School-Based Management in East Asia and Latin America

October 25, 2007

Emanuela di Gropello

Outline

1. Definition and Goals of SBM

2. Characteristics of SBM in Latin America and East

Asia

3. Impact of SBM in Latin America and East Asia

4. Lessons Learned and Needs for Further Research

What is School Based Management?

All SBM programs entail a transfer of responsibilities to schools

But level and type of responsibilities vary (budget generation and management, human resource management, academic policies, etc)

As well as relative roles and responsibilities of school actors (principal, teachers, parents, students)

Goals of SBM Programs: First and Second Order Effects

First-Order Effects: Empower schools (higher autonomy) Increase participation of parents and community Build local capacity

Second-Order Effects: Improve teaching-learning environment, lower costs Improve schooling outcomes (efficiency, quality,

coverage)

What is the Link between First and Second-Order Effects?

Allows local decision-makers to determine appropriate mix of inputs and education policies adapted to local realities and needs

Improves accountability of principals and teachers to parents and students

Makes it easier to set up new schools and hire teachers in remote rural areas (improved flexibility)

Characteristics of SBM in East Asia and Latin America

o Trend towards increasing decentralization in East Asia and Latin America

o In most countries, school autonomy co-exists with decentralization to sub-national levels (complex models and accountability lines), remaining limited

o “De-jure” school autonomy is generally more limited in East Asia, but not so for “de facto” autonomy

Decentralization of Decision-Making in East Asia

School Autonomy by Functional Area

o In both regions, core curricula and standards mantained centralized, but teaching methods often determined at school level

o Decisions on staffing often made by different levels of government, with very little autonomy at school level (with the exception of Hong Kong, Central America, some States in Brazil)

o Schools have somewhat more autonomy in managing non salary recurrent and capital resources (see Chile, Central America, China among others). Resource generation capacity varies in time

School Autonomy by Decision-Making Actor

o Principals generally have the highest decision-making power in budget allocation and human resources, followed by school boards

o Teachers have more autonomy in course content

o School boards tend to be more often elected and have more precise roles and responsibilities in LAC

Responsibility of School Level Actors for Decisions over Teacher Hiring and Budget Allocation (de-facto school autonomy)

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Responsibility of School Level Actors for Decisions over Course Content (de-facto school autonomy)

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Impact of SBM in LAC and EAP

Existing (limited) evidence shows that SBM can lead to higher efficiency and test scores, under certain circumstances, but the mechanisms through which this would occur are not always clear

More evidence available on impact of SBM at primary level – see for instance Central America, with several studies [Example 1]

Some new evidence available on secondary level – see for instance new studies on PISA and TIMSS [Example 2].

[more general, however, focused on autonomy by functional area more than SBM per se]

.

Example 1: SBM in Central America

El Salvador: EDUCO Guatemala: PRONADE Honduras: PROHECO All primary schools in poor rural areas

Nicaragua: Autonomous Schools (primary and secondary schools in urban/rural areas)

Main Components of SBM in Central America

School Councils (mostly parents) Councils’ functions: teacher management,

school maintenance, some pedagogical authority

Teachers’ characteristics: one-year contracts, generally less benefits

School grants: key in empowering councils, monthly or quarterly, use of allocation formulae

First Order Effects: School Empowerment and Community Participation

School grants have been successfully undertaken, empowering school councils

Empowerment has meant more decisions taken at the school level with higher community participation (particularly in Honduras and El Salvador)

Second Order Effects: From School Empowerment to Educational Performance (Efficiency and Quality)

As a result of higher empowerment and community participation, teachers and schools’ work hours are generally higher in autonomous schools (less absenteeism, less school closings – accountability argument)

Educational achievement, as measured by test scores, is generally similar (or even higher) in spite of location in poor areas. This result can be partly related to higher school and teacher effort (in Honduras and El Salvador)

Teacher and School Work Hours Higher in Autonomous Schools

Table 5.8: Teacher Attendance and Work Hours

Variable Nicaragua El Salvador Honduras Guatemala

Non-Autonom

ous

Autonomous

Public EDUCO Public PROHECO Public PRONADE

Work Hours 27.3 29.0* 33.7 36.8*

Teacher Absences (a) 1.4 1.2* 13.9 17.4 0.19 0.15*

Teacher Absences (b) 0.34 0.35 1.94 1.54*

Days Worked in School 111.0 113.0*

School Closings 29.5 20.5*

Test Scores are Similar (or even Higher) in Autonomous Schools

Table 5.13: Third/Fourth Grade Test Score Averages By School Type

Model: Guatemala Honduras El Salvador Nicaragua

World Bank 2002 HCRG 2002 Control PROHECO

Control EDUCO Control AUTO

Control PRONADE

Control PRONADE

Spanish -0.33 -0.39 0.02 -0.16* -0.04 0.03 1.75 1.73 -0.03 0.02

Math -0.27 -0.38* 0.01 -0.07 -0.04 0.03 3.74 3.59 -0.01 0.01

Science -0.12 0.08*

SES 2.5 2.2* 0.31 -0.46* 0.49 -0.42* 0.66 0.28 4.1 4.5*

Parental Education

4.2 3.0* 2.5 1.7* 3.2 2.5* 0.53 0.50 5.5 6.2*

Second Order Effects: From School Empowerment to Educational Performance (Coverage and Equity)

Due to higher community empowerment, good coverage results. In particular in isolated rural areas, where primary enrollment rates increased substantially in all countries

This coverage increase has led to equity improvements in education delivery

Less favorable results…

Drop-out rates still too high Often very small classes Teachers’ education levels generally less

satisfactory than in traditional schools Pedagogical models not innovatory Still a lack of institutional integration and

sustainability

Example 2: Recent Evidence on Impact of School Based Management from PISA 2000 and 2003 Analysis

By relating efficiency and learning outcome indicators to school autonomy across some LAC and EAP countries, recent WB study finds that:

1. Autonomy in teacher hiring and firing positively related to performance in LAC, but not EAP

1. Autonomy in budget generation and allocation positively related to performance in EAP, but not LAC

[autonomy in texts and course content also positively related to learning outcomes in EAP, but not to efficiency]

Recent Evidence on Impact of School Based Management from PISA 2000 and 2003 Analysis

3. Positive interaction between school socio-economic level and the impact of autonomy in schooling processes (such as choice of textbooks, course content, etc)

3. Results are generally stronger when principals or school boards have higher autonomy

Impact of SBM in East Asia and Latin America

Table 6: Impact of SBM in East Asia and Latin America

East Asia Sample Latin America Sample

Input Efficiency Output Efficiency Input Efficiency Output Efficiency

Pedagogic Autonomy 0.171** -0.009 0.236 0.004

Financial (budget generation and management) Autonomy

-0.046 0.012** 0.039 0.005

Human Resource (only teacher hiring and firing) Autonomy

0.104 -0.001 -0.364** 0.016

Controls (sorting, selection, public/private management, use of evaluation)

Included Included Included Included

Note: A negative sign implies positive impact on input efficiency; a positive sign implies positive impact on output efficiency. In bold, significant coefficients: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%.

Impact of SBM in Brazil and Indonesia – Characteristics of High Performing Schools

Recent Evidence on Impact of School Based Management from PISA 2000 and 2003 Analysis

This evidence seems to indicate:

A higher role for local informational advantages in EAP, maybe related to better school management capacity (but ambiguous effect of pedagogical autonomy)

A higher role for accountability advantages in LAC, maybe related to centralized bureaucracies particularly inefficient at allocating teachers and making them accountable (but ambiguous effect of decentralized salary determination)

Importance of different regional and national contexts in determining the effects of SBM

Recent Evidence on Impact of School Based Management from PISA 2000 and 2003 Analysis

Little evidence on how the impact of autonomy measures works: – Some limited evidence that impact of teacher

management autonomy and pedagogical autonomy works through lower pupil-teacher ratios, longer class time, better teacher morale and better school climate

– Some evidence that financial autonomy works through more educational resources

Other Evidence on Impact of SBM using PISA and TIMSS (or other international tests)

Wossmann and Gundlach (2004) on EAP - lack of parental involvement is generally negatively related to performance and school salary autonomy is positively related to performance in Japan and Singapore

Nabeshima (2003) on EAP - ambiguous impact of teacher autonomy and salary determination across countries

Gunnarsson and others (2004) on LAC - parental participation appears to be more consistently related to higher test scores than school autonomy (confirming results from Paes de Barros and Mendonca on Brazil, who find slight positive impact of election of principals on test scores)

SBM in LAC and East Asia: Lessons Learned

1. SBM can lead to higher efficiency and quality but impact depends on functional area, which, in turn, depends on regional and country specificities – institutions, capacity

case for decentralization of teacher hiring and firing in LAC case for further budget management decentralization in EAP

2. Impact also depends on school decision-making actor

case for decentralizing to principals on efficiency grounds? case for decentralizing to school boards on accountability grounds? case for decentralizing to teachers on quality grounds?

SBM in LAC and East Asia: Lessons Learned

3. Strong accountability lines (upwards and downwards) are essential and generally complementary in ensuring the success of a SBM model:

in all models enhance participatory decision-making for clearer expression of preferences and strengthened oversight

also clearly define roles and responsibilities, strengthen the capacity of the government for monitoring and auditing, develop M&E systems and, when applicable, incorporate quality/efficiency criteria in school transfers

SBM in LAC and East Asia: Lessons Learned

4. SBM is successful in poor rural areas for community-based simple management processes (see Central America). However, for more complex schooling processes, need to accompany SBM with effective capacity building

impact on school performance in Central America could have been stronger by providing parental training and information on key areas of school performance

Needs for Further Research

Existing evidence points to the need for more context-specific country studies, where role of socio-economic and institutional context can be better assessed

Need to open the “black box” to understand better the mechanisms through which SBM works

Need for more formal impact evaluations in primary and secondary education