S. R. Bhatt, Anu Mehrotra, The Dalai Lama Buddhist Epistemology

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    BUDDHIST

    EPSTEMOLOGY

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    BUDDHIST

    EPITMOLOGY

    S. R Bhatt and Anu Mehrotra

    Fowo b L

    ouo hlooh Nu 75a oa Adv

    GEEOO EWestport, Connecticut London

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    Lb --b

    Bhatt, S. R. (Siddheswar Resha) 1939-Buddist epistemology S. R Bha andAnu Mehrora ; foreord by the Dalai Lama

    p. cm{Conibuions in philosophy, ISSN 008926X ; no. 5)Includes the text of imga's NyyamukhaIncludes bibioghcal references and index.

    ISBN 03133108 paper Knoledge Theo of (Buddhism) 2 ignga, 5th cent yyukha3 Buddhst loc Dignga 5th cent. Nyyamukha. II. Tie SeesBQ0.B53 2000 9953

    Biis Libra Catoguing in Publicaion Data is available

    Copight 200 by S R Bhatt andAnu Mehroa

    All rights rseed No poion of his book may bereproduced by any pocess or technique, ithout teexpress written cnsent of the pubisher

    Lib of Cogss Caog Card umber: 990513ISBN 313310874ISSN 004926X

    Frst pubished 2000

    Greenwood Pess, 88 Post Road West Wespor CT 01

    impnt of Greenood Publishing Group Inc.www.genoodcom

    Pnted in he United States of Ameca

    The pape used in s book ompies wih hePeanent Pape Sdd issued by he Naional

    nfoaon Sndards Oanzation Z3941984

    1 7 4 1

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    Cos

    Foreord y he Daa Laa

    Preace

    Itroducto The Buddhst Theory o Koedge

    The Buddhst Theory o Perceto

    The Buddhst Theory o Ierec

    Aed : Npes

    Aed : pes (Trasato)

    Notes

    Gossary

    Bograhy

    Idex

    0

    0

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    Forwod

    T Dl m

    Whe Buddha kyau attaed elghteet eea the Bodh tree oretha to ad a hal thousad years ago hs acheveet s ot oy the resulto havg reached the eak o edtatve stalsato o havg rought greatcoasso to uto ut also o clear aalytc ought The lcd slcty ohs susequet teachgs are ale evdece o ths Ad deed he ecouragedhs olloers to regard eve hs o advce the sae rgorously crtcal lghtThus the stdy o logc ad e ature o oledge have ee ccal to Buddhsttradto ro the outset .

    These dsces cotued to develo ad oursh Ida aer the Buddhasassg aay reachg ther ace the ors o asuadhu Dga adDharakrt hch ere to ece seal to sdes the great oastc

    uverstes such as Nad ad aal. Ad t as ths tradto o acutelogc ad aalyss at as trastted ad reserved Tet or ore tha athousa years here t as eloyed ot erey to challege the ves oothers t to esure e clarty ad authetcty o o's o ve.

    Thereore I a delghted at to dstgushed coteorary Ida scholarsDr SR Bhatt ad Dr A Mehrotra have rtte the reset oo o BuddhstEsteology cludg a Eglsh traslato o e Nyya Prava . " Thsvaluale ork sheds lght o astruse tocs ad ll allo readers to ga aclearer aprecato o he des o Buddhst koledge

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    Pra

    ad logic i articuar ad of the entire edieva Idia eistemoogy ad ogic geera There are severa works coosed y him his area, amog hichPrama Samuccaya ad Nyya Prava are most ortat Prama

    Samuccaya is ot avaiae i its comete fo, even hough some of its chatershave ee restored om Tietan and other sources However Nyya Pravea isavailale to us i its l for A attemt has ee ade here to trasate it iEgish for e eet of Egish aguage readers The tet is resented here inRoa scrit ih a view to have wider readershi Eaatory otes have asoee rovided to cari soe oty oits

    Nyya Pravea is a classica work ertaiig to the modes of owig andreasoig i the Buddhist traditio For ceries it has een sudied as a manualof the Budhist theory of owedge i India, Tiet, Cha, ad oer couriesIt rovides a foundatio to the famous Buddhist art of deate (dd. Thereare severa Tieta a Chinse comentaries ad sucoetaries o NyyaPrava aar om the oes i Saskrit This accounts for its sigicace andouariy aog cassical schoars

    I a crytic, ut succict, maer Nyya Pravea resets Dgas viewso he ature of ercetio ad iference ad their faacies It also eaorateydiscusses the modes of arguentatio and retatio alog with eir falacies

    are gratefu to Greeood Puishig Grou ad its sta ad to

    Dr Hoa ho itroduced thi work to Greewood Our thas are aso due toIdia Council of Philosohical Research for rovidig acia assistace forthe rearatio of the work

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    Itroducion

    DCHO OF STANCE AND NO-SSTANCE ONLOGSThe varied and multifaceted Indian philosophical hought is charactered by twobroad philosophical tendencies at are antietical n nare but boh of whichcan be traced i germinal form to e Upaniadic ought One tendency, whichcan be termed "CCd r substance ontology, " has been dominantlypresented in e so-called si systems, e culation of which is foud inthe Advaita Vednta. The other tendency, which is popularly known as"Cd or nosubstance ontology, " nds its avoca and manifestation Buddhist ought The basic contention bircatig he two tendencies is eview regardig he ontological staus of peranence and change, bo of which,though opposite naure, are given to us veridica experience, and herefore

    bo clai the stas of reality The substance ontology advocates he permanenceaspect and tries to explain he phenomenon of change. The no-substance ontology,on he contrary, accepts he realiy of change alone and explais the experienceof pe rmanence as conceptual superimposition. Thus the history of Indianphilosophical thoght could be approached in terms of a dialectic of hese twodivergent tendencies.

    The substance-ontology revolves around e idea of permanence or abidanceas e sole criterion of reali. Accordingly, substce, hich alone is e substramof all aributes and modes, has the sole reality or e priary realiy, and e

    attributes and modes have eiter an apparent existence or a derivative existence.Acordg to Advaita Vednta substance, which is a unitary, homogeneous pureconsciusness, aone is real, and all attributes and modes are phenomenal in he

    sense that they are i i.e, neither real nor eal). Te Skhya systemand also the NyyaVaieia and Mms systems, however, assign some realityto change also insofar as matter is regarded as subject to muation wheer in e

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    form of evolutio from oe mass o ar or he form of combitio ofdiferet elemets of matter, ty producing a dfferent or ewcomlex. But he ot to be o is that v i hese schools ht

    dsla a realstic tedcy t priacy of substace d s ermaenessece ae empas ized It ay sgicat to oi out tht thee has lsoee aothe tenc te scoo of Jam erei the elusveess ofubstance otolog a o-susace oolog s been rejctd nd eqal sausis accore to boh emaece a chage

    NO-SSTCE OOLOGY OF BUDDISMBds hOUgh hs ceee o osnce otolog Gm

    he Bd wo ie Bds hoh s l o oohzg b

    tese logg o he eicio of seg. He iszed h l seig ie o 'tauM (ogig) d l og is e o e o he seoio o enence He o sgges w o o he n o eg fo ieece o ossili s he ke o oecomiffeig e o Nobe Th heefoe oce he ie o imenecea ossii s he w o ece sfeig. The eie ei h igeeal esoo i s o ae d cociosess hs be nesoody B s a sees o chgig oes (alw). The wod "mome is

    gesie of h c th e o eise is me-emede A h essess m Theeoe eisec is is ieic wih ime seies. Theeence seies co e hica o sycc o cogomei sarighta) ohe wo Ee see i isef i so cogoeio Meil eit s

    hyic cogloeio (b sagta), whees e ei is cccogoeio (ctta sagta) A ig eig schohsiclcoglomeio Sice he syci coglomeo is o o es sychohysic cogomeaio is e pafcasndha cosiig o osychc a oe sicl cogomeios. e ical ceo

    ss sha sna d sa sha Theoly hica cogomeio is pa skanhaTe esece seie hee of hc coglomeo o ccl

    coglomeo cois o distc s o esece h e scee b noieee. Tey e e ieede i e ese h ee cceeig i he ee s csl eee o ecedg i h eie nleise ee ecdg i i he ses o o be e h o gie ise oi scceeig These o iea ae eicl k pa amta(deee oigio) a ya c ece) e cose

    he essece of he o oe T ooed b e Bd The coce of esce seies (a{a santna) s io o Bu

    eahscs I eis e aiy o cssa chge es o he cs eede oigi o e sccig o he ecedg i he sees Theeiece oeece e sees s so ele o e asis o coiad deeece The e s ways cgig e chage s o om; is

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    nouon 3

    caually regulaed In cae of a huma being, e erie i pychophical, havinga diinc idniy of i own Bu i poe he roble of memory, recllecion,and recogniion in every diinc peronal idenity Buddhi hough explain

    hee problem al o in er of snn exience erie) In everypychophyical erie ha i unique and elfidenical e ucceeding em ohe preceding, and hi conglomeraion of fiefold erie , which begin wih hebirh of he conglomeraion in a paricular form, coninue ill he deah of haconglomeraion ha fo From birh o deah in hi erie here i a conchange, and ye here i reenion wi he poibili of recollecion and recogiion

    on he bai of which e pa i reained in he preen and haded over o heure In deah he oal conglomeraion doe no ceae o exi or doe no comeo an end and ge reained o a o give rie o anoer ongloeraion in omeoher for in e nex birh In hi eanrphoi he pychical erie i preenonly in he fo of srs laen preion) ained by ic forceThe ic force deermine he naure and fo of he nex bir They alodeermine he pfcsndhs he vefold conglomeraion) , which ha o comeino exience in e nex birh There i coninuiy no only wii one paricularbirh bu alo om one birh o anoher bih Thu, Buddhi hough wed a remarkable explanaion of he problem of peronal ideniy, e experienceof permanence, and o on expreed in he phenoena of eory, recollecion,

    and recogniionThere are oe inereing ipliaion of he noubance onologyadvocaed by he Buddha The idea of impeanence of reali reul in hedenil of a peanen and iral oul owever, hi doe no mean ha herei no echaolog or oeriology in Buddhi hough The Buddhi accoun of

    he deiny of he individual elf i condiioned by he idea of nipenanence),pfcndh vefold conglomeraion), and snn(exienceerie), and accordingly, he dei of he idividual elf i characerized aaainn of ni

    Anoher implicaion i he orm of iience on human auono anddenial of any uprauan or divine agen for helping he huan being o aainni Buddh pearheaded he rm radiion, which ephaized elfeffor and noble conduc (gi mg). In hi cheme ere i no roleaigned o any divine or uperhua agen Buddha alwa inpreed uon hifollower o have a criical aiude and an analyic ben of ind He wa oppoedo blind h, and ha i why he reje ced all noion abou rancendenal eniie However, i doe no ean ha Buddha wa aniprali He had an abidingfai in a moral and piriual order Tha i why he wa no a aeriali like aCka

    SRY OF BUDDHST THOUGHTEar Buddhim center around the eaching of the Budda, which are

    conained i he Pi Tipks Thi phae of Buddhit tought i therefore

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    rodio 5

    VAHA SCOOLThe Vaibhika school seems to hae acquied his name because i elies

    upo a comenay on he Tipi own as Vb This school upholds a

    dualis of mental and physical elements Alla is eal is momenay, and it iseihe physical (b) o menal (c). The objects of he wold ae aconglomeaion of eithe physical elemets o metal elemens o both No objectis peanent o abidig, but sce it is e fm of an incessant seies, it giesthe impession of pemanece These objects ae diecly on in peceptualcogitio e hee is sinUlaei of appeaance of e cogzg consciousnessad the cogized object a a paticula ie, peceptual cogniio of that objecakes place Thus, all hee hae simultaeous oign at one ad he same eThough e objct depeds on he cognzing cosciousness n ode to be own,

    he dependence is not necessay fo mee eistence objec may eist withoubeig own ad may thus be independent of he cogning consciousnessLewise, a cognzng consciousness may also eist ndependently of he cognedobject In this ay, he Vaibh school adocates dualism its metaphysicsand ealism in its epistemology The Vaibhika school concenaes moe o heanalysis of metal phenomena, and we fd an elaboae psychological aalysis e liteae belogig to his school

    SAA SCHOOLThe Sautntika school deies its ane fom a commentay called Stnt

    It is also a ealistic school, shaig its metaphysics wi Vaibhikas Sauttikasbeliee i he ometay eistece of the eal ad classi them ito metal adphysical The metal ad the physial ae baically idepedent of each othe,though susequetly they may iteact Sautntikas egad the object to beeistig idepedetly of the oetic pocess The object, he cogize ad hecogitio ae all distict The object may be kow o ma ot be ow If aobject is kow, it caot be know i diect peceptio I this espect e

    diffe fom Vaibhikas Accoding to Sautntikas, the omet of eistence oftle objec ad tle momet of he cogitio of the object caot be the samebecause cognition follows ad pesupposes eistence, ad eey eistence pecedesits cgition Thee caot be simultaneity of eistence and its cognition TheSautntika ikes eamine and ete e aibhika positio in is espectIn fact, this is the majo poit of diffeece betwee the two schools TheSauttikas ague at the obect of knowledge eists idepedetly of thecogi cosciousess, ad it ceases to eist in he et momet So, whe icomes ito eistece at that ey momet, it is ot cognized, ad it caot be

    cogized does ot eist i e et oet to be peceptally cogized, sotee is nee ay pecepal cognitio of a object Howee, it does ot meathat a object ca ee be cogized Thee is anothe mode of cogizig abject Befoe a object ceases to eist, it leaes out its pessio This imessiois e eact copy of its oiginal ad has seblace (spy) wi it The cogizigcosciousness pecepally appehends oly this impessio, and though

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    6 ouo

    s percepa appreheso of he mpresson fers he orga ojec Ths,

    Sars rodce he cocep of oec resso d hg hs advocae

    he represenve theor of percepon For them a cognos are reprsented

    cognons of he ojec ojec-qa-ojec s o drec perceved. O smpresson s perceved and ecase of e resemance of the two and cogve

    onavaa of the oject e mpresso s ae to e the orga oject

    MH SCHOOThe hrd schoo s a, whch s piosophcay ery sgncat

    Ngra has ee he rs ow expoent of s scoo. e args atBdas eacgs cnsst e ptipd (mdde pa) to e foowed

    for e reazao of ni whch s cessatn of a sfferg. According toNgra, Bdda advocated (essenceessness) of a exstence Aexsteces are (esseceess) he sense at e do not have sefexstecesb. Ever exstece has a orrowed xstece or a dependet exstecetspnn sbh ny (ac of dependet exstence)

    characterzes a reas The same posto ods good respect of a oght adgage. Jst as a rea s sef-negatg, a ght ad a agage are asosef-negatg Ngra exoses e oowess ad sef-cotadctor atre ofhe nportat conceps ad docres prevaen n hs ne n Bddhst ad o

    Bddhst posophes e sccessy empos e weapos of t adpydo demos sstems of metapyscs e advocates a twofodaproac to reat erms of si st (emrca rea) ad pt s(ancendena rea). Bo are caacterized t dere was. Empca

    s sbh (devod of nrsc exstence), ad rascedenta sppcny By pc he meas dspa of togh and agage. Ngra

    emphaszes e antieaysca, practca, ad pragmatc atre of Bddasteachgs ad as stress o he aaiet of pj (wsdom) eadng to (oe condct) ad sdh (sate of epose) Ths schoo s own asdma ecase of ts emhass on d pip wch s a practcamdde path, avodng a extremes I s own as avda ecase of tsexposo of essenceessess of a rea o acc of ts dependent characte

    YOGCSCHOOLThe prastc and reastc phosoph of e Sarvstvda cmates a

    mostc and deastc phosoph of navda (ogcra wa of a crtqead reecto of nyavda. The represetatve theor of percepton of the

    Sarntas mpes that a hat s cogzed s the contet of cognton, ad thecote of cogt has a form of ts ow, whc has sameess of form swh th form of e oject It rested the eor of snd aeor accordg to whch every cognton has a fo of ts own apat om heform gve to t y ts oect From he heor of snd tere was anatra trsto to he theor hat oy cotents of cogto or ns (deas)

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    rodio 7

    ae ea and tat tey aone ae cognized Te etena objects ae onyypostatizations Tey ae pesumed to be tee, but, in fact, tey ae onypojections f e consciousness Consciousness aone s ea Tus, in Vijada

    e find a epudiatin of e teoy tat e object of cogniton ests eteayand independenty of te cognizing consci osness (bhyhvd Teconsciosness tat aone is pimaiy a s momentay and is in the om of acontinuous o rvh Te ijnaada adocates ee ees of eaitynamey, piklpi (aginay, prnik (dependent o empica eaiandprmhik (tanscendenta eai Tanscenenta eaity is conceed tobe nitay steam of consciousness, tecncay on as vfn It is astoeouse of consciousness in e sense at it is te foundation of a steams ofconscosness tat ae esponsibe fo e appeaance of te od of etena

    objects It is a epositoy of the od impessions (sskrs and a depostoy ofne mpessions In this ay l vfn s te ony utimate ea In itseft is pue and caot be caacteized It can be epeenced oy in te state ofniv Te othe ee of eai is empiica, ic consists of [ite steam ofconsciousness and objects of conscosness I is te ee of e empiica odtat e epeience i n ou oiary fe It is a eaity tat is amenabe to empiicaoedge and ingistic epession It is empiica eai (sv s as dieetfom tanscendenta eaity rmhik s

    DVLO OF YOGCSTMOLOG

    Maitrea and sangaIn te Yogca tadition pio to Maitey, saga and Vasubandu initiated

    systematic piosophica eections It seems Maiteya eaced Yogca positionia yada, eeas aga and Vasubandu ee initiay Sautnti andaibi, espectiey, befoe coming to Yogca Maiteya s te auto ofseea os suc as Bodhisvc ie Spd Bhmi sroc, and bhismlkr Kik e discussed in detai te nate of

    eaity and te modes of oing In fact e is te foeune of te at of debate(vdvidhi in te Buddist tadition aga fooed Maiteya and epoundedYogca piosopy e composed to o entited Prkr Vcsrand Mhn bhidh Smuk Snii sr By and age e fooedMateya bt diffeed n espect of e teoy of poof (sdhn

    VasubandhuVasuband caied foad and syseatied te ogca piosopy e

    as an ao of seea ipoan os on onoogy and episeoogy oeof te os associaed t in ae d Vidhi, Vd M, Vd KaaaTa sr, and bhidh

    Digamong te post-Ngjuna Buddist piosopes Diga as been te

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    nrouon

    mst ntale ter w as carried aead e traditin f Maitrea sagaand asuandu successl reudiatig e egatiisc dalectics f Ngrjunaand reacing it wit a ilsical stiism that was a snesis f e

    Sautrntia and ijnada scs. t ges t e credit f Diga tat ereccled e Sautrntika ntlg wi te ruric f jnada ntlgfrmulated an eistemlg and lgic suited t s new ntlg and ragateda distinct lsical metdlg ased n te tecnique f apoha dulenegatn) . He intrduces a new mde f ilszin tersersingntgcal discussin in an eistemlgical setg a sle tat later n fascinatede Naa Na tier Gagea and is fllwers. Dga emls e tecnquef dule negatin (apoha) fr clart and recsin n tugt and language Heis an astrse lgcian. In is lgc e adcates a dctmus classicatn.

    Tis dictm is reected n te adca f tw es f real tw mdes fteir cgnitn sades f meang. He ales te idea f saoaanamual eclusn) in te elds f realit nwedge and language. In erwrds eer real s a class n tsel f and eer ting else cnstitutes i tscmlementar class. Tus tere is an ecluse rdering n te realm f reaitsuc tat tere are tw and nl t es f real namel salaaa unquearticular) and smnyalaaa its generalized mage). Wateer s unqueartcular cat e ts generaized image and ce esa. Te same rigid

    dictm s etended t te eld f estemlg. It was ate f Digat int ut tat eer eistemlg as t e structred eeng in iew tereqirement f ntlg. Fllwing tis ntlgcal cmment in Digasesteml tere are tw and nl alid mdes f nwng namelpaa ercetn) and anumna inference) ad n tes f wledgeerceal and inferental Te erceal cgzes te unque articular alneand can neer cgnize ts generalized mage. Te ferential n e ter andcgnzes te generalized age alne and cat cgnze te unique artcular.S just as tere are rgid dctm and strct rderng at te leel f realt

    tere are als a rgid dctm and strct rdering at te leel f wledge.Diga carres frard ts dictmus distnctn t te feld f language and

    meg. Eer cncet s eressle n laguage terms f ts meaning. Meags cneed a wrd tat reresents a artcular cncet. Te meaning f awrd i te negatie f ts negatie. Tus tere cat e an erlaing rcss-dsn the meanngs f an tw wds. Anter great cntrutn fDiga is n te frm f ragatin f te teres f:

    Mhmnasihi soog s o onsru o suor onoog

    ma avash h saraion o h o s o mo o knoing mas)3 Hew caa or ha rovs a sha o oa og4 nypoa h hor o ou ngaion ai o h is o onoog

    soog an hor o anguag

    Te magnum us f Dnga is Pama Samuccaya wi t i t s

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    noduon

    autocommeta (S) y Muh mn Piad eu mu ae some of s maor wos Toug mJSmuccy S lost ts Sasrt orgal t as bee parl restored fro ts two

    Tbeta versos ad Sasrt agmets

    DharmaiDarmakrt ot ol mastered e sstems of Vasubadu ad Dga but

    also excelled em Seve wors f Darmart ae own ad avalableAmog em J Vis most otable mz Vs a adncemetof the vew of Dga expouded in rmJ Smucc ad t supersedes telaer t cossts of for capters Te rst deas w te aalss of teprmzs general, e sod wt pk as pz te rd w ference

    shnumn and e fou w sllogsm (hnumn Te etwork of Darmak s m Vinic t s a abrdgmet of PmJVik Te trd wor s Bindu wc s a rer abrdgmet Te

    remaig four works are small tracts devoted to specc topcs e Bindu s asor classfcato of logcal reasos. Sbndh k s an examio ofte problem of relatos odn PrJ s a treatse o te act of carrgo dsputato Snnnr Siddhi s a treatse o e realt of oter mds taempts to rete solpssm

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    Chater 1

    e Bdds eo ofKowldge

    Every scool of pilosopy in India as attempted a eory of knowledge rm{s) on wic its metapysical structure is built Toug e ultimate ain ofpilosoping is generally recognied as knowledge of reality (vn) itis believed tat a eory of knowledge is a necessary prerequisite to a eoy ofreality Tis belief is grounded in the fact that to pilosopie is to reect on enatre of reality given eperience But snce evey experience is a cognitivereference to an object, ere is always e possibility of gong astray in isreference Toug evey eperience as a builtin tspenomenality or selftranscendence, it is not always guaranteed that it woul adequately and faithllyreveal its object. Tis possiiit of error in experience necessitates an inquiryinto its veracity In fact, e entire episteological pursuit begns with, andcenters around, this task Ters belonging to e Buddist tradition also,terefore, attempt to provide a fr episteological bais for teir teoy ofreality

    YSS OF OEDGE!All success uman action is necessarily preceded by knowledge"2

    this prefatoy reark Damaki dees e scope and ai of episteologyand ogic in te Bindu uman action may be eiter puposive orinstinctive uman purpose is, again, someting either desirable or undesirabeA purposive action based on owledge consists in attaining te desirable andavoiding e undesirable Knowledge is efficacious in causg successl action e sense tat it results n e aainment of e desirable a and avoidance ofe undesirable one A cause ay be productive kr) or informative pk) .Knowledge is a cause of successl action in e latter sense only It enables usto reac e eal, wic alone as practical efficien

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    Buddhist Epistemology

    Dffeen fo knowedge s fase cognon. Cognon a aes us ecan objec ffeen o e one eeaed n cogon s fase. Objecs dffe onaccoun of he fo nd spaoempoa ocaons. Tus, cogno epseningone fom of e objec s no o be consdeed as e when e ea objec as adffeen fom Lewse a cognon s no re f wong epesens e pceand me of te objec

    In e Prm Vi Dhamak defnes nowedge as a cognon tas no n dscodance wt s objec (m vismvdinm) .3 He emanans tha a cognon ha s pefec in accod wt s objec w aso becaacezed b noe (j h pro v) 4 I s eeao of an objecno e nown becase e objec s momena n nae and o a nwedge

    w accod w e objec whch ases a a er momen wen e objec saso n esence I s te fs momen of cognon, e momen of e fsawaeness Conous cognon s no ad o e, accodng o e Buddss,becase s no a new cognon b a ecognon Of tese wo caacescs,e s, nondscodace, s basc and an be egaded as e dffeena caaceof knowedge

    Knowede tus sands fo cognon a s a fat epesenaon of teea. mes s a n kowedge e objec mus be known i is an noohe hn h i is Since a nondeaig efeence s an essena condon of

    owedge, te t f owedge consss n s accod w te cognzed objecDhaoaa ps as foows: In common fe wen we sa a s bengspoken wa we ean s ta makes s eac an objec Sa, ta cogions e whch mes s eac objec pons o. In fac, nowedge does noceae an objec nd does no oe o s, bu js makes s eac a . Bmag s eac n objec nothng ese s mean an aendng o 5 HeeDhamoaa pons ou thee dsnc, sccesse sages noed e pocessof appeenson of objec, each sccedg one esng om e pecedgThe ae cognzng (dhigi) aendg rv) and eacng p)

    He maes cea ta te s sage aone s kowedgeKowedge s of wo pes I s e wen spngs fom nsde. I s

    dscse when s acqed b decng ou aenon owa an objec w thehep of e senses and te cognzg conscosness. Ol dscuse kwedges anzed n epsemoog.

    OBLE OF PRA sed eae, owedge s a nondscodant cognton Ts eans at

    no a cogntons e owedge O hose cognons wose nondscodances edenced can cai e sts of owedg The pobem of prmz a asgen se to c smuatig debate n e epstemoogca eases of Indanogin s bascay pobem of edencng e t of a cognon. Te questonof edencg cogniton ases becase a cogons ae nequa e epstecsats. Some ppea o be e and eea e coespondng objecs as e ae,wheeas ohes seem to be eoneos and sepesent the objecs. ad a

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    Te Bus Teo of Knowege 3

    cogntons been true there ould have bee o need o f evdencng them andthe entre epstemologcal nur ould not have arsen The ver possbl oferor n a cgnton necesstates ts subjecton to a crtca eamnaton th a

    v to estabshng ts truh or fas If the tth or fas of a cognton ndsto be establshed the ueston arses hat sort of crteron s to be resorted toThe robem of prm has been dscussed and rased precsel agast thsbacground

    PRAPLAIdan thnrs generall adopt a causal approach to oledge Knoledge

    s tan to be an outcome of a partclar causal compe n hch the most

    ecent nstumental cause (r s tecncall on as prmz In theBuddhst tradton the ord prmJ refrs to both the process of ong andthe oedge acured on that bass Buddhsts do not entertan the dstnctonbeteen te process of no ng (pmJ and ts outcome(rmphZ =prm hether or no pr and prmJphZ are to beshal dstingushed has ben a hotl debated ssue beteen Na and Buddhstthners Na thers nsst thatprmz as a process eadng to prm shoudbe dstngushed om th latter hch s ts phZ (result. For them prm sthe prmphZ, and prm s the rz of prm Buddhst ther

    hoer mantan that no dstncton can be possbe beteen the noetc processand ts outcome The act of cognzng complte concdes th the cognton oan object In fact Naas have to accept the dstncton because for themprmJ s the edencng condton for the trth of noedge hereasprms the evdenced oledge For Buddhsts noledge s selfevdencngand therefore there s no need to stngush beteen prmJ and ts phl.hus the dfference beteen Naas and Buddhsts s due to the df ferencen ther understndng of the natre and role ofprmJ Naas understandprmJ as that hch s the most effcent causal condton gvng rse to and

    edencng the oledge rmy rm ii prmJm hereas forBuddhsts t means that b hc an obect s knon rmye ho nnei

    Dga hoever does not rese to dra ths dstncton f t s neededfrom nctonal pont of ve He rtes e cal the cognton tself prmbecause t s generall conceved to nclude the act of cognsng athough prart s a result Commentng on t he rtes Here e do not admt as thealsts do that the resultng cognton dffers om the means of cognton. The

    resultng cognton arses bearng n tself the form of the cognsed object and s

    understood to ncude te act of cognzng. For ths reason t s metaphorcacaed prJ athough t s utmate deod of actvt. 6

    Nature of PapbaJaIn the Dnga-Dharmart tradton to dfferent es ae aaabe about

    th nature f prmwphZ Accordng to one prmJhZ conssts n the

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    Buddis piseoog

    cognton of an object (vidhig) Accodg to te oe t cont nelfcognton (v-vii) B tee w ae complementay an noconctng and ae aalable the wok of Dga7 Tey ae explcly etateby Damakt an Damottaa 8 ntaakta gae tem togete and bngot e tncton He mantan at accodng to te Satnta tadtonwc belee n bhd (ealm) s (mlaty n fo) obtanngbetween a cognton and t object to be treated a r wle cognton ofan object (vidhigi) to be teated a hl Accodng toVfnvd, of coue te r, but vsvedn o vvii (elf-cognton e rmhl n te tnte analy teeew ae not ffeent becaue vidhigi and svsvedn ae not todffeent penomena a ey ae two facet of te ane kowledge

    rp as PraaIt a been one of the peenal poblem of ploophy to pt foh cteon

    of tth that cogent and conncng Snce owledge cont n a cognton'beng ee o dcodance w t object the cteon of tth a to befomlated n tem of owledge beng n accodance wth t object Bddhthne theefe pt foth spy a a p, n the aence of whch nocognon can be taen to be nowledge The doctne of py a been

    folated eepng n ew the elfedental chaacte of knowledge and alote ew that nce eey knowledge an awaene of an object the condtonof t tth ae to be detemned n tem of t efeence to e object

    The Concet of rp in Early Buddhist hilosophyTe doctne of adocated by Dga ad Damakt a t oot

    e Satda tadton9 og t can e be aced ack to tle ealyBddt lteate n P 0 e Satda tadton dependent and objecteextence of te extenal object wa admtted Snlaty () of e fom

    epeented n a cognton to at of e object eld to be he r of teeltg cognton of at object (vidhigi) Accodngly a cognton at podced along w t object te wt efeence to at object Teobject the cognte ene and e cognzg concone ae all ntaneoand momentay All tee ext at e ane tne (hbhu he) and contttetle collocaton of cae (rmg at ge e to te cognton TAdama accot of te gene of peceptual cognton a been epeentedby Stcebatky n tle fom demontated n ge 1 1

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    Te Bddis Teor o Knowedge

    Figure

    Sa t

    isy indy = ns

    . - - tig poit of th h

    s = coo).

    Th th pcpal cogitio s gadd to b a slt of th ps ofcasal factos al

    1 aaaara a (ie., peceivg coscosess), ada a (ie cognitive sense) and3 [aaaaya (ie, object)

    H a qstio atuall aiss as o wh a paicla cogitio shold fto th objct ol fo its datio a o to th cogiiv ss o thcogizg coscosss, which a qall siltaos with it This is plaidby pttig foth th docti of s accodig to which , thogh all th

    casal factos a siltaosl pst, th objct alo povids a fo to thcogiio ad s dtis i

    Th pcedig viw is pt foh b th Vaibhika school bt it is ot accpabto Sa tikas, who j ct th otio of shbhu heu that is, h siltaity

    of obj c , cogiiv ss, ad cogizi cosciosss. Th basic objctioaisd by t agaist is positio is a i h backgod of otaiss itposs a sios pobl. h th cogitio aiss, th objct is o logpst bcas, big ota, t st hav b th b dstod . I scha situatio how ca it calld th pcptio of at objct alo, ad

    how ca that objct b th dtiat of th tuth of th cogitio? ThSattis thfo solv this pobl b pttig foth th docti ofspyaccodig to which th objct o dobt is otay bt lavs is ipssiopo cosciosss ad thog is ipssio, which has s wth thobjct, th objct is cogzd 2

    Thogh bo th Vaibhis d Satis accpt docti ofsth s it ditl. Th fo s t to pli wh th cogitio is dtidb th objct ad ot by cogitiv cosciosss, thogh both a th casal

    factos givig is to th cogitio; whil th latt s it to plai how hobjct that is alad dstod is cogizd i pcptio.

    The Doctrine of Srpya in the Diga-Dharmakti aditionI h DigaDhaakti taditio h docti of spy has bn

    piaily pt fo as a prm fo pcptal cogitio, and i this sns it

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    1 Buddit Epieolog

    ar a eparre o e Saria o i cocep I ac Scerba13a poie o hree fere e o r s ael

    o efe o e eo bewee eo d oepo o efe o e elio bewee saaa nd i pbhsa nd3 o efe o e eo bewee saaaa d oepodg sma aaa

    I he DigaDarari rao i a bee e e eco ee

    T DOC OF SPRA (SELF-VELATOTe ocre of sa bee p or i e coex of he ore baic

    ocrie o di wic ple ha every cogio ecearl i e

    fo of a wofol appearace ael a of e objec a a of elf Tocrie of dipy a bee a evble corollar o e ocre of s (el-revelao of cogo) wic rel i e oblerao of eiicio beweeah ioar a e ae cogiio ia oce bo evece a e eviece

    Te ocre o sp a bee e baic ee of e Biepeolog p forh i e coex o eor o oeare I a cogoi j a oear ae of exece ceaig o ex e ex oe eeiher we ca ave a cogio o a cogio he ver oe of org

    or we all ave o e e ver pobil o e cogio o a cogiobecae he ex o a cogiio wll o loger be ere o be cogize bhe beqe cogio Sice e cogio o a cogio i a ac give or

    eperiece ca e eroo ol i he oe o e ocrie o sp Coie w e heor o oear B al o ecogiio o cogo ol wi e fraewor o ilae a ever aof cceio T e ol poiio available wol be o avocae he eoryo p wic wol ea a a e very o o e cogiio'

    cogzg a objec alo cogiz elDiga a Darar e e expreo "ssii o epre ac 14 T we a a a e cogio o oeg ble e a a e aeie e awaree o e cogio o oeig ble Ti awaree cae

    b og oer a h cogio el. T e cogiio wile cogizga objec cogize el j a lap lliae el wle illig aobjec

    The Doctrine of v

    Te ocrie of s a st-py (elfevieali ocogiio) go oger No ol i ver cogio a cogio cogizg ielfb i alo eviece ielf . Now e qeio i w a a cogiio cogzeiel a h eable elf a ? To awer i a a earlir eocri of dipy a p or 5 ver cogiio proc wih awool appearace aely ha o l (shs a a of e objec

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    e Budds eo o Kowede

    vihs In being vihs t establishes its tru because of its being ine fom of the object

    16 When a cognition possesses the form of an object, it is

    a sucient ondition for its being true Thus, Dinga writes, The m is

    simply the cognition hav the form of he object

    1

    7Haori18 has made an atempt to represet the octrine of dvi usingthe ollwing smbls:

    Viyjn = C1Svhs in C 1 = S hhs in C1 = 0 1Vijnjn C2Svhs in C2 S2

    hhs in C2 = 02

    He writes a, according o Dnga, C1 = S 0\) C2 = (2 02)' ( idicates relation) Since C 2 tkes C1 fr its bject, 0 2 = ( I - 0 1) Therefore,C2 = {S2 ( I 01)} Thus, C2 is distinguishable om C t

    Nw, case e cogniion had onl h ( = hs then C 1 = 0 1 and C2 = 02 Since C2 akes C 1 for its objec, 02 = 0 herefore C2 = CtThus, ijnjn would be ndistinguishable from vijn If, on theother hand, the cognition had ny sv = hs then C1 = S

    'and C2 =

    S2 Hwever, sce the cogitio, hich does no possess the form of an objectwith itsef, remans e same at all times, S = S Therefore, C2 = Cr

    In fact, Hatori ges beyond C2 to pstlate C3 C4 an so on ad innHe writes, I he same maer, he ird and the succeedg cognition C3 C4 . Cn are disinguishable om the preceding ones nly wen they areacwledged to possess dvi The frmulas are as follows:

    (S3 S and 03 . . respectively, stand fr svhs and s C3 C, C2 C3 Cn ct ddg oer e pg CIC2 Cn_j

    "

    This symblc representation and its eplicaton given by Hattri d notseem to be very appealg, mai because ey are based on e presumptintha e sel-cognitin of the cognition, which volves two cognitins, namely

    C and C2 C 1 is the precedg, and C2 is e succeeding ne Hattri proposest g eond C2 t C3 C4 ad nim In is ventre he seems t be wrkigunder e sucessin-mdel Bu as we have sated earlier, Diga s er svr cat adequatel be undersd le a. iga is qte elci advcatg e siultaney mdel" wic would preclude an versteppingr C1 t C2 I C j is grante te dual rm svkr and hr wic

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    18

    u

    y

    Object (aI

    coitio na

    a a-paa

    Buddhst Epstemoo

    a aa

    I aa-a a

    aga aa

    a-paa eor prooucedl teds to do ere is o eed to bri i C ad if C is eedless we also have ipso facto ot to o bod C to C husa distctio betwee C ajna ad C ajna-jna woudviolate e very spirit of Dias eor of apa I fact wi Citself we have a and aa which are iextricabl so interspersed

    at e ca be distiuished ol for e sae of coceptual clarity but caeer be separated. owever is distictio does ot in a impl ata (ajna-jna ad aa (ajna are to dieretoccurreces. I e very act of owi a object ere is a awareess of theowi becse had ere bee o areess of e ow at e mometit could ot be possible to have it subsequetl as either e object or ecoitio of the object woul last for e ext momet.

    attori seems to uderstad e Buddhist eor of aa as implithat a the rst momet there is a rise of the rst pa amel at of

    a ad the at e succeedi momet ere will be e rise f thesecod pa amel at of but such a teretatio doest dojustice to Dias positio which explicitl maitais at a coitio haa alo with a a

    he Buddhist eor of aa uderstood i e cotext of "simultaeimodel is represeted Fiure 1 . 2

    T CONCE OF VYA

    he Buddhist eor of aa as represeted i Fiure 1 2 states clearlthat a also ow as aa-a or just a is e paa ofwhich aga (apprehesio of e object) ad aa (self-coitio)are e pa-paa here has bee a cotrver amo Buddhist oiciasprecedi Dga as to wheer aga is epa-paa or Of course is cotroversy presupposes the distictio beee pa ad

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    Te Budds Ter of Knedge 19

    pphl for pragmac puose oy. Grag s dsco, Dgawres t, srcy speag, hdhigi aoe s e prphl bussii c aso be regarded as prphl 9

    Every cogo s a cogo of someg s evaby refer o aobjec. Te objec gves rse o , ad tus deermes, te cogo. Te objecs regre s e lbn pry a s, e very groud upo wc ecogio s based I fac, te objec o oy serves o gve rise o e cgtobu so dffereaes om oer cogos. Wou assgg s as ofdffereto o e object, oe cogo co be dffereaed om aohercogto Toug from e trascedea po of vew eve peomeo spr (pure coscousess), a te emprca eve trpe dvso of (coscousess) s dw o ghyr (e form a s cogze),

    gh (e cogo), ad ssi (sef-cogo)Te ghyr serVesas ereag facor betwee oe cogo a aoer20

    Sice very cogo s deermied by e objec, s deermao soudbe udersoo as he cogo's avig e form of e obec. Tus, f eobjec s a pe, e correspodg cogo soud ave e form of pe. eoy w be sad o be deermed b te objec "pe ad be a e presetaobhs) of ta objec . If te cogo s a vrace w te objec, w ote be deerme by e objec, d s wi mou o s fas I order aa cogo sou be ue, as o reec or represe e objec i s rea fom.

    Ts w be possbe oy we e cogo s risig i e form of te object.Te tr of a cogo, terefore, cosss s sameess of form w eobject. I s o a owedge s formess, as s maaed by enirjndins. If e cogo were fomess we te objec ad a form,e cogo sef as dsgused om e obec wod rema e sameweter cogzes sometg bue or yeow or ayg ese Terefore, tecoto s te preeso of te object mus be dmed o be sr. To sytt cogto s sr is te sme tg s o say at s e form of teobject Te s cogto s us uersoo to possess te cio of ssumge form of te objec. For s reaso Dg cosders i as pr aougprmary t s a phl s spec as appreeso of a objec. 21

    TA ATA PRTISAAccorg o Budis ers sce every ue cogitio ad, for at

    mater, every cogiio is ecessary cause y ojec, ad sce ere reoy wo tyes of ojects, ey, e g gve d e dvs(cosrued, ere are o yes of cogio, e erceu ad e cocepa

    Corresodig o ese are wo es ofrbhs (me reex) The ercecogio cosists a ribhs at s n a s, deie ad o vage,ecuse i is csed y ojec at is ideede of e erceivg cosciousessd erefore objecivey re I case of cocepu cogiio ere is o sucojectivey exisg re oec, d ece e ribhs ere is n a is,defite d ge e apreeded ojec givg rise o areess geerates

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    Buddist Eistemgy

    a reguaed mena re (ie, a ree ited o a ery obec) I is us ikea pach of coor ha, ging rse o isual awareness, generaes a deie menaree ied o a pach The concepua awareness, on the oher hand, is no

    generaed he obec Thus, in e absence of he causal facor o reguae hemena ree, ere is no ed (deie) ena ree Howeer, shoud bemade cear ha om he empiical pon of iew i aniyaava (ideienessof praibhsa n no wa aecs the episemic saus of inferenia cognitionbecause he idi rm1)ya of a cognition depends no on the aueness ordeieness ofpbhsa bu on is sa (co wi e obt), d eena coon i e much psent

    Di Ani of Ptsa

    Since he objec gies rise o is pibha, e prabsa has o be ncoordinion wih is respecie objec According o Dinga, eer praibhahas o be in coordinaion wih is obec because i is produced b a obeconl objec cao produce an such pibhsa hat canno accord wi iLogicl, herefore, he rules ou an possibiiy of deiaion from is bec in apibhsa.

    Dhrrti' Ani f tsaDarmari, howeer, mainains a sometmes an obec ma fai o gie

    rise o is genuine prabhsa This may be due o seera facors ike he ocus ohe obec, he circumsances of e presenation of e obe, he disurbedstate o cognizing consciousness, and so on If a pbsa fais o accord wihits correspondng obect, it wil ack coordination wi i, and o that een icanno be said o be genuine Thus, when one has he pibsa of a moing treewhile raeng in a boat, he prabsa cano be said o be genue because itis not in accord wi its obect Of course, such an analsis of e episeicsitatio would not be acceptable to Diga, who would insist at eersa

    has to be in accord with its obect because it is produced by haobject onlIrrespectie of wheher a pbhsa ay or a no deiae om is obec,

    e fact remains ha eery pbhsa a rue cogniion must be in accord wiits obe ct Tha is wh Buddist thinkers ins ist on avisalvdakava(nondiscordance) as a necessary condiion of a true cogniion

    Is There Asrpya ferentil Ptsaie comeing on e Nya Binu of Dharmakrti, Dharmotara seems

    mainain a ere can be oly one pe of real objec, namel, e sakaa(uique paricular). There is no real object corresponding o e concepalcoition insofar as e smaakaa (geeralized image or cocept) is notobjeciel real This will en ean ha in a concepual cogition ere will nbe ay possibili of arhasya (coordinaion) wi e really eisting objecB Dharmotara's coen ca be sstaied ol if we oerloo e fac at

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    he Buddhst heo of owedge 21

    for Buddist iers aa"aa s also real alouh o f course is realol from the empirical pot of view (a{ a

    Juc cc ;yIt seems that e l reaso for the Buddhist iers to advocate the eorof jna is to provide for e determiatio of e coitio b its resectiveobject. Ever cotio refers to a object isofar as it is produced b e object.here is o coitio at is ot produced b e object ad at erefore is othavin some form ive b the object. hus ere is o formless coitiobecause i e ver process of its be produced b e object it ets so to sathe form of the object. It ma be at e fo of a coitio does ot accord withe specic object at is ive the epistemic sitatio ad ma accord wi

    some oer object at is ot ive but ol hpostatied. Such is the case iillusio Here there is o arhasa, ad hece it is ot a tre coitio. heconitio here has a form but ot of e ive object. hus e doctre ofsa serves e purpose of distuishi beee a tre coitio ad aerroneous oe. Buddhist iers derstad tes of aswaat is odiscordace wi the object of coitio. he ecessar as also thesufciet coditio for e availabili of odiscordace is ahaa, whicheas e coitio should be determied b at ver object ad ot b aoer object If it is deteied b some object oer a its ow it will be a

    case of aroa (discordace) raer tha at of a, because i that casesome oer object will be e determiat raer tha e leitimate oe

    Havi aaled the doctrie of a, we ma proceed to see e oudsfor its acceptace houh this doctrine is deduced as a corolar of e doctrieof dvaia ruds oe positive ad e oer eative have bee putfor to account for its accepce. he rst roud is e fact of recollectiowhich provides e basis for sai at e coitio has two forms ad at it isi accord wi its object. Dia puts t If e coitio has ol oeform either at of the object or of itself e e object which was coied e precedi coitio could ot appear i e succeedi coitio becauseat object of e preced cotio would ot exist whe a succeed coitioarises But we do have facts of recollectio whe some time aer there occurs toour mind the recollectio of our coitio as well as at of e object Weexpress e fact of e recollection of a past coitio e form remmberthat cogied e object. he recollectio of a past coiti is explaiableonl b admitt that the coitio is coied b itself.

    he secod roud for admitti a as apraa is at if a coitio

    were ot selfcoii ad selfevideci is would have resulted i iitereress because it would have required aoer coitio for its coitio advalidatio ad e secod oe would have required a third oe ad so forth.

    he doctrine of sa is ll cosistet wi e idealistic positio ofVijavda Buddhism for which i e ultimate aalsis all objects at appearto be objective and exteral are othin but projectios of the cosciousess.

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    u Esemoog

    Because of hs he Buddhst ca tak of the cogto aeag n the fo ofob ect has bee poted ot eae the dea of cogto assug the foof he ob ect shoud ot be mstake as saeess of fo betee he ob ect ad

    the cogto It stads o fo the deteato of the cogto b he ob ectHoeve he te spy s sght mseadg sofa as t gves he essoas f cogto has e sae o sma fo possessed he ob ect It s meagto tak of the fo of a ob ect but t does't make much sese to tak of thefo of a cogto uess t s udestood a guatve sese o that shoud be udestood to mea s that eve cogto ecessa efes to aobect ad eve te cogto has to efe to the obect as t s To efe to heob ect as t s meas to be of the fo of the obect destood ths a hecoteto of the Buddhst seems to be pasbe but to epess ths th the he

    of the te "spy s beset t the dffcu efeed to befoe I fact heBuddht ogcas houd have sed ohe wod hat oud have bette eessedthe dea of the cogtos beg deteed b ts coesodg ob ect.

    OR OF YDASDTe dea hat e tu of a cogto s to be eteme tes of ts

    efeece to ts ob ect eads Bdhst kes to e eo of dhn mnsiddhi Accog to Dga koege s o dobt eveato of ts ob ectad teefoe obect deped o koege fo ts eveato; the tt of

    koedge hoeve depeds o ts ect efeece to ts obect So fa as epstemcdepedece s coceed e obect depeds po koedge heeas egad to otc depedece koedge depeds o e obect e cotext oft tc depedece s take to cosdeato b Budsts. Hoeveaas sap dffe fom Bsts ad sst hat og koege s afath aaeess of ts ob ect e t of koedge s ot etee adgaateed b e obect bt b e mot effce causa codto whc stechca kow as r fact ths s a ata cooa of the adtcto betee

    prmad

    prmphl, fo a ikas a at

    s ea oabe ad e t of koedge s geeate (u ad vochsafedpi b prG o. Ths s ko as the eo of nhnmsiddhI ote os fo Naka epstemoog detemes otoog but foBdsts e evese s he case

    OBC OF OEGEAccodg to Buddhsts hee ae o to kds of objects of koedge

    ame the ea objectve uqe partcua (svZ) ad the geeazed

    cocet o mage (smZ$) . Ths s because he thg to be cogzed hashe cedng t o aspects The objectve ea the fo of uqe patcua haso eteso ace ad o duato tme It s devod of a fom attbutesdeteatos ad eatos. It s jst a pot stat o a momet the cessatmomets of sees of eas It s uque patcua the sese that t s ethedetca o sa to a ohe object It s a dstnct estece dssa

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    e B eo o Knowege

    to, and noncomparable with, any other real It is instntaneous because neverendures for the next moment It is discrete in the sense that it is an isolatedexisten

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    24 Buhs solog

    y mato e qe a eve be ko feee, ad kewsehe geeaze age a ee e k eeo What s ko eet aOt be ko eee d eesa Sh osto of

    ada hotomy of tay ese modes of kog s kow asprvsh whh meas ht eah of e two odes of kowg has tsow sepaate ad dstt shee of oeao.

    Thee s o tem U he esetve bets of the two. the qeta aoe s beey ea, he e eeazed age s a metaostt, a the oe s aay deet fom he ohe hee aot be ayogto that oeheds boh at e same te

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    Chaer

    Budds ory of Prcepion

    I he Buddhs eory of owedge percepo aa s regarded ashe foudaoa a sofar as ferece anna depeds o Iferece presupposes percepo, ad, herefore , ony hs respec doespercepo acqure prmacy over ferece Though a Buddhs hers

    om Diga oward agree o hs po, her udersaig of e are opercepio s o e same, ad hece he dee i dere ways

    EFI F PRKTo give a ogicay cocise ad comprehensie deiion seems o be a very

    dcu ask Some kers may manain exeme posiio a sch a deiocan neer be gie If he hing is ow, ey may argue, is deiio isuseess, and f i is o o, i is s more useess because i s impossbeThis , of course, has o bee e iew of e Bddhis hinkers e are coceedih Amog hese hinkers Diga o oy pus forh de ios ophiosophica erms i as sharp and cear-c ay as possibe bu aso gies aspecific meod of deing wih e he of doube egaies tadvNyyaMs hikers aemp o deie igs in erms of eir "essece , a is, heir characerizaios and reaios iga, o he corary, coendsha sch defios are useess because e "essece does exis Thus, hingsahings svalaaas are indeinabe Hwever, our concepion of a igvilp is deinabe According o hin, he caracerisic feaure o a o

    concepa knowedge (ad o angage) is ha i is diaecica Every concepionis a negaie coreae o is coerpa ad hie deig a cocep s aoeca be saed So, a deiiion is o a neaive characerizaion vtti oexampe, wha e coor "bue is we cao e, b we may diide a coors

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    6 Bus soog

    t " be ad " be he e ma mea a cr er thae The det f " be e a hch s t be ad cersee det f " be e "a hch s t be r Bddhsts a

    edge ca be dchtms cassed t drect ad drect The drect st drect, ad drect s t drec he drect cgt s tecca as aa, ad e drect as alan r aoa Paa ca erefre bedefed terms f ts dstct frm alan r aoa rm s t fsthat a ca be derstd as the " egate f alan

    EE WAS OF EFG R$I the ater Bddhst esemg ree dstct ss are dscee

    a atem t dee aa Thgh here seems t be am amg

    asbadh, Dga ad Dharmar at e det f aa shd be terms f " egae f an, he shar dff er th regard t thehraseg a s be sed t exress hs t. Vasbadh des t b sgstve hraseg. hs, he fas e sde he Dga ad Dharmart the her. The aer hgh he se egate hraseg dffer beeehemseves t ab he rederg f the hraseg b as abhe esemc stats f aa We frs state e hree sts deta adhe dertae ther cmarate aass arcar f he ss f Dgaad Dhaart

    VASA'S EFON OF RO he bass f he fat aaabe t s Vasba ca be regarded

    as the frst sstematc estemgca her ertag t e tradt fedb Dga the Vii a deed " o 'vf 1 hat s " ercet s a cgt rdced rm hatbect. ths deft asadh matas at aa s a cgtha s deteed b ts bect Here he rd "tato ts t e excsere f the bect lanaa ctradstct t the re f thecgte sese adiat he cgzg cscsess saanantaaaya 2 r exame, f the bec s fre, hch s a exstg reasvalaw ad f t s cgzed e cgt f fre s a case f ercetacgt Sch a cgt has a rea bect, hch s re, as dstct m thecceta bect, hch s e dea f re Bare exerece f he bect thta ccea eemet s regarded as ercea cgt Ths df feretacharacter f aa, hch cssts beg " egate f alan has beeexressed b Vasbadh th e he f the hrase " tato td he dea t

    be exressed b he hrase tat td s b cat e same as " thta ccetazat. Therefre asadh ca be terreted as degercet as bare exerec hat s se ad h cased b e bectht a termgg f cceta eemets Thgh Vasbadh des t

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    Te Bs Teory of Pereon 7

    specicay sa ha a percepa cogiio has o eeme of cocepaizaioad veraizaio, i fac, he meas i whe he says ha i is ecsivey comigfrom he ojc

    DGS DEFITIN F PRTsead of deig pr$ ems o o hd vfnm Dga

    defies i i erms of lpnpohm, ehaps becase he idea of pr$as " egaive of lpn c be bee expesed by e ae phase ahe hby he fomer er havg saed ha hee are oy wo kds of kowedge,3which he coveioay cas py$ ad numn Diga rs opraad says ha is owedge is lpnohm4 (ococepa) whichis aoer way o saig ha i is " egaive of lpn Eaier, he arged ha

    here are oy wo yes of cogiio ad a ee is o eed o osae reeor more yes; oherwise, i may ead o ifiie regess. hs, h objec ca becogized eihe p$ diecy o numn direcy; here is o oerway of cogizig i

    ga seems o have objecves whe he proceeds o defepr$ amey,

    o sngs fro anumna an so on (aavaram) an o sgs e Bs coeo fro e ves of oer soos

    (vipipainirkarram)

    Rejecio of Nyya- enitionhe sa defiiio of p give by yya-Ms ad oher

    o-Bddhis radiios ems of sesebj coc (indiyhsnni$)has bee ejeced by Dga may becase i akes o oice of e basicfeare o pr$, which is aways a ew cogiio, a is, cogiio ofsomehg ew ad o recogiio. Sch a cogiio ca be oy he fom ofsese pecepio, which is he firs mome of evey cogiio he foowig

    momes whe e aeio is arosed ad e ocess of mea cosciobegis, i is o more a re sese eceio a i was a e fis momeMoreove, a defio coais a coceaed cosio bewee e roperfcio of sese peceio ad he cio of e mid Sese eceio hasis ow cio, is ow objec, d is ow case. s cio s o make heobjec ese o he seses ($iv pr) no, of cose, forciby (nh) s objec is svl$ ie aricar sce is oe, beg eaad ecie, ca odce a sese mpessio, ad he svl$ ieaicr aga is is case h, prcosiss areess ribhs)of e resece of a objec, is mere esece ad oig more o cosrc aage of objec ribspr he resece of which has s bee eoed

    is oher fcio, a sbsee operaio ha foows i he rack of hefis

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    Budd pemoogy

    Rejecton of asubanhu's enitionDiga disagrees with Vsas way of expressng $ i terms

    of hd mainly ecause it suffers from amigui. Diga, eig aastse logician, does not want to leave any lacuna his definition at hedetects in at of Vasuandh. In saying at a percepal cogition is at whichis eclusivl caused y te oect, it is not clarl specied hether or ot isforids te ivolvemet of metal constction Diga states this poit quiteeplicil y dening perception as lppohm (non-concepta)

    Coparson of the entons of asubanhu an gaIn fact, ere does not seem to e any ndamental difference etween

    Vasuandhus deition and that of Dga The same fact has een positiveystated y Vasuhu nd negativel y Dnga Bot agree at what we normaltake to e perceptl cognitio is, in fact a comple of percepal d concepal,a sythess of the cotriution of the oect ad of the knowing mid ci). fwe represent this compex as K, the contriution of e oect as S , " and thecontriution of the owing mind as and synesis as " + , then K canalso e reresented as + C (i .e . , K S + C) According to oh hikers,e total K is not perceptal; it is a complex of perceptl and conceptal. Out

    of this comple only S" is perceptal, not C This fact hs een stated yVasuandh n sying at S " is percepal and y Diga n sayng at K C is percpal But, ct, e to expressions, S" and K C are equivalent.The linguistic epression correspondng to S" is a little amiguous, whereas elinguistic epression corespondng to K - C does not contain an amiguiy.Perps, Vsuadu 's denition coul ave een improved upon y te dditionof te word "e wic would ave meant tat a percepal cognition is ttwic is determied y te oject sole an exclusivel. But Dig tinks it

    etter to put e deition negatively so as to avoid any scope for amigiyHowever, it mst e mde clear t Dinga does not reect Vasuandu 'sdefition ut onl rings out its mplication clerer terms A perceptlcogition is solel determined y its oect it must e wholly given y e oectad not i an way constructed y e mnd. Ths, Dnga specifies at it is acognition hat is not at all sectively determined and conceived of n terms ofhe ilps (concepts and wors) of e pe ofdr (sstce), u (qli), (action), (clss), and nm (words) What is perceived y us is unique

    iividul, wic is re eistence, devoid of ll charcterizatios It is st whatis immediatey given to us in eperiece ocepts ad wors are commonsyl$ to severa oects, and e are not unique sl$) Frotis t follows tt, ccoring to ig, percpl ognitio is e editelgiven sesum in comlete isotion from ll conceptul deteritions

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    30 Budds Epsemoog

    term "ahta oerroneou to it e dee it te oa coo tat e om coc coco d e

    bject of PratyaPerception accordi to Darakrti coit te appreeio o an

    object i it ow pecic caracter svalakaa wic a otig in coowit oer object iilar or iilar and i copletely free from aociatiowit ame an erbal expreio wic are coceptual cotructio eobject of perceptio i tu e real wic i imediately reeale to ecocioue ad ot uc object tat are in e for of concept an wordvkalpas wic are ot a part of te gie ee data but are coceied i emid

    e object of perceptio i ifferent not oly ro e object tat are e for o cocept a word but alo from a bare figment of iaginatio.e uique particular svalakaa aloe i te real object a beig tereal an efficiet it aloe can produce a timulu upon e ee A figmeto iagiatio o te oer ad i ureal an erefore caot exercieay uc tiulu Coetig on Darmakrti opeing reark i tea Bndu at " al uccel ua action i precee by rigt kowlege Datara i e cotext o perceptio write at we a object i appreene

    by direct experiece it get coerte ito an object of purpoie actio rougee perceptio I fact i caracteritic feature of e eal object ditiuieit o all object tat are abolutely unreal and tat ae o prctical ecieathakyka

    We ay ow aalyze te two ter aey "kalpanpoha a"ahta tat cotitute Darakrti efiitio y uig te term"kalpanpoha Drakrti attempt to ditgui a perceptual cogitiofro all uc cogition at are in te for of coceptual cotructio Hedefie kalpa a ahlpassagayoapthsaptt 2 tat i a

    determate cogitio at i capable of erbalizatio In ti denition tereare two apect of kalpan tat ut be explicitly tate aely"pthsaptt ad ahlpasasagayogat Eery kalpan i apthsaptt tat i it i not jut bare cognitio thsa bt a eteatecognitio pthsapt o be aware of e bare exitence of a object iptha but to recogize tat oject a "i object a particular object ipthsapt e object i capable o giig rie to ental reex thsaoly It cot prouce determiation i e orm o recognition tat "it i ucad uc becaue coreponing to e etermination t ere i object

    preet e determiation caot be regared a a part of perceptual cognitiou Dararti raw a clearut ditctio betweepthsa apthsaptt Te pathsa aloe i geuie perceptio ad ot pthsa pttwic fllow pthsa e pthsaptt i kqlpan wic i paokajfna o anuna e oer apect o kalan i ahlpasansagoat

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    The Buddhs Theor o Perepon 3 1

    Dharmakrt pnts ut that a tha s ncaabe verbazatnanahla 1 whereas ony a that an be expressed n anuaeIn oer wrs percepton whch s pure sensatn s ony t be expernced It

    cant be d signat . I s nterestn t pnt ut here at Dharmakrt nt ondraws a cear dstnctn betwee percevn and desnatn but as reardsdesnatn as absoutey ncmpatbe w percevn Hs arment s t noverbazatn can take pace n e absence cnceptuazatn and hat ere sn cnceptuaztn perceptn In e exressn "ahlaaagoae wrd "yoa (capabe s ute sncant It ceary sttes at ouh t snecessary at ere cannt be verbazatn wut conceptazatn e reverses nt he case hat s t s nt necessary a where there s cnceptazatnthere must e verbazatn As Dharmttara wrtes e may as have

    cnceptazatn whch ah nt accmaned by crresndn wrds scaabe o en accmpaned as r exanpe the cnceptuazatn a babywhch has nt been verbazed" 15 Wherever ere s verbazatn tere has te cncetuazatn but wheer e reverse s as e case can be a debatabent. It wud erere be n rder we reect on the reatn betweencnceptuazatn d verbazatn n he cntext Dharmakrts pstn.

    wn Dharmttara t can be mantaned that by nsertn the wrd"yoa Dharmakrt wants t pnt ut at t s nt necessary at every case cnceptuazatn shud be accmpaned by verbazatn Every cncept scapae ben verbazed but n act t may r may nt be verazed hsmeans ony that verbazatn s t cmatbe w cncetazatn n eway n whch t s ncmpatbe w perceptn but t s nt ts necessaryaccmpanent Hwever we kee n vew a verse eneray ascrbed t Dan hch cncet s rearded as havn ts "yni (surce r pace r nwrds 16 ten Dharmarts pstn can as be understd as snn atere are tw mdes verbazatn namey acta and ptenta huh acncetuazatns may nt be asscated w actua verazatn tenta

    verbazatn s necessary resent eren ch a dstnctn betwee sraceanae" ad det anae" mht have bee ntended by harmakrtAccrdny n every cnceptuazatn ere mst be necessary det aaewhch means that there can be n wut e use anuae he useo anuae may nt be overt but cvert

    Besdes alpanpoham te her cnsttuent Dharakrts dentn sahntam 1 Perceptua knwede s at whch s ree rm alpan and at

    e sane tne s ahntam. e expan e te "ahntam " he mentnsderent nstances error caused by cr bdness rad mtn traven n

    a bat menta sckness and s n Cmmentn n Dharmttara wrtes hatabsence alpan and absence hnti (errr taken teer nt searatecnsttute he dentn percetn Dharmttara ts t at ese rderent stratns represent r derent types sn he case cr bndness s cated n he sense ran indiyagata he cause rad

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    32 Bdds seoog

    motion resuting in the cogtn o a iery circe is ocated in the objectvagata he cause o iusion o moving trees is ocated i e exeacircustances hat condiion the perceiver s 'asthita ay, the cause

    o haucinaory iusions is ocated in the intea circumstances aagataie the mena state o the perceiver A thse causes, hether ocated in theorgan or in e objec, whether extea or tea, aect the cognitive senseand resut in iusory sensaion So, perception shoud be a sense cognition atis distinct om these iusory sensations 19 I we undertake a comarative anaysiso the definition o a$a given by Diga and Dharmakrti, three basicrobems come up for our consideration They are

    1 Is a$a a za or saag jna oedge? What is meant by alpan? and3 I s th adjective "ahna necessary

    S PRA A PRABoth Diga and Dharmakrti, beore giing a deition o a,

    point out hat it is one o the twoJas O course, in Dharmakrti we d anexpicit detaied anaysis as to what is meant by Jya or saaatva(truh), and no such detaied anaysis is avaiabe in Dinga as ar as our

    information goes. It is, howeer, nconverbe at bo of em g aas a owever, in the context of eir insistence on alpanohatva(nonconceptuaity oaa it can realy be asked whether they can justiabyregard a$a as a pJa ntarakita20 denes perception exacty on thepattern o Dharmakrti ithout using the wor jna or Ja, and eremaaa, his commentator, raises a point as o why e word na is noused in this deition Does it in any way ean that ntarakita intends toexcude a$a om the sphere ojna o this aala rsponds bysaying that e ord is not used in he definition becase it is impied and

    therefore not needed owever, i can certainy nq heerpa,as it is defined by tlese Buddhist hinkers, can e a Ja, and i it can be,hen in hat sense? An answer to is question depends on our understanding opa I by a we mean just the presence o avisvaaa wioutere being any necessary awareness or conrnation o it asadigdhatva pa$a can be regarded as pa because i is having avisavdaatvawith its object insoa as it is excusivey determined by the object athaniyataand is o e same form as e orm o he object athasya But iais understood in te o avisvdaatva and asadighatva at is, acognition that is true and also indubitabe, hen, ertanly, a$a caot beregarded as a a because indubitabii or certainty is someing that isdepenent on conirmation or on the production o some invincbe groundshis woud mean that only a avasyaa udgmenta) or saviaajna(concepua) can be a Ja, and since pa$a by its very deinition is

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    Te Bust Teo of Percepton 33

    nonconcepal it caot be pt nder the bric of Bt as e haesaid if indbitability is not to be regarded as an essential element of then te tv of becomes a matter of alytic conseqence

    T IS ?he oher pot a arises for consideraion is ndersanding the od

    "n by Dga and Dharmakrti Sce Diga uses he epression"njojn o defe ln, hereas Dhaarti uses e epression"hilpoi for is prpose it has o be eaminedher bo of em are sing he ord pn i the same sense or i odifferen senses In oher ords ha needs to be eplaine is he meang ofpn according to Diga and Dharmakti hen Diga dees ln

    as "njdiyojn, he qesion arises heher i is o be nderstood asyojn (association) of n, ji and so on ih hgs or associaion of nithjti, and so on If it is understood in e former sense hen i goes againstDigas basic position at he ig vlz is beyon all associationsEidently therefore it is to be nderstood only he later sense2 as has beeneplicitly saed by narakia22 Understood in is sense ere does not seemo be any difference of opinion been Dinga's and Dharmkri'sndersanding ofln narakia denes ln as "hiliniti one pae of Dharmaki bt akes elaborae pas o pot ou ha i does notgo agains Dga 's deniion gien in he M 2

    IS T JECT ABA' ECESSY?he necessity of mentioning the characteristic of hntm has been

    controersial right from the tie of Diga It is rst mentioned by aga isdropped b Diga bt is reintrodced by Dharmakrti I is again dropped bysome of his folloers like tadea bt finally reestablished by Dharmottaraoeer it mst be noted at Diga is not alone in not using e adjectie" hnt As takita poits ot seeral Bddhist inkers regard lsionss prely mental facts haing nothing to do ith sense perception hese thiersobject to the inclsion of the adjectie "hnt in the definition ofp24

    y Dinga dropped the characteristic "hntm is not knon forcertain bt Stcherbatsy25 has pointed ot three considerations that seemto be qite plausible First of all eery illsory cognition has to be jdgmentalbt no judgmentalization belongs to the sensos part of the cognition.Eery jdgment is the constrct of the intellect and not the ree of the

    senses. Dinga maintains that pre sensation oes not contain anyjdgment neither he rght one nor he rong one becase it is nonconcepal It cot contai any illsion at all hence there is no need to add the adjectie"hnt oeer this doesn't mean hat perceptual cognition is not ap because for him p consists only in thy orviGvdtv and not in digdhtv

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    34 Bus soog

    Seond, Dga rejets asbh's deto o k$ beause toud be gven a reast nterretto For the same reason he resoves o dropthe haraterst o n bease t oud be nterpreted as mantang a

    poston at a oneptua owedge s erroneous and that pereptua oedgeaone s nonerroneoushrd, Dnga s aware o e ambgu o e ord "n, and

    to avod onson, he mst have ropped t. Dga, o ourse, doesn't denytat there are usons, but e mst be treated separatey ust as there arenerenta aaes, evss sary there an be k$ss butthese k$ss are due not to the senses but to the nteet ony.

    Dharmakt dsagrees wth Dga o ths pot and rentrodues eharaterst o n e deton Hs man agument s at e

    must sngush beteen sense uson and menta uson For exampe,hen e mstake a rope or a snake, the son s purey menta and easeshen t dspeed But when e see the movng moon the ouds, tsuso ontnues even we are onved that t s the ous that aremovng

    Whe expanng Dharmakrt's ontento, Dharmoara ponts out thatthe purpose o usng the two haratersts s not just to dstngush k$om nn but aso to ear away rong ognton26 he haraterst okalno oud aone have been qute suent or that but nwere not added, erroneous ogntons, e that o a ovg tree, at are notauty menta onstruts but are due to sensua aberratons oud not bedstgushed om genune perepton hereore, Dharmottara ssts that thentroduton o hn s perety order.

    In ths ontext Dharmottara wrtes at the term n shoud notbe understood n the sense o visvdk beause ths oud py atperepton aone s visvdk and not nn beause nn doesn'trepresnt svlk$ Had t been s n to manta at

    aone s visvdk and nt nn the term "klnoh oudhave been suent or t beause a kln ud But atdsn't se t be e ase For Dharmart both k$ and nn arevivdk n the sense that bo are onsstent wth ther respetve objets,nmey, vlk$a and lk$

    ntarakta and Kamaaa deend Dharmakrt and argue at ength toestabsh that usons our due to sensua aberratons aso, and they arenot just to be expained as menta dstortons Utmatey, a usons an betraed to a deet n the sense organ oneed, and the usons ere

    not due to ths deet and ere due to menta aberratons, ey woud havedsappeared hen e menta dstoon s reted Not ony ths, but e vvdpresentaton o ase objets usons aot be satsatory expained unessthey are regarded as sensua presentatons27

    Dharmottara expty mentons that there ere some thnkers amongBuddhsts theseves ho manta at even these aborma experenes are to

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    Th Buhs Thor o Pro

    be regarded as valid knoledge inasuh as they satis the pragmati tests erites, here are some ho maintain hat e vision of a moving tree by anobserver traeling by ship and similar pereptions are right pereptions beause

    here is in this ase an underyng reali hih is not a onstrution Indeed aman atg upon suh a pereption reahes something hih is a tree hene it issupposed at eperiene suppors his pereption 28

    Similarly, ntaraita also rites that beause of a suessl outome evenin erroneous ognition some peope maintained that erroneous ognition shoudaso be regarded as valid29 ile ommenting on is, Kamalaa explains that some people, in t, means some uddhist thiners themseves

    o Dharmottara and ntaraita point out that hat onstitutes vaidity isnot pragmati fiess aone but that pus onsisteny (visvkm i reaity

    So suh presentations, as he ght of the jee for e jee tself or of yelloonh she for a reay hite onh she or of moving trees for trees that arereally stationary are not vaid pereptios, though there is aua veriationere verifiation and pragmati satisfation anot, hoever, be aepted as hetest of vaidity but onsisteny of presentation ith reality is e riterion Whatis presented is he light of he jee or the yeo onh she and hat is atuallyattained is not the light of the jee or yeo onh shel but something differentIn e mirage, too, e reated ight of the sun and the determinate experieneof ater are presented

    aving disussed the divergent vis of the uddhist ogiians from Digaonrd, e an hile onuding restate our probem Is not ga's deitionof pereption as /nm ompete and suent y tse I seems ataddition of the adjetive "bnm is not oay neessary Probably,Dharmarti thought that the term "klpnpm is ompetent ony todistinguish rk from nmn but not from bn jfn ut here ean question and perhaps rejt Dharmarti's ontention and uphod Digasposition on e fooing grounds

    Ideed, sense pereption an be reoned as a soure of noedgemz only under the ondition that the noedge produed by asensation does not represent the sensory iusion Hoever, it seems quitesuperuous to mention "bnm as harateristi of vaid sensepereption, beause, aording to the lassifiation of the system, sensepereption is a variety of vaid, that is, noniusive, ognition

    heterm "bnm is almost a synonym of "klnm, sineonstrution represents iusion hen ompared ith pure sensation, thegenuine soure of knoedge So t beomes useess to use the synonym

    in the definitionA question may arise, o an e have erroneous ognition at e eve ofpereption? Pereption eng niilpk e have just e sensations of theobjet, and no judgment is formed at at stage Oy judgment an e right orrong For eample, enters a room i a friend of his, and there is a ropeying in the room istaing his rope for a snae, A ries, Snae

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    3 uds Epsoogy

    he friend says, No , it is merely a rope hus, the perception of the sameobject, rope, has resulted in two ieret mental constructs he rope must havegiven the same ind of sensation to bo of them, ut the first one thought it as

    a snae, and the second one ought it rightly to be a rope So , mental constructresults in ilusion, not bare perception For distinguishing mental constuct omperception Diga's denition is competent enough, and there is no need to addthe adjective "bntm to it

    Dharmarti, on one hand, believes in sensua aberrations and, i a viewto exclude these from the category of perception, includes e term "btmbut, on the other hand, he strongly advocates the theo of svtpmyvdaccoring to hich al cognition qua cognitions must be true his fact aotbe overlooed At the evel of sensation ere is no error. From is it folos that

    errors are due to noncognitive factors that is, factors extraneous to sensationence, he addition of the ajective "bntm seems to be useess

    NA OF $Al the episemoogical thiers in India are uous gg

    as a reliabe and valid cognition, but there exists a wide difference of opinionwi regard to its precise naure Ordinarily grantg a basic distinction beweentwo types of cognition, iikk (ineterminae) and sviklp (eterminate),it has been debated as to hether prk is to be regarded as niiklpkony or sviklpk ony or bo iilpk and svklpk he Grammarianphilosophers and e aina thiers tae one extreme view a al cognitions,cludng perceptua ones , are sviklpk since they are predicaive in characterand also necessarily embodied verba propositions overt or covert he Buddhistposition ies on the oer extreme, that pk is aays kk and cannever be sviklpk nm aone is sviklpk Before e iscuss heBudhist position in detail, i wou be orthwhie if we briey ouine teconiting non Buddhist posiions on this issue

    Ata etic ewI the Avaita-Venta, particuary n its earier phase, we seem to have a

    position ain to the Buddhist one, which is arrived at on a sigtl dierent basisAccording to it, the reai being of the nature of pure existence bereft of allcharacterizations (dd or niie snmtrm the perceptua cognition thatis i the form of presentation of an object must be niiklpk. It is a cognitionof is or e existent but not as determined by anying o deteine athg is to characterize it by his or at quali and is thus to distinguish it om

    other hings having different qualities Al this is the or of budd. en wehave a determinate cognition of an object on e basis of discrimination, heobject is deteined by certain qualities and relations Such a cognition, which isordinariy caed sviklp pr is not vaid (mit because it is noonger repesentative of the object, hich in the utimate anaysis is oneundierentiated cosciousness (ct. he Neo-Advaita Vednta, hoever,

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    Te Teo of Peeo 37

    accepts a distincion between niiklpaka and savikalpaka praka from tevahika or practca stadpoit ough from the prmhika standpointsuch a istiction is untenabe Accordng to it savikalpaka praka is the

    owedge of a ing as quaied by an atribute Te essence of savikalpakapraka is the detrmnation of its obect by way of predication On the otherhand niikalpaka paaka is owedge of te bare existence of a ng withoutany predication. Stricty speag ropositions e "Tavamasi aoe can beregarded as genuine niikalpaka praka Trogh aha-aahalakasuch proposition are to b dstood as oneyng the spe identity beween"a ad " vam Suc propositios technicay know as akhha va,are nnredicatie in arater. For example when we say "Tis is tat ma we do not predicate "tat man to "tis It is not a case tat we relate "this

    man wit "tat man but sy asset te identity beween te two 3!Graarians ew

    Gamarians o to the ter extreme and in is Jainas joi them inmaintining that a preptions are savikalpaka because they are ecessariypredicatie in charater and erbazed i form. Not ony perception but eeryognition percepua or nonpereptua has to be both propositioa as we assentetia I other words ey mantan that e epistemic cotent and the nuistiform are aways inseparabe and a propositions are nariay inguistic inform. Tere is no pure tinking but " speech ig. In e words of Bhaaria Grammaria piosopher "There is no thougtcontet without a anguageform an always tougtcontet is inextricaly interspersed wit aguage form.If te unfaiig for of language ad een ost to te tougtcontent thougtitsef woud ae een lost in obiio Tougt as a form ecause it is formedin language 32

    From tis it folows tat al ogitins ncludig percepua ons are atoce both jugmental and eral. A corolary of tis woud be that perceptiocan neer be nivikaaka but sould aways be savikalpaka

    NyyasSyaViiaita Venta ViewsIn e schoos of Nyya Mms S and Viidaita Venta

    the preeing two exreme iews are reconcied and a midde position is putfor . It is held these schoos that any pereption niikalpaka or savikalpakais a diect cognition of a rea indiidua that is a nity o uiersa ad particuarTe distitio between nivikaaka and savikalpaka is due ot to any differencen the contet of perceptio t to te y n which te same ontents of experiecemay e ordered and arraed.

    e Smya ikers perhaps initiay adoated a distnctio between two

    stages in percepal cogniton namely niikalpaka and savikalpaka, ad usedthe term lcana (Gestalt iew) for nivialpaka paka The firstappreension of an object is in te form of ndiretiated sesum and emanas is sakalpaka, at is direntiates e unifferentiated sens presetedby the senses. Whie commenting on e Ska Kik Vcaspatinira i his

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    38 Bus soog

    Sa Tattva md introdus a dgd distintion btwn th twokinds of pption 33

    ia of th Pras shoo ss to foow th Skha in.For hi h

    ivikalpaka prakais t first ont of ognition in whih

    thr is an undiffrntiatd apprhnsion of th objt as on indiidua who ofgnri and spifi atibuts (sammgdhavastr. Hr is no dfinitognition o it as his or that objt (vast viea . ikaaka praka tussbs hidrn's and dub prson's prptions34 It is nonba in natubaus ak apai to ouniat How, Kunias positionan as b undstood in a dint ann, if we a into onsidation foowing s and Pasrais onta thon

    Na vie a smam tim abhyate

    Tdrbhtast akevaiate.

    (In that apphnsio nith th patiua no unisa is xprindWhat is xpind is o th indiidua ojt at undis th two35

    That is , h gads ivikapaka praka as a sort of ihoat ognition whih nithr th partiuar nor gnaizd aspt is ognizd; no ar thdistinguishd Whatr is intptation o Kuria s position, fo hi it isindtrinat o nononptua and thrfor nonrba Th sond stag isat of savikalpaka praka, whih is a trinat ognition in whih th

    objt is ognizd b th ind aong wih its haratrizationsLik Sa and s ks, Na-Vaiika inks asoapt oh sags f prption and ost of th gad h as qua aid Fo Vaspati onward w find a aut distintion btwn h two stags ofpaa. On distintion btwn iikalpka and savikalpaka Janta writs,"A unirsa , a substane, a ation o a quai whatr ssn of an obt isgaspd b savikalpaka is qua graspd b iikalpaka Th eban ofa aningation of objt wi a tain word is ony ation atarks ut savikalpaka o iikalpaka. So fa as th objt is ond thr

    is not th at diffn btwn th two 3 Fo is statnt th on thingw an distint ak out is that for so Naiyikas, th distintion btwnivikalaka and savikaaka is on in rbai Th savikalpaka is rbaizdand pdiaiona, whras iikaaka is nonrbaizd and nonprdiationa.So in ivikalpaka w apphnd th objt aong wi a its ations andharatrizations, but w do not intrat th (vaiiavaghi and insavikapaka w do so. In th NayaNa, distintion twn th two isor sharp dawn as opad to Jaanta. Howr, th onsqun o suha sharpnss has bn so sor of rtinking on th ar of praka in tNaaNya Viana, in BPaiccheda and Siddta-Mvali is

    unwiing to apt ivikalpaka within th fod ofpraka sin it is a kind ofprjudgnt ognition 37

    In th Viidaita Vdnta, n though dstintion btwn iikalpakaand savikalpaka is aptd h two ar gardd as dint quantitatiBoth ar diati and ationa in harat, but whas st on is agu

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    e d eor o Perepo 39

    ad indefinite e second oe s vvd and dente The rst s he ta arenessrt irz of the obect It is bout e tota obect in hch theindividua as e as the unversa aspects of th obect are apprehended in eir

    interreationshp but ther s no compete certaint In the second or successveapprehensions the udgment becomes decisve and s therefore knon assvikl. Rmua uderstands svilpk not terms of udgmentaatonbut in terms of more decsiveness or certaint

    uddst ew against Grammarans on one hand and Naika Mmmsaka and

    Sa nkers on the other uddhs thinkrs nsist on percetion bengiiklk A clear-cu dstcton beteen iikk j and sviklpkj seems to have been introduced for the first time b Diga According tohim the derence beeen iiklk and svikk s not us quanttativea dfference in vvdness and sequence but s ndamental and qualtatve Theiiklk j s a cognon of an obec-qa-obect that can be oy n theform of pure aareness and tha can never be the form of aareness n terms oftought The reason s a our hough can never grasp the obect-qua-obecthat s in e form of svlks because our thought s alas restricted tosy lk It s tus clear tat the o pes of knoledge are qute dfferent

    not onl n teir nare but also n the sheres of ter operationWile defing thkrs om Dinga onard alas insist on itsbeing klpp. Klp stands for both ought and speech and tereforethe phrase klp ples to igs: is nonconcepual and s nonverbal

    uddsts start th a dchotomous dsincton beteen a oledge hat isercepal and a knoledge ta s nonpercepual tha is conceual From thist follos that perceal cognton cano be conceal cogniton and concetualcogniton canot be erceal cogion The nonconceal of ercepon

    means ts eedom om all mental concepons In oter ords all concepualcontents are mnd-given and menta mposons hereas erceion is given bythe obect and not at all b te m Dnga38 quotes an bid treatisen his suor here s stated that one ho has abl to erceve percevessomethng blue (N vt but t s not conceived at "this s blue (Nitivijti The eression "N vti ipes tat one has an mmediateaareness of te obect self. On e other hand "Nliti vi implies thatone forms a udgment based on erceon by associating a name it the obectperceived Thus the receding assage eresses te idea that erceion is free

    from concepual construction I other ords in respect of an obect e perceiverhas a sensation of the obect but does no possess any concepual aareness of it .

    There are to ings e mean hen e sa that percetion is iiklka

    ) I perepo e eer peree e ner or e er q e

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    40 s pseoog

    Ts we s pecee e svaaa ogoe becse s soe bee of ess A e eeof svaaaa ee e o qfcos ss e qe eee

    e ejecon of dhaa-dha bheda ssce-be eosp becse pecepon ee s o ppeeson of qes s ee s o eeno so o Fo empe "X s n objec f "X s neere e "P se owege of X so so e eee becse o e ckowege e geee w s ojec f P s eee e woe s o ge b e objec one becse e objec s o eeo cno cse eeon Coseqe w be scepc we obec f e pecee objec s eee s owege s so o eeeee svaaaa oe s e objec of pecep cogo s seos

    oes o enre fo e ex omen e svaaaa eg momeco e pecee wce eefoe eer peceo s ee fom oepecepo Lke svaaaa ee pecepo s qe svaovaraka)

    b Tee s oe sese wc pecepo s ococep Te cocepcogo (sava na s ws vavah na pece cogo szsargvagh na eo cogo oe os s o be

    poposo e poposo s e consc n wo ecosco ee co be foo of poposo Ts pecepcogo s opoposo Tog se s opopso on e bssof oe c fome poposo s sese c be ege s

    pepoposo e oe pepoposo pecep cogo ssfoe o poposo s cocepze ceses o be pecepoTo be cocep s o be opecep

    2 Tee s been bo geee og epseoogc es oeee kowege s posse wo gge s so n ew s Tog eene owege s gsc o owege sgsc Pecep owege s eere s ongsc becse oes no eqe e ep of ngge n so ecse s beo e ec ofgge Te oeb of nrviaka aka s p fo b NMs kes peps o e s go e o e seco b fo

    ss e seco go s oe sgc e fs oe aa sanaha expessbe gge o on becse oes o eqe eep of gge b becse s eee e objec (svaaaa)wc s eo e ec of gge

    Buddhists ut forth igorous ffort to dfnd ir osition isais nonBuddhist ns W ma hr rsnt n brif th Buddhist argumnts for thrctin of th nonBuddhist ositions which can b broad rrsntd intor nam th NaVaiika th Jaina and Mmmsaka

    Refutation o Nyya PositionIn th a tradition from Vcasatimira onward w ha a carcut

    distinction btwn two stags of rction and hnc of two ts of rctuacognition Th Buddhists acct nalpaa aon as paa and thrforth would dn that thr ar two stags or ts of praa in th form of

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    Te Bddt Teor f Perceton 4 1

    nkZk and svkZk Te man agment t fo by te ddists fononaccetance of k as svkZk is tat all deteminate ecetion iscapable of eing vebalized, nd if eceion is to be efned in te f

    kZn o in ms f - (beng cased b te object), en itcan neve be associated wi vebal exessio A cognition tat is in te fom ofappeension of an object (bs can neve be asociated wit vebalexpession because neie ae tee wods pesent in e object, no ae tewods idenical wi the object9 If it wee so, a eson ignoant of te meaningof te wods wold also be capabe of comunicang trog wods like tepeson wo knows e meaning In oe wods , to cognze is one ing , and todesigate is anoe. Te cognizing nction is not identical wit e designatingnction, no is e desigatng nction insepaably assoiated wi e cogzng

    nction Teefoe, a cognition odced by e object sold esent oy eobject and ot te wod, wic is wongly sosed to be denotative of teobject Fom tis it follows tat a deteminate knowledge ta is a mentalconstcion is eoeosly eld to be a tue eception Deteinate knowledgepeses an object as associated wi a wod (b althog in eai teobject is ndependent of ay association wit a wod Detemnate knowledge iscaused by te past menal pession (vkZvsn and it gass an ncetain(ny objec , not a xed oe. It dies wit evey individal becase it is nota eal object and is cased by e ast mental impession. Te nction of mentalmesion is always concaled in a deeminate knowledge, bt sice tatknowledge folows in te wake of ecetion, it sps e nction of e latte,ad because of tis deeate knowledge is misakenly spsed o be peceal.

    Te e agument pt fot by uddists is tat te deteinate owedgeis always edicaive fom in wic someig is edicated to sometng(v!vvg fn . Ts , it is aays ed