The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Regional Stability or an Alliance vs. the West?

By Travis BeecroftHIST 701

D’AgostinoMay 19, 2015

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A nineteenth-century redux has enveloped contemporary international politics and

“the old competition between liberalism and autocracy” is back.1 Robert Kagan was

right, and the signs are easily visible. Not only are absolutist rulers shoring up fellow

autocracies in areas riddled with revolutions, but democratic and autocratic governments

are constantly at odds with one another over ideology. The great powers are also aligning

into groups based on “strategic and economic considerations, as well as cultural

affinities,” despite times when they go against favored ideology.2 These groups, or

multilateral organizations, have emerged to play a number of roles in the global balance

of power because they can project strategic, economic, and cultural ideology in regional

and global matters. Over the last fifteen years, one such group, the Shanghai Cooperation

Organization (SCO), has provided stability in Central Asia and has shown what a non-

democratic international organization can provide. While the SCO is not perfect by any

means, the organization has provided stability to a volatile region, vastly improved

economic ties between its members, and even serves as a possible threat or counterweight

to the United States and the West.

Founded in 2001, the SCO consists of six members: China, Russia, Kazakhstan,

Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, four observers: India, Iran, Afghanistan,

Mongolia, and Pakistan, and three dialogue partners: Belarus, Sri Lanka, and Turkey.

The SCO’s original goal was to provide regional security against the “three evils” of

post-Soviet politics: terrorism, separatism, and extremism.”3 4 In fact, in the

organization’s declaration it states that the SCO “assigns priority to regional security and

will work to combat terrorism and separatism as well as illicit trafficking in weapons and

narcotics, illegal immigration, and other criminal activities.”5 After the attacks on 9/11

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the SCO increased its efforts to improve regional security in the fight against terrorism.6

First, not only had three SCO members granted the United States permission to establish

military bases in their countries after 9/11 (Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan), the

United States had quickly proven they were more effective in the fight against terrorism

than the SCO. As a result, the SCO realized they needed to become “more relevant in the

war against terror.”7 One way the SCO was able to achieve this was by constructing

Regional Anti-terror Structures (RATS) in Central Asia. When the SCO opened its

Tashkent-based RATS in Uzbekistan in 2004 it was the only antiterrorist center in

Central Asia. The goal of these anti-terror structures is to “coordinate the member states’

counterterrorism activities, monitor terrorist activities in the region, recommend

counterterrorist activities for the member states, and exchange information” with other

international organizations.8 Hailed as an “integral part of the SCO, both in terms of

practical cooperation against terrorism and rhetorically as a vehicle to address new

security challenges,” the RATS “seeks to act as a forum for research and analysis of

terrorism in the region, and dispense this information in the form of training and policy

advice to individual state apparatus.”9

These RATS have been used effectively against terrorist organizations associated

with “East Turkistan,” as well, a term China applies to “separatist groups that try to

separate Xinjiang from China.”10 These terrorist organizations have ties to al-Qaeda and

the Taliban, and one of these organizations, The Turkistan Islamic Party, is openly

“committed to carrying out jihadist activities against China in Xinjiang.”11 Their

activities in the region caused large-scale riots in Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang,

involving “brutal violence that the region had not seen since the establishment of the

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PRC.”12 By creating RATS and conduction regional anti-terrorism operations fairly

regularly, the SCO is able to combat those forms of terrorism causing unrest and maintain

regional safety. However, despite the fact that RATS “has no jurisdiction to enforce its

policy recommendations on its member states’ domestic affairs,” and that it “has not

achieved the level of integration required for a truly effective multilateral intelligence

agency,” it should still be labeled a success.13 In preventing over 250 terrorist attacks in

2005, the RATS “thus play a very important role in the SCO and is considered vital to the

wider evolution of the organization.”14 Additionally, “in recent years, anti-terrorism

mechanisms of the SCO, CSTO, and CIS have discussed how to better coordinate their

joint efforts in combining international terrorism by sharing information, developing

legal framework, and participating in joint operations.”15 By doing so, the SCO would be

a model of China’s “new idea of ‘cooperative security’ based on comprehensive, open,

and voluntary cooperation that enhances security for all, but threatens none.”16 In other

words, “the SCO provides an embryonic form of a community of practice that embodies

China’s new security concept.”17

In promoting this new security concept in the fight against terrorism and to

increase their military presence, the SCO combined the features of its military and

political activities in the form of war games and made and agreement with the CIS that

“open[s] the door for military cooperation between the two organizations.”18 These SCO

and CIS war games, first occurring in 2002, “have become increasingly ambitious,

developing from bilateral or multilateral level to a joint all-SCO level, and including not

only counterterrorism but also external security policy connotations.”19 Since 2002, these

war games have “implemented the provisions of the 2001 Shanghai Convention on the

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joint struggle against” the three evils.20 For instance, in for the first time in 40 years,

Chinese and Russian armed forces conducted joint exercises comprising 10,000 military

personnel, navy vessels and aircraft in what was called Peace Mission 2005. Two years

later, Peace Mission 2007 was conducted using troops from Russia, China, Kazakhstan,

Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, showing the cooperation the SCO shared in

combatting terrorism and projecting military might.21 It should be noted, however, that

the SCO is not a military alliance, and the organization should not be regarded as such.”22

However, the war games showed that “these countries would manage the security of their

region themselves, without outside (Western) interference.”23 Furthermore, although

these war games were described as being for peacekeeping and counterterrorism

endeavors, “the massive use of ground, air and naval arms and equipment clearly

demonstrated their capabilities in conducting modern conventional warfare,” thereby

exhibiting the SCO’s military power.24 With more war games to come, the SCO is

proving itself to have regional military clout, despite not being a military alliance.

In the last few years it can be argued, however, that the SCO “has shifted from

settling border issues to security and now to economic cooperation.”25 While regional

security is of importance to the SCO, so too, perhaps even more so, is un-hindered access

to the region’s rich energy supply, one that China recognizes “is of crucial significance

for [its] energy security and for its overall development.”26 The SCO understands that the

market they have access to is one of the “most dynamically developing in the world.”27

For instance, Kazakhstan has about 4% of the world’s proven oil reserves, Turkmenistan

has the world’s fifth largest natural gas reserves, and Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan control

90% of the five Central Asian republics’ total water resources.28 As a result, in 2004 the

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SCO’s members adopted a plan to establish a relationship between their major energy

producers: Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan, and its main energy consumers: China,

Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, forming what the Russian’s called an “Energy Club.”29

Leonid Moiseev, Special Representative of the President of Russia for SCO affairs stated

that the SCO Energy Club would:

Harmonize national energy strategies and development plans, […] give a platform for discussion of common programs and projects, […] solve questions connected with their implementation, […] become a brain and information trust, which would contribute to coordination of long-term programs in the sphere of the fuel-energy complex. It could in perspective elaborate common strategic guidelines, help to create general infrastructure, which should serve to implementation of joint projects, as well as persist in its position in foreign economic policy.30

Van Chun Zhun, representative of the CITC of China in the Russian Federation, believes

that because the SCO Energy Club allows energy companies from various SCO countries

to secure deals in the region. “This platform,” he stated, “can raise the cooperation both

between energy companies and the organization member states to a much higher level.”31

One energy company finding success with its partnership with the SCO is Gazprom.

Their Deputy Chairman Alexey Mastepanov stated that his corporation has “established a

long-term partnership relations with many of the biggest companies of the SCO

countries, and with some of them we have entered into relations of strategic

cooperation.”32 This is possible because they “have a general understanding of problems

of world energy security and possible ways of their solution.”33

Not only have individual energy companies found success in the region through

the SCO, but whole countries have benefitted as well. In 2003 the prime ministers of the

SCO countries agreed that all should “work towards creating favorable conditions for the

free flow of goods, services and technologies.”34 SCO members have shown they are

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committed to cooperative trade and have even built pipelines throughout Central Asia to

accommodate energy trade.35 The construction of these pipelines and the transportation

routes made to accompany them is part of the SCO’s plan to revitalize the ancient Silk

Road. Establishing a new Silk Road would be wondrous for SCO members because this

route is becoming “the world’s longest economic corridor that has the greatest potential

for development” and it would integrate Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan into “the

SCO structures of support and subsidization.”36 37 This, combined with the proposed

Chinese-Iranian trade route, which grants Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan their

closest sea access, allows the SCO and its landlocked members access to markets perhaps

not accessible without the organization’s formation.

The SCO is also providing for its observers “an umbrella under which they can

initiate and deepen economic ties with one another.”38 As an extension of the cooperative

trade philosophy, in 2003 the SCO adopted the Multilateral Trade and Development

Program that introduced 127 projects, including 19 related to energy cooperation, 20 to

transport cooperation, and roughly 40 to cooperation “in the spheres of education,

science, and technology.”39 This agreement, Dilip Hiro contends, “was shorthand for

keeping American and other western oil corporations out of Central Asia.”40 By 2005,

bilateral trade between China and the other SCO members reached nearly $38 billion, an

increase of 212% from the organization’s first year.41 That same year, Russia’s trade

with other SCO members amounted to over $41 billion, up from $26 billion in 2001.42

The trade between China and Russia has also been impressive, reaching $33 billion in

2006.43 Additionally, the SCO has helped in the realms of finance, and in 2005 the

organization established the SCO Interbank Association and the Interbank Association

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Agreement (IBA), bringing together the major banks of the SCO members by a signed

agreement that was “in support of regional economic cooperation.”44 Also, the Chinese

Eximbank has provided over fifty preferential loans to SCO members in fields such as

“telecommunications, transport and grid construction, water and agriculture, and energy”

thereby improving production and the economies of those nations and the SCO as a

whole.45 Because of this, China established a large credit fund of $900 million for its

Central Asian partners in 2004, a loan large enough to make “Western (and Russian)

economic diplomacy look pathetic.”46 If that was not enough to make the West look

pathetic, China pledged an additional $1.2 billion in credit to the SCO in 2007, and they

responded to the 2008 financial crisis by using the umbrella of the SCO to establish a $10

billion credit line for SCO members to “counter the shock of the international financial

crisis.”47 In this way, China is using the SCO to enhance its status as the world’s leading

creditor nation.

From China’s perspective, the SCO gives them the opportunity to show the world

what a non-Western democratic partnership can look like. With the power China holds in

the region it has molded the SCO into a representation of their own projected self-image.

For instance, William A. Callahan explains that because “China is intensely preoccupied

with creating a narrative for itself as a responsible and rising great power, and because

regionalism is part of what great powers do,” China must create a narrative for this as

well.48 In doing so, China is using the SCO as “part of [their] overall diplomatic strategy

to foster stable and productive international environment around China’s periphery while

fostering a more widely accepted Chinese leadership role.”49 To do this, “the SCO seeks

to promote distinctively Chinese normative order expressed through multilateral

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channels.”50 If successful, China hopes to show that “countries with different

civilizations and social systems could coexists in peace without democratizing domestic

systems,” that the era of “either enemies or allies’ is gone,” and that China’s plan for

“develop[ing] a model for cooperation in which major powers and smaller powers can

collaborate on equal footing” can be trusted by the non-West.51

Through the SCO, China is also promoting the “Shanghai Spirit” at the expense of

democratic ideology. This “Shanghai Spirit” has six components: “mutual trust, mutual

benefit, equality, consultation, respect for multicivilizations, [and] striving for common

development.”52 For China and the SCO the “Shanghai Spirit” represents “a

consolidating component, a source of unity and spiritual power…a common concept of

security, a civilization formula, a concept of development and a system of values.”53 The

“Shanghai Spirit” can also be seen as “a new and non-confrontational model of

international relations, a model that calls for discarding the Cold War mentality and

transcending ideological differences.”54 However, the only ideological differences the

SCO is looking to transcend through projection of the “Shanghai Spirit” are those that are

already authoritarian in nature. Thomas Ambrosio argues that the “Shanghai Spirit” “is

inherently conservative and designed to preserve the autocratic regimes in the region.” In

fact, one of the policies extended by the “Shanghai Spirit” is supporting authoritarian

regimes and protecting them against the spreading influence of democracy in the region.

In this sense, “the SCO represents a formidable challenge to the ideas of universal

democracy and human rights through its de facto legitimization of authoritarianism and

by establishing itself as a counterweight to external democratic norms.”55

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The notion of the SCO being a counterweight to the U.S. and challenging its

hegemony is nothing new as many have discussed the topic since the organization was

founded. For instance, Stephan Aris argues that “the SCO is seen as an attempt by

Moscow and Beijing to try and instrumentalize the SCO as a regional balancing structure

against Washington.”56 Dilip Hiro contends that much of the SCO’s rhetoric is inferring

they seek “to end the role of the United States as the sole superpower.”57 Furthermore,

Isabelle Facon argues that from 2005-2008, “the SCO most strongly gave the impression

that it was emerging as a powerful organization successfully challenging American

hegemony.”58 Moreover, as Emilian Kavalski notes, “the organization’s call for building

a new international political order based on multipolarity in international relations and its

opposition to interference in domestic affairs [dates back to and] is clearly aimed against

Western support for the ‘colored revolutions’ during the 2000s.”59 These “color

revolutions” in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and the Ukraine from 2003-2005 posed threats to

security in Central Asia because the revolutions were pro-Western and were taking place

in former Soviet Republics along China’s borders. The SCO views any “anti-regime

activities, such as the color revolutions,” as “inherently disruptive and linked to the ‘three

evil forces’” of terrorism, secessionism, and extremism that the organization “openly

seeks to combat.”60 Some even contend that the SCO is the East’s version of NATO,

however, the “SCO, unlike NATO, is not an alliance” because “it strives for a

relationship among members that is neither confrontational nor collusive.”61 As such, the

promotion of autocracy and the protection of authoritarian regimes remains high on the

SCO’s agenda, and as Kagan contends, “the global divisions between the club of

autocrats and the axis of democracy have broad implications for the international

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system.”62 This has not gone unnoticed by Western countries, and as a Japanese official

recently stated, “the SCO is becoming a rival black to the U.S. alliance. It does not share

our values. We are watching it very closely.”63

The inclusion of Iran as an observer state to the SCO again hints at the notion of

the organization challenging the West given Iran’s stance vehemently opposing the

United States. For instance, Iran has a “clear interest in being part of a bloc whose aim

was to counter threats and influence from the West,” and they want the SCO “to develop

into a power body influential in regional and international politics, economics and trade,

serving to block threats and unlawful strong-arm interference from various countries.”64

Moreover, Iran hopes to use the SCO as “diplomatic support against America’s

increasingly alarming demands,” but China does not wish to endanger U.S. relations.65

Most of the SCO members are wary about Iran’s inclusion because they fear “it could

deepen suspicions that the bloc is intended as a counterbalance to the U.S. influence

across the region,” however many of those suspicions are prevalent when discussing the

organization.66 However, if the SCO decided to legitimize its stance against the West, it

would have three formidable presences in China, Russia, and Iran, all seeking to

minimize American hegemony.

Perhaps attempting to quell this anti-West notion, the SCO’s decision to admit

India and Turkey as observer and dialogue states, respectively, brings two democratic

states into the organization. The inclusion of India as a full member has been advocated

for by Russia, who believes that “India’s presence could be a game-changer for the

SCO.”67 “India, who shares concern with Russia and China over the instability in

Afghanistan—contributing nearly $2 billion in aid to the country by 2014—wants access

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to the group to help with the fight against terrorism, and for its vast energy supplies. As

an observer state, India has so far already established a natural gas pipeline from

Turkmenistan via Afghanistan and Pakistan and it has an agreement in place with ONGC

and KazMunaiGaz that brings oil and uranium supplies to India.68 Additionally, in 2011

an agreement was signed between ONGC and Videsh Limited and KazMunaiGaz for

purchase of 25% stake in the Satpayev Oil Black in the Caspian Sea.69 Given that

“bilaterial ties between India and the SCO member countries have been very strong, with

the exception of China,” it makes sense for the inclusion of India into the group. For

instance, not only would the SCO benefit from India’s extensive IT, finance, and banking

experience, they would a also get the added benefit of ensuring “that China does not

become the dominant force in the grouping,” something that causes worry amongst SCO

members.70 If China is able to accept this notion and realize the benefits that India could

provide the SCO, they should let admit them as a full member, thereby admitting nearly

half of the world’s population into a single multilateral organization.

For China, the SCO has a multitude of strategic significances. Not only has it

promoted “confidence building and increased […] trust between China and nine of its

closest neighbors,” it has provided a quality framework “for China to cooperate closely in

combatting terrorism, extremism, separatism and various other cross-border criminal

forces.”71 The SCO has also focused the attention of the Central Asian states “on

preventing threats to Chinese control of Xinjiang,” “softened Russian resistance to

Chinese influence in Central Asia,” and it “serves as a gatekeeper for access by other

states that have a strategic interest in the region.”72 As a result, the “SCO provides a

regularized channel for China to strengthen political, economic, and security relations

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among its major Central Asian neighbors.”73 The SCO also serves as “a vehicle for

China to advance its economic aims in Central Asia […] in a way that avoids conflicts

with its neighbors.”74 By allowing for all this, the SCO is promoting the aims of China

through their policy implementations in other countries. The SCO has allowed China to

export its “Shanghai Spirit,” causing many to wonder how quickly it will catch on in

other authoritarian countries around the world. If it does, the SCO and the “Shanghai

Spirit” will continue to pose a threat to the United States as hegemon.

For Russia, everything is about projecting power across the globe, and it sees the

SCO as a means to that end. Upon entering the SCO with China, Russia set three goals

for its participation: “to be recognized as the predominant power, “to restore its status as

a global player and be recognized as a leading power center on the world stage,” and the

maintenance of its strategic partnership with China.75 With the increased arms trade

between Russia and China amounting to 45% of Russia’s arms exports, and nearly $2

billion annually in the form of weapons systems being sent from Russia to China, the

SCO is proving to be useful for both China and Russia. In fact, Russia finds the SCO

useful “because it provides a cooperative rather than competitive framework for the

extension of Chinese influence to the region,” cooperation being one of the guiding

principles of the organization.76 Moreover, Russia sees the SCO as an “important device

in its strategy to keep in check both the increasing influence of Western players and the

instabilities along Russia’s southern periphery.”77 This is one of the ideologies China

brings to the table as well, and with the power these authoritarian regimes wield they are

certainly enough to counterbalance the United States in the region. Moreover, Moscow

has attempted the use the organization to “resist efforts at democratization emanating

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from inside and outside the member states, to limit American and other Western

influence in Central Asia, and to promote Russian foreign-policy goals generally.”78

Russia believes that “Western ‘interference’ in the region, especially if it aims at

orchestrating regime changes, could not only reduce its own influence but also bring

extra trouble by seriously destabilizing the neighboring Central Asian states.”79 For

Russia, the SCO “has played a supplementary and consolidating role with Russia’s own

regional initiatives, offering Moscow additional entry channels into Central Asian policy

mechanisms.”80

Things have not been perfect for the SCO, however, as progress in the field of

economics for the SCO has been hindered by a few challenges. First, difficulties

surrounding “payment arrangements, customs procedures, and transportation facilities”

have prevented regional economic growth, and the “inequalities of development” with

Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan “lagging behind others could also become a

problem for the organization’s economic efficiency and cohesion.”81 Additionally, it “did

little of consequence in dealing with the Taliban and the problems in Afghanistan.”82

Many of the problems arise from the fact that the SCO countries are so diverse and with

many different personalities, goals, methodologies, etc. This has resulted in sticky

relationships dating back centuries between the organization’s members and puts

relations on shaky ground as many countries are suspicious about one another and their

motives, particularly against China and its potential as the regional hegemon. For

instance, “despite recent friendships between Russia and China, there are serious

concerns within the higher levels of Russian decision-makers about China’s increased

political, economic, and military growth and its implications for Russia in its backyard in

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Central Asia.”83 Because “the SCO members remain wary of one another and there are

numerous obstacles to greater economic, political, and military cooperation.”84 For

example, Thrassy N. Marketos explains that the other members “have shown

corresponding caution,” to China’s economic plans for the SCO, as they “see more open

multilateral market as removing the last remaining obstacles in the way of a de facto

economic takeover of the area by China.”85 It remains to be seen how these relationships

will develop over the next few years, but for their own sake, fostering trust with one

another must be imperative so the group can become more influential than it already is.

When evaluating success, Jean-Pierre Cabestan notes that “the most obvious

success[es] of this organization have been its very existence and survival” for more than a

decade, its contribution to the “de-isolation of the ‘Stans,’” and its help “in facilitating

communication, [and] improving trust” in the region.86 According to Julie Boland, the

SCO has also made progress on counter narcotics issues and it has helped manage the

Internet’s impact on SCO governments in a positive manner.87 It should also be noted

that the SCO was “developed from a one-dimensional security-consulting mechanism to

a comprehensive formal regional organization” and was the function of a “highly

successful cooperation in security areas that eventually ‘spilled over’ into other non-

security areas, such as foreign policy coordination, economic, and cultural cooperation, ”

speaking to the SCO’s ability to adapt to the times and needs of its members.88 89

Additionally, “the SCO contributes to regional security by helping member states

collaborate to stay in power” because everyone “benefits from the legitimacy extended by

the others and from cooperation against domestic opponents and foreign critics.”90 If

these countries continue working together, they could pose a credible threat to the West.

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Not only does the SCO hold nearly half of the world’s populations, it has some of the

largest economies in the world, and contains members eager to bring an end to U.S.

hegemony. As such, the SCO should remain on the radar for the U.S., and the U.S.

should do what it can to work with the SCO, if not ideologically then certainly

economically.

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1 Robert Kagan, The Return of History and the End of Dreams (New York: VintageBooks, 2008): 4.2 Kagan, The Return of History, 73. In the 19th century it was the absolutist rulers of Russia and Austria that shored up autocracies in post-revolutionary France and suppressed liberal rebellions in Germany, Poland, Italy, and Spain. Today, Russia and China are shoring up various autocracies after the Color Revolutions and Georgia and the Ukraine have experienced reprisals from Russia after hinting towards alignment with the West.3 Edward Lucas, The New Cold War: Putin’s Russia and the Threat to the West (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008): 135.4 See Image 1. With the addition of Uzbekistan in 2001, the SCO truly rounded into shape. Prior to this, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were known as the Shanghai Five, which was formed in 1996. For the sake of brevity, this discussion will focus on the organization post-2001, given the personality Uzbekistan brings to the organization and impact 9/11 had on the group’s rhetoric.5 Bates Gill, Rising Star: China’s New Security Diplomacy (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2007): 41.6 The “Color Revolutions” were Pro-Western and democratic revolutions in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Ukraine from 2003-2005.7 Yong Deng and Fei-Ling Wang Eds, China Rising: Power and Motivation in ChineseForeign Policy (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005): 180.8 Gill, Rising Star: China’s New Security Diplomacy, 131.9 Stephen Aris, Eurasian Regionalism: The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011): 4.10 Zhao Huasheng, “China’s View of and Expectations from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” Asian Survey 53.3 (Spring 2013): 43711 Huasheng, “China’s View of and Expectations from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” 439.12 Huasheng, , 438.13 Stephen Aris, Eurasian Regionalism, 126, 129.14 Aris, 129.15 Emilian Kavalski Ed, China and the Global Politics of Regionalization (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2009): 75.16 Emilian Kavalski Ed. China and the Global Politics of Regionalization, 75.17 Kavalski, China and the Global Politics of Regionalization, 51.18 Ibid, 15.19 Marcel de Haas and Frans-Paul van der Putten, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: Towards a Full-Grown Security Alliance?” (Clingendael: Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2007): 15. See Image 2 for a chat of the SCO war games through 2012. Source: Zhao Huasheng, “China’s View of and Expectations from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” Asian Survey 53.3 (Spring 2013): 443.20 Marcel de Haas and Frans-Paul van der Putten, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: Towards a Full-Grown Security Alliance?” 16.21 Marcel de Haas and Frans-Paul van der Putten, 17-1822 Fredholm, 4.23 de Haas and van der Putten, 19.24 Ibid, 19-20.25 Elaheh Koolaee and Mandana Tisheyar, “An Outlook on Energy Cooperation Approaches in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Region,” Geopolitics Quarterly 8.4 (Winter 2013): 46.26 Alyson J.K. Bailes, Pál Dunay, Pan Guang, & Mikhail Troitskiy. “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” SIPRI Policy Paper No. 17, (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2007): 46.27 Maxim Krans. “SCO Energy Club: What Will It Be Like?” InfoSCO. 28 October 2009, 2.

28 Adrian Pabst, “Central Eurasia in the Emerging Global Balance of Power,” American Foreign Policy Interests 31 (2009): 167.29 Elaheh Koolaee and Mandana Tisheyar, “An Outlook on Energy Cooperation Approaches in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Region,” 47.30 Maxim Krans. “SCO Energy Club: What Will It Be Like?” 2.31 Krans, 3.32 Ibid, 3.33 Ibid, 2-3.34 Thrassy N. Marketos. China’s Energy Geopolitics: The Shanghai Cooperation and Central Asia (New York: Routledge, 2008): 46. 35 Specifically, China has constructed two pipelines with SCO members. In 2005 the China-Kazakhstan oil pipeline was completed, and in 2009 the China-Central Asia gas pipeline was created, starting in Turkmenistan and going through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan en route to China. Source: Thrassy N. Marketos. China’s Energy Geopolitics: The Shanghai Cooperation and Central Asia (New York: Routledge, 2008): 47-50. Other construction includes a highway connecting Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, two high-voltage electricity lines in Tajikistan, a cement plant in Kyrgyzstan, and a hydropower station in Kazakhstan. See Meena Singh Roy, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: A Critical Evaluation.” Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses. 4 July 2006. http://www.idsa.in/idsastrategiccomments/TheShanghaiCooperationOrganisation_MSRoy_040706.html.36 Michael Fredholm Ed., The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Eurasian Geopolitics: New Directions, Perspectives, and Challenges, (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 2013): 4.37 Marketos, 50.38 Julie Boland, “Ten Years of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: A Lost Decade? A Partner for the U.S.?” (The Brookings Institute 21st Century Defense Initiative Policy Paper, 20 June 2011): 15.39 Nicklas Norling and Niklas Swanstrom, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Trade, and the Roles of Iran, India, and Pakistan,” Central Asian Survey 26.3 (2007): 432.40 Hiro, Dilip, “Re-Ordering the World Order.” The Guardian. 20 August 200741 Nicklas Norling and Niklas Swanstrom, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Trade, and the Roles of Iran, India, and Pakistan,” 434. From 1992-2005 the trade between China and Central Asia rose from $465 million to $7.7 billion. The increase in trade from 2004-2005 amounted to 72.5%, reaching $7.7 billion.42 Norling and Swanstrom, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” 434. Russia’s trade with Kazakhstan, for instance, has steadily grown from $3.8 billion in 1998 to $8.1 billion in 2004.43 Ibid, 434.44 Michael Fredholm Ed., The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Eurasian Geopolitics, 258. One of their first agreements for a loan and on investments in joint projects totaled $742 million in 2006.45 Fredholm, 258.46 Bailes, Dunay, Guang, & Troitskiy, 26.47 Julie Boland, “Ten Years of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: A Lost Decade? A Partner for the U.S.?” 15.48 Callahan and Barabantseva, China Orders the World, 170.49 Robert G. Sutter, China’s Rise in Asia: Promises and Perils (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2005): 253.50 Callahan and Barabantseva, 170.51 Deng and Wang Eds, China Rising, 184.52 Thomas Ambrosio, “Catching the ‘Shanghai Spirit’: How the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Promotes Authoritarian Norms in Central Asia,” Europe-Asia Studies 60.8 (October 2008): 1327.53 Thomas Ambrosio, “Catching the Shanghai Spirit,” 1327.

54 Bobo Lo, Axis of Convenience: Moscow, Beijing, and the New Geopolitics (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2008): 104.55 Ambrosio, “Catching the Shanghai Spirit,” 1322.56 Stephen Aris, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: ‘Tackling the Three Evils.’ A Regional Response to Non-Traditional Security Challenges or an Anti-Western Bloc?” Europe-Asia Studies 61.3 (May, 2009): 459.57 Dilip Hiro, After Empire: The Birth of the Multipolar World (New York: Nation Books, 2010): 171.58 Isabelle Facon, “Moscow’s Global Foreign and Security Strategy: Does the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Meet Russian Interests?” Asian Survey 53.3 (Spring, 2013): 478.59 Kavalski, China and the Global Politics of Regionalization, 75.60 Ambrosio, 1322.61 Deng and Wang, 184.62 Kagan, The Return of History, 76.63 Dilip Hiro, “Shanghai Surprise.” The Guardian. 16 June 2006.64 Aylin Ünver Noi, “Iran and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in the Changing International Environment,” Asian Affairs 25.1-2 (2012): 50.65 Lucas, The New Cold War, 204.66 Associated Press, “Ahmadinejad Calls For Regional Security to Counter US Influence.” The Guardian. 15 June 2011.67 Manish Chand, “India Backs SCO’s Bigger Afghan Role,” Russia & India Report. 8 June 2012. 68 Rupakjyoti Borah, “India and the SCO: Can They Tango?” Russia & India Report. 2 January 2013.69 Rupakjyoti Borah, “India and the SCO: Can They Tango?” 70 Ibid. 71 Bailes, Dunay, Guang, & Troitskiy, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” SIPRI Policy Paper No. 17, 46.72 Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell, China’s Search for Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012): 165-166.73 Gill, Rising Star, 37.74 de Haas and van der Putten, 34.75 Isabelle Facon, “Moscow’s Global Foreign and Security Strategy,” 462.76 Nathan and Scobell, China’s Search for Security, 166.77 Facon, “Moscow’s Global Foreign and Security Strategy,” 463.78 Mark N. Katz, “Russia and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Moscow’s Lonely Road From Bishkek to Dushanbe,” Asian Perspective 32.3 (2008): 184. 79 Facon, 463.80 Facon, 464.81 Bailes, Dunay, Guang, & Troitskiy. “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” 26.82 Sutter, China’s Rise in Asia, 260.83 Elaheh Koolaee and Mandana Tisheyar, 55. Bailes, Dunay, Guang, and Troitskiy, 46.84 Sutter, 260.85 Thrassy N. Marketos, China’s Energy Geopolitics, 46. 86 Jean-Pierre Cabestan, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Central Asia, and the Great Powers, an Introduction; One Bed, Different Dreams?” Asian Survey 53.3 (Spring, 2013): 435.87 Julie Boland, “Ten Years of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: A Lost Decade? A Partner for the U.S.?” 13.88 Deng and Wang Eds, 179.89 Ibid, 179.90 Nathan and Scobell, China’s Search for Security, 166.