Selected Labor Law Jurisprudence, From Feb2009-January2013

7/21/2019 Selected Labor Law Jurisprudence, From Feb2009-January2013

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Labor

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CBA; coverage. As regular employees, petitioners fall within the coverage of the bargaining unand are therefore entitled to CBA benefits as a matter of law and contract. Under the terms the CBA, petitioners are members of the appropriate bargaining unit because they are regularank-and-file employees and do not belong to any of theexcluded categories. Most importantlythe labor arbiters decision of January 17, 2002 affirmed all the way to the CA ruleagainst the companyssubmission that they are independent contractors. Thus, as regular rankand-file employees, they fall within the CBA coverage. And, under the CBAs express termthey are entitled to its benefits.

CBA coverage is not only a question of fact, but of law and contract. The factual issue whether the petitioners are regular rank-and-file employees of the company. The tribunabelow uniformly answered this question in the affirmative. From this factual finding flows legeffects touching on the terms and conditions of the petitioners regular employment. FarleFulache, et al. vs. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation,G.R. No. 183810, January 21, 2010.Employee benefits; permanent disability benefits. In accordance with the avowed policy of thState to give maximum aid and full protection to labor, the Court applied the Labor Codconcept of permanent total disability to Filipino seafarers. The Court held that the notion odisability is intimately related to the workers capacity to earn. What is compensated is not themployees injury or illness but his inability to work resulting in the impairment of his earnin

capacity; hence, disability should be understood less on its medical significance but more on thloss of earning capacity.In the present case, petitioner was able to secure afit to work certificationfrom a doctor onafter more than five months from the time he was medically repatriated due to a finding thahis disability is considered permanent and total. Significantly, petitioner remained unemployeeven after he filed on February 26, 2002 his complaint to recover permanent total disabilitcompensation and despite the August 31, 2005 Decision of the NLRC which was affirmed by thCourt of Appeals, ordering respondents to allow complainant to resume sea duty.That petitioner was not likely to fully recover from his disability is mirrored by the Labo

Arbiters finding that his illness would possibly recur once he resumeshis sea duties. This couvery well be the reason why petitioner was not re-deployed by respondents. Petitionerdisability being then permanent and total, he is entitled to 100% compensation, i.eUS$80,000 for officers, as stipulated in par. 20.1.7 of the parties CBA. Rizaldy M. Quitorianvs. Jebsens Maritime, Inc./Ma. Theresa Gutay and/or Atle Jebsens Management A/S,G.R. N179868, January 21, 2010.

Labor Code; interpretation.Another basic principle is that expressed in Article 4 of the LaboCode that all doubts in the interpretation and implementation of the Labor Code should binterpreted in favor of the workingman. This principle has been extended by jurisprudence t

cover doubts in the evidence presented by the employer and the employee. The petitioner ha
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at very least, shown serious doubts about the merits of the companys case, particularly in thappreciation of the clinching evidence on which the NLRC and CA decisions were based. Isuch contest of evidence, the Court applied Article 4 as basis to rule in favor of themployee. In this case, the Court held that petitioner was constructively dismissed given thhostile and discriminatory working environment he found himself in, particularly evidenced bthe escalating acts of unfairness against him that culminated in the appointment of anotheHRD manager without any prior notice to him. Where no less than the companys chie

corporate officer was against him, petitioner had no alternative but to resign from hemployment.The Court also gave significance to the fact that petitioner sought almost immediate officirecourse to contest his separation from service through a complaint for illegal dismissal, anheld that this is not the act of one who voluntarily resigned; his immediate filing of a complaincharacterizes him as one who deeply felt that he had been wronged.Manolo A. Peaflor vOutdoor Clothing Manufacturing Corporation, et al.,G.R. No. 177114, January 21, 2010.

Appeal; illegal dismissal. In the present case, the company terminated the services of foudrivers who were declared by the labor arbiter to be regular employees of the company in ainitial complaint filed by said drivers for regularization. Pending the companys appeal of thlabor arbiters decision, the company terminated the employment of said drivers on the grounof redundancy, which action, the Court viewed as an implied admission of the regulaemployment status of the drivers. The Court held that by implementing the dismissal action athe time the labor arbiters ruling was under review, the company unilaterally negated theffects of the labor arbiters ruling while at the same time appealing the same ruling to thNLRC. This unilateral move is a direct affront to the NLRCs authority and an abuse of thappeal process. All these go to show that company acted with patent bad faith. Farley Fulachet al. vs. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation,G.R. No. 183810, January 21, 2010.

Appeal; questions of fact. The rule that a Rule 45 petition deals only with legal issues is not a

absolute rule; it admits of exceptions. In the labor law setting, the Court may look into factuissues when there is a conflict in the factual findings of the labor arbiter, the NLRC, and thCA as in the present case where the labor arbiter found facts supporting the conclusion thathere had been constructive dismissal, while the NLRCs and the CAs factual findingcontradicted the labor arbiters findings. The conflicting factual findings are not binding on thCourt. The Court held that it retains the authority to pass upon the evidence presented andraw conclusions therefrom. Manolo A. Peaflor vs. Outdoor Clothing ManufacturinCorporation, et al.,G.R. No. 177114, January 21, 2010.

Appeal under Rule 45; questions of law vs. questions of fact.Petitioners in the present case dnot question the findings of facts in the assailed decisions. They question the misapplication o

the law and jurisprudence on the facts recognized by the decisions. For example, they questioas contrary to law their exclusion from the CBA after they were recognized as regular rank-andfile employees of the company. They also question the basis in law for the dismissal of foudrivers and the legal propriety of the redundancy action taken against them.The Court reiterated the established distinctions between questions of law and questions ofact by quoting its rulings in New Rural Bank of Guimba (N.E.) Inc. v. Fermina S. Abad anRafael Susan[G.R. No. 161818, August 20, 2008, 562 SCRA 503]: A question of law existwhen the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value othe evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted. A question of fac

exists when a doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the quer
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invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, thexistence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, as well as their relation to eacother and to the whole, and the probability of the situation. Farley Fulache, et al. vs. ABS-CBBroadcasting Corporation,G.R. No. 183810, January 21, 2010.Dismissal; burden of proof. It is a settled rule that in employee termination disputes, themployer bears the burden of proving that the employees dismissal was for just and valcause. That petitioner did indeed file a letter of resignation does not help the companys cas

as, other than the fact of resignation, the company must still prove that the employevoluntarily resigned. There can be no valid resignation where the act was made undecompulsion or under circumstances approximating compulsion, such as when an employees aof handing in his resignation was a reaction to circumstances leaving him no alternative but tresign. In this case, the Court held that petitioner had been constructively dismissed as hresignation was a response to the unacceptable appointment of another person to a position hstill occupied. In sum, the evidence does not support the existence of voluntarinesin petitionersresignation. Manolo A. Peaflor vs. Outdoor Clothing Manufacturing Corporationet al.,G.R. No. 177114, January 21, 2010.

Agency; principle of apparent authority. There is ample evidence that the hospital held out tthe patient that the doctor was its agent. The two factors that determined apparent authority ithis case were: first, the hospitals implied manifestation to the patient which led the latter tconclude that the doctor was the hospitals agent; and second, the patients reliance upon thconduct of the hospital and the doctor, consistent with ordinary care and prudence.It is of record that the hospital required a consent for hospital careto be signed preparatorto the surgery of the patient. The form reads: Permission is hereby given to the medicanursing and laboratory staff of the Medical City General Hospital to perform such diagnostprocedures and to administer such medications and treatments as may be deemed necessary o

advisable by the physicians of this hospital for and during the confinement of xxx.By such statement, the hospital virtually reinforced the public impression that the doctor was physician of its hospital, rather than one independently practicing in it; that the medications antreatments he prescribed were necessary and desirable; and that the hospital staff waprepared to carry them out. Professional Services, Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals, et al./Nativida(substituted by her children Marcelino Agana III, Enrique Agana, Jr. Emma Agana-AndayJesus Agana and Raymund Agana and Errique Agana) vs. The Court of Appeals and JuaFuentes Miguel Ampil vs. Natividad and Enrique Agana,G.R. Nos. 126297/G.R. No. 126467/G.RNo. 127590, February 2, 2010.Compensable illness. Since cholecystolithiasisor gallstone has been excluded as a compensab

illness under the applicable standard contract for Filipino seafarers that binds the seafarer anthe vessels foreign owner, it was an error for the CA to treat such illness as work-relatedand, therefore, compensable. The standard contract precisely did not consider gallstone acompensable illness because the parties agreed, presumably based on medical science, thasuch affliction is not caused by working on board ocean-going vessels.Nor is there any evidence to prove that the nature of the seafarers work on board a shiaggravated his illness. No one knows if he had gallstone at the time he boarded the vessel. Bthe nature of this illness, it is highly probable that he already had it when he boarded hassigned ship although it went undiagnosed because he had yet to experience itsymptoms. Bandila Shipping, Inc. et al. vs. Marcos C. Abalos,G.R. No. 177100, February 2

2010.
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Compensable illness; work related. Melanoma is not listed as an occupational disease undeAnnex A of the Rules on Employees Compensation. Hence, respondent has the burden oproving, by substantial evidence, the causal relationship between her illness and her workinconditions. Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind mighaccept to support a conclusion.The Court in this case agreed with the petitioner and the ECC that respondent was not able tpositively prove that her ailment was caused by her employment and that the risk of contractin

the disease was increased by her working conditions. While the law requires only a reasonabwork-connection and not a direct causal relation, respondent still failed to show that her illneswas really brought about by the wound she sustained during the supervised gardening activitin school. The CA accepted the allegation that the mole appeared right on the spot wherrespondent sustained the injury without any further proof that the mole appeared because othe injury. The CA further ruled that the risk of acquiring the said ailment increased by thnature of [respondents] work in going to school and in returning toher residence during schodays x x x. However, the CA failed to consider that in a tropical country like the Philippineexposure to sunlight is common. Unlike farmers, fishermen or lifeguards, it was not shown tharespondent had chronic long-term exposure to the sun considered necessary for thdevelopment of melanoma. Thus, the Court did not find the risk of contracting the disease thave been heightened by respondents exposure to sunlight in going to work and returning ther residence. Government Service Insurance System vs. Rosalinda A. Bernadas,G.R. N164731, February 11, 2010Dismissal; due process. The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard; it is thdenial of this opportunity that constitutes violation of due process of law. The employee wagiven the opportunity to be heard when a proper notice of investigation was sent to himalthough the notice did not reach him for reasons outside the employers control. The employewas not also totally unheard on the matter as he was able to explain his side through the tw

(2) explanation letters he submitted. These letters are clear indications that he intimately knewof the matter for which he was being investigated. If he was denied due process at all, thdenial was with respect to the charges of extortion, tardiness and absenteeism, which argrounds invoked separately from loss of trust and confidence. These grounds were not seriouconsiderations in the dismissal that followed, and therefore, were not considered by the Couas material to the present case. Bibiana Farms and Mills, Inc. vs. Arturo Lado,G.R. No. 15786February 2, 2010.Dismissal; due process. In an unlawful dismissal case, the employer has the burden of provinthe lawful cause sustaining the dismissal of the employee. The employer must affirmativeshow rationally adequate evidence that the dismissal was for a justifiable cause. The employee

behavior constituted just cause. However, the company cannot deny that it failed to observdue process. The law requires that the employer must furnish the worker sought to bdismissed with two written notices before termination of employment can be legally effected(1) notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which hdismissal is sought; and (2) the subsequent notice which informs the employee of themployers decision to dismiss him.Violation of the employees right to statutory due proceseven if the dismissal was for a just cause, warrants the payment of indemnity in the form onominal damages. This indemnity is not intended to penalize the employer but to vindicate orecognize the employees right to statutory due process, which was violated by the employer ithe present case. Hilton Heavy Equipment Corporation and Peter Lim vs. Ananias Dy,G.R. N

164860, February 2, 2010.
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Dismissal; due process. Failure to observe due process in the termination of employment for just cause does not invalidate the dismissal but makes the company liable for non-compliancwith the procedural requirements of due process. The violation of the employees right tstatutory due process warrants the payment of nominal damages, the amount of which addressed to the sound discretion of the court, taking into account the relevancircumstances. In the instant case, considering that the company already suffered financialbecause of poor sales performance under the employees watch, it is proper to reduce th

amount of nominal damages awarded to petitioner to Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00). Thamount of nominal damages awarded is not intended to enrich the employee, but to deteemployers from future violations of the statutory due process rights of employees. Rolando

Ancheta vs. Destiny Financial Plans, Inc. and Arsenio Bartolome,G.R. No. 179702, February 12010Dismissal; due process. In the dismissal of employees, it has been consistently held that thtwin requirements of notice and hearing are essential elements of due process. The employemust furnish the worker with two written notices before termination of employment can blegally effected: (1) a notice apprising the employee of the particular acts or omissions fowhich his dismissal is sought, and (2) a subsequent notice informing the employee of themployers decision to dismiss him. With regard to the requirement of a hearing, the essence odue process lies simply in an opportunity to be heard, and not that an actual hearing shoulalways and indispensably be held.Likewise, there is no requirement that the notices of dismissal themselves be couched in thform and language of judicial or quasi-judicial decisions. What is required is for the employer tconduct a formal investigation process, with notices duly served on the employees informinthem of the fact of investigation, and subsequently, if warranted, a separate notice of dismissaThrough the formal investigatory process, the employee must be accorded the right to presenhis or her side, which must be considered and weighed by the employer. The employee mu

be sufficiently apprised of the nature of the charge, so as to be able to intelligently defenhimself or herself against the charge. Wilfredo M. Baron, et al. vs. National Labor RelationCommission, et al.,G.R. No. 182299, February 22, 2010.Dismissal; gross neglect of duties. Article 282 (b) imposes a stringent condition before aemployer may terminate an employment due to gross and habitual neglect by the employee ohis duties. To sustain a termination of employment based on this provision of law, thnegligence must not only be gross but also habitual.In the present case, the employer asserts that the employees failed to regularly undertake monthly physical inventory of the outlets merchandise. The Court was not persuaded as found that inventory preparation and reporting did not fall on the employees shoulders sinc

they were to assist the [stock] clerk only.Kulas Ideas & Creations, et al. vs. Juliet Alcoseba, eal.,G.R. No. 180123, February 18, 2010.Dismissal; loss of trust and confidence. InFungo v. Lourdes School of Mandaluyong, wrestated the guidelines for the application of loss of trust and confidence as a just cause fodismissal of an employee from the service, thus: a)loss of confidence should not be simulatedb) it should not be used as subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal or unjustified; c) may not be arbitrarily asserted in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary; and d) must be genuine, not a mere afterthought to justify earlier action taken in bad faith. In thpresent case, the employee, who was a warehouseman, held a position of trust and confidencand was given access to and authority over company property with clear tasks and guideline

laid down very early in his employment. Like any business entity, the company has every righ
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to protect itself from actual threats to the viability of its operations. The employee, caught redhanded in a scheme to spirit off unpaid company sacks, not only violated his fiduciary duty acustodian of company property resulting in the companys loss of trust and confidence in himhe had also become a threat to the viability of company operations. To rule that he should breinstated would be oppressive to the company. The law, in protecting the rights of themployee, authorizes neither the oppression nor the self-destruction of the employer. BibianFarms and Mills, Inc. vs. Arturo Lado,G.R. No. 157861, February 2, 2010.

Dismissal; loss of trust and confidence. The doctrine of loss of confidence requires thconcurrence of the following: (1) loss of confidence should not be simulated; (2) it should nobe used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal, or unjustified; (3) it may not barbitrarily asserted in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary; (4) it must bgenuine, not a mere afterthought to justify an earlier action taken in bad faith; and (5) themployee involved holds a position of trust and confidence. Loss of confidence, as a just causfor termination of employment, is premised on the fact that the employee concerned holds position of responsibility, trust and confidence. He must be invested with confidence on delicatmatters, such as the custody, handling, care, and protection of the employers property and/ofunds. In order to constitute a just cause for dismissal, the act complained of must be workrelated such as would show the employee concerned to be unfit to continue working for themployer.The subject employee in this case is a managerial employee holding a highly sensitive positionBeing the Head of the Marketing Group of the company, he was in charge, among otherof the over-all production and sales performance of the company. Thus, as aptly pointed out bthe CA, his performance was practically the lifeblood of the corporation, because its earningdepended on the sales of the marketing group, which he used to head. The position held by themployee required the highest degree of trust and confidence of his employer in the formerexercise of managerial discretion insofar as the conduct of the latters business wa

concerned. The employees inability to perform the functions of his office to the satisfaction ohis employer and the formers poor judgment as marketing head caused the company hugfinancial losses. If these were not timely addressed and corrected, the company could havcollapsed, to the detriment of its policy holders, stockholders, employees, and the public general. Rolando P. Ancheta vs. Destiny Financial Plans, Inc. and Arsenio Bartolome,G.R. N179702,February 16, 2010Dismissal; loss of trust and confidence. The Court found convincing evidence that a pattern oconcealment and dishonesty marred the purchase of paper materials for the Womens Journalspecial project, with the employee playing the principal and most active role. There is nquestion that the employee failed to make a reasonable canvass of the prices of the pape

materials required by a companys special project, resulting in substantial losses to thcompany. That a rush job was involved, is no excuse as canvassing could be done even in days time as shown by the audit departments canvass. That the employee was responsible foconcealment and omissions also appears clear to us; he failed, under dubious circumstances, tseasonably disclose to his employer material information with financial impact on the purchastransaction.Thus, the Court cannot but conclude that substantial evidence exists justifying the employeedismissal for a just causeloss of trust and confidence. For loss of trust and confidence to ba ground for dismissal, the law requires only that there be at least some basis to justify thdismissal. The fact that the employee had been with the company for 25 years cannot chang

the conclusion that he had become a liability to the company whose interests he miserab
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failed to protect. Philippine Journalist, Inc. vs. Leozar Dela Cruz y Balobal,G.R. N187120, February 16, 2010.Dismissal; requirements. Under the Labor Code, the requirements for the lawful dismissal of aemployee are two-fold, consisting of substantive and procedural aspects. Not only must thdismissal be for a just or authorized cause; the basic requirements of procedural due process notice and hearing must likewise be observed before an employee may be dismissed. Thburden of proof rests on the employer to show that the employees dismissal has met these du

process requirements. The case of the employer must stand or fall on its own merits and not othe weakness of the employees defense.Bibiana Farms and Mills, Inc. vs. Arturo Lado,G.R. N157861, February 2, 2010.Dismissal; separation pay. Under Article 279 of the Labor Code, an illegally dismissed employe

shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to hfull backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalencomputed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actuareinstatement. In addition to full backwages, the Court has also repeatedly ruled that in casewhere reinstatement is no longer feasible due to strained relations, then separation pay may bawarded instead of reinstatement. In Mt. Carmel College v. Resuena,the Court reiterated thathe separation pay, as an alternative to reinstatement, should be equivalent to one (1) montsalary for every year of service. Sargasso Construction and Development Corporation vNational Labor Relations Commission (4th Division) and Gorgonio Mongcal,G.R. No. 16411February 9, 2010.Dismissal; serious misconduct. Misconduct has been defined as improper or wrong conduct. is the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a derelictioof duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error of judgment. Thmisconduct to be serious must be of such grave and aggravated character and not merely triviaand unimportant. Such misconduct, however serious, must nevertheless be in connection wit

the employees work to constitute just cause for his separation.In the present case, the Court found substantial evidence to prove that a serious misconduchas been committed to justify termination from employment. The Certified Public Accountanand Corporate Finance Manager of the company submitted a report dated February 19, 200stating that in spite of managements memorandum, the keys to the office and filing cabinetwere not surrendered. It was likewise stated in the report that petitioner Wilfredo Baron pulleout some records without allowing a representative from the internal audit team to inspethem. He noticed Wilfredo Baron deleting some files from the computer, which could no longebe retrieved. Moreover, a member of the audit team saw Cynthia Junatas (another petitionecarrying some documents, including a Daily Collection Report. When asked to present th

documents for inspection, Junatas refused and tore the document.In addition, the audit team discovered that MSI incurred an inventory shortage of One MillioThirty Thousand Two Hundred Fifty-Eight Pesos and Twenty-One Centavos (P1,030,258.21). found that Wilfredo Baron, the operations manager, in conspiracy with the other petitionerorchestrated massive irregularities and grand scale fraud, which could no longer be documentebecause of theft of company documents and deletion of computer files. Unmistakably, thunauthorized taking of company documents and files, failure to pay unremitted collectionfailure to surrender keys to the filing cabinets despite earlier instructions, concealment oshortages, and failure to record inventory transactions pursuant to a fraudulent scheme are actof grave misconduct, which are sufficient causes for dismissal from employment. Wilfredo M
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Baron, et al. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R. No. 182299,February 22010.Dismissal; theft; degree of evidence. The long-standing rule is that the existence of a conspiracmust be proved by clear, direct and convincing evidence. In Fernandez v. National LaboRelations Commission,The Court expounded on the degree of evidence required to establish thexistence of a conspiracy in this wise:While it is true that in conspiracy, direct proof is noessential, it must however, be shown that it exists as clearly as the commission of the offens

itself. There must at least be adequate proof that the malefactors had come to an agreemenconcerning the commission of a felony and decided to commit it. x x x For conspiracy to exisit is essential that there must be conscious design to commit an offense. Conspiracy is not thproduct of negligence but of intentionality on the part of the cohorts.

Verily, there was a dearth of evidence directly linking the employee to the commission of thcrime of theft, as his mere act of loading the dump truck with aggregates did not show that hknew of the other persons plan to deliver the load to a place other than the companyconstruction site. The only conclusion, therefore, is that the company had illegally dismissethe employee in the present case. Sargasso Construction and Development Corporation vNational Labor Relations Commission (4th Division) and Gorgonio Mongcal,G.R. No. 16411February 9, 2010.Employee; recovery of personal contributions. May a government employee, dismissed from thservice for cause, be allowed to recover the personal contributions he paid to the GovernmenService Insurance System (GSIS)? The answer is yes.Section 11(d) of Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended, provides: Upon dismissal for causor on voluntary separation, he shall be entitled only to his own premiums and voluntardeposits, if any, plus interest of three per centum per annum, compounded monthly. Thprovision continues to govern cases of employees dismissed for cause and their claims for threturn of their personal contributions.

Also, it should be remembered that the GSIS laws are in the nature of social legislation, to bliberally construed in favor of the government employees. The money, subject of themployees request, consists of personal contributions made by him, premiums paid ianticipation of benefits expected upon retirement. The occurrence of a contingency, i.e., hdismissal from the service prior to reaching retirement age, should not deprive him of thmoney that belongs to him from the outset. To allow forfeiture of these personal contributionin favor of the GSIS would condone undue enrichment. Carmelita Lledo vs. Atty. Cesar V. LledoBranch Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Branch 94, Quezon City, A.M. No. P-95-116February 9, 2010.Employee expenses; in-service training. In the present case, Article XXI, Section 6 of the CB

provides that All expenses of security guards in securing /renewing their licenses shall be fotheir personal account. A reading of the provision would reveal that it encompasses all possibexpenses a security guard would pay or incur in order to secure or renew his license. In-servictraining being a requirement for the renewal of a security guards license, expenses incurretherefore are claimed to be for the security guards personal account. However, the 199Revised Rules and Regulations Implementing the Private Security Agency Law (Republic Act No5487) provides that it shall be the primary responsibility of the operators of private securitagency and company security forces to maintain and upgrade the standards of efficiencydiscipline, performance and competence of their personnel. It further provides that [T]maintain and/or upgrade the standard of efficiency, discipline and competence of securit

guards and detectives, company security force and private security agencies upon prio
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authority shall conduct-in-service training The cost of training shall be pro-rated among thparticipating agencies/private companies.Since it is the primary responsibility of operators of company security forces to maintain anupgrade the standards of efficiency, discipline, performance and competence of their personneit follows that the expenses to be incurred therein shall be for the account of the companyFurther, the intent of the law to impose upon the employer the obligation to pay for the cost oits employees training is manifested in the aforementioned provision of law. While the la

mandates pro-rating of expenses because it would be impracticable and unfair to impose thburden of expenses suffered by all participants on only one participating agency or company, there is no centralization, there can be no pro-rating, and therefore, the company that has itown security forces must shoulder the entire cost for such training. If the intent of the lawere to impose upon individual employees the cost of training, the provision on the pro-ratinof expenses would not have found print in the law. Prior to the signing of the CBA, it was thcompany providing for the in-service training of the guards. Thus, implicit from the companyactuations was its acknowledgment of its legally mandated responsibility to shoulder thexpenses for in-service training. PNCC Skyway Traffic Management and Security DivisioWorkers Organization (PSTMSWDO), represented by its President, Rene Soriano vs. PNCSkyway Corporation),G.R. No. 171231, February 17, 2010Employer-employee relationship; control test. This Court still employs the control test tdetermine the existence of an employer-employee relationship between hospital and doctoIn Calamba Medical Center, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al.,the Court hethat: Under the control test, an employment relationship exists between a physician and hospital if the hospital controls both the means and the details of the process by which thphysician is to accomplish his task. x x x That petitioner exercised control over respondentgains light from the undisputed fact that in the emergency room, the operating room, or andepartment or ward for that matter, the doctors work is monitored through the hospital

nursing supervisors, charge nurses and orderlies. Without the approval or consent of thhospital or its medical director, no operations can be undertaken in those areas. For the controtest to apply, it is not essential for the employer to actually supervise the performance by themployee of his duties, it being enough that it has the right to wield the power.ProfessionServices, Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals, et al./Natividad (substituted by her children Marcelin

Agana III, Enrique Agana, Jr. Emma Agana-Andaya, Jesus Agana and Raymund Agana anErrique Agana) vs. The Court of Appeals and Juan Fuentes Miguel Ampil vs. Natividad anEnrique Agana,G.R. Nos. 126297/G.R. No. 126467/G.R. No. 127590, February 2, 2010.Management prerogatives; contract of perpetual employment. The Court cannot countenancthe employees claim that a contract of perpetual employment was ever constituted. While th

Constitution recognizes the primacy of labor, it also recognizes the critical role of privatenterprise in nation-building and the prerogatives of management. A contract of perpetuemployment deprives management of its prerogative to decide whom to hire, fire and promoteand renders inutile the basic precepts of labor relations. While management may validly waive prerogatives, such waiver should not be contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals ogood customs.An absolute and unqualified employment for life in the mold of petitionerconcept of perpetual employment is contrary to public policy and good customs, as it unjustforbids the employer from terminating the services of an employee despite the existence of

just or valid cause. It likewise compels the employer to retain an employee despite thattainment of the statutory retirement age, even if the employee has became a non-performin
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asset or, worse, a liability to the employer.Ronilo Sorreda vs. Cambridge ElectronicCorporation,G.R. No. 172927, February 11, 2010.Suspension; leave without prior authority. While it is true that the union and its members havbeen granted union leave privileges under the CBA, the grant cannot be considered separatefrom the other provisions of the CBA, particularly the provision on management prerogativewhere the CBA reserved for the company the full and complete authority in managing anrunning its business. The Court, in the present case, saw nothing in the language of the unio

leave provision that removes from the company the right to prescribe reasonable rules anregulations to govern the manner of availing of union leaves, particularly the prerogative trequire its prior approval. In fact, prior notice is expressly required under the CBA so that thcompany can appropriately respond to the request for leave. In this sense, the rule requirinprior approval only made express what is implied from the terms of the CBA.Despite managements disapproval of his requested leave, the employee still went on leave, iopen disregard of his superiors orders. This rendered the employee open to the charge oinsubordination, separately from his absence without official leave. Malayan Employee

Association-FFW and Rodolfo Mangalino vs. Malayan Insurance Company, Inc.,G.R. N181357, February 2, 2010.Quitclaim; elements. It is true that the law looks with disfavor on quitclaims and releases bemployees who have been inveigled or pressured into signing them by unscrupulous employeseeking to evade their legal responsibilities and frustrate just claims of employees. In certacases, however, the Court has given effect to quitclaims executed by employees if the employeis able to prove the following requisites, to wit: (1) the employee executes a deed of quitclaimvoluntarily; (2) there is no fraud or deceit on the part of any of the parties; (3) thconsideration of the quitclaim is credible and reasonable; and (4) the contract is not contrary tlaw, public order, public policy, morals or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with right recognized by law. Goodrich Manufacturing Corporation & Mr. Nilo Chua Goy vs. Emerlin

Ativo, et al.,G.R. No. 188002, February 1, 2010.Quitclaim; validity. In the case at bar, both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC ruled that themployees executed their quitclaims without any coercion from the company following thevoluntary resignation from the company. The contents of the quitclaim documents are simpleclear and unequivocal. The records of the case are bereft of any substantial evidence to showthat the employees did not know that they were relinquishing their right short of what they haexpected to receive and contrary to what they have so declared. Put differently, at the timthey were signing their quitclaims, respondents honestly believed that the amounts received bthem were fair and reasonable settlements of the amounts, which they would have received hathey refused to voluntarily resign from the said company. Goodrich Manufacturing Corporation

Mr. Nilo Chua Goy vs. Emerlina Ativo, et al.,G.R. No. 188002, February 1, 2010.Vacation leave; scheduling. Although the preferred vacation leave schedule of employees shoube given priority, they cannot demand, as a matter of right, for their request to be automaticalgranted by the company. If the employees were given the exclusive right to schedule thevacation leave then said right should have been incorporated in the CBA. In the absence of sucright and in view of the mandatory provision in the CBA giving the company the right tschedule the vacation leave of its employees, the CBA prevails.In the grant of vacation leave privileges to an employee, the employer is given the leeway timpose conditions on the entitlement to and commutation of the same, as the grant of vacatioleave is not a standard of law, but a prerogative of management. It is a mere concession or ac

of grace of the employer and not a matter of right on the part of the employee. It is, therefore
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well within the power and authority of an employer to impose certain conditions, as it deems fion the grant of vacation leaves, such as having the option to schedule the same. PNCC SkywaTraffic Management and Security Division Workers Organization (PSTMSWDO), represented bits President, Rene Soriano vs. PNCC Skyway Corporation),G.R. No. 171231, February 17, 2010Labor Procedure

Appeal; question of fact. While as a rule, a petition for review on certiorari shall raise onquestions of law, we deem it appropriate to examine the facts in this review, given th

conflicting factual findings between the Labor Arbiter, on the one hand and, the NLRC and thCA, on the other. The Labor Arbiter sustained Riveras dismissal with the finding that hcommitted acts of dishonesty or fraud against his employer. The NLRC and the CA held that nsubstantial evidence existed to support Riveras dismissal.Philippine Journalist, Inc. vs. LeozaDela Cruz y Balobal,G.R. No. 187120, February 16, 2010.Execution of judgments; separation pay/backwages; computation. In concrete terms, thquestion is whether a re-computation in the course of execution, of the labor arbiters origincomputation of the awards made pegged as of the time the decision was rendered anconfirmed with modification by a final CA decision, is legally proper.The Court held that under the terms of the decision under execution, no essential change made by a re-computation as this step is a necessary consequence that flows from the nature othe illegality of dismissal declared in that decision. A re-computation (or an origincomputation, if no previous computation has been made) is a part of the law specificall

Article 279 of the Labor Code and the established jurisprudence on this provisionthat is reainto the decision. By the nature of an illegal dismissal case, the reliefs continue to add on untfull satisfaction, as expressed under Article 279 of the Labor Code. The re-computation of thconsequences of illegal dismissal upon execution of the decision does not constitute aalteration or amendment of the final decision being implemented. The illegal dismissal rulinstands; only the computation of the monetary consequences of this dismissal is affected an

this is not a violation of the principle of immutability of final judgments. Session Delights IcCream and Fast Foods vs. The Hon. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division), Hon. National LaboRelations Commission (Second Division) and Adonis Armenio M. Flora,G.R. No. 17214February 8, 2010.Jurisdiction; absence of employer-employee relationship. Jurisdiction over the subject matter oa complaint is determined by the allegations of the complaint. In Pioneer Concrete PhilippineInc. v. Todaro,the Court reiterated that where no employer-employee relationship exisbetween the parties, and the Labor Code or any labor statute or collective bargaininagreement is not needed to resolve any issue raised by them, it is the Regional Trial Courwhich has jurisdiction. Thus it has been consistently held that the determination of the existenc

of a contract as well as the payment of damages is inherently civil in nature. A labor arbiter maonly take cognizance of a case and award damages where the claim for such damages ariseout of an employer-employee relationship.In the present case, the employee, from the period May 8, 1999 to October 8, 1999, was cleara project employee of the company. There is, therefore, an employer-employee relationshipConsequently, questions or disputes arising out of this relationship fell under the jurisdiction othe labor arbiter. However, based on petitioners allegations in his position paper, his cause oaction was based on an alleged second contract of employment separate and distinct from hproject employment contract. While there existed an employer-employee relationship betweethe parties while the project contract of employment existed, the present dispute is neithe

rooted in the aforestated contract nor is it one inherently linked to it. Petitioner insists on a righ
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to be employed again in respondent company and seeks a determination of the existence of new and separate contract that established that right. As such, his case is within th

jurisdiction, not of the labor arbiter, but of the regular courts. The NLRC and the CA wertherefore correct in ruling that the labor arbiter erroneously took cognizance of the case. RoniSorreda vs. Cambridge Electronics Corporation,G.R. No. 172927, February 11, 2010.Jurisdiction; void judgment. The company admits that it failed to appeal the January 29, 200Order within the period prescribed by law. It likewise admits that the case was already in th

execution process when it resorted to a belated appeal to the DOLE Secretary. The compansought to excuse itself from the effects of the finality of the Order by arguing that it waallegedly issued without jurisdiction. As such, it may be assailed at any time.While it is true that orders issued without jurisdiction are considered null and void and, as general rule, may be assailed at any time, the fact of the matter is that, in this case, it was wewithin the jurisdiction of Director Manalo to issue the Order. Under Article 128(b) of the LaboCode, as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 7730, the DOLE Secretary and her representativethe regional directors, have jurisdiction over labor standards violations based on findings madin the course of inspection of an employers premises. The said jurisdiction is not affected bthe amount of claim involved, as RA 7730 had effectively removed the jurisdictional limitationfound in Articles 129 and 217 of the Labor Code insofar as inspection cases, pursuant to thvisitorial and enforcement powers of the DOLE Secretary, are concerned. The last sentence o

Article 128(b) of the Labor Code recognizes an exception to the jurisdiction of the DOLSecretary and her representatives, but such exception is neither an issue nor applicabhere. Tiger Construction and Development Corporation vs. Reynaldo, et al.,G.R. N164141, February 26, 2010.Labor Appeal; cash bond. Article 223 of the Labor Code provides that an appeal by themployer to the NLRC from a judgment of a labor arbiter which involves a monetary award mabe perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bondin

company duly accredited by the NLRC, in an amount equivalent to the monetary award in thjudgment appealed from. Cash, means a sum of money; cash bail (the sense in which thterm cash bond is used) is a sum of money posted by a criminal defendant to ensure hpresence in court, used in place of a surety bond and real estate.To comply with the appeal bond requirement, the company deposited the amounof P71,909.77 with the United Coconut Planters Bank and surrendered to the NLRC thpassbook covering the deposit, along with a Deed of Assignment it executed assigning thproceeds of the deposit in favor of the employee and authorizing the NLRC to release the samin the event that the Labor Arbiters Decision becomes final and executory. Such Deed o

Assignment, as well as the passbook, is neither a cash bond nor a surety bond. The company

appeal to the NLRC was thus not duly perfected, thereby rendering the Labor Arbiters Decisiofinal and executory. Mindanao Times Corporation vs. Mitchel R. Confesor, G.R. No. 18341February 5, 2010.Cancellation of union registration. Art. 234(c) of the Labor Code requires the mandatorminimum 20% membership of rank-and-file employees in the employees union. Twenty percen(20%) of 112 rank-and-file employees in Eagle Ridge would require a union membership of aleast 22 employees (112 x 205 = 22.4). When the EREU filed its application for registration oDecember 19, 2005, there were clearly 30 union members. Thus, when the certificate oregistration was granted, there is no dispute that the Union complied with the mandatory 20%membership requirement. Accordingly, the retraction of six union members who later severe

and withdrew their union membership cannot cause the cancellation of the unions registration.
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Besides, it cannot be argued that the affidavits of retraction retroacted to the time of thapplication for union registration or even way back to the organizational meeting. Before thewithdrawal, the six employees in question were bona fide union members. They never disputeaffixing their signatures beside their handwritten names during the organizational meetingsWhile they alleged that they did not know what they were signing, their affidavits of retractiowere not re-affirmed during the hearings of the instant case rendering them of little, if anyevidentiary value. In any case, even with the withdrawal of six union members, the union woul

still be compliant with the mandatory membership requirement under Art. 234(c) since thremaining 24 union members constitute more than the 20% membership requirement of 2employees. Eagle Ridge Gold & Country Club vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,G.R. No. 17898March 18, 2010.Cessation of operations; financial assistance. Based on Article 283, in case of cessation operations, the employer is only required to pay his employees a separation pay of one montpay or at least one-half month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. That is all thathe law requires.In the case at bar, petitioner paid respondents the following: (a) separation pay computed a150% of their gross monthly pay per year of service; and (b) cash equivalent of earned anaccrued vacation and sick leaves. Clearly, petitioner had gone over and above the requiremenof the law. Despite this, however, the Labor Arbiter ordered petitioner to pay respondents aadditional amount, equivalent to one months salary, as a form of financial assistance. The award of financial assistance is bereft of legal basis and serves to penalize petitioner whhad complied with the requirements of the law. The Court also point out that petitioner may, ait has done, grant on a voluntary and ex gratiabasis, any amount more than what is requireby the law, but to insist that more financial assistance be given is certainly something that thCourt cannot countenance. Moreover, any award of additional financial assistance trespondents would put them at an advantage and in a better position than the rest of their co

employees who similarly lost their employment because of petitioners decision to cease itoperations. SolidBank Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al.,G.R. N165951, March 30, 2010.Cost of living allowance. COLA is not in the nature of an allowance intended to reimbursexpenses incurred by officials and employees of the government in the performance of theofficial functions. It is not payment in consideration of the fulfillment of official duty. Adefined, cost of living refers to the level of prices relating to a range of everyday items or thcost of purchasing those goods and services which are included in an accepted standard level oconsumption. Based on this premise, COLA is a benefit intended to cover increases in the coof living. Thus, it is and should be integrated into the standardized salary rates.

In the present case, the Court is not persuaded that the continued grant of COLA to thuniformed personnel to the exclusion of other national government officials run afoul the equaprotection clause of the Constitution. The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized bsubstantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulatedifferently from another. The classification must also be germane to the purpose of the law anmust apply to all those belonging to the same class.The Court found valid reasons to treat the uniformed personnel differently from other nationagovernment officials. Being in charge of the actual defense of the State and the maintenance ointernal peace and order, they are expected to be stationed virtually anywhere in the country

They are likely to be assigned to a variety of low, moderate, and high-cost areas. Since the
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basic pay does not vary based on location, the continued grant of COLA is intended to hethem offset the effects of living in higher cost areas. Victoria C. Gutierrez, et al. vs. Departmenof Budget and Management, et al./Estrellita C. Amponin, et al. vs. Commission on Audit, al./Augusto R. Nieves, et al. vs. Department of Budget and Management, et al./Kapisanan nmga Manggagawa sa Bureau of Agricultural Statistic (KMB), et al. vs. Department of Budget anManagement, et al./National Housing Authority vs. Epifanio P. Recana, et al./ InsurancCommission Officers and Employees, et al. vs. Department of Budget and Management, e

al./Fiber Industry Development Authority Employees Association (FIDAEA),et al. vs. Departmenof Budget and Management, et al./Bureau of Animal Industry Employees Association (BAIEA), eal. vs. Department of Budget and Management, et al./Re: Request of Sandiganbayan foauthority to use their savings to pay their Cola Differential from July 1, 1989 to March 11999,G.R. No. 153266/G.R. No. 159007/G.R. No. 159029/G.R. No. 170084/G.R. N172713/G.R. No. 173119/G.R. No. 176477/G.R. No. 177990/A.M. No. 06-4-02-SB. March 12010.Compensable illness. Jurisprudence provides that to establish compensability of a nonoccupational disease, reasonable proof of work-connection and not direct causal relation required. Probability, not the ultimate degree of certainty, is the test of proof in compensatioproceedings.In this case, the Court sustained the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC in granting total anpermanent disability benefits in favor of Villamater, as it was sufficiently shown that his havincontracted colon cancer was, at the very least, aggravated by his working conditions, taking intconsideration his dietary provisions on board, his age, and his job as Chief Engineer, who waprimarily in charge of the technical and mechanical operations of the vessels to ensure voyagsafety. Leonis Navigation Co., Inc. and World Marine Panama, S.A. vs. Catalino U. Villamater, al.,G.R. No. 179169, March 3, 2010.Compensable illness; entitlement. For disability to be compensable under Section 20 (B) of th

2000 POEA-SEC, two elements must concur: (1) the injury or illness must be work-related; an(2) the work-related injury or illness must have existed during the term of the seafareremployment contract. In other words, to be entitled to compensation and benefits under thprovision, it is not sufficient to establish that the seafarers illness or injury has rendered himpermanently or partially disabled; it must also be shown that there is a causal connectiobetween the seafarers illness or injury and the work for which he had been contracted. The 2000 POEA-SEC defines work-related injury as injury(ies) resulting in disability or deatarising out of and in the course of employment and work-related illness as any sicknesresulting to disability or death as a result of an occupational disease listed under Section 32-A othis contract with the conditions set therein satisfied.

Under Section 20 (B), paragraphs (2) and (3) of the 2000 POEA-SEC, it is the companydesignated physician who is entrusted with the task of assessing the seamans disability.While it is true that medical reports issued by the company-designated physicians do not binthe courts, the Courts examination of Dr. Ong-Salvadors Initial Medical Report have led it tagree with her findings. Dr. Ong-Salvador was able to sufficiently explain her basis concluding that the respondents illness was not work-related: she found the respondent not thave been exposed to any carcinogenic fumes, or to any viral infection in his workplace. Hefindings were arrived at after the respondent was made to undergo a physical, neurological anlaboratory examination, taking into consideration his past medical history, family history, ansocial history. In addition, the respondent was evaluated by a specialist, a surgeon and a


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oncologist. The series of tests and evaluations show that Dr. Ong-Salvadors findings were noarrived at arbitrarily; neither were they biased in the companys favor.The respondent, on the other hand, did not adduce proof to show a reasonable connectiobetween his work as an assistant housekeeping manager and his lymphoma. There was nshowing how the demands and nature of his job vis--vis the ships working conditionincreased the risk of contracting lymphoma. The non-work relatedness of the respondentillness is reinforced by the fact that under the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labo

Code (ECC Rules), lymphoma is considered occupational only when contracted by operatinroom personnel due to exposure to anesthetics. The records do not show that the respondentwork as an assistant housekeeping manager exposed him to anesthetics.

Accordingly, the Court held that the respondent is not entitled to total and permanent disabilitbenefits on account of his failure to refute the company-designated physicians findings that: (1his illness was not work-related; and (2) he was fit to resume sea duties. Magsaysay MaritimCorporation and/or Cruise Ships Catering Services International N.V. vs. National LaboRelations Commissions, et al.,G.R. No. 186180, March 22, 2010.Constructive dismissal. In constructive dismissal cases, the employer has the burden of provinthat its conduct and action or the transfer of an employee are for valid and legitimate groundsuch as genuine business necessity. Particularly, for a transfer not to be considered constructive dismissal, the employer must be able to show that such transfer is nounreasonable, inconvenient, or prejudicial to the employee. Failure of the employer tovercome this burden of proof taints the employees transfer as a constructive dismissal. In the present case, the employer failed to discharge this burden. The combination of harsactions taken by the bank rendered the employment condition of the employee hostile anunbearable for the following reasons: First, there is no showing of any urgency or genuinbusiness necessity to transfer the employee to the Makati Head Office. The banks stated reasothat the employee had to undergo branch head training because of his gross inefficiency wa

not supported by any proof that the employee had a record of gross inefficiency. Second, themployees transfer from Dumaguete to Makati City is clearly unreasonable, inconvenient anoppressive, since the respondent and his family are residents of Dumaguete City. Third, themployer failed to present any valid reason why it had to require the employee to go to thMakati Head Office to undergo branch head training when it could have just easily required thlatter to undertake the same training in the VISMIN area. Finally, there was nothing in thorder of transfer indicating the position which the employee would occupy after his trainingthus, the employee was effectively placed in a floating status. The banks contention that themployee was assigned to a sensitive position in the DUHO Task Force is suspect wheconsidered with the fact that he was made to undergo branch head training which is total

different from a position that entails reconciling book entries of all branches of the formerReconciling book entries is essentially an accounting task.The test of constructive dismissal is whether a reasonable person in the employees positiowould have felt compelled to give up his position under the circumstances. Based on thfactual considerations in the present case, the Court held that the hostile and unreasonabworking conditions of the bank justified the finding of the NLRC and the CA that the employewas constructively dismissed. Philippine Veterans Bank vs. National Labor RelationCommission, et al.,G.R. No. 188882, March 30, 2010.Disability benefits; entitlement. The seafarer, upon sign-off from his vessel, must report to thcompany-designated physician within three working days from arrival for diagnosis an

treatment. Applying Section 20(B), paragraph (3) of the 2000 Amended Standard Terms an
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Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vesselpetitioner is required to undergo post-employment medical examination by a companydesignated physician within three working days from arrival, except when he is physicalincapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same periowould suffice. In Maunlad Transport, Inc. v. Manigo, Jr., [G.R. No.161416, 13 June 2008, 55SCRA 446, 459] this Court explicitly declared that it is mandatory for a claimant to be examineby a company-designated physician within three days from his repatriation. The unexplaine

omission of this requirement will bar the filing of a claim for disability benefits. Alex Cootauco vs. MMS Phil. Maritime Services, Inc. Ms. Mary C. Maquilan, and/or MMS Co. Ltd., G.RNo. 184722, March 15, 2010.Dismissal; damages. Moral and exemplary damages are recoverable where the dismissal of aemployee was attended by bad faith or fraud or constituted an act oppressive to labor or wadone in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. With regard to themployees of Promm-Gem, there being no evidence of bad faith, fraud or any oppressive act othe part of the latter, the Court found no support for the award of damages.

As for P&G, the records show that it dismissed its employees through SAPS in a manneoppressive to labor. The sudden and peremptory barring of the employees from work, and fromadmission to the work place, after just a one-day verbal notice, and for no valid cause, bellowoppression and utter disregard of the right to due process of the concerned petitioners. Hencean award of moral damages is called for. Joeb Aliviado, et al. vs. Procter & Gamble PhilippineInc., et al.,G.R. No. 160506, March 9, 2010.Dismissal; fraud and serious misconduct. In this case, the Court found that Pastoril was aactively involved as Escoto and Omela in the sale of the Toyota Town Ace that resulted in a losto the company. All three participated in making the company believe that Aquino bought thToyota Town Ace for P190,000.00 when in fact, Aquino paid P200,000.00 for the vehicle. ThuPastoril acted in concert with Escoto and Omela in the transaction that defrauded their employe

in the amount of P10,000.00. Pastoril prepared and issued the deed of sale indicating that thvehicle was sold for P190,000.00, although she knew that the buyer was being chargeP200,000.00 for the vehicle. Escoto, Omela and Pastoril helped themselves to the pricdifference and tried to silence Rodriguez (who got wind of the anomaly) by giving himP1,000.00 and passing the P10,000.00 price difference off as the approved discount Aquinasked for. The Court held that there was a conspiracy between and among the threemployees, where every participant had made significant contributory acts. White DiamonTrading Corporation and/or Jerry Uy vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al.,G.R. N186019. March 29, 2010.Dismissal; just cause; loss of trust and confidence. Loss of trust and confidence, as a cause fo

termination of employment, is premised on the fact that the employee concerned holds position of responsibility or of trust and confidence. As such, he must be invested witconfidence on delicate matters, such as custody, handling or care and protection of the propertand assets of the employer. And, in order to constitute a just cause for dismissal, the accomplained of must be work-related and must show that the employee is unfit to continue twork for the employer. In the instant case, the petitioners-employees of Promm-Gem have nobeen shown to be occupying positions of responsibility or of trust and confidence. Neither there any evidence to show that they are unfit to continue to work as merchandisers foPromm-Gem. Joeb Aliviado, et al. vs. Procter & Gamble Philippines, Inc., et al.,G.R. N160506, March 9, 2010.
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Dismissal; just cause; misconduct. Misconduct has been defined as improper or wrong conducthe transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a derelictioof duty, unlawful in character implying wrongful intent and not mere error of judgment. Thmisconduct to be serious must be of such grave and aggravated character and not merely triviaand unimportant. To be a just cause for dismissal, such misconduct (a) must be serious; (bmust relate to the performance of the employees duties; and (c) must show that the employehas become unfit to continue working for the employer. In other words, in order to constitut

serious misconduct which will warrant the dismissal of an employee under paragraph (a) oArticle 282 of the Labor Code, it is not sufficient that the act or conduct complained of haviolated some established rules or policies. It is equally important and required that the act oconduct must have been performed with wrongful intent. In the instant case, petitionersemployees of Promm-Gem may have committed an error of judgment in claiming to bemployees of P&G, but it cannot be said that they were motivated by any wrongful intent idoing so. As such, the Court found them guilty of simple misconduct only, for assailing thintegrity of Promm-Gem as a legitimate and independent promotion firm. A misconduct whicis not serious or grave, as that existing in the instant case, cannot be a valid basis for dismissinan employee. Joeb Aliviado, et al. vs. Procter & Gamble Philippines, Inc., et al.,G.R. N160506, March 9, 2010.Dismissal; just cause; union security clause. In terminating the employment of an employee benforcing the union security clause, the employer is required only to determine and prove tha(1) the union security clause is applicable; (2) the union is requesting for the enforcement othe union security provision in the CBA; and (3) there is sufficient evidence to support thdecision of the union to expel the employee from the union. These requisites constitute jucause for terminating an employee based on the union security provision of the CBA.It is the third requisite that appears to be lacking in this case. It is apparent from the identictermination letters that GMC terminated Casio, et al., by relying upon the resolutions of th

union, which made no mention at all of the evidence supporting the decision of the union texpel Casio, et al. from the union. GMC never alleged nor attempted to prove that the companactually looked into the evidence of the union for expelling Casio, et al. and made determination on the sufficiency thereof. Without such a determination, GMC cannot claim thait had terminated the employment of Casio, et al. for just cause. The failure of GMC to make determination of the sufficiency of evidence supporting the decision of the union constitutenon-observance by GMC of procedural due process in the dismissal of employees. GenerMilling Corporation vs. Ernesto Casio, et al. and Virgilio Pino, et al.,G.R. No. 149552, March 12010.Dismissal pursuant to union security clause; separate notice and haring required. GMC illegal

dismissed Casio, et al. because not only did GMC fail to make a determination of the sufficiencof evidence to support the unions decision to expel Casio, et al., it also failed to accord thexpelled union members procedural due process, i.e., notice and hearing, prior to thtermination of their employment.GMC, by its own admission, did not conduct a separate and independent investigation tdetermine the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the unions expulsion of Casio, et al.simply acceded to the unions demand. Consequently, GMC cannot insist that it has no liabilitfor the payment of backwages and damages to Casio, et al., and that the liability for sucpayment should fall only upon the union officers and board members who expelled Casio, et alGMC completely missed the point that the expulsion of Casio, et al. by the union and th

termination of employment of the same employees by GMC, although related, are two separat


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and distinct acts. Despite a closed shop provision in the CBA, law and jurisprudence imposupon GMC the obligation to accord Casio, et al. substantive and procedural due process beforcomplying with the unions demand to dismiss the expelled union members from service. Thfailure of GMC to carry out this obligation makes it liable for illegal dismissal of Casio, eal. General Milling Corporation vs. Ernesto Casio, et al. and Virgilio Pino, et al.,G.R. No. 14955March 10, 2010.Employee benefit; bonus. By definition, abonus is a gratuity or act of liberality of the giver.

is something given in addition to what is ordinarily received by or strictly due the recipient. bonus is granted and paid to an employee for his industry and loyalty which contributed to thsuccess of the employers business and made possible the realization of profits. A bonus is alsgranted by an enlightened employer to spur the employee to greater efforts for the success othe business and realization of bigger profits.Generally, a bonus is not a demandable and enforceable obligation. For a bonus to benforceable, it must have been promised by the employer and expressly agreed upon by thparties. Given that the bonus in this case is integrated in the CBA, the same partakes the naturof a demandable obligation. Verily, by virtue of its incorporation in the CBA, the Christmabonus due to respondent Association has become more than just an act of generosity on thpart of the petitioner but a contractual obligation it has undertaken.

All given, business losses are a feeble ground for petitioner to repudiate its obligation under thCBA. The rule is settled that any benefit and supplement being enjoyed by the employeecannot be reduced, diminished, discontinued or eliminated by the employer. The principle onon-diminution of benefits is founded on the constitutional mandate to protect the rights oworkers and to promote their welfare and to afford labor full protection. Hence, absent anproof that the employers consent was vitiated by fraud, mistake or duress, it is presumed thait entered into the CBA voluntarily and had full knowledge of the contents thereof and waaware of its commitments under the contract. Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs. Lepanto Ceramic

Employees Association,G.R. No. 180866, March 2, 2010.Employee; monetary award. The law and the rules are consistent in stating that themployment permit must be acquired prior to employment. The Labor Code states: Any alieseeking admission to the Philippines for employment purposes and any domestic or foreigemployer who desires to engage an alien for employment in the Philippines shall obtain aemployment permit from the Department of Labor. Section 4, Rule XIV, Book 1 of thImplementing Rules and Regulations provides: No alien seeking employment, whether as resident or non-resident, may enter the Philippines without first securing an employment permfrom the Ministry. If an alien enters the country under a non-working visa and wishes to bemployed thereafter, he may only be allowed to be employed upon presentation of a dul

approved employment permit.Galera worked in the Philippines without a proper work permit but now wants to claiemployees benefits under Philippine labor laws. She cannot come to this Court with uncleahands. To grant Galeras prayer is to sanction the violation of the Philippine labor laws requirinaliens to secure work permits before their employment. WPP Marketing Communications, Inet al. vs. Jocelyn M. Galera/Jocelyn M. Galera Vs. WPP Marketing Communications, Inc. eal.,G.R. No. 169207/G.R. No. 169239, March 25, 2010.Employee vs. corporate officer. Corporate officers are given such character either by thCorporation Code or by the corporations by-laws. Under Section 25 of the Corporation Codethe corporate officers are the president, secretary, treasurer and such other officers as may b

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corporation, or the board of directors may be empowered under the by-laws of a corporation tcreate additional offices as may be necessary.

An examination of WPPs by-laws resulted in a finding that Galeras appointment as a corporatofficer (Vice-President with the operational title of Managing Director of Mindshare) during special meeting of WPPs Board of Directors is an appointment to a non -existent corporatoffice. WPPs by-laws provided for only one Vice-President. At the time of Galeras appointmenon 31 December 1999, WPP already had one Vice-President in the person of Webster. Galer

cannot be said to be a director of WPP also because all five directorship positions provided the by-laws are already occupied. Finally, WPP cannot rely on its Amended By-Laws to suppoits argument that Galera is a corporate officer. The Amended By-Laws provided for more thaone Vice-President and for two additional directors. Even though WPPs stockholders voted fothe amendment on 31 May 2000, the SEC approved the amendments only on 16 Februar2001. Galera was dismissed on 14 December 2000. WPP, Steedman, Webster, and Lansandid not present any evidence that Galeras dismissal took effect with the action of WPPs Boarof Directors.

Additionally, the following provisions in her employment contract are convincing indicators thaGalera was an employee and not a corporate officer: (1) it mandates where and how often shis to perform her work; (2) the wages she receives are completely controlled by WPP; (3) she subject to the regular disciplinary procedures of WPP; (4) section 14 thereof clearly states thashe is a permanent employeenot a Vice-President or a member of the Board of Directors; (5the intellectual property rights created or discovered by petitioner during her employment shaautomatically belong to private respondent WPP [Under the Intellectual Property Code, thcondition prevails if the creator of the work subject to the laws of patent or copyright is aemployee of the one entitled to the patent or copyright]; and (6) the disciplinary procedurstates that her right of redress is through Mindshares Chief Executive Officer for the AsiaPacific. This last circumstance implies that she was not even under the disciplinary control o

WPPs Board of Directors, and therefore, she could not have been a WPP corporate officer aonly the WPP Board of Directors could appoint and terminate its own corporate officer. WPMarketing Communications, Inc. et al. vs. Jocelyn M. Galera/Jocelyn M. Galera vs. WPMarketing Communications, Inc. et al.,G.R. No. 169207/G.R. No. 169239, March 25, 2010.Illegal dismissal. Under Republic Act No. 6715, employees who are illegally dismissed arentitled to full backwages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetarequivalent, computed from the time their actual compensation was withheld from them up tthe time of their actual reinstatement but if reinstatement is no longer possible, the backwageshall be computed from the time of their illegal termination up to the finality of the decision.The employees in this case are entitled to backwages and separation pay, considering tha

reinstatement is no longer possible because the positions they previously occupied are no longeexisting. General Milling Corporation vs. Ernesto Casio, et al. and Virgilio Pino, et al.,G.R. N149552, March 10, 2010.Illegal dismissal. WPPs dismissal of Galera lacked both substantive and procedural duprocess. Apart from Steedmans letter dated 15 December 2000 to Galera, WPP failed to provany just or authorized cause for Galeras dismissal. The law also requires that the employemust furnish the worker sought to be dismissed with two written notices before termination oemployment can be legally effected: (1) notice which apprises the employee of the particulaacts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and (2) the subsequent notice which informthe employee of the employers decision to dismiss him. Failure to comply with thes

requirements taints the dismissal with illegality. WPPs acts clearly show that Galeras dismiss
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Selected Labor Law Jurisprudence, From Feb2009-January2013