!e United States andPublic Diplomacy

New Directions in Cultural and International History

Edited by

Kenneth A. Osgood and Brian C. Etheridge

LEIDEN • BOSTON2010

CONTENTS

Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . !""List of Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "#

Introduction.$e New International History Meets the NewCultural History: Public Diplomacy and U.S. Foreign Relations . . 1Kenneth Osgood and Brian C. Etheridge

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%)*+", -"%+./&,0 &1 "2(3'2&(".2&+ 4"1(.'0Chapter One.$e Anomaly of the Cold War: Cultural Diplomacy

and Civil Society Since 5678 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht

Chapter Two.$e Problem of Power in Modern Public Diplomacy.$e Netherlands Information Bureau in World War II and theEarly Cold War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57David J. Snyder

Chapter$ree. Ethnicity, Security, and Public Diplomacy:Irish-Americans and Ireland’s Neutrality in World War II . . . . . . . . 81John Day Tully

Chapter Four. Hollywood, Tourism, and Dictatorship: SamuelBronston’s Special Relationship with the Franco Regime,597:–59:; . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103Neal M. Rosendorf

Chapter Five. Supranational Public Diplomacy:$e Evolution ofthe UN Department of Public Information and the Rise of$irdWorld Advocacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135Seth Center

Chapter Six. Transnational Public Diplomacy: AssessingSalvadoran Revolutionary E<orts to Build U.S. PublicOpposition to Reagan’s Central American Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165Héctor Perla Jr.

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(43 )2"(3- 1(&(31 &2- %)*+", -"%+./&,0Chapter Seven. Foreign Relations as Domestic A<airs:$e Role of

the “Public” in the Origins of U.S. Public Diplomacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195Justin Hart

Chapter Eight. Crisis Management and Missed Opportunities:U.S. Public Diplomacy and the Creation of the$ird World,59=:–5978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225Jason C. Parker

Chapter Nine. Film as Public Diplomacy:$e USIA’s Cold War atTwenty-Four Frames per Second . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257Nicholas J. Cull

Chapter Ten. Mediating Public Diplomacy: Local Conditions andU.S. Public Diplomacy in Norway in the 5978s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285Helge Danielsen

Chapter Eleven. Domestic Politics and Public Diplomacy:Appalachian Cultural Exhibits and the Changing Nature ofU.S. Public Diplomacy, 59>=–59:? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315Michael L. Krenn

Chapter Twelve. Networks of In@uence: U.S. Exchange Programsand Western Europe in the 5968s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 345Giles Scott-Smith

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371

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HOLLYWOOD, DICTATORSHIP AND PROPAGANDA:SAMUEL BRONSTON’S SPECIAL RELATIONSHIPWITH

THE FRANCO REGIME, 1957–1973*

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“For us, the most important of all arts is the cinema,” Vladimir Leninfamously declared, recognizing, as did most dictators in the twenti-eth century, the potential power of cinema to propagandize ideologiesand agendas.1 From an early point in the /011s, dictatorships saw theunique, preeminent qualities of American 2lm production. Hollywoodwas a huge-scale factory for the manufacture and distribution of motionpictures both within the United States and internationally. Tyrants andtheir propagandists tended either to look admiringly and enviously uponHollywood—as did the Soviet premier Josef Stalin, who 3atly stated, “IfI could control the medium of the American motion picture, I wouldneed nothing else to convert the entire world to communism”2—or theysought to compete with Hollywood and undermine its subversive in3u-ence via locally produced products in the manner of Joseph Goebbels,Nazi Germany’s minister of propaganda, who asserted, “We must give[German] 2lm a task and amission in order that wemay use it to conquerthe world. Only then will we also overcome American 2lm.”3 Ultimately,however, twentieth century dictatorships could 2nd no e4ective meansof either co-opting or e4ectively countering Hollywood 2lm production,with one notable exception: Franco Spain.

5e Franco regime was unique among twentieth century dictator-ships in its capacity to square the circle: it attracted a signi2cant num-ber of American producers to make big-budget 2lms in Spain, wherethe regime could use Hollywood as a propaganda transmitter while

* 5is chapter is dedicated to the memory of my late mentor Ernest R. May.1 Quoted in Richard Taylor and Ian Christie, eds., !e Film Factory: Russian and

Soviet Cinema in Documents, "#$%–"$&$ (London: Routledge, /006), p. /76.2 Quoted inAnthony Smith, In the Shadow of the Cave:!e Broadcaster, His Audience,

and the State (Univ. of Illinois Press, /089), /:8.3 Quoted in Eric Rentschler, !e Ministry of Illusion: Nazi Cinema and its A'erlife

(Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, /00;), </7.

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exercising control over the 2lms’ content via mandatory script approval.4For a decade from the early /0;1s until the early /081s, “Hollywood inMadrid” became one of the key overseas production venues for Amer-ican-produced and -distributed motion pictures. Although there weremany elements of serendipity in the development of this phenomenon, itdid not happen by accident. It required vision and 3exibility on both theIberian and Hollywood sides of the equation.

5e single most important 2gure, whether Spanish or American, inthe development of “Hollywood in Madrid,” and the political and eco-nomic bene2ts that accrued to the Franco dictatorship, was the 2lm pro-ducer Samuel Bronston. A pioneer in large-scale U.S. movie-making inSpain, he established a full-blown American studio with which to com-pete with U.S.-based production. From the late /071s through the early/081s, Bronston forged and maintained a uniquely intimate relationshipwith the Franco regime. Indeed, the Bronston-Franco partnershipmarksthe closest ongoing political collaboration ever recorded between a Hol-lywood 2lm production operation and a foreign country.

5e symbiosis between the Spanish dictatorship and the Americanproducer was the result of need and ambition on both sides.5e relent-lessly drivenBronston aspired to inherit Cecil B.DeMille’smantle asKingof the Epic Movie, and he needed an inexpensive and congenial venueto 2lm the sort of blockbuster motion pictures that were the rage at thetime. Franco and his minions needed economic and international polit-ical rehabilitation for a Spain ravaged by civil war and tarred by its closeassociationwith theAxis duringWorldWar II. Franco’s regime aspired toposition Spain as a respectedWestern anticommunist bastion, a “normalcountry,” as well as the cultural and ideological leader of the Spanish-speaking world.5

5ese mutual needs and ambitions would draw Bronston to Spain,where he established his studio in Madrid with the close cooperationof the Franco regime.5e Spanish government facilitated the producer’se4orts at every turn with monetary aid, matériel, logistics, and speciallegal arrangements and concessions. 5e regime’s estimation of Bron-ston’s singular value was marked by its presentation to him of the Order

4 5e only other dictatorship to attract more than a smattering of Hollywood pro-duction was Tito’s Yugoslavia, in the wake and in emulation of Spain’s dramatic success.However, the number of pictures produced there was far smaller than in Franco Spain,and there never developed a “Hollywood in Belgrade” (or Sarajevo, or Zagreb, for thatmatter) either in substance or international public perception.

5 Don Carlos Robles Piquer, interview by author, Madrid, Spain, July <118.

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of Isabel la Católica, Spain’s highest civilian honor, for his “work in estab-lishing closer cultural ties between the United States and Spain.”6 High-ranking regime 2guresmoonlighted as 2xers, consultants and scriptwrit-ers in the Bronston organization.

5e regime received much in return from the American 2lm mogul.Bronston produced several big blockbusters including the highly success-ful epic El Cid, King of Kings, !e Fall of the Roman Empire, and others.Just as important, Bronston also made, free of charge, a series of propa-ganda 2lms for the Spanish government that were screened both domes-tically in Spain and internationally, including in the U.S. His EstudiosSamuel Bronston became the cornerstone of “Hollywood in Madrid,”bringing in its wake considerable American and other international 2lmproduction that made Spain for a time into a leadingmotion picture cen-ter. His 2lms, and the gargantuan sets on which he made them, helpeddraw large numbers of tourists to Spain from the United States and else-where.

Both the dictatorship and the producer knew precisely what theywere doing.5e Franco regime was implementing a sophisticated inter-national tourist program that held both economic and political goals.7American and other foreign 2lm production in Spain 2t into this pro-gram of attracting tourists and had their own discrete economic andpolitical propaganda value as well. Foreign 2lm producers brought inhard currency for which Spainwas starving and gave work to 2lm techni-cal personnel and many other service providers at a time of painful eco-nomic restructuring and concomitant widespread unemployment. Addi-tionally, foreign production gave a major boost to poor areas of Spainwith attractive shooting locales, includingAlmeria and Las Rozas—itwasin the latter region that Bronston constructed his stupendous Las Matas

6 “Spain Medals Bronston,”Variety, <:October /0;9; “Spain Honors BronstonWorkon Cultural Ties,” Film Daily, /1 /<: /;9, Make all dates consistent and according to stylesheet, e.g. /<April /0;7. both cites in “Samuel Bronston” clipping2le, AcademyofMotionPicture Arts and Sciences Margaret Herrick Library of the Academy of Motion PictureArts and Sciences (hereaBer MHL), Beverly Hills, CA.

7 I have set out at length the background of the Spanish dictatorship’s e4orts to useAmerican tourism for its own economic and political purposes in “Be El Caudillo’s Guest:5e Franco Regime’s Quest for Rehabilitation and Dollars aBer World War II via thePromotion of U.S. Tourism to Spain,”Diplomatic History, 91 (<11;): 9;8–618.5is articleincludes a brief discussion of Hollywood production in Franco Spain as a factor in theregime’s program, a subject I have covered in greater detail in “ ‘Hollywood in Madrid’:American FilmProducers and the Franco Regime, /071–/081,”Historical Journal of Film,Radio and Television, <8 (<118): 88–/10.

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outdoor studio, where he built full-size recreations of Peking’s ForbiddenCity and the Roman Forum.

At one point the regime produced a top-secret international campaign,“Operación Propaganda Exterior,” aimed largely but not exclusively at theHispanophoneworld.5e plan at one point declared that “an artistic2lm,apparently ideologically neutral, has a greater in3uence on opinion thanthose which leave it possible to guess a de2nite and concrete purpose.”“Operación PE” placed special emphasis on co-productions betweenSpain and other countries.

No single 2gure was more important to the dictatorship in this regardthan Samuel Bronston, one of the greatest foreign enablers of the Francoregime, from both a propaganda and economic standpoint. 5e Amer-ican producer was keenly aware of the bene2ts to Franco Spain of bas-ing his 2lm production operations there. His image-enhancing and 2scalvalue, which he pointed out to an already appreciative regime, allowedhim to argue successfully for an unprecedented special status in Spainas the foreign head of a Spanish-registered corporation. And an equallyappreciative Bronston was unreservedly willing to pledge in return thatconcerning both propaganda and economics, “[W]hatever we do willalways be to the bene2t of the country that has received us so warmly,” apromise that entailed placing Spanish government oCcials on his busi-ness’s board of directors, submitting his 2lm projects for special autho-rization by the Ministry of Information and Tourism to make sure theywere suCciently valuable to the regime, and regularly producing docu-mentaries and other propaganda 2lms “covering national values.”

Samuel Bronston was one of the most signi2cant actors in a processthat I call “corporatism with a twist”—American business enterprisesworking hand in glove not with their own government, but with thatof another country, in this case a combined Hispano-U.S. corporatism.He also was an avatar of “soB power,” the now-widespread term devisedby the political scientist Joseph S. Nye. According to Nye, soB powerdescribes a co-opting process by which “[a] country may obtain theoutcomes it wants in world politics because other countries—admiringits values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity andopenness—want to follow it . . . . SoB power rests on the ability to shapethe preferences of others.”8 When one thinks of Hollywood and, morebroadly, American popular culture in soB power terms, it is generally

8 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., So' Power: !e Means to Success in World Politics (New York:Public A4airs, <116), 7.

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assumed that the bene2t accrues to the United States. But in fact Bron-ston placed this soB power at the service of the Spanish dictatorship, arelationship that reveals much about the ways in which states and non-state actors alike may seek to do the same in other circumstances.

Bronston’s Road to Madrid

Solomon Bronstein was born in /01: in the multi-ethnic Bessarabiantown of Ismail and was raised in France. A natural salesman whose bestproduct was always himself, Bronston worked as a French distributionrepresentative for U.S. 2lm companies before coming to theUnited Statesin /098, in the aBermath of a Parisian conviction for check kiting. Sur-mounting his entanglement with the French authorities, Bronston spentmuch of the next two decades as a relatively minor producer in Holly-wood, better known for his personal elegance and fund-promoting skillsthan for the movies he made.

But Bronston was resilient in the face of repeated setbacks and creativein leveraging his assets. A2lm property hemanaged to hold onto throughlean times was a biography of the U.S. naval hero John Paul Jones, a 2lmthat would eventually lead him to Spain. In /077Bronston reached out torecently retired Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz, who agreed to serve as theproducer’s personal advisor on the project. Nimitz immediately providedBronston entrée to the highest levels of the U.S. Navy, which pledged itsfull cooperation with Bronston’s production.9

Bronston also approached other distinguished and well-heeled privatecitizens of a patriotic bent who might be interested in aiding a 2lm thatglori2ed American maritime history and, in some cases, make someextra money from the e4ort. 5ese included R. Stuyvesant Pierrepont,Jr., who became the vice-president and treasurer of Admiralty PicturesCorporation (the company created to produce the 2lm) and Nelson andLaurence Rockefeller. Other prominent 2gures sitting on the company’s

9 Rear Adm. W.F. Boone, Superintendent, U.S. Naval Academy, to Bronston, /;February /07;; letter from Adm. Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations, to Bron-ston, /8 February /07;; letter from Rear Adm. E.B. Taylor, Chief of Information, U.S.Navy, to Bronston, /8 February /07;—all from “John Paul Jones” 2le (hereaBer JPJF),C.D. Jackson Papers (hereaBer CDJP), Dwight David Eisenhower Presidential Library,Abilene, KS (hereaBer DDEL). My thanks to senior archivist Dwight Strandberg at theEisenhower Library for his e4orts in locating and copying these papers.

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board included Lansdell K. Christie, who had made fortunes 2rst with aNew York barge operation company and then with an iron ore miningoperation in Liberia, and who had been the Democratic Party’s biggestcontributor in the /07; election; and recently retired career diplomatErnest A. Gross, who as deputy U.S. delegate to the United Nations hadfamously marshaled support for the Security Council’s condemnation ofNorth Korea’s invasion of its southern neighbor in June /071. Ambas-sadorGross, in turn, helpedBronston beat a path to the door ofC.D. Jack-son, who had recently served as a special assistant and speech writer toPresident Dwight D. Eisenhower, and whose well-established interest inthe use of media propaganda in the service of U.S. foreign policy wasaccompanied by the desire tomake a lucrative investment. Jacksonwouldbring in a cadre of friends as modest-scale backers of the John Paul Jonesproject.10

Bronston’s e4orts to secure adequate funding for the productionwaxedand waned during /07; and /078. During this time the producer madethree key contacts with profound rami2cations for the rest of his career.First, a member of a second wave of blue-blood investors included PierreS. du Pont III, a senior vice-president of the du Pont family’s holdingcompany, an outspoken conservative patriot, and a sailing a2cionado.Despite the Delaware aristocrat’s unpretentious, low-key demeanor, hewas evidently thoroughly beguiled by the ex-Bessarabian’s exuberance,high style, and seemingly boundless self-con2dence.5e twomenwould

10 R. Stuyvesant Pierrepont, Jr. deposition, <; January /08;, in Pierre du Pont v.Samuel Bronston, U.S. District Court-Northern District Texas-Dallas, case number CA-9-;:0:-E, 2les stored at National Archives Federal Record Center, Fort Worth, TX; logof telephone call by R.S. Pierrepont, Jr. to Nelson Rockefeller, in re arranging SamuelBronston meeting with Rockefeller, / February /07;, Papers of Nelson A. Rockefeller,Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow, NY; “Bomi Bonanza,” Time, <: March/060, !http: //www.time.com/ time/magazine /article/1,0/8/,8000;/,11.html?promoid=googlep" (/9May <110); “Stock Selling in Liberia,”Time, <0 February /0;1, !http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/1,0/8/,:89<0<,11.html" (/9 May <110); Fleet Adm.Chester W. Nimitz to Amb. Ernest Gross, </ February /07;, JPJF, CDJP, DDEL; Amb.Gross to C.D. Jackson, 7 March /07;, JPJF, CDJP, DDEL; on the highlights of ErnestGross’s career see for example “Shooting in the Yellow Sea,” Time, /: September/071, !http://www.time.com/ time/magazine /article /1,0/8/,:/9<7<,11.html?promoid=googlep" (/9 May <110); Trygvie Lie, In the Cause of Peace: Seven Years with theUnited Nations (New York: Macmillan, /076), chapters /:–/0; New York Times obit-uary of Ernest Gross, 6 May /000, !http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=0D16E;DA/69CF098A9787;C1A0;F07:<;1;" (/9 May <110); R.S. Pierrepont, Jr. toC.D. Jackson, </March /07;, with attached letter from Jackson to investor sub-group, </March /07;, JPJF, CDJP, DDEL.

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subsequently forge a close business partnership that would underwriteBronston’s blockbusters and ultimately exact a grievous toll on both oftheir careers.11

5e second crucial contact was with Victor Oswald, a Swiss nationalresident in Madrid, who was a representative of the Chase ManhattanBank in Spain (Chase Manhattan was owned by the Rockefeller fam-ily, and it is likely that Nelson and Laurence Rockefeller, both investorsin the “John Paul Jones” project, put Bronston and Oswald together).Oswald was aware of a number of American-based individuals and con-cerns that had frozen funds tied up in Spain—investments in Spanishbusinesses or real estate that could not be repatriated to the United Statesbecause of Spanish laws, in the manner of numerous other Europeanstates, which sought to head o4 capital 3ight and the damage it mightcause to a weak economy. Among the concerns seeking to move pese-tas into dollars were the Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, GeneralMotors, Eastman Kodak, and a Swiss holding company, Societe Privee,that owned industrial property in Spain.Additionally, therewas the estateof the late Isadore Stern,whohaddied leaving “a very valuable investmentin Spain,” andwhose family had tried for years without success to repatri-ate his money to the United States, owing to the Franco regime’s currencyrestrictions. Oswald worked closely with Bronston to nail down fundingfor a production whose costs had ballooned from two million dollars totwice that amount.12

11 See for example aCdavit of Pierre du Pont 9rd, : June /0;6, in Samuel BronstonProductions, Inc. and Samuel Bronston v. Pierre du Pont Pont and Jesse Moss, case num-ber 098; //0;6, New York State Supreme Court-New York County, on-site archive at ;1Center St., Foley Square, New York; deposition of Pierre S. du Pont, Wilmington, DE, /January /0;8, Richard Fleischer v. Bronston-Bengal Productions [and others], case num-ber ;6 Civ <<;<, U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, document from theprivate papers of the 2lm director Richard Fleischer (with thanks to the late Mr. Fleis-cher’s son Mark Fleischer, Esq., for providing a copy of the transcript to Paul G. Nagle,with whom I am co-authoring a biography of Samuel Bronston (University of Texas Press,in contract), and thanks to Mr. Nagle for providing it in turn to me); “Pierre S. du PontDirector of DuPont,”Wilmington Evening Journal, :October /06:; “P.S. du Pont III, Oth-ers Oppose Khrushchev Visit,”WilmingtonMorning News, 9/August /070, in “Pierre duPont 9rd” clipping 2le,Wilmington News-Journal, Newcastle, DE (with thanks to News-Journal librarian Ann Haslam for her kind assistance with clipping 2les).

12 5e information in this paragraph is drawn in part from the testimony of RudolphLittauer, Esq., / December /07:, and Irwin Margulies, Esq., / December /07:, in JohnPaul Jones Productions-New Jersey v. Barnett Glassman, U.S. District Court, New YorkCity, 2les stored at the National Archives Central Plains Region facility, Lee’s Summit,MO [hereaBer NARA-LS]. As one participant in setting up the 2nancing structure putit, “5e new 2nancing was predicated on the conversion—largely on the conversion of

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Bronston’s third crucial new relationship was with Jose Maria deAreilza, the Conde de Motrico, Spain’s Ambassador to the United States.A dapper career diplomat, Areilza had in earlier years been an ardentFalangist (Spanish fascist) but had recently startedmoving toward amoremoderate conservatism (he would later become a key 2gure in Spain’stransition from dictatorship to democracy aBer Franco’s death).13 Moreto the point, he was open to o4ering his services as a political 2xerto Bronston. 5e Conde strongly encouraged Bronston to use Iberianshooting locales when the two were seated together at a State Depart-ment dinner in /078; as the producer would later testify in court, “Hebrought me to Spain originally.” Areilza was placed on the Bronston

pesetas into a motion picture, and then the whole picture changed. It was no longera question of operating in Hollywood or anywhere else. It had to be done exclusivelyin Spain.” (Littauer testimony, /8<–/89). See as well “Contrato de Colaboracion entreJohn Paul Jones, Prod., Inc. y Suevia Films—Cesario Gonzales,” << February /07:—copysent to the Chief of the Service of Cinematographic Economic Arrangements, SpanishGovernment, in “John Paul Jones” 2le, Ministry of Information and Tourism, 9;-176/:-/88, Ministry of Information and Tourism-Culture Ministry 2les (alphabetized 2lm titlelistings), General Archive of the Civil Administration of the State, Alcala de Henares,Spain (hereaBer General Archive Alcala).

13 Most precisely, the Conde was a long-time right-wing monarchist who joined theFalange movement in the mid-/091s and was rewarded by Franco for his strong sup-port during the Spanish Civil War with his appointment as mayor of Bilbao, aBer thatRepublican and Basque nationalist stronghold was overrun by the Nationalist army in/098. Areilza would eventually grow disenchanted with Franco and by the /0;1s becomea supporter of the pretender to the Spanish throne, Don Juan, and then Prince JuanCarlos, once Franco pronounced Don Juan’s son as his successor. See José Maria deAreilza, Diario vasco, << May /098, article excerpt in Alun Kenwood, ed., !e Span-ish Civil War: A Cultural and Historical Reader (Providence and Oxford: Berg Pub-lishers, /009), 0;; Jose Maria de Areilza and Fernando Castiella, Reivindicaciones deEspaña (“Spain’s Claims,” devoted to setting forth Spanish imperial ambitions, especiallyin the Mediterranean region, a stance that Areilza and the other author later signi2-cantly moderated) (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Politicos, /06/); Emmet John Hughes,Report from Spain (New York: Henry Holt, /068), /86; Arthur P. Whitaker, Spain andthe Defense of the West (New York: Council on Foreign Relations [Harper imprint],/0;/), 909; Rafael Gomez Perez, El Franquismo y la Iglesia (Madrid: Ediciones Rialp,/0:;), /0 n;; Stanley G. Payne, Fascism in Spain, "$(&–"$)) (Madison: University ofWisconsin Press), 9/6; Paul Preston, !e Politics of Revenge: Fascism and the Militaryin Twentieth-Century Spain (London: Routledge, /007), xiv, <17; Michael Richards, ATime of Silence: Civil War and the Culture of Repression in Franco’s Spain, "$&%–"$*+(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, /00:), 6<; Paul Preston, Juan Carlos:Steering Spain From Dictatorship to Democracy (New York: Norton, <116), <0–91, /<6;Stanley G. Payne, Franco and Hitler: Spain, Germany and World War II (New Haven:Yale University Press, <11:), /<:. My thanks to Professor José Areilza of EMPRESA inMadrid, a grandson of the Conde deMotrico, for his comments on an earlier draB of thischapter.

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payroll and would receive at least D/71,111 for use of his “in3uence tohelp us out” with the Spanish government between /078 and /0;9.14

5us it came to pass that there was one logical place for Bronstonto do the bulk of the 2lming of John Paul Jones: Spain, which heldout the possibility of the least expensive 2lming to be had in West-ern Europe—but there were problems both of technical de2cienciesand oCcial suspicion toward Hollywood to surmount. Fortunately forboth the Spanish 2lm industry and for Samuel Bronston, Spain desper-ately desired hard currency and international rehabilitation.5e regimewas in the midst of implementing a program to promote Americantourism to Spain, as a central element of the regime’s e4orts aBer WorldWar II to improve Spain’s economic and diplomatic /political circum-stances; and following in tourism’s wake was the 2rst large-scale Amer-ican 2lm production in Spain. Sam Bronston would capitalize mightilyon both.

Hollywood and American Tourism in Postwar Franco Spain

In the early /071s, the Franco regime was in the midst of implementinga program to promote American tourism to Spain, as a central elementof the regime’s e4orts aBer World War II to improve Spain’s economicand diplomatic /political circumstances.5e Spanish government’s over-arching goal was to “sell” Franco Spain’s image abroad and particularly tothe United States. 5e policy aimed to portray Spain as a normal West-ern country and anticommunist ally, and to bring into Spain desperatelyneeded hard currency, especially dollars, and investment. 5e Francoregime was strongly encouraged in the years following World War II tolook to American tourism’s potential economic and propaganda bene2tsto Spain by prominent players within the U.S. travel and tourism indus-tries, including American Express, Hilton Hotels, Trans-World Airlines,and top American travel writers. As a report by the Spanish Ministry ofInformation and Tourism (MIT) put it in /07<, “[I]t is essential that thetourist who visits us not only returns here, but that he is converted into

14 Testimony of Samuel Bronston, <6 June /0;;, :–/8, in Bankruptcy of Samuel Bron-ston, ;6 B 6;6, U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, stored at NARA-LS[Bronston Bankruptcy "$%*]; author interview with Paul Lazarus, Jr., former senior vice-president of Samuel Bronston Productions, Santa Barbara, CA, January /00;; and PaulLazarus, Jr., “5e Madrid Movie Caper,” Focus (University of California Santa Barbara),v. /; (/007), 67–68.

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themost active propagandist of our nation, increasing in thismanner ourprestige in the world.”15

With tourism to Spain steadily increasing, providing the bulk of thecountry’s hard currency and delivering perceived propaganda bene2ts,the Franco regime was theoretically open to any means that would in-crease the number of overseas, and especially American, visitors. Motionpictures made in Spain were a self-evident enhancement medium. In-deed, the Ministry of Information and Tourism, with its oversight ofpropaganda, 2lm production and tourism, was geared toward harness-ing the 2lm-tourism synergy, albeit while also committed to combating“moral pollution.”16 From its earliest days the Franco regime looked tomotion pictures as both an economic and propaganda asset. 5e dicta-torship announced in /090, soon aBer consolidating its control of Spain,“5e cinematograph industry is perhaps one that most needs the guid-ing hand of the State . . . .5e new State cannot overlook activities of thiskind, which if on the one hand is of great interest to National economy,on the other hand represents for Spain a greatmeans ofmaterial and spir-itual propaganda.”17 Francisco Franco himself had written a 2lm script,Raza, in the early /061s. At the same time, the Ministry of Informationand Tourism was congenitally suspicious of Hollywood—as late as /0;1,internal MIT documents were warning that the American 2lm produc-ers and distributors amounted to “the sector most easily penetrated byJudaism and communism,” and that the regime had to be very wary in itsdealings with them as a result.18 Nonetheless, the inescapable reality wasthat the United States dominated the international 2lm market, and the

15 “Anteproyecto de PlanNacional de Turismo,” July /07<, <, section 60.1<, box /66/7,general heading “Cultura,” General Archive Alcala.

16 As one Spanish motion picture director later described 2lming in Spain during the/071s, “Our Ministry . . . functioned as two ministries that contradicted each other. Onethat was vigilant and one that stimulated tourism.5e one . . . prohibited bikinis on thescreen and the other was encouraging tourism that brought bikinis. 5us one would beasking oneself, ‘Which of the two should I follow?’ ” Carlos F. Heredero, Las Huellas delTiempo: Cine espanol, "$+"–"$%" (Valencia: Archivo de la Filmoteca de la GeneralitatValenciana, /009), p. <0.

17 “Cinematograph Regulations: Order dated at Madrid the twentieth of October,/090, issued by the Ministry of Industry and Commerce,” in Spain: Black Book Docu-ments /09;–/06;, UA Collection series /F—Black Books, box 0, folder : (Spain), UnitedArtists Collection, Wisconsin Historical Society, Madison, WI (hereaBer UAC, WHS).

18 “Borrador Previo para unEstudio Sobre Fines yMedios de la Propaganda de Españaen el Exterior,” dated August /0;1, p. /<, in box <:979, section 60.1;, heading “Cultura,”General Archive Alcala.

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Franco regime felt compelled to try to come terms with this dominanceand seek a useful accommodation with it.

During the early postwar period the Spanish2lm industry’s infrastruc-ture leBmuch to be desired. But despite formidable disincentives, Holly-wood in the /071s was 2nancially beleaguered as the result of anti-trustcourt rulings and the challenge posed by television; and thus Spain’s rep-utation as a poor nation with cheap prices attracted the U.S. 2lm indus-try’s attention. United Artists (UA) in particular had been assiduouslycultivating friendly relations with the Franco regime through its distri-bution operation in Spain.5e “studio without a back lot” became some-thing of a mecca for independent 2lmmakers, including such luminar-ies as Robert Rossen, Stanley Kramer, and King Vidor. 5eir success—especially Kramer’s—helped to nudge the Franco regime toward a gen-erally more receptive attitude to Hollywood production in Spain; and itprovided a perfect template for the far more thoroughgoing partnershipthat Samuel Bronston developed with Franco’s dictatorship.

Bronston’s Blockbusters and the MIT

When Samuel Bronston arrived in Madrid in /07: to shoot John PaulJones he found not only promises of oCcial support, but a country thatwas by European standards (which were of course lower at the time thanAmerican standards) notably inexpensive to work and live in. Bronstonhired as his director John Villiers Farrow, whose two great passions wereseamanship and conservative Catholicism.5e director had nursed sincethe late /061s the obsessive dream to 2lm a life of Christ, to be entitled“5e Son of Man.” Once John Paul Jones was completed, Bronston wasready to move on to bringing Farrow’s “5e Son of Man” to the screen.In the course of putting this project together Bronston astutely realizedhe had a golden opportunity to leapfrog past mere independent producerstatus and become something more: a full-blown movie mogul in chargeof his own studio.

Franco Spain o4ered a unique opportunity: it was dirt-cheap, in con-trast to Hollywood, Britain, or even Italy. Unlike Italy, there was nocompetition from wealthy, established local studios and producers whoalready had their own Hollywood connections (in Italy magnates likeDino di Laurentis, Carlo Ponti, and Bronston’s own sometime businesspartner Roberto Haggiag dominated the 2lm industry). Finally andmostimportant, Spain had a dictatorship that for both economic and political

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reasons was very open to collaborating with American producers, pro-vided they toed the line set down by the government. Bronston “saw thatthat Spain was a peaceful country where strikes were not allowed, wherethe workforce was basically [well-] quali2ed, and cheap, and . . . with thenecessary land, big land, to produce big 2lms, that wasmore or less acces-sible and also cheap. And he was the 2rst intelligent American producerwho discovered that.”19

Moreover, Sam Bronston had another signi2cant asset: a multi-mil-lionaire patron willing to underwrite his e4orts in an ongoing fashion,Pierre S. du Pont III, one of the twelve backers who put up funds for JohnPaul Jones. He was a member of the board of directors at E.I. du Pontde Nemours & Co. and vice-president of Christiana Securities, the duPont family holding company. 5ey met in /078; by the following yearthey had developed a special relationship concerning the production ofJohn Paul Jones. Du Pont personally invested nearly D/.7 million, overa quarter of the 2lm’s total cost. 5e two men would form a series oflimited companies that would enable Bronston to produce some of thegrandest 2lm spectacles of all time. As the producer’s partner, between/070 and /0;6 Pierre du Pont would sign guarantee notes on Bronston’sbehalf totaling approximately D<0million (around D<11million in <11:dollars).20

Bronston’s job of selling his audacious idea of a Hollywood in Madridto the Franco regime, which did not even allow foreigners to own themajority share of their Spanish-based operations, wasmade considerablyeasier by his ability to use the august du Pont name. As Carlos RoblesPiquer the one-time Director General for Information at the Ministryof Information and Tourism, recently recounted, “All of us . . . saw inBronston a very welcome man. Why? Because, 2rst of all he was a movieproducer; second, he was a man of extremely high intelligence . . . . For

19 Robles Piquer, interview by author, Madrid, Spain, July <118.20 “Bronston Raps His Ex-Accountant; Repeats ‘Harassment’ by Glassman Can’t Halt

‘John Paul Jones’ Dates,” Variety, /8 December /07:, in “John Paul Jones” 2lm clippingcollection, MHL; A4adavit of Pierre S. du Pont, : September /081, pp. <–9 and passim,in Pierre S. du Pont v. Samuel Bronston, case number 17;80 //0;0, New York StateSupreme Court, New York County, court archive at Center St., New York City; RudolphLittauer testimony, p. /86; “Total Bronston Operation Liabilities About D97 Mil, CourtDocuments Show,” Variety, : /0 /;7, “Samuel Bronston” clipping 2le, Variety EditorialOCces, LosAngeles, CA (my thanks to PaulG.Nagle for his instrumental aid in obtainingVariety’s “Samuel Bronston” clipping 2les). Dollar conversion courtesy of MeasuringWorth.Com, “Six Ways to Compute the Relative Value of a U.S. Dollar Amount, /886to Present,” !http://www.measuringworth.com/uscompare/" (/9May <110).

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the 2rst time, we had an American 2lm producer, intelligent, powerful,with money, or backed by money . . . and he could invest in movies inSpain, transforming Spain, or part of Spain, Almeria and Las Rozas ina great and wonderful plateau to produce 2lms, made in Spain for theworld. And that was the 2rst time that such a thing happened.”21

Additionally, Bronston had in his employ Areilza, the Conde de Mo-trico, the extremely in3uential ambassador to theUnited States. He acted,as Bronston coyly put it at one point, “as a public relations consultantin certain ways in the company”—although we are leB to ponder towhat extent Ambassador Areilza’s participation with Bronston was aproduct of cupidity or an oCcial role to co-opt the American producerfor the regime’s purposes. It would have been no matter to the ruthlesslyinstrumental Bronston one way or the other, of course, as long as hegot the access and cutting of bureaucratic red tape that he desired.Beyond the D/71,111 in cash that Bronston paid out directly to theSpanish diplomat over the course of /078–/0;9, Areilza received piecesof Bronston’s 2lms as an additional form of payment. With the Conde’shelp, Bronston was able to arrange lucrative licenses for the importationof D/1million worth of diverse goods, including oil and business addingmachines into Spain.22 Bronston perpetually operated under Areilza’saegis throughout the early /0;1s via the Conde’s son, who was one of theproducer’s key attorneys in Spain and the secretary of Bronston’s Spanishcorporation Samuel Bronston Española, S.A.23

Bronston’s e4ort was further simpli2ed by the preoccupations ofMinister of Information and Tourism Gabriel Arias Salgado, a devout

21 “Pierre S. DuPont: High-Flyin’ Angel,” Variety, <1 January /0;1, in “Samuel Bron-ston” clipping 2le, Variety Editorial OCces; Robles Piquer, interview by author, Madrid,Spain, July <118.

22 See memorandum from the Director General of Foreign Commerce, Ministry ofCommerce to Samuel Bronston, “Asunto: Pago rodaje peliculas ‘El Hijo del Hombre’ y‘Nelson,’ ” < /< /70, in “El Rey deReyes” 2le folder, 9;-176</-<;;,Ministry of Informationand Tourism-Culture Ministry 2les (alphabetized 2lm title listings), General ArchivesAlcala; also Bronston testimony, <1 June /0;;, in Bronston Bankruptcy "$%*, pp. /1–//,and :–/8 passim; Bronston testimony </ June /0;;, same 2le, <:–91. When asked underoath, “[A]t that time did you have any alleged in3uence with the Spanish Government,”Bronston simply replied, “Yes.” Areilza was a key, seminal source of this in3uence.(Bronston testimony </ June /0;;, same 2le, pp. <<–<9.)

23 Bronston testimony, ; /<1 /;;, inBronston Bankruptcy "$%*, :; Memorandum fromJosé Mario Armero, Spanish attorney for Samuel Bronston, to Jesse Moss, Samuel Bron-ston Productions, Inc., “Report on the Present Situation of Samuel Bronston Espanola,S.A.,” /< June /0;9, in binder of same name (giB to author from Raymond Cheesman,CPA, outside accountant for Samuel Bronston Productions, Inc).

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Catholic who had publicly declared that his job as Minister was “savingsouls.” 5e Franco dictatorship expeditiously approved the producer’srequest to begin 2lming his new Christ story project, and Bronstontransferred his family forthwith from New York to Madrid.24 Even asBronston’s 2lm of Christ’s life, now titled King of Kings, was still inthe early stages of production, planning had begun on the 2lm thatwould be Samuel Bronston Productions’ greatest commercial and criticalsuccess, El Cid, a subject tailor-made to endear Bronston utterly to theFranco regime. In the 2lm Charlton Heston portrayed Don Rodrigode Bivar, Spain’s greatest hero who began the centuries-long process ofChristian victory over the Moors in Spain. El Cid functioned as theIberian legendary equivalent of Roland or King Arthur; and FranciscoFranco fancied himself the Cid’s latter-day incarnation, an image theregime’s propaganda drove home incessantly.25

5e Franco regime continued to extend privileges to Bronston at everyturn. Manuel Fraga Iribarne, the Minister of Information and Tourismfrom /0;<–/0;0, stated 3atly that Bronston “was totally di4erent” fromthe other American 2lm makers in his status in Spain: “He was a spe-cial relation; he came here,” meaning he was based in Spain, not Hol-lywood.26 El Cid was able to mount an exceptionally lavish produc-tion because Bronston and his company had carte blanche access toSpain’s castles, walled medieval towns, and natural scenery (El Cid’sgrand screen appearance was also helped by the 2lm’s then-huge /1mil-lion dollar budget). Much of El Cid’s shooting was pointedly scheduledto be done outdoors around Spain. 5e avid cooperation of the Francoregime in arranging for Samuel Bronston Productions to 2lm at manyhistorical sites was indispensable. Bronston’s prestige in Spain reached anew high with the world-wide success of El Cid.5e Franco regime, andthe Spanish public-at-large, revered themovie as a near-perfect encapsu-lation of the Spanish heroic sensibility. Unsurprisingly, the Franco regimebolstered Bronston in ways great and small, such as providing thousands

24 See documents contained in “El Rey de Reyes” 2le folder, 9;-176</-<;;, Ministry ofInformation and Tourism-CultureMinistry 2les (alphabetized 2lm title listings), GeneralArchives Alcala; Irene Bronston (Samuel Bronston’s daughter), interview by author,Berkeley, CA, January /00;; Dr. William Bronston (Samuel Bronston’s son), interviewby author, Carmichael, CA, December /007, January /00;; Dorothea Bronston (SamuelBronston’s ex-wife), interview by author, London, July /00;.

25 Paul Preston, Franco: A Biography (New York: Basic Books, /00;), xvii, 0, 7<, /:/,9<0, ;6/–;6<.

26 Robles Piquer, interview by author, Madrid, Spain, July <118; Don Manuel FragaIribarne, interview by author, Madrid, July <118.

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of Spanish Army troops to serve as extras for only two dollars per day,horses included, and holding frequent meetings at the Ministry of Infor-mation and Tourism to discuss issues of common interest.5e capstoneof the Franco regime’s approbation and appreciation was its certi2ca-tion that El Cid was oCcially a 2lm in the “Spanish National Interest.”Only two 2lms in all of Spanishmotion picture history had been awardedthis classi2cation. In evaluating El Cid for this honor, which incidentallybrought with it a substantial subsidy from the Ministry of Informationand Tourism, Government censors uniformly lauded Charlton Heston’sportrayal of El Cid as a paragon of Spanish rectitude.27

Bronston’s Proposal for Propaganda Cooperation

El Cid 2t perfectly into a top-secret plan the Spanish Ministry of Infor-mation and Tourism put together in /0;1 for international pro-Francopropaganda. “Operación Propaganda Exterior,” as the plan was called,was initiated in /0;1 under the direct orders of Minister of Informationand TourismGabriel Arias Salgado.5e plan had a dual role to propagateSpain’s image broadly overseas and to further the longstanding goals ofHispanidad, the regime’s policy of establishing Franco Spain as the undis-puted leader of the Hispanophone world. Indeed, as far back as /090,the Spanish government’s “Cinematograph Regulations” explicitly stated,“5e new State must 2nd in the cinematograph a powerful instrument ofdi4usion which passing the frontier limits, shall make known, specially[sic] to our brothers in America, the ideals that today animate Spain, bymeans of a 3ourishing industry, symbol—towards creating an empire—of the e4orts we are disposed to make.”28

5e fundamental objectives of the plan were “[t]o impart an under-standing of the foundations on which our political system are based,”

27 Antonio Recoder (long-time local aCliate of theMotion Picture Export Associationof America), interview by author, Madrid, June /00;; Leon Patlach and Charlton Hes-ton, interview by author, April /00;; Proclamation by the Minister of Information andTourism, 91 January /0;<, box 9<8, “El Cid” 2le, Ministry of Information and Tourism-Culture Ministry 2les (alphabetized 2lm title listings), General Archives Alcala; see cen-sors’ reports, box 9<8, “El Cid” 2le, same location as previous cite.

28 “Cinematograph Regulations: Order dated at Madrid the twentieth of October,/090, issued by the Ministry of Industry and Commerce,” Spain: Black Book Documents/09;–/06;, United Artists Collection series /F—Black Books, box 0, folder : (Spain),UAC WHC. See as well for example Sidney Wexler, “Spain Looks Again at HispanicAmerica,”Hispania, September /0;7, 609–600.

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and “[t]o demonstrate that our political system is viable in other coun-tries, fundamentally in those in which Spanish is spoken.” OperaciónPE targeted three elements—the political sector, intellectuals, and “lamasa en general.” Concerning the last group, particular areas of pro-paganda fomentation included festivals, the press, radio, tourism (ofcourse), and 2lms, especially Spanish 2lms. 5e study noted the valueof foreign motion picture production in Spain, of which Samuel Bron-ston was already the ultimate example, declaring, “Collaboration withforeign countries produces results, in the case of Operación PE, that areextremely valuable. [Films that] a foreigner produces in Spain, about anyfacet of the national life, present to the foreign public a character of objec-tivity and dispassion that is not always conceded to nationals . . . Co-production means . . . for the most part the guarantee of a world-widedistribution of the 2lm, leaving the public unaware of the actual origin,obviating all possible suspicion of propaganda.”29

As it turns out, the Bronston-Franco linkages concerning propagandadesign were quite explicit, if initially subtle. Continuing to utilize hisstandard modus operandi of co-opting in3uential government 2gures,Bronston drew into his organization Enrique Llovet, a diplomat andwriter just returned from Spain’s embassy in Teheran. Back in Madrid,Llovet held the position of First Secretary at the Ministry of ForeignA4airs’ Instituto de Cultura Hispanica, which sought to “increase andstimulate and promote the relations between Spain and the Spanishspeaking communities.”30

Llovet would serve as a well-paid script writer and consultant in theBronston organization between /070 and /0;6, as well as a director fortwo years of Bronston’s Spanish corporation. When asked how he couldboth serve as a diplomat and work for Bronston, he explained, “Fortu-nately, it has always been possible for me to have these two parallel activ-ities. Up to now I have done ;0 2lms and of course I maintain both occu-pations without any problem.” However, Llovet’s participation was notnecessarily a bifurcation of his political and artistic vocations; his activi-

29 “Preliminary Study: Operación Politica Exterior: ‘PE,’ ” dated August /0;1, in box<:979, section 60.1;, heading “Cultura,” General Archives Alcala; “Operación PoliticaExterior: ‘PE,’ ” dated August /0;1, annex, “Cinematogra2a.”

30 Deposition of Enrique Llovet, / //9 /8/, p. / and passim,United States v. Bronston,;0 Cr. ;0;, U.S. Federal Court, First District, New York City, 2les stored at NARA-LS; Miguel Olid, “El guionista de Samuel Bronston,” El Pais, // //0 /11, at !http://www.elpais.com/articulo /andalucia /LLOVET/_ENRIQUE/guionista /Samuel/Bronston/elpepuespand/<111///0elpand_<9/Tes" (/9May <110).

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ties within the Foreign A4airs Ministry had an explicitly propagandisticelement. We cannot know at this point whether he had been oCciallyinstructed to exploit the Bronston enterprise for the sake of OperaciónPE. But we must, 2rst, note the circumstantial evidence—Llovet was incharge of a government organ dedicated to extending Hispanidad whilehe worked for Bronston, including on El Cid. Second, he played a keyrole in producing two propaganda short subjects,Objetivo %) and Sinfo-nia Española, out of a total of four that Bronston made for the Spanishgovernment.31

By /0;9 Samuel Bronston cast subtlety to the winds concerning hisservice as a propaganda asset. He proposed to the Franco dictatorshipa comprehensive program of political collaboration. With the regime’sassent, the already intimate relationship between Bronston and the re-gime became the closest ongoing public diplomacy relationship everforged, down to the present day, between a Hollywood 2lmmaker anda foreign government. Again it must be stressed that Bronston’s motiva-tions for his blueprint for collaboration had nothing to do with ideologi-cal sympathy and everything to do with business. He desired a specialdispensation that would allow his Spanish corporation, Samuel Bron-ston Española, S.A., to be majority foreign-owned, in contravention ofSpain’s /06; law requiring that “the capital of companies which pos-sess or exploit studios, laboratories or in general establishments for cin-ematographic production in Spain . . . .must be wholly Spanish.”32 5isstatute was getting in the way of Bronston’s e4orts to arrange foreign2nancing to purchase the land and studios he had been using for 2lmproduction, and in order to circumvent the law he laid out his col-laborative o4er. ABer noting at length the manifold economic bene2tsto Spain of his production operation, he laid out the political wind-fall:

From the point of view of information and propaganda, SAMUEL BRON-STONPRODUCTIONS, INC. are pleased and proud of the success of their2lm ELCID throughout theworld, and of the way that the name of Spain isbeing linkedwith the exhibition and publicity of this picture. In the 2lm 77DAYS AT PEKING [a depiction of the /011 Boxer Rebellion] . . . .special

31 Memorandum from José Mario Armero to Jesse Moss, “Report on the PresentSituation of Samuel Bronston Espanola, S.A.,” /< June /0;9, binder of same name,Raymond Cheesman accounting 2les; Llovet deposition, <–9 and passim.

32 “5e Law of <6-XI-90 Ruling National Industry as applied to CinematographicProduction,” <7 January /06;, <8 April /06;, binder “Report on the Present Situationof Samuel Bronston Espanola, S.A.,” Raymond Cheesman accounting 2les.

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interest has been taken to see that Spain’s intervention has been duly con-sidered. Journalists from all parts of the world visit Spain invited by thiscompany and hundreds of articles speak of Spain, where anAmerican pro-ducer is making 2lms for the whole world . . . .

Bronston then highlighted the political value of his current project,!eFall of the Roman Empire, and listed the roster of upcoming documen-tary 2lms he had already agreed to make on the Franco regime’s behalf.He projected that his slated future mega-productions would together“signif[y] approximately an expense of 2By million dollars,” or aroundD97/ million in <11: dollars, an especially welcome boon in the midstof Spain’s painful economic stabilization policy at the time—as Bron-ston pointed out.5e production capstone, planned for /0;7, was to be ahagiographic portrayal of the Spanish monarch who had sent Columbusto the NewWorld, expelled the Jews and Muslims from Spain, and insti-tuted the Inquisition. Isabel of Spain, Bronston suggested, would “be ourbiggest production, with a larger budget than any other 2lm yet made”—a particularly grand claim, given Bronston’s well-known penchant forastronomical production costs—“and the greatest worldwide exhibitionof characters and deeds from Spanish history.”

In exchange for the foreign owner dispensation he sought, the pro-ducer promised to codify and deepen his political cooperation with theFranco dictatorship:

If their activities can be developed in Spain on the basis of the [requestedauthorizations], SAMUEL BRONSTON PRODUCTIONS, INC. and par-ticularly their President,Mr. Samuel Bronston and SAMUELBRONSTONESPAÑOLA, S.A. would like to repeat their o4er to the e4ect that theirwork will aim at the widest collaboration in the spreading of Spanish val-ues. We are making, then, a general declaration that whatever we do willalways be to the bene2t of the country which has receive us so warmly and,more concretely, we are prepared to submit to the following conditions:

(A) We declare that the object of SAMUEL BRONSTON ESPAÑOLA,S.A. will be . . . .the production of cinematographic 2lms which exaltthe value of Spain . . . .

(B) [SBE, S.A. will] submit the realization of each Spanish 2lm, indepen-dently of the normal administrative procedure, to the express autho-rization of the Dirreccion General de Cinematogra2a y Teatro, sothat the 2lm may conform with . . . .the above point.

(C) Admit two representatives from the Ministry of Information andTourism as members of the Board of Directors of SAMUEL BRON-STON ESPAÑOLA, S.A.

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(D) [SBE, S.A. will] produce at least one full length or documentary 2lmper year covering national values in accordance with the suggestionsof the Ministry of Information and Tourism, the worldwide distri-bution of which will be guaranteed by SAMUEL BRONSTON.33

5e Franco regime could not have been more delighted with Bronston’sextraordinary proposal and enthusiastically agreed to its terms, stipu-lating that the two Ministry of Information and Tourism oCcials to beappointed to SBE, S.A.’s Board of Directors would hold the rank of Direc-tor General within the Ministry, an expression of the importance to theregime of the partnership and its activities.34

Bronston’s Propaganda Films for Franco

5e Franco regime was grateful for Samuel Bronston’s willingness to col-laborate explicitly with its propaganda outreach e4orts. Bronston wasequally appreciative of the regime and the special treatment they hadaccorded him, as he made clear in his proposal for his Spanish corpo-ration’s special status.5us it is unsurprising that he repeatedly assentedwhen Spanish oCcials approached him with requests to produce pro-Franco 2lms, even before the Spanish government granted him the waiv-er authorizing foreign ownership of Samuel Bronston Española, S.A.

Dr. Carlos Robles Piquer was the Director General for Information atthe MIT and one of Fraga’s key lieutenants on propaganda a4airs. Rob-les Piquer was in charge of the information (propaganda), not cinema,section of the MIT (he would in fact later head the latter branch), but“I had to do sometimes with the 2lms that dealt with, let’s say, politicalproblems . . . .” As Robles Piquer later testi2ed under oath, “I, togetherwith my colleagues and sta4 members of the Ministry told Mr. Bron-ston that we would like it very much if he produced some 2lms for infor-mation and tourism on present day Spain.”35 From this initial approachcame four completed propaganda 2lm projects, with more planned butnot executed.

33 Proposal concerning the legal status of Samuel Bronston Espanola, S.A., <7March/0;9, binder “Report on the Present Situation of Samuel Bronston Espanola, S.A.,”Raymond Cheesman accounting 2les.

34 Reply from the Spanish Presidencia del Gobierno granting Bronston’s request, 0May /0;9, in binder “Report on the Present Situation of Samuel Bronston Espanola, S.A.,”Raymond Cheesman accounting 2les.

35 Robles Piquer deposition, 6, /<.

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5ree of the 2lms—El Camino Real (5e Royal Road), SinfoniaEspanola (Spanish Symphony), and El Valle de los Caidos (5e Valley ofthe Fallen)—were geared to the Ministry of Information and Tourism’sgrand program to promote the oCcial commemoration of the <7th an-niversary of the Nationalist victory in the Spanish civil war, referred to as“<7 Years of Peace.” 5e Franco regime wanted to drive home the pointthat under El Caudillo’s leadership, Spain had avoided internal chaos andbloodshed (except, of course, in the jails that held thousands of politicalprisoners, many of whom were tortured or executed) and was achievingsocial development and prosperity.5e regime had multiple target audi-ences inmind: domestic, Latin American,Western European, andAmer-ican. As Carlos Robles Piquer put it, the propaganda 2lms, as well as thefeature 2lm El Cid in particular, “were, let’s say, weapons, useful weaponsto present Spain to the world, not only to Hispaniards [sic]—[but] alsoto convince the Hispaniards of the bene2ts of the regime . . . .”36

5e 2rst of these propaganda 2lms was the one most especially aimedat the United States. El Camino Real chronicled the exploits of FatherJunipero Serra, the /:th-century Spanish cleric who established a stringof missions in California. 5e idea for the 2lm originated with ManuelFraga Iribarne, who in /0;< had assumed the position as Minister ofInformation and Tourism, and who was a singularly shrewd strategist ofthe uses of media both for direct propaganda purposes and to promotetourism, which held both economic and propaganda value. “We wereaware that the public opinion in general [in the U.S.] was not in favor ofthe Franco regime,” Robles Piquer explained. “One of the reasons whyweorganized the [project] on Fray Junipero Serra was to [penetrate] somesectors of distinguished and high-level opinion in the United States.”5e MIT “was looking for ways to attract distinguished elements in theAmerican society to Spain . . . . We were looking for any door that wecould open, for that purpose,” when Fraga became aware of the imminent<71th anniversary of Fray Junipero Serra’s birth. He quickly realized theopportunity “to organize a special ceremony to link Spain and U.S.” andassigned his deputy Robles Piquer to handle the program.37

When Robles Piquer approached Samuel Bronston to make a docu-mentary 2lm about the cleric, the producer assigned one of his seniorfunctionaries, Jaime Prades, to oversee the project. Prades wrote anddirected the 2lm himself. 5e images throughout the motion picture

36 Robles Piquer, interview by author, Madrid, Spain, July <118.37 Ibid.

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were explicit in the U.S.-Spanish linkages the MIT sought to establish,including the 2lm’s opening and closing shots of the U.S. Capitol inWashington (which contains a statue of Junipero Serra in the Rotunda),modern-day San Diego, Los Angeles (including a separate view of Holly-wood), and San Francisco, and the California missions themselves, suchas San Luis Obispo, Santa Barbara, and San Juan de Capistrano. Car-los Robles Piquer followed up the production with a trip to the U.S. togain the participation of prominent Americans in the 2lm’s premiereon Mallorca, Junipero Serra’s birthplace (the 2lm pointedly displayedthe island’s beaches and main hotel being enjoyed by tourists). He per-suaded Los Angeles mayor Sam Yorty as well as the mayors of San Fran-cisco and Carmel (where Junipero Serra is buried), and his greatest coup,Earl Warren, former California governor and current Chief Justice ofthe U.S. Supreme Court, to attend the gala celebrations in Spain. “[W]ehad a budget, so we could invite in 2rst class planes, 2rst class hotels—everything was well-organized. And we celebrated two or three days inMallorca.”38

Sinfonia Españolwas, on the face of it, a travelogue designed primarilyto entice visitors to Spain. 5e anodyne description of the 2lm projectby the Spanish authorities was “Documental sobre España moderna,turística e industriel.” But there was of course far more to the projectthan met the eye. As Carlos Robles Piquer, who came up with the ideafor the project, testi2ed, the goal was for the 2lm to “portray the truthabout Spanish present life, and that of course the 2lm be presentednot only in Spain but everywhere as much, as broadly, as possible.”Bronston’s response to Robles Piquer’s request was that he “was veryeager about this idea of helping to make Spain well known by Spanishand other countries.” At a party at the U.S. Embassy in Madrid, Bronstonapproached Angel Sagaz, who was then the Director General of UnitedStates A4airs in the Spanish Foreign Ministry (and who, several yearslater would serve as Spain’s ambassador to the U.S.), “and said that hewas ready to get all possible elements, equipment, cameramen, anything

38 El Camino Real (/0;6), Filmoteca Espanola, Madrid; 2lm script in “Camino Real”2le, Ministry of Information and Tourism-Culture Ministry 2les (alphabetized 2lm titlelistings), General Archives Alcala; Robles Piquer, interview by author, Madrid, Spain,July <118; Invitation letter from Manuel Fraga Iribarne, Spanish Minister of Informa-tion and Tourism, to U.S. Supreme court Chief Justice Earl Warren, <0 March /0;9,box ;1, “Spain—Mallorca—/0;9–/0;7,” Papers of Earl Warren, Manuscript Division,U.S. Library of Congress, Washington, DC (my thanks to Paul G. Nagle for obtainingand providing to me a copy of this document).

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that could help him to make the best possible 2lm about Spain, its art,its folklore, its possibilities for tourism and o4er that 2lm to the SpanishGovernment for the public relations and propaganda of Spain.”39

While Bronston bore the costs of production himself, the governmentprovided himwith unrestricted access to any location in Spain hewished.Still, the 2lm remained technically Bronston’s, on the logic recently setforth in Operación PE: when asked what advantages there were forthe Spanish government for the 2lm to be owned in Bronston’s name,Robles Piquer replied, “Well, in my own opinion, as I was in charge ofSpanish propaganda, is that we needed that the 2lm remained into thehands—to the ownership of Mr. Bronston—because an oCcially made2lm should never be accepted by the public as a 2lm produced by theprivate enterprise. [It was] much better for us not only that the 2lm bemade by a well known producer as Mr. Bronston but also that the 2lmremained forever into his hands from a legal point of view.”40

5e Ministry of Information and Tourism was suCciently anxious toget the project under way and suCciently trusting of Bronston and hisorganization that it gave special permission to begin 2lming a full twomonths before the script went through the usual formal approval pro-cess. 5e regime’s trust in Bronston was well-placed. He produced thenearly two-hour long 2lm in the expensive widescreen Cinemascopeprocess, lovingly portraying the natural and architectural wonders ofSpain, documenting Flamenco dancers, bull2ghts, local pageants, andthe like, while working in humming modern factories, schools, hydro-electric dams, and other evidence of Spain’s great material and culturalprogress, including slow camera pans across bookstore shelves ladenwithcontemporary books, magazines and newspapers from across Europeand the U.S. that seemingly (and misleadingly) demonstrated a societydevoid of censorship. His cameras lingered as well over the recently com-pleted, gargantuan Catholic cathedral-cum-memorial to the NationalistCivil War dead, the Valle de los Caidos (more on this below). Bronstonalso included a sequence showing the grand sets for his latest super-epicin production,!e Fall of the Roman Empire, underlining his unique rela-

39 “Documentary about modern Spain, touristic and industrial.” Samuel Bronston2lms proposal to the Spanish MIT for the production of Sinfonia Espanola, May /0;9,“Sinfonia Espanola 2le,” Ministry of Information and Tourism-Culture Ministry 2les(alphabetized 2lm title listings), General Archives Alcala; Robles Piquer deposition, 9–6;Deposition of Angel Sagaz, /6 January /08/, <, inUnited States v. Samuel Bronston, ;0 Cr;0;, U.S. District Court, Southern District NY, 2les stored in NARA-LS.

40 Robles Piquer deposition, 7.

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tionship with the Franco regime and his high economic value to Spain,while providing an advertisement for other international producers tofollow in his footsteps.41

Hundreds of prints of the resulting 2lm were supplied gratis to theFranco regime’s oCcial agencies for showing both in Spain and abroad.Domestically, it was screened in no fewer than :1 cities and towns.Internationally, it was shown in 76 cities in Europe, North, Central andSouth America, and the Philippines. Sinfonia Espanola received a high-pro2le premiere in Madrid “in a very important . . . cinema . . . .where itwas oCcially presented with the attendance of Ministers and many highranking oCcials of the Government. It was part of the commemorationof the <7th Anniversary itself.” Fraga was ecstatic about the resulting 2lm:in a memorandum he waxed on about “the gorgeous cinematography. . . .its positive approach of respect for eternal and contemporary Spainand . . . .intended to be the greatest full-length documentary that hasphotographed Spain with a serious and transcendent content.” Fragapersonally shipped a copy to Francisco Franco for El Candillo’s privateviewing. 5e regime emphasized the domestic propaganda value of the2lm “to present to the thousands of spectators of the Festivals [of Spain]the extremely beautiful vision of eternal Spain and to commemorate theXXV Years of Peace.”42

Bronston’s documentary was shown around the world by the Spanishgovernment, “for instance, during the celebration of the Spanish exposi-tion called ‘Expo Tour’ in di4erent countries abroad and also during theoCcial visitsmade by Spanishministers, or Spanish high ranking oCcials

41 Samuel Bronston Productions proposal to the Spanish MIT for the productionof Sinfonia Espanola, May /0;9, “Sinfonia Espanola” 2le, Ministry of Information andTourism-CultureMinistry 2les (alphabetized 2lm title listings), General Archives Alcala;Sinfonia Espanola, /0;6, Filmoteca Espanola, Madrid.

42 Sinfonia Espanola lists of domestic and foreign exhibition venues, n.d.; see as wellletter from Carlos Robles Piquer to Jaime Prades of Samuel Bronston Productions (anddirector of the 2lm) concerning international exhibition plans, /< February /0;7; letterfrom Manuel Fraga Iribarne to Fernando Fuertes de Villavicencio, /1 April /0;6: “5edocumentary . . . is to be presented at the end of the month at a cinema in Madrid, withthe maximum solemnity . . . a program that will be widely exhibited in the Festivals ofSpain to demonstrate the current panorama of our Country and of the progress reachedduring the XXV Years of Peace.”; “Note by His Excellency the Minister concerning the2lm ‘Sinfonia Española,’ ” : April /0;6; Letter from Manuel Fraga Iribarne to FernandoFuertes de Villavicencio, /1 April /0;6; memorandum from Carlos Robles Piquer tothe Director general of Cinema and 5eater, 8 April /0;6—all documents in “SinfoniaEspañola” 2le, Ministry of Information and Tourism-CultureMinistry 2les (alphabetized2lm title listings), General Archives Alcala; Robles Piquer deposition, ;.

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to foreign countries,” as well as at the Spanish Pavilion at the /0;6–/0;7NewYorkWorld’s Fair. Spanish diplomat Enrique Llovet, whoworked formonths on producing Sinfonia Española, “took the 2lm to Latin Amer-ica where I showed it with my personal presence . . . . I went personallyto seven or eight countries of Latin America just to [speak to the audi-ence and] present the 2lm.” Moreover, Fraga and Robles Piquer followedthe progress of the 2lm as it was shown throughout the region. RoblesPiquer was especially exercised over the damaging image of the Francoregime and its conduct during the Spanish civil war portrayed in the con-temporaneous high-pro2le documentary, To Die in Madrid (“Mourir aMadrid”), directed by the respected French 2lmmaker Frédéric Rossifand co-narrated by the noted actor JohnGielgud, whichwas being shownin Latin America.5e Spanish propaganda oCcial reported to the Direc-tor General of Cinema and 5eater that he expected the forthcomingshowing of Sinfonia Española inUruguay “will be resisting the e4ects thatare being produced by the exhibition of ‘To Die in Madrid,’ which willsimultaneously be presented in Montevideo.” Unsurprisingly, the Francoregime classi2ed Sinfonia Española, like El Cid before it, as a 2lm in theSpanish National Interest.43

5ere is little extant documentation on Valley of the Fallen /Valle delos Caidos (/0;6), a 2lm aimed primarily at a Spanish domestic audience(although anEnglish-language versionwas intended forAmerican televi-sion). Alone of the four Bronston propaganda 2lms it cannot currently beviewed because of the fragility of the 2lm stock.5is is most unfortunate,as the 2lm clearly had a very high priority for both the Ministry of Infor-mation and Tourism and Samuel Bronston. Manuel Fraga Iribarne hasstated that the 2lm was a “was a very important work” for the “<7 Yearsof Peace” program. He stressed in a recent interview that “there are peo-ple from both sides buried there,” and this was a central part of the 2lm’simportance to the Spanish government: Fraga and Robles Piquer soughtthrough their propaganda e4ort to defuse long-simmering resentmentby the approximately half the Spanish population who identi2ed with

43 Robles Piquer deposition, ;; Llovet deposition, 9; see e.g. memorandum from Fragato Fernando Maria Castiella, Minister of Foreign A4airs, 8 September /0;7, whichdiscusses the “great success” of the presentation of Sinfonia Española in Mexico City;Letter from Robles Piquer to the Director General of Cinema and 5eater, </ October/0;6; letter from the Director General of Cinema and5eater to Manuel Fraga Iribarne,</ April /0;6—all documents in “Sinfonia Española” 2le, Ministry of Information andTourism-CultureMinistry 2les (alphabetized 2lm title listings), General Archives Alcala.

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the defeated Republican cause.44 Samuel Bronston devoted considerableresources to the production of the documentary-drama hybrid, includ-ing American director Andrew Marton, who worked on Bronston’s epic++ Days at Peking, and the conservative American writer and syndicatedcolumnist Jim Bishop. Bronston exclaimed to his production aide Pan-cho Kohner at the time, “Valley of the Fallenmust be the greatest docu-mentary 2lm ever made or we are just going to trash it [throw it away],because this is my giB to Franco.”45 In any event, both Bronston and theMinistry of Information and Tourism had taken on a devilishly diCcultsubject, as themassive cathedral, bored into the side of amountain whichis capped by a huge cross and monumental statuary that rivals the scaleof Mount Rushmore, was built over <1 years primarily with slave labordrawn from Republican political prisoners (they were given one day ofsentence commutation for each day of grueling e4ort on the project).

Finally, Objetivo %) was the most nakedly propagandistic of Bron-ston’s 2lms on the regime’s behalf. Written by Spanish diplomatic oCcialEnrique Llovet, the script touted the advances in technology, produc-tivity, and worker satisfaction under the Franco regime and laid downa challenge to the public to redouble their e4orts in aid of the regime’soCcial plan for continued economic development (“Plan de DesarrolloEconómico y Social de España”). 5e documentary short subject, while2lmed in color and Cinemascope, contains obviously contrived inter-views and comments from a cross-section of government oCcials, busi-ness people, and laborers. Government censors who usually avoidedcriticizing government-sanctioned o4erings were suCciently concernedabout the blatant nature of the 2lm to excoriate it in their reports tothe MIT: “Naturally, it is partisan and the script constitutes a typicalexample—a bad example—of the propaganda short subject, with imagesaccompanied by abundant text, adorned [in turn] with a large amountof 2gures . . . .and the script is a good illustration of the existing proce-dures by which cinema verité will be a diminished ‘verité’ that agreeswith the intentions of the 2lmmaker.” Nonetheless, the Spanish govern-ment was obviously satis2ed with the 2lm.5e MIT pushed ahead withplans to showObjetivo %) at all cinemas throughout Spain; and the Min-istry of the Economy screened Bronston’s production for numerous visit-ing foreign dignitaries, including King Faisal of Saudi Arabia.5e Saudi

44 Fraga and Robles Piquer, interviews by author, Madrid, Spain, July <118.45 Samuel Bronston, quoted by his former production aide Pancho Kohner, in an

interview with Paul G. Nagle, <118. My thanks to Mr. Nagle for providing me with acopy of this interview.

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monarch extolled the documentary’s depiction of “the prodigious e4ortsof the Spaniards on the road to progress and development.”46

Torpedoed by du Pont, Kept A,oat by Franco

Bronston’s Byzantine and legally questionable 2nancial practices caughtup with him dramatically in early /0;6. A demand for payment on a onemillion dollar loan caused a cascade of similar demands. 5e unwaryPierre du Pont, who had been blithely signing unconditional promissorynotes on Bronston’s behalf for over 2ve years, found himself to his hor-ror holdingmuch of the responsibility for debts originally valued at someD/61 million dollars (around one billion <118 dollars). Bronston’s debtload was eventually reduced down to the still huge 2gure of D6;million,much of which was owed by du Pont. 5e estranged benefactor imme-diately ceased backing Bronston’s projects, which caused the two men tobarrage each otherwith a series of lawsuits over the next decade.DuPont,humiliated before his family, precipitously “retired” from his positions atDuPont and Christiana Securities; he never worked again.47 5e varioussuits paralyzed Bronston 2nancially and ultimately made it impossiblefor him to resume major 2lm production.

Despite his diCculties, between /0;6 and /089 it looked at variouspoints as though Bronston was going to re-emerge in the Phoenix-likefashion that had been his career trademark. He received no small assis-tance in this regard from the Franco regime. Grateful for the singularcontribution that “Don Samuel” had made to the dictatorship’s goalsand hoping for more of the same, the Spanish government continuedto extend aid to the American producer in meeting his 2nancial obliga-

46 Objectivo %) (/0;6), Filmoteca Espanola, Madrid; 2lm script and censor’s report onObjectivo %), both in “Objectivo ;8” 2le, Ministry of Information and Tourism-CultureMinistry 2les (alphabetized 2lm title listings), General Archives Alcala; “ ‘Todos LosPueblos Arabes No Ignoran, ni Olvidaran Jamas, las Gallardas Posturas de Espana alColocarse a su Lado en los dias Mas Sombrios para Defender Su Causa como Se HaceEntre Hermanos’ ” [“5e Arab Peoples do not Ignore, Nor do 5ey Ever Forget, Spain’sValiant Position Standing at 5eir Side in the Darkest days in Order to Defend 5eirCause as Brothers Would”], La Vanguardia (Barcelona), ;//8/;;, p. 7/, online at the LaVanguardiaHemeroteca, !http://www.lavanguardia.es/hemeroteca/".

47 “Memorandum for the Files” by Richard Simmons of the Principal Creditors Groupof his conversation with Judge Simon RiEind, Pierre du Pont III’s attorney, dated ;October /0;;, in private papers of Philip Yordan (private collection; my deep thanks toPhilip’s widow Faith Yordan for giving me full access to these papers).

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tions.5e regime’s aid included a moratorium on Bronston’s debts and aseries of generous crude oil import licenses.5is crude oil scheme gener-ated some D/.<million in pro2t to be applied toward Bronston’s debts. Ata later juncture, Bronston explained to creditors, with crystal-clear self-awareness, “that he was a pioneer in themotion picture business in Spainwhich is today a 3ourishing industry and a tourist attraction and that thiswas a consideration for oil allocations being made to him.”48

5e principal creditors to whom both du Pont and Bronston owedhuge sums of money strongly supported Bronston’s returning to active2lm production as a means of raising revenue. But du Pont, embarkingon what can only be described as a vendetta, vehemently opposed suche4orts—indeed, du Pont was seeking possession of the Samuel Bronstonstudios in Spain, which the creditors’ group summarily rejected as “sheernonsense.” A distinguished group of Spanish lawyers advising the credi-tors explained, more temperately, that

Bronston is the key 2gure in the resolution of the Spanish situation . . . .[T]he Spanish government has gone out of its way to help Bronstonthrough oil ventures even over the opposition of some government minis-ters and in3uential businessmen.5e government’s desire to help is basedon the fact that Bronston started a new and expanding industry that cre-ated substantial employment and liquidated substantial blocked currencyby utilizing it within the country. Bronston heretofore produced motionpictures at his expense for the Spanish government that advanced tourism.5e cooperation and assistance a4orded Bronston would de2nitely not beavailable to du Pont or any third party since the government would feel noobligation to foreigners other than Bronston.49

But while the emphasis here was on tourism, the 2lm industry, and Bron-ston’s purely economic contributions to Spain, the solution proposed in/0;8 by the Franco regime to aid Bronston was squarely in the mold ofpolitical propaganda straight out of Operación PE and Bronston’s pro-posal for foreign ownership of Samuel Bronston Española, S.A., rightdown to the emphasis onHispanidad, as well as U.S. and European audi-ences:

48 Memorandum of conference held today at the oCce of Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby,Palmer & Wood, attorneys for Pierre S. DuPont, </ December /0;6, <; Minutes ofconference held this day at the oCces of Cahill, Gordon, Reindel and Ohl, ; //; /;;, </,both documents in papers of Philip Yordan.

49 Minutes of a meeting of Principal Creditors held at the oCces of Cahill, Gordon,Reindel and Ohl, 8 July /0;;, ;–8; “Memorandum: Conference held in Madrid, Spainfrom January 9/, /0;8 through February 0, /0;8,” /1 February /0;8, 7 and passim, bothdocuments in papers of Philip Yordan.

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5e companies will concentrate on the production of documentaries forvariousministries to promote industry—otherministries to promote tour-ism. During this period, the company will diversify in an e4ort to realize. . . .the potential of the Spanish economy.5e Spanish economy has grownfrom a D/< billion gross national product to a D<7 billion gross nationalproduct in the last 2ve years. Documentaries, industrial and educational2lms will be produced and directed to Latin American governments . . . .In addition, the Bronston enterprises are seeking television contacts withUnited States and European television chains so that production of 2lmsfor television can be undertaken. 5e possibility exists that a televisionchannel may be assigned by the Spanish government to the Bronstonenterprises.50

And so it was that Bronston continued to keep in the regime’s goodgraces, despite the lack of actual 2lm making. He was able to raise amillion dollars to put “Isabella of Spain” into an advanced state of pre-production in /0;0–/08/, including hiring Glenda Jackson to play thetitle role and Ronald Neame to direct. 5e script, according to Jackson,was notable for omitting any mention of Isabella’s expulsion of the JewsfromSpain in /60<, even as it emphasized, in themanner ofElCid, Spain’spivotal role in defeating the Moorish menace to Europe. But the pro-ducer, hobbled by the D9.;million dollar judgment du Pont won againsthim, could not raise the funds needed to move “Isabella of Spain” intoproduction, despite herculean promotional e4orts that included gainingthe backing of an associate of the notorious mobster Meyer Lansky.51

Bronston’s reputation and capacity to function in the 2lm industrytook a further hit in /08/ when he was convicted in U.S. Federal Courtof perjury. Although he successfully appealed the decision before theSupreme Court in /089, he was 2nancially exhausted and still facingthe du Pont judgment. In the meantime the Spanish government hadgone through a series of upheavals that denuded him of political supportwithin the Franco regime. In the summer of /089 the Spanish author-ities issued an arrest warrant against Bronston over an unpaid debt toAir Algiers, while the local press began to refer to him derisively as a“Rumanian Jew.”52 In an all-too-familiar replay of his 3ight from the

50 “Memorandum: Conference held in Madrid, Spain from January 9/, /0;8 throughFebruary 0, /0;8,” /1 February /0;8, ;, in papers of Philip Yordan.

51 Samuel Bronston deposition, /1 October /086, p. 9/, in Pierre du Pont v. SamuelBronston, U.S. District Court-Northern District Texas-Dallas, CA-9-;:0:-E; stored atNARA’s Fort Worth facility; Bronston was evidently oblivious to the organized crimeconnections of his backer, Edward Jules Markus, which are set out in “Pizza Parlous,”Private Eye (UK), /;March /080, pp. /0–<1.

52 “5e Reign of Spain,” <; February /0;7, Time !http://www.time.com/time/

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French authorities a generation earlier, Bronston slipped out of Spain andmoved with his family to Dallas, Texas. He paid o4 the D<;,111 debtto Air Algiers that had put him in the Spanish dock, while leaving mil-lions of dollars in other debts unpaid. He declared that he would soonreturn to Madrid to resume his production of “Isabella of Spain.” Butin fact the days of “Don Samuel” and his dreams of leading Hollywoodin Madrid were over. Bronston would return to Spain occasionally overthe next decade, but he would never again produce a 2lm there, or any-where else. Pierre duPont continued his unrelenting e4orts to squeeze hiserstwhile partner dry throughout the /081s.5e battery of lawsuits ulti-mately resulted in Bronston’s loss of his few remaining assets through per-sonal bankruptcy in /0:9. ABer enduring a decade of grinding, anony-mous poverty in Houston, Bronston died in a Sacramento, Californiahospital in /006.53

Conclusion

Samuel Bronstonmet the end of the line in Franco Spain amere two yearsbefore the Franco regime itself.5e two players hadwrung themaximumvalue out of each other by the end of their relationship. Some yearslater, in a last ditch e4ort to re-enter 2lm production, Bronston traveledto Manila in an attempt to forge with Ferdinand Marcos a relationshipsimilar to the one he had hadwithEl Caudillo. But despite his announcedplan to make a biographical movie about the life of Filipino hero Dr.Jose Rizal, Bronston could not get his hands on any of the billions ofdollars that the Marcoses had illicitly amassed. Imelda Marcos took ashine to Bronston and gave him a very expensive suit as a present. HeleB Manila more snappily attired than when he arrived, but no bettero4.54

magazine/article/1,0/8/,:99716,11.html" (/9 May <110); Peter Besas, “Samuel Bron-ston, Who Pulled Spanish Pic Industry Out of Doldrums, Now Facing Arrest,”Variety, ;August /089, “Samuel Bronston” clipping 2le, Variety Editorial OCces.

53 “Bronston: Madrid Debt paid, Will Continue5ere,” Variety, 0 August /089, “Sam-uel Bronston” clipping 2le,Variety Editorial OCces; see as well 2les within Pierre du Pontv. Samuel Bronston, U.S. District Court-NorthernDistrict Texas-Dallas, case numberCA-9-;:0:-E; Samuel Bronston, Debtor, case number BK-9-8;-<<9-F, United States DistrictCourt—Northern District of Texas-Dallas Division [Bankruptcy]; Dorothea Bronston,interview with author, London, July /00;; William Bronston, interviews by author,Carmichael, CA, January /00;.

54 “Bronston Plans Jose Rizal Biopic,” Variety, ; March /0:1, “Samuel Bronston”

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Still, Bronston demonstrated the possibility of using his own templateunder roughly analogous circumstances: an independent American 2lmproducer identi2es and approaches an authoritarian regime, distaste-ful but not commonly perceived as beyond the pale, with elements ofcorruption, a self-perceived international image issue and related desireto utilize American soB power for its own purposes, and whose coun-try has a motion picture industry not yet broadly or deeply penetratedby Hollywood production. By this modus operandi Bronston hoped toapproximate the collaborative relationship he and the Franco regime hadforged, the closest partnership achieved at any time between an Ameri-can motion picture enterprise and a foreign government.

Bronston’s partnership with Franco was unique, but not entirely so.One possible contemporary corollary is the Peoples Republic of China,which has been the bene2ciary of a number of U.S.-PRC co-productionslike Crouching Tiger /Hidden Dragon and American-distributed 2lmslike In the Mood for Love, Hero, and House of Flying Daggers. 5erehave also been U.S.-made productions 2lmed partly in China like thehighly successful action comedy Shanghai Noon and its sequel ShanghaiKnights. 5ese 2lms in the aggregate have portrayed for American (andglobal) audiences an exciting, romantic, attractive, culturally rich andnon-threatening China—and in the case of the last two 2lms mentioned,a China with signi2cant historical ties to the United States.55 Chinais, quite simply, bene2ting from an element of American soB power—Hollywood—and seeing this power of persuasion converted into its own,including in relation to the United States.56 5e Chinese government hasbeen demanding script review and approval as a condition of U.S. 2lmingthere, andHollywood producers have been sanguine about complying, inthemanner of the relationship between the Franco regime andAmerican

clipping 2le, Variety Editorial OCces; William Bronston, interview by author, Carmi-chael, CA, /007.

55 Chinese premier Jiang Zemin, urging the PRC Politburo to view Titanic, averredto his party comrades, “You should not imagine that there is no ideological educationin capitalist countries. ‘Titanic’ speaks of wealth and love, the relationship between richand poor, and vividly describes how people react to disaster.” Charles Trueheart, “WithPopularity Come Pitfalls,”Washington Post, <8 October /00:.

56 As the Chinese political analyst Li Yong Yan has put it, [I]t is imperative to under-stand that to the Chinese government, entertainment is not entertainment alone. It is aneducation to the people on nationalist patriotism. Moreover, media is not just a vehi-cle for information, but a battleground that is to be occupied, either by ‘us’, or by ‘them’.See “In Beijing, Porn’s Cool but Hollywood Sucks,” <9 June <116, Asia Times Online,!http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/FF<9Ad16.html" (May /9, <110).

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producers in Spain a half-century ago.57 Moreover, China is making everincreasing e4orts to gain international tourists, including Americans,and there is an awareness of the relationship between movies made inChina and tourism bene2ts—for example, the historic town featured inCrouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon is now a Mecca for travelers from theU.S. and elsewhere.58 But all of the 2lms that have involved Americanproduction have been “one-o4 ” a4airs. China is arguably waiting foranother Samuel Bronston: a well-funded producer bold enough, skilledenough, and apolitically instrumental enough, to collaborate with theCommunist dictatorship and establish a new American motion pictureempire in Hollywood in Beijing.59

57 Vivienne Chow, East Meets West, / December <117, Film Journal International,!http://www.2lmjournal.com/2lmjournal/esearch/article_display.jsp?vnu_content_id=/11/;/9817" (May /9, <110).

58 “Residents LeB out of China’s Tourism Boom,” 91December /0;1, UPI, http://www.upi.com/Business_News/<11;//</91/Residents_leB_out_of_Chinas_tourism_boom/UPI-06<8//;86:0796/" (May /9, <110).

59 For a more detailed comparative discussion of the Franco regime’s and the People’sRepublic of China’s Hollywood policies, see Neal M. Rosendorf, “Popaganda: WhatHollywood Can Do For (and To) China,”!e American Interest, March – April <110.