Seacurity Alert on EU Border

7/25/2019 Seacurity Alert on EU Border

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byGhiaNodia,JanPieko,andJeffLovitt

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SECURITY ALERT ON THE EUS DOORSTEP

Strategies for Strengthening Security in the

Eastern Partnership Countries

by Ghia Nodia, Jan Pieko, and Jeff Lovitt

Editor: Jeff lovitt

Project Manager, Caucasus Institute for

Peace, Democracy and Development/CIPDD:

Tiko Tkeshelashvili

Caucasus Institute for Peace,Democracy and Development/CIPDD,

June 2016

72, Tsereteli Avenue

0154 Tbilisi, Georgia

cipdd.org

This policy paper was produced in the

framework of the Project Security Alert

on the EUs Eastern Doorstep, by the

Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy

and Development/CIPDD (Georgia),

in partnership with the Foreign Policy

Association (Moldova) and the NGO

Promotion of Intercultural Cooperation

(Ukraine).The project issupported by the EaP CSF Re-granting

Scheme. The aim of the project is to raise

awareness about the EaP security challenges

and to develop a comprehensive vision for

the region.

This publication has been produced with

the assistance of the European Union. The

contents of this publication are the sole

responsibility of the Caucasus Institute for

Peace, Democracy and Development, and

can in no way be taken to relect the viewsof the European Union.

About the authors:

Ghia Nodiais chair of the Tbilisi-basedCaucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and

Development (www.cipdd.org) He was Minister

of Education and Science in Georgia in 2008.

He is currently a Director of the International

School of Caucasus Studies at the Ilia State

University.

Jan Pieko, based in Poland and Ukraine, is

Executive Director of the Polish-Ukrainian

Cooperation Foundation (PAUCI) (www.

pauci.org), and co-Founder of New Diplomacy.From September 2016, he is set to become the

Ambassador of Poland to Ukraine.

Jeff Lovittis the founding Chair of New

Diplomacy (www.newdiplomacy.net). From

2005-2015, he was Executive Director of PASOS

Policy Association for an Open Society.

Acknowledgements are due to the authors of the

projects accompanying six country studies:

Richard Giragosian, Zaur Shiriyev, Dzianis

Melyantsou, Tamar Pataraia, Victoria

Bucataru, Corneliu Ciurea, Hennadiy Maskak,

and Hanna Shelest.

Our thanks are also due to the three experts

who answered our questions for The View from

NATO Countries: Ioan Mircea Pacu, James

Nixey,and Gustav C. Gressel.

This paper was peer reviewed by Nicu Popescu,

Senior Analyst at the European Union Institute

for Strategic Studies (EUISS), Paris. The authors

bear sole responsibility for the views andarguments expressed in the inal paper.


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SECURITY ALERT ON THE EUS DOORSTEP

Strategies for Strengthening Security in the Eastern

Partnership Countriesby Ghia Nodia, Jan Pieko, and Jeff Lovitt

As the EU inalises its new Global Strategy, and NATO members prepare toaddress the challenges on the Alliances Eastern lank at the Warsaw Summit,Security Alert on the EUs Doorstep(and six accompanying papers on eachEastern Partnership country) assesses the security challenges facing NATO,the European Union, and the Eastern Partnership countries themselves,

and the need to balance deterrence with engagement vis--vis Russia and,more importantly, for NATO to work closely with Georgia, Ukraine and otherpost-Soviet countries to strengthen security for all through defence anddeterrence.

they pool funds and expertise together in a dramaticinvestment in security sector reform including

military and intelligence reform in the EasternPartnership countries.

NATO will have a much greater understanding

of imminent threats, and earlier warning, if itfocuses strongly on its Eastern lank and drafts

plans for closer co-operation with the EasternPartnership countries. This engagement and

intelligence-gathering are crucial at a time whenmisunderstandings and misinformation can triggera dangerous escalation of conlict with Russia.

NATO and the Eastern Partnership countries aredeeply interdependent in security terms. While theAlliance is not obliged to defend non-members, the

reality is that any future crisis in NATOs immediatevicinity will have an immediate impact on relationsamong Alliance members, as well as on how Russia

sees the Alliance.

Thus, resilient and well-prepared neighbours area key NATO objective. In this context, the Alliance

can bring the EaP countries into the strategicdialogue around deterrence strategy, include them

in operational planning platforms, assist them inmilitary training, intelligence support, joint militaryexercises, and standardisation of defensive weaponssystems to improve co-ordination and training, and

launch a special focus on security in the Black Sea

basin. It is in NATOs own interests to elaborateand present to three Eastern Partnership countries(Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova) a road map for further

co-operation with a membership perspective at theend.

Governments of the Eastern Partnership

countries need to acknowledge that they mustoverhaul their governance systems, which pose anexistential threat, primarily in the ields of ighting

corruption and implementing security sectorreform. They should bring their security policies

and command and control structures in line withNATO standards and norms. They will receive more

assistance from external actors if they place even

greater emphasis on strengthening their democraticcredentials through zero tolerance for corruption.They should also reach out wherever possibleto embrace contacts between representatives

of communities in conlict zones to de-escalatetensions, and foster trust and constructive dialogue.

Civil Society in the Eastern Partnershipcountries should build expertise in the security

ield, and should participate as an added valueexpert partner in the new Eastern PartnershipPlatform on Common Security and Defence Policy.

The European Union can become an even morevalued partner to NATO by issuing a declaration to

the Warsaw Summit, committing EU members tosupport the strengthening of NATOs Eastern lank(without duplicating NATOs military capabilityand command structure), and to co-operate with

NATO in the areas of maritime security, supporting

partners in training and capacity building, securitysector reform, joint exercises and the establishment

of a Centre of Excellence for countering hybridthreats. The EU and NATO will mutually beneit if

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS


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deny him new opportunities, and reduce tozero his doubt about our commitment todefending all NATO allies against militarythreats.2

This means going beyond building thecapacity to enforce Article 5 and the collectivedefence of NATO members, and to buildsecurity throughout the EUs neighbourhood,East and South. In the case of the EUs Easternneighbours, that means to ensure that Russiafaces high costs for any further aggressionssuch as the Russia-Georgia war of 2008, or theannexation of Crimea and invasion of EasternUkraine in 2014.

Security is Scarce,Destabilisation Aplenty

In recent years the European security order,based on the legacy of the Helsinki FinalAct, the Charter of Paris and the UnitedNations Charter, has been neither respectednor consistently enforced. For a long while,this framework provided a wide range ofdiplomatic instruments for solving potentialcrises and managed to keep the securitybalance in Europe. The Organization for

Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)and the UN guaranteed the inviolability offrontiers and the territorial integrity of states.

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, theRussian Federation was declared the legalsuccessor state of the USSR on the groundsthat it contained 51% of the populationof the USSR and 77% of its territory. As aconsequence, Russia inherited the USSRspermanent seat on the UN Security Councilwith its right of veto. This was accepted by theother successor republics of the Soviet Union.

Ukraine, as a new independent state, agreedto give up its nuclear stockpile which wasthe worlds third largest. The BudapestMemorandum, signed in December 1994,offered security guarantees against the threatto the territorial integrity and independenceof Ukraine, as well as of Belarus andKazakhstan. The Memorandum was signed bythree nuclear powers: the Russian Federation,the United States of America, and the UnitedKingdom.

2 https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/hearing/hearing-u-s-policy-toward-putins-russia/

Time to Rebuild Securityin the Neighbourhood

The EUs Eastern neighbourhood has become

the principal focus of security debates withinNATO in the run-up to the NATO WarsawSummit (8-9 July 2016). NATO DefenceMinisters, meeting in Brussels on 14-15 June,conirmed that four battle groups (of up to800 troops each) will be based in Polandand the Baltic states, there will be tailoredmeasures to enhance defence and deterrencein the Black Sea region, and NATOssupport for Ukraine will be boosted with aComprehensive Package of Assistance to thebuilding of stronger security structures.1

These steps, combined with measuresimplemented since NATOs 2014 WalesSummit the Very High Readiness Joint TaskForce (VJTF) and greater resources for theNATO Response Force follow strong callsfrom NATO members bordering on Russia forNATO to provide effective deterrence againstany military threat from the East.

While the Kremlin portrays such measures,and also the NATO land-based anti-missileshield stationed in Romania, as a threat thatwill require a response, they are defensive

steps. NATO is strengthening deterrence andits defences, not building attack capabilities.

However, NATO needs to have a sustained, long-term strategy not only to contain Russianaggression through effective deterrence,readiness, and defence capabilities, butalso to set the agenda, rather than engagereactively to unexpected actions launchedby the regime of Vladimir Putin. A betterprepared NATO with a strong, convincingdeterrent capability will make President Putinunderstand that the costs of an arms race are

too high on all counts, and that NATO remainsthe most powerful military alliance on theplanet, and one that represents stability andsecurity to the common neighbourhood of theCaucasus and Black Sea region.

As Michael McFaul, former US Ambassador toRussia (2012-2014), put it when addressingthe US House Foreign Affairs CommitteeHearing, US Policy Towards Putins Russia,on 14 June 2016, Putin will take advantageof opportunities, including splits withinthe alliance or ambiguities about NATOs

commitment to defend all members. We must

1 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_room.htm


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In the period preceding the Soviet break-upand its aftermath, the Kremlin fuelled andmanipulated local, mostly ethnically based,conlicts in its neighbourhood and therebymanaged to construct so-called frozen

conlict (more often protracted conlict)zones, which worked as leverage for securingthe Kremlins geopolitical interests. Thesezones were: separatist Transnistria inMoldova, Abkhazia and South Ossetia inGeorgia, and Nagorno-Karabakh which, afterthe Azerbaijan-Armenia war, became a defacto part of Armenian territory.

The fragile security architecture waschallenged, and the work of pan-Europeansecurity organisations (and various ad hoccontact groups set up to solve regional

problems) became less and less effective.

The full-scale crisis arrived when in March2014 Russia responded to the EuromaidanRevolution (also known as the Revolutionof Dignity) in Ukraine and the decision ofthe legitimate government in Kyiv to sign anAssociation Agreement with the EuropeanUnion (EU) with the annexation of Crimeafollowed by the invasion of Eastern Ukraine.

With this violation of the territorial integrity ofUkraine, the Kremlin invalidated the existing

European security architecture based on theaccords signed by Russia, and Europe facedthe most serious challenge to its security andstability since the Balkan wars following thebreakup of Yugoslavia.

The European securityorder has been neither

respected nor consistentlyenforced.

The worlds democratic community reactedto these developments through the existingchannels of international diplomacy (OSCE,UN, Council of Europe). New ad hoc initiatives,such as the Minsk contact group, and theNormandy and Geneva formats, were set up

to negotiate the conditions for a ceaseireand the withdrawal of heavy artillery. Theexisting security instruments the West had

at its disposal proved to be mostly ineffectiveand ill suited for dealing with Russia whichunilaterally changed the rules of the globalgeopolitical game.

At the same time, the EU became the targetof numerous terrorist attacks (Paris, thenBrussels), compounding the EUs existentialstruggles with the Greek insolvency crisis, thelow of refugees from Syria, and the potentialof Brexit (the heated debate ahead of Britainsreferendum on 23 June 2016 on its future EUmembership). While unity was reached onapplying economic sanctions against Russia,the EU had few adequate tools to respond tothe security threats in the East, and the spiritof solidarity was soon replaced by growinginsecurity, uncertainty and isolationism.

Eastern Partnershipat the Crossroads

Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, the threeEastern Partnership countries3 that decidedto sign Association Agreements with the EU,enjoy no security guarantees. In the caseof Ukraine, Kyiv was also deprived of theterritorial integrity assurance included in

the Budapest Memorandum. After the NATOBucharest Summit in 2008, the prospectof closer links and a NATO membershipperspective for Ukraine and Georgia were nolonger on the agenda.

After the Euromaidan Revolution and thedeaths of thousands of people who fought forEuropean values in Ukraine, a perceptioncontinued that the EU and transatlanticcommunity left their partners in the coldwithout any constructive support. Kyivs pleasfor Western weaponry to ight the Russian

orchestrated rebellion also fell on deaf ears.In the face of the aggressive policies of Putin,the Wests credibility was at stake. Russiasdestabilisation efforts could undermine theEastern Partnership initiative and bringthe post-Soviet countries back under theKremlins control, resulting in a Yalta-like newdivision of theworld.

3 A joint declaration, signed in Prague in May 2009,established the Eastern Partnership (EaP) initiative

between the EU and six post-Soviet countries (Armenia,Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Republic of Moldova, andUkraine), designed to strengthen integration between theEU and the region.


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The return of Ukraine to Russias sphereof inluence is clearly not going to happen,given the sharp turn away from Russia inpublic opinion in Ukraine and the thousandsof lives lost in the war in the East. The EUs

engagement is essential to support therecovery of the economy in Ukraine, andto ensure that anti-corruption reforms andessential restructuring takes hold. If the EUabandoned its support for Ukraine, that wouldleave a dangerously volatile and unstableconlict situation on the EUs doorstep.

Given the EUs rather limited capacity torespond properly to this challenge, it needsto work more closely with NATO to prepare astrategic plan to pre-empt and avert potentialconlicts and deepening chaos spreading

through the region. The renaissance oftransatlantic relations and rapprochementbetween the Old Continent and the US isthe only long-term option for reversing thisnegative trend. It will take time, will requirepolitical will on all sides, and a sustainedconsensus among the EU member states.

Security Vacuumbetween Russia and the EU

The Eastern Partnership (EaP) region ischaracterised by its location in a shared, butalso contested neighbourhood of both theEU and Russia. While the six countries atissue are extremely diverse in their foreignpolicy strategies, internal political systems,and security proiles, they share importantcommon features, including similar securitythreats and risks, unstable and sometimesautocratic political systems based onunderdeveloped economies, and insuficientcapacities of their security-providing agencies.

With regards to the general securityenvironment, the situation in the EaP region isshaky, unstable, and troublesome. The regioninds itself in a security limbo, squeezedbetween two major actors or sets of actorswith competing objectives and securitycultures. There is Russia on the one hand andWestern actors, represented by NATO, theEU, as well as individual nation-states withinthis realm, on the other. The 2008 Russia-Georgia war, and then the 2014 annexationof Crimea and the subsequent hybrid war

between Russia-supported separatists andthe Ukrainian state in the East of the countryshowed the scale of the rift.

These developments led to a qualitatively newreality, unseen at least since the early 1990s,whereby the use of military force aiming atchanging the borders of a sovereign state hadbecome an effectively permissible behaviour,

with no international power capable ofstopping this trend. An upsurge of violencein Nagorno Karabakh in April 2016 thatsurpassed any such incidents in this conlictsince the 1994 ceaseire, while not obviouslylinked to competition between Russia and theWest, its into the general perception that theregion is in a security vacuum and where useof force has become a viable option.

This, however, is not a traditional geopoliticalcompetition, but primarily a clash ofcontending values, norms, and security

cultures. The small and vulnerable statesthat constitute the EaP region4have a directstake in the outcome of this ight betweennorms and security philosophies. NATO andthe EU represent a culture of co-operativesecurity, principally relying on soft power,wherein small states can make their ownchoices; this security culture is intertwinedwith a preference for democratic pluralismthat ensures democratic peace and allows thepublic to deine the security choices of theirstates.

It is only natural that small states that arekeen to preserve their effective sovereigntyand have a greater commitment to democraticnorms, gravitate towards the European space,wherein small states may feel more secure andexercise a much greater degree of effectivesovereignty. Russia, on the other hand,openly stands for a traditional, 19th centuryconcept of power, whereby a limited numberof dominant players enforces the securityregime without consulting small states whosepredicament is deined as satellites of largerpowers.

As a result, Russia sees the region as an arenaof ierce geopolitical competition, wherethe West is trying to squeeze Russia out ofits legitimate sphere of inluence. FollowingRussias actions towards Georgia and Ukraine,the EaP region has become an area offundamental uncertainty, where the balanceof power that the actors are prepared to apply,as well as the norms within which they mayapply it, is undeined.

4 Ukraine, strictly speaking, may not fit into the classicdescription of a small state, but its endemic weaknessesand excessive vulnerability are evident.


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behaviour, this is still vastly insuficient toensure even basic security within the EaPregion.

Moreover, the three EaP countries that

made a clear choice in favour of close co-operation with the EU by signing AssociationAgreements, namely Moldova, Ukraine andGeorgia (in addition, Georgia is also strivingto become a NATO member), are especiallyvulnerable: it is not an accident that Georgiaand Ukraine were picked as speciic targets ofRussian aggression.

There is a strong impression in thesecountries that Russia punished them for theirorientation towards the EU and NATO, but thelatter did not stand up for them in a suficient

way. Thus, these countries are presentedwith a choice whereby one option (Europeanintegration) might leave them unprotectedand facing reprisals from Russia, while another(joining the Russia-led Eurasian EconomicUnion) runs against societys preferences andmay undermine the prospects for successfulpolitical and economic development.

The security component of the EUs EuropeanNeighbourhood Policy is largely declarative,and is represented by the principle of goodneighbourliness in the context of the need

for the settlement of conlicts between theEastern Partnership countries. It does notforesee engagement by the EU in the event ofconlicts between one or more EaP countriesand Russia.

The Association Agreements between theEU and respectively Ukraine, Georgia andMoldova provide that the parties shallintensify their joint efforts to promote stability,security and democratic development in theircommon neighbourhood, and in particularto work together for the peaceful settlement

of regional conlicts.5 The AssociationAgreements are nowhere near to providingany irm commitments from the EU to provideany sort of military, inancial or technicalassistance in case of escalating securitythreats to the parties to the agreements.6

There is no security for other countries of the

5 http://eeas.europa.eu/georgia/assoagreement/assoagreement-2013_en.htm, and http://eeas.europa.eu/moldova/assoagreement/assoagreement-2013_en.htm.

6 The EU Neighbourhood Policies and the Security Criseswithin the Eastern Neighbourhood by Roman Petrov, inSecurity and Human Rights25 (2014)298-311, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2779902

All countries within the EaP region, except forBelarus, are involved in territorial conlicts.While these conlicts are complex ones thatare linked to historical ethnic cleavages withinthe countries (or, in Armenias case, to its

ethnic kinship to people residing in NagornoKarabakh), under the current circumstancesthey have become Russias chief tool inmanipulating regional states in order toimpede their peoples choice to co-operatewith the EU and NATO.

If Armenias last-minute refusal to initial theEU Association Agreement in 2013 resultedfrom Russian pressure using Armeniasvulnerability vis--vis the Karabakh conlict Ukraines eventual choice in favour ofEuropean integration led to Russian military

interventions and annexation of Ukrainianterritory.

The return of Ukraineto Russias sphere of

inluence is clearly not

going to happen.

For a long time, Western actors were reluctantto admit that such competition takes placeat all, preferring to interpret problems withRussia as cases of disagreements betweenpartners. The advancement of the norms andinstitutions of liberal democracy in the 1990s,and the NATO and EU enlargement of the early2000s, led to an overestimation of Western softpower that, with only occasional applicationof hard power (as in rump Yugoslavia in

1999-2000), was deemed suficient to ensuregeneral stability and security in Europe andits neighbourhood.

The fact that Russia perceived this prevalenceof soft power as a pronounced threat to itsinterests, and was prepared to apply hardpower and aggressive hybrid war tacticsto counter it, caught Western strategistsunawares. While an agreement on sanctionsagainst Russia, as well as the more active stanceof NATO on its Eastern frontiers, suggeststhat Western powers are gaining a betterunderstanding of the tasks at hand, and haveachieved partial success in containing Russian


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and Turkey may inluence developments inthe South Caucasus as well.

The Muslim populations of Georgia andAzerbaijan have become a target of recruiters

for the Islamic State, or ISIS, while Armeniahas had to deal with refugees from the warzone in Syria, and Azerbaijans close militaryco-operation with Israel spoils its relationswith Iran. Still, the inluence of countries likeTurkey and Iran is of secondary importance ascompared with that of Russia.

Insecurity andShallow Roots of Democracy

The lack of a reliable and predictable securityregime in the EaP area is often matchedby a low level of political consolidation inthe countries and insuficient capacity ofthe national governments to face emergingsecurity challenges. This pertains both to thegovernments general capacity and legitimacy,as well as to the effectiveness of security-providing agencies.

There is considerable variety among EaPcountries with regards to their political

regimes, but in each of them there areconcerns related to both their effectivenessand stability. It is no coincidence that Georgia,Moldova and Ukraine, the three countriesmost advanced in their co-operation withthe EU, are also pluralist political systems.None of these countries can be considereda consolidated democracy, hence in none ofthem can the stability of the political systembe taken for granted.

This is the case both for the recent past andexpectations about the foreseeable future. In

about ten years, Ukraine went through twopopular democratic rebellions that in the lastcase (2014) led to violence and the light frompower of a democratically elected President. In2012, Georgia, with its own record of politicalturmoil, successfully managed the change ofpower by electoral means for the irst timein its history, which was rightly hailed as animportant democratic achievement. But thereis no widely shared conviction that this modeof change of power will become the rule.

Moldova has no experience of coloured

revolutions, but since 2005 the country hasbeen living in constant fear of large-scale

region, either. While it is commonly understoodthat Armenia renounced its bid to sign anAssociation Agreement with the EU due toRussian manipulation of its security concernswith regards to Nagorno Karabakh, the April

2016 escalation of hostilities demonstratedthat its choice far from ensured its security.The linkage of Azerbaijans military success toRussian arms supplies to Azerbaijan, comingafter the murder of an Armenian family by aRussian soldier stationed at a military baseon Armenias territory, dented the traditionalpro-Russia stance of the Armenian public andspurred more skeptical attitudes towards thepolicies of partnership with Russia that hadbeen a bulwark of Armenian security policy.

Azerbaijan has its own grounds for insecurity:

it is scared by the newly aggressive Russianpolicy in its near abroad, and suffers fromwhat it sees as neglect by the West (both theUS and the EU), as well as from the effect of thelow oil price on an oil-dependent economy.Following the crisis in Ukraine, even Belarus the country that is considered especiallyclose to Russia and has no territorial conlictsto worry about has started to work onimproving the readiness of its military forcesin order to adapt to the changing securityenvironment, and is seeking more co-operative relations with the EU.

Apart from the hard security area, manycountries are concerned about the increasingactivism of Russia within the EaP countrieswith the aim of creating a network of allieswithin these countries and of inluencingpublic opinion. The speciic objectives ofRussian propaganda efforts that are oftendescribed as the application of its own softpower may differ from one country to another,but a common thread is the discrediting ofEuropean norms and institutions by spreadingdeliberately false information about Western

democracies as well as pro-democracy forcesin their own countries.

These actions are especially dangerous inAssociation Agreement countries, whereRussian propaganda is deployed in strengthto tilt the internal political and public opinionbalance in favour of anti-EU sentiment.

While this set of general concerns is dominantfor the whole region, in the case of the SouthCaucasus there are additional ones. This sub-region is close to the Middle East and feels

spillover effects from the ongoing conlicts inSyria and Iraq. New tensions between Russia


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In all these countries, the fundamentalcommitment to the democratic path ofdevelopment is challenged not only externally,but also internally, though to different degrees.

In Georgia, public support for EU and NATOintegration is the most solid (over 70 percent in various public opinion polls9), but therise of openly anti-Western parties, as wellas media and NGOs, raises concerns aboutthe sustainability of this consensus in thefuture. The fact that support for EU and Euro-Atlantic integration is somewhat weakeramong Georgias largest minority, Azeris,and, especially, Armenian minorities, is also acause for concern.10

In Moldova, support for EU integration is

the shakiest among the three countries thatsigned Association Agreements.11 Real orperceived lack of support from Westernplayers, expressed in the refusal to recognisethe European vocation of Georgia, Moldovaand Ukraine, continuous procrastinationin granting a visa-liberalisation regime toGeorgia and Ukraine (Moldova was morefortunate, securing visa-free travel to theEUs Schengen area in 2014), and the de factoblocking of Georgias NATO perspective by anumber of NATO countries, are believed tohave strengthened the hand of pro-Russian

forces.

Despite all these challenges, these threecountries have achieved considerableprogress in developing free and relativelystable democratic institutions in very dificultcircumstances, and this progress has to beappreciated. In each case, this progress shouldbe attributed not only to the choices andactions of speciic political leaders, but to thecommitment and devotion of their citizens,who have often sacriiced their own safety toadvance the democratic and European future

of their countries.

Clearly, the autocratic regimes in Belarus andAzerbaijan raise considerable concerns in thearea of human rights; moreover, it would bewrong to accept the assumption emanating

9 See, for instance, National Democratic Institute (NDI),Public attitudes in Georgia. Results of a March 2016 surveycarried out for NDI by CRRC Georgia, http://www.civil.ge/files/files/2016/NDI-Georgia-March-2016-PoliticalRatings-eng.pdf.

10 Ibid.

11 Moldovans Public Perceptions of Politics and Government:Results of NDIs November 2015 Public Opinion Research,https://www.ndi.org/moldova-November-2015-survey-results.

post-election destabilisations that may betriggered by the incumbent government orthe opposition.

There is no conidence that this record of

instability and turmoil is fully in the past. In allthe countries, there is fundamental mistrusttowards political elites and a structurallyweak system of political parties. Continuousapplication of selective justice and physicalviolence against the opposition,7 attemptsto deprive society of its most popular andcritical TV outlet, Rustavi-2,8 and pressureagainst the Constitutional Court, raise deepconcerns about the fairness and legitimacy ofthe pivotal parliamentary elections scheduledfor 8 October 2016 in Georgia.

Setbacks in the transformation of the deeplycorrupt system of governance in Ukrainedo not bode well for the stability of thedemocratic system in Ukraine.

Russian propagandais deployed to tilt public

opinion in favour of

anti-EU sentiment.

In Moldova, the high level of politicalfragmentation and lack of consensus on thebasic direction of the country, matched byconcerns about endemic corruption withinthe political elite, are having a destabilisingeffect on the political system.

7 Retribution and the Rule of Law: The Politics of Justicein Georgiaby Johanna Popjanevski, Central Asia-CaucasusInstitute, Washington, DC, 2015

8 U.S. Expresses Concerns to Georgian Govt OverRustavi 2 TV Case, http://securityassistance.org/content/us-%E2%80%98expresses-concerns-georgian-govt%E2%80%99-over-rustavi-2-tv-case; KonradZasztowt, The Case of Rustavi-2 TV: Escalation of theConflict between Government and Opposition in Georgia,The Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM) BulletinNo. 113 (845), 9 December 2015, https://www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=21053;The Curious Case of Rustavi-2:Protecting Media Freedom and the Rule of Law in GeorgiabyCory Welt, PONARS Eurasia, Policy Memo 400, November

2015, http://www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/curious-case-rustavi-2-georgia.


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documents, such as National SecurityConcepts or Military Doctrines, and thesedocuments are useful sources for mapping thesecurity concerns, priorities and strategies ofeach country. However, in a rapidly changing

security environment, these quickly becomeobsolete and do not necessarily provide actualguidance on the decision-making process.

The lack of transparentand orderly procedures,

and weak civilian

oversight, are generic

problems.

The lack of a tradition of transparent andorderly procedures in decision-makingprocesses and promotion of personnel,unclear division between military and civiliancomponents or relevant agencies, weakcivilian oversight, and high levels of corruptionare generic problems the countries face (withimportant exceptions of certain countries

in certain areas). On the positive side, in allthe countries the military are under the irmcontrol of the civilian state (with the possibleexception of volunteer forces in Ukraine),and there is no threat of the military trying toimpose their will on the political leadership.

For obvious reasons, in recent years, concernabout the quality of security providers washighest in Ukraine, where the performanceof the army in Eastern Ukraine was generallyevaluated as rather poor. The high levelof corruption, obsolete command and

control structures, and low professionalismconstituted the greatest challenges. This,among other things, led to the proliferationof voluntary militias that are often consideredmore effective in combat than the regulararmy.

While the urgent need to counter theaggressive behaviour of Russia and theseparatist ighters it supports may justify theuse of such forces, the existence of relativelywell-organised militias that are not includedinto the regular system of command and

control may create problems for the countryslong-term security. Hence, drastic reforms in

from supporters of these regimes thatautocracy is the necessary price for stability.While they do provide for an appearanceof short-term stability, we know from theexperience of numerous such regimes that

unexpected implosion is also possible.They also oscillate between trends of greaterand lesser repression, which is generallyto be explained by the inluence of externalfactors. In particular, within the last two tothree years, Belarusian authorities becamemore interested in improving relations withthe West, released all political prisoners, andsigniicantly lowered the level of repressionagainst political opponents.

The government of Azerbaijan, on the other

hand, being somewhat frustrated aboutthe level of Western, especially US support,increased the level of repression against itscritics in the opposition, civil society andindependent media, although in 2016 someprominent jailed activists were released. Inaddition, repression against independentsecular organisations has strengthened thehand of the Islamic opposition, as well asradicalisation of Islamic groups, that createlong-term challenges for Azerbaijan.

Armenias political system is much freer than

those in Belarus and Azerbaijan, but autocratictrends and practices still prevail, with veryweak opposition and independent media.Since its independence, Armenia has beenruled by the same political elite that emergedfrom a nationalist mobilisation around theNagorno Karabakh conlict and still gainsits legitimacy from leading the country tomilitary victory at that time.

Moreover, Armenias most recent twopresidents, Robert Kocharian and SerzhSargsian, are natives of Nagorno Karabakh.

This source of legitimacy has lost much ofits sway, however, and society has developedconsiderable fatigue towards the rule of theincumbent political elite; but the system doesnot provide opportunities for alternativeplayers, which undermines its generallegitimacy.

Security Agencies in the Spotlight

The countries also widely differ when itcomes to the capacities of their securityagencies, though there are some commonfeatures. They usually have oficial strategy


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the military sphere (as in many other areasof governance) are the order of the day inUkraine. On the positive side, there is notableprogress in the area of democratic oversightof the security agencies, due to a more active

parliament and civil society.

Georgia, thanks to close and successful co-operation with NATO for many years, as wellas a result of reforms carried out since 2004,has considerably improved the quality of itsarmy, police and security services, increasingits effectiveness and cleaning the securityservices of corruption. However, it has nocapacity to counter threats coming from theRussia-occupied territories, not least becauseit is afraid to provoke the other side. A 10May 2016 incident, when a Georgian citizen

was killed by a representative of the self-proclaimed Abkhazian government on theGeorgian side of the dividing line, causedpublic outrage primarily because in thisepisode the government was seen as totallyincapable of protecting its citizens even on theterritory it apparently controls.

Azerbaijan and Armenia are two countriesthat have traditionally given priority to thedevelopment of their military due to theirinvolvement in a conlict with each other,and a compulsion to be ready for resumed

ighting at any moment. While, also based onthe outcome of the war in the early 1990s,the combat-readiness of Armenian troopswas usually judged higher, in recent years thebalance may have shifted.

Azerbaijan had an opportunity to invest partof its considerable revenues from oil and gasexports into upgrading its army, and there havebeen efforts to ight corruption in this area.The appointment of a new Minister of Defencein Azerbaijan in 2013 led to some structuralreforms in the Ministry, especially among

command structure staff, which apparentlywas conducive to improvements in the qualityof the military. However, the extremely lowlevel of democratic oversight over the militaryand security agencies continues to be typicalfor both countries, as well as for Belarus.

While concerns stemming from the moreaggressive information war and propagandaefforts from the Russian side are increasing,the governments are slow in deining policiesthat are supposed to counter the ensuingthreats. In January 2015, in Ukraine, the

Ministry of Information Policy was formed toill the gap in countering Russian propaganda.

Last but not least, the countries of theregion suffer from economic hardships andimbalances that stem partly from lower oilprices and the economic downturn in Russia,since many economies of the region are still

linked to Russian markets. All countries wentthrough painful currency depreciations andfalls in export incomes, which contributed tothe worsening situation of the poor. The crisiswas especially notable in Azerbaijan, whoseeconomy depends overwhelmingly on oil andgas revenues.

For obvious reasons, though, the hardshipsare the most acute in Ukraine. As a result ofthe war in its East, Ukraine has seen a fall ofabout 20 per cent in its economic capacitydue to the loss of industrial infrastructure in

Donbass. At least 3 per cent of the Ukrainianpopulation is now internally displaced, andin March 2016 President Petro Poroshenkoreported the number of 1.75 million InternallyDisplaced Persons (IDPs) in Ukraine.12

In a more tense security situation, countriesthat are exceedingly dependent on energysupplies from Russia look for ways to diversifytheir supplies. For instance, in 2015 Belarus,the closest partner of Russia in the region,adopted a new Energy Security Conceptwhich prescribed a set of measures whose

implementation are expected to somewhatreduce the countrys overwhelmingdependence on Russian energy supplies.

Fostering Stabilitywith NATO and the EU

The EUs Eastern neighbourhood regionis extremely diverse with regards to the

countries orientations towards differentmilitary and political alliances andorganisations. Georgia has been the most irmand consistent in its orientation towards NATOmembership. At the 2008 Bucharest Summit,it received a general promise that it will beadmitted to the organisation, even thoughthere is no consensus within the Alliance asto when and how (or whether) to act on thispromise. Respectively, its co-operation withNATO aimed at reform of the security sectorin the direction of acquiring NATO standards,gaining interoperability of its armed forces

12 SeeSecurity Alert on the EUs Doorstep Ukraine countryreportby Hanna Shelest and Hennadiy Maksak report.


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with those of NATO countries, and increasingdemocratic control of the security sector, arethe most advanced.

Despite Georgias frustration with NATOs

continuous indecision to grant it a MembershipAction Plan, which would be a decisivepreliminary step to membership, the openingof the NATO-Georgia Joint Training andEvaluation Center (JTEC) in Tbilisi in 2015 isconsidered an important step, demonstratingprogress in Georgia-NATO relations. However,more is expected.

Ukraine and Moldova have not made a formalapplication to join NATO but, especially inUkraine, there is a stronger political consensusin favour of deepening co-operation with

the Alliance. Ukraines recently updatedMilitary Doctrine is focused on adaptationof Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) to theNATO standards, and the inal goal theEuro-Atlantic integration of the country. Itis expected that by 2018, 90 per cent of theUkrainian units will be operating accordingto NATO standards.13 Moldova is somewhatmore cautious about linkage with NATO, butstill displays a willingness to co-operate withthe Alliance by participating in NATO-ledmilitary missions authorised by the UN, suchas SFOR (in Bosnia and Herzegovina), Iraq,

and KFOR (Kosovo).

On the other pole, Belarus and Armenia aremembers of the Russia-led Collective SecurityTreaty Organisation, and strategic partnershipwith Russia traditionally constitutes thecentrepiece of these countries geopoliticalorientation. However, in both countries thispartnership is increasingly seen as problematicbecause it does not bring suficient beneits tothem. Therefore, both Belarus and Armenia tryto complement (or balance) this partnershipby co-operating with other powers, most

notably NATO. In the Armenian case, thisis part of the complementarity policy thecountry has been pursuing since the 1990s.Belarus participates in nearly 100 events peryear with NATO within the Partnership forPeace (PfP) and Planning and Review Process(PARP) frameworks.

Azerbaijan pursues a cautious policy of non-alliance in the military sphere, althoughRussias aggressive policy in its neighbourhoodhas inclined Azerbaijan towards somewhatcloser co-operation with NATO.

13 Ibid.

At the same time, it is concerned not to alienateMoscow by making this co-operation too close.Since 2013, the change in the leadership ofthe Ministry of Defence and ensuing reformsresulted in more responsibilities being given

to NATO- and Turkish-trained staff, peoplewho had previously held fairly junior positions.However, the Ukraine crisis and annexationof Crimea threw the Baku regime off course,leading it to take a low-proile stance in regardto its relations with the Alliance. Nevertheless,Azerbaijan is interested in the development ofthe Energy Security Centre of Excellence (ESCE)that would be linked to NATO with the directinvolvement of Azerbaijan. This would gainBaku greater visibility inside NATO on energysecurity issues.

There is a similar division within the regionabout the level of co-operation with theEU. Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine signedAssociation Agreements with the EU in 2014,and in the same year Moldova achieved visaliberalisation with the EUs Schengen area.

Armenia and Belarus are members of the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union that precludeseconomic integration with the EU. However, boththese countries strive to develop relations withthe EU as well. This is true not only of Armeniathat in 2013 refused to initial the Association

Agreement with the EU at the very last momentunder apparent Russian pressure, but alsoBelarus which never articulated the goal of EUintegration. In particular, Minsk is interestedin concluding a framework agreement on co-operation (Belarus still doesnt have a ratiiedPartnership and Co-operation Agreement(PCA) with the EU) in order to maintain goodrelations with its neighbours, develop economicco-operation with this powerful economic bloc,and counterbalance Russias inluence.

Azerbaijan, relying on its wealth from mineral

resources and its strategic partnership withTurkey, steers clear of both European andEurasian integration projects. While bothBelarus and Azerbaijan have an interest indeveloping relations with the EU, the dismalhuman rights record in both countries is amajor spoiler. On the Azerbaijan side, there isdisappointment with the lack of EU involvementin inding a solution to the Nagorno Karabakhconlict. The release of political prisoners inboth countries (most recently in Azerbaijan)has raised hopes of developing co-operation,but there is still a long way to go.


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The View from NATO Countries

We asked three experts in securityand diplomacy to assess NATOs plans

JAMES NIXEY

Are NATOs plans leading up to the Warsaw Summitrealistic, suficient, and well-targeted, e.g. to increasethe military presence in the Baltics and to focus ontackling hybrid warfare?Theyre getting better, but they are a long way frombeing adequate. The Wales Summit in 2014 provided agood start at least rhetorically but the agreementsreached have yet to be fully implemented, not leastbecause of the lack of targeted defence spending byNATO member states. Clearly, the forces ranged on theRussian side of its border with the Baltic states are far

greater than the size of the NATO forces on the otherside. NATO is simply not doing enough in conventionalwarfare deterrence to make its position clear. This ispartly because the scale of the problem is not fullyunderstood. Hybrid warfare is just beginning to beunderstood, and some encouraging progress is beingmade in energy security and counter-bribery actions.But it is a steep learning curve. Russias abilities toinitiate hybrid warfare currently outweigh the Westsabilities to repel it.

What single measure or package of measures by NATOwould be most effective in deterring escalation offurther Russian military intervention in Ukraine andother Eastern Partnership countries?

The most effective single measure would be to makethe costs unacceptable to Moscow. This suggeststhe following clear message should be sent: If it isevident that you have assisted in the destabilisation ofEastern Partnership countries, we will take retaliatorymeasures detrimental to your economy and, evenmore importantly, to your elites. But NATO then hasto make good on that promise: if your bluff is called,you have to act.

Is NATO the only player who can lead on this?In terms of a strict military presence, yes. The EU andthe UN are not ready to build and commit a force,and the OSCE is not appropriate in this context. TheUS, however, has committed extra resources and iseffectively playing the leading role.

Given the prospects of Montenegros membership,and the closening of NATOs relations with Swedenand Finland, should NATO hold out the prospect ofmembership to Georgia and Ukraine?

No, at least not yet. The fact is, they are not yet ready.This is rather fortunate for NATO because if theywere technically ready, it would be harder (but stillnot impossible) to refuse Georgias and Ukrainesapplications. Both countries are still far too riddledwith governance problems to be seriously considered and their militaries are still not interoperablewith existing NATO forces. Ukraine is further awaythan Georgia in this respect, not least because ithas experienced more serious destabilisation morerecently. But the Georgians and Ukrainians needto improve their institutions to bring them to thestandards of their counterparts in the West (or buildthem from scratch in many cases). The West should beclear that although the answer is no for now it is

not out of the question and it is not impossible.

James Nixey is Head of the Russia and EurasiaProgramme at Chatham House, the Royal Instituteof International Affairs, London


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Are NATOs plans leading up to the Warsaw Summitrealistic, suficient, and well-targeted, e.g. to increasethe military presence in the Baltics and to focus ontackling hybrid warfare?I fear that the summit in Warsaw will be the endof the strengthening of NATOs Eastern lank, notthe continuation. The measures implemented sofar (Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF),an increase in the readiness of the NATO ResponseForce, and the rotation of a brigade throughexercises in all Eastern lank states) are only a irststep. It will be enough to stop a hybrid threat if theformations are on the spot in time. It is a symbol ofsolidarity. But in the case of Russian aggression, thehybrid phase will be followed by a conventional

assault in a matter of days. Given the largernumbers of Russian troops in place to conductconventional offensive warfare, a more substantialpresence will almost certainly be needed.

What single measure or package of measures byNATO would be most effective in deterring escalationof further Russian military intervention in Ukraineand other Eastern Partnership countries?There are two measures. The irst is manoeuvres.In the military ield, nothing works that youhavent practised before. Russias plan is to launcha corps-size offensive operation within one weekand expand it to a three-corps operation withinone month. The manoeuvres and deployment of

large offensive formations on Ukraines borders inMarch/April 2014 support this scenario. So NATOneeds to conduct its own large-scale manoeuvres practising to stop a corps-sized incursion intoany of the Eastern lank states and to remove theinvading forces from that territory within onemonth. And now the tricky thing. Im not religiouslypreaching for a direct, permanent presence on theEastern lank. If the sceptics would show in practicein such a manoeuvre that they could deploy thenecessary troops fast enough to the corners of theEastern lank and be combat-ready in the shorttime needed, Id be ine with the remote presenceof stronger reserves. But if that isnt possible,NATO has to react accordingly. (Of course, they will

never allow such manoeuvres, because the Italiansand French know that they cant accomplish this,and hence this weakness should not be disclosed.

GUSTAV C. GRESSEL

Unfortunately the Russians know as well). Butdeterrence is only credible when it has beenpractised in manoeuvres.

The second measure is renewal and reform of thenuclear policy of NATO. The policy must embracenew means of delivery, and new policies, but aboveall the policy must be signalled to the Russians andpractised in manoeuvres.

Is NATO the only player who can lead on this?Yes, because at least for the time being we needthe Americans for this. Unfortunately, amongst theEuropeans, the last year saw a large amount of de-solidarisation, led by the Visegrad Four with their

fundamental opposition to help in the refugee crisis.Since then, there has been zero appetite for doingsomething for the Eastern lank in France, Italy,Belgium, and the Netherlands. Even for GermanysMinister of Defence, Ursula von der Leyen, itgets increasingly dificult to move something inGermany. The moment of moving together haspassed; solidarisation has been reversed.

Given the prospects of Montenegros membership,and the closening of NATOs relations with Swedenand Finland, should NATO hold out the prospect ofmembership to Georgia and Ukraine?I would never say no to Ukraine and Georgia notonly to show Russia that it cannot negotiate over

the heads of other states, but above all to sustainthe momentum of reforms and transformation.Georgia is moving away from the West, and inUkraine the same might happen if they get toodisillusioned with the West. Although Ukraine hasto reform much (much, much, much, much) moreto come even close to NATO or EU membership, weshould not in principle exclude the membershipoption. On the contrary, we should explain to themevery day why they are so far away and whichobjective criteria they must fulil to get in

Gustav C. Gressel is a Policy Fellow in the Berlinofice of the European Council on Foreign

Relations


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Are NATOs plans leading up to the Warsaw Summitrealistic, suficient, and well-targeted, e.g. to increasethe military presence in the Baltics and to focus ontackling hybrid warfare?NATO has to convey to Russia a message ofdetermination to honour Article 5 of its foundingtreaty, the principle of collective defence in theevent of an attack against any of its members. It isan open question as to how we should measure whatthe Russians consider determination. Personally,I suppose that the more meaningful the plans for aNATO military presence are, the more impact theywill carry with Russia. Hybrid war is a differentmatter, because subversion is not covered by Article5. Consequently, in this ield, since Russia is intent ondoing everything possible to destabilise the targetcountries, NATO (and the EU) are equally free to dowhatever it takes to prevent that.

What single measure or package of measures by NATOwould be most effective in deterring escalation offurther Russian military intervention in Ukraine andother Eastern Partnership countries?When Stalin was lectured on the moral power of theVatican, he interrupted the lecturer and asked: Howmany divisions does the Pope have? Similarly, theRussian leadership today is impressed by one thingalone: military might! But, again, is an open questionas to the level of military measures required to impressthe Russians. The entire issue is rather political and

theoretical, because the Russians know perfectly wellthat the Eastern Partnership countries are not NATOand EU members, and the public messages of someprominent members of those organisations signalthat they might never be members...

Is NATO the only player who can lead on this?I am afraid it is, apart from the measures taken byindividual members, as in the case of helping Ukrainemilitarily ...

Given the prospects of Montenegros membership,and the closening of NATOs relations with Swedenand Finland, should NATO hold out the prospect of

membership to Georgia and Ukraine?It depends on whom NATO (I mean its leadingmembers) considers its main audience: Georgia andUkraine, or Russia, because the messages conveyedto these respective audiences completely contradicteach other. To satisfy both is impossible, becauseRussia considers Georgia and Ukraine the object of azero-sum game with the West.

Ioan Mircea Pacu MEP is Vice President of theEuropean Parliament, Vice-Chair of the Committeeon Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament,and former Minister of Defence of Romania.

IOAN MIRCEA PACUInternational Co-ordinationKey to Strategic Security

The EUs new Global Strategy is due to be

published the week before the WarsawSummit. According to a new Franco-Finnish Declaration on Strengthening theEUs Common Security and Defence Policy,published on 15 June 2016, Following theinalisation of the EU Global Strategy andwith a view to its full operationalisation, theEuropean Council should provide guidancefor a more effective and capable militarydimension of the EU.14

According to the joint declaration, WhileNATO remains the cornerstone of collective

defence, the EUs role as a security and defenceprovider both within Europe and abroadneeds to be reinforced, including through amore strategic approach to its relations withNATO. The European Council and the WarsawSummit should create political momentumto move forward with a joint declaration. Co-operation should be developed in the areasof maritime security, supporting partners intraining and capacity building, exercises andhybrid threats. The declaration argues thata Centre of Excellence for countering hybridthreats could support both EU and its member

states, and enhance EU-NATO co-operation.

This co-operation is essential, and the EU needsto issue strong support to the strengtheningof NATOs Eastern lank without duplicatingNATOs military capability. But it might be inthe areas of visa liberalisation and investmentwhere the EU is best placed to complementa reinvigorated NATO with soft power stepsthat bring the citizens of the EUs Easternneighbours closer to the EUs member states,and offers them a perspective for closerintegration with the EU and a membership

perspective.

In the words of Christopher S. Chivvis, NATOshould offer further funding and training tobolster command and control, intelligence,surveillance reconnaissance, special forces,and air and missile defences, while seekingto increase overall transparency and civiliancontrol of the militaries of the region. NATOsdecision to open a training centre in Georgiais a positive step. NATO can further increasethe funding it has provided to date via trust

14 http://valtioneuvosto.fi/documents/10616/334517/FR+FI+declaration.pdf/b3f6b546-a755-48b6-8786-6a058b361f41


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need to overhaul their governance systems, inparticular in the ields of ighting corruptionand implementing security sector reform.They should further prioritise these relations,because this may be the best available chance

for the successful security sector reformnecessary in all EaP countries, albeit todifferent degrees. This includes increasing thelevel of professionalism of military personnel,more eficient and transparent commandand control structures, and a lower level ofcorruption. Governments should be moreinclusive and transparent in developing theirsecurity strategies as well as in the processof implementing reforms in the securitysector. This will increase the eficiency of

their actions, gain them access to more expertadvice, as well as greater goodwill and thetrust of at least part of society.

Governments should rememberthat developing democracy and the ruleof law is not only a means to reap beneitsfrom Western actors, but that constitutionaldemocracy has also proven to be the mostreliable way to ensure effective and stablegovernance. Advancing institutions of fairpolitical competition, accountability of publicinstitutions, the rule of law, and protection

of human rights is an important priority forall EaP countries, however different theirpolitical systems may be.

Countries involved in territorialconlicts (all except for Belarus) should followconsistent and well thought-through strategiesthat combine commitment to their nationalinterests with pragmatic pursuit of strategiesaimed at exclusively peaceful resolution ofconlicts and reducing the existent level oftensions around them. More contacts betweenrepresentatives of conlicting communities

and regions (at both the government andcommunity levels) should be encouraged inall cases to de-escalate tensions, and fostertrust and constructive dialogue.

Civil society

Increase professionalism andknowledge on issues of security policy andsecurity reform that would enable civil societyactors to engage in a meaningful, innovative,

and productive participation in the processof formulating security reform policies andmonitoring their implementation.

funds for Ukraine. The alliance can also helpto reduce the inluence of Russian securityservices within the militaries and defenceestablishments of all three countries.15

The EasternPartnership governments

need to overhaul their

governance systems, in

particular in ighting

corruption andimplementing security

sector reform.

Priorities for national governments

and civil society in the EasternPartnership countries

Governments of EaP countries have dissimilarnational priorities and foreign-policyorientations, while the level of democracyand, respectively, the capacity of the civilsociety actors to inluence their governmentdecisions and actions varies a lot. However,one can formulate principal recommendationsthat are useful to most or all national actorswithin the EaP area:

Governments

While national governments havea different level of relations with NATO,due to their different geopolitical outlooks,the research has shown that all of themappreciate opportunities for closer co-operation with NATO. The EaP governments

15NATOs New Challenges, Christopher S. Chivvis inBeyond NATOs Eastern Border. Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova,

Foreign and Security Policy Paper 2016, No. 26, The GermanMarshall Fund of the United States, http://www.gmfus.org/publications/beyond-natos-eastern-border-georgia-ukraine-moldova


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including military and intelligence reform inthe Eastern Partnership countries.

The EU should work towards visaliberalisation, and waive visa requirements as

soon as the technical criteria have been met,promote more people-to-people exchanges(such as educational exchanges), and continueto deepen trade ties, and offer EaP countriesa perspective for closer integration with theEU and a membership perspective. The EaPcountries should be offered a major role inthe new EaP Common Security and DefencePlatform.

The EU should support independentjournalism in the EaP region, and supportprojects that raise the standards of quality of

journalism in both the EaP countries and theEU to ensure that reporting on the region isthorough, factually based, and credible.

NATO

The NATO Bucharest Summitsformula of keeping the doors open forUkraine and Georgia to join the Alliance (insome distant future) lays the ground for muchdeeper co-operation in security sector reform

that will strengthen NATOs intelligencecapabilities, and enable conidence-buildingand stabilisation of the security context on theEUs doorstep. It is in NATOs own intereststo elaborate and present to three EasternPartnership countries (Ukraine, Georgia,Moldova) a road map for further co-operationwith a membership perspective at the end.

NATO will have a much greaterunderstanding of imminent threats, and earlierwarning, if it focuses strongly on its Easternlank and drafts plans for closer co-operation

with the Eastern Partnership countries. Thisengagement and intelligence-gathering arecrucial at a time when misunderstandingsand misinformation can trigger a dangerousescalation of conlict with Russia. NATO andthe Eastern Partnership countries are deeplyinterdependent in security terms. While theAlliance is not obliged to defend non-members,the reality is that any future crisis in NATOsimmediate vicinity will have an immediateimpact on relations among Alliance members,as well as on how Russia sees the Alliance.Thus, resilient and well-prepared neighbours

are a key NATO objective. In this context, theAlliance should bring the EaP countries into

Civil society actors should put greatereffort into co-operating across countries,both within the EaP area and the EU, in orderto study and disseminate best practices, aswell as gain better knowledge of the risks

and challenges emerging in the process ofco-operation and integration with EU andNATO structures. Such co-operation is alsoimportant for adequately informing EUpartners about processes that take place inEaP countries, and gaining greater supportfor the EU and Euro-Atlantic aspirations oftheir countries within EU and NATO member-states.

Promote the idea of strong civilsociety engagement in the new EaP Platformon Common Security and Defence Policy,

which could become a very productiveplatform for discussing common problems,and formulating and advocating commonstrategies in this area.

Civil society actors should prioritisecivic education activities within their countriesto inform their societies on the speciicbeneits of EU and Euro-Atlantic integration,and effectively counter hostile messages thatcome from Russia and other actors and aredirected at changing the internal balanceof opinion within these countries aimed at

discrediting democratic nations and liberaldemocratic institutions.

European Union

The EU can become an evenmore valued partner to NATO by issuinga declaration to the Warsaw Summit,committing the EU members to stronglysupport the strengthening of NATOs Easternlank without duplicating NATOs military

capability and command structure.

The EU should develop co-operationwith NATO in the areas of maritime security,supporting partners in training and capacitybuilding, security sector reform, jointexercises and hybrid threats and, as proposedin the Franco-Finnish declaration, establisha Centre of Excellence for countering hybridthreats. This should work closely with, butnot duplicate, the NATO Co-operative CyberDefence Centre of Excellence in Tallinn.The EU and NATO will mutually beneit it

they pool funds and expertise together in adramatic investment in security sector reform


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NATO, in co-operation with EasternPartnership countries, should develop jointprojects for involving civil society in work onsecurity-related issues (recommended optionwould be to set up a special NATO Security

Alert grant programme for civil societyorganisations).

NATO Eastern Flank members shouldshare their experience of building and trainingthe Self-Defence Territorial Military units(experience of the Baltic states and Poland).

The Eastern NATO partners shouldregularly provide their NATO partners withtheir (Ukrainian and Georgian) experience indealing with Russian hybrid war technologyand Russian threats.

It is important to show to Russia thatNATO and its Eastern Partners are determinedto co-operate and form a common response toaggressive behaviour.

the strategic dialogue around deterrencestrategy, and include them in operationalplanning platforms.

NATO co-operation with the Eastern

Partnership countries should include:assistance in military training, intelligencesupport, standardisation of defensiveweapons systems to improve co-ordinationand training, joint military drills on EaPcountries territories, assistance in projectsrelated to medical treatment of the wounded(ield hospitals), assistance in post-traumatreatment and drafting plans for dealing withIDPs.

NATO should help to stimulateregional military co-operation between NATO

members and Eastern Partnership countrieswith a special focus on security in the BlackSea basin.

NATO members should formmultinational military units, such as thePolish-Ukrainian- Lithuanian Brigade with itsheadquarters in Lublin on Polish territorynear the border with Ukraine.


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Documents

Seacurity Alert on EU Border