Sculpting God. the Logic of Dionysian Negative Theology – John N. Jones

7/25/2019 Sculpting God. the Logic of Dionysian Negative Theology John N. Jones

1/18

Harvard Divinity School

Sculpting God: The Logic of Dionysian Negative TheologyAuthor(s): John N. JonesSource: The Harvard Theological Review, Vol. 89, No. 4 (Oct., 1996), pp. 355-371Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Harvard Divinity SchoolStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1509922

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2/18

Sculpting

God:

The

Logic

of

Dionysian

Negative

Theology*

John N. Jones

Yale

University

n recent

decades,

the

theology

of

Dionysius

the

Areopagitel

(pseudo-

Dionysius)

has

recaptured

the

attention

of

a number of

scholars.

These

scholars address

Dionysius's importance

for the

history

of

philosophy,2

for

Christian aesthetics3

and

liturgical

and

biblical

symbols,4

and

for

postmodern

*I

thank Michael

Foat,

Jeff

Fisher,

Dan

Grau,

Antony Dugdale,

David

Kangas,

and

Nancy

Gratton

for their

patient

and

helpful

responses

to this

work,

with

special

thanks

to Rowan

Greer and

Cyril

O'Regan.

'All

citations of

the

Dionysian

corpus

are numbered

according

to J.

P.

Migne, Patrologiae

cursus

completus

(Athens:

Typographeiou

Georgiou

Karyophylle,

1879)

3.1,

from

which all

Greek

quotations

are

taken.

Except

where otherwise

noted,

all

English

quotations

are from the

invaluable

Pseudo-Dionysius:

The

Complete

Works

(trans.

Colm

Luibheid;

notes and

addi-

tional trans.

Paul

Rorem;

New York: Paulist

Press,

1987).

2Stephen

Gersh,

From

lamblichus

to

Eriugena:

An

Investigation

of

the

Prehistory

and

Evolution

of

the

Pseudo-Dionysian

Tradition

(Leiden:

Brill,

1978).

3Hans

Urs von

Balthasar,

The

Glory of

the Lord:

A

Theological

Aesthetics,

vol. 2:

Studies

in

Theological

Style:

Clerical

Styles

(trans.

Andrew

Louth,

Francis

McDonagh,

and Brian

McNeil;

San Francisco:

Ignatius;

New

York:

Crossroads,

1984)

144-210.

4Paul

Rorem,

Biblical and

Liturgical Symbols

within the

Pseudo-Dionysian

Synthesis

(Toronto:

Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval

Studies,

1984).

Although

Rorem's most recent

monograph

(Pseudo-Dionysius:

A

Commentary

on the

Texts and

an

Introduction to

Their

Influence

[Ox-

ford: Oxford

University

Press,

1993])

is

an

important

contribution to

English-language

schol-

arship

in

the

field,

with

respect

to

negative theology

it rehearses

quite

precisely

Rorem's

comments in

Symbols

and

especially

in the footnotes of

Complete

Works.

When

discussing

Rorem,

therefore,

I will

refer

to

these earlier volumes.

HTR

89:4

(1996)

355-71


3/18

356

HARVARD

THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

theology.5

Much

of

this attention focuses on the brief and

historically

in-

fluential The

Mystical

Theology,

written ca. 500 CE. For

scholars, however,

this

text,

like the God of

which

it

speaks,

seems

to

embody

contradictions.

Is

there a consistent

logic

in the

text,

or is it

deliberately

inconsistent?

In

this

essay,

I

shall

analyze passages

throughout

the

Dionysian

corpus

in

order

to

interpret

the sometimes dense

expressions

of

Mystical Theology

and

uncover the

logical

structure of

Dionysius's

negative

theology.6

I

shall

suggest

that

Dionysius's primary

task is to

deny

that God is a

particular

being.7 By identifying

the

patterns

of

language

used

to

speak

of

beings,

Dionysius

can

identify

both

affirmative

and

negative language

that avoids

such

patterns

and hence is

appropriate

for

speech

about God.

This

interpre-

tation demands

close attention to the distinction between

particular

asser-

tions or denials and the assertion

or

denial

of

all

beings.

By

focusing

on

this distinction and on the

higher

status

of

negative

over

affirmative

theol-

ogy,

I

shall

show,

against

the

dominant trend

in

Dionysian

scholarship,

that

this

negative theology logically

coheres;

it is

neither

self-negating

nor

logi-

5Jacques

Derrida,

"How to Avoid

Speaking:

Denials,"

in Harold

Coward

and

Toby Foshay,

eds.,

Derrida and

Negative

Theology

(Albany:

SUNY,

1992)

73-142.

6There

are several a

priori

presumptions against

even the

possibility

of

finding

a

logical

structure in Dionysian negative theology. First, Dionysius claims, humans cannot know God

as God knows himself

(Divine

Names

1.588b;

for a

discussion

of

the

difficulty

in

Neoplatonism

of

imputing knowledge

to the undivided

God,

see

Gersh, lamblichus,

267-68).

The fact that

human

epistemology

is

limited, however,

does not mean that there is no discernable

structure

to the

highest

kind

of

knowledge.

Second,

Dionysius

sometimes writes

humbly

about

the

ability

of

his words to describe

divine matters

(Ecclesiastical

Hierarchy

7.568d;

Celestial

Hierarchy

15.340b;

Divine Names

13.98

lc-84a).

Even if one

takes these

expressions

of

humility

at face

value,

it

does

not follow

that what

Dionysius manages

to

say

is not

clearly

structured.

(For

the view

that

Dionysius's

expressions

of

humility

should not be

given

too

much

importance,

see Ronald F.

Hathaway,

Hierarchy

and

the

Definition of

Order in the Letters

of

Pseudo-Dionysius

[Hague:

Nijhoff,

1969] xvii).

Third,

several scholars

imply

that since

Dionysius

understands

theology

as a

prayer,

a

hymn

of

praise,

and

a

form

of direct

address,

it

should not be

externally analyzed

as an abstract

discussion of

philosophical

language.

See Andrew

Louth,

The

Origins

of

the

Christian

Mys-

tical Tradition: From Plato to

Denys

(Oxford:

Clarendon,

1981)

164-66;

and

Rorem,

Sym-

bols,

51.

This

merely

shows, however,

that

identifying

a

coherent

logical

structure

in

Dionysian

negation

is not

equivalent

to

grasping

the

religious meaning

of the

contemplative practices

that

manifest such

a

structure.

For an

example

of

postmodern

anxiety

about this

question

as

it

applies

to

Dionysius,

however,

see

Derrida, "Denials," 79,

91,

98,

111.

7For the sake of

analyzing

Dionysian

negative theology,

it suffices to

say

that

the denial

of

all

beings

will

deny

individual

existents,

being

itself,

and the

totality

of all

existents. For

a

study

of the kinds of

being

in

Dionysius,

see Bernhard

Brons,

Gott und die Seienden:

Untersuchungen

zum

Verhaltnis von

neuplatonischer

Metaphysik

und christlicher

Tradition

bei

Dionysius Areopagita

(Gottingen:

Vandenhoeck

&

Ruprecht,

1976)

esp.

chap.

1: "Die

Seienden:

Ontologie

und

menschliche

Hierarchie,"

lemma 1: "Die

Ontologie" (pp.

29-52).


4/18

JOHN

N.

JONES

357

cally

contradictory. Against

Rorem

and

von

Balthasar,

it does

not

negate

certain

statements

about

God

only

to

negate

the

negations;

against

Gersh,

it employs logical contradiction only in a highly qualified way. The posi-

tivity

of this

negative

theology,

that

is,

the

presence

of

language

that

Dionysius

does not

wish to

negate,

shows the

appropriateness

of

Dionysius's

metaphor

of

sculpture

for

theology.

In the

conclusion,

I use the

preceding

discussion

to

reinterpret

Mystical

Theology

and

suggest

how

logic

and

aesthetics

merge

as

Dionysius

"sculpts"

God.8

E

The

Problem:

nappropriate

Ways

of

Speaking

about God

In

large part,

Dionysian

theology

is a critical

theology,

addressed

po-

lemically against

what

Dionysius

sees

as erroneous

ways

of

speaking

about

God.9

For

Dionysius,

the fundamental

error in certain

speech

about

God

is

to confuse

God

with

beings,

that

is,

with

things

or

concepts.'0

In

Mystical

Theology,

he

writes:

But

see to

it that none

of this comes

to the

hearing

of

the

uninformed,

that,

s

to

say,

to those

caught up

with

the

things

of

the

world,

who

imagine

that there

s

nothing

beyond

nstances

of individual

being

and

who think

that

by

their own

intellectual

resources

they

can

have a

direct

knowledge

of

him who

has made the

shadows

his

hiding place.

And

if initiation

nto the

divine is

beyond

such

people,

what

is to be

said

of those

others,

still more

uninformed,

who describe

he transcen-

dent Cause

of all

things

in

terms

derived

from the

lowest orders

of

being,

and who claim

that

it is

in

no

way superior

to the

godless,

multiformed

hapes

hey

themselves

have made?"

According

to

Dionysius,

idolaters

confuse

God

with

things.

The other

"un-

informed"

ones,

perhaps

Middle Platonist

philosophers,

confuse

God

with

concepts."2

In another

text,

Dionysius

anticipates

how

this latter

group might

8Dionysius

draws the

metaphor

of

sculpting

from Plotinus

(Enn. 1.6.9).

Aphairesis

(daXaipeoTc,

"clearing

aside,"

"removal")

includes

both a

sculptor's

carving

and a

logician's

denial,

the

"subtraction"

of attributes

from a

subject.

9Some

scholars,

particularly

von

Balthasar,

downplay

or even

deny

this

polemic

tone.

Citing

Letters

7.1077c-80a,

von Balthasar

writes

(Glory,

149):

"Nothing

is more character-

istic of

Denys

than

his

rejection

of

apologetic:

why engage

in

controversy?

To do so

is

only

to descend

to

the level of one's

attacker."

Elsewhere,

von Balthasar

implies

that

Dionysius

wishes

to

"adopt

an irenical

position"

(p.

162).

This

is a

generous

interpretation

of

Dionysian

motives,

but

it is not

supported

by

the

corpus.

'0For

Dionysius,

both

things

and

concepts

"exist";

see

Mystical

Theology

l.lOOO1a-b.

"Ibid.

'2Regarding

such

Dionysian passages,

Derrida

remarks "one

is not far from

the innuendo

that

ontology

itself

is a subtle

or

perverse

idolatry"

("Denials,"

90).

In

Dionysius,

this is not

merely

innuendo

but an

explicit,

definitive

statement

of his entire

theological project.


5/18

358

HARVARD

THEOLOGICAL

REVIEW

criticize the biblical use of material

images

for

God,

preferring

to liken

God to

concepts.13

It

could be

argued

hat

if

the

[scripture

writers]

wanted o

give corpo-

real form to

what

is

purely incorporeal, hey.

.. should have

begun

with what we would hold

to

be

noblest,

immaterial nd transcendent

beings

[for

instance,

Wordand

Mind].14

Now

these sacred

hapescertainly

how morereverence nd seem

vastly

superior

o the

making

of

images

drawn rom the world. Yet

they

are

actually

no less defective than

this

latter,

for the

Deity

is far

beyond

every

manifestation f

being

and of life.

.

every

reason

or intelli-

gencefalls shortof similarityo [theDeity].15

Dionysius accepts

the

philosophers'

view that

material

images

cannot reach

God. The

philosophers'

own

solution,

that

is,

to

regard

concepts

as

more

adequate

for

representing

God, however,

fails as well.

Concepts

and mate-

rial

images

both fall short of

Dionysius's

God,

and for the same reason:

God is

beyond being.

Thus he writes:

"In the

scriptures

the

Deity

has

benevolently taught

us that

understanding

and direct

contemplation

of itself

is inaccessible to

beings,

since it

actually surpasses being."16

For

Dionysius, knowing

that God is

beyond being (U'Oepootooc) gives

structure to

theological speech.

Any way

of

attributing being

to God

is

mistaken.

Moreover,

Dionysius suggests,

such

attribution

follows a

clearly

defined

pattern.

As

a

preface

to

Dionysius's

discussion

of this

pattern,

I

shall first

briefly

consider

how

things

or

concepts

are

spoken

about

in

ordinary language.

If someone

says

that a

thing

x

is

white,

the listener

understands

as well that it is

not red. To assert a characteristic

of

any

x

is

also to

deny

some other

characteristic(s)

of it. The converse

is also true.

If

someone

says

that

x is

not

red,

the listener

assumes that

it is some other

characteristic-perhaps white, or transparent,

or invisible but

audible. That

is,

she

understands that there

is

some

assertion

to be made about

x,

even

though

she

may

not

know what that assertion

is. To be a

thing

x is to have

certain characteristics

and not to

have others.

'3Dionysius's

discussion

of

biblical

names in

chapter

2

of

Celestial

Hierarchy

begins

with

the issue

of names for

angels.

As

Rorem

notes

(Symbols,

86),

however,

it is clear that

the

discussion

is also about the use of names

for

God.

4Celestial

Hierarchy

2.137b-c.

15Ibid.,

140c-d.

Among

other

interpreters

of

Dionysius, Aquinas

was

uncomfortable

with

the

apparent

sense of this

passage. Appealing

to common

sense,

Aquinas

denied that

Dionysius

regarded all affirmations concerning God as equally defective. For example, Aquinas empha-

sized

(S.th.

la.13.2)

how much better it

is to

say

that "God is

good"

than to

say

"God

is a

body."

16Divine Names 1.588c.


6/18

JOHN

N.

JONES 359

In The Divine

Names,

Dionysius

writes,

"It is not

that

[the

Cause of

all]

exists here

and not there. He does not

possess

this kind

of

existence and

not that.""7Thus, Dionysius characterizes the way that assertion and denial

are

ordinarily

juxtaposed

when

speaking

about

things,

and

rejects

this

jux-

taposition

in

the case

of

the Cause of all.18

Later in the same

chapter,

Dionysius

adds that the Cause

of

all

"is

not

any

one

thing";

therefore

the

language

one uses

only

for a

particular

being-"it

is this and not that"-

is

not

appropriate

for the Cause.19

Although

Dionysius rejects

the

juxtapo-

sition of

assertion and

denial for

speech

about the Cause

of

all,

he does

permit

some kind

of

role for

multiple

assertions or

multiple

denials.

E

The Corrective:AppropriateWays of SpeakingaboutGod

In

the same Divine Names

passage, Dionysius

writes:

He is all

things

since he is the Cause of all

things.

.. But he

is

also

superior

o them all because he

precedes

hem and

is

transcendentally

above them. Therefore

every

attribute

may

be

predicated

of

him,

and

yet

he is not

any thing.20

'7Ibid.,

5.824a-b.

'8Particularly

on

the basis

of

Mystical

Theology

4-5,

almost all

interpreters

agree

that

denials occur when

Greek

nouns,

and

adjectives

of both

positive

and

negative

form

(such

as

"in

motion" and

"motionless"),

are

said

not to

apply

to a

subject.

Thus,

in

Mystical Theology

5.1048a,

Dionysius

writes that God is not "in

motion,"

not

"motionless,"

and neither error nor

truth.

19In

other

words,

for

Dionysius any

of

the "names" for

God,

such

as "mind" or

"life" or

"lifeless,"

are

privative,

since

they

refer

to

particular being

and

therefore

imply

a lack

of

perfection.

Letters 6

may

also address the

juxtaposition

of assertion and denial.

Dionysius

writes

(Letters

6.1077a)

that "what

is

not

red does

not have

to be

white.

What

is

not a

horse is not

necessarily a human."Although this letter does not discuss denial or assertion explicitly, there

are three reasons for

linking

this

passage

with Divine Names 5.824a-b.

First,

both discuss that

false conclusions are drawn from incorrect

assumptions

about the relation between

negative

and

positive

claims.

Second,

the letter's overall

message,

that the addressee has

merely

traded

one mistake

for

another,

correlates

well with

the

Dionysian

view of

ambiguous

denials.

Third,

according

to

Hathaway

(Hierarchy,

71),

Letters 6 contains terms that "one would

normally

associate with

a

treatise

on

logic."

If

Letters

6

addresses

denial,

then

Hathaway's

provocative

suggestion

about the relation between the

numbering

of the Parmenidean

hypotheses

in

neoplatonism

and

the

numbering

of

the

Dionysian

letters would find

support.

He writes

(Hi-

erarchy,

80),

"the

sixth

hypothesis represents

(the

absurdity

of)

relative

not-being,

and the

Sixth

Letter

connects the

problem

of falsehood and

appearance

with

relative

not-being

(no

one

should attack a particular religious belief or practice as not being good, since not-being-X

never

necessarily implies being-Y,

i.e.,

it is the

being,

the

positive

nature of a

thing,

which

must be

known or

recognized)."

20Divine

Names 5.824b.


7/18

360

HARVARD

THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

For

speech

about

God,

assertions

belong together

and denials

belong

to-

gether,

thus

forming

distinct

ways

to

name God. Because

they

function

differently,

however,

one should not combine assertions and denials. The

former

articulate God as Cause

of

all;

the latter

articulate God as transcen-

dent.

Combining

the

two

yields

language

that

may apply equally

to

God

and to

things,

thus

failing

to show

that God

is

unique

and

separate

from

beings.

Assertion

(Oicnc):

In

order to

avoid

using language

that

does

not reflect

God's

uniqueness,

one hastens to

qualify any

assertion about

God

in

a

way

that

implies

no denial.

For

example,

one

juxtaposes

several assertions that

cannot

in

ordinary language

apply

to

any

one

thing.

The

multiplicity

of

names for God in Divine

Names,

such as

"power

itself' and

"truth,"

ypify

this kind of

speech.21

Since these

names,

in

combination,

clearly

do not

refer to

any particular being,

the

way

of

assertions,

or what

Dionysius

calls

affirmative

theology,

adequately distinguishes

God from

beings.

As a

re-

sult,

the "is"

of

an

expression

such as "God

is

power

itself' takes

on

a

metaphorical

sense;

any

asserted name both is God and is not

God,

depend-

ing upon

the sense

in

which it is used. This double

sense,

identity

and

difference,

follows from

the role

of

assertions

in

articulating

God's causal-

ity:

for

Dionysius

as for Greek

Neoplatonists,

a cause is

both

immanent to

its effect

and

distinct from

it. The

"not" of

"is and is not" is

part

of

how

affirmative

theology

articulates divine

causality.

Discussing

the sense of

biblical names

in

Dionysius,

Rorem

correctly

calls attention to

the

negative

element,

the

"not,"

of

names understood in a

metaphorical

sense.22

I

do

not, however,

agree

with his claim that this kind of

negativity

emerges

only

when

negative theology

corrects

affirmative

theology.

Affirmative

theology

has a kind of

negativity proper

to

itself;

for

Dionysius,

affirmative

theology

in its own

right

is

metaphorical

discourse

distinguishing

God

from

all

beings.

Individual Denials and the

Denial

of

All

Beings:

The case

of

denials,

which articulate God's

transcendence,

is more

complicated logically

than

the

case of assertions. If

one

says

that God

is

both

power

and

truth,

one

avoids

any

confusion between God

and

thing

or

concept,

since no

thing

or

concept

that exists

in

a

particular way

is

both

power

and truth.

If one

says

that

God is

neither

power

nor

truth,

however,

one has not

excluded much:

21"Power":

bid., 11.953c;

"truth":

bid.,

7.872c-73a.

22Rorem,

Symbols,

89.

Although

the

"symbols"

in

the

title of Rorem's

monograph suggest

material images for God, such as those discussed in chapter 2 of Celestial Hierarchy, Rorem's

analysis applies equally

to

non-material,

conceptual

names,

such as those in

Divine

Names.

Hence

I

prefer

to

speak

of

"metaphors."


8/18

JOHN N. JONES 361

God could

still

be

a

"lion,"

a

"drunkard,"

r

several other

things.23

One

can

use denial

(dctaipeotc)

adequately

to

distinguish

God

from

beings by making

contradictory denials about God, denials that cannot both be true of any

being.

Thus,

as

Dionysius

writes

in

the conclusion of

Mystical Theology,

God neither "lives" nor is

"lifeless,"

neither

"possesses speech"

nor

is

"speechless."24

This

way

of

speaking

is

unusual,

imparting

to

Mystical

Theology

its

paradoxical

character.

It

does

not, however,

imply

that

one

has

abandoned all rules for

speech

about God. It is

only

the case that God

is

both

y

and

not-y

because other statements about God are true without

being

negated

in

any way;

the

equivalence

of

y

and

not-y

does not hold for

all

y.

One can also deny all possible names of God simultaneously. In the first

chapter

of

Divine

Names,

Dionysius

writes that:

since the union of

divinized minds

with the

Light beyond

all

deity

occurs

in

the

cessation of

all

intelligent activity,

the

godlike

unified

minds who

imitate hese

angels

as far

as

possible praise

t

most

appro-

priately hrough

he

denial of all

beings. Truly

and

supernaturally

n-

lightened

afterthis blessed

union,

they

discover

that

although

t

is

the

cause of

everything,

t

is not a

thing

since

it

transcends

ll

things

in

a

manner

beyond

being.25

This

passage

is

central

to

Dionysian negative

theology.

It shows

that the

highest

articulation

of

God that humans

can achieve is

through

"the

denial

of all

beings"

(8td

tr

c

av

6vcov

T3v

d0tpOVO

pc


9/18

362

HARVARD

THEOLOGICAL

REVIEW

As Divine Names 1.593b-c

indicates,

this

transcendent

knowing

is not

merely

to be

hoped

for:

some humans do achieve it.28

In

both of these

passages,

the transcendent God is articulated through "the denial of all beings."29

If

the denial of all

beings

articulates the

highest

God, however,

why

does

Dionysius

write,

in

one of the

concluding phrases

of

Mystical

Theol-

ogy,

that the Cause of all is

"beyond every

denial"

()KTE?p

niooav

d(aip?elv)?30

This

passage suggests

that one cannot reach God

by

any

kind of denial

at

all.

For this

reason,

interpreters

such as

Rorem,

von

Balthasar,

and Vanneste

suggest

that

in

Mystical Theology,

even denial is

ultimately

denied

as

adequate

for

speech

about God.

Dionysian negative

theology

involves,

as

Roques

calls

it,

"negations

doubles,"

or

self-nega-

tion.31This interpretation,however, is inconsistent with the previous pas-

28Divine Names 1.596a

suggests

that

scripture

writers are

among

the "unified minds." As

Rorem

emphasizes throughout

Symbols

(for

example,

18),

"theologian"

for

Dionysius

means

scripture

writer

(as

in Ecclesiastical

Hierarchy

3.432b).

Chapter

2 of

Mystical Theology

makes clear that Moses

is

among

the unified minds as well.

29For

example,

Paul knew the inscrutable and unsearchable God

by knowing

that

God

was

beyond

mind

(Letters

5.1073a).

In

Letters

1 as

well,

knowledge

as

"unknowing"

is a reference

point

for

discussing

the

highest

God:

"And this

quite positively complete

unknowing

is

knowledge

of him who is above

everything

that is known"

(1065a-b).

30Mystical Theology 5.1048b.

31Rene

Roques,

Structures

theologiques

de la Gnose d Richard de Saint Victor: Essais et

analyses

critiques

(Paris:

Presses

Universitaires

de

France,

1962)

143.

Treating negations

and

denials as

synonymous,

Rorem

(Complete

Works,

140

n.17)

writes that

Mystical Theology

concludes

by negating negation, by "abandoning

all

speech

and

thought,

even

negations."

On

p.

136 n.

6,

he also writes

of

Mystical Theology

1.1000b:

"Here at the outset and

again

at

its

conclusion

(MT

5.1048b

16-21),

the treatise refutes

the

impression

that

negations

can

capture

the transcendent

Cause

of all."

Similarly,

von Balthasar

(Glory,

206)

interprets

the conclusion

of

Mystical Theology

as

saying

that "God

is not

only beyond

all affirmations but

beyond

all

negations

too."

Mystical Theology

does

not,

however,

abandon all forms of

negative language;

since

the

denial of all

being

is

appropriate

to the transcendent

God,

individual denials are

abandoned.

Jan Vanneste also understands the denial that

falls short of

God

in

chapter

5

of

Mystical

Theology

as

including

even the denial of all

being

(Le

Mystere

de Dieu: Essai sur la structure

rationelle de la doctrine

mystique

du

pseudo-Denys I'Areopagite

[Brussels:

Declde

de

Brouwer,

1959]

48-51, 119-20, 154-55,

165).

Apparently,

Vanneste notices the

difficulty

of harmoniz-

ing

this

reading

of

Mystical Theology

5

with

passages

such as Divine Names 1. He

suggests,

therefore,

in

part

on the basis of

Dionysius's

discussion of

Moses'

ascent

of

Mount Sinai

in

Mystical Theology

3,

that

no

kind of denial reaches

God;

the

moment of

aphairesis

is

surpassed

by unknowing (dyvo/oia),

which in turn is

surpassed by

union

(evootc).

Vanneste's

groundbreaking exegesis

of

Mystical Theology,

however,

is inaccurate on this

point.

In

Mys-

tical

Theology

3,

Moses does not leave

aphairesis

behind in favor of

agnosia.

"He

pushes

ahead

to the summit of the divine ascents. And

yet

he does not meet God himself, but

contemplates,

not

Him who is

invisible,

but

where

he

dwells."

Clearly

the

summit of divine ascents is

equivalent

to "the holiest and

highest

of the

things perceived

with the

eye

of

the

body

or the

mind,"

that

is,

things

and

concepts,

or

beings.

Moses is united with God

at

the

very

moment he

breaks free

of

"all that the mind

may

conceive,

wrapped.

. .

in

the invisible."

That

is,

the


10/18

JOHN

N.

JONES

363

sages

and

is

exegetically

unnecessary.

The

problem

is the translation of

TCav.

As

the

previous passages

show,

Dionysius

holds that there

is

nothing

beyond

the God who is reached

through

the denial of all

beings.

This

passage,

therefore,

does

not mean that the

highest

God is

beyond

denials

considered

as a whole.

Here

iCav

does

not

mean

"all

together"

but

"each":

the

highest

God exceeds

what

any

individual denial

expresses. Although

the

denial

of all

beings adequately

and

unambiguously expresses

that God is

not a

being,

individual denials do not do so.

This is the first main

point

of

this

study:

there

is

a difference between

individual

denial(s)

and the denial

of

all

beings

at

once;

this

difference

is

central

to

Dionysian theology.

This difference underscores the

ambiguity

of individual denials and the

importance

of

using

them

correctly. Dionysius

elsewhere

implies

that deni-

als

have both an

ordinary

sense and a sense

appropriate

to God as transcen-

dent.32 Individual assertions

and

denials, therefore,

are

inadequate

for the

God

spoken

of

in

terms

of "the assertion of all

things,

the denial

of all

things,

that which

is

beyond

each assertion and

denial."33

Divine Names

2.641a

may

illuminate another

phrase

in

the conclusion

of

Mystical

Theol-

ogy:

"[The

Cause of

all]

is

beyond

assertion and denial. We make asser-

tions

and denials of what is next to

it,

but never of it."34

If

consistent with

the

previous

passages,

this

phrase

does not mean

that one does not

employ

assertion,

and neither does one

employ

denial,

since one must

deny

all

beings

of

the

highest

God. The

phrase

means that God

exceeds what can

be

expressed

by

each

individual assertion

and each denial.35

The

Subordinate

Role

of

the Assertion

of

All

Beings:

For

Dionysius,

the

highest

God is

correctly

known

or

sculpted

through

the denial of all

beings,

through multiple

denials not

conjoined

with

assertions.36

On

purely

logical grounds, Dionysius might

have

given

the

assertion of all

beings

the

same

status,

since assertions

together

suffice to

distinguish

God

from

par-

aphairesis

of all

beings, agnosia,

and henosis are not successive

moments.

They

are

simulta-

neous.

Although

Vanneste

rejects

the idea of

temporal

succession

(Mystere,

49),

his

discussion

of

logical

succession still introduces a division

not found in the text.

32Divine Names 2.640b.

33Ibid.,

2.641a.

Here,

Luibheid and Rorem

translate inv

as

"every."

34Mystical Theology

5.1048b.

35This

reading

shows other

apparently contradictory

phrases

in the

corpus

to

have a

straight-

forward

meaning.

For

instance,

in

Mystical

Theology

3.1033c,

Dionysius

discusses how

to

"deny

that which is

beyond

each denial"

(Complete

Works:

"every

denial").

Despite

its

para-

doxical appearance, this phrase means simply that Dionysius will show how to employ some

kind of

aphairesis

to articulate the

transcendent

God,

"that

which is

beyond

every

denial."

This is

done

through

the denial of all

beings.

36This denial

applies

to

the three

persons

of the

Trinity

as well

(for

example,

Mystical

Theology

5.1048a).


11/18

364

HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

ticular

beings.

Indeed,

Dionysius's

frequent

juxtaposition

of

assertion

and

denial,

and even of

the

assertion of all

things

and the

denial

of all

things,37

shows how

closely

the two

are

related.

Although

both

suffice to

separate

God from

beings,

however,

the two

ways

do not

have

equal

status. In

Divine

Names,

Dionysius

writes:

This

is

the

sort of

language

we must

use about

God,

for he

is

praised

from

all

things

according

o their

proportion

o him

as their

Cause.But

again,

the most

divine

knowledge

of

God,

that which comes

through

unknowing,

s

achieved

n a

union

far

beyond

mind,

when mind

turns

away

from

all

things,

even from

itself,

and

when it is made

one with

the

dazzlingrays,being

then

and there

enlightenedby

the

inscrutable

depth

of

Wisdom.38

In

a

passage

preceding

this

one,39

transcendence/the

denial of all

things

is

juxtaposed

with the

cause of all

things;

both

are

ways

to

approach

God. In

this

passage,

the

denial

of

all

beings,

which

as we saw earlier

correlates

with union and

unknowing,

is

made

superior

to assertion.

Dionysius

re-

affirms this

superiority

in

passages

pertaining

to

negation

which I

shall

examine below.40

Before

discussing negation,

however,

I

shall

briefly

examine

the

impli-

cations of the hierarchical relationship between two ways of articulating

God.

Following

Corsini,

Gersh

suggests

that

Dionysius

and other

Christian

Neoplatonists represent

a

decisive

moment

in

Western

philosophical

his-

tory.

This moment is

characterized

by

a move

to

logical

self-contradiction,

wherein

the first two Parmenidean

hypotheses,

which

correlate to

some

degree

to what I call denials and

assertions,

are both

attributed

to

God.

Thus,

it is true both that God is "at rest"

and

"moving"

and

that God is

not

at rest

and not

moving.41

The

characterization "self-contradiction"

misrep-

resents

Dionysian

theology,

however,

and

exaggerates

its

departure

from

its

sources. First, self-contradiction often implies incoherence or ambiguity in

a

logical

structure;

Dionysius's

structure,

that

is,

his

ways

for

speaking

37Divine Names

2.641a.

38Ibid.,

7.872a-b.

Mystical Theology

2 also discusses the relation between

unknowing,

union,

and

denial.

39Divine

Names 7.869d-72a.

40Celestial

Hierarchy

2.140d-41

a;

Mystical Theology

2.1000a-b.

41Gersh,

amblichus, 11,

155-56;

Eugenio

Corsini,

II

trattato 'De divinis

nominibus'

dello

Pseudo-Dionigi

e i

commenti

neoplatonici

al Parmenide

(Turin:

Giappichelli,

1962)

esp.

42,

115-22.

Andrew Louth

(Denys

the

Areopagite

[Wilton,

CT: Morehouse

Barlow,

1989] 87),

implic-

itly

following

Gersh

and

Corsini,

suggests

that

Dionysius rejects

the Proclean

framework,

which

clearly

distinguishes

negative

and affirmative

theologies. According

to

Louth,

Dionysius

brings

the two

together

"in stark

paradox."

Louth undermines the

force of this

claim, however,

by

writing

that denials

are

truer

than

affirmations

(ibid.,

88).


12/18

JOHN N. JONES 365

about

God,

is

quite

coherent.

Second,

even

if

one finds

"self-contradiction"

a useful

expression

for

coherent

language,

assertions and denials do

not

have equal status in Dionysius. The kind of contradiction Gersh mentions

requires

that the

same

thing

x be in

the same

respect

both

y

and

not-y.

Of

course,

one

may

read

Dionysius

as

saying

that even

though

the two

ways

of

speaking

refer to

different

aspects

of

God,

nonetheless

they

both

some-

how

refer

to the

same God.

Third,

even if this

were

true,

the

problem

of

kinds of

predication

arises.

As

noted

earlier,

at least some forms of

Dionysian

theological

language

are

metaphorical anguage,

not

ordinary

anguage.

Since

Dionysius

uses "is" in

a

particular way,

therefore,

one cannot

reject

the

logical

coherence

of his

statements such as "God is at rest and not

at rest"

unless one can show their metaphorical sense to be contradictory.

Fourth

and most

importantly,

even if

one wishes to

analyze

metaphorical

language

as

literal

predication,

the

peculiarity

of

Dionysian

logic

does not

arise

only

when he

applies

assertions

and denials

to God. He

already

vio-

lates

ordinary

logic

within

the

way

of

assertions,

wherein he

applies

non-

identical

names,

such

as

"power"

and

"truth,"

to

God;42

moreover,

this

aspect

of

Dionysian

negative

theology

is

unremarkable

in

Neoplatonist

thought.

However

one chooses to

characterize the

relation

between

assertions

and denials in Dionysian theology, the denial of all beings remains appro-

priate

to

God

in

a

way

that

individual

assertions,

individual

denials,

and the

assertion of

all

beings

do not.

Negations

clarify

and indeed

exemplify

this

distinction.

Negations

and

the

Way of

Negation

(cda6dao}c):

Few

have

studied the

precise

relation between

denial and

negation.

Although

Vanneste

long

ago

observed

that the two

appear

to

function

differently,

scholars

often

regard

them as

synonymous.43

Properly

understood,

however,

negations

help

illus-

trate

the

difference

between

kinds of

denial,

because

they

are

distinct

from

individual denials and correlative to the denial of all beings.

In

Mystical

Theology

1.1000la-b,

Dionysius

writes:

But see to

it that

none

of

this

comes to the

hearing

of

the

uninformed,

that is

to

say,

to those

caught

up

with

the

things

of

the

world,

who

imagine

that

there

s

nothingbeyond

nstancesof

individual

being

and

420r,

to

choose

examples

from the

Parmenidean

hypotheses,

God

is

both

at

rest

and

moving

(Divine

Names

9.916b-d).

43Vanneste,

Mystere,

58. Louth

(Origins,

167,

174),

translates

docaip?ol

as

"negation,"

but in his discussion of related passages refers to denial. An early French translation of the

corpus

(Maurice

de

Gandillac,

trans.,

(Evres

Completes

du

Pseudo-Denys

L'Areopagite

[Paris:

Aubier,

1943])

sometimes

renders

doatip?oti

as

"depouillement,"

but also

renders

both

d(oaipeoti

and

danoaotlc

as

"negation."

Rorem

and

Roques

consistently

refer to

both

d)atipe?ct

and

dcoir6aots

as

negation

(negation).


13/18

366

HARVARD

THEOLOGICAL

REVIEW

who think that

by

their own intellectualresources

they

can have a

direct

knowledge

of

him

who has made the shadowshis

hiding place.

And if initiation nto the divine is beyondsuchpeople,what is to be

said of those

others,

still more

uninformed,

who describe

he transcen-

dent Cause of all

things

in terms derived from the lowest orders

of

being,

and who claim that it is

in

no

way

superior

o

the

godless,

multiformed

hapes they

themselveshave made?What

has

actually

to

be said aboutthe Cause of

everything

s this. Since

it is the Cause of

all

beings,

we should

posit

and ascribe to it all the affirmations

we

make

in

regard

o

beings,

and,

more

appropriately,

e should

negate

all these

affirmations,

ince it

surpasses

all

being.

Now we

should not

conclude hat he

negations

are

simply

he

opposites

of

the

affirmations,

but rather hat the cause of all is

considerablyprior

to

this,

beyond

privations,

beyond

each

denial,

beyond

each assertion.44

This

passage

clarifies

the

meaning

and

relation of

assertion,

denial,

affir-

mation,

and

negation.

Dionysius

relates

all affirmations to

God as

Cause,

and he

subordinates

all affirmations

to

negation.

I have

already

shown that

divine

causality

relates to the assertion

of all

beings

and that this

is sub-

ordinate

to transcendence

and

the denial of

all

beings.

This raises the

pos-

sibility

that

the denial

of all

being

correlates

with what

Dionysius

calls

negation.

Chapter

two of

The

Celestial

Hierarchy

supports

this

suggestion.

Dionysius

insists

that

concepts

are

as deficient

as material

images

in

rep-

resenting

God.45

After

saying

this,

Dionysius proceeds

to contrast

such

ways

of

representing

God,

that

is,

affirmations,

with

negation,

another

kind

of

scriptural

device.46

He

states that

the

way

of

negation

"seems

to

[him]

much

more

appropriate"

than

affirmation,

"more

suitable

to the realm

of

the

divine."

This is

similar to

the

preference

he showed earlier

for

the

denial

of

all

beings

over the assertion

of all

beings.

Similar too

is

his

reasoning: "God is in no way like the things that have being and we have

no

knowledge

at

all

of

his

incomprehensible

and

ineffable

transcendence

and

invisibility."47

This

strengthens

the case that for

Dionysius, negation

and

the

denial

of all

beings

are

synonymous.

As I noted

earlier, however,

the

denial

of

all

beings

functions

very

differently

than an individual

denial.

Thus

negations,

too,

would

function

differently

than individual

denials.

To

explain

this

difference,

I shall examine

two unusual

features of

this

passage.

First,

in this

chapter,

Dionysius

discusses

not

merely

affirmation

44Luibheid

and

Rorem

render

diav

in the final

phrase

as

"every."

Throughout

the

corpus,

Dionysius explicitly relates being and knowability. One can know only what has being; what

is

beyond

being

is

by

definition

unknowable.

45Celestial

Hierarchy

2.140c-d.

46Ibid.,

2.140d-41a.

47Ibid.,

2.140d-41a.


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JOHN

N.

JONES

367

in

general

but

specific

examples

of biblical

representations

of

God,

such as

"Word" and

"life." Few have noted

that,

similarly,

when

Dionysius

dis-

cusses

negation,

he does not

merely

describe a

general way

of

speaking

but

specific

examples

of such

speech.

Indeed,

this

passage

is the

only

one in

the

Dionysian corpus

where

particular

words are

explicitly

and

unambigu-

ously

identified as

examples

of

negations.48 According

to

Dionysius,

"[the

deity]

is described as

invisible,

infinite,

ungraspable."49

This

sentence

sug-

gests

that the

following passage

in

Divine

Names

discusses

negation

proper,

and not

merely negative language

in

general:50

it is

customary

or

theologians

to

apply

negative

terms

to

God,

but

contrary o the usual sense of a deprivation.Scripture,or example,

calls the

all-apparentight

"invisible." t

says regarding

he One of

many

praises

and

many

names that he is ineffable and nameless. It

says

of the

One

who

is

present

n

all

things

and who

may

be discov-

ered from all

things

that

he

is

ungraspable

nd "inscrutable."

Similar clusters

of such words

appear

elsewhere

in

Divine Names5l

(invis-

ible,

incomprehensible,

"unsearchable and

inscrutable")

and in

Letters52

(invisible,

inscrutable, unsearchable,

inexpressible).

These words share certain features.

Dionysius

describes each of

them as

biblical representations;he does not describe all denials in this way. More-

over,

each

negation

is not

only alpha-privative

in

form,

a feature

shared

with

Greek words

such as "at

rest"

and

"lifeless,"

but

also

denotative of the

denial

of what is characteristic of all

beings.53

This

explains

the

continu-

ation of the Celestial

Hierarchy

passage:

"[The

deity]

is

described

as

invis-

ible, infinite,

ungraspable,

and other

things

which show not what he is

but

48Rorem

(Symbols,

86)

suggests

that

tropos

in

this

passage

does not

convey

any

technical

sense;

it means

simply

"manner"or "mode" of

speaking.

Whatever its

meaning

here, however,

note that Dionysius provides specific examples of negations, not simply negative language in

general.

49Celestial

Hierarchy

2.140d.

50Divine Names

7.865b-c.

51Ibid.,

1.588c.

52Letters 5.1073a-76a.

53The word

"negation"

always

articulates transcendence.

Yet,

although

most

words that

can function as

negations logically

denoting

God's transcendence

(for

example,

"unknow-

able,"

"ungraspable"),

two do

not: infinite and invisible. For this

reason,

Dionysius

can

at

times

apply

these words to

beings. Why

then does

he

use

them as

negations

at all? There are

two

possibilities.

First,

these words derive from the same

scriptural passages

as

other

nega-

tions,

so the words

may

connote transcendence.

Second,

the words

may

denote transcendence

in

a

modified

way.

Whenever

Dionysius

uses

"light"

as

a

metaphor

for

the

conceptual,

the

"invisible" indicates what

is

beyond

both

thought

and

perception.

Also,

if

Dionysius,

like

other

Neoplatonist

writers,

is

undecided whether the realm of

being

has an

infinity

of its

own,

"infinite"

may

at

times

negate

all

being.


15/18

368

HARVARD

THEOLOGICAL

REVIEW

what in

fact he is not."54

As

we saw in

chapter

seven of

Divine

Names,

this

kind of

negativity

does not

imply

the

privation

and

particular

being implied

by individual denials. Indeed, if negations were simply like individual

denials,

the

rhetorical

structure of

chapter

two of

Celestial

Hierarchy

would

make little

sense.

Dionysius

has

just

finished

describing

words that

seem to

honor

God but

in

fact

fail to do

so because

they

do

not

adequately

distin-

guish

God from

beings. Why

then offer

as a

corrective

other

inadequate

words?

Negations

are in

fact not

inadequate

for

speech

about the

transcendent

God.

Indeed,

whenever

Dionysius

mentions

them,

he

identifies

them as

the

justification

for

saying

that

God is

beyond

being.

One sees

the

method-

ological importance of negations in the second remarkablefeature of this

Celestial

Hierarchy

passage.

Dionysius

writes:

this

second

way

of

talking

abouthim

seems to

me much

more

appro-

priate,

for,

as the

secret and

sacred radition

has

instructed,

God

is in

no

way

like the

things

that have

being

and we

have no

knowledge

at

all of his

incomprehensible

nd

ineffable

transcendence nd invisibil-

ity.55

Regarding negation,

this

passage

is

tautological:

one

says

that

God is

"ungraspable"because one cannot grasp God's ungraspability. The word

and

the

justification

for

using

it

are identical.

This

negation,

like

others,

is

not one biblical

representation

among many;

it is a

representation

that

governs

the use of

other

representations.

A

negation

repristinates

transcen-

dence,

providing

a

summary

of

Dionysian negative

theological

method;

individual denials are

logical operations

that

follow from a

negation.56

This

is the

second main

point

of

this

study:

a

negation

and a denial

are

not

synonymous.

Unlike an

individual

denial,

a

negation

relates

to

the

(im)possibility

of

knowing

and

saying anything

about God. It

is,

so

to

speak, a second-order rule for the employment of first-order names.57As a

result,

Dionysius

never

rejects

negations

for

speech

about

God;

because

Dionysius's

God

surpasses

individual

assertions and

denials,

one

negates

when

speaking

theologically.58

54Celestial

Hierarchy

2.140d.

55Ibid.,

2.140d-41

a.

56Rorem

(Symbols,

6, 25,

49, 63,

etc.)

persuasively argues

that

Dionysian

theology,

both

affirmative

and

negative,

is a

method for

interpreting

the

concrete

representations

in

scripture

and

liturgy.

Rorem

may

not

give

sufficient

attention, however,

to what

kind of

method the

theology

is.

Negations,

which are

ultimately true,

show that

all other

biblical representations

fall short of the

transcendent God.

57Mystical Theology

5.1048a.

58This

reading

implies

that

there are

negations

as well as denials in

Mystical

Theology

5.

In his

helpful

discussion,

Roques

(L'univers

dionysien:

Structure

hierarchique

du

monde


16/18

JOHN

N.

JONES 369

E

Implications

of

this

Interpretation

I have

argued

that

in

Dionysian theology

there is a

strong

distinction

between

two kinds of

denial,

the denial of

particular being

and the denial

of all

beings,

and that

negation

correlates with the latter.

I

have

also

argued

that,

properly

understood,

Dionysian

negative theology

is

neither self-

negating

nor

self-contradictory.

Without

debating

the

philosophical

or

theo-

logical

merits of

this

theology,

I

consider it

important

to note

briefly why

its

logical

structure,

even

when

properly

understood,

lends

itself

so

easily

to such

readings.

I summarize

Dionysian

negative

theology roughly

as

follows: "God

is not a

being

and so cannot be known

or

spoken

of

as

beings

are known or

spoken

of." Is

this statement itself a kind of

assertion

about God?

Many

modern and

most

postmodern

readers would

answer in

the

affirmative,

regarding

any

sentence about a

subject

as a

kind of

predicative

act,

a kind of

knowledge

and

speech.

This

view makes even the

denial of all

beings

an

assertion,

because

it is

considered

impossible

to

avoid

saying

something

about "what God

is"

when

speaking,

even when

speaking

of what

is

beyond being.59

For

instance,

Derrida

interprets

Dionysius

as

struggling

to utter

God's

inutterability

but

always

saying

too

much,

bringing

God

into

the realm of word

and

being

by

the

very

act

of

speaking.60Dionysius

never

says,

however,

that he

regards

all

speech

about

God,

including negative theology,

as

speech

about

being.

Moreover,

his

systematic

distinction between

negation

and the

language

of

privation,

to

which he

assigns

distinct

functions,

shows

that

he

does not

regard

both

as

languages

of

particular being.

In

light

of this

distinction,

current

construc-

tive

theologies

should be

conscious

of

the

difference between

how

Dionysian

theology

may

be retrieved and

how

it is to

be

interpreted

in

its own

right.

E

Sculpting

God:

a

Reinterpretation

f

The

Mystical

Theology

In light of the previous discussion, I shall attempt a summary of Mys-

tical

Theology.

This

short treatise

opens

with

Dionysius's

address to the

selon le

pseudo-Denys

[Paris:

Aubier,

Montaigne,

1954]

206-7)

understands the

negations

of

Celestial

Hierarchy

2

as

quite

similar to

"monstrous,"

dissimilar

images

for

God from

scrip-

ture,

such as

eagle

or

drunkard. Both fall short of

God,

but

at

least both leave

the

intelligence

unsatisfied,

so that the mind knows not to

dwell on them as

adequate

representations

of God.

In

my

reading, Dionysius

juxtaposes negations

and

monstrous

images

not because

they

have

the same

status but

because

negations

are the

rationale for the value of

dissimilar

images.

Dionysius's

God is indeed

"ungraspable."

If

one must use

images,

therefore,

it is

better

to

use

images

that

are less

likely

to

appear adequate

for

depicting

God.

59Inother words, as Celestial Hierarchy 2.141a in particular shows, Dionysian negative

theology requires

that

some

predicates

are not

conceptual.

60According

to

Derrida,

Dionysius

wishes to

gesture

to

a

hyperessentiality beyond predi-

cation,

negation,

and

conceptualization

("Denials,"

74,

77).

I would

respond

that,

for

Dionysius,

negations

proper

are so

stripped

of

conceptuality

that

they

do not risk

delimiting

God.


17/18

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HARVARD

THEOLOGICAL

REVIEW

Trinity

beyond being,

asking

it to lead Christians

to the

"highest

peak

of

mystic scripture,"

a

place

characterized

by

paradox.

Then,

beginning

his

address to

Timothy,

Dionysius urges

him to leave behind

"everything per-

ceptible

and

understandable,"

that

is,

as

I

have said

above,

things

and

concepts.

He

urges

Timothy

to

say nothing

of this ascent to those who

think that

God

is a material

object

or a

concept.

It

is

appropriate

to liken

God

to

particular

beings,

"since it is the Cause

of

all

beings,"

and more

appropriate

to

negate,

since

"it

surpasses

all

being." Using

language

similar

to that of

Gregory

of

Nyssa,

Dionysius

interprets

Moses' ascent of Mount

Sinai as the mind's ascent to the

place

of

unknowing.61

In

chapter

two,

Dionysius

introduces the

metaphor

of the statue:

sculptors

"remove

every

obstacle to the

pure

view of the hidden

image,

and

simply

by

this act of

clearing

aside

(dCoaipeotc)

they

show

up

the

beauty

which is

hidden."62

Dionysius

carries

out this

carving

in

the

following chapters.

In

chapter

three,

he

gives examples

of

beings

that

form the material for

carving:

descriptions

of God

according

to

"forms,

figures,

and instruments" such as

"sleeping,"

"drunk,"

and

"hungover."

As such

perceptible images

are carved

away, only

concepts

remain.63

The

higher

the mind's

ascent,

the less that

remains

to be carved

away. Language

ultimately

"falters"

where the

final

obstacles have been

removed,

the final

beings

denied.

The

statue

is

carved;

language

is "at

one with

him

who

is

indescribable."64

Despite

their more

paradoxical appearance, chapters

four and five

merely

rehearse these same ideas

in

greater

detail.

Chapter

four

says

that God is

not

anything

that

might

characterize material

objects: having shape,

form,

quality, quantity,

and

weight; perceptible; changing;

divisible.

Chapter

five

removes

concepts

from

God,

but

nonetheless

continues to

say

a

great

deal

about the

ungraspable

God,

for

example,

that God cannot be named

or

known.65

It

is

only

the

presence

of

such

unnegated speech

that makes

sculpture,

and the concreteness

and

specificity

it

implies,

an

appropriate

metaphor

for

Dionysian negative theology;

as Rolt

observes,

a

theology

of

pure

negativity

would seek

not to carve a block of marble but to

destroy

61Louth

(Origins,

175)

discusses

Dionysius's

relation

to

Gregory

of

Nyssa

and

Dionysian

ecstasy;

Louth's further discussion of

the

difference between

the human and

angelic

hierar-

chies

and

the

hierarchies

of

names for

God

(Origins,

176-78

and

Denys,

105)

is

unequalled

in its

clarity.

62Mystical

Theology

2.1025a-b.

63Ibid.,

3.1033b.

64Ibid., 1033c.

65I

hope,

in

a

later

study,

to examine

the

relation between

negations proper

and

phrases

that

appear

to be

roughly

synonymous

with

them,

such

as "free of

every

limitation"

(Mystical

Theology

1048b).


18/18

JOHN

N.

JONES 371

it.66 The conclusion

of

Mystical

Theology,

that God is

beyond

each indi-

vidual assertion

and

denial,

serves an aesthetic and a

logical

function. It

shows that in Dionysius's view no more carving (denial) is necessary.

Moreover,

by repeating

the

language

of

chapter

one,

it shows that the

project

of

(non-)predication

announced

in

chapter

one is

completed.

Nonetheless,

the

work of

sculpting

this statue

may

not

be

as finished as

Dionysius

believes.

To

some,

the stone

remaining

on the

pedestal appears

indistinguishable

from

the stone

pieces

carved

away.

Artists

taking Dionysius

as

their

master

may

both

appreciate

the

beauty

of his creation and

wonder

if it

must be

sculpted

still

further,

and what

form,

if

any,

would

represent

its consummation.

66C. E.

Rolt,

trans.,

Dionysius

the

Areopagite:

"The

Divine

Names" and "The

Mystical

Theology"

(8th

ed.;

London:

SPCK,

1977)

195 n.1.

Documents

Sculpting God. the Logic of Dionysian Negative Theology – John N. Jones