Science and Global Security - Princeton Universityaglaser/WWS353-Syllabus-2017-REV2.pdf · • S. Glasstone and L. M. Redman, An Introduction to Nuclear Weapons, WASH-1037 Revised,

WWS/MAE353:ScienceandGlobalSecurity:FromNuclearWeaponstoCyberwarfare(Spring2017)AlexanderGlaser,Syllabus,Revision2,April23,2017

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ScienceandGlobalSecurityFromNuclearWeaponstoCyberwarfareandArtificialIntelligence

©MarkVallen,1980


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ScienceandGlobalSecurityFromNuclearWeaponstoCyberwarfareandArtificialIntelligence

AlexanderGlaser

TuesdaysandThursdays,Bowl016,1:30–2:50p.m.

CoursedescriptionAdvances in science and technology over the past century have created manyunprecedentedandstillunresolvedglobalsecuritychallengesforpolicymakersandthepublic.The inventionofnuclearweaponsduringWorldWar II ledEinstein toconclude that “theunleashedpowerof theatomhas changedeverything saveourmodes of thinking.” Security concerns and government-sponsored researchprograms later combined to shape the Cold War arms race between the UnitedStates and Soviet Union. Many military and technical innovations resulted; theseinclude precision-guided intercontinental ballistic missiles, spy satellites, and theglobal positioning system (GPS), but also the modern electronic computer andcomputernetworks,whichbecamethebasisfortheinternet.Recentdevelopmentsin biotechnology and digital communication and control raise the prospect ofpossiblenewkindsofwarfare.This coursewillprovidestudentswithabasic technicalunderstandingof someofthe critical technologies that are relevant to national and global security andwillequipstudentswiththeskillstobetterassessthechallengeofdevelopingeffectivepolicies to manage such technologies. Case studies will interalia include nuclearweaponsandtheirproliferation,deliverysystemsforweaponsofmassdestruction,biotechnology and biosecurity, new media and crowdsourcing, autonomousweapons,superintelligence,andcyberwarfare.Whiletheemphasisofthiscoursewillbeonthesecuritychallengesposedbymanyofthesetechnologies,itwillalsoexploretheapplicationofsciencetoarmscontroland disarmament. Examples covered in class will include the potential of open-source satellite imagery, which has been effectively used for crowd-sourcingpurposes,andinternet-enabledapproachestoencouraginganonymousreporting.

Forrevisionsandupdates,gotonuclearfutures.princeton.edu/courses/wws353


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CourseOverview

Week Date ID Topic Concept/Guest DUE

102/07 SettingtheStage

02/09 11 NuclearWeapons1:Principles

202/14 12 NuclearWeapons2:Effects

ScalinglawsHandout

02/16 13 NuclearWeapons3:Acquisition

302/21 14 NegotiatingaTreatyBanningNuclearWeapons (w/RayAcheson) PS1

02/23 21 Biological(andChemical)Weapons

402/28 22 Biotechnology,Biosecurity,andBioterrorism (w/AndyLeifer) PS2

03/02 23 DynamicsofInfectiousDiseases ModelingI

503/07 24 ExpertBriefings:BiosecurityandModeling (w/FeffermanandChyba) +PS3+

03/09 31 NuclearEnergyandNuclearProliferation1

603/14 32 NuclearEnergyandNuclearProliferation2(Casestudy) MakingSenseof

EquationsI

03/16 Midtermexam(inclass) Midterm

SPRINGBREAK

703/28 41 DeliverySystems1:mostlyMissiles MakingSenseof

EquationsIIHandout

03/30 41 DeliverySystems2:mostlyMissiles(continued)

804/04 42 NuclearStrategyandDeterrence1

04/06 43 NuclearStrategyandDeterrence2:Wargame

904/11 51 Verification1:EmergingTechnologiesandVirtualReality (w/TamaraPatton) +PS4+

04/13 52 Verification2:Satellites

1004/18 61 TheFuture1:Cyberwarfare(KineticPwnage) (w/EdSkoudis)

04/20 62 TheFuture2:Cyberwarfare

1104/25 63 TheFuture3:MachineLearningandSuperintelligence

ModelingII

04/27 63 TheFuture4:MachineLearningandSuperintelligence

1205/02 TeamPresentations

05/04 TeamPresentations


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AssignmentsWeeklyreadings,regularblogpostsorcomments;fiveproblemsets(mostlyinthefirsthalfofthesemester);midtermexaminclass;teamprojectsandpresentations(inthesecondhalfofthesemester);andfinalexam.ProblemsetsaredueTuesdaysbeforeclass.A24-hourdelaycarriesa20%penalty,a48-hourdelaycarriesa40%penalty;wedonotacceptproblemsetsafterwards.Studentscanworktogetheronproblemsetsingroupsofuptothreestudents,butsubmitseparateproblemsetsanddraft individualanswers toallquestions.Whenworkingingroups,listnamesoftheotherteammembersonthefirstpage.

Prerequisites

Noprerequisites

Grading(tentativebreakdown)

Problemsets: 20%Midtermexam(inclass): 15%Teamprojects: 15%Finalexam(closedbook): 25%Blogposts,comments,annotatedsyllabus: 10%Class/preceptparticipation: 15%

Readings;Blogpostsandcomments;AnnotatedsyllabusMost readings and media required for this course are available online, eitherdirectly(withopenaccess)orthroughPrincetonUniversity.AllotherreadingsareorwillbeavailableonBlackboard;thesearemarkedwith(BB)below.Eachweek,twostudentstaketheleadonblogging,dueMondays,9:00a.m.,andallotherscanrespondbyWednesday,9:00a.m.Foramaximumblogscore,5contributionpointsareneededbytheendofthesemester(1pointforeachblogcomment;2pointsforpostinganinitialentry).Upto3additionalpointswillbeawardedattheendofthesemester for particularly thoughtful contributions. Students are encouraged toannotateahardcopyof thesyllabuswithshortcommentsontheusefulnessof thereadings;thiswillhelpusimprovetheassignmentsfornextyear(2points).


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WeeklyScheduleandReadings

SettingtheStage:Science,Technology,andtheDoomsdayRisk(Feb.7)

Advances in science and technology have always played an important role inshaping thenature ofwarfare, but a fundamentallynewdimension emergedwiththe invention of nuclear weapons in the 1940s and, as the nuclear arsenalsexpanded, therespectivecapability fornearly-instantglobaldevastation.Sincetheend of Cold War, many global security challenges have evolved but, as formerPresident Obama pointed out in 2009, “in a strange turn of history, the threat ofglobalnuclearwarhasgonedown,buttheriskofanuclearattackhasgoneup.”Newtechnologiesarenowemergingthatcouldagaintransformtheconditionsofglobalsecurity. These developments can be disruptive (aswith the invention of nuclearweapons) or gradual as with the increasing significance of autonomousweaponsandartificialintelligence.Thedual-usenatureofmanyrelevanttechnologiesfurtherhighlightsthecomplexityofsoundpolicy-making.Tosetthestageforthetopicsandissuescoveredthissemester,wewillbrieflyexplorethedifferenttypesofsecuritythreats today, theperceptionandprioritizationofrelevantrisks,andtheresultingchallengesforeffectivepolicymaking.Readings(fortoday,onlyrecommended):• ItisTwoandaHalfMinutestoMidnight,2017DoomsdayClockStatement,Science

andSecurityBoard,BulletinoftheAtomicScientists,January26,2017,thebulletin.org.

Moretoexplore:Hereandbelow,“moretoexplore”readingsandvideosarenotrequired!• RemarksbyPresidentObamaatHiroshimaPeaceMemorial,HiroshimaPeace

Memorial,Hiroshima,Japan,May27,2016.

• Figures1–3andSections3.1and3.2inPart3(EmergingTechnologies)inGlobalRisks2017,12thEdition,WorldEconomicForum,Geneva,2017,reports.weforum.org/global-risks-2017andwww3.weforum.org/docs/GRR17_Report_web.pdf.

• Welcometo2035...TheAgeofSurprises,UnitedStatesAirForce,CenterforStrategyandTechnologies,Video/Commercial,2min,2012,www.youtube.com/watch?v=9Xpu2QqLnHY.


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Unit1:NuclearWeapons(Feb.9,Feb.14,Feb.16,andFeb.21)

Shortlyafterthediscoveryofnuclearfissioninthelate1930s,itbecameclearthatthe process could, in principle, unfold in an explosive chain reaction and releaselarge amounts of energy. At the time, itwas unknown, however, just howhard itwould be to make the fissile material (highly enriched uranium or plutonium)needed for a nuclear weapon. During World War II, the U.S. Manhattan projectdemonstrated the technical basis of large-scale fissile material production(includingthefeasibilityofoperatingnuclearreactors)andledtothedevelopmentand use of the first nuclearweapons in 1945. The Soviet Union demonstrated itsnuclearcapability in1949,andmilitaryplannersonbothsidesbegan to integratetheseweapons into theirwar-fighting arsenals. The emerging arms race betweenthe superpowers further escalated in scale with the invention of the hydrogenbomb,whichwouldincreasetheyieldofnuclearweaponsseveralhundred-fold.Thedestructiveeffectsofnuclearweaponsremainunparalleled; they involveairblast,heat,andnuclearradiation.Keywords:Nuclear fissionprocess; radioactivity;effectsofnuclearweapons;medicaland climatic impact of nuclear war; nuclear reactors, nuclear fuels, uraniumenrichment,plutoniumproduction.NuclearWeapons1:Principles(Feb.9).Inthisunit,weexploretheprinciplesofnuclearfissionandtheconceptofanuclearchainreaction,estimatethetimescaleoftheprocesses involved,anddeterminetheamountofenergyreleased inanuclearexplosion.Wecanthenalsoestimatetheso-calledcriticalmassandtheapproximateamountofmaterialneededtomakeanuclearbomb.Readings:• HenryStimson(SecretaryofWar),MemorandumDiscussedwiththePresident,

April25,1945,nsarchive.gwu.edu.

• JonathanFetter-Vorm,Trinity:AGraphicHistoryoftheFirstAtomicBomb,HillandWang,2012,pp.39–61.(BB)

• KostaTsipsis,“ThePhysicsofaNuclearExplosion,”Chapter2inArsenal:UnderstandingWeaponsintheNuclearAge,SimonandSchuster,NewYork,1983.(BB)ALTERNATIVELY:

• “NuclearPhysics”(C.2)inAppendixC(“BasicNuclearPhysicsandWeaponsEffects”),NuclearMattersHandbook2016,U.S.DepartmentofEnergy,Washington,DC,2016,www.acq.osd.mil/ncbdp/nm/NMHB.


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Moretoexplore:• RichardRhodes,TheMakingoftheAtomicBomb,Simon&Schuster,1995.

• S.GlasstoneandL.M.Redman,AnIntroductiontoNuclearWeapons,WASH-1037

Revised,U.S.AtomicEnergyCommission,Washington,DC,June1972.

• RobertSerber,TheLosAlamosPrimer:TheFirstLecturesonHowtoBuildanAtomicBomb,UniversityofCalifornia,Berkeley,1992.

NuclearWeapons2:Effects(Feb.14).Whathappens if theenergyequivalentof20,000 tons of high explosive is released within one millionth of a second in avolume of one cubic foot? In this session, we will examine the effects of nuclearexplosions, which involve air blast, heat, and nuclear radiation, and discuss theconsequencesofregionalandglobalnuclearwar.Readings:• StatementbythePresidentoftheUnitedStates,WhiteHousePressRelease,

August6,1945.(BB)

• J.RobertOppenheimer,RecollectionoftheTrinityTest(“NowIambecomeDeath,thedestroyerofworlds”),TelevisionBroadcast,1min,1965,www.youtube.com.

• RETROReport,“NuclearWinter,”NewYorkTimes,April4,2016,www.nytimes.com.

• AlanRobockandOwenB.Toon,“LocalNuclearWar,GlobalSuffering,”ScientificAmerican,302,January2010,pp.74–81.(BB)

• KostaTsipis,“Blast,Heat,andRadiation,”Chapter4inNuclearAlmanac:ConfrontingtheAtominWarandPeace,Addison-Wesley,Reading,Massachusetts,1984.(BB)ALTERNATIVELY:

• “TheEffectsofNuclearDetonations”(C.4)inAppendixC(“BasicNuclearPhysicsandWeaponsEffects”),NuclearMattersHandbook2016,U.S.DepartmentofEnergy,Washington,DC,2016,www.acq.osd.mil/ncbdp/nm/NMHB.

Web:


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• NUKEMAP,byAlexWellerstein,nuclearsecrecy.com/nukemap.Video:• TheHouseintheMiddle,FederalCivilDefenseAdministration,12minutes,1954,

www.youtube.com.

• IsaoHashimoto,1945–1998,MultimediaArtwork,14minutes,2003,www.ctbto.orgorwww.youtube.com.

Moretoexplore:• WhiteLight,BlackRain:TheDestructionofHiroshimaandNagasaki,

DocumentarydirectedbyStevenOkazaki,86minutes,2007.(BB)

• JillLepore,“TheAtomicOriginsofClimateScience,”TheNewYorker,January23,2017,www.newyorker.com.(BB)

• S.GlasstoneandP.J.Dolan,TheEffectsofNuclearWeapons,U.S.GovernmentPrintingOffice,Washington,DC,1977,www.ipfmlibrary.org/gla77.pdf.

• A.A.Broyles,“NuclearExplosions,”AmericanJournalofPhysics,50(7),July1982,pp.586–594.(BB)

• LeoSartori,“EffectsofNuclearWeapons,”PhysicsToday,March1983.(BB)Nuclear Weapons 3: Acquisition (Feb. 16). How hard is it to make a nuclearweapon?HaroldAgnew,directorofLosAlamosNationalLaboratory from1970to1979, once said: “Thosewho say thatbuilding anuclearweapon is easy, they areverywrong,butthosewhosaythatbuildingacrudedeviceisverydifficultareevenmorewrong.”Today, it iswidelyacknowledgedthat theproductionof thenuclearexplosivematerial remains themost significant technical hurdle in the process ofmakinga(simple)nuclearweaponorexplosivedevice.Inthisunit,wewillexplorethe technologies and infrastructureneeded tomakeplutoniumorhighly enricheduranium in quantities that are sufficient for a weapons program. We will alsoexamine the risk of nuclear terrorism, which became a particular concern after9/11.Inthisscenario,anon-stateactorwouldacquireexistingnuclearmaterialtofabricate an “improvised nuclear device.” Such a device may have a much loweryield than a typical nuclear weapon, but still be hundreds or thousands of timesmoredestructivethanconventionalexplosives.Readings:


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• H.A.Feiveson,A.Glaser,Z.Mian,andF.vonHippel,“Production,Uses,andStocksofFissileMaterials,”Chapter2inUnmakingtheBomb:AFissileMaterialApproachtoNuclearDisarmamentandNonproliferation,MITPress,Cambridge,MA,2014.(BB)

• “AmateurA-Bomb,”TimeMagazine,May13,1974.(BB)

• WilliamLangewiesche,“HowtoGetaNuclearBomb,”TheAtlantic,December2006,www.theatlantic.com.(BB)

• PeterZimmermanandJeffreyLewis,“TheBombintheBackyard,”ForeignPolicy,October16,2009,foreignpolicy.com.(BB)

Moretoexplore:• SteveColl,“TheUnthinkable:CantheUnitedStatesbeMadeSafefromNuclear

Terrorism?,”TheNewYorker,March12,2007,www.newyorker.com.(BB)Nuclear Weapons 4: Negotiating a Ban on Nuclear Weapons (Feb. 21). InOctober2016, theFirstCommitteeof theUnitedNationsGeneralAssembly,whichdealswithdisarmamentandinternationalsecuritymatters,adoptedaresolutiontobegin negotiations on a treaty banning nuclear weapons: 123 countries voted infavor, 16 abstained, and 38 voted against this resolution, includingmost nuclearweaponstates(exceptChina,Pakistan,andNorthKorea)andmostmemberstatesofNATO.NegotiationsaresettobegininNewYorkinMarch2017.Today,wewillhaveanopportunitytolearnabouttheoriginsandprospectsofthisinitiative.GuestLecture:RayAchesonRay Acheson is the Director of Reaching CriticalWill (reachingcriticalwill.org). Sheprovides reporting, analysis, and advocacy across a range of internationaldisarmamentandarmscontrol issuesand forums, includingthoserelatedtonuclearweapons,explosiveweapons,thearmstrade,armeddrones,andautonomousweapons,andgenderanddisarmament.RayisalsoontheBoardofDirectorsoftheLosAlamosStudy Group, represents theWomen's International League for Peace and Freedom(wilpf.org) on several coalition steering groups, and previously worked with theInstitute for Defense and Disarmament Studies. She has an Honors BA from theUniversityofTorontoinPeaceandConflictStudiesandanMAinPoliticsfromTheNewSchoolforSocialResearch.Readings:


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• RayAcheson,ThomasNash,andRichardMoyes,ATreatyBanningNuclearWeapons:DevelopingaLegalFrameworkfortheProhibitionandEliminationofNuclearWeapons,ReachingCriticalWilloftheWomen'sInternationalLeagueforPeaceandFreedomandArticle36,May2014,reachingcriticalwill.organdarticle36.org.

• TakingForwardMultilateralNuclearDisarmamentNegotiation,UnitedNationsGeneralAssembly,FirstCommittee,Seventy-firstSession,A/C.1/71/L.41,October14,2016,reachingcriticalwill.org.

Moretoexplore:• AlexanderKmentt,“TheDevelopmentoftheInternationalInitiativeonthe

HumanitarianImpactofNuclearWeaponsandItsEffectontheNuclearWeaponsDebate,”InternationalReviewoftheRedCross,97(899),2015,www.icrc.org.

Unit2:Biotechnology,Biosecurity,andBioterrorism(Feb.23and28,Mar.2and7)

TheBiologicalWeaponsConvention(BWC)bearsasuperficialsimilaritytotheNPT,but in fact differs greatly in scope and monitoring. The traditional concern overbiologicalweaponswaswith stateprograms; thishasnowbeensupplementedbyboth the threat of terrorist use and, perhapsmost disturbingly, the extraordinarygrowth of biotechnology that places increasing potential power for dangerousbiologicalmodificationsinthehandsofthetechnicallycompetent.Keywords:Biologicalandchemicalweaponsconventions;wedgemodel;dynamicsandcontrol of infectious diseases; epidemics and pandemics; anthrax, smallpox;biotechnology;biosecurity;bioterrorism;diseasesurveillance.BiologicalWeapons1:Principles(Feb.23).Inthisfirstsession,wewillintroducethe fundamental principles and effects of biological and chemical weapons. Inparticular, we will also characterize the similarities and differences between thedifferent typesofweaponsofmassdestruction (nuclear, biological, chemical) andhowtheseweaponsare(orcanbe)capturedinarmscontrolregimes.Readings:• JeanneGuillemin,“Introduction”and“BiologicalAgentsandDisease

Transmission,”inBiologicalWeapons:FromtheInventionofState-SponsoredProgramstoContemporaryBioterrorism,ColumbiaUniversityPress,2006,pp.1–39.(BB)


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• EdwinD.Kilbourne,“PlaguesandPandemics:Past,Present,andFuture,”inNickBostromandMilanCirkovic,eds.,GlobalCatastrophicRisks,OxfordUniversityPress,2008,pp.287–307.(BB)

Video:• Contagion,directedbyStevenSoderbergh,106minutes,2011.(BB)Moretoexplore:• TheBiologicalandToxinWeaponsConvention(BTWCor,moreoften,justBWC),

availableatwww.opbw.org.BiologicalWeapons2:Acquisition(Feb.28).Especiallysince the2001anthrax-letterattacks(following9/11),concernsoverthepossibledevelopmentanduseofbiologicalweaponshasshiftedfromstate-sponsoredprogramstoeffortsthatanon-state actor might be able to launch. In this unit, we will examine how recentadvances in biotechnology, especially the growing capabilities to sequence andsynthesizeDNA (including theDNA of pathogens) exacerbate these concerns, askhowthescientificcommunitycanorshouldconduct“experimentsofconcern,”andexplorestrategiestomitigatesomeofthepresentandemergingsecurityrisks.GuestLecture:AndyLeiferAndyLeifer isanAssistantProfessor in theDepartmentofPhysicsandthePrincetonNeuroscience Institute, where he directs the LeiferLab. Previously he was a Lewis-SiglerFellowandPrincipalInvestigator.HereceivedhisdoctorateinBiophysicsfromHarvard University under the supervision of Professor Aravi Samuel. As anundergraduate,heattendedStanfordUniversitywherehegraduatedwithdegrees inPhysics and Political Science and interdisciplinary honors in international securitystudies.HegrewupoutwestinsunnyCaliforniaandColorado.Readings:• “ScienceofSyntheticBiology,”Chapter2inNewDirections:TheEthicsof

SyntheticBiologyandEmergingTechnologies,PresidentialCommissionfortheStudyofBioethicalIssues,December2010.

• HeidiLedford,“CRISPR,TheDisruptor,”Nature,522,June4,2015,pp.20–24.

• JohnBohannon,“BiologistsDeviseInvasionPlanforMutations,”Science,347(6228),March20,2015,p.1300.


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• HeidiLedford,“LifeHackers,”Nature,467,October7,2010,pp.650–652.

• AliNouriandChristopherF.Chyba,“BiotechnologyandBiosecurity,”inNickBostromandMilanCirkovic,eds.,GlobalCatastrophicRisks,OxfordUniversityPress,2008,pp.450–480.(BB)

Moretoexplore:• BiotechnologyResearchinanAgeofTerrorism,CommitteeonResearch

StandardsandPracticestoPreventtheDestructiveApplicationofBiotechnology,NationalResearchCouncil,Washington,DC,2004,www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=10827,ExecutiveSummaryandChapter1(“Introduction”),pp.1–40.(BB)

• AliNouriandChristopherF.Chyba,“Proliferation-resistantBiotechnology:AnApproachtoImproveBiologicalSecurity,”NatureBiotechnology,27(3),2009,pp.234–236.

• RichardDanzigetal.,AumShinrikyo:InsightsIntoHowTerroristsDevelopBiologicalandChemicalWeapons,CenterforaNewAmericanSecurity,Washington,DC,July2011.

BiologicalWeapons3:DynamicsofInfectiousDiseases(Mar.2).Theeffectsofbiologicalweapons can be greatly amplified if the disease caused by the agent iscontagiousandleadstoanepidemicinthetargetedpopulation.Inthissession,wewill develop a simplemathematicalmodel to describe the dynamics of infectiousdiseases(“SIRmodel”).Thiswillenableustoassesstheeffectsofadiseaseoutbreakandtheeffectivenessofdifferentcontroloptions.Readings:• DuncanJ.Watts,“EpidemicsandFailures,”Chapter6inSixDegrees:TheScience

ofaConnectedAge,Norton&Company,February2004.(BB)

• P.Munz,I.Hudea,R.J.Smith,“WhenZombiesAttack:MathematicalModelingofanOutbreakofZombieInfection,”J.M.TchuencheandC.Chiyaka(eds.),InfectiousDiseaseModelingResearchProgress,NovaSciencePublishers,Inc.,2009.(BB)

Videogame:• PlagueInc.,www.ndemiccreations.com,oniOSandAndroid.


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Moretoexplore:• R.M.AndersonandR.M.May,InfectiousDiseasesofHumans:Dynamicsand

Control,OxfordUniversityPress,1991.BiologicalWeapons4:ExpertBriefings(Mar.7).Wewillconcludethisunitwithtwo expert briefings. Professor Nina Fefferman will provide some additionalinsightsintomathematicalmodelingofinfectiousdiseasedynamics,especiallyhowindividual behaviors can cause different outcomes at the level of the population.ProfessorChristopherChybawillsharewithusthefindingsfromarecentstudyonbiosecuritybythePresident'sCouncilofAdvisorsonScienceandTechnology,co-co-chaired by Chyba, offering “guidance about how the United States can takeadvantage of its strong scientific community to prepare for and respond topathogensofallkinds.”Guestlectures:NinaFefferman(viaSkype)andChristopherChybaNina Fefferman is Associate Professor in theDepartment of Ecology& EvolutionaryBiology at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville. Her research focuses on themathematics of epidemiology, evolutionary and behavioral ecology, and self-organizingbehaviors,especiallyofsystemsdescribedbynetworks.Whiletheresearchin the Fefferman Lab frequently focuses on disease in human and/or animalpopulations, and how disease and disease-related behavioral ecology can affect theshort-termsurvivalandlong-termevolutionarysuccessofapopulation,peopleinthelab have worked on problems as diverse as computer network security to socialbehaviors in grass-roots organizations that make the movement susceptible toradicalization.ChristopherChyba isProfessorofAstrophysicalSciencesand InternationalAffairsatPrincetonUniversity.Hissecurity-relatedresearchemphasizesnuclearandbiologicalweaponspolicy,armscontrol,andnonproliferation.Hisscientificresearchfocusesonsolarsystemexplorationandthesearchfor lifeelsewhere.From2009through2016,hewas amember of the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology(PCAST). Dr. Chyba co-chaired the PCAST study “Action Needed to Protect AgainstBiologicalAttack”in2016.Readings:• EricLofgrenandNinaFefferman,“TheUntappedPotentialofVirtualGame

WorldstoShedLightonRealWorldEpidemics,”TheLancet:InfectiousDiseases,7(9),September2007,pp.625–629.(onlineandBB)


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• “LetterReporttothePresidentonActionNeededtoProtectagainstBiologicalAttack,”President'sCouncilofAdvisorsonScienceandTechnology(PCAST),Washington,DC,November2016,obamawhitehouse.archives.gov.(BB)

Unit3:NuclearEnergyandNuclearProliferation(Mar.9andMar.14)

A basic understanding of nuclear reactor and fuel-cycle technologies will beimportant in allowing us to appreciate the differences between various technicalandnon-technical choices for civilian nuclear-energy use. To a large extent, thesechoicesdetermine theproliferationrisksassociatedwithnuclearpower.Since the1970s,manycountrieshaveabandonednuclearweaponprograms,butsomeothershaveemerged,andconcernsaboutthenatureofnuclearactivities,sometimespartof civilian nuclear power program, persist. This week, we will explore thefundamentalsofvariousnucleartechnologiesandexaminethestrategiesthathavebeenproposedor implemented toprevent thediversionof civiliannuclearpowerprogramsformilitarypurposes.Tocomplementthisdiscussion,wewillexploreandassesssomerelevantcasestudies.Keywords: Nuclear fuel-cycle options; civilian and military use of nuclear power;technical and non-technical dimensions of nuclear proliferation, nuclear safeguards,nuclear non-proliferation treaty, multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle;Pakistan,Libya,NorthKorea,Iran.NuclearEnergyandNuclearProliferation1(Mar.9).Thislecturewillprovideanintroductiontothebasictechnologiesandprocessesunderlyingthepeacefuluseofnuclearenergy—andhowsomeofthemcanbeusedformilitarypurposes.Readings:• H.A.Feiveson,A.Glaser,Z.Mian,andF.vonHippel,“FissileMaterials,Nuclear

Power,andNuclearProliferation,”Chapter5inUnmakingtheBomb:AFissileMaterialApproachtoNuclearDisarmamentandNonproliferation,MITPress,Cambridge,MA,2014.(BB)

• RobertH.SocolowandAlexanderGlaser,“BalancingRisks:NuclearEnergy&ClimateChange,”Daedalus,138(4),Fall2009,pp.31–44,mitpressjournals.org.

• ScottSagan,“WhyDoStatesBuildNuclearWeapons?ThreeModelsinSearchofaBomb,”InternationalSecurity,21,Winter1996/97,pp.54–86.(BB)

• Anonymous,IAEASuperInspectors,February2012,www.youtube.com/watch?v=kE-0pdlx5Jk.


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Video:• AisforAtom,Documentary,BBC,46min,2011,

www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/adamcurtis/2011/03/a_is_for_atom.htmlorwww.youtube.com/watch?v=-FDrA7yUdFc

NuclearEnergyandNuclearProliferation2: IranandNorthKorea(Mar.14).Iran and North Korea have dominated the domestic and internationalnonproliferation debate over the past few years. While fundamentally different,bothareamongthehardestnonproliferationchallengesofthepastfewdecades,andeveryrecentU.S.Administrationhaspursueddifferentpoliciestowardthesenuclearprograms.InthecaseofIran,theEU3+3(France,Germany,andtheUnitedKingdomplusChina,Russia,andtheUnitedStates)signeda landmarkagreementwithIran.ThenewU.S.Administrationmayhowever stop supporting thisdeal,which couldrapidly lead to its collapse. The regional and global consequences of such abreakdownarehardtoanticipate.NorthKoreaontheotherhandhassuccessfullyproliferated, testing its first nuclear device in 2006 after the 1994 AgreedFramework had collapsed in 2002/2003. North Korea has since carried out anumberofadditionalweapontests,probablyweaponizedawarhead,anditisonthevergeofdemonstratingcredibleICBMcapability,i.e.,missilesthatcouldeventuallyreachU.S.territory.ItishardtoseehowtheNorthKoreanweaponsprogramcouldbe rolled back, and it is unclear what the regional implications of North Korea’scapabilitiesoverthenextyearswillbe. Inthisunit,wewillexploreinmoredepthoneoftheseprogramspendingdevelopmentsinthecomingweeks.Readings:• PLACEHOLDERREADING#1:JointComprehensivePlanofAction,Vienna,14July

2015.

• PLACEHOLDERREADING#2:TheIranNuclearDeal,TheDefinitiveGuide,HarvardKennedySchool,BelferCenterforScienceandInternationalAffairs,Cambridge,MA,August2015.

• PLACEHOLDERREADING#3:38north.org.

• PLACEHOLDERREADING#4:DarylKimballandKelseyDavenport,“RecalibratingU.S.PolicyTowardNorthKorea,”IssueBriefs,9(1),February2017,www.armscontrol.org.

SPRINGBREAK


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Unit4a:DeliverySystemsandBallisticMissiles(Mar.28and30)Theimportanceofadeliverysystemfornuclearweaponshasbeenrecognizedfromthe very beginning. In his famous 1939 letter to President Roosevelt, Einsteinassumedthatnuclearweaponswouldbepowerfulbutgiganticandspeculatedthatbombswouldthereforehavetobe“carriedbyboat”and“mightverywellprovetobetooheavyfortransportationbyair.”Nuclearwarheadsturnedoutmuchsmaller,anddeliverybecamepossiblenotonlybyaircraftbutalsobyballisticmissiles.Theinventionoftheintercontinentalballisticmissileequippedwithguidancesystemsinthe late 1950s and the development of de-facto invulnerable submarine-launchedmissiles critically shaped nuclear postures during the Cold War. The spread ofmissile technology continues to be a challenge for the nuclear nonproliferationregime.Inthisunit,wewillreviewthebasicphenomenaandconstraintsunderlyingthe delivery ofwarheads over intercontinental distances and the implications fornuclearstrategy.Keywords:Rocketequation;ballisticmissiletrajectories;nucleartriad.Readings:• DietrichSchroeer,“IntercontinentalBallisticMissiles,”Chapter6inScience,

TechnologyandtheNuclearArmsRace,Wiley&Sons,NewYork,1984.(BB)

• DonaldMacKenzie,InventingAccuracy:AHistoricalSociologyofNuclearMissileGuidance,MITPress,Cambridge,MA,1990,Chapter1(“AHistoricalSociologyofNuclearMissileGuidance”)andChapter8(“PatternsintheWeb”).(BB)

Moretoexplore:• LynnDavisandWarnerR.Schilling,“AllYouEverWantedtoKnowaboutMIRV

andICBMCalculationsbutWereNotClearedtoAsk,”JournalofConflictResolution,17(2),June1973,pp.207–242.(BB)

• AlbertD.Wheelon,“FreeFlightofaBallisticMissile,”ARSJournal,29(12),1959,pp.915–926.

• JamesN.Constant,FundamentalsofStrategicWeapons:OffenseandDefenseSystems,MartinusNijhoffPublishers,TheHague,1981.

Unit4b:NuclearStrategy,Deterrence,andtheLast30Minutes(Apr.4and6)AstheColdWararmsraceacceleratedinthe1950s,militaryplannersintheUnitedStates and elsewhere began to develop and then refine the concept of nucleardeterrence, which included massive retaliation, flexible response, and mutualassureddestruction(basedona “securesecond-strikecapability”).Along theway,


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thesuperpowersalsobegantoembrace(nuclear)armscontrol,which isbasedonthe sharedunderstanding that it canbepreferable forallpartiesnot toengage incostly and potentially destabilizing arms races. Arms control regulates, limits,reduces,orprohibitsparticularclassesofweaponsandhasremainedacriticaltoolto support global security to the present day. Arms-control agreements are oftenenshrined in treaties, which usually require verification mechanisms to confirmcompliance.Inthisunit,wewillexaminethebasicconceptsofnuclearstrategyandarmscontrol.Wewillalsoexamine,thecontributionsthatestablishedandemergingtechnologiescanplayintreatyverification.Keywords:Massiveretaliation;mutualassureddestruction;no-firstuse,second-strikecapability.Readings:• ThomasM.Nichols,“NuclearStrategy,1950–1990:TheSearchforMeaning,”

Chapter1inNoUse:NuclearWeaponsandU.S.NationalSecurity,UniversityofPennsylvaniaPress,Philadelphia,2014.(BB)

• CarolCohn,“SexandDeathintheRationalWorldofDefenseIntellectuals,”Signs:JournalofWomeninCultureandSociety,12(4),1987.(BB)

Moretoexplore(includingsomeclassics):• AlexanderL.GeorgeandRichardSmoke,DeterrenceinAmericanForeignPolicy,

TheoryandPractice,ColumbiaUniversityPress,NewYork,1974,Chapter1.(BB)

• RobertJervis,“DeterrenceandPerception,”InternationalSecurity,7(3),Winter1982/83.(BB)

• LawrenceFreedman,TheEvolutionofNuclearStrategy,3rdEdition,PalgraveMacMillanPress,London,2003.(BB)

• JeffreyKnopf,“TheFourthWaveinDeterrenceResearch,”ContemporarySecurityPolicy,31(1),April2010.(BB)

• EricSchlosser,CommandandControl:NuclearWeapons,theDamascusAccident,

andtheIllusionofSafety,PenguinPress,2013.

WARGAME:TheLast30Minutes(Apr.6)Readings:


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• BruceBlair,“WhatExactlyWouldItMeantoHaveTrump’sFingerontheNuclearButton?,”PoliticoMagazine,June11,2016,www.politico.com.

• “NuclearCommandandControl,”Chapter6inNuclearMattersHandbook2016,U.S.DepartmentofEnergy,Washington,DC,2016,www.acq.osd.mil/ncbdp/nm/NMHB.

Unit5:ScienceandTechnologyforArmsControlandVerification(Apr.11andApr.13)

Arms-control agreements are meaningful only insofar as they also includeprovisionstodemonstratecompliancewiththeagreementthroughasetofagreedreportingandverificationprovisions. Inthisunit,wewillexplorethepoliticalandtechnicalchallengesofverificationinthecontextofarmscontrol,withaparticularemphasis on the role of satellites and the potential of social media, which mayprovide fundamentally newways to detect or report non-compliancewith treatyobligations.Verification1:EmergingTechnologiesandVirtualReality(Apr.11).GuestLecture:TamaraPattonTamaraPattonisaDoctoralStudentinScience,TechnologyandEnvironmentalPolicy(STEP) at theWoodrowWilson School of Public and International Affairs. Prior tocoming to Princeton, Tamara worked as a researcher at the Vienna Center forDisarmament and Non-Proliferation (VCDNP) and at the Stockholm InternationalPeaceResearchInstitute(SIPRI).ShehasanMAinnonproliferationstudies fromtheMiddlebury Institute of International Studies andaBA in international studies fromtheUniversityofWashington.Readings:• EdwardIfft,“PoliticalDimensionsofDetermining“Effective”Verification,”

Chapter1inCoreyHinderstein(ed.),CultivatingConfidence:Verification,Monitoring,andEnforcementforaWorldFreeofNuclearWeapons,NuclearThreatInitiative,Washington,DC,2010.(BB)

• TamaraPatton,BernadetteCogswell,MoritzKütt,andAlexanderGlaser,“Full-MotionVirtualRealityforNuclearArmsControl,”57thAnnualINMMMeeting,July24-28,2016,Atlanta,Georgia.(BB)

Moretoexplore:


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• AmyF.Woolf,MonitoringandVerificationinArmsControl,ReportR41201,CongressionalResearchService,December23,2011.(BB)

• NewSTARTTreatyandProtocol,

www.state.gov/documents/organization/140035.pdfandwww.state.gov/documents/organization/140047.pdf

Verification2(Apr.13).Thislectureexpandsonthebasicconceptsunderpinningthe politics and technology of verification. As a case study, we will examinesatellites,whichwerefirstdevelopedanddeployedbythesuperpowersduringtheCold War for threat assessment and war planning. When the first arms-controltreatieswerenegotiatedintheearly1970s,however, they(also)becameacriticaltool to enable verification of these agreements without the need for onsiteinspections. Many countries and now also private companies operate satellitestoday,andtheyhavebeguntosellimageryofunprecedentedquality,sometimesona first-come first-serve basis. In this session, we will discuss why satellites arewheretheyare,determinetheresolutionlimitsoftheimagerythatcanbeobtainedwiththem,andexplorewhatfuturerolessatellitescouldplaygiventhan“quasireal-timeimageryforeveryone”maysoonbecomeareality.Keywords:Satelliteorbits;satelliteimagery;opticalresolution.Readings:• VIDEO:PlanetataGlance,2016,www.youtube.com/watch?v=UL1aAwGW7VQ.

• KelseyHartiganandCoreyHinderstein,“TheOpportunitiesandLimitsof

SocietalVerification,”InstituteofNuclearMaterialsManagement54thAnnualMeeting,PalmDesert,CA,2013,www.nti.org.

Moretoexplore:• D.Wright,L.Grego,andL.Gronlund,“TheBasicsofSatelliteOrbits”and“Types

ofOrbits,orWhySatellitesAreWhereTheyAre,”Sections4and5inThePhysicsofSpaceSecurity:AReferenceManual,AmericanAcademyofArtsandSciences,Cambridge,MA,2005,www.amacad.org.

Unit6:TheFuture(Apr.18,Apr.20,Apr.25,andApr.27)

Inthisunit,wewillexplore(oftenmorequalitativelythanquantitatively)emergingtechnologiesandtheirpossibleramificationsforglobalsecurity.


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TheFuture1:TheInternetofThingsandKineticPwnage(Apr.18).GuestLecture:EdSkoudisEdSkoudis is the founderofCounterHack,anorganization thatdesigns,builds,andoperatespopular “infosec challenges”and simulations includingCyberCity,NetWars,CyberQuests,andCyberFoundations.AsdirectoroftheCyberCityproject,Edoverseesthe development of missions that help train “cyber warriors” in how to defend thekinetic assets of a physical,miniaturized city. Ed's expertise includes hacker attacksand defenses, incident response, and malware analysis, with over fifteen years ofexperience in information security. Adapted from: www.sans.org/instructors/ed-skoudis.Readings:• RobertO'HarrowJr.,“CyberCityAllowsGovernmentHackerstoTrainfor

Attacks,”WashingtonPost,November26,2012,washingtonpost.com(BB)

• VIDEO:TheSevenMostDangerousNewAttackTechniques,RSA2017KeynoteSession,February15,2017,www.sans.org/the-seven-most-dangerous-new-attack-techniques.Note:WatchatleasttheSkoudissegment(first15minutes).

• HackedCameras,DVRsPoweredToday’sMassiveInternetOutage(“2016DynCyberattack”),October21,2016,krebsonsecurity.com.

Moretoexplore:• RobertM.Lee,MichaelJ.Assante,TimConway,AnalysisoftheCyberAttackon

theUkrainianPowerGrid,DefenseUseCase,SANS/E-ISAC,Washington,DC,March18,2016,ics.sans.org.(BB)

• G.Conti,M.Weigand,E.Skoudis,D.Raymond,T.Cook,andT.Arnold,“TowardsaCyberLeaderCourseModeledonArmyRangerSchool,”SmallWarsJournal,April2014.(BB)

TheFuture2:Cyberwarfare(Apr.20).Thediscovery inmid2010of “Stuxnet,”asophisticatedcomputerwormdevelopedbytheUnitedStatesandIsraeltodestroyuranium enrichment equipment in Iran brought into international focus theemergingstrategiccapabilitiesofcyberattacks, including thepossibilityof “kineticmilitary action. In mid 2011, the Whitehouse released its own cyber-strategy,declaring that “whenwarranted, the United Stateswill respond to hostile acts incyberspaceaswewouldtoanyotherthreattoourcountry.”Manyothercountries


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are actively expanding their cyber capabilities. In this lecture,wewill explore thefundamental elements of cyberwarfare, as far as they can be identified andanticipated today; consider the similarities anddifferences between cyberwarfareand “physical” warfare; and examine if and how traditional security concepts(including crisis stability, attribution, escalatory control, and minimization ofcollateraldamage)andstrategiesapplytocyberwarfare.Readings:• SeymourM.Hersh,“TheOnlineThreat:ShouldWeBeWorriedAboutaCyber

War?,”TheNewYorker,November1,2010,www.newyorker.com.

• JosephNye,“DeterrenceandDissuasioninCyberspace,”InternationalSecurity,41(3),Winter2016/2017.(BB)

• BraveNewCyberworld,PaneldiscussionwithStewartBaker,WilliamBurns,MassimoCalabresi,MichaelChertoff,JaredCohen,ShaneHuntley,GeorgePerkovich,andDavidSanger,CarnegieEndowmentforInternationalPeace,April18,2017,carnegieendowment.org/2017/04/18/brave-new-cyberworld-event-5561.

Moretoexplore:• TheDODCyberStrategy,U.S.DepartmentofDefense,Washington,DC,April

2015.

• InternationalStrategyforCyberspace,ThePresidentoftheUnitedStates,WhiteHouse,Washington,DC,May2011.

• DepartmentofDefenseStrategyforOperatinginCyberspace,U.S.DepartmentofDefense,Washington,DC,July2011.

TheFuture3:MachineLearningandSuperintelligence(Apr.25and27).Recentyears have seen unprecedented progress in the field of machine learning, whichgivescomputerstheabilitytolearnfromdata.Twomajortypesofmachinelearningare currently being distinguished: In supervised machine learning, a program istrained on a set of (“labeled”) training data to reach conclusions about new(“unlabeled”)data,effectivelymakingpredictionsaboutthefuture.Inunsupervisedmachine learning, a program is given unlabeled data andmust find patterns andrelationships therein, i.e., discover hidden structures in a dataset.With regard tomilitary applications, the pace of progress inmachine learning has already to animportant debate about the possibility of autonomous weapons, which, onceactivated,wouldselectandengagetargetswithoutfurtherinterventionbyahuman


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operator. Some experts consider this development inevitable; others consider ithighly problematic and see autonomous weapons as violating principles ofhumanity.Lookingfurtherahead,andcurrentlyintherealmofsciencefiction,theremay be autonomous systems that match and eventually exceed human-levelintelligenceandachievewhatsomecall“superintelligence.”Ifsuchsystemsshouldbedevelopedatalland,iftheyare,howtoensurethattheyremainbenevolentoncethey exist, has been considered one of the “most momentous questions that ourspecieswilleverconfront.”Inthisunit,wewillexplorethesecurityimplicationsofthese(possible)developments.Readings: • E.Ackerman,“WeShouldNotBan‘KillerRobots,’andHere’sWhy,”IEEE

Spectrum,July29,2015,spectrum.ieee.org.

• S.Russell,M.Tegmark,andT.Walsh,“WhyWeReallyShouldBanAutonomousWeapons:AResponse,”IEEESpectrum,August3,2015,spectrum.ieee.org.

• NickBostrom,“GetReadyfortheDawnofSuperintelligence,”NewScientist,5July2014,pp.26–27.(BB)

• NickBostrom,“PastdevelopmentsandPresentCapabilities”and“PathstoSuperintelligence,”Chapters1and2inSuperintelligence:Paths,Dangers,Strategies,OxfordUniversityPress,2014.(BB)

• StuartRussell,DanielDewey,MaxTegmark,“ResearchPrioritiesforRobustandBeneficialArtificialIntelligence,”AIMagazine,36(4),2015,futureoflife.org.

Video:• ExMachina,directedbyAlexGarland,108minutes,2015.(BB)

TeamPresentations(May2andMay4)

TBD.


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©DaveTheurer,Atari,1980

Documents

Science and Global Security - Princeton Universityaglaser/WWS353-Syllabus-2017-REV2.pdf · • S. Glasstone and L. M. Redman, An Introduction to Nuclear Weapons, WASH-1037 Revised,