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Security Basic Concepts
| 2016 ARM Symposia3
Security must be sized relatively to the environment
where the device is running and its accessibility to the hacker
Security Basic Concepts
@ System Level
Software attacks: protocols,
weak implementation of
cryptography, weak passwords,
malware, viruses, Trojan
horses, …
@Board (Device) Level
Software attacks + non
invasive HW attacks
through Debug Port,
Memory Access, Power
Analysis, …
@ Chip Level
Software Attacks +
Physical Invasive HW
attacks: Laser, FIB,
Reverse Engineering,
Probing, …
Cost of the attack
Device Accessibility
| 2016 ARM Symposia4
Security implementations Must be sized relatively to the consequence of a hack,
Not to the value of the device.
The hacker will put in perspective: The “value” of the hack:
- E.g. money, fun, technical challenge, terrorism…
The “cost” versus the “risk” of the attack:
- Time spent to perform the attack,
- Expertise required to perform the attack,
- Level of collusion (level of information of the system),
- Cost of equipment needed to perform the attack (the economical barrier),
- Access to the system (physical access, protected by firewall…),
- Legal penalty if caught (fine, prison…),
Example: the Smart Meter gateway: Bill of Material: <$20,
Consequence of an attack: black-out in neighborhood: $Millions.
Cost of implementation of Security
?
| 2016 ARM Symposia5
Security for TV/STB/OTT/
| 2016 ARM Symposia6
HD Content Protection
Television, Monitor, Projector
Internet
Digital Rights Management
Laptop
PC
Notebook
Tablet
Smart Phone
Set-Top Box/ OTT
• Wired / Wireless Conn.
• HDMI/DisplayPort/Miracast/DLNA
• IP-Based
• Higher-level Content Protection
•HDCP2.0/2.1/2.2
• DTCP–IP
Assets
Rich Content
(U)HD Content
Protection
| 2016 ARM Symposia7
Security for Banking Application
| 2016 ARM Symposia8|
蠶食鯨吞 ---第三方支付深入你的食衣住行3rd party payment penetrate in deep in daily life and erode traditional banking business.
| 2016 ARM Symposia9|
傳統金控面對來勢洶洶的第三方支付大舉壓境之時 ( Facing the
upcoming competition from 3rd party payment among the traditional
banking industry : )
發展行動支付勢在必行 ( Developing mobile payment is a must )
過去以個人電腦為服務拓展核心 ( Transition from PC centric )
現在以無所不在的移動平台App為服務發展觸角 ( into app based
mobile platform everywhere )
客戶隱私保護與數據傳輸安全的保障為廣泛採用之最後一哩路 (
account confidential and privacy data protection and ensuring the
secure data transmission become the last mile before such mobile
service is persuasively adopted )
Now or never 刻不容緩
| 2016 ARM Symposia10|
Bad app is everywhere…( 250 apps
were withdrawn from apple App
store….)
Are you sure that your ID/PW are secure when it is
in use or at rest? ( Hollywood Stars’ Photo/Video
exposure…)
| 2016 ARM Symposia11
Every software application is vulnerable to binary hacking
Networks are transparent
Intended operation is easily subverted
Security systems are undermined
License checks are removed
Apps are repurposed as attack vectors
Keygens are created
HostIDs and clocks are spoofed
Clients and servers are compromised and cloned
Embedded software is stolen
CE IP is subverted
Unprotected Software is Easily Hacked
| 2016 ARM Symposia12|
既然無法兼善天下(OS) ( Since there is no way for you to enforce the enhancement of security
from OS side….)
但求獨善其身(APP) ( the alternative way is to ensure your developed App can be tampered
resistant via: )
受入侵時提供警示 ( auto alert while there is attempt of tampering )
讓入侵者不得其門而入 ( make the door to secret invisible )
保護證書密鑰用於無形 ( protect the certificated and secret key from being probed and replaced
and use it in a invisible way )
Wrapper/Sandbox cannot protect the app from being tampered during runtime.
安全的道路上你需要專家的協助 ( you need expert’s
assistance on road of security )
| 2016 ARM Symposia13|
WhiteBox Technology白箱技術
Cryptographic
Algorithm Input: ABC
Key: 1234
Output: XYZ
WhiteBoxInput: ABC Output: XYZ
Before
After
| 2016 ARM Symposia14
Security for Communication
| 2016 ARM Symposia15
Security Challenges in the NetworkSolution: Strong encryption, authentication, and platform integrity
2-WayCommunication
2-WayCommunication
Server
Data Management
Take control of the Device
or Application
Insert Non-Authorized Devices
Man in The Middle: (Are we talking to the expected endpoint?)• Spy the line
• Hijack network
• Replay
• Broadcast private information
Take Control of the
Routers/Servers
Gateways /
Router
Rogue or
Personal
Devices
| 2016 ARM Symposia16
Mass adoption of standards based security protocols SSL/TLS (Device/Server), IPsec (Client/Server), MACsec (Device)
Wireless – Zigbee, WPA, CAPWAP, LTE/3G Baseband,
Platform – Data Storage, Asset Protection
Data plane performance continues to increase: Today: Stalled at 10Gbps due to protocol and implementation limitations
L2: MACsec, beyond 100Gbps, multiport 40G, line speeds
L3: IPsec, 40Gbps and higher,
L4: SSL/TLS/DTLS, 40Gbps and higher
Control plane secure tunnel establishment & key management: Key refresh and tunnel setup rates matching 40Gbps and beyond
Efficient , area optimized Public Key Accelerators & True Random Number Generators needed
Platform (intrinsic) security At a minimum: Secure Boot and Secure Debug
Better: Trusted Execution Environment, Trust Anchor, Key Vault
Security Requirements for Connected SystemsFrom Core to Cloud
| 2016 ARM Symposia17
Comparison: MACsec to IPSec to
SSL
MACsec IPSec SSL/TLS
Description Layer 2 security
Hop-by-hop
Peer-to-peer protocol
Layer 3 ”network layer”
security
End-to-End ”tunnels”
Peer-to-peer Protocol
”Secure Sockets” ie
application layer
encryption;
Client-server model
Complexity
Deployment
Relatively simple to
implement
Phased deployment
possible
Complex protocol suite,
many options
Key management and
distribution with another
(complex) protocol (IKE)
Security to be built-in
to the application
Tunnel use with
limitations
Phased deployment
difficult
Performance Designed for very high
speeds (> 40 Gbps)
Assumes HW crypto in
most cases
Ranges from low to high
(Embedded Clients to
Telco Switches)
HW crypto use prevalent
Assumes medium to
low performance
HW assist possible at
server end
| 2016 ARM Symposia18
Security Protocols: Which security protocol will each application use?
- Examples: IPsec (gateway/gateway), SSL/TLS (client/server), DTLS (client/server) for SSL VPNs,
VoIP, and CAPWAP for Wireless AP Provisioning, MACsec (Ethernet)
Performance: What is the network bandwidth of the device? Do you require line rate security performance?
CPU Utilization: How compute intensive is the protocol implementation?
- What is your power budget? (Battery, AC powered?)
- How many CPU cycles are available for security?
(Is this a forwarding device or is data initiated/terminated by apps on the local CPUs)
Application Concurrency Will multiple applications in the system all require security services?
Is there a requirement to isolate crypto keys & operations from other applications running in the system?
Is there a trusted execution environment present such as ARM TrustZone?
The solution to all these questions is a dedicated HW resource to accelerate all crypto functions
System considerations when selecting a security architecture
| 2016 ARM Symposia19
System tradeoffs for each architecture
HW Crypto
Accelerator
Security Data plane
Stacks
Packet EngineSecurity Data plane
Stacks
Security Data plane
Stacks
Security Control plane
Security Control plane
Security Control plane
Packet Engine & Classifier
Security Data plane
Stacks (incl SW crypto)
Security Control plane#1 & #2
SW only Security
Protocol
SW complexity
PerformanceHost utilization
low high
Power dissipation
SW complexity
PerformanceHost utilization
low high
Power dissipation
SW complexity
PerformanceHost utilization
low high
Power dissipation
SW complexity
PerformanceHost utilization
low high
Power dissipation
#4 Using a HW
Crypto Packet
Engine
#3 Using HW
AES & HASH
cores
#5 HW Security
Packet Engine /w
classifier
Mo
re E
ne
rgy &
Pe
rform
an
ce E
fficie
nc
yMost Efficient and Scalable
Architecture
| 2016 ARM Symposia20
Security Acceleration is not efficient by only accelerating the actual cryptographic tasks.
Crypto acceleration only has effect for large packets.
IPsec Security and Crypto ProcessingWhere to Optimize and Accelerate?
IPsec tasks
on host
Crypto tasks
in SW or in HW
Application
flow id
calculation
send data
SA
lookup
packet
trans-
formation
content encryption
packet
routing
init and
call
crypto HW
hash
init and
call
crypto HW
wait
do other tasks do other tasks
interrupt interrupt
Processing time depends on packet size
Processing time independent on packet size,
fixed per packet, large overhead for small packets
In
cre
asin
g T
hro
ug
hp
ut
Increasing Packet Size
Throughput dominated by packet
processing overhead
Throughput dominated by data
bandwidth limits
A
B
c
| 2016 ARM Symposia21
HTTP file download over an IPsec VPN tunnel
Example: 500MB binary file download
1400-byte IP packets using TCP via HTTP at 60Mbps
The packet engine significantly reduces power consumption.
INSIDE’s EIP-197 Packet EnginePower Example Explained
The Packet Engine is 10x greater in energy efficiency for the
same operation when compared to software only
File download @60Mbps No Security SW SecurityARMv8
HW Security w/EIP-197
CPU Type (big or little) Little Big Little
CPU Frequency 300MHz 1600MHz 600MHz
CPU Load 10% 75% 50%
CPU Power 30mW 1200mW 110mW
| 2016 ARM Symposia22
Efficient Driver Development Kits on EIP-197
Seamless Integration with INSIDE’s QuickSec & Matrix SW stacks
Open Source Stacks (which still lack efficient use of HW resources)
Support ARMv7 & ARMv8
INSIDE Secure Offers: QuickSec MACsec Toolkit
QuickSec IPsec Toolkit
MatrixSSL SSL/TLS/DTLS Toolkit
Demonstrated real life 40Gbps performance on customer silicon with INSIDE Secure packet engines
Alternative Protocols for Deployment Flexibility LTE/3G/2G crypto as an option: KASUMI f8-9/SNOW 3G/ZUC
Storage crypto support as an option: XTS-AES
DTLS CAPWAP for managing large WiFi deployments
Protocol processing Software toolkitsRequired in addition to the Hardware Implementation
| 2016 ARM Symposia23
Manufacturers are liable when hacks succeed
Power efficiency lowers cost & increases MTBF
High speed network systems continue to drive best profits
Why choose inside secure
INSIDE Secure has a complete suite of HW-IP for all your design points, with the available protocol
source code for a complete system implementation
Protocols
Performance
Power
Risk
SSL/TLS, DTLS, IPSec, MacSec,
VPN’s, HDCP, DTCP
Hardware acceleration enables the
fastest systems
Hardware acceleration decreases
power
Effective security keeps your
company out of the news
Security already pervasive and required
Secure Communication for
Data Center Chip
| 2016 ARM Symposia25|
Network security threats expand daily
Consultants, contractors and even guests have network access.
Unmanaged devices come into the workplace, attaching to networks.
Many people have ability to access secured networks, that are internally handling traffic from many authorities
within the network.
Threats Include:
MAC address spoofing used to gain unauthorized access to a network or to services from an ISP or to mask
identity during illegal activity.
Passive monitoring or ‘eavesdropping’ from Ethernet line or other transport networks, to obtain sensitive
information such as passwords or proprietary company data.
Man-in-the-Middle attack where an attacker operates between a client and server, to either intercept sensitive
data or to modify that data as it is being transmitted.
Ethernet Security Threats
| 2016 ARM Symposia26|
Secure Ethernet communications are essential
Government agencies around the world have set demanding certification standards for encrypting sensitive transmitted data.
Commercial organizations adopt encryption as the optimal approach to protecting sensitive data transmitted across their Wide and Metropolitan Area Networks that interconnect their different sites.
Achieved with encrypting and integrity protecting end-to-end data traffic
Based on cryptographic keys, algorithms and management policies
Further Security Requirements
High-performance – ideally at maximum capacity of the network.
Low and predictable latency for all deployments
‘IT friendly’
- Scalable
- Runs across multiple devices
- Works seamlessly with other types of network protection devices, such Intrusion Detection/Prevention Systems via deep packet inspection.
Market requirements for Security
| 2016 ARM Symposia27
Using IPsec or SSL/TLS is not scalable to Secure the LAN
End-to-End security example:
Securing all data between
user PC’s and network
servers/printers using IPSec
Configuration complexity:
With:- X clients and,
- Y servers,
- X*Y tunnels to manage.
In this example:- 20 tunnels so,
- 40 session keys.
Server load
Each server has to encrypt and decrypt data for X tunnels: not scalable!
| 2016 ARM Symposia28
MACsec Deployment Scenario:Hop-by-Hop
MACsec requires 1 Connection Association
per collision domain:
In this example
7 CA’s.
Number of active keys in a CA equals
the number of CA participants:
So in total
18 keys here.
Computational load distributed
over switches / routers:
Scalable
Different from 802.1X:
MACsec allows multiple authenticated and secured clients per port
hub MACsec capable
switch or router
MACsec Enabled
| 2016 ARM Symposia29|
Today, networks are secured mostly with end-to-end VPN (Virtual Private Network):
Layer 3 protocol (IPsec).
Application layer protocols (SSL/TLS).
Due to complexity and place in the network stack these are typically running on application processors
Acceptable for relatively slow Client connection (e.g. accessing Bank or Emails).
Too slow and too expensive for network infrastructure.
Hardware acceleration is costly and complex
Industry is moving towards integrating security into the Network equipment.
Maximize efficiency by implementing protection in hardware.
Throughput scaling along with evolution of the Network equipment.
The MACsec security standard (IEEE 802.1AE and IEEE 802.1X) was designed specifically to provide port based security across Local Area Networks (LANs).
What is MACsec and why is should be used
| 2016 ARM Symposia30|
The MACsec security standard was specifically designed to secure ‘hop-by-hop’ network connections requiring every port at the end of an Ethernet segment to be MACseccompliant.
To provide end-to-end WAN security, many vendors adopted MACsec to be used across the following use case:
Core networks
Provider Edge network
Virtual LAN Connections between Campus and Branches
Data center interconnects
This brought the following requirements to MACsec implementation:
Suitable for integration into the network port. Typically MACsec is placed into the Ethernet or Optical Transport Network PHY
- This allows adding MACsec by upgrading line cards and not changing other parts of the complex equipment.
Throughputs from 10Mbit to 500Gbit
- Low-speed PHYs (up to 10Gbit)
- High-speed Ethernet (10Gbit to 100G bit)
- Multi-mode Ethernet and OTN (10 Gbit to 500 Gbit)
Ability to leave some parts of the packet unprotected to be accessed and modified by the network nodes.
Featured frame classification to support multiple virtual MACsec ports at the same physical port.
MACsec adoption and market requirements
| 2016 ARM Symposia31|
Low latency
Scalable
Many different deployments
High speeds
Mixing various interface speed grades
Line rate processing for all type of packets and all packet sizes
Fixed latency/timing
Evolvement to FlexE
All these items are addressed with INSIDE Secure’s MACsec IP products
INSIDE Secure’s products can be embedded behind the MAC interface. Without applying the security function it is
fully transparent.
General requirements/properties of L2 networks
| 2016 ARM Symposia32|
Example: MACsec in Data Center Interconnects
MACsec enabled router
| 2016 ARM Symposia33|
Example: MACsec through access provider’s
network
| 2016 ARM Symposia34
MACsec in Typical Router/Switch
design
The MAC is the ‘natural’ place for MACsec.
But there are benefits to implement MACsec in PHY (e.g. Vitesse)
Switch ASICControl Processor
up
link
PHY
PHY
PHY
PHY
XAUI, or PCIe,
hypertransport,
...
XA
UI
GM
II, RG
MII
10G PHY module
(XENPAK, SFP+)
1Gbp PHY module
(SFP)
MA
C
MACsec data
plane (802.1ae)
MACsec control
plane (802.1X-REV)
MAC
MACsec data
plane (802.1ae)
| 2016 ARM Symposia35
Why MACsec in the PHY?
• The Ethernet MAC is often located inside the switch ASIC, with the
PHY parts as separate components or pluggable modules
• Thus, putting MACsec in a router requires replacement of the switch
ASIC
– Switch ASICS only upgraded for significant new functionality – thus
new pinout and new board design
– Customer will have to replace his complete router/Line Card
• Adding MACsec capability to a pluggable module allows an easy
upgrade option
– Router/switch manufacturers can reuse board design if MACsec
capable PHY chips are drop-in replacements
– Customer only replaces modules
| 2016 ARM Symposia36|
IoT
MONETIZING THE INTERNET OF THINGS WITH
INSIDE SECURE
For more information, please feel free to contact InsideSecurevia [email protected]