SCFI - Impact Turn File

SCFI 2010 Impact WorkTeam Jabob and the STGs ___ of ___

Index

US-Russia War Good: 1NC Shell...................................................................................................................2US-Russia War Good: 1NC Shell...................................................................................................................3US-Russia War Good: 1NC Shell...................................................................................................................4US-Russia War Good: 2NC Ext......................................................................................................................5US-Russia War Good: 2NC Ext......................................................................................................................7

Indo-Pak War Good 1NC................................................................................................................................8Indo-Pak War Good 1NC................................................................................................................................9

Korean War Good 1NC.................................................................................................................................10Korean War Good 1NC.................................................................................................................................11Korean War Good 1NC.................................................................................................................................12

Middle East Instability Good 1NC.................................................................................................................13Middle East Instability Good 1NC.................................................................................................................14Middle East Instability Good 1NC.................................................................................................................15Middle East Instability Good 1NC.................................................................................................................16Middle East Instability Good 1NC.................................................................................................................17Middle East Instability Good 1NC.................................................................................................................18

Afghan Instability Good 1NC........................................................................................................................ 19

Terrorism Good 1NC.................................................................................................................................... 20Terrorism Good 1NC.................................................................................................................................... 21

US-Russian Relations Low........................................................................................................................... 22US-Russian Relations Bad........................................................................................................................... 23US-Russian Relations Bad........................................................................................................................... 24US-Russian Relations Good.........................................................................................................................25US-Russian Relations Good.........................................................................................................................26US-Russian Relations High.......................................................................................................................... 27

NATO Bad: Hurts Russia..............................................................................................................................28NATO Bad: Generic......................................................................................................................................29NATO Bad: Generic......................................................................................................................................31NATO Bad- Generic......................................................................................................................................32NATO Bad: Leads to Entanglement............................................................................................................. 33NATO Bad: Causes Proliferation..................................................................................................................34NATO Bad: Hurts Civilians........................................................................................................................... 35

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US-Russia War Good: 1NC Shell

1. A war with Russia is inevitable—winning is essential for US dominanceTelegraph, 07 [Adrian Blomfield, Telegraph's Moscow correspondent, Analyst for Middle East, Russia, and Georgia, “Retired generals predict US-Russia war”] 7/17/07, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1557726/Retired-generals-predict-US-Russia-war.html

Capitalising on the increasingly bellicose rhetoric in Moscow, a group of influential retired generals yesterday said the United States was preparing to invade Russia within a decade. Interviewed by Komsomolskaya Pravda, Russia's biggest circulation newspaper, the four senior generals - who now direct influential military think tanks - said the United States had hatched a secret plan to seize the country's vast energy resources by force. "The US is both laying the ground and preparing its military potential for a war with Russia," said Gen Leonid Ivashov, a former joint chief of staff. "Anti-Russian sentiment is being fostered in the public opinion. The US is desperate to implement its century-old dream of world hegemony and the elimination of Russia as its principal obstacle to the full control of Eurasia." The generals said the conflict would inevitably spark a third world war, but predicted it would be fought only with conventional weapons or "low impact" nuclear missiles. Dismissed by some critics as the Cold War nostalgia of a handful of Soviet dinosaurs, such opinions nevertheless reflect a growing mood of nationalism both within the Kremlin and among many ordinary Russians wistful for lost superpower status. Engaged in a bitter dispute with Washington over its plans to erect a missile defence shield in central Europe, Vladimir Putin has increasingly used the kind of anti-American rhetoric many assumed had disappeared with the Cold War. Once more casting the United States as Russia's main threat , the Russian president, a former KGB spy, has accused Washington of "diktat" and "imperialism" - even going so far as to liken America to the Third Reich.

2. [Insert Heg Impact]

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3. US has first-strike capacity for nowArtyukov and Trukhachev, 06 [Oleg and Vadim, Centre for Research on Globalization, “US Capable Of Wiping Out Russia’s Nuclear Capacity In A Single Strike”] 3/23/06, http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=2154

For the first time in the last 50 years the USA is on the verge of attaining ultimate domination with regard to nuclear weapons. This means that Russia is no longer able to keep up with the United States. If a conflict were to break out, the USA would be able to quickly and with impunity attack Russian territory, and Russia would have no means to mount a response. This is roughly the message of an article published in the latest edition of the American journal Foreign Affairs. Its authors calculated that in

comparison with the USSR, the amount of strategic bombers at Russia’s disposal has fallen by 39%, intercontinental ballistic missiles by 58% and the number of submarines with ballistic missiles by 80%. “However the true scale of the collapse of the

Russian arsenal is much greater than can be judged from these figures,” they write . “The strategic nuclear forces now at Russia's disposal are barely fit to be used in battle.” Russian radar is now incapable of detecting the launch of American missiles from submarines located in some regions of the Pacific Ocean. Russian anti-air defense systems might not manage to intercept B-2 stealth bombers in time, which could easily mean that they are able to inflict a strike with impunity on Russian nuclear forces. If Russian missile forces continue to decrease at the current rate, then in about 10 years only isolated missiles, which the

American anti-missile defense is capable of intercepting, will be able to deliver a retaliatory blow. “It will probably soon be possible for the USA to destroy the strategic nuclear potential of Russia and China with a single strike,” says the article. The article’s authors come to

the conclusion that all this may stabilize the worldwide hegemony of the USA and sustain the foreign policy course of the USA, which aims to prevent the appearance of another power centre in the world of equal strength, and to exclude the possibility of weaker nations undermining American positions in key regions around the world, such as the in Persian Gulf. Russian experts reacted extremely guardedly to the article in the American journal. It is obvious that Russian strategic nuclear forces are experiencing difficult times. Modernization is being carried out, but at a very slow rate. In the 1990s the Russian submarine fleet was almost totally destroyed. And it hardly seems possible to revive it in the coming years, as this would require colossal funds. But it also obvious that it is completely unjust to talk of the USA’s domination with regard to nuclear weapons. This aim is unattainable within the next decade. “At least until 2015 it is unlikely that Russia’s nuclear containment capacity will noticeably diminish, as there are still some launch systems among the strategic missile forces that Russia can still rely on for a considerable length of time, capable of delivering an effective retaliatory strike,” senior academic at the RAN Institute of World Economics and International Relations Vladimir Dvorkin told Interfax. He has previously headed four research institutes in the Russian Ministry of Defense, devoted to problems of strategic weapons. However, the main message of the article in the American journal is not that Russian nuclear forces are rapidly falling into decay and do not represent a significant threat to the USA. It is just that in Washington ever more vehement arguments can be heard that Russia is of no particular value to the USA as a political partner. We should take into account that this journal Foreign Affairs is published by the Council on Foreign Relations. As recently as the 6th March it published a report entitled “Russia’s incorrect course”, the main idea of which was that Russia’s opinion is now only important to the USA on certain questions and that the paths of the two countries are significantly diverging. Therefore the article on the forthcoming “nuclear domination” of the United States is no more than an attempt to “scientifically” expound the theory that Russia is of absolutely no use as a partner. Therefore it could be that we will not have to wait long to find out something new about our own country. That prospect is no less gripping… Comments from experts: Aleksey Arbatov, Director for the Centre of International Security IMEMO RAN: At the current time there is no cause for concern. But in the next 10-15 years Russia will have to improve the ground-based component of its nuclear forces – for example, its ground-based radar system and warning system for a missile attack. If it does not do that, then many systems will go out of date, nuclear parity will be lost, and the USA will gain a definite advantage. But Russia has the means to not let that happen – for example, our ‘Topol-2’ complex has no equals in the world, and it needs to be developed in sufficient quantity. In turn, Russian diplomacy must work to ensure that all nuclear powers decrease, not increase the size of their nuclear arsenals.

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4. But, Russia is rapidly modernizing their military capacity—this makes a future war unwinnableMcDermott, 09 [Roger, Honorary Senior Research Fellow, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Kent at Canterbury (UK) and Senior Fellow in Eurasian Military Studies, Jamestown Foundation, Washington, DC., on the Editorial Board of Central Asia and the Caucasus, Scientific Board of the Journal of Power Institutions in Post-Soviet Societies, Editor of Central Asia, Graduate of the University of Oxford, Radio Free Europe, “Russia’s Armed Forces Undergoing 'Unparalleled' Transformation”]

In the aftermath of the Russia-Georgia war of August 2008, Russia's political and military elites embarked on a highly ambitious program to reform and modernize the armed forces by 2020 . That program envisages abandoning the mass-mobilization principle in favor of forming mobile, permanent-readiness forces, capable of reacting to the order to deploy within "one hour." In April 2009, U.S. Director of National Intelligence Denis Blair said in unclassified written answers to the Senate Intelligence Committee that the ongoing reshaping of Russia's ground forces will enable it to "militarily dominate" most of its neighbors. Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov has been castigated by some domestic opponents who argue that his reform will destroy the Russian Army. Yet, dramatically downsizing its oversized officer corps to maximize efficiency, switching from a division-based to a brigade-based table of organization, and reforming the General Staff Academy and the system of military education pale in comparison with the huge challenges involved in modernizing its aging equipment and weapons inventory. Many aspects of the reform agenda are so radical, far-reaching, and multifaceted that Western and Russian commentators have failed to identify the key elements. One widespread misconception is related to the affordability of the plan to downsize the officer corps by 205,000 by 2012. Since doing so will undoubtedly be very costly, especially in light of the current economic crisis, many dismissed this as another failed bid to reform the structures. In fact, Western interpretations of these reforms have consistently underestimated key aspects of the program, assessing it primarily in terms of Russian economic potential and stressing the officer downsizing. Many aspects of the present agenda, currently far advanced, are thus missed, ignored, or simply ridiculed as signs of impending failure. They include the speed of transferring to brigade structures; overhauling the system of military education; radically changing the General Staff Academy; introducing a civilian chaplaincy; rewriting the manuals on combat training; and focusing on noncommissioned-officer (NCO) training and testing the new structures. 'New Look' By June 2009, the mass mobilization, division-based system had already largely disappeared. In its place, more than half the required brigades were already formed and exercises and training were geared to testing and developing these new structures. The Russian media coined the phrase "new look" to describe these monumental changes. However, there appears to be something more going on than simply concentrating on appearance; this is no public-relations campaign. Indeed, it is impossible to understand the ongoing transformation of the Russian armed forces by measuring it in terms of Western paradigms, such as its inability to conduct noncontact warfare, or by emphasizing the armed forces' lack of sophisticated modern weaponry. The Russian military is changing fast; few are able to perceive the sheer breathtaking scale of these changes, and the familiar methods of assessing its conventional capabilities are passing into history. Analysts, commentators, and decision makers on all sides are unable to fit the "new look" Russian military into a familiar pattern. One thing is clear: By the end of this year, the Russian Army will be unrecognizable. While the main focus of the reform campaign is to produce mobile, permanent-readiness formations capable of intervention within a relatively short period, which some might perceive as a Western paradigm, in reality any improvement to Russia's conventional forces will have implications for the country's foreign and defense policies. While it is very likely that the structures that emerge will still compare unfavorably with Western militaries, they will nonetheless meet the needs of a modern and potentially resurgent Russia, enhancing its capability to project power within its "near abroad." What must be stressed is that the current condition of these forces is so decrepit and desperately in need of modernizing that the reform agenda will not contribute to improving "interoperability" with NATO forces for future peace support operations. Such a benevolent strategy would require both political will and intensive supporting programs agreed between Moscow and NATO. Both are unrealistic given the shift in the geopolitical landscape after the Georgia war and the ongoing opposition in Moscow towards any future eastward expansion of the alliance. Moreover, without these programs, the lives of allied personnel could be potentially jeopardized by any ill-conceived plan to create interoperability. Indeed, analyses of the Russian military in the wake of the Georgia conflict, which exposed many of its conventional failings, concentrated on its future military requirements in precisely this context. For instance, although one key feature of the large-scale military exercises Kavkaz 2009 in late June was to test the new brigade structures under an "antiterrorist" guise, those exercises appeared to rehearse an improved version of intervention in Georgia. Unrecognizable Much of the reform program also appears hurried, such as introducing widespread changes within the manning system before a revised military doctrine (expected in late 2009) is published. On August 10, President Dmitry Medvedev sent a bill to the Duma that constitutes the legal basis for future intervention by the Russian military abroad in protection of its citizens or its national interests. Until the reforms are completed, it is difficult to extrapolate policy implications, but one thing is clear: By the end of this year, the Russian Army will be unrecognizable.

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US-Russia War Good: 2NC Ext

War is Inevitable – Arctic ResourcesMatthews, 09 [Owen, Modern History at Oxford University, Newsweek's Moscow Bureau Chief, Istanbul Correspondent, Author of “Stalin's Children: Three Generations of Love and War”, Mail Online, “The Coldest War: Russia And U.S. Face Off Over Arctic Resources”]

As the oil wells run dry, the planet's last great energy reserves lie miles beneath the North Pole. And as the U.S. and Russia race to grab them at any cost, the stage is set for a devastating new cold war. The year is 2020, and , from the Middle East to Nigeria, the world is convulsed by a series of conflicts over dwindling energy supplies. The last untapped reserves of oil and gas lie in the most extreme environment on the planet - the North Pole - where an estimated bonanza of 100 billion barrels are buried deep beneath the Arctic seabed. The ownership of this hostile no-man's-land is contested by Russia, Denmark, Norway, the U.S and Canada. And, in an increasingly desperate battle for resources, each begins to back up its claim with force. Soon, the iceberg-strewn waters of the Arctic are patrolled by fleets of warships, jostling for position in a game of brinkmanship. Russia's Northern Fleet, headed by the colossal but ageing guided missile cruiser Pyotr Velikiy (Peter The Great), and the U.S. Second Fleet, sailing out of Norfolk, Virginia, are armed with nuclear-tipped cruise missiles - and controlled by leaders who are increasingly willing to use them. For now, such a scenario is pure fiction. But it may not be for long. Only recently, respected British think-tank Jane's Review warned that a polar war could be a reality within 12 years. And the Russians are already taking the race for the North Pole's oil wealth deadly seriously. Indeed, the Kremlin will spend tens of millions upgrading Russia's Northern Fleet over the next eight years. And its Atomic Energy Agency has already begun building a fleet of floating nuclear power stations to power undersea drilling for the Arctic's vast oil and gas reserves. A prototype is under construction at the SevMash shipyard in Severodvinsk. The prospect of an undersea Klondike near the North Pole, powered by floating nuclear plants, has environmentalists deeply worried - not least because Russia has such a dismal record on nuclear safety and the disposal of radioactive waste. The new generation power stations will be engineered to the highest safety standards, says Russia, with two 35-megawatt reactors on a giant ship-like platform which will store its own nuclear waste. But even if there is no spillage of radiation, the plants are likely to speed up the warming of Arctic waters and contribute to the disappearance of the polar ice cap. And there are other, even more chilling dangers in the race for the North Pole's resources - the prospect of war on the top of the world. A battle for the North Pole would be the coldest war of all. Fought in a frozen wasteland, where nuclear submarines already prowl beneath the polar cap - and occasionally break through it - a conflict in the Arctic would involve an arsenal of Cold War-era hardware. Since late 2007, Russian Bear and Blackjack tactical bombers have been flying perilously close to Canadian territory. Tensions reached a new level in 2008, when Canada declared a go-slow on issuing visas to Russian nationals in protest at the airspace violations. Soviet and U.S Cold Warriors spent decades fantasising about how to militarise the Arctic. Joseph Stalin sent millions of gulag prisoners to their deaths building an insane railway between the Arctic towns of Salekhard and Igarka. Leonid Brezhnev built fleets of monster, nuclear-powered icebreakers in an attempt to keep a passage around northern Siberia open year-round. Today, Russia, Canada and the U.S. keep isolated military posts dotted across the Arctic Circle, supplied by helicopters and, in Russia's case, manned by shifts of shivering conscripts in tall felt boots and sheepskin coats. But above all, any confrontation over the Arctic would be a naval one, with Russia's Northern Fleet, based at Murmansk, confronting the U.S. Second Fleet. Fully two-thirds of Russia's naval power is allocated to its Northern Fleet. The fleet also boasts Russia's newly-revamped nuclear missile submarines. The fleet is also armed with new, sea-launched Bulava intercontinental ballistic nuclear missiles, which are designed to evade U.S. missile defence shields and destroy entire cities. Clearly, Moscow sees the north as its most vulnerable, and easily expanded, frontier and seems willing to stake its claim with devastating force. War over the North Pole was, until Russia's invasion of Georgia in August, an unlikely scenario. Now, though, as Russia becomes ever more aggressive (President Medvedev has just signed off on the latest round of a massive upgrade of the country's armed forces), it has come a step closer to the realms of the possible. The Kremlin has made it clear that it has set its sights on domination of the last great wilderness on Earth. At stake is the massive mineral wealth hidden deep under the Arctic seabed - much of it made more accessible as the ice cap retreats. Vladimir Putin, Russia's Prime Minister, long vowed to build an 'energy empire' and dreamed of reversing the collapse of Russian power after the fall of the Soviet Union, an event he once called 'the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century'. And now Putin's hand-picked successor, President Dmitry Medvedev, has set his sights on the Arctic, a chunk of territory with massive mineral wealth. In a startling attempt to re-draw the map of the world, Moscow has signalled its intentions to annex a huge swathe of the continental shelf, which runs from Northern Siberia, to include the entire North Pole. Medvedev set out his assertive strategy to expand Russia's borders northward at a meeting of Russia's national security council in the Kremlin almost immediately after coming to power last year . 'Our biggest task is to turn the Arctic into Russia's resource base for the 21st century,' he told his top security lieutenants. The top of the world currently lies under international waters, supervised by a United Nations Commission. The five countries with Arctic coastlines - Russia, Canada, the U.S, Denmark (which owns Greenland) and Norway - control only a 200-mile[Continued On Next]

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http://www.bloomsbury.com/Books/details.aspx?isbn=9780747591818

SCFI 2010 Impact WorkTeam Jabob and the STGs ___ of ___[Continued from Top] economic zone extending north from their northern coasts. Beyond that, it is a no-man's-land. Russia's President Dmitry Medvedev controls a formidable arsenal of nuclear weapons, along with Russia's powerful Northern Fleet But under UN rules, an Arctic country's zone can be extended if it can prove that the undersea territory it wants to claim is geologically part of its own continental shelf - in other words, a natural extension of its own territory. Using this loophole, Russia has mounted a massive scientific and diplomatic effort to redraw the polar map. The Russians made what they claimed was their first major scientific breakthrough in the summer of 2007. The Rossiya nuclear ice-breaker, carrying 50 scientists and tons of seismic equipment, nosed through the ice of the polar region, taking sonic and magnetic photographs of the seabed. After a freezing 45 days at sea, the Russians announced that they had discovered that an underwater ridge directly links Russia's Arctic coast to the North Pole. The Lomonosov Ridge, named after the 18th-century founder of Moscow University, is an impressive piece of real estate - according to Moscow's claim, it guarantees Russia's rights over a polar territory half the size of Western Europe, which just happens to contain ten billion tons of oil and natural gas deposits. Countries have fought devastating wars over much less . To push the point home, the Kremlin decided that a Russian submarine would plant a national flag on the bottom of the sea at the North Pole. The expedition, led by the bearded Artur Chilingarov, a celebrated Russian polar explorer, set out aboard the giant ice-breaker Akademik Fedorov carrying two MIR deep submergence vehicles. Accompanied by a businessman, an Australian adventurer and a Swedish pharmaceuticals millionaire, Chilingarov descended to a depth of 4,261m below the polar ice. And then, on the seabed at the geographic North Pole, the submersible dropped a three-foot Russian flag made of Siberian titanium. It also left another flag encased in a time capsule - the banner of the pro-Putin United Russia party. Unsurprisingly, the televised flag-planting sparked angry reactions from Russia's Arctic neighbours. 'This isn't the 15th century,' stormed former Canadian Foreign Minister Peter MacKay. 'You can't go around the world and just plant flags and say: "We're claiming this territory."' The U.S also protested. But the point was made: Russia was deadly serious about its claim to the North Pole - and had the hardware, scientific clout and steely political will to push it through. It's impossible to build a permanent base at the North Pole simply because there's no land, and the giant chunks of sea ice jostle and drift in the Arctic. Nonetheless, the Russians have made an attempt. On a 16 sq km island of ice near the North Pole, the 'North Pole-35' ice station was established soon after Chilingarov's expedition. Three hundred tons of equipment, prefabricated buildings and food were offloaded on to snowmobiles, along with 22 scientists, who raised the Russian flag over their snowbound station. For the past year, the inhabitants of this real-life Ice Station Zebra have been the closest human inhabitants to the North Pole - until the station was abandoned early in the summer as the ice drifted rather too close to Canada's Fram Strait. But the North Pole isn't the resurgent Russian empire's only prize. Moscow is also believed to be readying a claim to an 18,000 sq mile piece of the Bering Sea, which separates Alaska from Russia's far east. Known as Chukotka, the region's governor until July was Chelsea football club owner Roman Abramovich. A U.S.-Soviet Maritime Boundary Agreement awarded the undersea territory to the U.S. in 1990. The agreement, signed by Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, was designed as a post-Cold War gesture of reconciliation - and was bitterly opposed by Soviet hard-liners. Now, the complaints of these hardliners have become Kremlin policy, as the Russian media denounce the agreement as a treasonous act by Shevardnadze, who later became the pro-Nato President of Georgia. Indeed, many members of the Kremlin-controlled parliament are demanding that the agreement be reviewed, setting the scene for a diplomatic storm between Russia and the U.S. Russia is also stepping up the military pressure in its push for Arctic riches. The Kremlin has increased the number of patrol flights over the Arctic by Tu-95 strategic bombers - known as Bears. These gigantic warplanes are designed to carry nuclear payloads. Canadian Defence Minister Peter MacKay was angry over the provocative flights, which swing close to Canadian airspace. 'We're obviously very concerned about much of what Russia has been doing lately,' MacKay said as he launched Operation Nanook, an Arctic military exercise designed to assert Canada's sovereignty over its own huge Northern Territories. 'When we see a Russian Bear approaching Canadian air space, we meet them with an F-18. We remind them that this is Canadian sovereign airspace, and they turn back.' And so with tension escalating, many believe the Arctic could be the scene of the next Russia-Nato clash. So far, Russia's sabre rattling is just that - rattling. What's more, their chances of laying claim to the Arctic's riches are legally ambiguous. According to a study by Southampton's National Oceanography Centre's Law of the Sea Group, Denmark (which owns Greenland, the closest landmass to the North Pole) and Canada also have claims to the no-man's-land. 'Denmark could be given the North Pole,' said Helge Sander, the country's science minister. 'The preliminary investigations done so far are very promising.' But her optimism may be misplaced. With billions of barrels of oil and a former superpower's hurt pride at stake, it looks like the battle for the North Pole is ever more likely to be fought not by teams of lawyers, but the old-fashioned way, with a clash of Cold War hardware.

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US-Russia War Good: 2NC Ext

Now is Key – Economic and land—revenue stream volatile, population decreasingLieber, 07 [Robert J., Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown University, "Persistent Primacy and the Future of the American Era", APSA Paper] 2007, http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/1/1/0/5/pages211058/p211058-1.php

Constraints on the capacity of adversaries also needs to be taken into account. Russia under Putin has put pressure on its immediate neighbors and seeks to rebuild its armed forces, but Moscow’s ability to regain the superpower status of the former Soviet Union remains limited. The Russian armed forces are in woeful condition, the total population is half that of the USSR and declining by 700,000 per year, the economy is overwhelmingly dependent on revenues from oil and natural gas and thus vulnerable if world market prices soften, and the long term stability of its crony capitalism and increasingly authoritarian political system are uncertain. China, despite extraordinary economic growth and modernization, will continue to depend on rapid expansion of trade and the absorption of vast numbers of people moving from the countryside to the cities. It may well become a major military challenger of the United States, first regionally and even globally, but only over the long term. As Mark Hass has noted, demography also works to the advantage of the United States. Most other powerful states, including China and Russia as well as Germany and Japan, face the significant aging of their populations. Although the U.S. also will need to finance the costs of an aging population, this demographic shift is occurring to a lesser extent and more slowly than among its competitors . Haas argues that these changes in global aging “will be a potent force for the continuation of U.S. power dominance, both economic and military.” 31 Finally, the United States benefits from two other unique attributes, flexibility and adaptability. Time and again, America has faced daunting challenges and made mistakes, yet it has possessed the inventiveness and societal flexibility to adapt and respond successfully. Despite obvious problems, there is reason to believe that the country’s adaptive capacity will allow it to respond to future requirements and threats. None of this assures the maintenance of its world role, but the domestic underpinnings to support this engagement remain relatively robust. Thus for the foreseeable future, U.S. primacy is likely to be sustainable. America’s own national interest – and the fortunes of a global liberal democratic order – depend on it.

No first-strike capacity—submarine upgrades will guarantee second-strike capability in the future RFE, 08 [Radio Free Europe, “Russia Hopes To Deploy New Nuclear Missile Next Year”]

MOSCOW (Reuters) -- Russia hopes to deploy a new submarine-launched nuclear missile next year, underlining Moscow's determination to upgrade its nuclear strike forces, a senior defense official has been quoted as saying . Colonel General Vladimir Popovkin, head of armaments for the Russian armed forces, told the Defense Ministry newspaper "Krasnaya zvezda" that Russia's recent war with Georgia "compels us to rethink the current state of the armed forces and how they should develop further". President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin have both pledged to extend Russia's recent military build-up with extra funds to buy new, high-tech arms. On October 1, Putin announced an extra $3.1 billion of spending next year, partly to replace equipment lost in the Georgia war. But despite the billions of dollars spent since Putin came to power as president in 2000, Russia's million-strong armed forces remain poorly equipped, badly paid, and reliant on a large proportion of unwilling conscripts . Defense analysts based in Moscow say much of the extra spending has not reached the front line because of corruption or mismanagement and many weapons programs are running late. One of these is the Bulava, a submarine-launched long-range nuclear missile that Putin says will be capable of penetrating any missile defenses -- a reference to Washington's plans for a new global system to shoot down hostile missiles. The Bulava, a modified version of the land-based Topol-M, has had a checkered history with several test launch failures and is running at least two years late. The navy pronounced the latest Bulava exercise on September 18 a success, saying the missile flew from the White Sea right across Russia to the Far East. Popovkin, who is also deputy defense minister, said he hoped the armed forces would accept the Bulava for service next year. Upgrading Russia's strategic nuclear forces remained a top priority because they were the cornerstone of its defenses. "As long as we are a nuclear power, no hotheads will venture to attack our country," Popovkin said in the interview. "We have already this year started fitting out strategic nuclear forces with the Topol-M missile," he added. Russia also planned to modernize its nuclear-capable Tupolev TU-160 supersonic strategic bombers and to fully commission the first of three new nuclear-powered submarines to carry the Bulava missile, he added. The first of these submarines, the "Yury Dolgoruky," was launched in February, six years after its original scheduled date, though it still lacks the missiles it was designed to carry.

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Indo-Pak War Good 1NC

1. No offense-war wouldn't escalate-it would devastate Pakistan solving global terrorismYoung 09 David H. Young is a Washington-based writer and analyst of international affairs and violent conflict. In various capacities, he has worked or consulted for the International Rescue Committee, the Carter Center, the Israel Policy Forum, the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy, the Center for Democracy and Human Rights in Saudi Arabia, Soliya, and Abraham's Vision. Graduated from Davidson College and earned a Master's Degree in Conflict Analysis and Resolution from George Mason University “Indo-Pak tensions and US options” David H. Young Tuesday, 13 Jan, 2009

But according to a flood of recent press reports, if India seems likely to attack Pakistan, then both the Pakistan Army and the militants they are supposed to destroy could find themselves facing the same grave threat in India. Various militant factions and supporters of the Taliban — all the way from South Waziristan to the Swat Valley — could put their wars with Nato and Islamabad on hold and find their way to Kashmir or the Indian border. In the meantime, US and Nato forces in Afghanistan would be in the unfamiliar position of having neither friends nor foes on the other side of the Afghan/Pakistan border. And this would present Washington with equally unfamiliar flexibility. The US presidential transition could alter this dynamic, but under these circumstances, the most likely benefit to the US would manifest in southern Afghanistan, where the resurgent Afghan Taliban would face potentially crippled supply lines of weapons and equipment, which are currently flowing from the Pakistani Taliban and the tribal clans loyal to them in the NWFP and especially Fata. If those middlemen are busy at Pakistan’s eastern border, there will be fewer available at the western border. Another possibility is that, like their Pakistani counterparts, the Afghan Taliban might also flock to the Indian border or LoC to fight the Indians. Numerous Taliban leaders and foot soldiers are foreign-born and tied to the militant Pakhtun world by marriage and lifestyle; but many are jihadists at heart and would drool at the prospect of a glorious war on numerous fronts. Though less likely, in either scenario, the Afghan Taliban would be stretched uncharacteristically thin without support from across the border, and the US/Nato/Afghan forces would be less hindered to improve security and perhaps earn a little loyalty from local Pakhtun tribes in southern Afghanistan. At the very least, there would be fewer obstacles to US intelligence gathering and infiltration, which is always in desperate need of a boost. Either way, however, a substantive contingent of the Pakistani Taliban and their supporters will probably remain in the NWFP/Fata and continue supporting the Afghan Taliban. In the end, Pakhtuns are notoriously territorial, and some will not be interested in repelling the Indians from the land of their ethnic rivals in Pakistan’s eastern provinces. In this case, Washington would be able to test Pakistan’s claim that — as limited as Islamabad’s assistance has been since 2001 — the war on terror would be in a far worse state without Pakistan’s help. Willfully testing this claim has always been too risky for the US because the price of being wrong could be frightfully high. But if Islamabad refuses to keep its contingent of soldiers on Pakistan’s western border anyway, then as a silver lining, Washington might be able to test this notion and use it as a basis for strengthening or drastically altering the US-Pakistan relationship.

2. Pakistan spends billions on its military, an Indo-Pak war would end its military development and start focus on the economy. Bokhari 05 three Master's degrees: a recent one in Political Science from U of T, specializing in nuclear disarmament in South Asia. As well as, an M.Phil, Defense and Strategic Studies from QAU Pakistan and an M.Sc. International Relations from the same institute, specializing in South Asian nuclear politics. Ms Bokhari has the honor of being a Track II Diplomat (1999-2001) from Pakistan to India and played a crucial role in citizen's diplomacy to see the success of the present peace process between India and Pakistan. Ms Bokhari has extensive experience of working with the Pakistani foreign office's policy research institutes in Pakistan: Islamabad Policy Research Institute (2001). Has lectured and attended various peace and disarmament schools and conferences: Harvard University Program on Asia and International Relations, Cambridge University (UK), Itlay (ISODARCO), San Diego University (USA), Dalhousie University, Halifax, University of Beijing, China, Jawaharlal Nehru University, India, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi. Ms Bokhari has drafted four international publications in the areas of war and terrorism peace, disarmament and nuclear confidence building measures and has lectured at various international forums. She is currently working on her fifth one. She has also appeared as a strategic analyst on OMNI TV (Toronto), and PTV(Islamabad) She has been affiliated with Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies (former) and has strong association with the Noble Peace Prize Pugwash Movements. She is a member of Canadian International Council. Sarah Bokhari “Indo-Pak peace”

The doves in Pakistan and the nuclear pessimist lobby are of the view that a normalisation of relations with India would divert the huge resources spent on Pakistani defence and more towards intra-economic development. Musharraf and other military leaders have often admitted that the stability of Pakistan rests on two pillars, i.e. armed forces and economics [11]. For attracting foreign investment and seeking positive economic benefits, the Pakistani delegates at the 2004 World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, prepared a brochure which, under the section ‘Relations thaw with India’, contained a passage with the phrase ‘looks as though commerce may succeed where diplomats have so far failed’. There is no doubt that the trade benefits would be massive. Pakistan is a very poor country by all standards. In the last fifteen years, the incidence in poverty in Pakistan has risen from 20 to 33%. Pakistan’s burgeoning population, now approximately 140 million, is poorly educated and cared for. According to the United Nations Development Program’s Human Development Report, for 2003 Pakistan spent 1.8% of its GDP on education and 0.9% on health, compared to 4.5% on defense.

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Indo-Pak War Good 1NC

3. Indo-Pak war key to a major reduction on terrorism Frontier India 08 emerged as a comprehensive and reliable source of public information. The website is an important resource for governments, policy makers, industrialists, political and economic experts, and researchers interested in International affairs. The content of Frontier India is provided by its staff, in cooperation with affiliated experts and journalists from around the globe. The site is updated daily and is w3c schools compliant. December 24th, 2008

Both the Pakistani Army and the Jihadi organisations like Tehrik-e-Taliban & Jamaat-ud-Dawa have confirmed that they will participate in a war against India. Statistically we are looking at more than 70% of worlds Jihadist and their Pakistani Army supporters. Al Quieda will not miss the opportunity to participate in such a mega event. In the words of a chief terrorist of the outlawed Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, Baitullah Mehsud “time had come to wage a real jihad they had been waiting for” as per the report of the news from Pakistan. This is an opportunity that has not to be missed by the countries engaged on war on terror. A war would benefit the US/NATO, Afghanistan and India who suffer the brunt of Pakistan backed terrorist. Primarily, this brings all terrorist elements on single platform, which, would have been otherwise elusive. US is paying an estimated Pakistan almost one billion dollar a year to kill these terrorists and it bears no result. It will also represent an opportunity for US to wrest control of the Islamic Nuclear weapon for global good. For Afghanistan, it will be an opportunity to cross the line of control and hit targets of opportunity deep inside Pakistani terrorist breeding grounds. For Indian terrorism problem, a strike on Pakistan will be the best option. Historically, India has missed the opportunity of dismembering Pakistan and dismantling its terrorist structure due to world pressure. The world opinion is favorable as now they themselves are suffering from the international migraine called Pakistan. Pakistan’s economy is at its lowest and its military apparatus is very old. Even though the terrorist have declared that they will participate in fighting, there are areas in Pakistan which would like to gain freedom. Breaking up Pakistan and dismantling its terror structure will greatly reduce the world terror problem. Like minded allies like India, US, Afghanistan and Israel should jointly

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Korean War Good 1NC

1. South Korea is ProliferatingOlsen 2004(Edward A Olsen, November 2004, Center for Contemporary Conflict at the Naval Postgraduate School, http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2004/nov/olsenNOV04.html)

This entire situation was shaken by surprising revelations in early September that South Korean scientists were working on nuclear power experiments in the year 2000.[21] This caused Seoul to try to explain the experiments as both minor and unrelated to nuclear weapons.[22] As South Korea’s past nuclear experiments drew increasing attention, ROK officials cautiously acknowledged the experiments could have more theoretical significance than originally ascribed to them.[23] In turn, all this activity drew more critical attention[24] and caused the IAEA to refocus its attention on South Korea.[25] Compounding the controversy of the Korean nuclear situation were the subsequent reports of a North Korean nuclear weapons test near the DPRK’s border with China that were swiftly denied by North Korea and discredited by most international observers, but—when seen in the context of South Korea’s nuclear experimentation—they added to the sense of ambiguity surrounding Korean nuclear issues.[26] All of this attention to nuclear issues in both Koreas tended to reinforce the conventional wisdom behind U.S. policy and the policy of the United States’ main Asian ally, Japan, toward Korea which was succinctly expressed by former Secretary of State James Baker in the conclusion of a recent opinion column: “No country, including China and Russia, wants to see a nuclear weapons capability on the Korean Peninsula .”[27] That assessment from a conservative vantage point was offered in support of the current President Bush’s efforts to create support for the United States’ attempt to block nuclear proliferation in Korea. A similar viewpoint was expressed in considerable detail by one of the United States’ leading progressive analysts of Korean affairs, Selig Harrison, whose overall perspective is quite different from the current Bush administration.[28] Whether the United States is led by a second term of the Bush administration or by a Kerry administration, it is likely that these parameters will shape U.S. policy toward Korea in pursuit of more or less the same goal.As balanced and sound as that goal is, and as much as the United States has every right to expect its South Korean ally to support that objective, there is reason to second guess the prospects for success. U.S. desires for a non-nuclear Korea are not new. Koreans in both Koreas are well aware that the United States prevented the ROK under Park Chung-hee from becoming a nuclear power, clearly wants to halt North Korea’s current nuclear agenda, and is more than annoyed by the persistence of some South Koreans to explore the ROK’s nuclear potentials. In this context it is legitimate to ask whether U.S. pursuit of a non-nuclear Korea will succeed in preventing Koreans in a reuniting Korea from having the same nuclear option that China successfully pursued and Japan must contemplate as it confronts both China’s rising power and the possibility of a strong reunited Korean nation state in between Japan and China. In short, may the Mugunghwa/Rose of Sharon of literary notoriety yet blossom? It could under certain circumstances

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Korean War Good 1NC

2. Korean War is Key to UnificationCoghlan, 08 (April 2008, Colonel David Coghlan, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub859.pdf, 1984 graduate of the Royal Military College Duntroon, specialized in Ground Based Air Defense, deployments to East Timor and Afghanistan, Masters of Defence Studies from the University of New South Wales, member of the U.S. Army War College Class of 2008)

The final and most ominous reunification scenario is one of war that leads to the military defeat of the DPRK.43 North Korean initiated war is the worst case of all these scenarios, and although the likelihood is remote given the capabilities of the North Korean military, the possibility of a precipitative event (including an accidental one) triggering war cannot be ruled out. Although North Korea is unlikely to prevail in a conventional campaign against the South, there is the possibility that Kim Jong-il could initiate war out of desperation (the so-called cornered rat syndrome44) or related to this, facing irreversible economic decline but still possessing a strong military, he may resort to preventative war to gain a negotiating position favorable to Pyongyang. Given that North Korea is unlikely to get to such a position against a prepared enemy, the optimal time for North Korea to attack is during a period of low tension, ideally when the United States is preoccupied elsewhere.45 Assuming that Kim Jong-il is more interested in state survival than state suicide, this option is remote. However, considering the stakes, it cannot be discounted. Despite the perils of predictions and the almost unlimited combinations of the scenarios presented, some conclusions can be drawn to guide stakeholder approaches to reunification and beyond. First, despite the optimism of the 1990s, none of the scenarios discussed envision early reunification, and it seems that for the foreseeable future the status quo on the Korean Peninsula will remain. Second, the likelihood of the gradual scenario in which 6 the two Koreas reunite in a soft landing appears, as it is predicated on fundamental reform by North Korea, to be highly unlikely. Consequently, all scenarios suggest to one extent or another that reunification is not going to be soft46 and in the case of system collapse or war, could be potentially devastating for the Korean Peninsula. Third, with status quo likely to be in effect for the foreseeable future, this provides all interested parties time to prepare to comprehensively reduce the impact of a reunification hard landing and subsequent absorption by the South. Fourth, bearing in mind the cost of reunification, the longer North Korea survives, the more anachronistic it will become; the greater the disparity between North and South; and the higher the eventual cost of reunification. Finally, despite the time available from the status quo option, the worst case wildcards of unexpected collapse and/or war cannot be discounted and must be planned for. Given these scenarios, a raft of prospects, opportunities, and challenges is presented to stakeholders in the region. The next part of this discussion will examine how these stakeholders may respond to these challenges.

3. Korean War leads to China and U.S. InterventionOlsen 2004(Edward A Olsen, November 2004, Center for Contemporary Conflict at the Naval Postgraduate School, http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2004/nov/olsenNOV04.html)

Were Korea to unify as a result of a war that would entail U.S. intervention in order to rescue the ROK from the DPRK by eliminating its nuclear

capabilities, creating circumstances likely to lead to Chinese involvement as well, thereby the resulting united Korean state would be unable to pursue many options—nuclear included—that the foreign interventionists are prepared to block. Moreover, a united Korea that would emerge from war would likely be so damaged by the war that it could not pursue a nuclear option. Similarly, albeit far less dangerous to all concerned, were a united Korea to emerge as a result of any North Korean collapse scenario, the burdens imposed on South Koreans as they pick up the pieces and try to assemble a viable Korean nation state would be so formidable that Seoul’s abject dependence on foreign assistance would compel such a united Korea to acquiesce to all the foreign benefactors’ desires that Korea not pursue a nuclear option.The costs and risks associated with the renewed war and catastrophic collapse scenarios make it clear why they should be avoided if possible for the sake of Korea ’s future. Even if the United States and other countries might perceive these scenarios in a somewhat favorable light because they would almost certainly preclude a nuclear option for the resulting united Korea, the inherent costs and risks are too large. Similarly, the potential for preemptive North Korean regime change to create costly long-term burdens for the resulting united Korea—that would foreclose its nuclear option—on balance make this scenario very undesirable for Korea.[29] Were any country or countries to pursue that sort of scenario via economic, political, or military means, it/they would end up paying the price in both financial terms and in future relations with Korea.

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Korean War Good 1NC

4. Without war intervention, a unified Korea will be nuclearOlsen 2004(Edward A Olsen, November 2004, Center for Contemporary Conflict at the Naval Postgraduate School, http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2004/nov/olsenNOV04.html)

Clearly there is a better option. The United States—and any of the other countries that want to avoid a nuclear Korea—should develop policies designed to help both Koreas’ mutual engagement policies intended to reconcile their differences and create the means to develop a unified Korea. For the United States and its South Korean ally this would entail greater appreciation by Washington of President Roh Moo-hyun’s version of President Kim Dae-jung’s “sunshine policy” now called the “policy of peace and prosperity”[30] and the ways President Roh uses the policy to expand South Korea’s engagement with North Korea.[31] Such support by the United States—preferably in conjunction with China, Japan, and Russia—will minimize the chance that the Mugunghwa/Rose of Sharon nuclear option will ever be contemplated seriously by Koreans because of their collective sense of gratitude and obligation toward the external powers that will have acted as facilitators and catalysts for peaceful Korean reconciliation and unification. If the United States and the other major powers were to abstain from such engagement in assisting the two Koreas to become one, especially if the United States were to be perceived in both Koreas as once again pretending to be supportive of a Korean reunification agenda while expecting it will fail (as others have in the past) that Koreans can see as analogous to the “free vote” congressional metaphor,[32] it could well set the stage for inter-Korean bilateral negotiations—without any external mediation or assistance—which might produce a united Korea with reasons to be well disposed toward a nuclear option. The foundation of those reasons would be Korean nationalism that is already motivating both Koreas’ fervor for reuniting and would receive a tremendous boost were the two Koreas to resolve their differences solely on their own. A united Korean nation state spawned by such a process is virtually certain to be very conscious of its independence and national pride. While it is conceivable that such a Korean state could pursue a neutralist foreign policy as some have advocated,[33] a nationalistic united Korea is far more likely to be pragmatic in its international realism , perhaps aligning Korea with Kenneth Waltz’s contention that greater possession of nuclear weapons can enhance geopolitical stability.[34] This would enable Korea to strive to be on a par with its Chinese and Japanese neighbors. Since the PRC is a major nuclear power and Japan has the technological know-how to become a nuclear power very rapidly—making Japan a de facto “virtual” nuclear power[35]— it is all too easy to visualize a nationalistic united Korea that owed no obligation to any external power for its creation contemplating a nuclear option in order to generate a stabilized regional balance of power. Such a Korea might well perceive the notions embodied in the Mugunghwa/Rose of Sharon literary metaphor as the essence of realism capable of making Korea a truly formidable “poison shrimp.” Clearly, however, none of this would be in U.S. national interests regarding its nuclear non-proliferation policies.On balance the most prudent approach the United States can take toward the Korean nuclear issue is to avoid the war-based, collapse-based, regime change-based, and autonomous negotiations-based scenarios for resolving inter-Korean tensions. Instead, the United States—preferably in conjunction with regional partners—should do its utmost to be supportive of the inter-Korean engagement processes that can reconcile Korean differences and reunify the Korean nation in a state that will have moral and geopolitical obligations toward its external benefactors and the international system they play major roles in shaping. That approach will simultaneously resolve the Korean nuclear issues and the longstanding issues surrounding a divided Korea that should have been resolved decades ago.

[Insert Impact of Nuclear Korea]

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Middle East Instability Good 1NC

1. Middle East war stays local, and countries don’t get involved in wars they don’t have ties to—No escalation Cook, Takeyh, and Maloney, 7-- (Douglas Dillon Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Ray, Senior Fellow For Middle Eastern Studies at the CFR, Suzanne, Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institution, June 28, , online:http://www.cfr.org/publication/13702/why_the_iraq_war_wont_engulf_the_mideast.html)

Long before the Bush administration began selling “the surge” in Iraq as a way to avert a general war in the Middle East, observers both inside and outside the government were growing concerned about the potential for armed conflict among the regional powers. Underlying this anxiety was a scenario in which Iraq’s sectarian and ethnic violence spills over into neighboring countries, producing conflicts between the major Arab states and Iran as well as Turkey and the Kurdistan Regional Government. These wars then destabilize the entire region well beyond the current conflict zone, involving heavyweights like Egypt. This is scary stuff indeed, but with the exception of the conflict between Turkey and the Kurds, the scenario is far from an accurate reflection of the way Middle Eastern leaders view the situation in Iraq and calculate their interests there. It is abundantly clear that major outside powers like Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkey are heavily involved in Iraq. These countries have so much at stake in the future of Iraq that it is natural they would seek to influence political developments in the country. Yet, the Saudis, Iranians, Jordanians, Syrians, and others are very unlikely to go to war either to protect their own sect or ethnic group or to prevent one country from gaining the upper hand in Iraq. The reasons are fairly straightforward. First, Middle Eastern leaders, like politicians everywhere, are primarily interested in one thing: self-preservation. Committing forces to Iraq is an inherently risky proposition, which, if the conflict went badly, could threaten domestic political stability. Moreover, most Arab armies are geared toward regime protection rather than projecting power and thus have little capability for sending troops to Iraq. Second, there is cause for concern about the so-called blowback scenario in which jihadis returning from Iraq destabilize their home countries, plunging the region into conflict. Middle Eastern leaders are preparing for this possibility. Unlike in the 1990s, when Arab fighters in the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union returned to Algeria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia and became a source of instability, Arab security services are being vigilant about who is coming in and going from their countries. In the last month, the Saudi government has arrested approximately 200 people suspected of ties with militants. Riyadh is also building a 700 kilometer wall along part of its frontier with Iraq in order to keep militants out of the kingdom. Finally, there is no precedent for Arab leaders to commit forces to conflicts in which they are not directly involved. The Iraqis and the Saudis did send small contingents to fight the Israelis in 1948 and 1967, but they were either ineffective or never made it. In the 1970s and 1980s, Arab countries other than Syria, which had a compelling interest in establishing its hegemony over Lebanon, never committed forces either to protect the Lebanese from the Israelis or from other Lebanese. The civil war in Lebanon was regarded as someone else’s fight. Indeed, this is the way many leaders view the current situation in Iraq. To Cairo, Amman and Riyadh, the situation in Iraq is worrisome, but in the end it is an Iraqi and American fight. As far as Iranian mullahs are concerned, they have long preferred to press their interests through proxies as opposed to direct engagement. At a time when Tehran has access and influence over powerful Shiite militias, a massive cross-border incursion is both unlikely and unnecessary. So Iraqis will remain locked in a sectarian and ethnic struggle that outside powers may abet, but will remain within the borders of Iraq.The Middle East is a region both prone and accustomed to civil wars. But given its experience with ambiguous conflicts, the region has also developed an intuitive ability to contain its civil strife and prevent local conflicts from enveloping the entire Middle East. Iraq’s civil war is the latest tragedy of this hapless region, but still a tragedy whose consequences are likely to be less severe than both supporters and opponents of Bush’s war profess.

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2. Middle East instability increases oil pricesMcElroy 10— (Kevin, “What Will Make Oil Prices Rise this Summer?”, Wyatt Investment Research July 2, http://www.wyattresearch.com/article/what-will-make-oil-prices-rise-this-summer/5366 )

But I believe that oil is one minor war-action away from higher highs this summer. That brings me to something my wife and I encountered yesterday. I should note, I’m writing today’s issue from a hotel room in Boston. My wife and I are celebrating our first wedding anniversary this week. After spending yesterday afternoon ferrying between Boston’s harbor islands, we encountered what I believe may be the catalyst for higher oil prices this summer. In Boston Common, amid the hot dog stands and balloon vendors, hundreds of pro-Palestinian protesters greeted us on our walk back to our hotel in Back Bay. Being on vacation, and trying desperately to avoid television, we weren’t aware of the recent headlines from Gaza – where Israeli commandoes boarded a flotilla of activists headed for Israel’s blockade of the 20 mile strip of Palestine. The protestors all had the same old pro-Palestine signs, along with some language about a blockade but I didn’t think much of it –I’ve seen similar signage at International Monetary Fund protests in Washington DC, Republican rallies in Philadelphia, Democrat rallies in Baltimore, and pro-life/pro-choice marches everywhere in between. If you rally a few college students for a cause that someone finds worthy of protest, eventually, the Israel/Palestine contingent will show up to remind us that yes, the two nations still don’t get along.But I’m not here to pick sides – I’d sooner kick over a hornet’s nest than wade into Israeli-Palestinian politics. I’m here to survey the situation for its profit potential. And simply put, war in the headlines almost always means higher oil prices. War in the Middle East, even more so. Take a look at this chart that plots oil prices in 2008 dollars since the end of World War II:You can see how oil prices seem to track Middle East war headlines and little else. Will Israel and Palestine resume hostilities? I don’t know, but it’s exactly these kinds of headlines that act as a catalyst for higher oil prices. I use the word catalyst as a direct metaphor. If you remember from high school chemistry, a catalyst is a substance that increases the rate of a reaction. A skirmish in Gaza might not pinch the hose of oil supply one iota, but it can have the effect of making people bid the price of oil higher regardless of real supply and demand forces. And as we remember from the summer of 2008, sometimes higher oil prices themselves are a catalyst for ever-higher oil prices.

Perceived Middle East increases prices – Investors fear shortageEllis 6-- (Byron A., PH.D., Executive Director at the Jethro Project “Middle East Instability Drives Crude Oil Prices”, Jethro Project, June, http://www.jethroproject.com/Energy%20Prices-Rev4.pdf)

Many politicians and pundits attribute higher prices to increased demand, shortages, or supply manipulations by energy companies. Demand, however, has not increased significantly and crude oil is plentiful. British Petroleum (BP) Statistical Review of World Energy June 2005, documented that in 2000 worldwide crude oil production was 74,950 million barrels per day and increased to 80,260 million barrels per day in 2004, or a 7 percent increase in 5 years. According to the Energy Information Administration (March 2006, International Petroleum Monthly), average total world demand in2005 was 83.62 million barrels per dayand average total world supply was 84.08 million barrels per day. The Economist (Aug. 13, 2005) also indicated that crude is plentiful, and this is expected due to the lure of higher prices. Furthermore, supply manipulation by refiners would have significantly curtailed refinery output. However, the Annual Energy Review 2004 documented increases in refinery output, in spite of industry consolidation. The three leading world petroleum consumers are the United States, Japan, and China. US’ consumption in 1990 was about 18 million barrels per day and rose to about 21 million barrels per day in 2005; Japan's consumption in 1990 was 5.2 million barrels per day and was approximately 5.4 million barrels per day in 2004. China’s consumption in 1990 was approximately 2.5 million barrels per day and about 7 million barrels per day in 2005. US and Japan’s consumption remained almost constant between 1990 and 2004, at about 5 and 20 million barrels per day, respectively. So, what is driving up the price of crude oil? The main reason for the increase is instability in the Middle East. Instabilitycauses traders to bid up future prices and provides refiners with the opportunity to charge as much as the market can bear And, hints of preemptive strikes on Iran create further market instability and heighten the belief of future crude oil shortages. Perceived future shortages means that the future price of a barrel of crude oil will continue to increase. Under perceived market instability, the ability to increase margins (raise prices)does not require output reduction (shortage), higher demand, or supply manipulation; it merely requires consumers to believe that a shortage, or pent up demand, exist. Additionally,industry consolidation from 319 operable refineries in 1980 to 149 in 2004 facilitates the psychological perception of shortages and hence margin increases.

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1. High oil prices are key to alternative energy developmentKyle 8— (Steven, Professor of Applied Economics and Management, Cornell University, “For Alternative Energy's Sake--Keep Oil Prices High”, Scientific American, http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=keep-oil-prices-high)

As oil and related energy prices soared to record highs over the past two years, interest in alternative fuels soared, too. Hybrid cars have appeared seemingly overnight, and proposals for solar, wind and other renewable technologies are being made everywhere. We need to remember, however, that all this action has one cause—high oil prices—and progress could grind to a halt if those prices fall again. It might seem ridiculous to worry about such a thing; don’t we all want to spend less on oil? And isn’t hoping for that just whistling in the dark? Not necessarily. At present, it is virtually axiomatic in the popular press that growth in demand from the U.S., China, India and elsewhere will keep oil prices high forevermore. But this common wisdom ignores the possibility of recession, or even depression, reducing demand growth to near zero, just as new drilling (mostly overseas) increases supply. Recession is already upon the U.S., and China’s economy is slowing rapidly. As Wall Street collapsed in October, oil prices dropped to around $70 a barrel. Saudi Arabia’s stated goal of maintaining a price floor of $80 a barrel or higher suddenly seemed optimistic.So what is the problem? In the short run, nothing. But sustained development of new energy sources always rests on the condition of the old ones. Coal did not arise as Europe’s main energy source until Europeans had cut down virtually all their forests for fuel, and the later switch to oil did not occur until the scarcity of coal drove its price high. In the 1970s Americans responded to high oil prices with alternative energy projects and more fuel-efficient cars. But when prices dropped in the 1980s, we threw caution to the wind—along with the energy projects. We purchased ever larger cars and SUVs and moved to ever more distant suburbs. Sure enough, now that oil prices have spiked again, we are looking at the same alternatives we had relegated to niche markets then. Today renewable technologies such as wind and solar are close to being competitive with fossil fuels. But we can say good-bye to that prospect if oil prices decline to $60 to $70 a barrel, which could easily happen in a recession, as we witnessed in October. Two years of lower prices can turn hybrid cars into a bad financial proposition for consumers, and green technology start-up companies could go bankrupt as demand for their goods dries up. Even a temporary decrease in petroleum prices would undermine the long-term development of the alternatives we all know we need.

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2. Alternative Energy developments are key to preventing global warmingThompson 2-- (Elizabeth A., “Aggressive energy research needed to curb global warming”, MIT News, October 31, http://web.mit.edu/newsoffice/2002/global.html )

Regulations alone will not stabilize climate or curb global warming, says an international team of climate and technology experts that includes an MIT engineer. What's needed is the development of advanced technologies for alternative sources of energy that allow both climate stabilization and economic development . In a paper published in the Nov. 1 issue of the journal Science, the researchers evaluate several advanced energy technologies for their ability to supply carbon-emission-free energy and their potential for large-scale commercialization. They found that no existing alternative energy source, nor combination of sources, could adequately replace the energy produced by fossil fuels. The team's conclusion: massive research commitments are needed to develop these technologies to effectively slow global warming. "To reduce greenhouse gas emissions from our energy systems while maintaining energy prices at comparable levels to today will take revolutionary change as opposed to evolutionary change," said Howard J. Herzog, a principal research engineer at MIT's Laboratory for Energy and the Environment and co-author of the Science paper. The study's call for prompt and aggressive energy research and development distinguishes it from the Bush administration's Energy Plan, which focuses on domestic oil exploration, and the recent United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change "Mitigation" report, which indicates that existing technologies can stabilize human-induced adverse climate change. During the last century, the concentration of atmospheric carbon dioxide has increased from about 275 parts per million to about 370 parts per million. Unchecked, it will pass 550 parts per million by the end of this century, the report states. Climate models and paleoclimate data indicate that 550 parts per million of carbon dioxide, if sustained, could eventually produce global warming comparable in magnitude (but opposite in direction) to the global cooling of the last Ice Age. "What our research clearly shows is that scientific innovation can only reverse this trend if we adopt an aggressive, global strategy for developing alternative fuel sources that can produce up to three times the amount of power we use today," said Martin Hoffert, a professor of physics at New York University and the leader of the team. "Currently, these technologies simply don't exist--either operationally or as pilot projects." The team focused on alternative energy sources including terrestrial solar, wind, biomass, nuclear fission, nuclear fusion and fission-fusion hybrids. The team also explored non-primary power technologies that could contribute to climate stability and slowing down global warming, such as conservation, hydrogen production, superconducting global electric grids and geoengineering.

[Insert Warm]

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Increase in Oil prices reduces consumption Rhein 5— ( Eberhard, senior adviser at the European Policy Center, “Why high oil prices are a force for good”, Energy Bulletin, October 30, http://www.energybulletin.net/node/8589)

The international community has been laboring for 10 years under the Kyoto Protocol negotiations to agree on a global reduction of energy consumption and carbon dioxide emissions of less than 10 percent by 2012. So the market has achieved within a few months what international bureaucrats - hampered by resistance from key consumer countries like the United States, China, Australia and India - have struggled to obtain in a decade.What does this teach us? First, there is nothing more effective than the price mechanism to induce human beings to change their consumption habits. The doubling of oil prices during the last year has raised the prices of air transport, shipping, electricity, steel and, of course, of fuel for automobiles or heating. Every citizen in the world is equal when confronted with the oil price increase. This may not be just, but it is effective. And that is what counts in this strategic area.Second, a 10 percent cut in demand for gasoline is huge, given the effect of excise taxes and consumers' addiction to their cars.Excise taxes serve as a powerful damper of gasoline price fluctuations. A doubling of the oil price has produced only a 10 percent decline in demand for gasoline because the price of gasoline contains more than 60 percent of excise taxes, which are calculated per tonnage and therefore not affected by the price increase. Americans, with hardly any excise taxation on gasoline, feel the pinch much more than Europeans. They should expect an even deeper cut in consumption .In addition, the demand for gasoline is not very sensitive to price changes: Modern citizens would rather cut consumption elsewhere than renounce their cars, air-conditioning and heating.Third, the longer oil prices stay at the high level of more than $50 per barrel, the greater the impact on the demand for oil. People will buy cars that consume less fuel and shift from gasoline to diesel engines. In Belgium, 70 percent of the cars bought in the first half of 2005 were equipped with diesel engines, which offer the double advantage of lower consumption and lower fuel prices. People will invest more in new energies and energy-saving devices, which are suddenly becoming profitable. It is no surprise that the shares of renewable energy companies have skyrocketed during the last few months. Finally, can we say whether oil prices will decline again in a few years? Hardly anybody expects this to happen. The general expectation is for the price to stay above at least $50 per barrel, because of supply problems and rising demand. The oil industry is discovering few new reserves, and the cost of production is rising steeply as less accessible reserves are tapped. Meanwhile, the demand for oil and energy continues to rise, as billions of people in Asia and Latin America claim their fair share of global prosperity. Politicians should be preparing citizens worldwide for a future in which energy prices will remain high, and policy makers should be ready to keep the oil price near the present level by raising the level of excise taxation when necessary. Unfortunately, most politicians are still too myopic or timid to deliver such a message. This needs to change.The high oil price is a bonanza for advocates of the Kyoto Protocol, who will probably claim for the protocol what the market has achieved: the decline of carbon dioxide emissions. If oil prices can be maintained at or above today's high levels, there is less urgency for the extension of the protocol beyond 2012. The market is doing the job - and it embraces all types of energy consumption, which the Kyoto Protocol does not. It becomes therefore almost immaterial whether or not China and the United States will one day join.If the market takes an extended dip, however, as it did in the 1990s, the protocol - particularly its mechanism for trading emission rights - may still be useful as a safety valve.

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High oil prices improve the U.S. economy—Five ReasonsThomas 8— (Joe, Dean, Cornell University's Johnson School of Management and a Professor of Operations Management, “Viewpoint -- High Oil Prices Could Help U.S. Manufacturing”, August 8, Industry Week, http://www.industryweek.com/articles/viewpoint_--_high_oil_prices_could_help_u-s-_manufacturing_17024.aspx)

The higher oil prices that have shocked American industry and consumers alike may contain more than a silver lining, they present a golden opportunity to propel the U.S. into a more productive and efficient future. The short-term pain of higher transportation costs will turn into long-term gains if national policy aims forward instead of backward.Both presidential candidates have addressed this issue mostly in response to higher gas prices for consumers. But the responses so far -- more offshore drilling and conservation -- address only part of the problem. A national policy based on alternative energy, natural gas, better mass transportation, more stringent auto mileage standards, tax breaks for greener technologies and offshore drilling (although results will be years in the future) and nuclear energy will be necessary to power up industry and consumers .As we discovered when the IRS gave tax breaks to consumers who drove gas-guzzling SUVs and classified them as trucks leading to a surge in SUV demand, government can and does affect behavior quite significantly. Of course, private industry must respond as well. The manufacturing industry has taken the lead, with more local production and a more efficient supply chain instituted out of necessity. The days of sourcing lumber in the Pacific Northwest, shipping it to China for production of furniture, and sending it back to Chicago or Dallas as a new dining room table will be less common now that a container from Shanghai to Long Beach costs $8,000, compared to $3,000 less than 10 years ago. Prices have dropped from $140 a barrel, but the era of cheap oil is over and no amount of debate on tire pressure can change that. Here are five outcomes that are likely if Americans embrace the end of cheap oil and politicians, industry and consumers act accordingly. 1. The U.S. will keep many of our manufacturing jobs. High oil prices and the devaluation of the dollar have made Asian goods more expensive to purchase and ship, and I believe this will keep the manufacturing sector stable. Many U.S. industries will keep current jobs and transfer fewer jobs offshore. Still, the initial investment required for plants in some heavy industries that have moved overseas is so high that new plants will not be built in some capital-intensive industries. The overall benefit will occur not just for final product assembly, but across the supply chain. Much of the U.S. economic growth comes from small- and mid-sized enterprises, which can provide better customer service and faster response time by keeping their manufacturing local. This competitive advantage will keep their manufacturing jobs in the U.S. 2. More U.S. auto production. Even though GM and Ford are closing factories and trying to build fewer trucks and more small cars, a transformation that will result in fewer jobs, the overall employment may stay stable -- or increase -- due to foreign investment. With the cost of auto components, including steel, rising, foreign auto firms like Honda, Toyota and Hyundai will purchase more components in the U.S. and assemble cars here, enjoying cost savings in purchasing and transportation and providing additional U.S. manufacturing jobs. 3. Less Driving. The Federal Highway Administration reported Americans drove 9.6 billion fewer miles in May compared to a year earlier. For the first four months of the year compared to 2007, we drove 40.5 billion less miles. This trend has major implications for train and bus usage and less tax revenue for the nation's highway system. Lower tax revenue is a problem, but less driving and smaller cars will decrease oil consumption and provide side benefits, cleaner air and fewer highway fatalities. 4. Green Investment. It is now economically feasible to invest in wind, solar and other alternative energies. GE has a two-year backlog on turbines for large windmills. The private sector will find ways to improve the technology and lower the cost for a range of energy sources such as biofuels. But wind and biofuel will not be enough by themselves and industry must discover how to make solar power and other alternative energies economically efficient. 5. National Energy Policy. For years, gas prices were too low and it made us do things that were not economically justifiable or sustainable. The presidential race features candidates who advocate drilling -- which will take years to produce results -- and to produce more ethanol from corn, which is a mistake in my opinion. Biomass, grass and sugar cane are much more efficient as sources for ethanol than corn. A comprehensive energy policy which incorporates ideas to help manufacturing, the environment, and the economy can be called "all of the above." We need drilling; we need nuclear power; we need renewable energy. Higher energy prices make many of these efficient.

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Afghan Instability Good 1NC

Turn- an unstable Afghanistan is key to preventing Indo-Pak War.Finel 09, Bernard Finel, Atlantic Council contributing editor, is a senior fellow at the American Security Project, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Nuclear War, 9/1/2009, http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/afghanistan-pakistan-and-nuclear-war

As the foreign policy community has started to seriously question whether the war in Afghanistan serves America's strategic interests, regional experts Jari Lindholm and Joshua Foust have offered up a new rationale: preventing a nuclear war between India and Pakistan. Foust writes : The big danger, as it has been since 1999, is that insurgents, bored or underutilized in Afghanistan, will spark another confrontation between India and Pakistan, and that that confrontation will spillover into nuclear conflict. That is worth blood and treasure to prevent. Lindholm argues: Without access to the training grounds of Afghanistan, Pakistan’s intelligence service would’ve found it difficult to build the militant armies it sent to invade Indian-controlled Kashmir in the early 90s; and without Kashmir in flames, the nuclear close-calls of 1999 and 2001 never would have happened. Why We Fight Prevent is an awfully strong word, isn’t it? Realistically, we’re talking about “reducing” (at best) the risk of nuclear war rather than preventing it. How many American lives is it worth to reduce the already low risk of nuclear war between India and Pakistan? Is this a humanitarian argument? That the loss of life in South Asia would be so great as to justify the investment? We can’t build a consensus on Darfur, and most Americans regret the Somalia intervention which saved hundreds of thousands at the cost of 19 American lives. Is it an environmental issue? Concern over potential fallout and maybe broader climactic considerations? We can’t even build a consensus on a carbon bill to address the certainty of climate change when even the most aggressive bill would cost a fraction of the cost of the Afghan war. So structurally, it is an argument which relies on appeals to unlikely risks and vague principles to justify the very real loss of American lives and the expenditure of hundreds of billions of dollars of taxpayer dollars. Second, the argument relies on incoherent strategic logic. “Fixing” Afghanistan would have no effect on the risk of nuclear war and might indeed increase it by some tiny fraction. Lindholm and Foust seem to believe that Islamist radicals, if allowed to return to Afghanistan, would create pressure for the Pakistani government to behave more aggressively toward India or independently provoke a conflict between the two. The first is almost certainly the reverse of what would occur. The second unlikely but also unrelated to Afghanistan. Does radicalism in Afghanistan pressure Pakistan into more extreme behavior? Clearly not. Some indiscreet Pakistani strategists consider Afghanistan as providing strategic depth in the case of a conflict with India. The concept is fuzzy frankly, because unless the Pakistani army plans to retreat over the border — with no infrastructure or supplies — to avoid Indian advances, there is no compelling conventional strategic depth argument. But, on the other hand, having as a neighbor a state that would unquestionably take Pakistan’s side in a conflict would provide some opportunity to retreat strategic assets, leadership, and potentially provide a base for guerrilla resistance against an Indian incursion. In short, what a Taliban controlled Afghanistan might provide Pakistani leaders is a small measure of reassurance that in a conflict, the Pakistani army would not find itself crushed between an Indian advance and a closed Afghan border. But while in a constrained and unlikely case, the “strategic depth” provided by Afghanistan could provide Pakistan with some options in the case of an Indian attack, there is no way in which the “strategic depth” provided by Afghanistan could aid in the development of an offensive military option against India. In short, strategic logic suggests that a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan would reduce the risk of conflict by reducing insecurity among Pakistani elites . Because it would not provide Pakistan with any additional offensive capabilities, it ought not increase insecurity among Indian decision makers. Lower levels of insecurity usually result in lower levels of risk taking and less pressure for military pre-emption in times of crisis. An Islamist — and likely anti-Indian — regime in Afghanistan almost certainly eases the security dilemma in South Asia rather than increasing it.

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Terrorism Good 1NC

1. Terrorism helps U.S. hegemony – Key to Iraq WarPeople’s Daily 02—( “A year after the ‘September 11’ attack”, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200209/11/print20020911_103025.html)

Diplomatic Gains after "September 11": Taking advantage of the unprecedented moral support extended to the United States by the international community, America has successfully organized an international counter-terrorist alliance, and has gained political dominant power; it has strengthened its relations with its allies, at the same time it has pushed forward its ties with other big powers, particularly US-Russian relations; US troops have entered Central Asia, gone deep into South Asia and returned to Southeast Asia, and further enhanced the superiority of its global strategy. In the anti-terrorist war, it has put into practice its theory of military revolution, and displayed and consolidated its military superiority. Generally speaking, the US status as the superpower has become more prominent after "September 11 ". Hidden Diplomatic Troubles: It is over-confident of its military strength and is inclined to adopting a relatively oversimplified method of dealing with terrorism, it gives priority to the military; unilateralism rears up its head, its hegemonist tendency becomes more conspicuous, it has unilaterally terminated the ABM (Anti-ballistic missile) treaty and forced through the NMD (national missile defense) system, it has withdrawn from the Kyoto Protocol and the CTBT (comprehensive [nuclear] test ban treaty), it rejects the International Criminal Court's restraint on the United States, it extends more unequivocal support to Israel in the Arab-Israeli conflicts and threatens to attack Iraq in defiance of everything; economically, it wages an iron and steel trade war, while asking other countries to cut down subsidies to agricultural products , it has decided to provide American farmers with financial aid of US$13 billion. The Bush administration's new concept of security: also called "offensive realism" Supremacy to security of native land;Object of precaution is not a specific category of countries, but rather it is countries, groups and even individuals with attacking "abilities";Security Measures Taken in USCombating terrorism has become a long-term component part and near-term main task of US strategy, US ties with other countries, to some extent, depends on other countries' cooperation with the United States in the fight against terrorism; The focus of counter-terrorism is preemptive strike at the source of threat abroad, or called "preventive intervention", the present object of its preemptive strategy is the so-called "axis of evil" countries, especially Iraq; Proceeding from the need of countering threats, it may employ any means, particularly lowering the nuclear threshold; The Asia-Pacific region becomes the focus in its regional military strategy;While guarding against non-traditional security threat, it maintains vigilance on the question of traditional security, particularly preventing the emergence of a leading power on the Eurasian continent.

[Insert Heg Good]

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Terrorism Good 1NC

Terrorism helps the U.S. economy—When a disaster strikes, the government spends money to rebuild and stimulates growthNoah 01— ( Timothy, senior writer for Slate magazine, contributing editor to The Washington Monthly, a staff writer at The New Republic and a congressional correspondent for Newsweek, and cum laude graduate of Harvard, “Will Terrorism Resuscitate the U.S. Economy?”, September 12, http://www.slate.com/id/1008279)

The Wall Street Journal and Washington Post both predict in their Sept. 12 news columns that the havoc wrought by yesterday's events may bring on a recession. Chatterbox thinks they couldn't have it more wrong. While the destruction of the World Trade Center, the multiple plane crashes, and the damage to the Pentagon are morally obscene because of the (probably thousands) of deaths and countless injuries they caused, economically the net result of the terrorists' actions is likely to be beneficial to the United States. "The U.S. economy will go into a recession as a result of the terrorist attack," Sung Won San, chief economist for Wells Fargo & Co., told the Post's John M. Berry and Steven Pearlstein. Why? Consumer confidence will tumble. But what does anxiety about a terrible but decidedly non-monetary tragedy have to do with consumer confidence? In the Journal, Greg Ip and John D. McKinnon explain that by causing an oil spike, the Gulf War depressed consumer confidence and eventually helped cause a recession. Yesterday's oil prices did indeed spike, and "as political tensions rise again in the Mideast" we may see oil prices stay high for some time. Translation: If the United States bombs or invades Afghanistan in order to take out Osama Bin Laden--the increasingly likely mastermind of yesterday's mayhem--then oil-producing nations might get mad and cut back oil production. Could be, but there are an awful lot of "ifs" there. (Certainly the oil-producing Saudis seem unlikely to shed any tears for Bin Laden, who for years has been on the lam from Saudi law enforcement.) Another consumer confidence argument is that people will stay out of airplanes in droves for fear of fatal hijackings. But Chatterbox bets that won't happen. After a traumatic event like this one, people are eager to reassert normal patterns of behavior, even--perhaps especially--if it means suppressing rational fears. Call it a laudable refusal to be bullied, or call it a pathological amnesia, but it's real and it's beneficial to the economy. (Consider, for example, all the people who rebuild their California houses after earthquakes.) As for the stock market, Chatterbox defers to Moneybox columnist Rob Walker's wise judgment that there probably won't be any significant effect. OK, so the World Trade Center disaster won't harm the economy. Why does Chatterbox think it will benefit the economy? Simple: because we live in a very wealthy nation that responds to horrible disasters by spending large sums of money. In this case, the spending will come both from private insurers and from the federal government's Federal Emergency Management Agency, which over the past decade has established itself as a politically unstoppable source of federal largesse. FEMA helped Southern California's recession-plagued economy to boom after it suffered various natural disasters in the early 1990s. In that instance, of course, California benefited from a Democratic administration's reliance on its votes in the upcoming 1996 election. Since New York is unlikely to go for Bush in 2004, this president will likely be less enthusiastic about rebuilding it. But rebuild it he must if he wants to demonstrate that terrorists can't damage U.S. morale. Why will the entire U.S. economy benefit, as opposed to just New York's? Because the money will be spent in the nerve center of American finance, which is having a rough time of it these days. Chatterbox believes that the mere presence of construction activity around Wall Street will have a beneficial psychological effect on bankers and brokers. It will also provide a meaningful Keynesian stimulus to a national economy that, let's face it, was tottering on the brink of recession well before Sept. 11. The recession may still come, but the countercyclical spending should help shorten it.

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US-Russian Relations Low US-Russian Relations weak- Barriers still exist.Saunders 10, Paul J. Saunders, executive director of the Nixon Center and served as a political appointee in the State Department during the George W. Bush administration, Russian-American Obstacles Overshadow Obama-Medvedev Meeting, 6/23/2010, http://politics.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2010/06/23/russian-american-obstacles-overshadow-obama-medvedev-meeting.html

When President Obama meets with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev on Thursday in Washington, his administration will understandably focus on the improvement in the U.S.-Russian relationship during the last year. But many, if not most, of the obstacles to a real partnership with Russia still lie ahead—and it would be dangerous to ignore them. In the wake of the August 2008 Russia-Georgia war, interaction between Washington and Moscow had reached its lowest point in perhaps two decades. Since that time, the tone of U.S.-Russian diplomacy has improved considerably, Russia has expanded American access to its airspace to supply U.S. forces in Afghanistan, the two countries have signed a modest but symbolically useful arms control agreement, and Moscow has voted with Washington to support new United Nations Security Council Sanctions on Iran. These are important accomplishments—and administration officials would doubtless argue that there are others. Yet the progress in U.S.-Russian relations remains very fragile and could easily stall or even collapse amid new recriminations. That was after all the experience of the previous two American presidents, each of whom began his term in office reaching out to Moscow only to see the effort fail. There are many reasons for those failures, including developments in Russia and mistakes in American policy. The principal problem, however, is that the United States and Russia have different foreign policy goals, priorities, and expectations.

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http://politics.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2010/06/23/russian-american-obstacles-overshadow-obama-medvedev-meeting.html

http://politics.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2010/06/23/russian-american-obstacles-overshadow-obama-medvedev-meeting.html


US-Russian Relations Bad

Russia leverages U.S. support policies to aid terroristsLunev 02 [Stanislav, Colonel, former Russian spy, consultant for the FBIand the CIA, “Moscow’s Two-Faced Strategy”, Newsmax, 8-30-2002, http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2002/8/30/23934.shtml]

The latest developments connected with Russia's ties with Iraq, Iran and North Korea – President Bush's "axis of evil" – very clearly demonstrate the real nature of the Kremlin's two-faced strategy . While officially supporting the U.S.-led anti-terrorist coalition, Moscow has been speeding up the establishment of alliance-type relations with these major sponsors of international terrorism. On Aug. 21, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld warned that if Russia decides to do business with nations that are sponsoring international terrorism, companies around the world might shy away from doing business with Moscow. "To the extent that Russia decides that it wants to parade its relationship with countries like Iraq and Libya and Syria and Cuba and North Korea, it sends a signal out across the globe that that is what Russia thinks is a good thing to do, to deal with the terrorist states , to have them as their relationship developers," he said in Fort Hood, Texas, after meeting with President Bush.

Nuclear terrorism risks extinction.Sid-Ahmed 2004 (Al-Ahram Mohamed, Weekly political analyst, "Extinction!" 8/26, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/ 2004/705/op5.htm)

We have reached a point in human history where the phenomenon of terrorism has to be completely uprooted, not through persecution and oppression, but by removing the reasons that make particular sections of the world population resort to terrorism . This means that fundamental changes must be brought to the world system itself. The phenomenon of terrorism is

even more dangerous than is generally believed. We are in for surprises no less serious than 9/11 and with far more devastating consequences. A nuclear attack by terrorists will be much more critical than Hiroshima and Nagazaki , even if -- and this is far from certain -- the weapons used are less harmful than those used then, Japan, at the time, with no knowledge of nuclear technology, had no choice but to capitulate. Today, the technology is a

secret for nobody. So far, except for the two bombs dropped on Japan, nuclear weapons have been used only to threaten . Now we are at a stage where they can be detonated. This completely changes the rules of the game . We have reached a point where anticipatory measures can determine the course of events. Allegations of a terrorist connection can be used to justify anticipatory measures , including the invasion of a sovereign state like Iraq. As it turned out, these allegations, as well as the allegation that Saddam was harbouring WMD, proved to be unfounded. What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. S ocieties would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive.

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US-Russian Relations Bad

US-Russian relations cause rapid prolif Lunev 02 [Stanislav, Colonel, former Russian spy, consultant for the FBI and the CIA, “America’s worst foes are Moscow’s best friends”, Newsmax, August 20, 2002, http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2002/8/19/164404.shtml]

From 1956 onward, the Russian media said, the former Soviet Union and North Korea developed cooperation in such sensitive areas as nuclear research, while supporting Pyongyang's program for building nuclear weapons. Pyongyang's military is armed with Soviet weapons, and currently Russia continues to sell arms to North Korean communists. Russia is also assisting Pyongyang in creating its own air and anti-missile defense systems by deploying Russian-made S-300 anti-air and anti-missile complexes. This weapon is capable not only of fighting against hostile combat aircraft, but can also destroy tactical and operational missiles and, in some cases, strategic nuclear missiles. Recently, it became known that during the "new partnership" with the West, Russia is secretly selling modern missile technologies and components to North Korea, which radically increases Pyongyang's nuclear missile capabilities. According to U.S. intelligence estimates, Russia is clandestinely selling special aluminum alloys, laser gyroscopes and other components used in missile guidance as well as connectors and relays used in missile electronics. There is no doubt that under Putin, Russian foreign policy has sought to create a network of alliances to counterbalance and challenge the U.S. in international affairs. Under these circumstances it is impossible to speak about any real cooperation with Russia, the best friend of the "axis of evil" nations.

That causes global nuclear war. Utgoff 02 (Deputy Director of the Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of the Institute for Defense Analyses., Survival, vol. 44, no. 2, Summer 2002, pp. 85–102 “Proliferation, Missile Defence and American Ambitions”)

In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear ‘six-shooters’ on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations.

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US-Russian Relations Good

Russian relations are key to Afghanistan and stopping terrorism.BBC 08, BBC Monitoring South Asia – Political, Russia can influence NATO operation in Afghanistan, says Afghan daily, 7/1/2008, http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T9752598856&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T9752598859&cisb=22_T9752598858&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=10962&docNo=25

Russia's onslaught on Georgia, which could have seriously affected relations among regional countries, ended shortly after it [Russia] recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia officially as independent. The step has once again normalized the regional situation. Russia warned during the war in Ossetia that it would cut any relations with NATO and that this could affect Afghanistan, because NATO has been transferring its logistical and military equipment to Afghanistan via Russia. If Russia had applied its threat, NATO forces could have faced a new serious challenge in Afghanistan and this could have been the start of another cold war between Russia and the West. It seems that both Russians and westerns have tolerated much and reacted wisely with political compromise following the Russian military expedition to Tbilisi and the crisis in South Ossetia. The recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia by Russia has contributed considerably to diffusing the crisis and preventing an upsurge in violence in the region. Preventing homelessness and killing any time and anywhere on the globe is a sign of humanitarian and democratic feelings. Meanwhile, westerners have also realized that too much resistance against Russia will most likely cut 30 per cent of Russian energy to Europe. Both westerners and Russians agreed on one strategic point - that a continued clash in Georgia can endanger half of the globe. Of all countries, Afghanistan's situation means that it can be seriously affected by developments in the world. Stopping the shipment of equipment to NATO in Afghanistan could result in an extremely weak war on terror in the country. Hence, Afghanistan as the front line of the battle, could be damaged heavily and the fanatical anti-government terrorists could take advantage of the disparity.

US Russian relations key to stop terrorismStepanova 01, Yekaterina Stepanova, senior researcher at the Center for Political and Military Forecast of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Keep America From Becoming Another Israel, 7/27/2001, http://www.cdi.org/russia/173.htmlLong before the tragic events of September, Afghanistan presented one of the rare examples of U.S. and Russian active bilateral cooperation on a regional security problem. Improved cooperation on Afghanistan stood as a notable exception to generally problematic relations between the United States and Russia. Problems ranged from strategic arms control to human rights to regional conflict management -- especially in the former Yugoslavia, Iraq and on the territory of the former Soviet Union. U.S.-Russia cooperation on Afghanistan took different forms: from seeking to force the Taliban, the country's de facto government, to change its policies on terrorism and narcotics through UN sanctions, to forming a bilateral working group focusing on terrorist threats coming from Afghanistan. Long before September, this "untypical" case of U.S.-Russia cooperation on a regional security problem had provoked both political and academic interest. Both Russia and the United States have been key international players in the region. Both have used Afghanistan (the Soviet Union directly and the United States indirectly) as a Cold War playground; both have been seriously considering the "terrorist threat" coming from Afghanistan. As permanent members of the UN Security Council, both have been the most active advocates of sanctions against the Taliban, despite disagreements with some other members. And both have resorted or threatened to resort to the use of force against targets in Afghanistan, with the U.S. bombing Osama bin Ladin's "terrorist bases" in 1998 and Russia threatening missile attacks in 2000. However, it is the wider counter-terrorism aspect of the problem that has important foreign policy and domestic implications for both states. This is what led presidents Bill Clinton and Vladimir Putin in 2000 to agree to form a bilateral working group on Afghanistan specifically to complement U.S. and Russian counter-terrorist efforts. For the United States, it was the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Africa, allegedly instigated by bin Ladin, that seemed to stimulate a reinvigoration of policy on Afghanistan, which had been off the primary agenda since the fall of Najibullah's government in 1992. For Russia, which has also declared the struggle against international terrorism as one of its top foreign policy priorities, the greatest challenge regarding the situation in Afghanistan was the so-called "Islamic threat" -- the potential of the Taliban to stimulate the rise of radical Islam in Central Asian states, thus aiding, directly or indirectly, radical Islamic movements in challenging local regimes. With the U.S. response to the September terrorist attacks in the offing, the question of whether U.S.-Russian cooperation on Afghanistan is a case-specific phenomenon or a litmus test for Russia's future cooperation with the West -- both in confronting terrorism and in resolving other conflicts across Eurasia -- is now more relevant than ever. Any disproportionate and unfocused U.S. unilateral military action against "appointed culprit" states -- an action that has the potential of seriously destabilizing the situation not only in the states under attack, but in the adjacent regions as well -- could create more security problems than it is meant to solve, stimulate backlash aggression from forces hostile to the United States and lead to erosion of the wide international consensus in their favor. While this time U.S. unilateralism is unlikely to be openly disputed, as the case for self-defense can be justified, the need to counter international terrorism more than ever requires multilateral solutions that should not be limited to the use of military force. In the longer term, the world cannot afford its leader, the United States, to become another Israel -- a "fortress state" whose active and effective unilateral counter-terrorist measures seem largely to fail to address the underlying problems fueling terrorism.

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US-Russian Relations Good

US- Russian Relations has accomplished muchGordon 10, Phillip H. Gordon, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, at the German Marshall Fund, U.S.-Russia Relations Under the Obama Administration, 6/18/2010, http://www.acus.org/natosource/us-russia-relations-under-obama-administrationThe Obama Administration’s new approach to Russia has produced considerable results that have advanced U.S. interests on a host of vital issues. Some of the most prominent include: *New START Treaty, which is the most comprehensive arms control agreement in nearly two decades. The Treaty cuts – by about a third – the nuclear weapons that the United States and Russia will deploy. It significantly reduces missiles and launchers. It puts in place a strong and effective verification regime. And it maintains the flexibility that we need to protect and advance our national security, to guarantee our commitment to the security of our Allies, and to move responsibly toward world without nuclear weapons. * We concluded a lethal air transit agreement that has now permits, on average, two U.S. planes a day to fly over Russia carrying troops and supplies in support of the mission in Afghanistan. To date, over 275 flights have carried over 35,000 passengers and valuable cargo. Russia’s rail network has facilitated transit of more than 10,000 containers of supplies. And Russia’s willingness to consider NATO’s request for helicopters, spare parts, and training to the Afghan National Security Forces open the door to additional important security assistance. About 30% of cargo to Afghanistan goes through the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) and 60% of the NDN goes through Russia. * Well over 100 meetings and exchanges have taken place under the auspices of the Binational Presidential Commission, bringing together over 60 Russian and American government agencies, not to mention multiple private sector and non-governmental partners. We have achieved concrete results: * On security, we have agreed to dispose of enough weapons-grade plutonium for 17,000 nuclear warheads; * On economics, American companies were the first to announce investments in Russia's Skolkovo innovation center, while Russia just awarded a 50-aircraft tender for Boeing 737s worth $4 billion; * On people-to-people cooperation, we completed in May our first ever youth basketball exchange in the United States and supported over 40 American cultural events in Russia. * We are working on many other areas from the environment to terrorism.

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http://www.acus.org/natosource/us-russia-relations-under-obama-administration




US-Russian Relations High

US-Russian Relations are strong, the spy scandal had no effectOzdal 10, Hbibe Ozdal, Journal of Turkish Weekly Columnist, Spy Scandal and The Recent U.S.-Russian Relations, 7/6/2010, http://www.turkishweekly.net/columnist/3361/spy-scandal-and-the-recent-u-s-russian-relations.html

An analysis of the current U.S.-Russian relationship shows that both sides are willing to extend the positive agenda and to go beyond the disarmament and non-proliferation questions, where they have achieved considerable success. Considering, the state of relations with Russia, which Obama inherited from Bush administration, the current level of relations can be evaluated as a major progress. Even though some analysts insist on the idea that “Russia is the same Russia so that there is no need to resetting or renaming the relations with Russia”, it seems that the spy scandal will not have at least traumatic affect on U.S.-Russian relations. Since the Obama administration announced that it would not expel the Russian diplomats and expressed no indignation that its putative partner was spying on it, it seems that President Obama’s plan is to largely ignore the issue publicly, leaving it to diplomats and investigators to handle, while he moves on to what he sees as more important matters.

US-Russian relations are extremely strong, spy scandal provesZlobin 10, Nikolai Zlobin, Director of Russian and Eurasian Programs at the World Security Institute and Senior Fellow at the Center for Defense Information, Spy scandal demonstrates closer relations between Moscow and Washington, 7/13/2010, http://en.rian.ru/valdai_op/20100713/159777682.html

Oddly enough, the scandal has shown that political ties between Russian and U.S. leadership are much closer than one might think. The way the conflict was resolved (through an exchange of accused spies), the fact that it was resolved so quickly, the way in which both countries presented the events, and what political officials involved in these cases said -- all of this shows a strong desire by both countries to minimise the political impact, minimise the political effect and reach a solution. This scandal could not have been resolved so easily if U.S.-Russian relations were not as good as they are today , which was the case just a few years ago, for example. It may seem paradoxical, but this scandal will help strengthen the relationship of mutual trust between Moscow and Washington. The way it has been resolved shows that both sides are willing to do everything possible not to upset the nascent good chemistry, so to speak, that is developing between the two presidents.

Economic ties have driven strong US-Russian RelationsKleinfeld and Cohen 10, Klaus Kleinfeld, chairman and CEO of Alcoa and chairman of the U.S.-Russia Business Council, and William Cohen, former defense secretary and U.S. senator, is chairman and CEO of The Cohen Group, a global business consulting services firm based in Washington, Business Is Driving Us Toward a New Era, 6/30/2010, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/business-is-driving-us-toward-a-new-era/409363.html

In the summer of 2008, the Russia-Georgia conflict plunged U.S.-Russian relations to their lowest point since the Cold War. Once in office, the Obama administration initiated a “reset” of U.S.-Russian relations. While this generated understandable skepticism from some concerned about objectionable Russian behavior, it nonetheless was the right policy in our view. Every president for the past century has found it necessary and beneficial to U.S. interests to work closely with the Kremlin despite problems or tensions in U.S.-Russian relations. After some early missteps, this reset has borne fruit with progress in the security, trade and commercial spheres. Last Thursday in Washington, a group of 30 CEOs from prominent U.S. and Russian corporations met with Obama and Medvedev with a mandate to use their collective experiences to promote new paradigms for mutually beneficial trade and investment. This corporate dialogue is the type of constructive private sector cooperation Washington and Moscow need to make sure the reset moves forward. Strong economic ties breed strong political relationships, and expanded trade and investment will be the foundation upon which security cooperation can be sustained. With the support of both presidents, business has taken the lead in driving the two countries toward a new era of economic cooperation and mutual prosperity.

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http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/business-is-driving-us-toward-a-new-era/409363.html

http://en.rian.ru/valdai_op/20100713/159777682.html

http://en.rian.ru/valdai_op/20100713/159777682.html

http://www.turkishweekly.net/columnist/3361/spy-scandal-and-the-recent-u-s-russian-relations.html


NATO Bad: Hurts RussiaStrengthening NATO upsets Russia-causes aggression. EU Times 10 (“Medvedev says Russia Concerned over Endless NATO Expansion” February 26, 2010, http://www.eutimes.net/2010/02/medvedev-says-russia-concerned-over-endless-nato-expansion/)

Russia’s new military doctrine does not identify NATO as its major threat but Moscow is disturbed by the alliance’s “endless enlargement”, President Dmitry Medvedev said in an interview published on Thursday.Russia has made future NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia, two former Soviet republics, a ‘red line’ in its relations with the West. It said in the new doctrine, published on February 5, that one of the “main external threats of war” came from the alliance’s eastward expansion to Russia’s borders.“NATO is not seen as the main military threat (to Russia) in the military doctrine,” Medvedev said in an interview with French weekly magazine Paris Match.“The issue is that NATO’s endless enlargement, by absorbing countries that were once part of the Soviet Union, or who are our immediate neighbors, is of course creating problems because NATO is after all, a military bloc,” he said.Medvedev’s comments clarify the stance toward NATO set out in the military doctrine, which reiterated Moscow’s long-standing fears of encirclement by the alliance.Medvedev, who will travel to Paris next month, warned that Russia would not remain indifferent if NATO continued to expand and reconfigure missiles near its borders, according to a transcript published in Russian on the Kremlin.ru website.“This can’t but disturb us,” Medvedev said, adding that it did not mean Russia was returning to the thinking of the Cold War, when NATO was the Soviet Union’s biggest foe.Eighteen months after Russia’s brief war with pro-Western Georgia, Moscow’s relations with the alliance remain tense. NATO members have shown little enthusiasm for Medvedev’s call to create a new, umbrella European security treaty.

US-Russia war would lead to extinctionHelfand and Pastore 09 [Ira Helfand, M.D., and John O. Pastore, M.D., are past presidents of Physicians for Social Responsibility. March 31, 2009, “U.S.-Russia nuclear war still a threat”, http://www.projo.com/opinion/contributors/content/CT_pastoreline_03-31-09_EODSCAO_v15.bbdf23.html]

President Obama and Russian President Dimitri Medvedev are scheduled to Wednesday in London during the G-20 summit. They must not let the current economic crisis keep them from focusing on one of the greatest threats confronting humanity: the danger of nuclear war. Since the end of the Cold War, many have acted as though the danger of nuclear war has ended. It has not. There remain in the world more than 20,000 nuclear weapons. Alarmingly, more than 2,000 of these weapons in the U.S. and Russian arsenals remain on ready-alert status , commonly known as hair-trigger alert. They can be fired within five minutes and reach targets in the other country 30 minutes later. Just one of these weapons can destroy a city . A war involving a substantial number would cause devastation on a scale unprecedented in human history. A study conducted by Physicians for Social Responsibility in 2002 showed that if only 500 of the Russian weapons on high alert exploded over our cities, 100 million Americans would die in the first 30 minutes. An attack of this magnitude also would destroy the entire economic, communications and transportation infrastructure on which we all depend. Those who survived the initial attack would inhabit a nightmare landscape with huge swaths of the country blanketed with radioactive fallout and epidemic diseases rampant . They would have no food, no fuel, no electricity, no medicine, and certainly no organized health care. In the following months it is likely the vast majority of the U.S. population would die. Recent studies by the eminent climatologists Toon and Robock have shown that such a war would have a huge and immediate impact on climate world wide. If all of the warheads in the U.S. and Russian strategic arsenals were drawn into the conflict, the firestorms they caused would loft 180 million tons of soot and debris into the upper atmosphere — blotting out the sun. Temperatures across the globe would fall an average of 18 degrees Fahrenheit to levels not seen on earth since the depth of the last ice age, 18, 000 years ago. Agriculture would stop, eco-systems would collapse, and many species, including perhaps our own, would become extinct . It is common to discuss nuclear war as a low-probabillity event. But is this true? We know of five occcasions during the last 30 years when either the U.S. or Russia believed it was under attack and prepared a counter-attack. The most recent of these near misses occurred after the end of the Cold War on Jan. 25, 1995, when the Russians mistook a U.S. weather rocket launched from Norway for a possible attack. Jan. 25, 1995, was an ordinary day with no major crisis involving the U.S. and Russia. But, unknown to almost every inhabitant on the planet, a misunderstanding led to the potential for a nuclear war. The ready alert status of nuclear weapons that existed in 1995 remains in place today.

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NATO Bad: GenericNATO Alliance hurts the United States-high costs and security holes. Bandow 10 (Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow at the CATO institute, “Ditching NATO would save the US money” July 16, 2010, http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2010/07/16/ditching_nato_would_save_us_money_99070.html)

Since the formation of NATO more than sixty years ago the Europeans have scrimped on defense. With an essentially bankrupt continent desperately cutting back on government spending, Europe's military outlays will fall further. Washington's finances are equally bad: the United States also should cut military expenditures, especially for Europe. The transatlantic alliance was created in 1949 as relations with the Soviet Union grew frosty. The image of the Red Army pouring through the Fulda Gap fueled Western nightmares. Nevertheless, NATO always stood for North (America) and the others. In the alliance's early years the European members understandably concentrated on economic reconstruction. But they never stopped leaving the heavy military lifting to the United States. Washington regularly begged its allies to increase their defense outlays and they regularly agreed to do so. Then they just as regularly reneged, citing domestic needs and political obstacles. By the 1980s

the Europeans actively opposed U.S. initiatives in Central America and elsewhere. But America continued to protect its errant allies. Then came the collapse of Communism. What then was the purpose of NATO, the quintessential anti-Soviet alliance? Today Europe no longer needs defending. There is no more threatening Red Army. Moscow possesses only a limited conventional capability and has no interest in marching on Warsaw or Budapest, let alone Berlin or Paris. The European Union collectively possesses a larger population and economy than does America. NATO fans first responded with proposals that the alliance deal with illicit drugs and the environment. Then it promoted regional integration by expanding into Central and Eastern Europe. None of these missions made much sense. NATO is a military alliance. The European Union always was a better vehicle for achieving nonmilitary ends. Next NATO went to war "out of area," launching an aggressive war against Serbia - which had threatened no alliance member - to settle ethnic conflict in Kosovo. But the Balkans mattered far more to Europe than to the United States. Now there is the mission in Afghanistan. Alas, that remains primarily America's war. The most important allied assistance comes from just a handful of states and could be provided bilaterally. (Australia already does so outside of NATO.) Most European states have deployed small contingents, hamstrung by "caveats," or combat restrictions, well away from the battlefield. All are looking for the exit. Along the way NATO expansion has made America less secure. Bringing in the Balkan and Baltic countries added liabilities with precious few capabilities. Adding Georgia and Ukraine to the alliance would be even worse, creating huge security black holes. Neither country is remotely relevant to U.S. security. America's membership in NATO is supposed to protect America, not make other states more secure by increasing the risk to Americans. After leaving military affairs largely to America, leading Europeans retained a delusion of turning the European Union into a Weltmacht. They touted the Lisbon Treaty, which created a new president and foreign minister and promoted a "common security and defense policy." However, the treaty has delivered bureaucratic confusion rather than continental confidence - there now are three different presidents (two permanent and one rotating) squabbling over organizational primacy. The "High Representative" for foreign affairs has spent more time negotiating with EU politicians than foreign nations. More important, the Europeans still refuse to develop militaries warranting a new European foreign and defense policy. NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen admitted that the system "will remain a paper tiger if it is not followed by concrete contributions when we need concrete military contributions." However, there is not the slightest chance that such contributions will be forthcoming. Most European nations have steadily cut defense spending over the last two decades. Just five meet the NATO objective of 2 percent of GDP for their militaries. Several are closer to 1 percent or even below. And the numbers are likely to go down even more. Reported the Wall Street Journal: "Governments in France, Germany, Spain and Italy, in rolling out recent austerity measures in response to Europe's sovereign debt crisis, have promised that their militaries won't be spared in coming spending cuts." The United Kingdom's Defense Minister Liam Fox has pledged to cut "ruthlessly and without sentiment." The Europeans' roughly forty thousand troops on station in Afghanistan also will fall. These deployments are everywhere unpopular. The Dutch government recently fell over a dispute on extending the mission. Even British politicians are talking about bringing their forces home. The newer members of NATO, supposedly more worried about the still testy Russian Bear, have behaved no differently. In a study for the Strategic Studies Institute, Col. Joel Hillison observed: "While Russian military expenditures began to rise after 2001, the average defensive burden of these new members continued their gradual fall." Some Americans fulminate against the Europeans, calling them wimps and worse. For instance, Robert Kaplan dismissed European "decadence." He contended: "With their patriotism dissipated, European governments can no longer ask for sacrifices from their populations when it comes to questions of peace and war. Ironically, we may have gained victory in the Cold War, but lost Europe in the process." Defense Secretary Robert Gates was a bit more polite when he charged in February: "The demilitarization of Europe - where large swaths of the general public and political class are averse to military force and the risks that go with it - has gone from a blessing in the 20th century to an impediment to achieving real security and lasting peace in the 21st." No doubt, military force can be useful in a dangerous world. But treating war as just another foreign-policy option can be an even bigger "impediment to achieving real security and lasting peace." For years the U.S. government has engaged in promiscuous war making and threat mongering, leaving America less secure. In these cases, the "peacenik" Europeans have been more often more right than the United States. Still, the dream of a revived transatlantic alliance lives on. A so-called "group of experts" headed by former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright released their report NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement in mid-May. The document called for "a new Strategic Concept": defending Europe, confronting unconventional threats, acting outside alliance boundaries, winning in Afghanistan, preventing crises, creating new partnerships, "participating in a comprehensive approach to complex problems," engaging Russia, adding new members, creating new military capabilities, maintaining nuclear weapons, providing missile defense, responding to cyber attacks, becoming "a more agile alliance" and, last but not least, "telling NATO's story." An earlier, longer report for the European Union Institute for Security Studies called for "a commensurate military capability" to the EU's "civilian power." The EUISS also urged the Continent to "to act autonomously from NATO," which would require "a fully-fledged European (Continued on Next)

(Continued From Top)command to plan and conduct military operations." These are ambitious agendas for nations which may not even have militaries in 2020 at the rate they are cutting defense spending. In fact, there are few threats against which the Europeans must arm. Russia can beat up on hapless Georgia, but trying to swallow Ukraine or Poland would be something else entirely. And a Martian invasion is about as likely as a Russian attack further west. Of course, the Europeans are affected by events elsewhere in the world. But with existential threats lacking, any wars are likely to be matters of choice, not necessity. And the benefits have to

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SCFI 2010 Impact WorkTeam Jabob and the STGs ___ of ___be weighed against the costs. Just how much is it worth to Europeans to keep the Karzai clan in power in Afghanistan? Already there is a sense of "never again" when dealing with Afghanistan. The German defense minister recently proposed four new restrictive criteria, starting with "great and imminent danger to another NATO member." The Afghan mission probably would have failed all four of his conditions even when it was proposed, let alone today. The basic issue, argues Andrew Bacevich of Boston University, is cultural: the Europeans have lost their taste for blood. Thus, the attempt to transform NATO "from a defensive alliance into an instrument of power projection," writes Bacevich, is merely another doomed attempt "to reignite Europe's martial spirit." It ain't going to happen. Rather than whining about European military spending - especially after doing so much to discourage the continent from acting independently - the United States should allow the Europeans to bear the consequences of their actions. That means withdrawing American troops and leaving NATO to the Europeans. Continental defense should be the responsibility of the EU, essentially NATO without the NA (depending upon what Canada would choose to do). If member states prefer to preserve their expensive and expansive welfare states, then so be it. It would still be in the interests of both sides to cooperate militarily - on matters of joint interest. Washington simply has nothing at stake in the Balkans. No more U.S. threats, wars, or deployments there. Most Europeans believe Afghanistan is America's war. The United States should seek support from nations which see involvement as a matter of global security rather than alliance solidarity. Equally important, America needs to cut its defense budget. Total military outlays exceed $700 billion - nearly half of global expenditures. Yet America faces no obvious existential threat, other than an unlikely Russian nuclear attack. The United States has no reason to devote limited resources to defending prosperous and populous allies, most notably in Europe, but also in Asia. During the Cold War, American officials feared the consequences of allowing their allies to be feckless. Today the allies rather than America would suffer from any mistakes. Europe is bankrupt. It is spending less on the military. America is bankrupt. It is spending more on the military. And defending Europe. To coin a phrase, it is time for a change. If the administration won't lead the way, then Congress should take control through the use of the appropriations process.

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NATO Bad: GenericNATO alliance bad for the United States- allows Europe to evade security responsibilities, overstretches American resources, and hurts American security. Carpenter 9 (Ted Carpenter, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, is the author of eight books and more than 400 articles on international affairs. His most recent book is Smart Power: Toward a Prudent Foreign Policy for America (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). He is a contributing editor to the National Interest and serves on the editorial boards of Mediterranean Quarterly and the Journal of Strategic Studies, “NATO at 60:A Hollow Alliance” March 30, 2009, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa635.pdf)

Perhaps most worrisome, the defense spending levels and military capabilities of NATO’s principal European members have plunged in recent years. The decay of those military forces has reached the point that American leaders now worrythat joint operations with U.S. forces are becoming difficult, if not impossible. The ineffectiveness of the European militaries is apparent in NATO’s stumbling performance in Afghanistan. NATO has outlived whatever usefulness it had. Superficially, it remains an impressive institution, but it has become a hollow shell—far more a political honor society than a meaningful security organization. Yet, while the alliance exists, it is a vehicle for European countries to free ride on the U.S. military commitment instead of spending adequately on their own defenses and taking responsibility for the security of their own region. American calls forgreater burden-sharing are even more futile today than they have been over the past 60 years. Until the United States changes the incentives by withdrawing its troops from Europe and phasing out its NATO commitment, the Europeans will happily continue to evade their responsibilities. Today’s NATO is a bad bargain for the United States. We have security obligations to countries that add little to our own military power. Even worse, some of those countries could easily entangle America in dangerous parochial disputes. It is time to terminate this increasingly dysfunctional alliance.

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NATO Bad- Generic

NATO exposes the US to potential security threatsCarpenter 9 (Ted Carpenter, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, is the author of eight books and more than 400 articles on international affairs. His most recent book is Smart Power: Toward a Prudent Foreign Policy for America (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). He is a contributing editor to the National Interest and serves on the editorial boards of Mediterranean Quarterly and the Journal of Strategic Studies, “NATO at 60:A Hollow Alliance” March 30, 2009, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa635.pdf)

The new members the alliance has admitted since the end of the Cold War are weak client states that expect the United States to defend them. That was largely true even of the first round of expansion that added the mid-sized countries of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. It was more evident in the second round that embraced such tiny military players as Slovakia, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. Such micro allies are security consumers, not security producers. From the standpoint of American interests they are not assets, they are liabilities—and potentially very dangerous liabilities. Taking on the obligation to defend the Baltic countries was especially unwise, because NATO now poses a direct geopolitical challenge to Russia right on Moscow’s doorstep. Relations between Russia and its small Baltic neighbors are testy, to put it mildly. At the moment, Russia may be too weak to challenge the NATO security commitment to those countries, but we cannot be certain that will always be true. The endorsement of NATO membership for Croatia and Albania confirms that the alliance has now entered the realm of farce. The military capabilities of those two countries are minuscule. According to the 2009 edition of The Military Balance, published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Croatia’s military budget is a mere $962 million, and it’s military force consists of 18,600 active-duty personnel. Albania’s budget is $233million, and its force is 14,295. They will augment Estonia’s $425 million and 5,300 troops, Latvia’s $513million and 5,187 troops, Lithuania’s $500 million and 8,850 troops, and Slovenia’s $756 million and 7,200 troops. By not offering membership to Macedonia, though, NATO will have to do without Skopje’s $163 million and 10,890 troops.5 Collectively, those countries spend less on their militaries in a year than the United States spends in Iraq in two weeks. Such new allies are not merely useless; they are potentially an embarrassment to the alliance, and possibly a serious danger. When Vice President Dick Cheney asserted during a visit to the Balkans in 2006 that the proposed members would help “rejuvenate” NATO and rededicate the alliance “to the basic and fundamental values of freedom and democracy,” he showed how out of touch with reality U.S and NATO policy had become. 6

Croatia is just a few years removed from the fascistic regime of Franjo Tudjman and continues to have frosty relations with neighboring Serbia. Albania is a close ally of the new, predominantly Albanian state of Kosovo, an entity whose independence Serbia and Russia (as well as most other countries) do not recognize and vehemently oppose. Albania also is notorious for being under the influence of organized crime. Indeed, the Albanian mafia is legendary throughout Europe, controlling much of the gambling, prostitution, and drug trafficking.7 Efforts to add Ukraine and Georgia to the alliance, a policy that the Bush administration pushed and the Obama administration endorses, would be even worse than the previous rounds of expansion. Ukraine’s relationship with Russia is quite contentious. Georgia’s relationship, of course, is even worse than that, as last summer’s warfare confirmed. Rational Americans should have breathed a sigh of relief that Georgia was not a NATO member at the time the conflict erupted. Proponents of NATO’s enlargement eastward sometimes act as though the alliance is now merely a political honor society. Their underlying logic is that, because the nations of Eastern Europe have become capitalist democracies, they deserve to be members of the West’s most prominent club. But nearly all the newer members ornate, which are the most concerned about possible adverse security developments emanating from Russia, consider the alliance to be more than a political body. They are counting on tangible protection from depredations by their large eastern neighbor. And, equally important, Moscow does not view the current incarnation of NATO as merely political in nature. The Georgian conflict should remind us that NATO is still officially much more than a political club. It remains a military alliance with extensive obligations—especially for the United States. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty proclaims that an attack on one member is an attack on all. That means the United States is obligated to assist in the defense of every member—no matter how small, how militarily or economically insignificant, or how strategically exposed that member might be.

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NATO Bad: Leads to EntanglementNATO expansion draws the US into conflicts. Carpenter 10 (Ted Carpenter, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, is the author of eight books and more than 400 articles on international affairs. His most recent book is Smart Power: Toward a Prudent Foreign Policy for America (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). He is a contributing editor to the National Interest and serves on the editorial boards of Mediterranean Quarterly and the Journal of Strategic Studies, “Balkan Tensions and the future of NATO”. 7/10/10, http://www.hellenesonline.com/go/2010/07/balkan-tensions-and-the-future-of-nato/)

NATO expansion into the Balkans is a spectacularly bad idea, for it entangles the alliance in an assortment of murky disputes and potential dangers. Most of those issues are of little relevance even to NATO’s other European members, much less to the United States. The alliance has not been strengthened by the process of enlargement; to the contrary it has acquired new strategic liabilities rather than assets. The new members are militarily useless, and they all bring with them a variety of unpleasant problems. Enlargement has been an especially bad deal for the United States. As NATO’s leader, America is responsible for implementing the alliance’s goal of maintaining stability throughout its membership zone in Europe–and in even in security arenas beyond the continent. Given the history and current condition of the Balkans, U.S. policymakers have now made all the quarrels and problems of those volatile region America’s problems. That is an extremely unwise strategy.

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NATO Bad: Causes Proliferation

Other countries use NATO policies as an excuse for increasing their nuclear stockpiles and deploying weapons. Meier 9 (Oliver Meier, Arms Control Association & Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy Hamburg, Options for NATO: Pressing the Reset Button of the Strategic Concept, “Securing collective defense without missile defense and tactical nuclear weapons – feasible and desirable” pg. 39, 2009, http://www.basicint.org/pubs/natoshadow.pdf)

Second, there is a danger that other states could use nuclear sharing as a precedence to justify deployments of nuclear weapon on the territory of non-nuclear weapon states. The United States is the only nuclear weapon state that currently deploys nuclear weapons during peacetime on the territory of non-nuclear weapon states but states like Pakistan may want to base some of its arsenal in other states, for example Saudi Arabia. Third, nuclear sharing is undermining efforts to convince countries like Iran that nuclear weapons are no longer useful instruments of national security. As long as NATO allies argue that nuclear sharing is increasing their security, it is inconsistent to tell others to forgo nuclear options. Fourth, the secrecy surrounding NATO nuclear deployments is undermining calls for greater transparency by other states, particularly Russia. NATO is neither confirming nor denying numbers of nuclear weapons deployed in Europe nor details about nuclear weapons bases. Even Parliamentarians in host nations are denied access to information about nuclear weapons deployments. At the same time, NATO is very much interested in increasing transparency related to thousands of Russian tactical nuclear weapons, which would be ideal targets for terrorist networks. Polls in NATO nuclear sharing states show that the majority of citizens are in favour of withdrawal of nuclear weapons and several Parliaments have made statements in this regard.6 Viewed from this perspective, it certainly would strengthen political and public support for collective defence if NATO would bring its nuclear policy in line with public opinion

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NATO Bad: Hurts Civilians

NATO involvement increases the chance civilians will be hurtKoster 9 (Karel Koster, Research Department, Socialist Party Netherlands, Options for NATO: Pressing the Reset Button of the Strategic Concept, “NATO: Abolition or Reform?” pg. 23, 2009, http://www.basicint.org/pubs/natoshadow.pdf)

The second problem is the set of consequences of NATO and its allies waging war in less developed regions of the world. Technological advances have increased the distance between the military personnel of the member states and the consequences of the application of their weaponry. The use of long-distance weapon systems has gravely corroded ethical constraints that tend to limit the full-scale application of such weapons. Such rules of engagement as do exist tend towards force protection, rather than the saving of civilian lives. This is particularly relevant in guerrilla warfare situations, where distinctions between combatant and non-combatant disappear. Today an increasing proportion of conflicts is intra-state, rather than between nations. The long term 20th century trend towards increasing numbers of civilian casualties is therefore continuing into the present century, at least in relative terms. Media perceptions to the contrary, the average uniformed soldier is today much safer than a civilian in a conflict zone. There are also far-reaching consequences for the citizens and soldiers in the countries deploying those soldiers elsewhere. Increasingly, the citizenry of industrialized states is far less inclined than in the past to undertake work involving even a limited risk to life and limb. This is true for armies based on conscription, as well as those based on volunteers. The present shift towards increasing dependence on military contractors for many military functions will therefore continue. This shift, together with the deployment of long-distance weapons will further increase the distance between military and the civilian population of the countries where they are deployed. Therefore, the chance that the civilian population will be injured or their property damaged will also increase. Furthermore, the nature of guerrilla warfare is such that ever more violent and illegal methods are resorted to in order to gain the upper hand. The most extreme consequence is the use of counter-terror and illegal methods of incarceration and interrogation, including torture, which inevitably involve civilians. A dangerous adjunct is the increased use of civilian nation-building agencies and expertise in all-encompassing Strategies—the so-called ‘comprehensive approach’—in which the civilian element is entirely subservient to military aims. Waging this type of war is a recipe for defeat. Long-term changes within the countries deploying the military are also inevitable. Conscription armies were firmly rooted in the societies from which they were recruited. Volunteer armies less so and contractors not at all. That has consequences for the political involvement of the civilian population and the way it relates to the military involved in far-off wars and, crucially, the consequences of those wars. Whereas under conscription returning casualties impressed on the citizens the extreme seriousness of the enterprise in which their government was involved, the modern-day situation involves at best, small communities of the military and their families while in no way influencing the lives of the majority of the population, except in possible increased taxation.

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