Searching for the Limits and Explanations of the Non-Selective Superiority Bias

Kathryn Bruchmann, University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa, USA

Jerry Suls, University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa, USA

Seon Lee, University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa, USA

Jason Rose, University of Toledo, Toledo, Ohio, USA

Zlatan Krizan, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa, USA

Paul Windschitl, University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa, USA

Keywords: non-selective superiority bias, comparative bias, focalism, positivity bias

Word count: 4699

CORRESPONDING AUTHOR:

Kathryn Bruchmann

University of Iowa

Department of Psychology

E-11 SSH

University of Iowa

Iowa City, Ia 52242

kathryn-bruchmann@uiowa.edu

AUTHOR BIOS:

Kathryn Bruchmann is a PhD student at the University of Iowa.

Jerry Suls is a professor and collegiate fellow at the University of Iowa.

Seon Lee received her master’s degree in 2010 from the University of Iowa.

Jason Rose is an assistant professor at the University of Toledo.

Zlatan Krizan is an assistant professor at Iowa State University.

Paul Windshitl is a professor at the University of Iowa.

DECLARATION OF CONFLICT OF INTEREST:

If no conflict declared: The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interests with respect

to the authorship and/or publication of this article.

FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE/FUNDING:

If no funding received: The author(s) received no financial support for the research and/or

authorship of this article.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS OR AUTHOR NOTES:

The authors wish to thank the members of the CHIP lab for their assistance in collecting

data used in these studies.

Searching for the Limits and Explanations of the Non-Selective Superiority Bias

Abstract:

Three experiments were conducted to test the robustness and explanations of the Non-Selective

Superiority Bias (NSSB), whereby any randomly selected item from a positive category is rated

more favorably when compared with a cohesive group of other exemplars from the same

category. Having participants rank-order all exemplars prior to making a direct comparative

rating did not reduce the NSSB (Exp. 1). Whether participants considered similarities or

differences between the randomly selected target and the other individual exemplars, the target

was rated more positively than the rest (Exp. 2). Finally, even comparing a randomly selected

exemplar with exemplars from different categories (“apples versus oranges”), the NSSB was still

obtained (Exp. 3). The generalizability of the bias and the implications of the current results for

the focalism, unique attributes and LOGE explanations of the NSSB are discussed.

Article text:

Everyone has probably heard someone else say, “I know what I like,” (also the title of a

hit rock and roll song) but research in social judgment, social cognition and decision-making

shows that preferences can change dramatically depending on how the options are presented and

preference is assessed (for examples, see Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002). A compelling

example is the Non-Selective Superiority Bias (Klar, 2002; Giladi & Klar, 2002). In a

representative demonstration, participants are instructed to generate five different exemplars

from a positive category, such as pleasant acquaintances. Then the name of one of the

acquaintances is randomly selected and rated for pleasantness compared to the rest, considered as

a whole. Typically, findings are that the acquaintance that was randomly selected is judged to be

more pleasant than the rest (see also Suls et al., 2010). A comparable bias is found for exemplars

of negative categories, such as irritating acquaintances: any randomly selected person is rated

more irritating than the others. As all exemplars have the same probability of being drawn, it is

logically impossible for the randomly selected target to always be better (or in the case of a

negative category, worse) than the rest; nonetheless, the target item is judged more extremely

than the other items. Giladi and Klar (2002) refer to this effect as the Non-Selective

Superiority/Inferiority Bias (NSS/IB) because the item randomly selected as the target is rated

more extremely than the rest (Giladi & Klar, 2002). Although the effect has been demonstrated

with positive and negative categories, the research reported in this paper focused on the positive

or superiority version of the bias.

The NSSB seems counterintuitive, which raises questions about its replicability,

generalizability and explanation although it has been obtained under seemingly stringent

conditions. Klar (1997) had students successively rate each member of their class compared to

the rest on traits such as intelligence, friendliness, or generosity. Everyone, in the group, in turn,

was rated as “above average.” The same effect was obtained even when participants rated

anonymous group members (Klar & Giladi, 1997). Obviously, all of the group members cannot

be “above average” but the ratings showed just that.

Krizan and Suls (2008) also replicated the NSSB even when it was pitted against the

tendency for people to rate themselves as superior to others on positive or high-skilled traits (i.e.,

Better Than Average Effect; Alicke, 1985; Kruger, 1999). Participants were instructed to

generate a list of pleasant persons and also to include their own name in the list. Then a name

was selected “at random” as the comparison target. Either the participant’s own name or the

name of another person from the list was the target. With the participant as target, the self was

judged to be the most pleasant─ consistent with the standard Better than Average (BTA) effect.

However, when the participant was included with the rest of the group, the target (someone else

from the list) was rated more positively than the group, contrary to the self-enhancing BTA

(Alicke, 1985).

One boundary condition for the NSSB was identified by Windschitl, Conybeare, and

Krizan (2008), who changed the timing of the introduction of the target item. In the standard

paradigm, participants are told which item is the target item after being exposed to the entire

group; Windschitl et al. (2008) showed that if the target item was indicated (by separating it or

highlighting) before the entire set of exemplars was introduced, the target item was consistently

rated to be less attractive than the referent group. These authors did not provide a full

explanation for the reversal, but did show that the target revealed late (in the conventional

paradigm) receives an advantage in terms of heightened attention or weight (see Houston,

Sherman & Baker, 1989).

There are many occasions in the real world, however, in which the timing is “right” for

the bias. For example, a manager making a hiring decision might arbitrarily pick one of the best

resumes to peruse, even though the others had already been reviewed. The current research

primarily was designed to test the robustness of the bias and search for boundary conditions

when the timing of the introduction of the target item is conducive to finding the effect.

As a secondary aim, we hoped the results might be informative about the reasons for the

bias. According to the Local Comparisons-General-Standards (LOGE) model (Giladi & Klar,

2002), the target receives more positive ratings because it is not compared to the restricted set of

other five pleasant people (comprising the local group), but to a hybrid standard, comprised of

the local group and the (lower) global standard associated with “acquaintances, in general.”

Because this combined standard, logically must be less positive (than the local group), the target

compares more favorably. In short, LOGE claims a global standard encroaches on the judgment

process and is responsible for the NSSB.

Another explanation, referred to as focalism (Chambers & Windschitl, 2004; Moore &

Kim, 2003), assumes that the target item is weighted more heavily in comparative ratings

because a focal item is given more attention and judgmental weight than the referent group.

Finally, the unique attributes hypothesis (UAH) suggests that the target item is not only weighted

more heavily, but, because of the salience associated with being the target, its unique attributes

define the standard with which the other items are compared (Chambers, 2010; Suls et al., 2010).

For example, if Las Vegas were compared to other travel destinations, it would be rated better

than the rest because of its superior entertainment (its unique attribute), but if Honolulu were the

target it would be rated as superior because of its excellent climate. It is worth noting that both

focalism and unique attributes should operate especially when the target of the comparative

judgment is revealed late (after all of the exemplars are known). This is because Windschitl et

al’s (2008) findings, described earlier, suggest late identification of the target commands more

weight and attention.

Three experiments are reported which involved variations in instructions or

manipulations to test the limits of the NSSB, as well as provide information bearing on the

explanations described above. The first experiment had participants generate a series of positive

exemplars and rank them for favorability before randomly selecting a target item to compare to

the referent group. We predicted that, after establishing a rank-ordering, raters should be

constrained from judging a randomly selected exemplar as better than the rest. The LOGE

model supports this prediction, as a global comparison should not come into play because local

comparisons (in the form of rank ordering) were overtly made. Focalism and UAH do not lend

themselves to explicit hypotheses about the prior effects of rank-ordering although one might

speculate that creating a preference hierarchy would discourage any bias favoring the exemplar

that was later randomly selected as the target item.

In Experiment 2, participants generated several positive exemplars and then were

instructed to adopt a similarity mindset or a difference mindset about the items. Our rationale

was that thinking about how the exemplars are similar to each other should counteract the

tendency to judge the randomly selected target more positively because shared features should

highlight the similarities among items, thereby “short-circuiting” unique attributes and focalism

effects. A difference mindset should produce the converse tendency because the differences

between the target and the others should be highly accessible. According to both the focalism

account and the UAH, a difference mindset might increase the bias by magnifying the “special”

status of the target item.

The third experiment modified the standard procedure in which all exemplars are drawn

from the same category (e.g., pleasant people). Instead, positive exemplars from several

different categories were generated. This procedural modification allowed us to inquire whether

a randomly selected “favorite” from one category (such as favorite musicians) would be judged

“the best” compared to favorites from different categories (such as travel destinations). If the

bias extends to different categories, this would require the LOGE model to posit an implausibly

diffuse global standard of “things.”

Experiment 1: Does Ranking Limit the Non-Selective Superiority Bias?

In some decision-making contexts, judges consider the features of each option and rank-

order them prior to making a final selection or evaluation. For judges who previously had rank-

ordered all of the options, the order should be evident when shortly after asked to rate a

randomly selected item from the list. In fact, conducting a prior ranking seems like a strong

strategy to “short-circuit” the nonselective superiority effect. If a person earlier had ranked an

item as fourth (out of six) on a list, they should not subsequently rate that item more positively

than the other items (including the item they ranked first)a prediction tested in this experiment.

Method

Participants and Design

Eighty-seven undergraduate students enrolled in an elementary psychology course earned

partial course credit for participating. Participants were randomly assigned to a two condition

(listing versus ranking) between-participant design.

Material and Procedures

Participants were recruited in groups of one to eight for a study of “judgments about food

preferences.” When participants arrived in the lab, each was given a packet of materials with

instructions to generate a list of six of their “favorite foods.” On a random basis, one-half of the

participants were instructed to list the six foods “in rank-order from most liked.” The remaining

participants were simply asked to list six favorite food items. Then, the experimenter randomly

selected a number and participants treated the item in the corresponding row as the target item in

the rating instructions. For example, if the experimenter drew a “4,” the subject was asked to

consider the food written in the 4th

row of his or her form as the target item.

Participants were instructed, “Compared to the other foods that you listed, how would you rate

the selected food? (-5 = dislike it much more than the other foods; 0 = like it as much as the other

foods; 5 = like it much more than the other foods). After the rating materials were collected, all

participants in the ranking condition were given a sheet of paper and given a “surprise recall

test,” to list from memory the rank order they had made earlier. Participants who had been in the

listing condition were asked just to list the items for a second time. This supplementary

information was collected to assess participants’ recall accuracy (less than five minutes after

generating the lists/ranks). Then participants were debriefed and thanked for their participation.

Results and Discussion

In the standard instructions condition, the randomly selected food was rated more

favorably than other foods in the favorites list (M = 1.2, S.D. =1.76, t (45) = 4.6, p <.001,

d=1.37)─replicating the NSSB. The bias also was exhibited for participants who had previously

rank-ordered their six favorite foods. That is, rank-ordering the food items did not eliminate or

even reduce the bias, M = 1.63 (1.5), t (40) = 7.2, p < .001, d=2.28. The mean ratings across

conditions did not differ, n.s.

One potential confounding factor might be that participants could not recall the rank-

orderings they made earlier; if they failed to remember their prior rank-ordering then it should

have had less effect on the preference ratings. In supplementary analyses, we compared each

participant’s initial rank ordering of foods with the rank ordering that was recalled at the

conclusion of the lab session. In the ranking conditions, ten participants (out of 41) incorrectly

recalled their rank-ordering, although no participants mis-remembered that the target item was

ranked first. In the listing condition, participants only generated the list of foods with no mention

of rank-ordering; only three participants forgot one or more items from their initial list.

As a further check, the ratings of those who forgot their initial rankings were excluded

from the analyses; but the nonselective superiority bias was still evident, M = 1.5 (1.4), t (30) =

6.52, p < .001, d=2.38. The bias was also significant for participants assigned to the mere listing

condition who recalled all the items, M = 1.3 (1.8), t (42) = 4.72, p < .001, d=1.46. With some

confidence, we can conclude that inclusion of participants who forgot their original rank-

ordering did not confound the basic results. Contrary to expectation, initially ranking of items did

not eliminate the NSSB.

One potential complication is that participants in the mere listing condition, while not

instructed to list the items in order from most preferred, may have done so anyway─ perhaps

because the most preferred exemplars were generated first. However, the reader should keep in

mind that the target item was randomly selected from one of six so even if some of the

participants initially (and implicitly) generated a rank-ordered list, across participants, every item

had an approximately equal probability of being selected as the target stimulus. In fact, the mean

ranking of the target items (in the rank-order conditions) was slightly (but non-significantly)

below the midpoint (M= 3.43, S.D.= 1.75) ruling out that the targets just happened to be

preferred a priori.

Experiment 2: Similarity Versus Dissimilarity Mindset

In the previous experiment, the a priori comparisons required to establish a preference

ranking did not eliminate the NSSB. The second experiment took a priori comparison a step

further by testing whether thinking about the similarities (vs. differences) among category

exemplars eliminates the superiority bias. According to Mussweiler’s (2003) selective

accessibility comparison model, when a similarity focus is adopted, the commonalities among

items become more cognitively accessible and assimilation (i.e., displacement of evaluation or

meaning) to the target should occur. If a dissimilarity mindset is adopted, however, the target’s

unique features should become more accessible so the target should be more readily contrasted

with the group, and rated more extremely. The UAH and focalism accounts should make the

same prediction about the effects of the difference mindset.

In this study, some participants were given instructions designed to instill a mindset that

should work in opposition to judging the randomly selected target more extremely (i.e.,

favorably) than the rest. Specifically, participants were asked to think about ways the exemplar

was similar to the others. In another condition, participants were instructed think about ways the

exemplar was different from the others, which, if anything, should increase the bias.

Study 2 had participants generate a list of healthy foods. By keeping the category the

same as Study 1’s, but changing the nature of the judgment to “healthiness”, we tested the

generalizability of the bias beyond “liking.”

Method

Participants and Design

One hundred sixteen undergraduate students enrolled in an elementary psychology course

at a large Midwestern university earned partial course credit for participating in small group

sessions in the laboratory. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three experimental

conditions (similarity; dissimilarity; control).

Material and Procedures

Participants were asked to list six healthy foods on a sheet of paper printed with six rows.

Then, the experimenter announced he/she would draw a random number from 1 to 6 from an

envelope in plain sight of the participants; the food in the corresponding numbered row was then

considered the target item. Participants were randomly assigned to write for ten minutes about

how the target food was similar or dissimilar to the rest of the foods they had listed on a blank

sheet of paper. The remaining third of participants (control condition) worked on an unrelated

writing task (i.e., describing their daily routines).

Then all participants rated the target food “in terms of how healthy/unhealthy it is in

comparison to the other food items [they] listed” (1= much less healthy than the other items on

the list; 4= just as healthy as the other items on the list; 7 = much more healthy than the other

items on the list). Then subjects were debriefed and dismissed.

Results and Discussion

Manipulation check. To ensure that participants followed the similarity/difference

mindset instructions, two independent coders rated all essays. For the control essays, raters

indicated whether participants followed instructions or not, and were in perfect agreement. Two

participants were removed from analysis for failing to follow instructions (i.e., they first began

writing about the target foods instead of their daily routines because of an experimenter error).

For the similarity and difference essays, coders separately counted the number of statements

indicating the target was similar to the other items, and the number indicating the target was

different from the others. Coder agreement for these counts was very high (r’s>.90). A

composite similarity ratio was created by averaging the ratings of the two coders and then

dividing the number of similarity statements in each essay by the total number of statements (i.e.,

sum of similarity and difference items). A t-test comparing the ratios shows that participants in

the similarity group provided more similarity (and less difference) statements (M=.92, S.D.=

0.17) than participants in the differences condition (M=0.01, S.D.= 0.05) (t (68)= 31.41, p<.001).

Thus, the mindset manipulations appear to have been effective.

Contrary to expectations based on selective accessibility (Mussweiler, 2003), or

predictions of the Unique Attributes Hypothesis, in the similarity condition the target food was

rated as healthier than the rest (M =4.51, S.D. =0.85, t (38) =3.75, p = .001, d=.1.23). In the

dissimilarity condition, the target was also rated significantly more healthy than the other foods

(M =4.30, S.D.=0.81, t (36) = 2.23, p <.051, d=.74). The control condition also demonstrated the

bias, M = 4.50, S.D.=0.92, t (37) = 3.34, p < .01, d=1.10. T-tests comparing the magnitude of

ratings across the three conditions were non-significant.

In sum, even participants who wrote about a randomly selected exemplar’s similarities to

other members of the same category exhibited the NSSB ─ the single exemplar tended to be

rated as a healthier food than the other healthy foods. The same bias was obtained when

participants wrote about how the single exemplar food was different from the other listed foods.

The fact that focusing on similarities between the exemplar and the other stimuli seemed to have

little effect on the superiority bias suggests that it is quite robust. Furthermore, thinking about the

target’s differences with the remaining items did not inflate the bias. In short, what judges

cognitively “did” with the items prior to making the comparison judgment did not affect the

comparative rating.

Experiment 3: “Comparing Apples to Oranges”

In the third study, we modified the conventional procedure, whereby judges compare one

randomly selected exemplar to a set of exemplars of the same positive category (Giladi & Klar,

2001). In light of the adage, “You can’t compare apples to oranges,” is the bias only obtained

when all items represent the same category? Or do judges rate a randomly selected favorite

movie more favorably than an array of several favorite things from diverse categories, such as

favorite foods, vacation spots and sports. Stated simply, does the NSSB occur even for the

diffuse and global reference group of “likeable things?”

Method

Participants and Design

Eighty-one undergraduate students enrolled in an elementary psychology course earned

partial course credit for participating. Each was randomly assigned to one of two between-

participants conditions (self-selected “free categories” or experiment imposed “diverse

categories” conditions).

Material and Procedures

Participants were recruited in groups of up to eight for a study of judgments about

“people, places and things.” Upon arrival at the lab, participants received a folder containing a

manila envelope, six slips of paper clipped together, and an instruction sheet. One-half of the

participants were randomly assigned to the “diverse categories” condition in which they were to

generate “one favorite” item from each of six different categories─ books, musical groups,

foods, different parts of the county, movies and sports. The rest were assigned to the “free

category” condition─ to generate a list of six different “favorite things,” with no categories

imposed. “They could generate the six items from the same category, a different category, or a

mixture of things from same or different categories.” The only constraint was the items should be

things they liked.

All participants were given five to ten minutes to write the six items on individual slips of

paper, to place all the slips in the envelope and shuffle them. Then, they were asked to draw one

slip (without looking) and place it on one side of the desk. The remaining items were placed on

the other side of the desk. (Side of desk was counterbalanced across participants.) Then

participants made a direct comparative judgment of the randomly drawn target versus the other

items: “How much do you like/dislike what is listed on the target slip compared to all others?” (-

4 = dislike much more than the rest; 0 = about the same as the others; 4 = like much more than

the rest).

People are likely to differ in their liking for general categories, which potentially may

influence judgments of the randomly selected target in the diverse category condition. To assess

this possibility, participants were asked to rate how much they liked each of the six general

categories─ musical groups, food, different parts of the country, movies, books, or sports on 7-

point Likert scales (1 = not at all to 7 = very much). Finally, participants were debriefed and

thanked for their participation.

Results and Discussion

Preliminary Analyses

To check whether participants assigned to the diverse category condition followed the

instructions, two coders independently counted the distribution of categories represented by the

exemplars generated by the participants. All of the participants assigned to the diverse category

condition generated exemplars from each of the six different categories. For the free condition,

two coders counted the number of items from different categories that were generated by each

participant. The counts of the coders were highly correlated, r = .76, p < .01. Most participants

(95.1%) generated items from at least 3 different categories.

In the diverse category condition, we tested whether variation in liking for the six

imposed categories might introduce a confound. Mean preference ratings ranged from 4.9 to 5.9

(S.D.’s ranging from 1.1 to 1.6); there was no differential favorability across categories.

Direct Comparisons

In the free categories condition, participants rated the target better than the referent group

(M=0.75, S.D. = 1.9, t (41) =2.7, p<.01, d=.84). In the diverse categories condition, participants

also rated the target to be above the average (M = 0.65, S.D. = 1.5, t (38) = 2.7, p <.01, d=.88).

Thus, regardless of whether the target exemplar and the referent group were exemplars from

different categories or a mix of exemplars from the same or different categories, the target was

rated as more favorably than the remainder. The participants’ randomly selected “favorite thing”

was judged more positively than the rest of their favorite things─ even if they were from

different categories. As noted in the Introduction, the idea of a general evaluative standard for

“things,” seems implausible and raises concerns about the encroachment of a global standard that

is integral to the LOGE model.

General Discussion

Regardless of whether all exemplars were initially ranked, similarities versus differences

between the target and the other exemplars were considered, or the target item was compared

with items from diverse categories, the NSSB was obtained. Although it is premature to dub the

NSSB as “invulnerable,” none of the intuitively plausible limiting factors proved to be its

“kryptonite.” The NSSB appears to be both a prevalent and robust phenomenon.

The precise mechanisms that underlie the NSSB and make it so robust still remain

unclear, however the results provide some insights. The LOGE model (Giladi & Klar, 2002)

posits the target is actually being compared to a more global group of items from the same

category. Positing the existence of a global standard as an explanation for Experiment 3’s results,

however, seems implausible. Participants compared a target to a group of items from different

categories, so the global standard would have to be comprised of “all manner of things”. This

seems far too diffuse to be a credible mechanism.

As mentioned earlier, focalism refers to the tendency to give more weight to information

in the foreground (or salient hypothesis) than to background information (or to alternative

hypotheses) (Chambers & Windschitl, 2004; Moore & Kim, 2003). The target item is more

salient so it gets more attention and more information is recruited about its positive features than

for the referent so the target is favored in the direct comparison judgment. This explanation could

account for results found in Experiments 1 and 3, but it seems odd that prior recruitment of

similarities (differences) between the target and the other items in Experiment 2 did not reduce

(increase) the advantage conferred by focalism. It would appear that that subjects treat the prior

comparison-making (of ranking or similarity/difference finding) and the direct comparison

judgment rating as distinct judgment tasks. Since the target is the focal item in the main direct

comparison, it receives the judgmental advantages.

The UAH (Chambers, 2010) also seems to predict that prior similarity-finding would

decrease while difference-finding would augment the NSSB by altering cognitive recruitment of

the target’s unique standard. We observed, however, that although similarities and differences

were found per the experimental instructions, this had no effects on the NSSB. Again, our

favored explanation is that the prior cognitive comparisons do not “carry-over” so the target’s

salience still can evoke a unique standard of comparison for the direct comparison judgment.

We initially thought that ranking or finding similarities/differences would make

information accessible that would carry-over much the way priming procedures carry-over to the

interpretation of subsequent stimuli (e.g., Higgins, 1996). However, priming effects are weaker

or are eliminated when the perceiver is aware of the interpretive bias and corrects for it (Bargh,

1989; Martin, 1980). The ranking and mindset instructions were very explicit and reminiscent of

manipulations that inhibit priming effects. Ironically, the explicit nature of the prior comparisons

may have blocked effects of any information made accessible has on the final decision.

The other potential contributing factor is that it was not completely known to participants

that the target item was going to be directly compared to the rest of the items until the dependent

measure was administered. In Experiment 1, the target was not randomly selected until after the

ranking of all exemplars. In Experiment 2, the target was selected prior to the

similarities/differences mindset instructions, but participants did not know before receipt of the

dependent variable that the target was to be the focal element of the direct comparison. In accord

with Windschitl et al.’s (2008) results, the target should receive more attention and weight

because it was most recently identified as the “target.” This differential salience should aid and

abet focalism and UAH, which should facilitate recruitment of more information supporting the

target’s superiority to the rest.

We lack a complete resolution about mechanisms, but the practical implications of the

results are clearprior cognitive comparisons do not block the NSSBand we do not yet have a

de-biasing strategy. Highlighting the target prior to the other exemplars, as Windschitl et al. did,

might be effective, but in many everyday decision-making contexts, prior exposure is logistically

impossible or unfeasible. The NSSB appears to be a very robust and resilient effect with

consequences for decision making and preference in employment, political, economic and social

policy contexts and may have downstream behavioral implications. The fact that we were unable

to create conditions to de-bias the NSSB represents both an intellectual and practical challenge.

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