SAMPLE MEMO #1

To: Senator [name deleted] From: [Name Deleted] Subject: Military Retirement Reform 1. Issue: Personnel costs have increased 66% from 2002 to 2016 requested amounts while the number of active duty service members has actually decreased. DOD must decrease future personnel spending by modifying the retirement system to provide benefits to every service member who serves for at least 3 years while remaining attractive to recruit and retain our nation’s best. 2. Background: Congress has attempted to modify military compensation in the past, but the existing retirement system has received no material changes in over 30 years. The recommendations from the Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission’s (MCRMC) released in February do address many of the shortcomings of the current system. However, as the chart below depicts, their recommended pension, career continuation pays and TSP contributions cost nearly as much as the current system. General Odierno, Army Chief of Staff, has warned that at today’s rate, the Army’s personnel costs will consume 80% of the service’s budget by 2020. A much more dramatic cost savings benefit must be adopted to control personnel costs and alleviate its strain on the defense budget. The DOD can retain the status quo 20-year cliff-vesting system, adopt the MCRMC’s proposed pension combined with TSP option, or make a more material change and transition to a pure defined-contribution plan. The current system provides a pension to those who reach 20 years of service equal to 2.5 times the number of years served times the average of the high 3 years of pay. The MCRMC proposal lowers the retirement pay multiplier from 2.5 to 2, automatically contributes 1% of base pay to the member’s TSP and matches the member’s TSP contributions up to 3%. The proposal also provides continuation pay equal to between 3 and 14 months base pay at the member’s 12th year of service, which is assumed to be invested in their TSP. The defined contribution plan would simply deposit a percentage of the member’s base pay into TSP each month. The amount would vest between 3 and 15 years at 8.3% each year. This is to encourage retention after the member’s initial 3-year commitment is fulfilled. To make the benefit somewhat comparable to the current plan, 12% should be contributed to their TSP. 3. Analysis: The table below highlights the costs of each plan to the government and the potential benefit to the service member. While these costs are easily definable, the impact on recruiting and retention is much more difficult to predict. However, it is

logical to assume the more generous the benefit to the service member, the more effective it will be at retaining quality personnel. Given all services have met their recruiting and retention goals for the past 8 years and active duty strength is being reduced, some risk can be assumed in this area. No matter what modifications to the current retirement system are adopted, Congress must honor the contractual obligations it made with current military members, and institute these changes only for future service members.

Retirement Assets of a Retiring Active-Duty E7

Status Quo Pros - Most stable and guaranteed source of income for retirees - Influence on recruiting and retention are known - Administration of retirement system already in place Cons - As highlighted by the General Obierno, personnel costs are too high to maintain - Perceived unfairness when only 17% of service members ever receive any amount of retirement benefit

MCRMC Proposal Pros - Leverages TSP contributions to allow potential growth to a more generous benefit - Alleviates some government financial burden (about 10K over estimated E7 retiree payouts) by relying on TSP growth - Service member’s TSP is fully vested after 3 years guaranteeing some benefit to all who serve at least that long

Cons - Pension, TSP match and continuation pay do not save the government enough money to make a meaningful impact on the budget - Market risk will influence returns in TSP account - Full vesting occurs too soon to serve as a retention tool

Defined Contribution Pros - Substantial savings compared to other alternatives - Phased vesting from 3 – 15 years (8.3% each year) serves as an effective retention tool - Leverages TSP contributions to allow potential growth to a more generous benefit Cons - Provides a less generous benefit than MCRMC plan, but better than status quo which could impact recruiting - Market risk will influence returns in TSP account 4. Recommendation – I recommend you not only oppose the MCRMC proposal, but also draft and propose legislation to change the retirement system to a defined contribution plan effective for all newly accessed service members beginning in FY 2018. This change will alleviate burden on the defense budget through eliminating excessive personnel costs resulting in cost savings and flexibility for DOD to invest taxpayer money in future materiel solutions to our nation’s defense.

References

Levinson, R., Shah, S., Connor, P. K. (2011). Bloomberg Government Study Impact of

Defense Spending: A State-by-State Analysis. Bloomberg Government. Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission. (2015). Final Report

of the Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission. Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense. (2014). 2013 Demographics Profile

of the Military Community. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller). (2001). National Defense Budget

Estimates for FY 2002. Retrieved from http://comptroller.defense.gov/BudgetMaterials.aspx.

Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller). (2015). National Defense Budget

Estimates for FY 2016. Retrieved from http://comptroller.defense.gov/BudgetMaterials.aspx.

SAMPLE MEMO #2

TO: Chairman, House Committee on Ways and Means, Subcommittee on Social Security FROM: [Name Deleted] SUBJ: REFORMING SOCIAL SECURITY TO MAINTAIN SOLVENCY Issue:

The Trustees of the Social Security Trust Fund estimate that the Old Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) Trust Fund will be insolvent by 2034 as projected costs outpace income. Once insolvent, the program will be unable to meet its obligated benefits, resulting in beneficiaries receiving either delayed full payments or timely reduced payments. An immediate reform to the Social Security program is required in order to maintain immediate solvency, provide sufficient benefits to beneficiaries near the poverty line, and ensure the program’s sustainable solvency for future generations.

Background:

Social Security’s insolvency problem stems from an ageing baby boomer generation and a comparatively smaller working population. The country’s recent economic recession has reduced program income, yet simultaneously increased outlay need. As costs of living and life expectancy rates increase, more retired Americans depend on Social Security benefits to avoid falling below the poverty line.

The OASI trust fund’s pending insolvency presents a financial and legal roadblock due to the conflict between the Social Security Act and the Antideficiency Act. The juxtaposition of these two laws requires the trust fund to maintain its own solvency in order to outlay full benefits to beneficiaries.

In 1982, the OASI trust fund faced immediate insolvency, and Congress allowed the program to borrow $17.5 billion from the Disability Insurance and the Medicare Hospital Insurance trust funds. This loan maintained the OASI fund’s solvency and resulted in amendments that lowered benefits and increased the payroll tax rate. These amendments not only maintained OASI solvency, but also yielded a program surplus for 22 years.

If the OASI fund reaches insolvency, scheduled benefits must be cut over 20%, or the tax rate must increase more than 16.2%. However, if reforms are implemented now, the changes will be less drastic, and citizens will have more time to adjust their private retirement funds to compensate for any benefit reductions.

The graphs below demonstrate the effects on the trust fund ratio if reforms are delayed.

Analysis:

Possible solutions to maintain Social Security’s solvency include reducing benefits, increasing the tax rate and/or base, and changing beneficiary eligibility requirements. Although most proposals suggest a combination of these solutions, this analysis will discuss the pros and cons of each solution individually below.1

Reducing Benefits

One method of reducing benefits is to reduce the Primary Insurance Amount factors by indexing initial benefits off of prices, rather than prices and earnings. Currently, the PIA formula is progressive, favoring people with lower average earnings. Often referred to as “price indexing,” this option would calculate average initial benefits for retirees based off of prices alone. As real earnings grow, initial benefits will decrease for all beneficiaries compared to current projected benefits. This option’s outlay savings will increase over time as prices rise 1 Little existing research analyzes the long-term solvency of the OASI and DI trust funds individually. Therefore, this analysis will consider the two funds as one combined fund, referenced as the Social Security trust fund.

slower than real earnings. This solution is the only option that results in long-term sustainable solvency for the Social Security trust fund.

In order to protect the lowest-earners from being disproportionately impacted by these benefit reductions, a new poverty-related minimum benefit could be introduced. Based on each year’s poverty guideline, this minimum benefit would only apply to beneficiaries with over 10 years of earnings. This option would increase outlays, but not significantly change the trust fund’s solvency.

Increasing the Tax Rate/Base

One tax option is to increase the payroll tax rate by 2 percentage points over 20 years to a final rate of 14.4%. This solution extends the trust fund exhaustion date to approximately 2083 and would affect people of all earning-levels equally.

Another option is to eliminate the taxable maximum, effectively increasing the payroll tax base. Currently, only earnings up to $118,500 are taxed. Eliminating this maximum will extend trust fund solvency to approximately 2083. This option would negatively impact society’s highest earners.

Changing Eligibility Requirements

The primary way to change eligibility for Social Security involves raising the full retirement age (FRA). Gradually increasing the FRA from the current age of 67 to age 70 would roughly mirror recent increases in life expectancy, and would reduce program spending by 13% by 2060. Raising the FRA to 70 effectively decreases beneficiaries’ lifetime benefits, yet fails to significantly change the trust fund insolvency date.

The graphs below illustrate the effects each option would have on Social Security’s finances, represented as a percentage of GDP.

Based on the above analysis, the only appropriate option of Social Security reform is to reduce benefits by enacting price indexing, while simultaneously instituting a new minimum poverty-based benefit.

Recommendation:

In order to implement these reforms, you should first commission a CBO analysis of the potential financial benefits from combining price indexing with a minimum benefit. Pending a positive analysis, you should then meet with the SSA leadership to address restructuring the current Social Security benefits formula.

Maintains Immediate Solvency

Protects Low-Earning

Beneficiaries

Creates Sustainable Solvency

Secondary Effects

Index Initial Benefits to Prices Impacts all beneficiaries

Index Initial Benefits to Prices,

and Institute a Poverty-Related

Minimum Benefit

Negatively impacts all beneficiaries above poverty

line; positively impacts beneficiaries below poverty

line

Increase Tax Rate Negatively impacts all earning levels

Increase Tax Base Negatively impacts only highest earners

Raise FRA to 70

Impacts all beneficiaries, but has greatest negative impact

on lower-earning beneficiaries who depend on benefits

sooner in life

References

CBO. (2014, July 11). Answers to Question from Senator Hatch About Various Options for Payroll Taxes and Social Security. Retrieved March 1, 2015 from http://www.cbo.gov: http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/45519-QFR_Hatch.pdf

CBO. (2014, November 20). Options for Reducing the Deficit: 2015-2024. Retrieved March 1, 2015 from http://www.cbo.gov: http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/49638-BudgetOptions.pdf

CBO. (2012, January 10). Raising the Ages of Eligibility for Medicare and Social Security. Retrieved March 1, 2015 from http://www.cbo.gov: http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/01-10-2012-Medicare_SS_EligibilityAgesBrief.pdf

CBO. (2015, January 26). Social Security Old Age and Survivors Insurance – Baseline Projections. Retrieved March 1, 2015 from http://www.cbo.gov: http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/43889-2015-01-Social_Security.pdf

CBO. (2010, July 1). Social Security Policy Options. Retrieved March 1, 2015 from http://www.cbo.gov: http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/07-01-ssoptions_forweb.pdf

CBO. (2013, December 17). The 2013 Long-Term Projections for Social Security – Additional Information. Retrieved March 1, 2015 from http://www.cbo.gov: http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/44972-SocialSecurity.pdf

CBO. (2014, July 15). The 2014 Long-Term Budget Outlook. Retrieved March 1, 2015, from http://www.cbo.gov: http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/45471-Long-TermBudgetOutlook_7-29.pdf

Hungerford, T. (2013, February 5). Increasing the Social Secuirty Payroll Tax Base: Options and Effects on Tax Burdens. Congressional Research Service (CRS). Retrieved March 1, 2015 from http://fas.org: http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33943.pdf

Lanza, E., and Nicola, T. (2014, September 17). Social Security Reform: Legal Analysis of Social Security Benefit Entitlement Issues. Congressional Research Service (CRS). Retrieved March 1, 2015 from http://fas.org: http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32822.pdf

Meyerson, N. (2014, June 23). Social Security: Minimum Benefits. Congressional Research Service (CRS). Retrieved March 1, 2015 from http://fas.org: http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43615.pdf

Meyerson, N. (2014, August 28). Social Security: What Would Happen if the Trust Funds Ran Out? Congressional Research Service (CRS). Retrieved March 1, 2015 from https://fas.org: http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33514.pdf

Meyerson, N. (2015, February 4). How Social Security Benefits Are Computed: In Brief. Congressional Research Service (CRS). Retrieved March 1, 2015 from http://fas.org: http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43542.pdf

Nuschler, D. (2013, June 17). Social Security Primer. Congressional Research Service (CRS). Retrieved March 1, 2015 from http://fas.org: http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42035.pdf

Nuschler, D., and Sidor, G. (2014, July 31). Social Security: The Trust Fund. Congressional Research Service (CRS). Retrieved March 1, 2015 from http://fas.org: http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33028.pdf

Sidor, G. (2013, January 24). Fact Sheet: The Social Security Retirement Age. Congressional Research Service (CRS). Retrieved March 1, 2015 from http://fas.org: http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41962.pdf

The 2014 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Federal Disability Insurance Trust Fund. July 28, 2014. U.S. Government Printing Office.

SAMPLE MEMO #3

To: USD(AT&L) From: [Name Deleted] Subj: Appropriation Reprogramming During Continuing Resolution ISSUE

Temporary appropriations, or continuing resolutions (CR), have been required during some portion of the fiscal year for 34 of the last 37 years. The formulaic and temporary nature of CRs create a significant administrative burden for implementing agencies, but the fact that the CR “freezes” a program’s appropriation profile from the previous year can create the greatest challenge, particularly for acquisition programs transitioning between major phases of the acquisition process. CRs can leave program managers attempting to advance a program in a procurement phase with RDT&E appropriations simply because last year’s budget required RDT&E; this can only result in inefficiency at best and waste at worst. BACKGROUND Continuing Resolutions: The U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power of the purse and directs that “no money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law.” Continuing resolutions (CR’s) are temporary spending measures passed by Congress in lieu of annual appropriation and authorization bills. CR’s are based on the prorated continuation of the prior year’s budget; consequently, a government program is “frozen” in the prior year’s budgetary configuration. This means that a program will be funded during a CR with the same mix of appropriations as the previous year’s budget.

The other major difference between CR and normal appropriations concerns the amount of funding and the time frame for which it can be used. Normal appropriation bills are for an entire fiscal year, but CR’s are budgetary stopgap measures which cover only a specified period of time. In general, the CR will prorate the previous year’s budget based on the duration of the CR, but the specific formula can vary. In some cases the amount appropriated in the CR may be based on the President’s Budget request, Congress’s budget resolution or some other number specified in the CR. Reprogramming of Appropriations

The DoD Financial Management Regulations (DoD FMR) detail the procedures for reprogramming of DoD appropriated funds, which allows transferring funds from one appropriation type to another. Reprogramming actions can be divided into two general categories which are separated by the reprogramming threshold; above threshold reprogramming (ATR) actions require the prior approval of Congress while Congress can simply be notified of below threshold reprogramming (BTR) actions.

ANALYSIS Continuing resolutions come at a heavy cost. One of the most well understood effects is the reduced efficiency of departments, but one of the more damaging impacts is only known anecdotally. The “frozen” nature of the CR combined with the reprogramming thresholds means that acquisition programs cannot transition from development to production or may not be able to properly ramp to the required production rates. In addition to the general cost of CR’s, a program manager in this position is faced with the dilemma of either restructuring the program to fit the same appropriations as last year or to find new, previously unplanned, avenues for the funding contained in the CR. Either way the program will be executed in a sub-optimally. This problem is well understood and frequently discussed in program management training material, but the actual effects have not been studied or documented. The challenge of a misaligned appropriation profile can be addressed in several ways. The solution should seek a balance of program efficiency while respecting Congress’s authority and responsibility to appropriate funds.

• Option 1: Status Quo - Modify each program to fit the appropriations. • Option 2: Request Congressional approval for reprogramming to fit the program’s

appropriation profile, while staying within the CR’s budgetary bounds. • Option 3: Implement a new policy lifting the reprogramming threshold during CR’s

allowing programs to align appropriations with their planned appropriation profile. The first two options respect Congress’s budgetary authority, but are each inefficient and

wasteful in their own way. Option 1 wastes effort redesigning a program into a suboptimal configuration to comport with the CR’s appropriations. In some cases, a program may pursue low priority or even wholly ancillary activities simply due to the alignment of the allocated resources. Option 2 wastes effort in assembling, requesting and waiting for Congress’s approval to align appropriations to the program. The effort involved in assembling the reprogramming request is significant, especially when one considers the fact that DoD typically attempts to address all DoD programs with a single omnibus request.

Option 3 strikes a balance between respecting Congress’s authority to set budgetary limits and giving DoD the flexibility to execute programs efficiently. The amount of funding appropriated in the CR will still be respected, but the already significant burden of temporary funding measures will not be exacerbated by misaligned appropriation types. RECOMMENDATION

1. Direct ASD(Acquisition) to conduct a study on the cost of misaligned appropriations due to continuing resolutions over at least the past 10 years.

2. In coordination with USD(C)/CFO, contact OMB to draft a proposal that lifts the Congressional authorization threshold for appropriation reprogramming during continuing resolutions.

References Sager, Michelle. Budget Issues: Effects of Budget Uncertainty from Continuing Resolutions on Agency Operation. (GAO-13-464T). Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2013. http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-464T Tollestroup, Jessica. FY2014 Continuing Resolutions: Overview of Components. (CRS Report No. R43405) Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43405.pdf Fantone, Denise M., Poling, Susan A. Continuing Resolutions: Uncertainty Limited Management Options and Increased Workload in Selected Agencies. (GAO-09-879). Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2009. http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-879 Wolf, Frederick D. Appropriations: Continuing Resolutions and an Assessment of Automatic Funding Approaches. (GAO/AFMD-86-16). Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 1986. http://gao.gov/assets/150/144084.pdf Bowsher, Charles A. Updated Information Regarding Funding Gaps and Continuing Resolutions. (GAO/PAD-83-13). Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 1982. http://www.gao.gov/assets/210/206129.pdf DoD Financial Management Regulation, Vol.3, Ch. 6: Reprogramming of DOD Appropriated Funds. August, 2000. Candreva, Philip J. “Automatic Continuing Resolutions: A Cure Worse Than the Ailment.” Monterey College of Law. (Provided on 30 Jan 2015.) Candreva, Philip J. “Defense Budgeting” (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 26 Feb 2015).

SAMPLE MEMO #4

To: General Martin E. Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

From: [Name Deleted]

Subj: Redefining Capability of National Nuclear Deterrent Requirement

Issue:

The use of the nuclear triad is an antiquated method of fighting using simple spending, which succeded at the time, but times have changed. Our strategy needs to evolve for future and therefore, we must redefine the capability of our national nuclear deterrent requirement to the current political environment and the new threats in order to be more cost and battle effective in the future.

Background:

Since the Cold War, U.S. has maintained a triad of nuclear deterrent composed of nuclear bombers (N-Bombers), land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (LB-ICBMs) and ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). Each leg of the triad had its own advantages and disadvantages.

At the time, the main agendas were “Beating the Soviets” by causing them to over-spend and protection through “Mutually Assured Destruction,” but with the passing of the Nuclear Nonprofileration Treaty in 1970, the agenda began to change into “Strategic Stability” with a public desire to reduce arms. Now, the deterrent only needs to ensure the capability of sufficient retaliation in the case of a pre-emptive strike, and therefore, it can focus on quality over quantities to meet the demand with less cost.

However, the triad is out-of-date with technology from the 60s, and in order to maintain “Strategic Stability,” funding has to be given to our forces for modernization.

Analysis:

The option for the future of the nuclear deterrence programs are to upgrade all three or switch to any combination of a diad or monad nuclear deterrence. The capability of each nuclear deterrence method is best seen by using a service level of effort analysis, the priority list of future threats, and a total effectiveness comparison.

Service Level of Effort:

• Air Force

o Maintenance: Low quality and insufficient frequency. Compared to SSBNs, a greater life-cycle cost.

o Issues: Cheating scandals and drug alliegations among missile personnel. Lack of formality in operations of nuclear weapons including loss of nuclear weapons.

o Reactions: Multiple Defense Secreties have fired high ranking officials including the Air Force Secretary and Chief of Staff

• Navy

o Maintenance:

CNO 1 - allocated 100% of the requested budget

Priority 1 - highest priority for repair and maintenance parts

o Issues: Cheating scandal at prototype

o Reactions: Director of Naval Nuclear Propulsion, who reports to the CNO, handled the investigation and legitimization of the Navy’s process for qualifying nuclear operators.

Future Threats:

• China is indicitive of the future threats that the U.S. will face because of its raising economic and military prowess

• China has displayed urgent modernization of their navy because of a concern with a wide range of missions including nuclear deterrence and protection of maritime forces. In particular, they have apprehension about the U.S. submarines stationed at Guam.

• China has a SSBN fleet that is close to the level of the U.S. Navy’s quality and quantity. They have also exceeed the U.S. in the number of fast attack submarines.

The triad meets the same capability of nuclear deterrence by providing the maximum destruction; however, it is redundant to maintain all three for the same capability, and due to fisical constraints, we should go with the most effective method, SSBNs. They have an institutional commitment from the Navy, our threats see them as a threat, and they have the greatest total effectiveness.

SSBNs can be set as a priority for the military with the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS); however, Congress controls the authorization and appropiation of the budget. Due to the 60-year history of nuclear deterrence, the triad has become imbedded into the U.S. system, and it is unlikely to get budget approval for the re-allocation of funds between services for a monad. The better approach is to give the Navy control of the triad since the Navy has proven successful in this field. This will empahize sharing technology and

improving efficiency. The Navy will either get N-Bombers and LB-ICBMs up to standards, or if they cannot comply, allow them to degrade to the point that Congress will be forced to stop authorizing funds and reappropriate it to the Navy.

Recommendation:

1) Set a priority for SSBNs with the JCS.

2) Request that the Secretary of Defense designate the Navy as the Single Manager for Nuclear Deterence under “Ballistic Missle Defense Technology” and “Advance Concept and Performance Assessment.”

3) Direct the Air Force to coordinate all future RDT&E efforts with the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition.

4) Appoint a Nuclear Defense Program and Technology Board with representatives from the all four services and with the a Navy Admiral as chair of the board.

Work Cited

Brook, Tom Vanden. (2014, January 23). Hagel calls for Air Force Nuclear Missile Review. Retrieved March 1, 2015 from USA Today: http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/01/23/hagel-nuclear-missile-review/4801951/

Friedman, Behamin H. (2012, May 18). How to Kill the Nuclear Triad. Retrieved March 1, 2015 from Congress Blog: http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/228323-how-to-kill-the-nuclear-triad

GAO. (2014, December 11). Nuclear Weapons: DOD’s plan for Implementing Nuclear Reductions Generally Addresses Statutory Requirements but Lacks Some Detail. Retrieved March 1, 2015 from GAO: http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-15-89R

GAO. (2014, June 10). Nuclear Weapons: Ten-Year Budget Estimates for Modernization Omit Key Efforts, and Assumptions and Limitations are Not Fully Transparent. Retrieved March 1, 2015 from GAO: http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-373

GAO. (2014, May 15). National nuclear Security Administration: Agency Report to congress on Potential efficiencies Does Not Include Key Information. Retrieved March 1, 2015 from GAO: http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-434

GAO. (2012, July 31). Strategic Weapons: changes in Nuclear Weapons Targeting Process since 1991. Retrieved March 1, 2015 from GAO: http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-786R

GAO. (2006, April 26). Nuclear Weapons: Views on Proposals to Transform the Nuclear Weapons Complex Retrieved March 1,2015 from GAO: http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-606T

Harvey, ADM John C.. (2014 November). The independent Review of the Nuclear Enterprise. (U.S. Naval Insititute). Retrieved March 1, 2015, from U.S Naval Institute: http://blog.usni.org/2014/11/25/the-independent-review-of-the-nuclear-enterprise

Hildreth Steven A., and Woolf, Amy F. (2010, May 25). Ballistic Missile Defense and Offensive Arms Reduction: A review of Historical Record. (Congressional Research Service). Retrieved March 1, 2015 from Congressional Research Service: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41251.pdf

JFQ. (2008, July). Focus on Naval Power. Retrieved March 1, 2015 from JFQ: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jfq/jfq-50.pdf

Kimball, Daryl, and McKinzie, Matthew. (2015, February 23). Commentary: Nuclear Dangers: Myth, Reality, Responses. Retrieved March 1, 2015 from Defense News: http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/commentary/2015/02/23/commentary-nuclear-dangers-myth-reality-responses/23885837/

Medalia, Jonathan. (2010, June 4). Detection of Nuclear Weapons and Materials: Science, Technnologies, Observations. (Congressional Research Service). Retrieved March 1, 2015 from Congressional Research Service: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R40154.pdf

Medalia, Jonathan, Belkin, Paul, Kan, Shirley A., Kerr, Paul K., Mix, Derek E., Nikitin, Mary Beth, Zanotti, Jim. (2013, May 1). Nuclear Weapons R&D Organizations in Nine Nations. (Congressional Research Service). Retrieved March 1, 2015 from Congressional Research Service: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R40439.pdf

Montgomery, Evan B. (2013, December 5). The Future of America’s Strategic Nuclear Deterrent. Retrieved March 1, 2015 from CSBA: http://csbaonline.org/publications/2013/12/the-future-of-americas-startegic-nuclear-deterrent/

Raatz, Airman 1st Class Joseph. (2014, September 19). Modernization of US Nuclear Forces not Optional. Retrieved March 1, 2015 from U.S. Air Force: http://www.af.mil/News/ArticleDisplay/tabid/223/Article/499888/modernization-of-us-nuclear-forces-not-optional.aspx

Rinehart, Ian E., Hildreth, Steve A., and Lawrence, Susan V. (2013, June 2013). Ballistic missile Defense in the Asia-Pacific region: Cooperation and Opposition. (Congressional Research Service). Retrieved March 1, 2015, from Congressional Research Service: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R43116.pdf

RT. (2010, October 28). Oops! US Air Force Loses 50 Nukes. Retrieved March 1, 2015 from JFQ: http://rt.com/usa/usa-lost-nukes-missiles/

Woolf, Amy F. (2015, Febuary 23). Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons. (Congressional Research Service). Retrieved March 1, 2015 from Congressional Research Service: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL32572.pdf

Woolf, Amy F. (2015, Febuary 6). Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic missiles: Background and Issues. (Congressional Research Service). Retrieved March 1, 2015 from Congressional Research Service: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41464.pdf

Woolf, Amy F. (2015, Febuary 4). The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions. (Congressional Research Service). Retrieved March 1, 2015 from Congressional Research Service: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41219.pdf

Woolf, Amy F. (2011, February 7). Nuclear Arms Control: The Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty. (Congressional Research Service). Retrieved March 1, 2015 from Congressional Research Service: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL31448.pdf

Xenakis, John J. (2015, February 28). World View: US Navy Says that China Now has more Attack Submarines then US. Retrieved March 1, 2015 from BREITBART: http://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2015/02/28/world-view-us-navy-says-that-china-now-has-more-attack-submarines-than-us/