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Testimonyof

Deputy Assistant Secretary ofDefense Robert ScherAsian and Pacific Security AffairsOffice of the Secretary of Defense

before theSubcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs

Senate Committee on Foreign RelationsUnited States Senate

July 15, 2009

Maritime Issues and Sovereignty Disputes in East Asia

Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to appear before yourSubcommit tee today to provide testimony on Maritime Terri tor ial Disputesand Sovereignty. These issues are central in the Asia-Pacific securityequation, and ones that we in the Department ofDefense are paying veryclose attention to. I commend the Subcommittees continuing interest in thisimportant topic and I look forward to sustaining an on-going dialogue withyou a s these dynamics evolve.In a speech that Secretary ofDefense Robert Gates delivered on May 30,2009 at the Institute for International Strategic Studies (IISS) armual defenseconference in Singapore, he outlined the remarkable changes that have takenplace in the Asian security environment since the end of the Cold War.More specifically, in highlighting the growing wealth and improving livingstandards of the peoples ofAsia, Secretary Gates stressed the correlation

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between stability and economic prosperity, one of the definingcharacteristics ofAsian security dynamics during this period. The Asia-Pacific region for the past tw o decades has largely been at peace; it has beenstable, and that stability has redounded to the benefit of all.Despite this stability, one of the factors that we see potentially challengingthe Asia-Pacific security environment and the subject of todays hearing is a series ofpersistent territorial disputes, particularly disputes overmaritime territories in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea, among anumber of regional actors. In recent years, we have observed an increase infriction and tension over these disputes, frictions that stand in contrast to therelatively peaceful and cooperative focus on diplomatic solutions thatcharacterized the issue following the landmark 2002 Declaration on theConduct of Parties in the South China S e a .The sources of the rising friction are varied increased demand for oil andnatural gas naturally increases the perceived stakes among claimants insecuring resource rights; increased attention to the question of sovereigntyclaims in the run-up to the May 2009 deadline for filing extendedcontinental shelf claims under the UN Convention on the Law of Sea; risingnationalism, which increases the sensitivity among governments and peoplesto perceived slights and infringements related to territory and sovereignty.In addition, Chinas growing military capabilities have become a factoraffecting the tone and tenor of dialogue on regional maritime disputes.In analyzing Chinas maritime activities, I think it is important to draw adistinction between the harassment ofU.S. naval auxiliary vessels nearChina and Chinas approach to its South China Sea claims in general. Whileit is important to draw this distinction, the basis for the U.S. response appliesequally to both.Harassment by Chinese fishing vessels ofU.S. naval auxiliary shipsconducting routine and lawful military operations in Chinas ExclusiveEconomic Zone (EEZ) re-emerged this year a s an irritant in the U.S. Chinarelationship. I will note, however, that since May, there have been nofurther incidents ofPRC-flagged fishing vessels harassing U.S. navalvessels.While any incident at sea is of concem, the decline of these incidents after abrief spike underscores the commitment of the leadership of our tw o

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c o u n t r i e s d e a l w i t h t h e s e i s s u e s p e a c e f u l l y a n d t h r o u g h d i p l o m a t i cc h a n n e l s .

T h e D e p a r t m e n t o f D e f e n s e v i e w s C h i n e s e b e h a v i o r E E Z a n d m o r eb r o a d l y S o u t h C h i n a S e a r e g i o n - l a r g e s e c t i o n o f w h i c h C h i n a

c l a i m s - h a v i n g t w o b a s i c p r e m i s e s .F i r s t l y , t h e r e s t r a t e g i c i s s u e o f C h i n a ' s a s s e r t i o n o f s o v e r e i g n t y o v e r

b u l k o f S o u t h C h i n a S e a . T h i s p l a y s o u t m a i n l y o n p o l i t i c a l a n de c o n o m i c f r o n t s w h i c h h a v e b e e n d i s c u s s e d i n d e t a i l b y m y c o l l e a g u e f r o m

t h e S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t , s u f f i c e t o t h a t C h i n a a c t i v e l y o p p o s e s a n ya c t i v i t y b y o t h e r c l a i m a n t s t o a s s e r t t h e i r o w n s o v e r e i g n t y c l a i m s . V i e t n a m ,

T a i w a n , P h i l i p p i n e s , M a l a y s i a , I n d o n e s i a a n d B r u n e i e a c h c l a i ms o v e r e i g n t y o v e r p o r t i o n s o f S o u t h C h i n a S e a ( S C S ) ; m a n y o f t h e s ec l a i m s a r e c o n f l i c t i n g - n o t a b l y a r e a s a r o u n d S p r a t l y a n d P a r a c e l

i s l a n d s .

S e c o n d l y , s u p p o r t g r o w i n g s t r a t e g i c a n d p o l i t i c a l e m p h a s i s t h i sr e g i o n , C h i n a i n c r e a s e d a n d w i l l c o n t i n u e i n c r e a s e , f o r c e p o s t u r e

S o u t h C h i n a S e a . A s P L A u p g r a d e d f a c i l i t i e s o n H a i n a nI s l a n d , f o r e x a m p l e , w e d i r e c t c o r r e l a t i o n w i t h P R C a s s e r t i v e n e s s

r e a c t i o n U . S . s u r f a c e a n d a c t i v i t y .U n d e r s t a n d i n g s t r a t e g i c p r e m i s e d o e s i m p l y t h a t D e p a r t m e n t

a c c e p t s m a n n e r w h i c h C h i n a a s s e r t e d i t s e l f t h i s r e g i o n . W es t r o n g l y o b j e c t b e h a v i o r t h a t p u t s r i s k t h e s a f e t y o f v e s s e l s a n dc l e a r v i o l a t i o n o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l n o r m s o f b e h a v i o r o c e a n w a t e r s o u t s i d e

t e r r i t o r i a l s e a s . T h e D e p a r t m e n t w i l l c o n t i n u e l e v e r a g e a v a i l a b l ec h a n n e l s c o m m u n i c a t e t h i s p o s i t i o n P L A c o u n t e r p a r t s . I n d e e d ,

t h e r e c e n t D e f e n s e C o n s u l t a t i v e T a l k s B e i j i n g h e l d o n 2 3 - 2 4 J u n e , t h i st o p i c w a s o n a g e n d a . T h e t w o s i d e s a g r e e d c o n v e n e S p e c i a lM e e t i n g u n d e r p r o v i s i o n s o f U . S . - C h i n a M i l i t a r y M a r i t i m e

C o n s u l t a t i v e A g r e e m e n t ( M M C A ) ( 1 9 9 8 ) c o m i n g w e e k s r e v i e ww a y s i n v i g o r a t e M M C A p r o c e s s , i m p r o v e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , a n d

r e d u c e c h a n c e s o f a n i n c i d e n t o r a c c i d e n t b e t w e e n o u r t w o f o r c e s a s t h e yo p e r a t e n e a r e a c h o t h e r .F u r t h e r , w e r e j e c t a n y n a t i o n ' s a t t e m p t p l a c e l i m i t s o n e x e r c i s e o f h i g h

s e a s f r e e d o m s w i t h i n a n e x c l u s i v e e c o n o m i c z o n e s ( E E Z ) . C u s t o m a r yi n t e r n a t i o n a l l a w , a s r e f l e c t e d a r t i c l e s 5 8 a n d 8 7 o f 1 9 8 2 U n i t e d

N a t i o n s C o n v e n t i o n o n L a w o f t h e S e a , g u a r a n t e e s n a t i o n s t h e r i g h t

countries to deal with these issues peacefully and through diplomaticchannels.The Department ofDefense views Chinese behavior in its EEZ and morebroadly in the South China Sea region a large section ofwhich Chinaclaims a s a s having tw o basic premises.

QFirstly, there is the strategic issue ofChinas assertion of sovereignty overthe bulk of the South China S e a . This plays out mainly on the political andeconomic fronts which have been discussed in detail by my colleague fromthe State Department, but suffice to say that China actively opposes anyactivity by other claimants to assert their own sovereignty claims. Vietnam,Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei each claimsovereignty over portions of the South China Sea (SCS); many of theseclaims are conflicting notably in areas around the Spratly and Paracelislands.Secondly, to support the growing strategic and political emphasis in thisregion, China has increased and will continue to increase, its force posture inthe South China Sea. As the PLA has upgraded its facilities on HainanIsland, for example, we see a direct correlation with PRC assertiveness in itsreaction to U.S. surface and air activity.Understanding the strategic premise does no t imply that the Departmentaccepts the manner in which China has asserted itself in this region. Westrongly object to behavior that puts at risk the safety of our vessels and is aclear violation of international nonns of behavior in ocean waters outsideterritorial s e a s . The Department will continue toleverage all availablechannels to communicate this posit ion to our PLA counterparts. Indeed, atthe recent Defense Consultative Talks in Beij ing held on 23-24 June, thistopic was on the agenda. The tw o sides agreed to convene a SpecialMeeting under the provisions of the U.S.-China Military MaritimeConsultat ive Agreement (MMCA) (1998) in the coming weeks to reviewways to invigorate the MMCA process, improve communications, andreduce the chances of an incident or accident between our tw o forces a s theyoperate near each other.Further, we reject any nations attempt to place l imits on the exercise ofhighs e a s freedoms within an exclusive economic zones (EEZ). Customaryintemational law, a s reflected in articles 58 and 87 of the 1982 in the UnitedNations Convention on the Law of the Sea, guarantees to all nations the right

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to exercise within the EEZ, high s e a s freedoms of navigation and overflight,a s well a s the traditional uses of the ocean related to those freedoms. It hasbeen the position of the United States since 1982 when the Convention wasestablished, that the navigational rights and freedoms applicable within theEEZ are qualitatively and quantitatively the same a s those rights andfreedoms applicable on the high s e a s . We note that almost 40% of theworlds oceans liewithin th e 200 nautical mile EEZs, and it is essential tothe global economy and international peace and security that navigationalrights and freedoms within the EEZ be vigorously asserted and preserved.As previously noted, our military activity in this region is routine and inaccordance with customary international law a s reflected in the 1982 Law ofthe Sea Convention. W e have consistently reiterated our basic policytowards the competing claims in the South China Sea - most recently at theShangri-La Dialogue in May 2009, where Secretary Gates stated that theU.S. does not take sides in the sovereignty disputes and supports a peacefulsolution that protects freedom ofnavigation. In his speech a t that event,Secretary Gates stated, whether on the s e a , in the air, in space, orcyberspace, the global commons represents a realm where we mustcooperate where we must adhere to the rule of law and other mechanismsthat have helped maintain regional peace.As Secretary Gates has said, we stand for openness, and against exclusivity,and for common u s e s of common s p a c e s in responsible ways that sustainand drive forward our mutual prosperity. The United S ta te s h a s a n interestin keeping sea lines of communication open; avoiding being drawn into aregional conflict; encouraging resolution of territorial disputes through amultilateral framework that avoids any precedent setting acquiescence; andprotecting the United States reputation in Southeast Asia.In support of our strategic goals, the Department has embarked on a multi-pronged strategy that includes: l) clearly demonstrating, through word anddeed, that U.S. forces will remain present and postured a s the preeminentmilitary force in the region; 2) deliberate and calibrated assertions of ourfreedom of navigation rights by U.S. Navy vessels; 3) building strongersecurity relationships with partners in the region, at both the policy levelthrough strategic dialogues and at the operational level by build ing partnercapacity, especially in the maritime security area, and 4) strengthening themilitary-diplomatic mechanisms we have with China to improvecommunications and reduce the risk ofmiscalculation

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Force posture is perhaps the most important component of the first elementof our policy outlined above. In this regard, the military build-up on Guam isviewed a s permanently anchoring the U.S. in the region and cementing ourresident power status. We believe this will have a stabilizing influence onthe policies and strategies of South China S e a claimants. The altemative - apower vacuum caused by a U.S. security withdrawal from the region would leave very little strategic maneuver room for the least powerfulamong them.As for the second element of our strategy, U.S. Pacific Command willcontinue to assert freedom of navigation rights in the region. U.S PacificCommand will continue to conduct operations in the South China Sea, instrict compliance with customary intemational law a s reflected in the UNConvention on Law of the S e a . The United States activity will be govemedby our interests in the region, and our desire to preserve security andstability throughout the westem Pacific.The third element of our strategywill focus on expanding and deepening ourdefense diplomacy and capacity building programs in the region a simportant supporting efforts to prevent tensions in the South China Sea fromdeveloping into a threat to U.S. interests. To that end, we have recentlyestablished high-level defense policy dialogues with Vietnam and Malaysiathat complement our already strong consultative mechanisms withPhilippines, Thailand, and Indonesia. Through a variety of securitycooperation activities ranging from seminars to multilateral exercises, we arealso helping the countries of the region overcome longstanding historicaland cultural barriers that inhibit multi-lateral security cooperation.Finally, we need to invigorate the mechanisms that we have in place toengage China on this and other security issues, namely the U.S.-ChinaDefense Consultative Talks, the U.S.-China Defense Policy CoordinationTalks, and the U.S.-China MilitaryMaritime Consultative Agreementprocess. These mechanisms provide open and sustained channels ofcommunication to build greater confidence and mutual understanding,discuss candidly our differences, and improve understanding and applicationof safety standards and rules of the road fo r operations that improve thesafety of sailors and airmen of all countries in the region.All of this effort is designed to reduce volatility. rWe believe the South ChinaSea claimants a s s e s s that the U.S. is a stabilizing regional influence. Whilewe do not propose to arbitrate or mediate the underlyingconflicts between

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competing claims, our presence does provide a sense of stability and amodicum of breathing room for the claimants to pursue political means toresolve these i s s u e s . 'I would be happy to answer your questions.

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