Schelling - Aphorisms of 1805

S.Na►ec, 143 (1W1)236 IDEALISTIC STUDIES

SCHELLING'S APHORISMS OF 1805subjunctive mood, lies at the very heart of the hypothesizing activity. Ifscientific knowledge constitutes a system of coherent truths, then theorizingwithin a system so conceived is difficult to justify. This is to say that acoherent system of scientific claims as conceived by Rescher limits theflexibility of theorizing as ordinarily understood. For to suggest a scientifichypothesis as something to be tested places all relevant scientific truths ona tentative footing until the said hypothesis has been proven true. Henceone could argue that there is at least the suspension of the truth of knowledgeclaims surrounding the counterfactual until the requisite verification hastaken place, which is antithetic to Rescher's thesis.

All of this is not to deny the valuable work Professor Rescher has donein indicating a way by which hypotheticals can be handled within a systemof knowledge claims. However, the remedy he proposes cannot cure theproblem in all of its manifestations. Somehow, natural discourse seems todemand that there be an openness of connotation which resists specificationin terms of a possible world model. From this perspective much remainsunsaid concerning the role of the subjunctive, in which mode Rescher presentsa great number of his illustrations.

Cleveland State University

Notes

'Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars, eds., Readings in Philosophical Analysis, "The Contrary-to-Fact Conditional," by R. M. Chisholm (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1949),p. 485.

'Nicholas Rescher, Hypothetical Reasoning (Amsterdam, 1964).'Nicholas Rescher, The Coherence Theory of Truth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973).'Rescher, 1973, p. 265.'Rescher, 1973, p. 272.Rescher, 1973, pp. 280-81.'Rescher, 1973, pp. 284-87.8Rescher, 1973, pp. 275, 278, and 286.9Rescher, 1973, pp. 84-85."'Robert Stalnaker, "Formal Semantics and Philosophical Problems," paper presented at

the American Philosophical Association meeting, New York City, 1979."Stalnaker, pp. 6-8.''Alan R. White, Truth (New York: Anchor Books, 1970), p. 16.

Translated by Fritz Marti

Introductory Note by the Translator. (Translator's insertions are in brackets.)

In the second part of these aphorisms, starting at about Aphorism 121,Schelling sketches the traits of his Naturphilosophie. (I shall retain that wordbecause it is more convenient than any awkward and possibly misleadingtranslation.) The total of the two hundred and twenty-four aphorisms (VII,140-89) can rightly bear the title of an Introduction to Naturphilosophie.But when I here present a translation of only the first eighty, I ought towarn the reader that she or he will not find Schelling's Naturphilosophie,but rather an emphatic introduction to the method of philosophizing andmore especially a short "negative theology," that is, an instruction in whatnot to do when theologizing. I hope that theologians unfamiliar with theGerman original will find my translation useful, and that it will challengephilosophers to revise a still current notion that Fichte provides one half ofphilosophy and Schelling the other.

The notion goes back to the different Critiques of Kant. The basic questionof the Critique of Pure Reason was: How is objective knowledge possible?The problem of the Critique of Practical Reason was: How is unconditionalobligation possible? And the Critique of Judgment raised the questionregarding the systematic unity of "theoretical" (i.e., objective) and "practical"(moral) truth. The climax of this third Critique is found at the end of sectionII of the Introduction:

There must be a ground of the unity of the supersensible which lies atthe basis of nature, with that supersensible which the concept of freedomcontains practically [that is, not as a mere fact but in a sheer act]; andthe concept (Begriff) of this ground, although it does not attain eithertheoretically or practically to a knowledge (Erkenntnis) of the ground,and hence has no jurisdiction (Gebiet) of its own, nevertheless makespossible (or ought to make possible) the transition from the mode ofthought (Denkungsart) according to the principle of the one to thataccording to the principle of the other. (J. H. Bernard's translation,here slightly amended.)

It may look as if Fichte had tried to extend the jurisdiction of practicalreason so as to cover the theoretical. And, in line with Kant' s "primacy of

238 IDEALISTIC STUDIES SCHELLING'S APHORISMS OF 1805 239

practical reason," one can point out that scientific objectivity is one of ourmoral duties. "Yet," says A. R. Caponigri (Philosophy from the Renaissanceto the Romantic Age, University of Notre Dame Press, 1963, p. 510), "itwas obviously no part of Fichte's intention to negate the order of nature,or with it the possibility of a philosophy of nature." Now if the "ground ofunity" postulated by Kant could be attained by the practical "mode ofthought," then indeed the conventional label of "subjective idealism" wouldstick to Fichte. And then one could say with Caponigri that "the developmentof the system of reason which was undertaken by Schelling appears as thecomplement of Fichte's efforts and their completion." As Capaigri adds:"This complementariness led presently to the characterization of their respec-tive systems as subjective and objective idealism." Compare what Schellinghimself said in 1801:

Fichte, for instance, could have conceived of idealism in an entirelysubjective and I, in contrast, in an objective sense.... idealism in thesubjective sense would have to claim that the I is everything, idealismin the objective sense on the contrary that everything equals [is equalto the] I, and that there exists nothing but what equals I. No doubtthese are different views, although one cannot deny that both are idealis-tic. I do not say this is the real case. I merely posit it as possible. Butsupposing it were the case, then the reader could not learn from theword idealism anything about the proper content of a system advancedunder that name. (IV, 109)

The word complement might induce the reader to believe that Schellingsimply added the half of philosophy missing in Fichte. And that would leadto two isms, or to two philosophies. Yet in 1802 Schelling himself declaredemphatically that

there is only One philosophy and One science of philosophy; what youcall different philosophical sciences are only representations of the oneand indivisible whole of philosophy under different aspects (unter ver-schiedenen ideellen Bestimmungen) or, if I may immediately use thefamiliar term, representations in different potencies. (On the Relationof Naturphilosophie to Philosophy as Such, I, 106)

Nowadays the word potency is no longer familiar. What does it mean?In a vulgar expression, it means what one "can do," but not what one actually"is doing." If we want to talk philosophy, we can and must start fromsomewhere, as Kant says, in some "mode of thought." The mode Schellingcalls dogmatism starts from the assumption of some thing, and as Kant hadshown, things are conditional entities. Criticism starts from the unconditionalconviction we all have or could and should have of being each what goes

by the name of "I." Following the clues in Kant, Fichte, and, at firstindependently from Fichte, young Schelling grasped that unconditionality."Unconditional is that which cannot at all be turned into a thing, cannotbecome a thing" (I, 166). "The principle of dogmatism is some not-I positedas antecedent to all I; the principle of criticism is an I posited before everynot-I and excluding every not-I" (I, 170).

In Kant's language the not-I in the strictest sense is called a thing-in-itself(Ding an sich). In 1795, in his Grundlage (I, 286), Fichte wrote: "If theWissenschaftslehre were asked 'how are things constituted in themselves?'it could answer only saying 'the way we ought to make them. — Fichte mayhave had in mind the last section of §84 in Kant's Critique of Judgmentwhich states that man's "existence involves the highest purpose to which,as far as is in his power, he can subject the whole of nature, contrary towhich at least he cannot regard himself as subject to any influence of nature"(J. H. Bernard's translation, p. 285f.). Although Fichte's sentence soundslike an intransigent ethicism that would reject the very study of the objectiveconstitution of things by physical science, in the same Grundlage the sentencethat "the not-I is itself the product of the self-determining I and is nothingabsolute posited outside the I," is followed by the sentence, "an I that positsitself as positing itself, or a subject is not possible without an object, or:the determination of the I, that is, the I's reflection . on itself as this specificI is possible only under the condition that it set its own limit in an opposite,"that is in an object (I, 218).

This interdependence of subject and object led to Schelling's emphasisin his Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism of 1795 where hestressed the fact that dogmatists can be as serious thinkers as criticists. (See,for instance, the sixth and seventh letters, I, 307-16, and my introductionto the Letters in The Unconditional in Human Knowledge, Bucknell Univer-sity Press, 1980, pp. 151-55.)

In 1801 Schelling started the Presentation of My System of Philosophywith the following statement.

Having for several years tried to present one and the same philosophyfrom two quite different sides, as Naturphilosophie and as Transcen-dental Philosophy, the present situation of the science now, earlier thanI myself wanted, drives me to establish publicly the system itself whichin my mind underlies those different presentations, and to place withinreach of all who are interested what until now I possessed only formyself or shared with but a few. There are those who now first under-stand the system as I here present it and who therefore care to and arecapable to compare it with those earlier presentations. Furthermore there

SCHELLING'S APHORISMS OF 1805 241240 IDEALISTIC STUDIES

are those who realize how many preparations were necessary for thecomplete and evident presentation which I am convinced I can nowmake. They all will judge it natural and not at all faulty that I firstmade these preparations and that, from those quite different sides, Itried to prepare the complete knowledge of this philosophy (which Iaudaciously and really take for the real one) before I would dare topresent it in its totality. None of those who realize all this will be ableto imagine that I have changed my own system of philosophy. (True,there were some who actually imagined this after my lectures of lastwinter.) [In the winter 1800/1801 Schelling gave three lectufe courses:on philosophy of art, Naturphilosophie, and transcendental philosophy.See Kuno Fischer, Schellings Leben, Werke and Lehre, 4th ed. , 1923;p. 35.]....Never have I taken what I call transcendental philosophy andNaturphilosophie for being each by itself the system of philosophy...Ialways took them for opposite poles of philosophizing. With the presentpresentation I am standing at the point of their indifference. (IV, 107f.)

If, after this exceedingly solemn declaration, one looks at the content ofthe Presentation of 1801, I for one find two distinct and very different parts.First comes a methodical though very formal inquiry into the concept ofbeing, winding up with theorem §51: "The first relative totality is matter"(IV, 142). After these thirty pages there follow seventy pages of what tome looks like the often repeated, though equally often reformulated, Natur-philosophie. Now, since Schelling declares that, for his manner of presen-tation, he chose "Spinoza as a model" (IV, 113), let the reader who is notallergic to German do what one can do so profitably with Spinoza's Ethics:skim the content by reading only the theorems. The main thesis is Schelling'sDeclaration (Erklarung) § 147: "Matter, insofar as it is not raised to the formof absolute identity, we call dead or inorganic matter. Matter which is [sic!]the form of being of absolute identity is living (belebt)" (IV, 206).

Ever since my years of studying physics in 1915-1922 (a now very datedphysics indeed) I have tried at least once a decade to understand Natur-philosophie. Though I could no longer pass an examination in physics, thegist of what I once learned sticks to my mind and completely blocks myvision when I read such a statement as theorem §152: "With regard to thewhole, the plant represents carbon, the animal nitrogen. Therefore the animalis septentrional, the plant meridional. The latter pole, with regard to theparticular, is designated by the male, the former by the female sex" (IV,207). Schelling calls this a Corollary of § 151: "The organization [of anorganism], in the particular as well as in the whole, must be conceived asengendered by metamorphosis." This outright evolutionism, a generation

before Darwin (1809-1882), tallies with the anti-Newtonian or anti-mechanistic view that nature is alive and that the very study of the inorganicis relatively abstract, a view I heartily share. I also share Schelling's viewthat the empirical sciences borrow their methodical concepts fromphilosophical insights, necessarily though often unintentionally and withoutknowing their source. This view leads to Schelling's distinction betweenempirical natural science and Naturphilosophie. It does not justify nor excusefor us the romantic roamings of Schelling (and of Hegel) based on theromantic though sincere guesses of the incipient sciences around 1800.

In his Berlin lectures of 1804 on the Basic Traits of the Present Age,Fichte spoke of the hunches of a physicist who "starts from phenomena andseeks the unifying law." Following his hunch he will return to the observablephenomena in order to test his thought, willing to give it up if not confirmedby experiment. Thus his hunch is "a gift of genius, and not fantastication(Schwdrmerei). A fantasticator (Schwiirmer) "demands that nature adjust tohis thoughts" (VII, 117). It is well known that Schelling's hunch expressedin the first clause of §89 (IV, 161), that "the process of an electric conduitoccurs under the form of magnetism," led Schelling's pupil H. Chr. Oersteda score of years later to the experimental proof of electromagnetic induction(1820; see Kuno Fischer, loc. cit. , 336).

After all this I should answer the question of this introductory note: Whatis the significance of the Aphorisms in Schelling's development? This is notthe place to review all his writings up to 1805. Below I simply list them.Here I merely point out two things. First, the structure of the Aphorisms of1805 as a whole is the same as that of the System of 1801, that is, aphilosophical methodology precedes a sketch of the Naturphilosophie. Sec-ond, the methodology of 1801 is restricted to the concept of being whilethat of 1805 is a methodology of the philosophy of religion, for us stillindispensable. Schelling furnished a methodology of Naturphilosophie inthe "first or general part" (VII, 198-220) of his Aphorisms on Natur-philosophie which, in the Yearbooks on Medicine as Science (1806), followour Aphorisms as an Introduction to Naturphilosophie, and which give stillanother presentation of Naturphilosophie. The identical bipartition of thetreatises of 1801 and 1805 justifies our separate printing of the methodologyof 1805.


Schelling's Works 1792-1805All titles here are put into English which, to be sure, may lead to someconfusion.

Date Title Reference in Werke

1792 On the origin of human evil. Latin thesis forthe Master's degree in philosophy. Germantranslation by Reinhold Mokrosch in the firstvolume of the Historico-Critical Edition broughtout by the Bavarian Academy of Sciences(Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1976). I, 1-40

1793 On myths, historical legends, and philoso-phemes of the oldest world. 41-83

1794 On the possibility of a form of philosophy assuch.* 85-112

1795 On Marcion as emendator of the Pauline letters.Theological dissertation in Latin. German trans-lation by JOrg Jantzen in the second volume of theHist. Crit. Ed. (Stuttgart, 1980). 113-48

1795 Of the I as principle of philosophy or on theunconditional in human knowledge. *

149-2441795 Philosophical letters on dogmatism and criticism. *

281-3411796 New deduction of natural right. *

245-801796 Treatises as explanation of the idealism of Wissen-

schaftslehre. 343-4521796 (Seven short papers). 453-871797 Ideas for a philosophy of nature. II, 1-3431798 Of the world soul, a hypothesis of higher physics. 345-5831799 First sketch of a system of Naturphilosophie. III, 1-2681799 Introduction to the sketch of a system of Natur-

philosophie. 269-3261800 System of transcendental idealism. English trans-

lation by Peter Heath (University of VirginiaPress, 1978). 327-634

1800 On the General Literary Journal of Jena. 635-681800 General deduction of the dynamic process or of

the categories of physics. IV, 1-781801 On the true concept of Naturphilosophie. 79-1031801 Presentation of my system of philosophy. 105-2121802 Bruno, or on the divine and natural principle of

things. Dialogue. 213-332

1802 Further presentations from the system of phi-losophy. 511-23

1802 Miscellaneous (the poem Heinz Widerporst:546-48). 525-65

1802 On the nature of philosophical critique in generaland its relation to the present stage of philosophy inparticular. V, 3-17

1802 On the absolute identity system and its relation tothe newest (Reinholdian) dualism. A dialogue be-tween the author and a friend. 18-77

1802 Rtickert and Weiss, or the philosophy that needs nothinking and knowing. 78-105

1802 On the relation of Naturphilosophie to philosophyas such. 106-24On construction in philosophy. 125-51On Dante in philosophical regard. 152-63Miscellaneous notes. 164-206

1803 LectUres on the method of university study. Englishtranslation by Norbert Guterman (Ohio UniversityPress, 1966); has a few flaws. 207-352

1803 Philosophy of art (Jena lectures 1802/1803, Wiirz-burg lectures 1804/1805). 353-736

1804 Immanuel Kant. VI, 1-101804 Philosophy and religion. 11-701804 Propaedeutic of philosophy. 71-1301804 System of the entire philosophy and of Naturphil-

osophie in particular. 131-5761805 Preface to the Yearbooks of Medicine as a Science. VII, 132-391805 Aphorisms as introduction to Naturphilosophie. 140-971805 Aphorisms on Naturphilosophie. 198-244

*English translation by Fritz Marti in The Unconditional in Human Knowl-edge (Bucknell University Press, 1980).

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APHORISMS AS AN INTRODUCTION TO VIT`ZPPQTWSWPPQM

Friedrich W. J. Schelling

1. Be it in science, in religion or in art, there is no higher revelation thanthat of the divinity of the All, and in fact those three start from this revelationand have significance only through it.

2. Wherever that revelation occurred, even when transitory, there wasrapture, repudiation of finite forms, cessation of all conflict, concord andwondrous agreement, often across long gaps of time, notwithstanding thegreatest individual originality, and as the fruit of it a universal coalition ofthe arts and sciences.

3. Wherever the light of that revelation got dim and men perceived thingsnot from the All but as separated, not in their union but in disunion, andlikewise tried to conceive of themselves in isolation and as separated fromthe All, there you see science desolated in vast spaces, in spite of greatefforts only slight advances in the growth of insight, grains of sand addedto other grains in order to build the universe. You also see the beauty oflife vanished, and a widely diffused wild war of opinions regarding the firstand most important things, everything gone to pieces, in isolation.

4. In its very nature all conflict in science can have but one source, thedisregard of that which, being all-blessed, can contain no discord. Thosewho take a stand against the idea of unity are fighting for nothing else thanthe very discord on which their existence depends. If all false systems, allartistic degenerations, all aberrations of religion are only the consequenceof that disregard and abstraction, then the rebirth of all sciences and allaspects of culture can start only with the renewed acknowledgment of theAll and its eternal unity.

5. This insight is no light that shines from without but it arouses usinwardly and moves the entire bulk of human culture. This insight worksin everything, be it ever so great or ever so trifling. And as it urges andworks in the whole tree of knowledge so also in its every branch and twig.

6. Yet not only the separations of the sciences from each other are abstrac-tions, but likewise the separation of science from religion and art.

7. Just as all elements and things of nature, being mere abstractions fromthe All, ultimately enter into the all-life of nature whose image is the earthand the stars, each of which divinely embodies all forms and kinds of being,so also must all elements and creations of the spirit ultimately enter a commonlife which is higher than the life of each separately.

8. This composite life of science, religion and art would be that statewhich is shaped in conformity with the divine model, in mankind as a whole.Furthermore the relation which reason has to the structure of the universeis the same as the relation of philosophy to that perfect state, that is, onlyin such a state can philosophy find its own image manifest and alive.

9. Science is the knowledge of the laws of the whole and thus of whatis universal [and common]. Religion however is the contemplation of theparticular in its ties to the whole. It is religion that ordains the naturalscientist as a priest of nature, owing to the devotion with which he caresfor the particular. Religion assigns the God-set limits to our bent for theuniversal, and thus, as a sacred tie, it mediates science with art. Art shapesthe universal and the particular into one.

10. The state legislation amounts to nothing without the heroism of pres-ervation and the religion of compliance in the particular. Similarly the fullbeauty of public life can be born only from the combination of the universalityof legislation with the particularity of all and every one, a combination dueto the spirit which rules the whole, not mechanically but artfully, as ananimating and governing spirit. There is a third similar dependence:philosophy can attain a divinity in line with the idea of philosophy only bymeans of an actual permeation of science with religion and art.

11. The eye alone never sees enough, nor does the ear ever hear its fill,reason too is never satiated with contemplation. In its seclusion, sciencefurnishes an analogy: nobody can think the thought of the All to its end,nor talk it through. Though in its search for laws science insists on conclus-iveness, it has another side on which it is open and unlimited. The acknowl-edgment of that side is the religion in science.

12. Religion, however, in its devotion to the particular, in case it doesnot also return to the absolutely universal, will necessarily lose itself insuperstition. And I ask everyone who is not biased whether he knows anothername for the representations of individual things and phenomena whiCh apious zeal brings forth without any knowledge of the laws of the All.

13. To see the finite dissolved in the nonfinite is the spirit of science inits seclusion. To see the nonfinite in the finite, in the comprehensibility ofthe finite, is the spirit of art.

14. To present with the seriousness of science those laws in which, asan ancient put it, the immortal God lives, yet to grasp with the same lovethe particular, even the most singular, and thus to identify in a nonfiniteway the universal and the particular is the spirit of true philosophy.

15. The material in which the spirit finds its form is infinite. Providedthis material is drawn from the All, it matters neither for that infinity norfor philosophy in what form the spirit reveals itself, be it the lyrical outpouringof a harmonious individual, as an echo of the harmony of the universe, or


be it the epic spread and fullness of the history of the universe poeticallycondensed, or finally revealed in strictly plastic delimitation, either in thestill tart style to which any system gives birth in science and in art, or inthe more moderate style of an art already unshackled by gracefulness, or inthe last perfection full of dramatic life, with sublime mastery over the matter,where the profoundest seriousness and the freest play reciprocally illuminateand elevate each other. These forms merely designate different levels ofculture and of artistic maturity.

16. Winkelmann said the still tart and severe style of the oldest sculpturehad to precede the creations of later art beautified by grace. Like -wise onlythose states which begin with strict legislation are gifted for greatness. Andsimilarly the seriousness and strictness of scientific discipline must haveovercome the ignorance of minds before the sweeter fruits of philosophycan ripen. The Platonic word, let none enter who is not initiated intogeometry, is valid in a much wider sense.

17. The true infinite is not formlessness but is delimited in itself, isfinished by itself and is thus perfect. This inner perfection of the infinitewhich is imprinted on the greatest and the smallest furnishes a fit type oflooking at the particular and a system of knowing a whole.

18. Yet not only the whole as whole is divine. For so is also the part andthe particular by itself. Even if the scientific form were only a band aroundthe full sheaf, and if I gave you only a single ear as a growth of divinekind, you would have to thank me. All the more, since scientific form isan inner organic connection where every part is of the nature of the wholeand lives in itself just as much as it lives in the whole.

19. What do I boast of?—Of the one that was given to me, of this thatI have proclaimed the divinity even of the particular, the potential samenessof all knowledge no matter of what topic, and thus the infinity of philosophy.'

20. I first gave a new presentation of my doctrine of nature and of theAll in 1801, in short sentences and in as simple strokes as then seemedpossible. [Representation of My System of Philosophy, IV, 105-212.] Inthe part where that representation enters into particulars, I have since foundcause to improve or to change my view of many a thing and in general toexpand it. The general foundations, however, as they are established there(§§1-50 of that Representation) have wonderfully held good in every sub-sequent investigation, even in views that sprang still from divination ratherthan from conscious knowledge. In my best insight, the anger of the vo-ciferous multitude that considered my doctrine of the All as a bone ofcontention tossed to them could not cast doubts upon a single one of mysentences, much less cancel one. Here my only intention is to affirm afresh

the whole and the still valid in that representation and bring it into everypossible new light.

21. Herewith I give thanks for all improvements known to me which havebeen made with regard to the matter and form of that representation, bethey well meant or born from ill will.

22. In the first place, only what I have already said here and am yet tosay can answer the question whether religion can be higher than philosophy,and whether philosophical insight can be enhanced by religion. To be sure,religion is not philosophy. Yet a philosophy that would not unite religionand science in sacred harmony would not be philosophy. The religion ofthe philosopher, however, has the complexion of nature; it is the robustcomplexion of him who with bold courage descends into the depths ofnature, and not the pale color of one who like a hermit indulges in idleself-contemplation. The latter can in no way be connected with ourphilosophy which rests on the wholeness of nature's All.

23. Philosophy is also poetry. Yet let it not be a forward poetry whichvoices nothing but the subject, but the inward poetry implanted in the objectlike the music of the spheres. First let the matter be poetic, before the wordis so,

24. What I deprecate most are rhetorical trimmings with which some havetried to improve this simple doctrine. In many writings of such authors, tome their well-known vintage tasted like a wine turned sour in their handsso that, like bad innkeepers, they tried to recure it with honey or sugar.

25. Of course I acknowledge something higher than science, and whatyou say when you talk about it is not your own wisdom. Still, does anyoneattain that higher simply because he bungles in science? That would be likedeclaring someone is a first-rate poet simply because he writes bad prose.

26. Those who are condemned by their own frame of mind to remainpupils are the very ones who vociferate the loudest about the restrictions ofschool. And all kinds of competitors for a prize plant themselves in Natur-philosophie just like the arrogant gluttons in the house of Odysseus. Nowonder when at last brazen beggars who are poorer in spirit than Irus ingoods issue a pugilistic challenge to him from whose table they still devourthe leftovers.

27. Yet even many of the better ones have too narrow a view of my causewhen they do not see that it is not only a concern of our time and that, onmy part, I have done nothing but furnish the element for endlessly possibleinsights. Unless our whole time changes, philosophy can never again excludeits eternal relation to nature, nor can it desire to comprehend the whole bymeans of the one-sided abstraction of the intelligent world.


28. Do I want a school?—Yes, but the way there were once schools ofpoetry. That way those of joint inspiration may continue in a common keyto compose this eternal poem. Give me a few of this kind, such as I havefound, and see to it that inspired ones will not be wanting in the future, andI promise you yet the 611,ripos (the unifying principle) even for science.This requires no pupils nor any head or master. No one teaches another,nor is bound to another, but each only to the God who speaks out of all.

29. I have long set up in front of opponents and of others the iron andthe bow. Can they shoot through the hole? The sequel will show whetherthey were capable of bending the bow.

30. In line with the specific program of this journal, I wanted to startwith those principles which are needed for the specific pursuit of Natur-philosophie and to present them not in a doctrinaire way nor by alwaysgiving strict proofs, but more historically, in testimony of the matter itself.And it seemed to me it would be most expedient to proceed in the followingorder.

a) Of unity and totality. (Von der Ein-und Allheit.)

31. It is impossible to furnish anybody with a description of reason.Reason must describe itself in each one and by means of each one.

32. Sense is divine in the following respect. Though it is bent upon theparticular, sense grasps each particular by itself as if it were a world byitself and as if nothing existed beside this particular. Not knowing what itis doing, sense beholds a present infinity; thus, in each particular, it beholdstotality, yet without resolving it in unity. —Hence the unfathomableness ineverything sensuous, the chaos, the confused plenitude. Sense can be equatedwith religion.

33. Ratiocination, however, discerns the empty unity without fullness ortotality. The nature of ratiocination is clearness without depth. By meansof forming general concepts, ratiocination compares things and, mirroringone thing in another, but not comprehending it in itself, ratiocination doesaway with the divineness of all things and of each in particular. At the sametime, ratiocination posits the very distinguishability and manifoldness ofthings. And insofar as ratiocination comprehends the general in the particular,at the expense of the particular's infinity, it can be equated with science inits isolation.

34. It is the imagination (Einbildungskraft) which unites clearness withdepth, the fullness of sense with the comprehension of ratiocination. Imag-ination as such is only sense aware of its infinity, or ratiocination as simul-

taneously intuitive (der Verstand, der zugleich anschauet).35. Reason, however, contains sense, ratiocination and imagination as

three finite restrictions, without being itself one of the three in particular.Reason discerns not merely the confused infinite (without the unity) as sensedoes, nor the empty unity (without the infinity) like ratiocination; but unityand infinity, clearness and fullness themselves are one in reason, yet notmerely in the particular manner of the imagination, but absolutely(schlechthin) and in a nonfinite manner.

36. Reason cannot affirm anything that would have reality only in somerelation or comparison, for if it did it would be the same as ratiocinationand could posit only finiteness. Therefore, in the first place, it cannot affirmany [mere] distinctions, no matter of what kind, and, secondly, it cannotdiscern or posit anything that could exist only owing to another, but onlythat which is from and by itself absolutely and in every respect, or thatwhich is the nonfinite positing of itself. This is the idea of absoluteness.

37. Reason, therefore, can be satisfied only by that which is equal toitself, not only in the particular but absolutely and quite universally(schlechthin and durchaus allgemein) in everything and in each one, in anonfinite manner. That which is thus equal to itself and self-affirmative is,therefore, as the self-equal, or as the oneness, also simultaneously infinityor totality. This is only God. For he is affirmation of himself, that is, theindissoluble identity of predicating and predicated. Since this identity aloneis the existence and essence of all things, God is the positing (Position) ofall things, that which in all things is equal to itself.

38. The affirmation of the infinite oneness and totality is no mere accidentin reason, it is its entire essence itself, which is also expressed in that lawwhich alone admittedly takes unconditional affirmation into account, thelaw of identity (A = A).

39. You have been considering this law as merely formal and subjective;thus you could find in it only the empty repetition of your own thinking.Yet it has no reference to your thinking but is a universal, a nonfinite lawwhich states that in the universe there exists nothing as merely predicatingor predicated, but that eternally and in everything there is only One, whichaffirms itself and is affirmed by itself, which manifests itself and is manifestby itself, in a word, that nothing truly exists which is not absolute (36), notdivine.

40. Contemplate that law as such, recognize its content, and you shallsee God.

41. The infinite clearness in ineffable fullness, and the ineffable fullnessin infinite clearness is God—infinite affirmation and equally infinite being


affirmed by itself, in an absolutely simple invisible manner.

b) About reason as knowledge of the Absolute.

42. Not we, neither you nor I, know about God. For insofar as reasonaffirms God it cannot affirm anything else and thus at once annihilates itselfas something particular, as something outside of God.

43. In truth and as such there is no subject at all, and no I and thereforealso no object or non-I, but only One, God or the All, and nothing else. If,therefore, there is any knowing at all and any being known, then whateveris in either is still only the One as One, that is, God.

44. The "I think, I am" is ever since Descartes the fundamental error inall knowledge. Thinking is not my thinking, and being not my being, foreverything is only God's or the All's.

45. Reason is the one kind of knowing in which it is not the subject butthe absolutely universal (therefore the One) that knows (43) and in which,on that very account, the absolutely universal alone is the known (39).

46. Reason is not a faculty, not a tool, nor can it be used. Anyhow thereis no reason at all which we could have, but only a reason which has us.To search in oneself and to count or weigh the faculties which afford aknowledge of God is the utmost limit of confusion and of inward eclipseof the mind.

47. Even reason is not an affirmation of the One, which could be outsidethe One, but a knowledge of God which is itself in God. Since nothing isoutside of God, the very knowledge of God is simply the nonfinite knowledgewhich God has of himself in the eternal self-affirmation (36), that is, it isitself the being of God and is in this being.

48. Reason does not have the idea of God, it is this idea and nothingelse.... With regard to reason one cannot ask whence the idea of God comesto it, since reason itself is this idea....As everyone sees light shining innature, so he must acknowledge the idea of God as shining in reason andin those who speak about it, not by any power of their own but by the powerof God, since without divine inspiration (Begeisterung) nobody can knowGod nor speak of God.

49. This idea is not an object of dispute or of discord. All particularity,which alone can be disputed, vanishes in this idea. The inane one whowould deny it voices it without knowing it; he cannot rationally connecttwo concepts except in this idea.

50. God is not the highest, he is the One as such. He is not to be imaginedas the highest or as the end, but as the center though not as in contrast to

a periphery, but as all in all. Even the highest is highest only in relation tosomething lower. God, however, is without any relation at all, that whichis affirmable only from itself and by itself.

51. Therefore there is no ascent of knowledge to God, but only animmediate recognition, yet not immediate on the part of man, but of thedivine by the divine.

52. In no kind of knowledge can God occur as the known (the object).As known he ceases to be God. We are never outside of God so that wecould set him in front of us as an object. Just as the feeling of gravity isour being in gravity, so is the knowledge of God itself the being in God.Here there is nothing subjective and nothing objective, because there are notwo distinct entities, one which knows and another that is known, but onlyone and the same (51), God.

53. Every kind of view in which the subject subsists as subject is inherentlyreprehensible. You speak of an inkling (Ahnung) of what is divine, of afaith which you place higher than knowledge (Erkenntnis). But the divinehas no inkling of the divine. Also there is no faith in God that would be amere disposition in the subject. What you wanted to save was merely the

• subject. You did not at all want to glorify the divine.54. There is a restraint of will which, in no merely human, physiological,

or psychological but in a divine manner, forces human beings to act theright way. And so there is a way of acting in which the individual forgetsitself. Likewise there is a divine restraint of knowledge which does notoriginate in human beings themselves and in which the knowing one as suchdisappears, just as in that kind of acting, the acting one disappears as anagent. Yet along with the vanishing knower there also disappears the knownas known. 2

c) About the indivisibility of knowledge by reason or theimpossibility of abstracting anything from the idea

of the Absolute or deriving anything from it.

55. As soon as the idea of God is born from the fullness of reason(Vernunft) ratiocination (Verstand) steps in, in order to take part in thisgood. Ratiocination wants to inspect separately what is posited in that ideaas eternally and absolutely one, and to bestow reality outside of unity uponwhat has reality only in the unity. Every such abstraction immediately man-ifests its nullity thrugh the contradiction that accompanies it necessarily.


56. As soon as one does away with the indivisible unity of it, this ideadissolves into contradictions. You were of the opinion that with these con-tradictions you could argue against the idea itself, but in fact you merelyrevealed the idea's inner essence. By that very fact it became, and alwaysbecomes, evident that ratiocination cannot affirm any one of the possibleantitheses by itself without contradiction, and that to every such thesis itsantithesis can be affirmed with the same right, also that the indivisible unityof the idea contains truth only in its indivisibility.

57. The reasonable idea (Vernunftidee) of God states that he is the infiniteaffirmation of himself. Right away ratiocination would separate from theidea what is affirmative and likewise what is affirmed, and would conceiveof God as either the one or the other. However, precisely through the ideaitself, it can be shown that each of the two ostensible separables into whichthe idea seems to be dissolved is contradictory.

58. The idea that God is the infinite affirmation of himself seems to bedissoluble into two conclusions: God affirms himself infinitely, and God isbeing affirmed by himself. If you consider the first one by itself, it isimpossible that God affirm himself, for the affirmative (the concept) isgreater than the affirmed (the thing). Yet God as affirming himself is abso-lutely identical with God as the affirmed, or with what is being affirmed ofGod. (The two are one and the same.) God does not grasp himself becausehe cannot be greater than he is. Therefore the proposition: God affirmshimself, taken by itself, is impossible by virtue of the idea itself. The sameis true with regard to the opposite proposition. For likewise God cannot bewhat is affirmed of him. He is incomprehensible for himself and cannot begrasped because he cannot be inferior (kleiner) than he is, because he isnothing different, but only one and the same.

59. In the same manner every possible reasonable affirmation (Ver-nunftbejahung), no matter what its expression, can be dissolved in a con-tradiction, provided you lift out only one of the members of the identitywhich the affirmation expresses. The result is that what you so abstract canbe neither posited nor not posited. For instance, by virtue of the idea of theAbsolute which defines it as that whose essence is also its existence (dasSein), one cannot attribute existence to God, since existence as such is onlyin contrast to essence, while in God it is absolutely identical with essence.Yet neither can existence be denied of God, for the same reason that in Godexistence is precisely the same as essence.

60. Given the proposition that God is unity and totality (Einheit andAllheit), one cannot posit unity by itself. God is not what is simply One,for the One is only in contrast to the Many, while there are no Many that

can be contrasted with the absolute One (das schlechthin Eine). Thus theidea does away with itself, and God is also not One. Nevertheless he is alsonot not-One, that is, not Many.

61. All knowing is nothing else than affirming From time immemorialscience has looked for the point where being (das Sein) includes knowing,and knowing includes being. But how could they be more completely onethan in the idea of the universal substance, the idea of God, whose beingis the infinite affirmation of himself, and whose being therefore includesthe knowledge, but in an infinite way, and vice versa knowledge includesbeing. Yet for that very reason it is not possible to attribute being or knowl-edge separately. For the self-affirmation of God is an infinite affirmation,and therefore in God the knowing and the known are one and the same,and in that respect there is no knowing in God. Nevertheless God is alsonot a negation of all knowing, a completely blind Absolute, a mere being(Sein). For, being as such is only in contrast to knowing; the being of God,however, is the infinite affirmation of himself, and is therefore not thenegation of knowing.

62. The same can be said, in a more general sense, of the contrast betweenbeing and acting. In God there is neither an acting nor a negation of acting.Not an acting, for the infinite self-affirmation of God fuses with the beingof God and is itself this being (61). Nevertheless the acting in God is notnegated, because in being he is the infinite affirmation of himself. Thus thecircularity of the argument (der Umkreis des Cirkels) can be regarded as abeing, yet as a being it includes an acting, namely the absolute self-recog-nition of the unity as totality.

63. This short inspection (55-63) suffices as a proof that the idea of theAbsolute resists every abstraction, that it is absolutely indivisible, thereforethat it is also impossible to derive anything from it by analysis or abstraction.'

64. The proposition that the Absolute has no predicates is quite correctinsofar as the predicate itself is possible only in contrast to the subject (acontrast that is unthinkable in God), and insofar as every possible predicatecan be contrasted with another. But nothing which stands in a relation,therefore nothing which stands in a contrast, can be affirmed by reason (istaffirmabel durch die Vernunft) (36) and affirmed of God.'

65. Therefore eternally the Absolute can be expressed only as absoluteand absolutely indivisible identity of the subjective and objective, an expres-sion which is the same and designates the same as the infinite self-affirmationof God (36).

66. In this idea reason posits neither the negation of contrasts nor anyactual contrasts in it. Not the negation, for then the unity would he a merely


negating and therefore conditioned unity. As for contrasts, they are effacedin that idea not in a negative but in a positive way; what the idea negatesis not the disparity in every contrast, and what it affirms is the absoluteidentity in a given contrast. Yet there is no validity in the opposite assumptionthat the contrasts were posited as real in the idea. They are not [real] fortheir positive identity is posited, and they are also not not real, for theirnegation is not posited.

67. Absolute identity of the subjective and objective cannot be a mereequilibriums or synthesis but only an entire being one.

68. I will try to clarify by some illustrations this distinction [of 67] whichis clear enough in itself yet is not clear for most. The fulcrum of a leverrepresents the equilibrium of two opposite forces; it is what unites both, butit is not their absolute identity. It is what it is, namely a point of rest, butonly in relation to the two forces, not by itself. The forces annul each otherin that point, but the point as point is not the positive nullity of the two.

69. The whole nature and all sciences offer plenty of examples of theabsolute unity of opposites. He who would comprehend matter even in thesimplest manner by contraction and expansion would never arrive at a realmatter as long as he would assume those two as if they were opposites likethe forces of a lever, and if he would not conceive of matter in each of itspoints as both, expansive and attractive, in an indivisible manner.

70. Or think of any sense organ, for instance an organ of sight. In eachpoint of its nature (Wesen) it is both, a being and a seeing, and yet onlyone. The seeing and the being do not stand to each other like factors whichannul each other. Yet the organ is not mere being, in abstraction from theseeing (else it would be mere matter) nor is it mere seeing, in abstractionfrom being (else it would not be an organ); it is entirely being and entirelyseeing. In the being there is also a seeing and in the seeing a being.

71. The idea of the circle is an absolutely simple and indivisible idea.—Although in the concrete circle the center and the circumference arespatially outside of each other, yet in the idea of the circle they are one.One cannot abstract from the circle, for the center by itself without thecircumference is not center, and the circumference by itself, abstracted fromthe center and therefore from the entire circle, is not a circumference. Truly,therefore, in the idea of the circle neither the center nor the periphery isposited separately, but in each there is already by necessity the entire circle,that is, the absolute unity. The center is the circle in its affirmativity or theideal circle. For what is a point anyway but a circle of infinitely smalldiameter, or a circle whose periphery coincides with the center? On theother hand, the periphery is only the circle regarded in its being affirmed

or in the totality. Here the unity as such is equal to the totality, the centeras such equal to the periphery (since the size of the periphery is of noimportance, it is equal to the point). The being one, on the part of the two,is not the unity of two parts which only together make a whole; center andperiphery are not factors of the circle; the circle is neither the product northe synthesis of the two; it is their absolute identity.

72. The whole of nature is at variance with every kind of abstraction, forinstance with the notion of matter as something wherein all subjective innerlife and all perception is negated. Although in the deeper spheres of naturethe perceptions are dimmer and hazy, they are unmistakable in the animals,which we nevertheless regard as sheer material beings. In their case, howcan perception be superadded to matter, if matter as such and as being isnot yet perceptive? The action of animals is completely blind. We think ofthem not as acting on their own, but we assume something else, an objectiveground as acting in them. Nevertheless we recognize with irrefutable cer-tainty, forced on us by the meaningfulness of those actions and especiallyby their artfulness, that this ground or principle, though as such objectivein regard to the animals, is yet similar to a conscious principle, in spite ofthe lack of consciousness. And as we recognize this we are not positing anydualism. Even the most obstinate habit of seeing mere objectivity in naturecould long have been subdued by the phenomena of extraordinary states inman, in which even according to common opinion the soul has no share,for instance any sure actions of the sleepwalker which occur as distinctlywithout consciousness and yet reveal as much expediency as the actions ofanimals, those incessant somnabulists. 6

73. It is not at all my opinion that the absolute identity of the subjectiveand objective is only the particular essence of God (for the essence of Godis nothing particular). I hold that it is the essence of all things, the absolutelyuniversal (das schlechthin Allgemeine), and that nothing can be affirmed orcan be, that would not be simultaneously affirmative and affirmed, withoutany dualism. For just as it is no real opposition if one and the same beinghas two different names, A and B, and just as in this case the being A andthe being B are not two different beings but only one being, so everythingthat is affirmable by reason is only one being, and as one is entirely andthroughout affirmed, entirely ideal and entirelyreal.

74. The ground, however, for this absolute identity of the subjective andobjective, as the same in everything, lies in God alone who is the infiniteaffirmation of himself, and through whom, as the universal substance, allsubstance is likewise in itself oneness of the affirmative and affirmed.

75. It follows (from aphorisms 55 to 74) that just as abstraction has no


power over the idea of God and can neither bend it to its purposes nor liftout of it anything particular to be set up by itself, so it is impossible toderive anything from that idea, in the manner of becoming or of issuing forth.

76. In God everything is without origin, eternal. For whatever can be,owing to the idea of God, is necessarily and is eternal, and whatever cannotbe in this manner cannot be at all. Therefore nothing can truly come aboutin God or evolve from God.

77. God inclines toward nothing, neither in him nor outside of him, forhe is all bliss (allselig). He does not bring about anything, for he is everything.The infinite affirmation of himself is not an act to which God could havethe relation of agent; it is the very being of God. God does not come to beby the fact that he affirms himself or knows himself, but he is an infiniteself-knowledge in the infinite being, not outside of it nor as a separate act.

78. In itself this idea of the infinite self-affirmation of the nonfinite being,which is by and from itself, is as simple as it is difficult for ratiocination,which moves only in contrasts. For ratiocination the idea means one of twothings, either a self-division of God by which, for instance, he would posita part of himself as objective (as world) and keep the other for himself, thatis, he would posit himself as subject and also posit himself as negated inthe object, a hypothesis which contradicts the very first idea of God asinfinite position of himself. Or it means a self-differentiation in God whereas,if there were any action in God, it would have to be his self-identification.Yet that cannot be since God does not identify himself, but is the absoluteidentity.

79. Equally worthless, entirely contradictory is the notion of an Absolutewhich goes forth from itself. If God could go forth from himself, then onthat very account, he would not be God, not absolute. On the contrary,absoluteness or infinite self-affirmation is the eternal return, not as an act,but as the eternal being and persisting of God in himself.

80. This consideration (75 to 79, as well as the earlier one 55 to 74)shows that ratiocination can have no part in the idea of the Absolute, andif methodic knowledge (Wissenschaft) found only two ways open, the oneof analysis or abstraction and the other of synthetic deduction (a twofoldassumption which is indeed quite current), then we would have to deny allknowledge of the Absolute. Nothing can be detached from God, for he isabsolute precisely because nothing can be abstracted from him. Nothing canbe derived from God as becoming or coming into existence, for he is Godprecisely because he is everything. —Speculation is all [the knowledge wehave], that is, seeing, contemplating that which is in God. Methodicalknowledge (Wissenschaft) has value only insofar as it is speculative, that

is, contemplation of God as he is.'The explanations given so far contain the mere beginnings of philosophy.

It is entirely useless to quarrel about these beginnings. Likewise it wouldbe useless to try to give further explanations to those who, judging fromtheir own repeated utterances, are not able to fashion any other notion ofthe Absolute but that of a Thing and, more specifically, of a thing in whichthe identity of subject and object inheres as a property.'

Notes

'[Translator's note] In the Logic (III, 151) Hegel wrote: "If the infinite is set up in contrastto the finite as qualitatively different from that other, then it must be called the bad infinite,the infinite of ratiocination, for which it is the highest, absolute truth....Then there are twoworlds, an infinite and a finite one, and in their relationship the infinite is only a boundaryof the finite and is thus itself only a specific infinite which is itself finite." Hegel calls it "dasNicht-endliche" (i.b. 150). The word "das Unendliche" retains a touch of potential Aufhebung,a promise for Vernunft but tantalizing for Verstand (ratiocination).

2 [Schelling's note] These sentences point at the value of the so far best known endeavor[by Jacobi?-----as one might surmise, reading Xavier Tilliette's Schelling, I, 313] thoughindubitably also the last endeavor to turn the knowledge of the Absolute into a subjectivity.To be sure this endeavor was not unforeseen by the author who, in the Lectures on the Methodof Academic Study (V, 207-352) [fluently but not flawlessly translated by Norbert Guterman,Ohio University Press, 1966], had foretold it so definitely that he could not now write aboutit more definitely. Our age asks for knowledge as knowledge of the subject, and for a moralitydecreed by the individual itself. In this sense, to be sure, I exclude knowledge and moralityfrom the system of reason, and I do it in a very positive way. Also I am pleased in findingthat one has begun to see it.

[Gerbrand Dekker speaks of Jacobi's "irrational knowledge by faith" (Glaubenswissen) onpage 131 of Die Rackwendung zum Mythos. Schellings letzte Wandlung, Oldenbourg Verlag,1930.]

'[Translator's note] In the Introduction to his lectures on the history of philosophy, firstdelivered in 1805-1806, Hegel said: "Philosophy is most inimical to the abstract and leadsback to the concrete" (XIII, 37}.

4 [Translator's note] Relation in the sense of contrast. In his Presentation of PhilosophicalEmpiricism, last presented at Munich in 1836, Schelling stated: "One could well say thatGod is really nothing in itself; he is nothing but relation and pure relation, for he is only theLord" (X, 360). Compare the penultimate page of the very latest and unfinished writing (seeXI, v) by Schelling: God "shows his reality which is independent of the idea...and thusreveals himself as the real Lord of being" (XI, 571).

'[Schelling's note] An equilibrium of opposites is the highest one can reach in terms of

258 IDEALISTIC STUDIES

relations. Hence such a misunderstanding of the idea on the part of those who comprehendnothing but relations. Most have at least disputed this product of their incomprehension. Butwhat judgment must be given on those who want to argue against me, not in opposition tothe misunderstanding but in agreement with it?

6[Translator' s note] The reader may wonder why a Naturphilosoph should insist on denyingconsciousness in animals. Schelling surely is no objectivist.

7 [Schelling' s note] Schelling himself refers to a passage in the Neue Zeitschriftfiir speculativePhysik, 1802 (Fernere Darstellungen aus dem System der Philosophie, IV, 391) whose gistis: "As reason is summoned to think the Absolute, neither as thinking nor being, still to thinkit a contradiction arises for reflection, for which everything is either thinking -or being. Butin this very contradiction intellectual intuition manifests itself (trio die intellektuelleAnschauung ein) and produces the Absolute."

'[Translator's note] Schelling then quotes a passage taken from Leibniz who says that, inorder to give men the attention necessary for the first and basic and most simple concepts,one must call them back from their dissipations and to themselves. The theologians whospoke of eternity needed many discourses, comparisons and examples to make eternity known,although there is nothing simpler than the concept (notion) of eternity.

EXTENDING THE DARWINIAN MODEL:JAMES'S STRUGGLE WITH ROYCE AND SPENCER

Charlene Haddock Seigfried

In the nineteenth century there were as many formulations of Darwinianevolution as there were Darwinians. Consequently, Michael Ruse defines a"Darwinian" as "someone who identified with Darwin, but not necessarilysomeone who accepted all of Darwin's ideas."' Therefore, the only way todetermine what William James meant by Darwinian evolutionary science isby checking his references to it and his adoption of recognizably Darwiniantheory and methods. By "Darwinian evolution" he sometimes refers to areductionist interpretation according to which consciousness is nothing butbrain processes, and survival of the fittest is applied to reality mechanisti-cally. 2 He excepted himself from this interpretation, however, and his ownevolutionary Darwinism was a merging of idealist philosophical and empir-ical scientific commitments. James was confident that his reading of Darwinand particular application of it were consistent with the Darwinian texts andthat the reductionist Darwinians who understood the survival of the fittestas a justification for a Hobbesian, state of nature were misreading Darwin.

There is certainly adequate support in Darwin for James's position, butthe particular slant he gave it was peculiarly pragmatic and was held incommon, with variations, with C. S. Peirce and Chauncey Wright, whoinfluenced him, and with John Dewey, whom he influenced. As John HermanRandall, Jr., pointed out, James was also greatly influenced by Josiah Royceduring the eighties and early nineties, the same time he was writing thePrinciples of Psychology.' Royce differed from the pragmatists in stylinghimself an idealist. Since Royce and James both considered the doctrine ofevolution central to their philosophic outlook, but disagreed on its meaning,a comparison of their treatment of it should throw light on an importantidealist source of James's Darwinism. I will first explicate Royce's and thenJames's early formulations of Darwinian evolution to show both how muchJames was indebted to contemporary formulations of American idealism,which in turn can illuminate his reading of European sources, and how muchhe diverged from Royce's idealism in his own evolutionism.

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Schelling - Aphorisms of 1805