Saul Smilansky, Responsibility and Desert_Defending the Connection

7/28/2019 Saul Smilansky, Responsibility and Desert_Defending the Connection

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Mind Association

Responsibility and Desert: Defending the ConnectionAuthor(s): Saul SmilanskySource: Mind, New Series, Vol. 105, No. 417 (Jan., 1996), pp. 157-163Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association

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Responsibility and Desert:Defending The Connection

SAUL SMILANSKY

Feldman1995)makesa striking laim:ourcentralphilosophicalwayofthinkingaboutdesert s misguided.Feldman argets wo elementsof thephilosophical understandingof the notion of desert:the connectionbetweenresponsibility nddesert,andtheconnectionbetweentime anddesert.I believe that we have the resources o handleFeldman'sdoubtsaboutresponsibility nddesert,and maintainheconceptual onnectionbetween he two.LikeFeldman, concentratenthe corenotions,notonany possibleminorexception.Once the connectionbetweenresponsibil-ity and desert s securedwe canpartially cceptFeldman's therclaim,abouttimeanddesert,but we can also see why it shouldnot troubleusgreatly. can consider his second ssue only briefly.

Themethodology f Feldman'snteresting ndprovocative aper s sim-ple.He claims oexplicatehetraditionalhilosophical iewabout espon-sibilityand desertand about ime anddesert,and thenproducesobviousandwidespread ounter-examples, hich shouldconclusivelyshow theprinciples f "receivedwisdom" n desert o be indefensible. eldman lsoconsiders hequestionwhy virtually llpreviousphilosophers avemadesuch gross mistakes. But in the case of responsibilityand desert thisamountso littlemore hanpointingout thepurportedfailure oconsidera sufficientlywidevarietyof examples" Feldman1995, p. 72).

Accordingto Feldman,received wisdom aboutresponsibilityanddesert s as follows:"DR:If S deservesx invirtueof thefact thatS didorsuffered , thenS is responsibleordoingorsuffering " (Feldman1995,p. 64).Thisanalysis itsmanycases.Forexample,we oftensaythatamandeservesblame for doing somethingwrongbecausewe assume that hewasresponsibleordoingit. Ifwe were to learnotherwisewe would notholdhim to be deservingof blame.Feldman laimshowever hat"Therearecountlessperfectlyordinaryases in whichwe deserve hings nvirtueof factsfor which we bearno responsibility"Feldman1995, p. 68).Aninnocent igure-skaterttacked y a thug"deserves napologyandsomecompensationnvirtueof thefactthatshe wasviciouslyattacked.Yet shebearsnoresponsibilityor the attack"ibid.).Herewe mayclaim that heelement of responsibilityis introduced hroughthe attacker,who isMind, Vol. 105 .417 . January 1996 ( Oxford University Press 1996


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158 Saul Smilanskyresponsible.Thishoweverputstheresponsibilityn thewrongplace forthe purposeof inquiring fterthe connectionbetween heresponsibilityand desertof the skater.Moreover,Feldmananticipates his move andsaysthatanyrevisedDRtaking t intoaccountwouldalso be false.

Consider,orexample,a caseinwhichayoungchild becomes llwith a painfuldisease.Suppose he child suffers or a while withthis disease,andeventuallydies. The parentsare overwhelmedwithgrief.Surelyno onebearsanyresponsibilityortheirmisfor-tune,andyet the grievingparentsmightdeservevarious hings nvirtueof enduringt. (Feldman1995, p. 69)I agreethatFeldman's xamplesrefuteDR.This, however, s of littleconsequence,orDR is not aplausiblewayof understandinghe connec-tion betweenresponsibilitynddesert.Somepreviousphilosophers eld-manquoteshaveindeedspoken n termsof DR. I will not consider heexegeticalquestionwhetherDRrepresentshecompleteview of all thesephilosophers.I will attemptto show thatwithin certainparameters,responsibilitys a conditionof desert. tis not so accordingoDR, butthefaultis with DR rather hanwith the connectionbetweenresponsibilityand desert.I thinkthat thepositionI arguefor is an articulation f the"common-sense"9iewonresponsibility nddesertrather hana strongly

revisionistposition.The"connection"iew onresponsibilitynddesert s muchricher hanDR. It can be said to consistof fourbasic elements:(i) A specification f thebackground onditions.

(ii) Theidea of a "baseline" f desert.(iii) The distinction etween"positive" nd"negative" esponsibilityas conditions or desert.(iv) Thedistinctionbetween"first-order"nd"second-order"esert.

It is importanto get an adequate iew of the first two notonlybecausethey are crucial in understandinghe view I am presenting,but alsobecause hey mayseemtobeexceptionso theconditionalityf desertonresponsibility. otharehowever a)well knownand (b) lie outsideof thecore of our attitudesandpracticesconcerningdesert.They createtheframework ithinwhich heconnection etweenresponsibilitynddesertis established.(i) "Backgroundonditions": ne exceptionwhereeven partial espon-sibilitycannotbe assumed ies at theouterreachesof the construction fthe conditions or socialresponsibility-theseparation f thepotentiallyresponsible nddeservingrom hosewholackthepotential orresponsi-bility-baseddesert.As Sidgwicknoticed,we canbe troubledhereby thematter f animals Sidgwick1963,p. 284).A chicken, orexample, s notresponsibleor notbeinga person:whythendoes it deserveworsetreat-


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Responsibility nd Desert:DefendingTheConnection159ment hana person-whatever hatmaymean,say,equalconsideration fits needs?Thereare difficultmattersnvolvedhere,buttheydo not con-stitutea threatothe coreconception f responsibilitynddesert.One canmake a two-tierdistinction.Firstwe determine he class of those whohavepotential ordesertbaseduponresponsibility,.e. persons.Thenthe"game" f desert s playedwithin hisgroup,withresponsibilitys a con-ditionfor desert.

(ii)The "Baseline" f desert: secondpossibleexception oncerns ac-tors likethe favorable nvironmentwe inhabit. f therewas no freshairaroundhumanife wouldcease,butwhilepeople maybe responsibleorthe demiseof freshair theyarenotresponsibleorits originalexistence.Still, we maywant to say thatpeopledeservefresh air.If Godwere todepriveusof ithemightbesaid o havedonewrong,andsimilarlyormorepedestrian ollutingagencies.Hence t seemsthatpeopledeservewithoutbeing responsible.Onereplywouldbe thatpeopledo notstrictlydeservefreshair,butareat mostentitled o it.Thismay create he appearancehatIam makinghings oo easyformyself.However,ven fwe want ospeakherein termsof desertFeldmanwouldnotgetmuchmileage nhis argu-mentagainst he connectionbetweenresponsibility nddesert.This diffi-culty is not directlyrelevant o his maincase, and, again, it has beenrecognized nddealtwithbefore e.g.Sher1979,pp. 364-5). Thesolutionis to see only exceptionsbeyonda certain"baseline" s necessitatingaresponsibility-baseordesert.We arenotdeservingof freshairbyreasonof ourresponsible ctionsbut,sinceinthispeopleareequaland hedesertis unobjectionable,hedemandorresponsibilityoesnotcome ntoplace.Responsibilityomes nonlywhen hequestionswhether ne isdeservingof exceptionalreatmentprizes,punishment, ufferingandthelike).

Feldman's ase for the lack of connectionbetweenresponsibility nddesertcannow becomparedomyformulation, iththeseconclusionsnmind.There s noresponsibility-baseorthe desertof freshair(even f wewant to speakof desert n thiscase),but this is notan interesting esult,since fresh air is morallyunobjectionablend all equally"deserve"hefreshair.Weneed to considera case whereexceptionaldesertcomesintoplace:if a chemicalplantseriouslyruins he air of a town the citizensofthe town deservecompensation, r at leastcompassion.Feldmanwouldinterprethe caseso thatresponsibilitys not a condition or desert:afterall, the citizensof the town are notresponsibleor thepollutingof theirtownby theplant.The alternativenterpretationamofferingmaintainsthe connectionbetweenresponsibilitynddesert: inicepersonscan mor-ally expectnotto be harmedwhen notresponsibleorbeing harmed, ndsince thepeopleof the town are not responsible or the pollution(theyhave done nothing to deserve it), they deserve e.g. compensation.


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160 SaulSmilanskyMore formally:(1) We assume backgroundconditions delineating those to whom thecategories of responsibility and desert apply (persons of a certaincapacity).(2) We assume a "baseline" of desert (e.g. everyone deserves freshair).(3) The only way in which people can come not to deserve the "base-line" is through being responsible for not deserving it.(4) Hence, if people suffer from the lack of the "baseline" without be-ing responsible, they do not deserve to suffer.(5) In such a case they deserve as a consequence e.g. compensation.(6) Desert, then, can follow from "positive responsibility", fromwhat one is responsiblefor doing or suffering; or from "negativeresponsibility", from suffering (lack of the "baseline") withoutbeing responsible for this.(7) Desert due to "negative responsibility", as in (5) above, can beseen as "second-order"desert, for one deserves compensation fornot receiving one's "first-order"desert.

This formulation needs to be furtherexplicated and refined, but it will dofor our purposes. It seems to me that this formulationmeets the two cru-cial tests: it more truly representsthe actual way in which desert is com-monly understood, and it overcomes the examples Feldman presentsagainst the connection between responsibility and desert.Take Feldman'sexample of the skater who becomes deserving by suffering an attack. Inorder for a person to deserve she must either be responsible for deserving(the "positive" condition), or have suffered without being responsible (the"negative" condition). Feldman considers only "positive responsibility",and hence cannot see how responsibility is a condition for desert. On myformulation the skaterdeserves because she has been done badly, belowthe "baseline" for desert, and is not responsible for this: she deservessomething not despite the fact that she was not responsible, but becauseshe was not responsible for being attacked.She might deserve the suffer-ing were she responsible, but the lack of responsibility means that shedoes not deserve to suffer: she deserves compensation or an apologybecause she does not deserve to suffer,and she does not deserve to sufferbecause she is not responsible for the suffering.

It is striking that our thinking is here symmetrical. The same reasonwhich would have made her deserving of the suffering, i.e. that she wasresponsible, makes by its absence the skater not deserving of the suffer-ing, andhence deserving of e.g. compensation.The role of desert is in thisway counterfactual,thatno one deserves to suffer unless she is responsi-ble. This keeps responsibility as a condition for deserving suffering, andresults in ("second-order")desert for compensationbecause the "negative


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Responsibility nd Desert:DefendingTheConnection161responsibility"ondition or desert s met, i.e. becauseof lackof respon-sibility for not getting the "baseline" of acceptable conditions shedeserves(personalsafety fromattack,in this case). Responsibility isthroughout crucialconsideration or theestablishmentf desert.

My interpretationf the connectionbetweenresponsibility nd desertnot only satisfiesour ntuitionsn the examples onsidered. t also accordswiththegeneralstructure f ourthoughtconcerningustice,in so far asit involvesdesert.Consider irstcriminal ustice.The urgencyof the freewill problem,orexample, ollows ustfrom he fact thatresponsibilitysnormallyconsidered condition or desert, n theway I specified.If weaccept harddeterminisma criminal cannot be consideredultimatelyresponsibleordoingwhathe does:we wouldthensaythathe does notdeserve o be punished Smilansky1993).If the criminals nevertheless"punished",ay,forconsequentialisteasons,we would thensaythathe("6second-order") eservescompassion.As before,we see thatresponsi-bility is a condition or desert.Or considerdistributiveustice.Heretheimportance f desert s indispute, nd herearevarious ther omplexities,butcertainegalitarianpositions neatlyshowthe structurewe areafter.Underwhat is perhapshe mostsophisticatedecentegalitarianormula-tion,theonly way in which a personcancometo deserve o be less welloff thanotherss if she isresponsible orbeing ess well off(Cohen1989).Responsibilitys once againa condition ordesert,withequalityas the"baseline".

Toconcludeon the matterof responsibility nd desert.I have arguedthatwhileFeldmanhas pointedout certaindeficienciesn expressionsof"receivedwisdom"on responsibility nddesert,he has not refutedtheview thatthere s an inherent onnectionbetween he two.Althoughhiscounter-examplesefuteDR (his formulationf "receivedwisdom"), heconnectionbetweenresponsibility nd desertcanbe maintained,n theway I have explicated.Since Feldman'scounter-exampleshouldnotworryus, there s no reason,as far as one can see, to abandon he viewabout heinherent onnectionbetweenresponsibilitynddesert.

Feldman lso attacksasecondcomponent f ourview aboutdesert, heconnectionof desertwithtime. "DT:If at t S deservesx in virtueof thefactthatS did orsuffered omethingat t', thent' cannotbe later hant"'(Feldman 1995, p. 67). Here as well Feldmanworksby proposingacounter-example. childwe believeis shortlyabout o suffer roma ter-minal illness deserves benefits from the Make-a-WishFoundation,althoughhemightnotknowhis condition ndhisactual ufferinghas notyet began(Feldman1995, p. 70).Feldman s clearlymoresuccessfulhere thanwithresponsibility,ndwe are in his debt. Theformulation proposedaboveis helpfulhereas


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162 Saul Smilanskywell. It seems that the role of time in desert largely derives its importancefrom the factor of responsibility. To the extent that we require "positiveresponsibility" for actions in order to generate desert, such-as when pun-ishment is involved, the desert needs to come after the base for desert.There are various pragmatic reasons for this but the central principledrea-son is that not to do so trespassesthe obligation to respect persons.I I haveargued this in detail before, concerning punishment (Smilansky 1994, areply to New 1992, who has responded in New 1995).

Feldman's strength on time and desert mostly lies with "negativeresponsibility" cases such as where ("second-order")desert follows fromthe lack of responsibility for suffering.Once we keep in mind the structureof thought on responsibility and desert I formulatedabove, the idea thatdesert may come temporallybefore the base for desert, allowing innocentsufferers-to-be to "pre-deserve", should not trouble us greatly. "Pre-desert"for "negativeresponsibility"would not affect the role of responsi-bility in desert, nor pose any significant threat to the core of our view ofdesert and its role in moral life. The matter of time and desert merits amore detailed considerationthan I can give it here. But neutralizingFeld-man's threat to the crucial connection between responsibility and desertmeans that we see why the exceptions to DT are severely limited, and thatwe need not be seriously troubledby the matter of desert andtime.

Responsibility and desert lie at the centre of our ethical life, and areimportantfor ourviews of ourselves andfor the evaluation of thejustnessof social and political arrangements. Crucial questions can be asked,questions such as: how importantis responsibility-based desert for dis-tributivejustice? How do we determinethe "baseline" for desert? Whichforms of responsibility are requiredfor desert, and can they be met? Theconceptual connection between responsibility and desert is not howeverproblematic.2

Department of Philosophy SAUL SMILANSKYUniversity of HaifaHaifa 31905Israel

' There s alsoa differencebetweenourreactionso desertof favorablehingssuchaspraiseorgiftsandunfavorablenessuchasblameorharm.The matter fconnecting o thepersonresponsibles importantwithboth,but withrespect otimewill trouble smoreconcerning esertofunfavorablehings. cannot urtherconsider uchcomplexitieshere.

2 Jamvery grateful o G.A. Cohen,Avnerde-Shalit,AmihudGilead,GioraHon, HagarKahana-Smilansky,ddoLandau,DanielStatman,Galen Strawsonandreferees orMind, orcomments ndraftsof thispaper.


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Responsibility and Desert: Defending The Connection 163REFERENCES

Cohen, G.A. 1989: "On the Currencyof EgalitarianJustice". Ethics, 99,pp. 906-44.Feldman, Fred 1995: "Desert: Reconsideration of Some Received Wis-dom".Mind, 104, pp. 63-77.

New, Christopher1992: "TimeandPunishment".Analysis, 52, pp. 35-40.1995: "PunishingTimes: Reply to Smilansky".Analysis, 55, pp. 60-

2.Sher,George 1979: "Effort,Ability and PersonalDesert". Philosophy and

Public Affairs, 8, pp. 361-76.Sidgwick, Henry 1963: The Methods of Ethics 7th Edition. London:

Macmillan.Smilansky, Saul 1993: "Does the Free Will Debate Rest Upon a Mis-take?".Philosophical Papers, 22, pp. 173-88.1994: "The Time to Punish".Analysis, 54, pp. 50-3.

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Saul Smilansky, Responsibility and Desert_Defending the Connection