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T H E N U C L E A R A T K I N S A S S Y S T E M A L L I A N C E

Safety CultureM. Griffon-Fouco IAEA WS - January 2012

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Content

1. Safety culture: a permanent questioning

2. A case study : the Blayais flood

3. How can we help?

Source :EDF

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SAFETY CULTURE:A PERMANENT QUESTIONING1

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Safety Culture, a permanent questioning My background

My story is linked with safety and with the improve ment of Safety Culture .

Atomic Energy Commission (IRSN) : probabilistic studies of nuclear accidentsin taking into account human factors.

EDF : first team on human factors in NPP and impact of them on incidents and accidents.

Blayais NPP (4 reactors PWR 900 MW) for 10 years : Safety and QualityManager, Manager of two reactors and General Manager of the whole plant for more than 4 years.

Assystem for 5 years : an independent engineering company with aspecific awareness of safety.

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From the study of safety and the root causes of incidents and accidents

To the permanent Management of safety as a General Manager of a NPP

Safety Culture , a permanent questioning My background

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Safety Culture , a permanent questioning Evolution

Before TMI (1979)– First probabilistic studies on human factors– First studies on root causes of human errors

Post TMI

1) a booster to study root causes of human errors an d to make a lot of improvements.– Rewriting of incident and accident procedures– Man-machine interface of control room.– Communication between operators and shift supervisor.– Training of the operating Teams

2) a booster to organize the safety.– Creation of the first crisis organization between headquarters and the NPP and between

operators and safety authorities.3) a booster for technical improvement.– Procedures H (out of design) and U (ultimate)– New pressurized valves, measurement of water level in the reactor vessel.

Creation of INPO : to “promote the highest level of safety and reliability”.

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Safety Culture , a permanent questioning Evolution

TCHERNOBYL

1) a world wide impact

– WANO was created with its Peer Reviews (in addition of OSART = Operational Safety review Team created by IAEA in 1982).

2) transparency – in the NPP.– towards public information.

3) INSAG 4 in 1991 : main principles of safety for N PP.

– The foundation of Safety Culture.

4) International nuclear event scale (INES) proposed by AIEA on 1991

5) Reorganization of safety in NPP : – Independence between Safety Engineers and Operating Team.– Creation of a Quality and Safety Team.– Separation between Operation and Safety : Operation and Safety Department in EDF

becomes Safety Department.

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In French NPP, a progressive improvement of safety

� Post TMI = Human Factors

� Post TCHERNOBYL = Transparency and separation between safety and op erators.

� BLAYAIS incident = Reassessment of safety margins (a case study as following).

� Post FUKUSHIMA = Reassessment of safety margins and other improvem ents to organize crisis management.

Safety Culture, a permanent questioning

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CASE STUDYTHE BLAYAIS FLOOD2

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Before Fukushima : BLAYAIS incident in December 1999.

11 (Source NRC – Regulatory Information Conference)

12 (Source NRC – Regulatory Information Conference)

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Blayais floodFeedback analysis

Source :EDF

Flooding hazards considered in the design– Severe storm-driven waves coinciding with high estuary

level exceed the worst-case design scenario

Protective measures defined by design for operation

– Insufficient height and inadequate shape of the dykes– Insufficient protection of the underground rooms

containing safety equipment– Difficulty to detect water in affected rooms– Inadequate warning system– All 4 units concerned, on-site organizational difficulties

Effects on the storm on the NPP’s support functions and surroundings

– Temporary site inaccessibility (blocked roadways, phone communication…)

– Partial temporary loss of offsite power supplies– Clogging-up of filters of water intake

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Blayais floodAction Plan – A comprehensive review of the flood risks

Flooding hazards– Identification of all phenomena which can

result in a flood in the 19 French NPP– Re assessment of flood hazards / impacts

at each siteProtective measures

– Identification of equipment to be protected– Review of existing protective measures– Modifications or improvements if required

Effects on NPP’s support functions and surroundings

– Specific flood procedures developed as necessary

– Analysis of the risks : site inaccessibility, loss of offsite power supplies, heat sink behaviour, communications…

– Means defined to avoid or cope with them

Source :EDF

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Blayais floodLessons learned

The blayais event used as an opportunity to reassess design rules and improve NPP protection

A comprehensive review, carried out over 7 years involving various skills (R&D, engineering, operation…)

Upgraded protection of most NPP against flood (about 110 M€ expenses) and set up of site specific flooding procedures

A climate survey put in place to periodically reassess the need for any additional measures (10 years timeframe)

Source :EDF

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Safety Culture, a permanent questioningWhere does it come from?

• Evolution of identified risk factors

Technical Systems

TMI Tchernobyl

Technical HumanFactors

Safety Culture

• Evolution of safety scope

Fukushima

Reassessment of safety margins and improvement in crisis management

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n.triple.aHOW CAN WE HELP?

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n.triple.a – who are we and how we can help?Delivering engineering excellence worldwide

The alliance of two of the world’s leading consultancy and engineering firms: Atkins and Assystem .

A strong relationship forged through working together on the ITER international nuclear fusion research project.

Our combined nuclear experience spans more than four decades intwo pioneering nuclear countries.

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Engineering activitiesNeeded at all the phases of a project

Lenders Technical Advisor

Architect Engineering

Consulting

Owner Engineering

Operation & maintenance

support

Commissioning& start up

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Why do you need an engineering company? The power of our organisation

Our nuclear experience:• In-depth knowledge of nuclear technologies for nuclear new build

programmes – access to our know-how and best practices• The full range of nuclear and technical skills.

Our experience and track record of successfully managing large scale projects with high constraints of planning, quality and cost

Our independence

Our tailored and collaborative approach driven by a long term commitment with our client

The availability of our training academy

Our local presence combined with our ability to reach-back to a broad and deep capability (capacity to mobilize and flexibility)

Contact: 75 Boulevard Haussmann75008 ParisFRANCE

Phone: +44 7740 634 733Email: contact@ntriplea.com