Security, Transparency and Human Rights

Ernesto Villanueva

Full professor Legal Research Institute National Autonomous University

of Mexico

Founder Director. Legal Research Institute. University of the Americas-

Puebla

Institutional systems of justice and public safety at various levels of government

have taken significant importance in Mexico. It is understandable if we assume

that the guarantee of peaceful and harmonious coexistence of the governed is

an assumption of the existence of the rule of law. Reason for which, both legal

institutions claim attention, need of monitoring and social control by the

competent authorities of the expressions of organized society and the academic

community. In that same way, we can say that in Mexico, transparency and

accountability has acquired a certificate of naturalization, at least in its

normative expression. This are legal tools of the governed against the authority

as essential ingredients in the fight against corruption, strengthening the

effectiveness of human rights and the consolidation of the sociological and

normative figure of the citizens. This study is a starting point to discuss

transparency and accountability as tools to combat corruption and promote an

effective human rights system of justice and public security in Mexico, in order

to identify strengths and weaknesses of these institutions and to provide

mechanisms for evaluating, monitoring and social control of them. The key

challenge lies in the corruption and impunity that have become endemic

practices in the country. There is no single definition of the concept of

corruption. It has different meanings in different societies as Susan Rose-

Ackerman said1. In any case, corruption is a symptom that something is wrong

with in the state2. In fact, for starters there is a case of corruption when the law

has been violated. But it is possible to update the corruption hypothesis conduct

which does not infringe the law, but it hurts the rational perception of what is

right or wrong. As it is known, a behavior may be legal, but immoral. Throughout

1 Corruption and Goverment. Causes, consequences and reform. Cambridge University Press. P. 5.

2 Ibid, P. 9

the world there are phenomena of corruption, but in this country they play a part

of everyday life. It is sufficient to recall just how Hugo Concha, Héctor Fix-

Fierro, Julia Flores and Diego Valadés interpreted the results from the National

Survey of Legal Culture. "The negative situation that prevails in matters of law

enforcement and the establishment and operation of institutions, not only I s

disturbing but can make one speculate as to the existence of a culture of

lawlessness and the strength of informal institutions over the formal. In other

words, the predominance of politics over what is legal in Mexico not only

perverted the operation of the institutions component of the rule of law, but also

generated a counter culture of respect law enforcement. The maxim of “law

enforcement” was replaced by a common idea that “the most skilled, is who

mocks the law better”3. And in that same direction, the problem is compounded

by the existence of impunity. The Dictionary of the Royal Academy of Spanish

Language defines impunity as "the lack of punishment.” The breach of the law

has no consequence for the perpetrator of a lawful conduct. Or in terms of the

Inter-American Human Rights Court impunity is "the total lack of investigation,

arrest, prosecution and conviction of those responsible for human rights

violations"4 In the most basic concern that is the commission of crime, a study

of CIDAC estimates a figure of 98.76% in the indicators of impunity in Mexico5.

Within the public power, corruption and impunity are not in any way beyond the

usual practices. Former Federal Superior Auditor, Arturo Gonzalez de Aragon

noted that "few politicians are now acting with a view to future effects

statesmen. For the sake of governance is often passed on in favor of the control

of conflict, allowing in its name while justifying it and accepting what is obviously

and in a system of law punishable, unacceptable and inexcusable”6.

Even worse. National security services are not registered as an intelligence tool

to make Mexico a viable rule of law. In some areas there have been positive

efforts as the creation of the National Security Bicameral Congress created by

3 Cultura de la Constitución en México. Una Encuesta Nacional de actitudes, percepciones y valores.

México. Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas de la UNAM. P. 21 4 Caso de la “Panel Blanca” (Paniagua Morales y otros). Sentencia de 8 de marzo de 1998. Serie C No.

37. párr. 173 5 Guillermo Zepeda Lecuona. “Índice de incidencia delictiva y violencia”. CIDAD. Agosto del 2008

6 www.asf.gob.mx/pags/AASF/Reflexiones/26Reflexion.pdf

the applicable law. It´s limited powers and the expressed lacks of belief in the

law, legislators are not reliable etc; make regulation of national security only a

dream. It is known that the states even have their own 'intelligence' services,

though its operation would be contrary to law or, in the best case, have gaps or

loopholes to better regulate these activities. The truth is that people do not

perceive the benefits to be expressed in the basic duty of government: ensuring

public safety, ensure that there can be the peaceful coexistence of the

governed. Needless to say that drug cartels or organized crime of any kind are

not the responsible for the insecurity, but solely the government that has

breached its legal obligations. Naturally, cartels or who are part of organized

crime have no constitutional duty to protect the welfare of the governed, given

that its activities are conducted outside the law. If they have carried out criminal

activities it has been because the state is unable to enforce the law. In a context

of social explosions like the one happening today its inexplicable factual

liberalization of services monitoring, surveillance and monitoring, if anything,

should be reserved only to the responsible authorities for defined and limited

purposes. It is clear that formally the right not to be disturbed is a fundamental

prerogative, under the Constitution, but not fulfilled or done in a minimal way.

Much less those authorities of any level distract resources to gain personal

political advantages. The peoples should not be hostage to the government or

any political power that exists. We have already lost our families public spaces.

The state not only fails to do its homework, now it also exposes its weaknesses

in public.

In this context, the proposed measures to temper this and make the validity and

effectiveness of the standard run, as far as possible, in the same direction call

for proposals of substance. It is not enough just to propose a legislative initiative

under the usual standards that will probably be death letter, or at least a very

questionable effectiveness. Mexico has developed antibodies to put the general

interest over personal gain. The culture of negotiation of the law and no action

without adjectives is still a good wish. Security sector and law enforcement

often provide higher levels of opacity on the grounds that it is necessary to

enable them to fulfill their missions. This new budget in Mexico is not new in

democratic societies. For Schroeder, "the field of good governance of the

security concerns of democratic forms of accountability and transparent

processes of decision making7.”While it is true that the categories of "public

safety" and "national security” are part of the list of exceptions in the laws on

access to public information, it is also true that not everything should be

classified as secret or confidential information. It should be noted that the

Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of OECD security defined as "a

universal condition in which individuals and communities live in freedom, peace

and security, fully participate in the governance of their countries enjoy the

protection of fundamental rights, access to resources and basic needs to live

and live in an environment that is not harmful to their health and welfare8.” In

this same manner, the Human Rights Commission has noted:

Security has always been one of the main functions of the states. Undoubtedly,

the evolution of authoritarian states toward democratic states has evolved the

concept of security also. The concept of security that was handled previously

concerned only to ensure order as an expression of power and supremacy of

state power. Today, democratic states promote police models consistent with

the participation of the inhabitants, with the understanding that the protection of

citizens by law enforcement officials must be given within a framework of

respect for the institution, the laws and fundamental rights. Thus, from the

perspective of human rights when it comes to security today it cannot be limited

to just fighting crime, for we are talking about how to create an enabling

environment and appropriate for the peaceful coexistence of people. Therefore,

the concept of security should put more emphasis on the development of the

work of prevention and control of the factors that generate violence and

insecurity, rather than merely repressive or reactive tasks with acts already

consummated9.

It is for these reasons that the principle of "all or nothing" has been overcome in

this area. On the one hand it is prudent to quote three principles to be observed

7 Measuring Security Sector Governance –A Guide to Relevant Indicators p.23

8 Ibid. P. 8.

9 Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos. Informe sobre Seguridad Ciudadana y Derechos

Humanos. Washington. 2009 p.6

when classifying information as confidential. These are early evidence of harm,

the principle of maximum disclosure and the principle of public interest. The

principle of evidence of harm guarantees the principle of maximum publicity at

the time when the authority to classify certain information as restricted basis

and justification based on the principle of evidence of harm in three parts, which

are valued at the following three elements: 1)The information is provided in one

of the exceptions provided in the statute itself, 2) The release of information

may actually threaten the public interest protected by law and 3) the damage

that can occur with the release of information is greater than the public interest

to know the relevant information10. The principle of maximum disclosure in

Mexico is found in the second paragraph of Article 6 of the Constitution of the

United Mexican States, which prescribes verbatim the principle of maximum

disclosure as follows:

"To exercise the right of access to information, the Federation, States and the

Federal District, within their respective powers, shall be governed by the

following principles and guidelines:

I. All information held by any authority, entity, agency and federal, state and

municipal, shall be public and will only be temporarily reserved for public

interest in the terms established by law. The interpretation of this right must

prevail the principle of maximum disclosure. "

This principle is exercised in two ways: By examining the information that the

authorities are obliged to publish its own motion and a request for access to

information. The rule of law should provide that obstruction and destruction of

public records without cause are behaviors that are crimes; they should also

establish minimum standards for conservation, protection and security. For the

third, the law should not require the petitioner's to motivate its interest as a

procedural criterion of admissibility of the application: The social control, interest

10

ARTICLE 19, The Public's Right to Know Principles on Freedom of Information Legislation , June 1999

in the management of public affairs or any other reason deemed sufficient, it is

reason enough and sufficient11.

The limit of the principle of maximum disclosure takes place when the authority

proves that the content of the application is under a regime of exceptions

provided in the law itself.

The principle of maximum disclosure is the instrument to give effect to the

fundamental right of access to public information but for this principle to be truly

effective, the authority must carry out four activities:

A) Automatically publish relevant information;

B) Maintain public records;

C) Do not impede access, and;

D) Not require to justify its request.

This maxim implies that every subject must make available to any person any

information in his possession. But you cannot unilaterally determine the precise

wording or the elements of this indicator, that ground must be established

clearly and accurately.

Here are some examples. On the one hand, in October 1995 a group of experts

in international law, national security and human rights developed an

international model called Johannesburg Principles on National Security,

Freedom of Expression and Access to Information that has been observed by

increasing emerging democracies when introduced into the legal system rules

on access to information and national security. The same is true of the

principles developed by the Center for National Security Studies based in

Washington.

Both documents are interesting because they both provide worthy consideration

of legislative drafting guidelines, at the moment of drafting a bill in matter of

exceptions as some bases to be considered when translated into a legal 11

Consejo de Europa, Recomendación Rec(2002)2)

standard the idea of national security. For example, Principle 1.1 of the

Johannesburg Principles states that any restriction on information or expression

must be established by law and it must be accessible, unambiguous and

formulated with great precision to know clearly what action is considered illegal.

Principles 1.2 and 1.3 focus on the issue of national security and require that

any restrictions on information and expressions that the government considers

that incurs in the field of national security must have the genuine purpose and

proven effect of protecting a legitimate affair of national security interest. That

is, the government under these principles has to prove to an independent

institution that risk of the territorial integrity or viability of the nation, limiting the

margin of discretion when an authority invokes national security as grounds for

denying access to public information. The text of the Center for National

Security Studies makes clear how the security services despite being, by its

very nature, secret, should provide access areas primarily in two areas, namely:

a) They must be prescribed by the law defining the powers of the entity, its

methods of operation and the means by which it is accountable to society;

b) Legislators, citizens should be entitled to participate in decision making on

issues that constitute the objectives of the security and legitimate means to

implement them;

In the United States, Article 552 b 1 (A) of the FOIA provides that information

regarding matters affecting national security must attend a presidential decree

that set the criteria. Presidential Decree 12, 958 on the classification of national

security information establishes a system to classify, safeguard and disclose

relevant information. The decree itself provides that:

a) If there is doubt about whether to classify information or not, one should

choose to release that information;

b) The information that according to the decree could affect national security is

that related to military plans, weapons systems or operations, foreign

government information, intelligence activities (including special activities),

intelligence sources or methods, or cryptology, foreign relations or foreign

activities of the United States, including confidential sources, scientific,

technological and economic issues related to national security programs of the

United States government to protect nuclear materials or facilities, or

vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, projects or plans related

to national security.

Even in the most recent Presidential Executive Order number 13526 United

States of January 2, 2010 on the classification leaves except that information

"that may involve violations of law, inefficiency or administrative errors"12.

In recent years have noted the substantial increase in the Expenditure Budget

of the Federation to work for public safety and law enforcement13, but the

significant resources of the treasury for these items are not reflected nor will

they be reflected in a reasonably acceptable result. In fact, other studies show

this dissatisfaction. From the outset, it should be noted that between 1997 and

2007 there was an increase of 700 percent drug-related crimes14. The company

also still rely on the authority found that only 22 percent of crimes go

unreported15. Crime victims do not report because they considered it a "waste

of time" (39%) or distrust of authority (16%). Most of the victims who filed a

complaint assert they spent "nothing"(33%) or that it is "pending" (23%)16. The

perception of the governed for 2009 is that crime has increased (58.5%) and

have not done things that they have not done before17. In sum, by 2009 the

impunity index rises to 98.3%, so that anyone who commits a crime only 1.7%

of the cases will be brought before a judge18. These elements show that the

institutions of law enforcement and public safety have significant levels of

opportunity for improvement and that the issue of public safety and law

12

1.7 (a) (1) 13

Entre 1999 y 2006 se destinaron 293 mil 239 millones de pesos, de acuerdo a Marcial Tepach y Richard Muñoz. Indicadores delictivos y el presupuesto público federal para la seguridad pública en México. 2006. México. Cámara de Diputados. Pp. 34, 35 yss. 14

Gertz Manero, Alejandro. Seguridad y justicia. Universidad de las Américas. México. P. 9 15

Sexta Encuesta Nacional sobre Inseguridad. ICESI. 2009 16

Loc. Cit. 17

Loc. cit. 18

Índice de incidencia delictiva y violencia 2009. CIDAC. México.

enforcement are one of the areas of attention in the national agenda, whose

relationship is related to problems of corruption19.

This article relates two border issues with skills that have been studied

independently without any interaction. Transparency and accountability are not

exhausted as objects of study in the abstract, but as the law provides

mechanisms to make measurements of the major national problems, such as

on public safety and law enforcement. By linking these two areas of study we

can generate criteria for and effectiveness of public safety with the protection of

human rights and the scrupulous and rational use of public resources. That

same concern is expressed clearly in the National Public Safety 2008-2012,

which reads: "" The challenge is to suppress corruption, impunity, violence and

mistrust. To cope, you have to train and professionalize the police, thereby

fostering the State's response is much more effective20. "Corruption thrives in

secrecy and opacity. By contrast, in developing social monitoring mechanisms

based on the law may encourage the efficiency not only as an island of

success, but a verifiable premise gradually. It is clear that the phenomenon of

corruption has reproduced with greater force in the absence of mechanisms for

monitoring, evaluation and external control.

In systems of law enforcement and public safety it was decided to classify

information as confidential and / or classified under the argument that it

complicates the performance of their work. That policy is practiced outside the

law not only have not given results, but on the contrary, increased public

resources for the development of their powers has been accompanied by higher

incidence of crime. The analysis, through the tool that provides transparency,

will identify the strengths and weaknesses of the systems of justice and

security, and create mechanisms to fight corruption and protect human rights.

The adoption of criteria for regulating access and information classification

elements will contribute to regenerate public trust in the police forces and law

enforcement, and institutions which guarantee the social peace. The application

of accessibility criteria for measuring and classifying information systems to 19

Centro de Estudios Sociales y de Opinión Pública, "Temas en la agenda nacional", en Seguridad Pública [Actualización: 9 de octubre de 2009], en www.diputados.gob.mx/cesop/ 20

Programa Nacional de Seguridad Pública-2008-2012. SSPF. México, p. 19

public safety and law enforcement will periodically evaluate the performance of

these institutions, creating incentives to adjust the behavior of public servants,

exposing the presumptive cases of illegality, and conciliating profiles with

people in public service.

It must therefore take action from the university to be an established reference

of schemes for the democratic control of security and justice sectors. This

control is based on the principles of transparency, accountability and

responsiveness to citizens, as stated in the OECD21. Representatives of

security and justice institutions should be accountable for their actions and

should be held accountable for acts of negligence. So that the monitoring

mechanisms must be designed to provide safeguards to prevent abuses of

power and ensure that the institutions work efficiently and effectively while

respecting the rule of law. There are at least five interdependent pillars of

supervision and control:

Internal Control

Executive Control

Legislative Control

Judicial Review

Civil society monitoring.

The concept of "control" in the strictest sense, means ensuring that specific

procedures are followed. In the broadest sense, means creating the conditions

conducive to the achievement of the agreed standards of performance,

including the desired results, and compliance with laws and policies. The control

can be implemented through formal and informal means. In general, the formal

means are used to ensure the adjustment of intelligence activities with the

policies and procedures necessary approvals, funding, audit and review, while

informal channels are used in ethical values and leadership issues, including

others. For its part to apply the notion of "accountability" refers to the

relationship based on the obligation to demonstrate and be accountable for the

21

OECD. The OECD Handbook on Security System Reform supporting security and justice. 2007. P.112

performance resulting from the agreed expectations. Among the requirements

for effective accountability are22:

Clarify and agree roles and responsibilities;

Clarify and agree on expectations of what should be done and how what is not

going to do, and what you want to achieve;

Performance expectations are offset by the respective capabilities of each party

- for example, authorities, powers and resources; reporting timeliness and

reliability of the results reached in light of expectations

Review and reported performance feedback, so that the achievements are

recognized and, if necessary corrections are made.

According to the OECD control system security should be shown as follows23:

A security system at various levels of government:

Level Main Actors Main mechanisms

Internal Security Forces ,

law enforcement

authorities

Supervision, internal review

system, proactive monitoring,

internal complaints mechanisms,

codes of conduct, discipline,

performance review and control

functions and duties, human

resources, system selection,

retention and promotion, freedom

of information.

Executive Head of state,

ministers, national

security advisory

Supreme command authority,

establishing security policies,

priorities and procedures, select

22

Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). Intelligence Practice and Democratic Oversight- A Practitioner’s View. 2003 23

Organization for Economy Cooperation and Development. The OECD Dac Handbook on Security System Reform (SSR) Supporting Security and Justice. 2007 p.112-113

councils and

coordination

and retain staff, reporting

mechanisms, office administration;

there is the power to investigate

complaints of abuses and failures.

Legislative Parliament and

parliamentary bodies

Hearings, budget approval,

research, promulgation of laws,

visiting facilities and inspection,

power of citations.

Judicial Courts, civil courts.

criminal courts and

military courts

Adjudication of disputes arising

from security services and private

employees, protection of human

rights, strengthen the rule of law,

monitoring of special powers of

security, ensuring the

constitutionality of the actions,

provide effective remedies, review

of security policies and justice in

the context of procurement.

Independent

Agencies

Ombudsmen, national

human rights

institutions, agencies,

audit committees

receiving public

complaints

Public complaints, promote respect

for human rights among the

population and within security

institutions, investigate complaints

of failure and abuse, ensure proper

use of public funds, ensure respect

for the rule of law.

Civil Society NGOs, media, research

agencies

Provide expertise and analysis of

security and justice policy,

lobbying, providing an alternative

vision to the public and their

representatives on these issues,

research, monitoring. Office

administration, there is the power

to investigate complaints of abuses

and failures.

To achieve the control and accountability, transparency becomes an essential

tool. More still no agreement among different lawyers to prioritize the principle

of transparency, which, although not absolute "must ensure a fair balance

between it and the legitimate needs of secrecy. Transparency is important to

ensure that security and justice providers are subject to public accountability24.

"This work is part of the need to identify the distance that separates the tasks of

security and law enforcement while respecting the principle of transparency and

human rights, which is found along the extensive analysis in federal agencies in

the area and a large sample of states considered by the recurring presence of

high-impact crime in its territory according to the report Journal of the media in

the country.

To carry out this task 23 indicators were created (the total is 50 indicators in the

next edition of this project) each composed of different items that reflect

precisely the state of affairs in the field in their broad strokes. For indicator can

be understood as "a quantitative or qualitative information derived from a

number of observed facts that can reveal relative positions in a given area.25"

The selection of benchmarks was based on the revision of laws, international

conventions and treaties signed by Mexico, as well as interpretations and

studies of internationally renowned institutions like the Inter-American Court of

Human Rights, Human Rights Commission, The Commission on Accreditation

for Law Enforcement Agencies and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic

Control of Armed Force. The indicators selected according to the provisions of

the Constitution of the United States of Mexico, general and special laws

24

Ibid. 117 25

Nardo, Michela, et al. Handbook on Constructing Composite Indicators: Methodology and User Guide. OECD Statistics Working Papers 2005/3. Paris: OECD Publishing. p. 8

applicable international treaties and conventions ratified by Mexico and

practices were: constitutional aspects regarding access to information,

transparency and accountability, constitutional issues regarding public safety,

legal, cardholder name, accountability, management and maintenance of the

institution, certification in public safety, organization of the Department of Public

Safety Office, Human Resources institution, admission, staff recruitment and

selection of the institution, agency agreements or arrangements, public

information, command protocols, critical incidents, special operations and

homeland security, internal affairs, inspection services, criminal investigation,

ownership and control of evidence , assisting victims and witnesses, drug

crimes and organized crime, juvenile operations, crime prevention and

community involvement, central or internal reports and human rights. The

selection of the universe under study had the basic criteria those states with the

highest percentage of crime incidence and recurrence of high-impact crime in

relation to the average for the country. Under this method the sample was very

wide, 30% of the country: Baja California, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Distrito

Federal, Durango, Mexico State, Michoacán, Nuevo León, Oaxaca, Sinaloa

Federation (Secretary for Security, Attorney General the Republic and Federal

Police). In the next study will examine the whole national territory.

The study carried out with federal authorities and 12 states on public security

and law enforcement can draw the following preliminary conclusions:

First. You may notice the absence of a minimum common denominator on what

should be classified as privileged and confidential in organisms under study,

because although it is true that laws on access to federal information and states

show differences between them and others, they also maintained, however, a

common base catalog identification of exceptions and their treatment. There is

therefore a core of knowledge in the authorities on how to classify and to invoke

the arguments arising from the application of the principles of casuistry proof of

damage, maximum publicity and public interest test, which are accepted as

elements must contain an act of classification authority. Worse, in most cases

not even filled the assumptions of the constitutional principle of legality to

establish and, above all, to motivate the act of denying access to information.

Second. In some cases such as Baja California, Chihuahua and Nuevo Leon

went so far as to not provide nearly all the information requested. In the case of

Chihuahua and Nuevo Leon they proceeded to generate classification

agreements regarding requests for information applied, which highlights the

bounded compliance with Article 6 of the constitution, second subparagraph

and laws on access to public information. Similarly these acts of authority show

a lack of knowledge about weight criteria between access to information and its

limits as well as lack of interest in knowing them. The information contained in

the study was obtained from public sources. In Baja California the worst case

was given that the authorities did not even respond to requests for information.

It is recalled that in Baja California the existence of an honorary guarantor

lifeless material information creates incentives for opacity.

Third. By contrast, the federal Public Security Secretariat, the Federal Police

and the Ministry of Public Security of the Federal District were the units or

agencies of the universe studied showed best interest to respond in a timely

manner, requests for information that served basis for the construction of

evaluation indicators of this ongoing study. In the case of classified information

as proprietary or confidential observed the principles of constitutional legality, in

large part, the principles of harm test and public interest. This does not

necessarily mean that the institutions of reference are shown as transparent as

possible, but facing a context where law enforcement is the exception, it stands

out as just part of that exception to the rule.

Fourth. Most of the information of the departments and agencies studied

exhibits characteristics of propaganda to position the public security authorities

and law enforcement in the minds of opinion. In fact, it was noted as a trend that

no parameters of comparability over time to enable its veracity and credibility to

the information generally available on internet portals.

Fifth. One element of concern is the absence of individual job performance

records in the Attorney General's Office, given that it was the only institution of

the analyzed which indicated the absence of such information. It should be

remembered that in all activities, especially those related to the tasks of security

and law enforcement it is essential to control, monitor and evaluate the staff not

only to verify that your conduct conforms to the provisions of the law of

administrative responsibilities public servants, but to build trust among society.

By contrast, according to their own data "in the federal police, each element has

a unique record which contains personal documents and administrative work

generated during the relationship, controlled by the same agency." This

underscores the absence of common criteria including two federal agencies

where there are clear differences in perception and approach on transparency.

Sixth. The trend in the departments and agencies under study shows that

respect for human rights has ample opportunity for improvement. While it is true

that in the explicit category of human rights, the secretariats and prosecutors

responded affirmatively in when questioned on the existence of programs, it is

also true that the responses received by witnesses under protection, victims

and even internal disciplinary processes of the agents and staff for the agencies

observed restrictions on human rights

Seventh. It is disturbing to note the lack of operational tools that allow

information sharing and joint collaboration between the secretariats and

prosecutors in the study. In the light of information received and entered in the

portals of transparency of the subjects under study show that they operate as

lone units without institutional lines of communication between peers. This limits

any strategy to combat crime in either the common law or federal law

enforcement and shows the strengths that exist in the secretariats and offices

for the persistent presence of mutual distrust. This also creates incentives for

non-institutional exchange of information which cannot generate the monitoring,

evaluation and control, which in turn causes the detriment of the mission and

vision of security secretariats and prosecutors in the country. This lack of

communication and outdated information also causes that agents charged or

sentenced in one state may choose their reintegration into another entity or

corporation under the lack of updated databases.

Eighth. It is possible to identify that the treatment given to the operatives and

the general staff of public security secretariats and offices resembles the same

parameters with which they manage the civil service. No distinction is made

with the role and basic characteristics of inclusion and family welfare that those

who work there should have. Even worse, no training programs, nor service

programs or career police, clear and transparent mechanisms of mobility and

career advancement. When you create exceptional training programs and

training records are not individualized for continued monitoring. There was no

integral support observed for the agents or their families spiritually or a high

esteem as a professional community. Nor do they have a reasonable salary for

the services provided and that they are asked to see thru according to the

applicable laws and regulations. It would seem as if the premise for tabulation of

salaries parted from corruption acquiring a naturalization pass in the country

and guaranteeing them a double salary as well as economic bonuses

regardless of the law. This logic is part of the high rate of turnover. Investment

in education and training generates, on many occasions, a perverse effect by

applying the knowledge gained precisely the service of persons suspected of

crimes.

Ninth. The existence of internal agency conflict resolution does not clearly

manifest the existence of an independent entity, but rather, we see that the

trend followed in these instances of conflict resolution and discipline are judge

and jury. This is not compatible with the principles of constitutional law nor with

the criteria established in various supranational judicial bodies like the Inter-

American Court of Human Rights.

Tenth. Generally shown a sustained growth of public budget allocated to the

Ministry of Security and prosecutors' offices and its inversely proportional

results to the expectations of society. It should draw attention to this fact the

lack of certification of the agencies both in relation to statutory audits and

studies in situ. Also worth mentioning is that the structure of the secretariats and

offices for safety is created in the image and likeness of the institutional

infrastructure of the bureaucratic system without the institutional design

elements to meet their own tasks in a reasonable manner. It is necessary to

continue to identify a larger number of indicators, covering all the departments

and agencies of the Federation and the states

Basic Bibliography:

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