Security Requirements in Security Requirements in Service Oriented Architectures Service Oriented Architectures

for Ubiquitous Computing for Ubiquitous Computing

Almerindo Graziano, Domenico Cotroneo, Stefano RussoAlmerindo Graziano, Domenico Cotroneo, Stefano Russoagrazian@unina.itagrazian@unina.it

MobiLab Research GroupMobiLab Research GroupUniversità degli studi di Napoli “Federico II”Università degli studi di Napoli “Federico II”

OutlineOutline

MotivationMotivationAddressing Ubiquitous SecurityAddressing Ubiquitous SecurityThe Story So FarThe Story So FarSecurity RequirementsSecurity RequirementsEvaluationEvaluationConclusions Conclusions

Service Oriented ArchitecturesService Oriented Architectures

Established computing paradigmEstablished computing paradigm A SOA is based uponA SOA is based upon

Service definitionService definition Service Discovery and DeliveryService Discovery and Delivery

SOAs have evolved from the Internet modelSOAs have evolved from the Internet model Different service definitionsDifferent service definitions Different discovery/delivery protocolsDifferent discovery/delivery protocols

ProblemsProblems Interoperability and standardizationInteroperability and standardization SecuritySecurity

Addressing Ubiquitous SecurityAddressing Ubiquitous Security

Wireless securityWireless securityWidely addressedWidely addressed

Security of SOAs in ubiquitous computingSecurity of SOAs in ubiquitous computingNot widely addressed (often just an Not widely addressed (often just an

afterthought)afterthought)Not addressed consistentlyNot addressed consistentlyNo security requirements analysisNo security requirements analysisStronger Interoperability problemsStronger Interoperability problems

The Story So FarThe Story So Far

Standard ProtocolsStandard Protocols BluetoothBluetooth JiniJini SalutationSalutation UPnPUPnP SLPSLP JXTAJXTA

Integrated ArchitecturesIntegrated Architectures SSDSSSDS CentaurusCentaurus Proxy-based protocolsProxy-based protocols

Ongoing researchOngoing research SplendorSplendor

Security RequirementsSecurity Requirements

Secure service Secure service registration/deregistrationregistration/deregistration Example: DoS attacksExample: DoS attacks

Secure Discovery Secure Discovery (service records)(service records) AuthenticatedAuthenticated AuthorizedAuthorized ConfidentialConfidential GenuineGenuine AnonymousAnonymous

Secure DeliverySecure Delivery AuthenticatedAuthenticated AuthorizedAuthorized ConfidentialConfidential GenuineGenuine AnonymousAnonymous

Application SecurityApplication Security AvailabilityAvailability

Evaluation ResultsEvaluation Results

EvaluationEvaluation

Genuine discovery and Genuine discovery and delivery are underestimateddelivery are underestimated Achieved partially or not at allAchieved partially or not at all

Service (de)registration is Service (de)registration is assumed trusted assumed trusted

No architecture addresses No architecture addresses security in service definitionsecurity in service definition

Application security often out Application security often out of scopeof scope

Different access control Different access control modelsmodels ACLs or CapabilitiesACLs or Capabilities

Different granularityDifferent granularity User or DevicesUser or Devices

Location of the PDPLocation of the PDP Local by the device or remote Local by the device or remote

by a resource managerby a resource manager

Different trust modelsDifferent trust models

ConclusionsConclusions

Not possible to address all security requirementsNot possible to address all security requirements Total security does not existTotal security does not exist Limited resourcesLimited resources

Need to use threat models (mobile adversary and mobile Need to use threat models (mobile adversary and mobile victims)victims)

Security requirements driven by use casesSecurity requirements driven by use cases Abuse cases can help model the threatsAbuse cases can help model the threats

Use risk assessment to rationalize security issuesUse risk assessment to rationalize security issues Secure interoperability still a challengeSecure interoperability still a challenge

Trust models, access control, authorization managementTrust models, access control, authorization management

Ongoing WorkOngoing Work

Complete evaluation work to includeComplete evaluation work to includeAccess control models, trust models, Access control models, trust models,

authorization managementauthorization managementDesign of a Secure SOA for Nomadic Design of a Secure SOA for Nomadic

ComputingComputingUse/Misuse cases for threat analysisUse/Misuse cases for threat analysisThreat modelling and design with UMLsecThreat modelling and design with UMLsecValidation with UMLsecValidation with UMLsec

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