Salim Said the Political Role of the Indonesian Military Past Present and Future Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science, Jan 1, 1987, Vol.15(1)

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The Political Role of the Indonesian Military:

Past, Present and Future

Salim SaidTempo, Jakarta

This paper attempts to briefly examine the political role of the Indonesian militaryfrom its inception to its dominant position in Indonesian politics today. It also

attempts to discuss whether or not it would continue to play the same role in thefuture. The paper will be divided into three sections: the political role of the militaryduring the revolution, the increased political involvement of the military, conflictinginterpretations of the military role and the possibility of future change.

Political Role of the Indonesian Military Between 1945-49

Although the military has dominated political life in Indonesia only in 1965, its clear,involvement in politics was during the revolutionary period, i.e. before Indonesiaattained its independence. In fact, it was during that period that civil-military

relations in Indonesia were shaped. The relations can be explained by the interactionbetween two factors: the involvement in politics of the Indonesian military since itsinception and the weakness of civilian institutions. The military's involvement in

politics, in turn, can be explained by several characteristics of the Indonesian militaryand its history since its inception in the early days of the revolution.

The Indonesian army was a self-created army in the sense that it was establishedneither by the government nor by a political party. Instead, the military created, armedand organized itself out of the shambles of the Japanese-trained Indonesian militia

following the surrender of the Japanese and the proclamation of independence (1945),when the newly organized government was reluctant to raise an army. The centralgovernment under Sukarno, which was afraid of antagonizing the Allies, wanted toachieve independence peacefully. The youth then took the initiative to arm themselvesand defend the country.

Because the reluctant government did not give proper guidance to the military,the military had to elect its own Panglima Besar (Armed Forces Commander). Theman elected was Sudirman, a former school teacher turned battalion commander

during the Japanese period. As the Armed Forces Commander, Sudirman assumedthe highest position in the military by way of election, and only later was he confirmedby the government in his position. General Sudirman's actions were the behaviourof an army commander who, while recognizing the authority of the political leader-

ship, also saw himself as more than a mere government soldier.


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The political behaviour of Sudirman as a logical consequence of the self'creation of the army could not have developed as it did had it not been for the weaknessof political and governmental institutions. This weakness not only caused the govern-ment to lose control of the military but also convinced the officers under Sudirmanto pursue their own policy of independence from the government.

The experience in the guerrilla war following the Dutch attack on the Republican. areas which began on 19 December 1948 and lasted until 11 August 1949 is also

important in understanding the military behaviour after independence. The guerrillawar was an opportunity for General Sudirman to demonstrate the autonomy of the

army, that is, when the political leadership decided to surrender to the Dutchcolonial army, Sudirman and his forces went to the jungle to fight a guerrilla war.

Even before the Dutch attack, Sudirman had prepared for the worse. Heinstructed his deputy, Nasution, to deal with the Dutch. Basically there were two

things Nasution did to implement these instructions. First, he reorganized the armyinto two forces, the mobile army and the territorial army. Second, he prepared the

people for a total war.The separation between the mobile and the territorial army was conceptualized

based on a strategy of a war of attrition, in which the mobile army or the shock troopswould concentrate on attacking the enemy wherever they were, while the territorial

troops would be posted in definite locations to be the nucleus of the people's resistance

against the enemy.After the Dutch attack, the army in Java which was already divided into four

divisions, was given the power to govern the island in a time of emergency. Nasutionas the Commander of the Java Army was the highest military as well as governmentauthority during the emergency. Under him were the four divisional commanders,

who were appointed as the military governors for their respective areas. Right belowthe divisional commanders and the military governor were STM (Sub TerritoriumMiliter, Sub Regional Military Command) commanders who paralleled the Residentas the head of a Keresidenan (residency). Below this there was the Kabupaten (district)which was paralleled by the KDM (Komando District Militer, District MilitaryCommand). One level below was the Kecamatan (sub-district) and it was matched

by Nasution with the KODM (Komando Order Distrik Militer, Sub-District MilitaryCommand) - see Figure 1.

All of the civilian heads of the above-mentioned governmental structure, from

governor down to_camat (sub-district head) were subordinated to the officials of the

military government. Thus the governor became a mere advisor to the divisionalcommander and military governor; the resident and adviser to the STM commander;the bupati (District head) of the KDM commander; the camat of the KODMcommander.

Only the lurah (the village's head) could still function more or less as usual. Butunlike before, during the guerrilla war, the lurah was controlled not by the camat

anymore but by the commander of the KODM. And around the lurah there weresome pemuda who were already trained as the village cadres by the army. These villagecadres were the extension of the KODM to supervise the day to day operation ofthe lurah.' I


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Figure 1 The Structure of the Military Government in Java during the GuerrillaWar, 1948-49

Compared with the military governmental structure, the organization of themobile troops during the guerrilla war was far simpler. Under the divisional .

commander there were what was called at that time Wehrkreise (independent units)whose area paralleled the residency of the STM. Most of the time, the commanderof the Wehrkreise was also the Commander of the STM. All of the fighting unitsin the Wehrkreise were operationally under the command of the Commander of theWehrkreise. Due to the failure of the reorganization as initiated by Nasution, the

troops in each Wehrkreise were mostly mobile troops. Thus the mobile troops werenot only assigned to fight the enemy but also to assist the Military Government, atask which was

supposedly assignedto the territorial

army.The task of the

MilitaryGovernment itself was basically to make sure that the following three principles wouldbe implemented:

First, the Republic would continue to resist as a state and byusing the instruments of a state. Second, no matter howdifficult the circumstances of the war became, the administrationwould have to continue - even for instance, in regions whichhad become isolated, were frequented by Dutch patrols, or inwhich permanent Dutch military posts had been established.


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To this end, civil servants at all levels would have to be paralleledby military personnel, and extensive authority should bedelegated to the regions. Third, the military administration wasfirst of all a means of resistance, that is, a means for mobilizingand organizing all fighting forces and a means for using localresources in the resistance.'

The guerrilla war experience - in which a military government was created -

in turn created a model of civil-military relations, which is characterized by militarycontrol over the political system throughout the Republican controlled area. It hassince played an influential role in shaping the army leaders' conception of how theyshould relate to civilian society. After the late 1950s, parts of the model were once

again put into practice. Since 1966 the model has been the most important elementin the structure and practice of Indonesian government.

The decision by Sudirman to conduct guerrilla warfare against the Dutch whenthe civilian leaders decided to surrender to the Dutch colonial army that stormed the

Republican stronghold in December 1948 can only be understood in the context ofweak civilian and governmental constitutions. Basically there are two reasons for thisweakness.

In Indonesia, unlike India where the British Raj created the Indian Civil Serviceand even allowed the Indian Congress (Party) to develop long before independence,the Dutch in Indonesia systematically denied the nationalist movement a chance to

grow. There was to be sure, a corps of indigenous civil servants cultivated by theDutch colonial authority, but this body was devastated by the Japanese occupationforces and what was left was torn apart by unleashed popular power in the early daysof the Revolution.

But the immediate cause of the weakness of civilian institutions was the suddenchange of the governmental system in November 1945 from the American stylepresidential system to the European parliamentary system. The new system allowedthe creation of many political parties, some of which joined the government and othersthe opposition camp. The constant bickering between the opposition and the partiesin the government under the ever present threat that Dutch might annihilate of the

newly born Republic, not only caused the government to lose control over the alreadypoliticized army, but also convinced the military to pursue its own policies indepen-dent of the government as much as it could.

In this connection it is interesting to compare the Israeli and Indonesian armiesin their first few months. Unlike Indonesia, Israel under Prime Minister David BenGurion was able to put the Israeli Defense Force under the government's control.And because of this the political involvement of the Israeli officers could be

successfully contained.I would argue that the Indonesian military experience during the Revolution

makes ABRI (Indonesian Armed Forces) unique among Third World military, not

only in its origin but also in the way in which civil-military relations developed after

independence was won. Unlike other military, the military in Indonesia acted as oneof the several recognized political forces since its inception. Although soon after

independence, its role was curtailed for a while but it gradually emerged again.


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Political Role of the Military Before the 1965 Coup

Following the transfer of sovereignty in December 1949 and the establishment of theUnitary State of the Republic of Indonesia in August 1950, the political role of themilitary was severely curtailed, if not completely cut off. There were three reasonsfor this. First, the constitution - known as the 1950 Provisional Constitution -

was clearly based on the Western Liberal democratic tradition in which the militarywas subordinated to civilian supremacy. Remembering that period more than twentyyears later, T. B. Simatupang, the Chief of Staff at that time, wrote:

In the early fifties we were observing the eagerness [of themilitary] to concentrate attention on the development of military .

expertise. That approach was based on an assumption that thepolitical groups would institutionalize the political system and

manage to develop the society, the economy, and the culture.Had the "experiment" succeeded our situation today would bedifferent.' J

Second, the army was in the hands of the modernizers, officers like Nasution and

Simatupang who were the motor behind the rationalization and reorganization in1948. Third, after the death of Sudirman in January 1950, the military lost its ir-

replaceable father who never hesitated to oppose the government whenever he thoughtone of its policies would victimize the army. The death of Sudirman also meant theloss of the indispensible unifier for the heterogeneous army. It was this lack of unitythat made the army the object of civilian interventions for many years, until Suharto,in 1969 finally succeeded in unifying the army under his control.

Despite the three factors working together to weaken the military, it neverabandoned politics completely. As early as the formation of the first cabinet of the

unitary state in 1950 under Prime Minister Mohammad Natsir, the military wasinvolved in deciding who the defense minister should be. The candidate fromNatsir's party was finally replaced by a person acceptable to the army.4

4

In the early 1950s two events occurred which had a critical impact on thedirection of civil-military relations. These were the October 17, 1952 incident andthe so-called June Affair in 1955.

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In order to understand the background of the October 17 incident we first haveto know the attitude of the military toward the civilian politicians right after thetransfer of sovereignty. The bitter experiences with the "surrender" of Sukarno onDecember 18, 1948, the cease fire of 1949 and the powerful position of the civilian

politicians under the new constitution were the background for the affair. Moreover,most of the members of the provisional Parliament at that time and some of the

ministers did not belong to the groups genuinely fighting for independence. This iseasy to understand if we know that the Republic of Indonesia post-1950 was a pro-duct of an integration between the original Republic, whose capital was Yogyakarta,and the areas formerly under the federal states created by the Dutch. As we have

already seen, during the revolution, in order to contain the original Republic, theDutch had been creating many states all over Indonesia. It was to those many states- joined together with the original Republic as the United States of Indonesia -

that the Dutch transferred sovereignty at the end of 1949. But those many states


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existed only for a very short period. Within a year following the transfer of sovereignty'all of those states dissolved themselves and merged with the Republic of Indonesia.'

The 17th of October incident, the first open conflict between the army and thecivilian politicians in post-independence Indonesia came into being when the pro-visional Parliament discussed a topic which was regarded by the army as its internalproblem. The topic was the modernization of the army. This idea as developed byNasution, then Commander of the Army, was opposed by a certain group inside thearmy itself. The latter group had close contact with President Sukarno and with acertain group on the opposition side of Parliament. It was really as a result of a lettersent by the latter group that the Parliament started to discuss the military problem." 6

Army Headquarters and several regional commanders were very irritated by thisaction of Parliament. On October 17, 1952, the officers from Army Headquarterstogether with some regional commanders went to the palace to see President Sukarnoand asked him to assume power and dissolve the provisional Parliament. Sukarnodid not succumb to the military pressure, and Nasution, as the highest rankingofficer from Army Headquarters, resigned thereafter.7 ,

Commenting on the failure of the October 17, 1952 incident, an observer wrotelater:

As to the officers, they failed to achieve their purpose not onlybecause the president was able to intimidate them by hismagnetic hold on the masses but also - perhaps primarily- because of the lack of consensus and discipline amongthemselves.... To illustrate, while Colonel Nasution, Chief of ,Staff of the Army, was being hostile to Parliament and incliningtowards an authoritarian and militaristic approach, Major ,General

Simatupang,Chief of Staff of the Armed

Forces,was

arguing against a military dictatorship.'As a result of the October 17, 1952 incident, "... the overall bargaining strength ofthe army vis-'a-vis everyone else in the political arena was seriously impaired".9 Andit was that weak bargaining position of the army that became the root of another

. conflict between the army and the government.On July 31, 1953 a new cabinet came into being with Iwa Kusuma Sumantri,

a well-known leftist, as Minister of Defense. There were two policies of KusumaSumantri that irritated the Army. First was his open sympathy to the leftist groupwhich consisted of people who were involved in the 1948 communist rebellion in

'

Madiun. The second was the policy whereby the Minister maintained or even deepened.

the cleavage between the pro- and the anti-October 17 groups. Looking back to this

period Ali Sastroamijoyo, the then Prime Minister, wrote:

. Naturally, Iwa's policy produced an uneasy feeling in thearmy as a whole, and it was this perhaps which caused a growingdesire within the army to make peace among themselves so that

. TNI would become united and strong again and could with-stand strongly and resolutely the interference of politicians inarmy affairs. The idea of restoring the unity of the army haddeveloped in the middle of 1954, but it was not until February17, 1955 that it took on a more concrete form, when a meetingheld in Yogya was attended by more than 250 TNI officers.

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In July 1959 President Sukarno formally declared the return of the country to..

the 1945 revolutionary constitution in which the president played the central role.The decision was made after the Constitutional Council, the body elected in 1955to draw a new contitution, failed to reach consensus on which constitution to adopt.In 1960 President Sukarno banned several parties, the most important among them

being Masyumi (the modernist Muslim Party) and the PSI (the Socialist Party ofIndonesia). The reason given for the ban was that both parties had some importantleaders involved in the regional rebellions. With the Nationalist Party (PNI) weakand divided, this decision left the Communist Party (PKI) as the only powerful partyin Indonesia.

The period from 1959 until 1965 in Indonesian political history is known as the

period of Guided Democracy. During this period,

. President Sukarno and the army leadership under MajorGeneral (subsequently Lieutenant General and later General)Nasution were the principal power elements in government....

Soekarno continued to lack a political organization of hisown. In order to maximize his influence vis-2?-vis the army,

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therefore, he needed to find support from political groups hostile'to the army....

But it was the PKI which provided Soekarno with his bestorganized, most vociferous, and most reliable body of supportagainst the army leaders. Hence it was that the President

'

repeatedly shielded the PKI against the effort of Nasution andhis associates to reduce its power."

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Sukarno stayed in power as long as he could manage to balance these forces.Once the balance became

unbalanced,as

happenedin October 1965 after the

assassination of six generals from Army Headquarters by a group of young officers

apparently in alliance with the Communist Party, Sukarno was no longer in control.'9After months of intensive psychological warfare between Sukarno and the

Army, on March 11, 1966, Sukarno finally authorized General Suharto, then Chief-of-Staff of the Army, to take any action he felt necessary for the country on behalfof Sukarno. The first action Suharto took was to disband the PKI. With no PKI anda weak Sukarno, the military stood unchallenged on the stage of Indonesian politics.

The Changing Ideology of the Indonesian Military

Beginning in 1957, martial law legalized the entry of the officers into politics. ButGeneral Nasution - who had been reinstated as the Army Chief of Staff in 1955- still needed a doctrine to justify the political role of the military in terms of its ,own history and experiences. It was here that he looked back to the period of 1945-49.From this time on the name of Sudirman reappeared again as the symbol of the ..autonomy of the army vis-'a-vis the politicians who controlled the government. It isinteresting to see that the reappearance of Sudirman's name in the Indonesian politicalarena coincided with a political situation which in the eyes of the officers very muchresembled the situation in the early days of the revolution. And their reaction wassimply a repetition of Sudirman's reaction in the forties.


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In the late fifties the military were (onceagain) angry

at theconfusion of political parties, the corruption, the ideologicalstrife, the political instability, all of which they believed, in

, simplistic fashion, was to blame for the lack of progress in thecountry,....20

At the same time, while conducting operations against the rebels - DI/TII, RMS,PRRI/Permesta - Nasution slowly adjusted his guerrilla concept into an anti-guerrillatactic, complete with a military territorial staff paralleling the civilian government.

A clear picture of the military's socio-political role was not presented untilNasution's "Middle Way" speech in November 1958. By that time military officershad already started to occupy many positions which normally belonged to the civiliandomain. One month before Nasution made his historic speech at the National MilitaryAcademy in Magelang, Central Java, Lt. Col. Isman was already dispatched to New

York to be the adviser to the Indonesian delegation at the United Nations. Even beforethat, as the result of the nationalization of Dutch companies, many officers had

already become company managers.21 Thus when Nasution in his speech insisted thatthe military would not be purely a spectator but must be granted the opportunityto participate in the government on an individual basis to make use of its non-militaryskills, Nasution was simply seeking the justification for a new development that had

already become a reality.In the midst of news about coups in many newly independent states at that time,

the "Middle Way" speech was looked upon as a lesser evil compared to a total militarytakeover. It is no wonder that within three days after Nasution's speech Prime Minister,

Djuanda came up with his approval. 22The next step taken by Nasution after his "Middle Way" speech was to launch

the idea of abandoning the liberal democratic system through the readoption of the

revolutionary Constitution of 1945. The reason given by Nasution for this step wasas follows:

... to regain the unity and the spirit of national strugglc, to .cultivate a stable government ideally and structurally after the

. liberal system failed to bring about stabilization .... 11

In practical terms, the return to the 1945 Constitution was a part of Nasution's

strategy in his effort to give the military a legal socio-political position in the

country. Following Nasution's interpretation, under the 1945 Constitution there arethree kinds of political representation: political parties; functional groups; and the .

representatives of the regions. The Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia, for

Nasution, are clearly part of the functional groups. Other members were peasants,artists, journalists, religious scholars, workers, women, youth and intellectuals. 24

While working toward the reenactment of the 1945 Constitution, Nasution wasalso busy reviving and redefining his old theory of guerrilla war and territorial

management. And since his "Middle Way" policy stipulated the involvement of the

military in all aspects of public life, there seemed to be no better way to implementit than the revival of the practice and the experience of the guerrilla war of 1948-49in the form of territorial management. Right after the "Middle Way" speechNasution instructed the Seskoad (Army Staff and Command School) in Bandungto prepare a doctrine through which the "Middle Way" policy could be carried out


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based on the experiences in the revolution. While Seskoad worked slowly to con- 'struct the doctrine, Nasution in his many speeches never failed to propagate his

guerrilla war and territorial management concept. In one of his speeches in 1960,Nasution said that

A state which realizes that it is poorly armed, equipped andorganized would practice Territorial Warfare against itsopponents who are superior in number of arms, equipment andgood organization, etc.

Territorial warfare absolutely requires territorial supportand service from the whole people in the territory.."

In order to have territorial support and service from the whole people there are several

requirements proposed by Nasution. The number one requirement is what he callsthe territorial elements, elaborated as follows:

... Indonesia is divided into Military District Commands withtheir organization from top to bottom. The task of each com-

. mand is to build up its own territory to prepare itself to faceany possibility such as rebellions" foreign attacks, etc.?6

The above-mentioned quotation very much reminds us of the Wehrkreise systemwhich was practised by the Indonesian army during the Guerrilla War in 1948-49.As we already know the Wehrkreise system was a system developed by Nasution

during the revolution to cope with the situation in which the enemy, the Dutchcolonial army, was far superior to the Indonesian guerrilla army. With the Wehrkreisesystem it was expected that each area could fight independently from other units.It was based on that system that Nasution developed a network of military govern-ment in which the civilian government was subordinated to the military governmentby having a parallel military governmental apparatus to control every level of civiliargovernment.

In March 1962 Seskoad finally produced the doctrine which was called "TheDoctrine of Territorial Warfare". For those who are familiar with Nasution's

concept of guerrilla war during the revolution this doctrine is no more than a refine-ment of the old one. The most important and decisive part of the doctrine for thefuture socio-political role of the military is point 4 of Part One from Book One whichreads as follows:

For the successful implementation of territorial warfare,attention must be given to the following:1. Stabilization in the political field.

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2. Consciousness that the Pantjasila is our only ideology and

that it has but one official interpretation.3. A single authoritative leadership which is constantly felt.4. Complete integration of the three services (land, sea and air)

and their utilization in territorial warfare on the basis of thecapability of the state.

5. Planned over-all development which in turn will maximizethe resources for territorial warfare.

6. Territorial management which will permit self sufficiencyin carrying out territorial war.2'


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In the previous pages we have already seen how Nasution had promoted theidea of readopting the revolutionary Constitution of 1945. By doing that Nasutionnot only had envisaged the socio-political role of the army under the revolutionaryconstitution, but also expected that at the same time there would be a "stabilizationin the political field" (point one as quoted above) since it was expected that theideological conflicts of liberal democracy would be eliminated by adopting Pancasilaas the "only ideology and that it has but one official interpretation" (point two).Point three, on leadership, while reminding us of the traumatic experience of thearmy during the revolution when there was no unified political and military leader-

ship, at the same time must also be seen as in support of Sukarno's leadership andhis doctrine of Guided Democracy in which the army had a socio-political role.

It is against this background, (points two and three) that we have to understandNasution's drive to minimize the position of the political parties and their ideologiesand to maximize the role of the functional groups in the Indonesian political arena.Thus in his speech at Seskoad on August 7, 1961, Nasution clearly says that

... in thinking about the challenge inherent in the ideals ofGuided Democracy, and with this concept of guidance and thismethod of consultation, we believe that it is no longer necessaryto have various parties and ideologies. We have in our Pantjasilaand in our revolutionary ideals, one basis and objective for ourrevolution, one national mission. There is no need for anythingelse. The principles and objectives parties adhered to in the pastare no longer necessary, and since they are no longer necessary,our society can be divided along the lines of its work in therevolution. 28

A point which very much reminds us of the practice of guerrilla war in 1948-49 ispoint six, territorial management. It is based on this point that we should under-stand the recreation of the territorial apparatus of the army to parallel the civiliangovernment apparatus. Thus following the adoption of the "Middle Way" policythe army started to create military commands (Kodam, Komando Daerah Militer,Regional Military Command) in each province. Beneath the Kodam is Korem(Komando Resort Militer, Sub-Regional Military Command), paralleling the Residencyof the civilian government's administrative structure. Next comes Kodim (KomandoDistrik Militer, District Military Command), the counterpart of the civilian kabupaten(district). Under the district are two more levels of civilian government, the kecamatan(sub-district) and kelurahan (village). These levels are paralleled respectively byKoramil (Komando Rayon Militer, Sub-District Military Command) and Babinsa(Bintara Pembina Desa, Village Development Non-Commissioned Officers) - see

Figure 2.At each level of this governmental and military structure there is a council whose

members include the highest official in the civilian government, the chief of police,the military commander, the chief prosecutor, and the head of the court. The councilis known as Muspida (Musyawarah Pimpinan Daerah, Council of Regional Leader-

ship) and the chairman of this Council is always the military commander. This system,reintroduced in the late 1950's, still exists today.

The territorial apparatus created nation-wide following the "Middle Way" policywas formally organized to sustain military operations against the PRRI/Permesta


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Figure 2 Parallel Civil Bureaucracy and Army Territorial Command

rebellion of the late 1950's. But the rebellion was successfully crushed and martiallaw lifted in the early sixties. The army, already recognized as a functional groupunder the revolutionary Constitution of 1945, now used the territorial apparatus to

compete with the PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia, Indonesian Communist Party)which became very powerful during the Guided Democracy era."

In the last days of Guided Democracy, when the PKI had already outmaneuveredthe other political parties, and Sukarno was perceived by many as very sympatheticto the communists, it was to the Army that most of non-communist Indonesia -

especially the elites - looked. It was then no wonder that following the abortive

coup d'état of October 1, 1965, the Army got the whole-hearted support of non-communist Indonesians to crush the PKI as well as to depose Sukarno.

Only four months following the transfer of power from Sukarno to GeneralSuharto on March 11, 1966, Seskoad in Bandung held an important seminar to reviewthe army doctrine. This seminar is known as the Second Army Seminar, since thefirst seminar was held in 1965 a few months before the abortive coup .d'éiat. Therewere two reasons to have the second seminar; first, the product of the first seminarwas heavily contaminated with the leftist jargon of Guided Democracy. Second, thefirst seminar was held under the assumption that the Army was only one out of manyfunctional groups in the country. The debacle of the PKI and the fall of Sukarno

brought Indonesia into a completely new era in which the Army found itself to bethe dominant political force in the country. For this they needed a new doctrine. Thebasic ideas of guerrilla warfare and territorial management were still there, but thenew doctrine, christened Tri Ubaya Cakti (Three Sacred Efforts), does not only talkabout the Army as one of many functional groups but already outlines the policies


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version of the doctrine is called. Before we come to the disagreement, we first halveto remember that the Army doctrine of non-military involvement is a document thathas been adjusted again and again to the latest political position of the military. The"Middle Way" speech was made when the military already occupied a wide rangeof non-military positions, notably as managers of the former Dutch companies. "TheTerritorial Warfare and Territorial Management" doctrine of 1960 was introducedwhen the network of territorial apparatus was already there when the military of-ficers already occupied all kinds of civilian positions except the Presidency. And whenin 1966 Seskoad revised the old doctrine to accommodate the latest developments,the military was already the sole power holder of the country. Thus the Dual Func-tion in Panglima Sudirman's era was different from Nasution's era, and both of themwere different from Suharto's time.

It is interesting to see that since 1966 there has been no significant change inthe doctrine itself. This certainly can be understood by the unchanging politicaldominance of ABRI from that time on. But this by no means indicates that thereare no changes taking place. Only now are changes taking place in the implementa-tion of the doctrine. A good example of this adjustment in implementation occurredin the late 1960's when the government of General Suharto finally had to compromisewith the political parties to adopt the proportional representation system instead ofthe single district system as intended by the Army before. In return for this concessionthe Army was guaranteed 100 seats in the parliament and did not have to contestelections.

To the critics of the Suharto government, military as well as civilian, the

compromise on the election system is perceived as the beginning of a series of con-

tinuing adjustments made by the government in interpreting and implementing the

Dual Function which is taken to be a way to perpetuate the reign of the presentgovernment.

'

Discussing the various interpretations of the Dual Function of the IndonesianArmed Forces one cannot avoid bringing in Gen. Nasution. Nasution is certainly notthe only critic of the way the military-dominated government interprets and

implements the Dual Function, since there are many retired generals who have

organized themselves to voice their concern to the government. But from all those

criticizing the government it is only Nasution who has a clear idea of how the DualFunction should be carried out.

It is an irony in Indonesian history that Nasution, who conceptualized the politicalideology of the military, and led them into the political arena in the 1950's, at theend became a bitter critic of the implementation of his brainchild. As early as 1966,in his lecture at Seskoad, Nasution already warned his colleagues about the need forthe "purification of the meaning and the implementation" of the Dual Function

concept."What Nasution means by "purification" has been explained by him in many

articles, lectures, pamphlets and interviews. In one of his interviews Nasution madeit very clear that the political function of ABRI should be interpreted in terms ofSection 2 of the 1945 Constitution. This section of the constitution deals with func-tional group political representation.'6 And if ABRI were to adhere to this sectionof the constitution, according to Nasution, then the political role of ABRI will only


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be visible in the MPR (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, People's ConsultativeAssembly) and not in day to day politics. By doing this, according to Nasution again,the legitimacy of ABRI's political role is not derived only from its historical role duringthe revolution, but more than that it will have the guarantee of the constitution.',

Another point of Nasution's criticism of the government is the position of ABRItoward relationship between the political parties and the state party Golkar (GolonganKarya, Functional Groups). According to Nasution, ABRI should not favor one

political group over another, especially during elections. This criticism came aboutafter seeing ABRI openly backing Golkar in all elections held in Indonesia since the

military came to power.Since Nasution's criticism and also similar criticisms from other retired generals

have been discussed elsewhere, it is not necessary here to go beyond what has beenoutlined above." What is more interesting if we are trying to assess the possibilityof future change is to find. out the government reaction to the criticism.

But before we proceed to the government reaction to their critics, one thing shouldfirst be said. While almost no civilians have been involved in the debate on the inter-

pretation or misinterpretation of the Dwi Fungsi, the criticism from inside - Nasutionand many other retired generals - does have a spill-over effect outside the militarycircle. Thus when students openly criticized Suharto in 1978, they were not againstthe military and the Dual Function but merely against Suharto's policy of runningthe country. In the streets of Jakarta and Bandung in 1978 one could see postersand logos on the T-shirts of the students: "Bring ABRI back to the people." Thisis clearly another way of expressing what Nasution had said many times in the late

seventies, that is that the way the Dual Function is now implemented only puts ABRIin the same position as the Dutch colonial army, an army which was used by the

government to implement its policies. This, according to Nasution, is contrary toPanglima Besar Sudirman's position, namely that the Indonesian Army should notbe a "dead tool" in the hands of the government.

The government reaction to the student criticism was dramatic and decisive. In1978 many students were arrested, some were tried. When the recalcitrant were finallytaken care of, the time for explanation arrived. No less than President Suharto himselfcame up with a clear answer to his critics. On March 27, 1980, in addressing anArmed Forces "Commanders' Call" in Pakanbaru, eastern Sumatra, PresidentSuharto made it clear that ABRI as the apparatus of national defense stands aboveall groups. But ABRI as a functional group must choose a trusted partner, a partnerwho is clearly working for Pancasila.11

A complete reaction to the critics of Suharto's interpretation of the Dual Function

only appeared in public when Pejuang dan Prajurit (Fighter and Soldier), a bookedited by Brigadier General Nugroho Notosusanto, was published in 1984. Curiouslyenough the book, prepared in the Defense Department, claimed not to be the officialvoice of the government, even though, as a manuscript, it was already widely discussedinside the military establishment before being published. The book is really a

repetition of the many already known reasons and explanations for ABRI to play anon-military role. In this case the book is very tautological and pedantic, redundantwith quotations from everybody whose writing could be used to support ABRI's

political role. But for the observer of the Indonesian military's political role, the book


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is essentially prepared to counter Nasution and some other retired generals' continuedcriticisms.

On page 180 of the book, for instance, Nasution is not only shown to contradicthimself through a comparison of his statements made at different times, but alsohis idea that ABRI should stay away from day to day politics is labeled unrealistic,showing only that Nasution does not know what political life is about. Interestinglyenough, right after discrediting Nasution, the book praised Lt. General (ret.)T. B. Simatupang as an example of a person with a positive approach to the military'ssocio-political role. Apparently Simatupang is praised for having said that:

In projecting the TNI's role in the future in the Pancasila statewhich is developing itself, we can have a negative and a positive

'

approach. The negative approach discusses ways to diminishand to end the

non-militaryrole of the

armyin the future. The

positive approach discusses how we can make use of the TNI,besides the other social forces in the society, to overcome ourweakness as a nation, especially in the political field. Byadvancing in political development, the socio-political role ofthe TNI will certainly, even though slowly, decrease.""

Unlike Nasution, Simatupang, who openly does not like the term Dual Function("to give it a name is to make it permanent"), never discussed the Dual Functionin detail. This certainly put him in a favorable position in the eyes of the governmentvis-à-vis Nasution who keeps the government irritated with his very specific criticisms.

On the differences in interpretation of the Dual Function, Nugroho's book

acknowledges that even among the active military officers there are varying opinionsabout the proper political role of ABRI .4' But despite that, the book clearly shows

that there is nobody entertaining the idea of abandoning the Dual Function. Thistime not for historical reasons - that since the revolutionary period ABRI alreadyhas two functions - but because

... if ABRI's socio-political function is dropped, and ABRI onlyacts as the tool of the government, then if political turbulenceoccurs in which social forces oppose each other because of theirinterests contradicting each other diametrically, is there anyother potential [power] that can play the role of moderator andstabilizer?4Z

Thus we then can conclude that the military has no plan to abandon the powerin their hands, which is not surprising. What is surprising - in comparative perspective- is that by holding that power the Indonesian military does not have the problemof legitimacy like the one disturbing ruling militaries in most other third world

countries. And as we have seen in the previous pages, most politically consciousIndonesians also do not question the legitimacy of the military in politics. What they.are concerned about is the interpretation and the implementation of the doctrine,not the doctrine itself.

What will be the form of future military participation in politics? Accordingto Ali Murtopo,

The statements of the leaders of ABRI already have made it'

clear that the Dual Function will be there to stay. And this is justified by the constitution...."


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But at the same time General Murtopo also writes that the dominant position of ABRIin the country's politics is a different story. ABRI became dominant, according to

Murtopo, because the situation forced it to come to that position. And this is because"until now we have not yet had civilian political groups which have clear and firm

programs". Because of this, writes Murtopo further,We can logically conclude that it is very possible that thedominant position of ABRI will decrease and even disappear,if the situation becomes normal, and if the civilian politicalgroups free themselves from the elements of subversion, andif they can prove that they. are better than now."

For General Benny Murdani, the present ABRI Commander, the Dual Functionis a state of mind and not something physical. "The physical part of it is the byproductof the state of mind," he said in an interview with the author. It is because of thisthat General Murdani is not surprised to see multiple interpretations of the DualFunction. General Murdani basically sees three interpretations currently circulatingin society. First is Nasution's interpretation. On this Murdani says,

General Nasution left the service more than ten years ago. He'

has busied himself reading books on philosophy and thenreaches a conclusion. But that conclusion will probably onlybe applicable twenty five years from now."

The second interpretation is the "shallow" one, namely understanding the Dual Func-tion only as a way to provide patronage to the military personnel by placing themin civilian posts. This interpretation is certainly the result of the fact that most ofthe important positions in Indonesian civilian bureaucracy are being taken by the

military officers, active as well as retired ones. "This is a clearly wrong interpretation,"snapped Murdani. According to the General, the placement of so many officers inthe civilian posts since 1965 should be seen in the context of the purge of the

bureaucracy of communist elements and the followers of Sukarno following theabortive coup of October 1965. The third interpretation, according to Murdani, comesfrom people "Who know nothing and talk as if the Dual Function will stay foreveras it is today." By saying this Gen. Murdani is clearly referring to some high rankingmilitary officers who do not see any possible change in the shape of Indonesian civil-

military relations in the future. For Murdani what will happen in the future will not

solely be determined by ABRI. "Let the coming generation decide what will be good .

for our country in the future," said the General.Will military dominance be a long term characteristic of Indonesian politics? _

The answer, apparently, is yes. The legitimacy is there and the civilian political forceis

yetto

come. And asthe civilians are still

standingon the

fringeof the

politicalarena, the inner dynamic of power will clearly originate and circulate among the

military officers themselves. In this case the most likely debate to have our attentionin the near future will be the debate about interpretation and implementationemanating from inside the military. But looking to the history of the militarydoctrine that has always adjusted itself to the latest development, hope is still therethat as the society changes and as the civilians become ready, the doctrine will be

adjusted once again.


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NOTES'

1.For a detailed treatment of the political role of the Indonesian military between 1945-49, please seemy unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, "The Genesis of Power: Civil-Military Relations in IndonesiaDuring the Revolution for Independence, 1945-1949" (Ph.D. thesis submitted to The Ohio StateUniversity, 1985).

2. T. B. Simatupang, Report From Banarair Experiences During The F?ople's War (translated by BenedictAnderson and Elizabeth Graves), Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, CornellUniversity, New York, 1972, p. 130.

3. T. B. Simatupang, Peranan Angkatan Perang Dalam Negara Pancasila yang Membangun (Jakarta:Yayasan Idayu, 1980), p. 21.

4. According to M. Natsir, T. B. Simatupang, the Armed Forces Chief-of-Staff at that time, refusedthe candidate of Natsir for the position of defense minister. Natsir then had to accept the candidateof Simatupang, namely Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX. M. Natsir, interview, Jakarta, September 22,1984.

5. Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca and London: CornellUniversity Press, 1962), pp. 58-77.

6. Dr. A. H. Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan 1ùgas, Vol. 3 (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1983), p. 179.7. Feith, The Decline, pp. 246-73; Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan 1ùgas, Vol. 3, pp. 1-214.8. Guy J. Pauker, "The Role of the Military in Indonesia" in John J. Johnson (ed.), The Role of the

Military in Underdeveloped Countries (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1962),. pp. 208-209.

. 9. Feith, The Decline, p. 395.10. Ali Sastroamijoyo, Milestones on My Journey (St. Lucia, Queensland: Universityof Queensland Press,

1979), pp. 272-73.11. Feith, The Decline, p. 398.

'

12. Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan 1ùgas, Vol. 3, p. 277. ,13. Feith, The Decline, p. 399.14. Pauker, The Role, p. 211.15. Feith, The Decline, pp. 487-555.

16. The first two Generals to be members of cabinet were Sambas Atmadinata from the Army and Nazirfrom the Navy. They were sworn in on April 9, 1957.See Nugroho Notosusanto (ed.), Pejuang DanPrajurit (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1984), p. 76.

17. A. H. Nasution, Tonggak Tonggak Dwi Fungsi (Jakarta, mimeo, 1981), p. 17. See also DanielS. Lev, The Transition To Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics, 195 7-1959(Ithaca, New York:Southeast Asia Program, Department of Asian Studies, Cornell University, 1966), pp. 191-92.

18. Feith, The Decline, pp. 591-92.'

19. See Donald Hindley, "Political Power and the October 1965 Coup in Indonesia", Journal of AsianStudies XXXVI, No. 2 (Feb. 1967): 237-49; Justus M. van der Kroef, "Interpretation of the 1965Coup: A Review of Literature", Pacific Affairs 43, No. 4 (Winter 1970-71): 557-77; van der Kroef,"Origin of the 1965Coup in Indonesia: Probabilities and Alternatives", Journal of South East StudiesIII, No. 2 (Sept. 1972): 277-98; B. R. O'G. Anderson and Ruth McVey, A Preliminary Analysis ofthe October 1, 1965, Coup in Indonesia (Ithaca, New York: Modern Indonesia Project, CornellUniversity, 1971).

20. Lev, The Transition, p. 59.. 21. Ibid., p. 192. _.

22. Ibid., p. 193.23. Dr. A. H. Nasution, Kekarjaan ABRI (Jakarta: Seruling Masa, 1971), p. 18.24. Idem., Toward The Pieople's Army (Jakarta: C. V. Delegasi, 1964), p. 20.25. Ibid., p. 39.26. Nasution, Toward, p. 43.27. Guy J. Pauker, The Indonesian Doctrine of Territorial Warfare And Territorial Management (Santa

Monica, California: The Rand Corporation, 1973), p. 56.28. Pauker, The Indonesian Doctrine, p. 170.29. See Herbert Feith, "Dynamics of Guided Democracy" in Ruth T. McVey (ed.), Indonesia (NewHaven:


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Southeast Asia Studies, Yale University, 1963), pp. 336-42.30. Indonesia, Angkatan Darat, Seskoad, Doktrin Perdjuangan TNI-AD "Tri Ubaya Cakti" (Jakarta:Angkatan Darat, 1966), p. 10.

31. Ali Moertopo, Strategi Politik Nasional (Jakarta: Yayasan Proklamasi, CSIS, 1974), pp. 108-109.32. Nasution, Kekarjaan ABRI, p. 41.33. Nugroho Notosusanto (ed.), Pejuang Dan Prajurit (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1984), p. 288. On the

self-perception of ABRI as savior, unifier and dinamisator, see R. William Liddle, "Soeharto'sIndonesia: Personal Rule and Political Institutions", Pacific Affairs 58, No. 1 (Spring 1985):84-85.

34. Quoted in Notosusanto (ed.), Pejuang, p. 162.35. David Jenkins, Suharto and His Generals, Indonesian Military Politics 1975-1983 (Ithaca, New York:

Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1984), p. 216.36. Section Two of the 1945 constitution reads as follows:

1. The membership of the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly consists of members ofParliament plus regional delegations and groups according to the regulations established by the law.

2. The Provisional People's Consultative Assembly holds a meeting at least once in five years in the

capital of the state.3. All the decisions of the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly shall be decided by themajority [my emphasis].

Thus when the army talks about the functional groups and their relation to the constitution, theyreally are referring to article two of the 1945 Constitution. It is clear that the word groups (golongan-golongan) does not specify who belongs to it.

37. A. H. Nasution, "Dwi Fungsi ABRI: Pada Mulanya dan Kini", Prisma IX, No. 12 (December 1980):42-43.

38. Jenkins, Suharto and His Generals, p. 217.39. Apparently Suharto did not concern himself with the possibilityof a conflict of interest between ABRI's

position as defender of the country on the one hand and as a social force on the other.40. Quoted in Notosusanto (ed.), Pejuang dan Prajurit, pp. 180-81.. ,41. Notosusanto (ed.), Pejuang dan Prajurit, p. 334.

'

42. Ibid., p. 349.43. Moertopo, Strategi Politik, p. 123.

44. Ibid., p. 124.45. General Benny Murdani, interview, Jakarta, November 13, 1984.

Documents

Salim Said the Political Role of the Indonesian Military Past Present and Future Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science, Jan 1, 1987, Vol.15(1)