verified Request For BailiffAnd For Sanctions, \vhere he swore under oath that I was going to violently assault him in Judge Nielsen's chalnbers on April 25, 2006. However, the conversation was recorded, and the transcript impeached Mr. Rodems' sworn testimony. Mr. Roderns lied to the Comt.

Mr. Rodems invoked the nalne ofthe oftlle Honorable Richard A. Nielsen in the threat I allegedly made against him. Mr. Rodenls did this ill a calculated effort to prejudice the Court against me. Mr. Rodelns used his position as an Officer of the Court to lend credibility to his verified accusation against lne. Mr. Rodenls invoked the nalue of the Judge Nielsen to make the Court itself fearful ofa violent attack from nle.

Mr. Rodems' presenting of criminal charges to obtain advantage in a civil matter, and dishonesty atld lack of candor toward the court" had its intended result, to prejudice Judge Nielsen against me. Therefore I ,vas forced to nlove to disqualify the judge.

AccoDlpanying this complaint is the following:

Plaintiff's Motion to Disqualify Judge, November 3,2006 (Exhibit O(a)) Plaintiffs Memorandum ofLaw, Plaintiffs Motion Disqualify Judge (Exhibit O(b)) Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion To Disqualify Judge, November 20, 2006 (Exhibit G(e») Order of Recusal, November 22,2006 (on the Court's own motion) (Exhibit Oed))


Judge Nielsen initially ruled that my ffi'?tion was not timely filed. Two days later the Judge recused himselfon his own motion, presumably on the luerits ofDIy motion that Mr. Rodems peljured llimself, lied under oath, in order to prejudice the Court against Ine.

The Bar.should take note that shortly after Judge Nielsen recused himself in this case, he was reassigned to another division. As ofJanuary 22, 2007, Judge Nielsen was reassigned to tIle newly created "Division L" for Complex Business Litigation_ Judge Nielsell had a reputation ofdisregard for unrepresented persons, and Mr. Rodems exploited that prejudice to the COUlt's detrimel1t. Mr. Rodems ~mbal1·assed the Court.

On May 28, 2002, a story authored by Kathryn Wexler appeared in the St Petersburg Times about the Honorable Richard R. Nielsen entitled "Without an attorney, boy falters before judge". The stOly described 110W Judge Nielsen failed to provide an attorney to an hldigent minor during a restitution llearing. ~

On May 31, 2002, another story authored by Kathryn Wexler appeared in the St. Petersburg Tilnes about Judge Nielsen entitled "Teen who defended self gets attorney". The story describes how two days after tIle St. Petersburg Times detailed the teen's CQUltroom predicament, Judge Nielsen made room 0]1 his docket to deterilline wllether the family was indigent and, Ilence, entitled to fi·ee counsel. The llearing was over in 10 minutes, and the teen got a court-appointed Spanish tra.nslator and a public defender, tIle Times repolted.

On May 29, 2002, the St. Petersburg Times published an editorial about tlle Honol·able Richard R. Nielsell entitled "Judge should have kno\vn better". The editorial begins "What was Hillsborough County Circuit Judge Richard Nielsen thinking when he forced a 16-year...old to represent himself in court?"

The St. Petersburg Times is a highly respected newspaper ofnational acclaim. The Times published at least two news stories critical of Judge Nielsell relative to an um·epresented person. The Tinles also published an editorial that said Jlldge Nielsen made a mistake that needed cOll-ectioll. This is what the Times wrote about Judge Nielsen's reasoning that he thought the tninor was somehow protected by the fact his codefendant had an attolney: "That is either an alarming perspective on the law or an inept attelnpt at damage control, for he also said, in the same breath, that the attorney may have had a conflict playing two roles in the case.H

Judge Nielsen's reputation with um-epresented persons is infamous, and Mr. Rodems exploited Judge Nielsen's lalown prejudice against umeepresented petsOlls. In the process Mr. Rodems embarassed the Judge and caused Judge Nielsen to recuse himself) and likely caused the Judge to be reassigned to another division.

Currently the following motion to show cause is pending before the court, but not currently scheduled: Plaintiffs Motion With Affidavit For An Order To Show Cause Why Ryan Christopher Rodems Should not Be Held In Criminal Contempt Of Court And


Incorporated Melnorandum OfLaw. Kindly advise ifthe Bar would like to consider this motion to sho,v cause and I will provide a copy to The .Florida Bar.

5. Dishol1esty, Lack of Candot Toward the COUlt,_ Mr. Rodems willfully lied to Judge Nielsen in a letter dated October 12, 2006 about my failure to communicate. Mr. Rodems wrote the following: "~ ..1 transmitted a copy of the enclosed proposed Order to Mr. Gillespie and asked him to comment by today. I have not heard fl.-om l1im regarding this proposed Order." (Exhibit P, relevant portion).

Mr. Rodenls statement to Judge Nielsen is false, because I spoke witIl . Mr. Rodems about this and other matters the previous day by telephone. A transcript of tIle telephone conversation between me and Mr. Roden1s accompanies this complaint as Exhibit K. This example is illustrative, 110t exhaustive, ofMr. Rodems' dishonesty to the Court for the purpose to advantage in civil litigation.

In conclusion, to the extent that matters in the civil lawsuit, and my prior relationship with my former lawyers bear upon Mr. Rodems' curl-ent misconduct, I have enclosed Plaintiffs Motion for Punitive Damages Pursuant to Section 768.72 Florida Statues, witll supporting exhibits_ (Exhibit R).

TIlls complaint Ineets the requirements ofRule 3-7.16(a), LilnitatiorlS on Tilne to Bring Complaint, because the offenses occurred on or after August 29, 2005, when Mr. Rodems made his first appearance in the civil litigation. The six year time period to commence an inquily luns through August 29, 2011. This complaint also meets the requirements of Rule 3-7.4(e), No Delayfor Civil or Crinlinal Proceedings. Rule 3-7.4(e) says an investigation shall not be deferred or suspended without the approval of the board even though the respondent is Inade a palty to civil litigation or is a defendant or is acquitted in a criminal action, notwithstanding that either of such proceedings involves the sl.lbject matter of the investigatioll.

This concludes IllY complaint against Ryan Christopller Rodenls. It is my intent to fully cooperate with The Florida Bar and its grievance process~ Killdly contact me ifyou have additional questions or need anything else. Thank you.

Signed Florida Bar Inquily/Complaint FOIID

Witness list, and witness exhibits AA through DD The following Suppolting evidentiary exhibits:


A. My Complaint for Breach of Contract and Fraud, filed August 11, 2005

B. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Strike. This was Mr. Rodems' first appearance in tllis lawsuit, August 29, 2005

c. Order by Judge Nielsen finding a cause ofaction for Breach ofContract and Fraud against BRC and William J. Cook, JanualY 13, 2006

D. Retaliatoly Libel counterclainl by Mr. Rodetns, January 19, 2006, against Neil J. Gillespie, witll allegation ofextol1ion; Libel Counterclaim submitted in Answer, Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim

E. July 12, 2006 letter, Kenneth La\\lrenCe Marvin, Director La\vyer Regulation

F. Febluary 9, 2005 letter, Susan Bloen1endaal, ClliefBranch Disciplinary Counsel

G. September 7, 2006 letter, David M. Snyder to Ryan C. Rodems

H. Septenlber 14,2006 letter, Ryan C. Rodems offering a "\valk away" settlement

Ia October 5, 2006 letter, Ryan C. Rodems, settlement offer to David M. Snyder

J. February 7, 2007 letter, Ryan C. Rodems settlelnellt offer to Neil Gillespie

K. October 11, 2006, transcript of telephone conversation, Rodems to Gillespie

L. June 6, 2000, St. Pete Times story, "Attorney's suit says he received coffee in the face"

M. June 10, 2000, St. Pete Times story, "Bucs accused of extortiol1"

N. JUlle 22, 2000, St. Pete Times story, "Bucs fans win in ticket settlement"

O. (a) Plaintiff's Motion to Disqualify Judge, November 3, 2006 (b) Plaintiff's MelTIOrandum ofLaw, Plaintiff's Motioll Disqualify Judge (c) Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion To Disqualify Judge, Novelnber 20, 2006 (d) Order ofRecusal, November 22, 2006 (011 COtlrt's OWll motioll)

P. October 12, 20061etter, Ryan Roqenls to Judge Nielsen

Q. Transcript ofMarch 3, 2006, telephone conversation with Mr. Rodems where he threatened to reveal confidential client information

R. Plaintiffs Motion for Punitive Damages Pursuant to Section 768.72 Florida Statues, with suppoliing exhibits.

June 20, 2007

Witness list for the bar complaint against Ryan Christopher Rodelns~ ID no. 947652

1. The Honorable Richard A. Nielsen Circuit Couli Judge, Thirteenth Judicial Circuit Roanl 524~ 800 East Twiggs Street Tampa, Florida 33602

Witness to the false statements and peljury ofRyan Christopher Rodems

2. Kenneth Lawrence Marvin Director ofLawyer Regulation The Florida Bar 651 East Jefferson Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2300

Mr. Marvin is a witness to the authenticity and content of his letter to me of July 12, 2006 'conlmenting on whetller or not good-faitll effolts to resolve a dispute with an attorney or face a bar complaint alnount to the crime ofextortion under Florida law.

3. Mark A. Ober, State Attorney Office ofthe State Attolney for tIle Thitteenth Judicial Circuit 800 East Kennedy Blvd. Tampa, Florida 33602

Enclosed are four letters written to State Attorney Mark A. Ober about my lawyers' accusation that I committed the crime offelony extoliion pursuant to Florida Statutes, section 836.05 (2000), and the holdings ofCarricarte v. State, 384 So.2d 1261 (Fla. 1980); Cooper v. Austin, 750 So.2d 711 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000); Gordon v. Gordon, . 625 So.2d 59 (Fla. 4tl1 DCA 1993); Berger v. Berger, 466 So.2d 1149 (Fla_. 4th DCA 1985), for followil1g instructions on The Florida Bar~s complaint form, and taking the advice of Don Spangler ofthe Attorney Consulner Assistance PrograJll (ACAP) to make a good-faith effolt to resolve Iny dispute before making a bar complaint.

The letters are presented withollt enclosures, with the exception of the March 24, 2006 letter, which includes my letter to Amscot CO"plaintiff Gay Ann Blomefield& Kindly advise ifyou desire the other enclosures,

ExhibitAA March 7, 2006, lettet only ExhibitBB March 16~ 2006, letter only ExIlibitCC March 24, 2006, with enclosed letter to Gay Ann Blomefield ExhibitDD July 15, 2006

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIR'rEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, IN AND FOR HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY

GENERAL CIVIL DIVISION

NEIL J. GILLESPIE, CASE ID: OS-CA·720S Plaintiff,

v.

BARKER, RODEMS & COOI(, P.A., DIVISION: G a Florida corporation; and WILLIAM J. COOI{,

Defendants.

------~------~/

ORDER PROHIBITING PLAINTIFF FROM APPEARING PRO SE

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants' "motion for an order to show cause as

to \vhy Plaintiff should not.be prohibited from henceforth a~pearingpro se," filed on July 29,

2010. It i~ alleged that'Plai'ntiff is a~' abusive li~igant who should 'not be permitted to fil~ flllther

pleadings in this cause' u~l~ss they are firs~ reviewed and signed:b; ~~ ahoniey lice~~ed t~ practice

law in this state. Defendants allege that Plaintiff~s prosecution is an affront to the dignity of the

judicial system and an unacceptable burden on its resources. On November 4, 2010, this court

issued the order to show cause why Plaintiff should not be prollibited from appearil1gpro see

Among Plaintiff~s response were his fourth and fifth attempts to disqualify this court. This

response is typical of Plaintiff's litigation style. And his continuing course of conduct in this case

is all the more troublesonle because this case is presently pending appellate review of a final

summary judgment order. There is nothing left to litigate at this tinle. Yet Plaintiff continues to

file spurious pleadings \vith this court, each of which must be reviewed and evaluated by members

of the court staff. For these reasons and the reasons el1umerated in the nlotion, the Court hereby

finds that Plaintiff is an abusive litigant and, in order to preserve both the dignity and the efficient

operation of the judicial systenl, his right to full access to tIle court should be curtailed to the

extent described in this order. Plaintiff is hereby PROHIBITED from filing any paper with this

court \vhich is not signed by an attorney duly licensed to practice la\v in the State of Florida.

10f2

The Court therefore ORDERS as follows:

I. Plaintiff SHALL CEASE filing any pleading, correspondence, or other document in this

case unless the document is signed by an attorney who is duly licensed to practice law in

the State of Florida.

2. The Clerk of Court SHALL REJECT for filing any document received from Plaintiff

which does not bear the clear and conspicuous signature of an attorney duly licensed to

practice law in this state.

3. The Clerk of Court SHALL NOT DOCKET any pleading, correspondence or other

document received from Plaintiff which is prohibited by this order.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers in Hillsborough County, Florida, this 15th day of._ ~.,h'" .-::~)

November, 2010. OR\G\NAL b\vNb.

~O'l 1 5 20\0 ~\J/\.rtlHI~ J. CO?\>

___________---~(,JHCU\T.)\JOGE:

MARTHA J. COOK~ Circuit Judge

Send copies to: Neil J. Gjllespie Plaintiff 8092 SW 115th Loop Ocala, FL 34481

Ryan Christopher Rodems, Esquire Attorney for Defendant 400 N Ashley Drive Suite 2100 Tampa, FL 33602

20f2

IN TI-IE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY t FLORIDA

CIVIL LAW DMSION

NEIL J. GILLESPIE, Plaintiff, Case No: 05~CA-007205

Division: G and

BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, P.A., A Florida Corporation, and Wn.,LIAM J. COOK,

Defendants.

-----------------~/

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S EMERGENCY MOTION TO DISQUALIFY DEFENDANTS' COUNSEL RYAN CHRISTOPHER RODEMS & BARKER RODEMS & COOK, PtA.

THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon the Plaintiff's motion, filed July 9, 2010. This is the

third time that the Plaintiff has motioned to disqualify Defenda"nt's counsel t despite having been informed

in an order issued May 12, 2006 that this issue had been DENIED WITH PREJUDICE. "With

prejudice" that Ineans that '~he motion in question is "finally disposed ... and bars any future action on

that claim.u ] Moreover, because of the doctrine of res judicata 2.this motion must be DENIED.

The Plaintiff is again noticed (as he has been in t\VO previous Court orders) that repeat filings

attempting to revisit the same issue can be found to rise to the level of a sanctionable offense.3

The Clerk of Court is ORDERED to never accept another pleading fronl the Plaintiff that

indicates an attelnpt to disqualify Defendants~ counsel, as this matter has been DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

DONE and ORDERED in Chambers at Tampa t Hillsborough County, Florida, on July __,

2010.

OR\G\NAL SiGNED

JUL 2220\0 Martha J. Cook MAHTHA J. CO?!< CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE C\f\ClHTJU[)(;>E

1 Black's Law Dictionary, 7th Edition. 2 Matters that have been "definitively settled by judicial decision." Black's La\v Dictionary, 7th Edition, :1 Lanier v. State ofFlorida, 982 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 2008).

Page 1 of2 EXHIBIT 2

Copies Furnisbed To: Neil J. Gillespie, pro se (Plaintiff) 8092 SW 11Sth Loop Ocala, FL 34481

Ryan Christopher Rodems, Esq. (for Defendants) 400 North Ashley Drive, Stet 2100 Tampa, FL 33602

Page 2 of2

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, IN AND FOR HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY


NEIL J. GILLESPIE, Plaintiff,

CASE ID: OS-CA-7205

v.

BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, P.A., Defendant.

-------------,

DIVISION: G

ORDER DENYING EMERGENCY MOTION TO DISoUALIFY JUDGE MARTHA J. COOK

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintif.rs emergency motion to disqualify Judge

MattIla J. Cook, filed on November 1, 2010. The undersigned judge is a successor judge as

defined in Florida Rule ofJudicial Administration 2.330(g) because a previous judge has already

disqu'aIified himself from these proc~edings pursuant to a rule 2.330 motion filed by Plaintiff

This is the third such motion addressed by the undersigned. It is without merit. For the reasons

discussed below, the COlll1 denies the motion.

In 11is motion, Plaintiff alleges that the undersigtled is bias"ed against him and requests the

appoil1tment ofa judge ad litem; he recommends for the purpose Fidel Castro, of Cuba. There is

yet no agreement bet\veell the parties as to whether such a judge ad litem is satisfactory to them.

This is alone sufficient reason to deny the request to. appoint J\tfr. Castro judge ad litem under

section 38.13, Florida Statutes.

In support ofhis motion, Plaintiffreiterates a legally insufficient allegation previously

argued, llamely, that the judge must disqualify llerselfbecause he has brought federal suit against

her for civil lights violations. This remains a legally insufficient basis for disqualification. See

Dowda v. Salji.o ~55 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984), 5-H COJporatioll v. Padovana, 708 So. 2d

244 (Fla. 1994), May v. South Florida Water ManagelJlen!, 866 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004),

and Ba)' Bank & Trust v. Lelvis, 634 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). Plaintiff also argues that tIle

ulldersigned is acting in partIlership with Defendant, intentionally inflicts severe emotional

EXHIBIT 10f2 ;3

distress on him due to his "legal abuse syndrome,u alld has declared that she believes he lies. TIle

Court is entitled to lule on tIle truth of these assertions and finds that they are inaccurate. The

COUlt is Ilot in fact biased against Plaintiff.

It is therefore ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiffs motion is hereby

DENIED.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers in Hillsborough County, Florida, this day of

November, 2010. OR(G\NAl SIGNED

NOV 02· 20'0

Send copies to: Neil J. Gillespie Plaintiff 8092 SW 11Sth Loop Ocala, FL 34481

Ryan Christopher Rodems, Esquire Attolney for Defendant 400 N Ashley Drive Suite 2100 Tanlpa, FL 33602

.;.' 'I

2of2

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIR'rEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, IN AND FOR HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY


NEIL J. GILLESPIE, CASE ID: OS-CA-7205 Plaintiff,

v.

BARKER, RODEMS & COOI(, P.A., DIVISION: G a Florida corporation; and WILLIAM J. COOI{,

Defendants.

----------~/

ORDER PROHmITING PLAINTIFF FROM APPEARING PRO SE

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants' "motion for an order to show cause as

to why Plaintiff should not,be prohibited from llenceforth a~pearingpro se/' filed on July 29,

2010. It i~ alleged that 'Plaintiff is a~' abusive li~igant who should 'not be permitted to file fmiher

pleadings in this cause'u~l~ss they are:firs~ revie~ed and signed:b; ~~ attor~ey lice~sed t~ practice

law in this state. Defendants allege that Plaintiff's prosecution is an affront to the dignity of the

judicial system and an unacceptable burden on its resources. On November 4, 2010, this court

issued the order to show cause ,vhy Plaintiff should not be prollibited frolll appearhlg pro se.

Among Plaintiff's response were his fourth and fifth attempts to disqualify this court. This

response is typical of Plaintiff's litigation style. And his continuing course of conduct in this case

is all the more troublesome because this case is presently pending appellate revie\v of a final

summary judgment order. There is nothing left to litigate at this tinle. Yet Plaintiff continues to

file spurious pleadings \vith this court, each of which must be reviewed and evaluated by members

of the court staff. For these reasons and the reasons enumerated in the nlotion, the Court hereby

finds that Plaintiff is an abusive litigant and, in order to preserve both the dignity and tIle efficient

operation of the judicial systenl, his right to full access to tIle court should be curtailed to the

extent described in this order. Plaintiff is hereby PROHIBITED from filing any paper with this

court which is not signed by an attorney duly licensed to practice la\\' in the State of Florida.

EXHIBIT t of2 c=---_lJ-

The Court therefore ORDERS as follows:

I. Plaintiff SHALL CEASE filing any pleadingt correspondence t or other document in this

case unless the docun1ent is signed by an attorney who is duly licensed to practice law in

the State of Florida.

2. The Clerk of Court SHALL REJECT for filing any document received fronl Plaintiff

\vhich does not bear the clear and conspicuous signature of an attorney duly licensed to

practice law in this state.

3. The Clerk of Court SHALL NOT DOCKET any pleading, correspondence or other

document received from Plaintiff which is prohibited by this order.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers in Hillsborough County, Florida, this 15th day of " ". ~_..'.~~~~

November. 2010. OR\G\Nf\l S\GN\:::.\) \iQ'I 15 2.6\0

~,: ~rrn-Jf~ J. COO~{. ______________~~·{'~~~\HGU\-r.)UPGE

MARTHA J. COOK, Circuit Judge

Send copies to: Neil J. Gillespie Plaintiff 8092 SW 115th Loop Ocala, FL 34481

Ryan Christopher Rodems, Esquire Attorney for Defendant 400 N Ashley Drive Suite 2100 Tampa, FL 33602

20f2

-------------

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE TmRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR IDLLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA


NEIL J. GILLESPIE,

Plaintiff,

vs. Case No.: 05CA7205 Division: F

BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, PIA., a Florida corporation; and WILLIAM J. COOK,

Defendants. /

MOTION FOR AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE AS TO WHY PLAINTIFF SHOULD NOT BE PROlllBITED FROM HENCEFORTH APPEARING PRO SE

Defendants Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A. (BRC) and William J. Cook, move the Court

for an Order to show calIse as to why PlaintiffNeil J. Gillespie should not be prohibited from

henceforth appearing pro se, and as grounds therefor would state:

1. In Shotkin v. Cohen, 163 So.2d 330, 331 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964), the Third District

Court ofAppeal issued a show cause order requiring Shotkin to "show cause in writing ... WIlY

he should not be prohibited from henceforth representing himself' because ofms conduct, which

the Court stated denl0nstrated that he "either deliberately ignores the rules ofprocedure

applicable to this court, or is unable to understand said Florida Appellate Rules.~'

2. In PlateI v. Maguire, Voorhis & Wells, P.A., 436 So.2d 303, 304 (Fla. 5th DCA

1983), the Court required a pro se litigant to Ilave all court filings reviewed and signed by a

tnember ofthe Flolida Bar.

ill the past fourteen months, Mr. Platel has filed nine notices ofappeal in connection with several civil actions.... In SODle instances, Mr. Platel has sued judges who have issued

EXHIBIT S

adverse rulings. In connection with these several appeals, Mr. Platel has filed a plethora ofmotions which have included "Notices ofSupplemental Authorityu amounting simply to factual arguments, a "Request for Jury Trial," and a "Memorandum ofLaw,·Evidence ofRis Ability to File Law Suits,tt wherein Mr. Platel attached several form letters addressed to himselffrom politicians.

The consequence ofMr. Platel's litigious disposition and apparent lack of legal training is that this court has been inundated with voluminous and, for the most part, incomprehensible documents from him. TIns court has spent an unreasonable amount of time and effort attempting to decipher his pleadings, often with no success. This court recognizes the constitutional mandate that courts be open to all persons under Article I, § 21, Florida Constitution. Because the judicial process is the recognized dispute-settlement method, access to courts should not be placed beyond the reach ofany citizen. However, when one person, by his activities, upsets the normal procedure ofthe court so as to interfere with the causes ofother litigants~ it is necessary to exercise resh·aint upon that person, i.e", requirement that pleadings be accompanied by an attorney's signature-a restraint which does not amolmt to a complete denial of access.

3. The Article I, § 21, Florida Constitution right ofaccess to Courts is not unlimited.

Gillespie's actions have exceeded the tolerable limits. He should be barred from self-

representation. Kohn v. City ofMiami Beach, 611 So.2d 538, 539-40 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)("We

conclude that it is a mistake to hold a pro se litigant to a lesser standard than a reasonably

competent attorney. Section 454.18, Florida Statutes (1991) clearly provides 'any person ... may

conduct his own cause in any court ofthis state ... subject to the lawful rules and discipline of

SUCl1 court.' Likewise, in CalT v. Grace, 321 So.2d 618 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975), cert. denied, 348

So.2d 945 (1977), we observed a party's self-representation does not relieve the party ofthe

obligation to comply with any appropriate rules ofcivil procedure.").

4. In the event that Gillespie is permitted to continue to act pro se, the Court should

require that every pleading, motion or other document served or filed in this case is reviewed and

approved by a member ofthe Florida Bar.

5. On or about August 15, 2005, Plainti~ pro se, served his Complaint, alleging

2

two counts against Defendant BRC and two counts against Defendant William J. Cook. Since

that time, Plaintiff: by his activities) has upset the nomlal procedure of the Court so as to interfere

with tIle causes of other litigants, including Defendants in tbis action. As a result, the Court is

empowered to evaluate whether Plaintiff should be prohibited from continuing to represent

himself in this matter. Platel, 436 So.2d at 304.

a, Plaintiffhas denlonstrated a lack ofunderstatlding ofthe Florida Rules of

Civil Procedure, substantive law, professional decorum, and has on two occasions displayed

symptoms ofillness during court proceedhlgs, whether feigned or actual, l following Gillespie's

failed requests to stop proceedings when the COUlt was presiding in a manner that Plaintifffound

unfavorable to him.

b. In Court filings, Mr. Gillespie claims to suffer from U[d]epression and

mood disorder," for which he is taking prescription medications. He has, at times, declared his

qualifications to represent llimself: but also filed motions seeking the appointment ofcOlUlsel by

the Court, proclaiming his mental and intellectual limitations.

6. Plaintiffhas demonstrated a history offiling impertiJlent, scandalous and

incomprehensible documents with this Court. The following is a patiiallist ofPlaintiff's actions

in this case that upset the normal procedure of the Court so as to interfere with the causes of

1 On July 12, 2010, Mr. Gillespie stated to the Court during a hearing that he required medical attention, and he asked to be excused. As of3:36 p.m. on July 12, 2010, Mr. Gillespie was well enough to send e-mails. On February 5, 2007, dW'ing a hearing before Judge Isom in this matter, Mr. Gillespie" announced after several unfavorable rulings, '~I don't even know why I'm sitting here. And I'm very ill. I've expressed that to you. I can't even effectively assist myself: So I'm not going to participate in this charade anymore." Whether Mr. Gillespie was actually ill in either hearing has not been established.

3

other litigants, including Defendants in this action:

a. On February 4, 2006, Gillespie moved to disqualify the undersigned from

representing Defendants, but Judge Nielsen denied the motion on April 25, 2006, with a written

Order entered May 12, 2006.2 After Judge Nielsen recused himself: Gillespie moved to

reconsider the 11lling denying 11is Illotion to disqualify and brought it for hearing on Febluary 5,

2007. Because Gillespie claimed he could not answer the Court's questions about the motion

because he was "not an attomey/' Judge 180m decided not to consider any further the motion to

reconsider Judge Nielsen's ruling denying Gillespie;'s motion to disqualify the undersigned.

b. On July 12, 2010, Gillespie filed another motion to disqualify the

undersigned, and it is largely incomprehensible, replete with citations to irrelevant portions ofthe

Rules Regulatlllg the Florida Bar, atld citations to irrelevant case law on legal points not at issue.

On February 8, 2006, Gillespie moved to dismiss Defendants' libel counterclaims, raising

waiver, economic loss rule and other defenses that had no legal or factual basis. 011 February 28,

2006, Defendants served a section 57.105(1), Florida Statutes motion for sanctiol1S on Gillespie,

seeking an Order that Gillespie be required to obtain an attorney_

c. In response to the section 57.105, Florida Statutes motion for sanctions, on

April 28, 2006, Gillespie filed a docwnent entitled "Plaintiff's Qualifications to Proceed Pro Se."

2 Gillespie has moved to disqualify every judge assigned to this case. He also filed bar grievances against Defendant Cook, Chris A. Barker, and the undersigned, all ofwhich were determined to be unfounded. Gillespie then filed a grievance agail1st the Florida Bar lawyers who handled his grievances against Barker, Rodems and Cook. Gillespie also filed a complaint against the undersigned with the Tampa Police Department, claiming the undersigned committed perjury in defending his clients in this action, but the Tampa Police Department, as did the Florida Bar, found that there were no perjurious statements made by tIle undersigned.

4

Yet, three days earlier, on April 25, 2006, Gillespie filed "Plaintiff's Motion for Appointment of

Counsel, Attorney's Fees, and Legal Retainer," requesting that the Court appoint an attorney for

him and require Defendants to pay for his attorney.

d. On March 3, 2006, during a telephone conversation regarding the case,

Gillespie threatened to "slam" the undersigned "against the wall;" as a reSll1t, I filed a verified

request that a bailiffbe present at all hearings. Subsequently, Judge Nielsen advised that a bailiff

is present at all matters involving pro se litigants.

e. On MarcIl 28, 2006, Defendants served discovery on Gillespie. Gillespie

did not "fully or completely respond to it~ so after consultation, Defendants filed a Dlotion to

compel on May 11, 2006. Judge Nielsen heard and granted the motion to compel on June 28,

2006 and awarded attorneys' fees and costs. The written Order was entered on July 24, 2006.

£ On August 14, 2006, Gillespie filed a notice ofappeal of the July 24, 2006

Order on discovery with the Second District Court ofAppeal. The undersigned advised him in

writing that it was improper to appeal a discovery order, and that Gillespie was in violation ofthe

July 24, 2006 Order because he did not provide the discovely responses ordered. Gillespie

responded by telling the undersigned not to give hinllegal advice. On August 25, 2006, the

Second District Court ofAppeal entered the "Order Denying Petitioner's Notice ofAppeal."

g. On August 22, 2006, Gillespie filed a petition for writ of certiorari with

the Second District Court ofAppeaL On Septenlber 8, 2006-, the Second District Court of

Appeal entered the "Order Dismissing Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Certiorari."

h. Because Gillespie did not comply with tile July 24, 2006 Order on

discovelY, Defendants moved for an order to show cause on August 25, 2006. The hearing on

5

this motion was scheduled 011 October 4, 2006. In filings with the Court before tIle hearing on

October 4, 2006, Plaintiffrepresented to this Court that, because ofWs disabilities, he req1.1ired

that an attorney be appointed for him under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and he

requested a continuance ofthe hearing on Defendants' motion for an order to show cause.

i. At the hearing on October 4, 2006, Judge Nielsen denied Gillespie's

request for appointment by the Court ofan attolney for him. Gillespie represented to the Court

during this hearing that an insurer lnay provide counsel to defend him on Defendants'

COllnterclairns for libel, but if it did not, he intended to hire an attorney. Judge Nielsen decided

to not make any otller rulings to give Gillespie time to retain counsel, and he ordered Gillespie to

advise the Comt ofhis progress in retainil1g counsel by October 18, 2006.3

j. Subsequently, Plaintifffiled letters dated October 16 and 18, 2006 in

response to the Court's request for infonnation regarding Gillespie~s progress hiring counsel.

Rather than provide a progress repolt, Gillespie submitted numerous attachments including,

among other things, transcripts of telephone conversations between Gillespie and Defendants'

counsel, correspondence regarding settlement discussions, criticisms ofthe Court's rulings on

matters in this case, allegations about an alleged act by Jonathan L. Alpert more than five years

a~o in an unrelated case, criticism ofJudge Nielsen for his decisions in other cases, as well as

hearsay statements purportedly fl.-om unidentified nlembers ofthe Florida Bar criticizing Judge

Nielsen and Defendants and Defendants' counsel. The substantial majority ofthe nvo letters is

inunateriaI, impertinent or scandalous, and the letters should be stricken from the record.

3 A written Order was entered on October 23, 2006.

6

k. Plaintiff claimed an entitlement to appointment ofcounsel under the ADA

-- an argument that would be considered frivolous by a licensed attorney. When the Court asked

for citations supporting his claim for an attorney under the ADA, Plaintiffdeclined to offer any,

telling the Court til am not an attorney and I have not been to law school." (Plaintiffs October

18, 2006 letter, Exhibit 1 (Transcript of October 4, 2006,--page 7)). Yet, on other occasions, he

has filed documents touting his legal abilities.

1. On November 3, 2006, Gillespie nloved to disqualify Judge Nielsen.

Gillespie accused him of being "llostile" to pro se plaintiffs and having a "sadistic quality." In

that same motion, Gillespie also accused tIle undersigned ofaggravating his "existing disability,"

which required medical treatment "that reduced Plaintiffs intellectual ability to represent

himself." The motion to disqualify was untimely and legally insufficient, and Judge Nielsen

denied it on November 20, 2006. Two days later, however, Judge Nielsen entered an Order of

recusal.

TIl. On Novelnber 29, 2006, Judge Claudia Isom was assigned to the case.

Gillespie filed a motion requesting Judge Isom to disclose conflicts ofinterest, and included in

the supporting documents a transcript ofa voice mail from a staffer in then..Govelnor Jeb Bushrs

office regarding some unrelated matter.

D. On February 5, 2007, Judge Isom held a hearing, and after several rulUlgS

unfavorable to Gillespie, including the denial afills motion for rehearing on the July 24, 2006

Order on discovery, Gillespie stated "Judge, rm going to ask that you disqualify yourself I'm not

7

getting a fair hearing here. rve asked to have an attolney present many times.4 Everything I say

is not considered. I don't even know why I'm sitting here. And I'm very ill. I've expressed that to

you. I can't even effectively assist myself. So I'm not goil1g to participate in this charade

anymore." (Transcript of hearing, February 5, 2007 at 72:12-19). Judge Isom terminated the

proceedings to afford Gillespie an opportunity to file a written motion to disqualify her.

o. Before lnoving to disqualify Judge 1som, Gillespie filed "Plaintiffs Notice

ofVoluntary Dismissal," and "Plaintiffs Motion for an Order ofVoluntary Dismissal" on

FeblUaty 7,2007.

p. On February 13, 2007, Gillespie moved to disqualify Judge Isom.s That

same day, Judge Isom entered the "Court Order OfRecusaI And Directing Clerk To Reassign To

New Division/' fmding the motion to disqualify hel' to be legally insufficient, but nevel1heless

recusing herself.

q. On February 15, 2007, Gillespie served his "WitIldrawal OfPlaintiffs

Motion For An Order OfVollUltalY Dismissal" and "Withdrawal OfPlaintiffs Notice Of

4 Ofcourse, Gillespie, pro se, served the 110tice ofhearing, thereby scheduling hearings on February 5, 2007. Moreover, he previously told Judge Nielsen, on October 4, 2006, that he intended to hire an attorney, and he never did so. No judge assigned to this case has ever denied Gillespie the opportunity to hire an attorney.

S In his motion to disqualify Judge IsoID, Gillespie accused her of"forc[ing] Plaintiff to participate in a hearing .... without counsel." Judge Isom denied the motion as legally insufficient. More recently, in open court, Gillespie accused me and Judge 1som ofconspiring against him by agreeing to not advise him tIlat Judge 180m's husband was once a Ia,v partner of Jonathan L. Alpelt's at my predecessor law fum. Not only was Mr. Isom never a law partner of my predecessor law firm, but also the only occasions in which I ever spoke to Judge 180m about anything in this action is when Gillespie was present.

8

Voluntary Dismissal.u

r. On March 27, 2008, Judge Barton detennined after an evidentiary hearing

that Gillespie must pay $11,500.00 in sanctions because ofhis discovery violations, which

resulted in the July 24, 2006 Order entered by Judge Nielsen, and his pleadil1g in violation of

section 57.105, Florida Statutes, which resulted in Judge Bation entering the Order granting

sanctions on July 20, 2007. Gillespie \vas represented by counsel at this heating.

s. On October 13, 2008, Gillespie's attolney moved to withdraw, but

apparently he and Gillespie resolved their issues. Several months later, Gillespie's attorney again

moved to withdraw again, whicl1 was granted on or about October 1, 2009. The case was stayed

to provide Gillespie with 60 days within which to find replacement counsel.

1. Despite the stay, on October 5, 2009, Gillespie filed a pro se motion to

disqualify Judge Barton, alleging lUlder oatIl that "[a]s a proximate cause ofJudge Barton's

actions, plaintiffs mother, Penelope Gillespie, died Septelnber 16,2009." That motion was

denied as legally insufficient on October 9, 2009.

u. On December 16, 2009, Defendants noticed the post-judgmellt discovery

motions to compel for hearing on Janumy 19,2010, but Gillespie, pro se, complained that the

hearing dates were not cleared witll him, and he demanded that several other motions be

scheduled for hearing. Thus, Judge Barton scheduled all pending motions for hearing on Janumy

26,2010.

v. At that hearing on January 26, 2010, Gillespie claimed to be disabled and

that he required accommodations.. Judge Barton inquired as to what accommodations were

required, and Gillespie requested an opportunity to file written support, which Jlldge Batton

9

granted. No other action was taken during that hearing.

w. Thereafter, Gillespie apparently submitted a hearsay report from a

purported expert exparte to Judge Barton. Despite Defendants' objections to the exparte

communication, Gillespie has never filed the ex parte hearsay report or served a copy on

Defendants.

x. Unhappy with Judge Barton, Gillespie made complaints to tIle Chief

Judge, in ,vriting.

y. As a result of the Court's caseload, the next hearing was not scheduled

until May 5, 2010. At the May 5, 2010, Gillespie served a motion for leave to file an amended

complaintj attaching an amended complaint. Defendants did not stipulate to its filing, and

therefore the motion for leave to file the amended complaint remains pel1ding. A review of it

SllOWS it is also largely incomprehensible, raises claims already dismissed, raises futile claims,

and fails to comply with the pleading requirements of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.

z. Plaintiffhas failed to schedule his motions for hearing, and then blamed

the Court and the undersigned for the fact that tIle motions were not ruled upon.

aa. After Judge Batton was disqualified, Gillespie filed a motion to disqualify

Judge Cook on Jtme 14, 2010, wmcll was denied. The motion to disqualify was legally

insufficient Gillespie's first basis for disqualification was dissatisfaction with Judge Cook's

decision not to cancel a hearing. Housing Authority of City of Tampa v. Burton, 873 So.2d 356,

358 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)("Adverse rulil1gS, by themselves, wllether they are correct or incorrect,

are not legally sufficient grounds upon which to base a Inotion to disqualify a judge for prejudice

or bias. n). Gillespie's second basis for disqualification was Ius self-perceived "controversy

10

between Plaintiffal1d [the judicial assistant] over whether notice was provided to record calls

with her: II and therefore, Judge Cook may be prejudiced against him. (plaintiffs motion to

disqualify at ~ 29). This also was legally insufficient.

bb. On July 23, 2010, Gillespie filed a third motion to disqualify Judge Cook,

tWs time in writing, al1d under oath. Gillespie alleged as follows in paragraphs 8 and 9:

Judge Cook is biased toward Gillespie on matters ofdisability. Judge Cook is emotional on matters ofdisability because daughter [ ] is disabled. This information is public knowledge and Judge Cook seeks publicity about her daughter's disability. In a S1. Petersburg Times story May 13,2009 reporting on [ ]'s disability, the Times wrote "Her mother, Hillsborough Circuit Judge Martha Cook, fought back tears as [] told the story.n (Exhibit B). Another story published April 12,2001, Birthing Bad Legislation (Exhibit C) wrote "Martha Cook-Sedgeman, chokes up with happiness as she describes her daughter" [] who was hOITI two months premature. Her buill mother exited when [ ] was 1 day old. There were clearly problems at birth, which would become apparent later as a 70 percent loss ofhearlllg. The [ ], who had arranged to adopt [ ] before her birth, had to guarantee an unexpected $100,000 in medical bills. "The costs were staggering," Martha recalls. 9.

Judge Cook is typical ofa certain kind ofparent ofdisabled clrildren who are hostile to adtuts with disabilities. Some ofGillespie's disabilities are congenital like [ ]'s but Gillespie's disabilities \vere much more extensive.

(plaintiff's Motion to Disqualify Judge Martha J. Cook, July 23, 2010, ~~ 8-9). There is no

factual basis for these repugnant and despicable allegations. It is clear that Gillespie, having not

gotten Iris way, will use any means to try to get rid ofany judge or person involved in the case

that does not conform to Plaintiffs jaundiced vie"v ofjustice. This motion to disqualify is

beyond a desperate act; it draws into question Gillespie's motives and mental and intellectual

ability to adequately participate in these proceedings.

co. Gillespie is also trying to intitnidate witnesses. On July 26, 2010,

Gillespie sent by facsinlile a letter to John Gardner, Esquire, Defendants' expert witness in

11

connection with the sanctions against Gillespie. In the July 26,2010 letter, Gillespie accuses Mr.

Gardner ofvarious wrongdoings connected with his expert testimony and threatens action ifMr.

Gardner does not yield to Mr. Gillespie's demands -- another apparent act ofextortion. See

Exhibit 1.6

WHEREFORE, Defendants request that the Court Order Gillespie to show cause as to

,vhy he should not be restricted from representing himself.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26th day ofJuly, 2010.

RY C OP Flor aaBarNo. 947652 Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A. 400 North Ashley Drive, Suite 2100 Tampa, Florida 33602 813/489-1001 813/489-1008 (facsimile) Attorneys for the Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

6 On June 13 and 18,2003, Gillespie wrote to Mr. Cook, tlu°eatening that ifBRC did not pay him money, tilen he would file a complaint against Mr. Cook with the Florida Bar and contact his former clients. Gillespie's actions may llave constituted extortion. See § 836.05, Fla. Stat. (2000); Carricarte v. State, 384 So. 2d 1261 (Fla. 1980); Cooper v. Austin, 750 So. 2d 711 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000); Gordon v. Gordon, 625 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); Berger v. Berger, 466 So. 2d 1149 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985).

12

07/2612010 14:54 FAX 813 651 1874 JOHN W GARDNER tal00307~26-~e1a 08:05 NEIL GILLESPIE PAGE2 ,

,; ','

VIA US CER:llll]WJ MAll. RR.R Arlicle NCl.. 7009 0080 00022061 1457

VJA }'AX CBlJl 651 ..1874

July26~ 2010

Mr. John William Gnrdnor John W. Gardner, PA 221 East Robertson Street Brandon, Florlda 33511 ..5234

RE: Ne'jl 1. Oille8pie Vtl. Barker! Rodcnrns & Cook, fa end William J. Cookt

Caq~ No. OSa.CA-7205, llillsborough Circuit ClvU Court, Tampa) Florida

DearMr. Gardner:

On Maroh 20~ 2008 you negligently tostified as an expert witness in the above captioned matter concemillg attorney:!s fees tor Ryan Christophor Rodems. As a. result I sustained dmnages and yOUT neglig.enl testimony was the proximate cause ormy damages.

As an expert witness you kIlew or should have known that Mr. Rodcms was unlawfully representing llis finn and partner against a fonner cJient in the sanle Qr substantially re)$.(ed matter, and that Rodems" independont professional judgment was materially limited by the lawyer's own interest. As such Mr. R()(l~ms' representation was unlawful, and Rodems wa~ not entitled to any attorneys fces. You apparently violated FI.. Bar Rule 4-3.3(0) when you failed to disclose'to the tribullal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction lalown to the lawyer t(l he directly adverse to the positi(lll oflhe client and not disclosed by opposing counsel,

Counsel has ~t responsibility to lully inform the court on appJicablo law whether tavora.ble oxadverse to position ofclient so that th" court is better able to make a. fair and accurate detenni.natiOll ()f Lhe maiter before it. Newberger v. Newberger, 311 So,,2d 176. As evidenoed by t=mel-gency Motion To DiliQual11y Dofendants" (:oullsel Ryan ChrIstopher Rodems &, Barker~

RodxIDs 4t Cgok, PAll legal authllrily directly adverse to the position ofMr. Rodems and Barker, Roclems & Cook, !'A was no~ disclosed to tile Court by either YOll or Mr. Rodoms.

Enclosed you will find a CD with Emergency Motion To DisqualifY Defendants' Counsel R.yan Christopher Rodems & Bark~r, Rodcms & Cook. PA~ This docum~nt is also available online at http://you~u~I()rg/.Please immediately notify the court that your expert witness testimony of March 20t 2008 was neglJgent, and lake stops to recant your negligent expert wItness testimony_

In addltiou, pursuant to FI~ Bar Rule 4"8~3a Reporting ProfessIonal Misconduct (relevant portion) (a) Reporting Mi!-iconduct QfOther Lawyers. A lawyer who knows that another lawyer has committed a viola.tion of· the Rulos ofProfessional Conduct that raIses u S\lb~tan(ial qu~sti.on as

EXHIBIT J

f.{gUU4

PAGE3

Mr. John Williatn Gardner rage -2 John w. Oaroner, PA July 26, 201()

to that lawyor's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness a.q a lawyer in other respects sha.lllnfornl the appropriate pt(lfessional authority. Kindly rcpon Mr~ Rodems' lnisconduct lo the Florida Bar..

Please (uk~ action Lo oorrect your negligenoe and misconduct wltl,fn the next five (5) days,. otherwiso TYt/illtake that as your refusal and 1wIll proceed on that basis~ Thunk Y(lU.

SincerelY1{

.. ://~~~_J eilJ.O· esp~~

, 8092' 115th Loop Ocala, Floridf134481 T~oIephone~ (352) 854-7807

ltnclosure: CI)

Documents

Ryan Christopher Rodems, Response to Florida Bar Complaint No. 2013-10,271 (13E)