Scaling up rural sanitation in Vietnam

Experiences with a problem-driven approach to the political economy of water and sanitation

Daniel Harris Michelle Kooy

Pham Quang Nam 16 January 2012

2

Problem statement

• Given persistently disappointing outcomes in the rural sanitation subsector, why is it that a number of seemingly successful pilot programmes of various ‘innovative approaches’ in the subsector have not been scaled up?

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Findings

• Ensuring sufficient intra-sectoral allocation for any approach to improving rural sanitation

• Why an effective pilot isn’t enough: Overcoming barriers to innovative approaches to sanitation– Formal barriers

• Regulations on recurrent/development expenditure

– Informal barriers• Visibility, credit and risk-reward calculations for

sanitation planners– Operational realities: Partners at scale

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Partners at scale

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Implications

National enabling environment

Securing funds for sanitation subsector within the WATSAN

sector (in NTP3)

Development of guidance on budgeting

for innovative approaches (NTP3 budget circular)

Develop (outcome-based) performance

indicators

Rebalance between investment and recurrent

expenditure

Provide a legal basis for adopting innovative approaches (NTP3)

Provincial decision-makingSupport in developing detailed budgets for implementation of recurrent spending

Leverage incentives (top-down and bottom-up) for

provincial and other local level leadership

Pilot projectsInclude

mechanisms to progressively shift

to government systems (or other actors capable of

operating at scale)

Provide evidence of outcomes and benefits accruing

to local leadership

Awareness of funding mechanisms, options for innovative approaches

(including availability of TA where necessary)

Demonstrate feasible cost norms and

accounting for the cost of all inputs

(sequenced funding)

Push the boundaries of

accepted approaches to

sanitation

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Extended engagement

• Clarity of purpose• Problem

identification

Pre-analysis

• Systemic factors• Actors, Incentives• Prescription

Analysis• Uptake of findings• Evaluation

• Thinking• Programming• Outcomes

Post-analysis

Many thanks to Mark Harvey, Renwick Irvine, Ngo Thi Quynh Hoa, Than Thi Thien Huong and others at DFID-Vietnam for their assistance and engagement with the project, Helen Richards and Jane Crowder at DFID-UK, Simon O’Meally for his leadership on initial project development, and all those who have contributed time and thoughts to the work.

The views presented here are those of the speaker, and do not necessarily represent the views of ODI or our partners.

111 Westminster Bridge Road, London, SE1 7JDT: +44 207 9220 300

www.odi.org.ukd.harris@odi.org.ukm.kooy@odi.org.uk

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Problem-driven analysis

What is the challenge, or ‘problem’ to be addressed?

Begin with identification and review of evidence of poor outcomes to which political economy weaknesses appear to contribute

What are the systemic factors in place that are relevant to the problem?

Analysis of systemic factors including features of geography, geopolitics, population, culture and social structure; Historical legacies; Formal and informal institutions

What combination of perceived incentives shape the behaviour leading to this problem?

Analysis of: 1. Stakeholders’ interests, influence and alignment;2. Problems of: Credible commitment; Collective action

(free riding, tragedy of commons, etc.); Moral hazard; Information asymmetry among principals and agents; Exit, voice and loyalty

Source: Adapted from Fritz et al., 2009:7