LECTUREONE12May1959LetmebeinwitghthefictionthatyoudonotyetknowanytghinabouttheCritiqueofPureReason.Thisfictionissimultaneouslylegitimateandillegitimate.Itisillegitimatesinceitisobviousthateven
todaya
worklikeKant'sepistemologicalmagnumopusradiatessuchauthoritythateveryonehasheardsomethingorotheraboutit.oever,in.
adee,perenseiisless ofafictionthanitse,ms.ebecomespublicknowledgeit
tendsgenerallytoobscureits
truemean-ingratherthantoelucidateit.Theformulaetowhichphilosophiesupinarigidfashionandthustomakeagenuineinteractionwiththemalltheharder.Tomakethepointmorespecificallyinrelationnicanrevolutionconsistedintheideathattheelementsofcognitionthathadpreviouslybeensoughtintheobjects,inthings-in-them-selves,werenowtobetransferredtothesubject,inotherwordstoreason,thefacultyofcognition.1Tn
suchacrudeformulationthisviewofKantisalsofalsebecause,ontheonehand,thesubjectiveturninphilosophyismucholderthanKant-inthemodernhistoryofphilosophyit
goesbacktoDescartes,andthereisa sensein
whichDavidHume,Kant'simportantEnglishprecursor,wasmoreofasubjectivistthanKant.Andontheotherhand,thiswidelyheldbeliefismistakenbecausethetrueinterestoftheCritiqueofPureReasonisconcernedlesswiththesubject,theturntothesubject,thanwithLIILUUjLLLlVCHdLU1411-IllLlull.2LECTUREONEIfImaymakeastartwithaprogrammaticstatement,asortofmotto,encapsulatingwhatyouareabouttohear,IwouldsaythattheKantianro`pJectcanactuallybecharacterizednotasonethatadoptssubjectivismin
ordertodoawaywiththeobjectivityofcogni-tion,butas
onethatgroundsobjectivityinthesubjectasan
objectivereality.Itstandsincontrasttothepreviouslydominantviewwhichdowngradedobjectivitybyemphasizingthesubject,andrestricteditinaspiritofscepticism.This,wemightsay,isKant'sprojectintheCritiqueofPureReason,andhehimselfhassaidsoinanotverywell-knownpassageinthePrefacetotheCritiqueofPureReason.Ishallreaditouttoyouatoncebecauseitmayhelptodispelasignificantmisunderstandingfromtheveryoutset.Hisenquiry,hesays,
hastwosides,oneofwhichis
concernedwithobjects,whiletheotherseekstoinvestigatethepureunderstandingitself,itspossibilityandthecognitivefacultiesuponwhichitrests;andsodealswithitinitssubjectiveaspect'.2Hegoesontosaythat,importantthoughthisexpositionis,itisnotessentialtohischiefpurpose',forthechiefquestionisalwaysthis-whatandhowmuchcantheunderstandingandreasonknowapartfromallexperience?Not:-howis
thefacultyofthoughtitselfpossible?'3Ibelieve,therefore,thatifyouacceptrightfromthestartthattheinterestoftheCritiqueofPureReasonliesinitsintentiontoestablishtheobjectivenatureofcognition,ortosalvageit,ifI
mayanticipatemyfutureargument,thiswillaffordyouaetteraccbesstotheworkthanif
yousimplysurrendhertotewidespreadideaofKant'sso-calledsubjectivism.4ThisremainstrueeventhoughthesetwoaspectsofKant'sphilosophyareinconstantfrictionwithoneanother.Howthisprocessoffriction,howthesetwoaspects,relatetooneanotherinaseriesofconfigurationsandhowthisgives
rise toawholesetof problems-toexplorethiswill bethetaskI
havesetmyselfinthislecturecourse.ButletmereturntothefictionIstartedwith.ItisreasonableformetoassumethatyouhavenopreconceivednotionsabouttheCritiqueofPureReasonbecausethetraditionalbeliefssurroundingthisworknolongersurvive.Once,somefortyyearsago,averyimortanthilosppopherof
thedayremarkedwittilythata
pphilosoherwassomeonewhoknewwhatwassaidin
thebookshehadnotread.AndthisremarkcouldprobablybesaidtohaveappliedtotheCrt-tiqueofPureReason.In
otherwords,theaurasurroundingthisbookwassoextraordinaryatthetimethatevenpeopleunfamiliarwiththetextseemtohavehadafeeling'forwhatitcontained-ifyouwillpardonmyuseofthisword;nootherwordwillreallydo.Theintel-lectualsituationofourageis
oneinwhichnoworkbelongingtothepastreallyenjoyssuchauthorityanymore,andcertainlynotKant'sM
E T HO"DSA NDI N T E N T !
O3NS~manumo~us,forthesimplereasonthattheschoolthatdominatedtheGermanuniversitiesuntilaroundfortyyearsagohasfadedsome-whatandhasbecomesomethingofadeaddog.sThiswastheNeo-Kantianschoolinitsvariousguises-mathematicalinMarburgandarts-orientatedinsouth-westGermany.InconsequencetheCritiqueofPureReasonisnolongerabletoderiveanysortoftraditionalnourishmentfromthatsourceeither.Iimagine,therefore,thatyoumaywellapproachtheCritiqueofPureReasonwithsomethingofthefeelingthatitislikeanoldstatueoftheGreatElector,6anidolstandingonitsplinthgatheringdust,somethingthattheprofessorskeepondiscussingbecause,regrettably,theyhavebeeninthehabitofdoingsoforthepast150years,butnotanythingthatneedcon-cernusovermuchtoday.Whatindeedarewesupposedtodowithit?YouwillprobablyhaveanideathattheCritiqueofPureReasonisconcernedontheonehandwithparticularquestionsofscientifictheoryandthatitisfilled
withdiscoursespertainingtotheindividualsciences,discoursesthatfor
themostparthavenowbeensuperseded.Forexample,youwillallhaveheardsomethingtotheeffectthattheKantiantheoryoftheaprion`natureoftimeandspacehasbeenunderminedbyrelativitytheory,orthattheKantiantheoryofcaus-alityasanaprioricategoryhasbeenrefutedbyquantummechanics.Ontheotherhand,however,thenarrower,morespecificallyphilo-sophicalquestionsoftheCritiqueofPureReason-thatistosay,thosenotconnectedwiththegroundingofthesciences-maywellhavelostsomethingoftheirexaltedstatusinyoureyes.Forwhenyouheartheconceptofmetaphysics'-tomentiontheothertermthatforms
thesubjectoftheKantiancritique-youwillnotgenerallybe thinkingof
thesameconceptsasformedtheessenceof
metaphysicsinKant'seyes-thatistosay,theconceptsofGod,freedomandimmortality,orof
theindependenceortheexistenceornon"`-existenceof
thesoul.Youhaveinsteadbeenbroughtuptofind
thetrueessenceofmetaphysicsinsuchconceptsasBeing[Sein].Letmesayrightawaythattheso-calledquestionofBeing'doesnotrepresentaninnovationwhencomparedto
theCritiqueofPureReason,orahappyrediscovery.WecouldrathersaythatKanthassomeverydefiniteandunambiguouscommentstomakeaboutthequestionofBeing'inaverycentralchapteroftheCritiqueofPureReason,namelythechapterontheAmphibolyofConceptsofReflection.AndImayPerhapsaddthatif
youdonotwishtocapitulatetothecurrenttalkaboutBeing'andtosuccumbhelplesslytothesuggestivepowerofthisso-calledphilosophyofBeing',it
wouldbe
averygoodthingforyoutofamiliarizeyourselveswiththesematters.It
isnotmywishtoeliminatetheproblemsinvolvedherebyproclaimingina
professorial4LECTUREONEmannerthattheCritiqueofPureReasonisaGod-givenworkwiththekindof
authorityenjoyedby,
say,Platoforthelasttwothousandyears,ortoassertthatwefeel
paralysedwhenconfrontedwiththeseeternalvaluesandunabletomusterthenecessaryrespectandthenecessaryinterest.{wouldsay
that,onthecontrary,suchadmonitionsvtheemselssmackoftheimpotenceandhollownessimplicitinanysuchconceptofunchanging,eternalvalues.I
shouldlikeinsteadtodosomethingelse.Icannotdenythat1
stillbelievethatthisworkisonethatdeservestheverygreatestrespect.Itdoessoforquiteobjectivereasons,albeitforreasonsthatareverydifferentfromthosetowhichitoweditspositionwhenitfirstappeared.WhatI
shouldlike is tomakethisbookspeaktous. I
shouldliketoshowyouwhatinterestthemattersthatarediscussedinit
canstillholdforustoday.AndI
shouldliketorehearsetheexperiencestatuner
letIshdI.worasjectiverealities,asexperiencesfor`mmganessentialpartofthehistoryofphilosophy.I
attemptedsomethingofthesortinmymemoriallectureonHegelthatsomeofyoumayhaveheard.7So
whatI
wouldliketodoistoretranslatethisphilo-sophyfromacodified,ossifiedsystembackintothekindofpicturethatresultsfromasustainedX-rayexamination.Thatistosay,Ishouldliketourgeyoutoconceiveof
thisphilosophyas
aforcefield,assomethinginwhichtheabstractconceptsthatcomeintoconflictwithoneanotherandconstantlymodifyyoneanotherreal}standinforactuallivingforces.At
thesametimeandasamatterofcourse-if I haveanysuccessatall
inachievingmyaims-anessentialtaskwillbetoenableyoutoreadthe-veryextensive-textof
theCritiqueofPureReasonforyourselves.I
hopeyouwilllearnhowtodistinguishbetweenitsessentialandless
essentialaspects,acrucialmatterwhenreadingKant.AndI hopealsoto
makethingscomealiveby
presentingthemintermsofanumberofmodels.ItisnotmyintentiontogiveyoulengthyparaphrasesoftheCritiqueofPureReason,ortosupplyyouwithcommentariesonparticularpassages.All
thathasbeendonecountlesstimesandthoseofyouwhowouldlikesuchanapproachcanfindmorethanenoughexamplesofit
inthesecondaryliterature.InsteadIshalltrytointroduceyoutothecorephilosophicalprob-lemsthroughthediscussionofparticularquestionsthatIregardasbeingofcentralimportance.ButIshalldothis,asIhavesaid,notthroughtheexpositionofKat]t'sideasasacompletephilosophy,butasakindoftranscriptoftheintellectualexperiencesthathebehindthem.Andtheconceptofexperience(orwhatI
wishtoshowyouofit)is notonethatcanbeexplainedabstractlyinadvance.I
wouldaskyounottoexpectmetostartwitha definitionofwhatI
meanbyit;itsmeaningwillbecomeclearinthecourseoftheselectures.METHO~DSANDINTENTIO5NS~Youwillbecurioustolearnabouttheactualsourceoftheintim-idatingreputationofthisworkasthephilosophicalworkparexcel-lence.A
pointintimewhenatraditionhascometoanendandwhentheauthorityofbooksisnolongertakenforgrantedhastheadvant-agethatitispossibletoputsuchquestions.IshouldliketotellyouthatifI
havespokenofthelossofauthorityoftheCritiqueofPureReason,thisisnotjustaninventionofmine.ThereareinfactphilosophicaltrendstodaythatreallydoregardthewholeofKant'sphilosophyasnothingmorethanacultobjectthathasnowbeensupersededthankstoadvancesinscientificknowledge,andthatfarfromcallingforphilosophicallabouritcanatbesthopeforacertainantiquarianinterest.AnexampleisHansReichenbach,thelogicalpositivist,whohasdefendedthispointofview,withgreatcourage,ifnotalwayswiththerequisitesensitivity,inhisbookTheRiseofScienticPhilosophyandinanumberofotherwritings.8_____________________________________________________________________actuallyderivesitsgreatauthority-particularlywhenyouseethatit
saysnothingaboutthemajortopicswhichmightbethoughttobeofinterest.Tomakethisbrutallycleartoyou:ifyouexpecttofindin
theCritiqueofPureReasonproofsfororagainsttheexistenceofGodortheimmortalityofthesouloroffreedom,youwillbesorelydisappointed.Itis
truethatthereis
nolackofsuchproofs,aboveallinthegreatsecondpartoftheTranscendentalLogic,namelytheTranscendentalDialectic.However,theseproofssufferfromthegravedefectthatKanthasalwaysarrangedthemambiguouslybecausehehasalwaysadvancedthemintheformofantinomies.Whatthismeansisthathehasdemonstratedthatboththetruthofthesecon-ceptsandthatoftheiroppositescanbeproved.Whatwehavehereisatheoryofcognition,butatheoryofcognitioninadoublesense.Thefirstmeaningisthatitattemptstolaythefoundationsofthesciencesthatin
Kant'seyes areestablishedandfreefromdoubt,thatis
tosay,ofmathematicsandthenaturalsciences.Thesecondmean-inglies
inhisattempttorestrictthepossibilityofknowledgeofthose_____________________________________________________________________important.Youhavetobeclearaboutthis.TheCritiqueofPureReasondoedoesnotdeHoyttpheoleexise~dst.tAwhcoenncepHelts;.neforremexkedplle',nhetheHistoryofReligionandPhilosophyinGermany,thattheupshotoftheCritiqueofPureReasonisthateventheLordofLordsisdying,wallowing-unproven-inhisownblood',thentheemphasismustbe
placedonthewordunproven.9Thatis tosay,whatis limitedis
thepossibilityofproof;judgementsaboutthesecategoriesassucharenotmadein
thebook.Whatconstitutestheenormoussignificance6LECTUREONEofthebookandwhatreallychangedthewholeintellectualclimateina
waythatreverberatesdowntotheeverydaylife ofourmindstodayis
probablythefactthatit
deniedthatcertainquestionswererationalandhencebanishedthemfromourhorizons.BernhardGroethuysen,the.historianofideas,hasattempted~to
show_ inhiswritingshowoaneeviiGddthdI
dsappearedfromtheworldinthecourosefthelaterseventeenthandearlyeighteenthcenturies-notaspartofatrendtowardsatheism,butbecausethequestionsaboutthemceasedtoease.owwbkd
loNemightsaythattheachievementoftheCritiqueofPureReasonisthatawholeseriesofthesegreatmetaphysical,fundamentalconceptsvanishedfromthehorizonofwhatcouldberationallydecided.Andinthesameway,moderntheology,asithasbeendevelopedbyKarlBarth,followingSofenKierkegaard,hasinsistedwithgreatfeelingonplacingthecategoriesoftheologyinextremeoppositiontoknowledgeandhasarguedthatwhatappliestothemistheparadoxicalconceptoffaith.IfthishasbeenpossibleitisbecauseitisimplicitintheKantiansituation,inthesensethatthesharpdistinctionthatKantmadebetweenknowledgeandthosemetaphysicalcategoriesisafundamentalpremiseforustoday.Thusif
wearetospeakofthecritiqueofpurereason,qthiscritiuemustberegardedas
neithera negativereply,norindeedas
areplyofanysort,tothefundamentalquestionsofphilosophy.Itisratheracritiqueofthosequestions.Itisa
critiqueoftheabilityofreasontoposesuchquestions,todothemjustice.WemaysayperhapsthattheenormousimpactoftheCritiqueof
PureReasonhasitssourcein
thecircumstancethatitwasineffectthefirstworktogiveexpressiontotheelementofbourgeoisresignation,tothatrefusaltomakeanysignificantstatementonthecrucialquestions,andinsteadtosetuphouseinthefiniteworldandexploreitineverydirection,as
Goethephrasedit.11Thisisa
verydifferentkindofoutlookfromtheradicalatheismofthephi/osophesoftheEnlightenmentsuchas
HelvtinsorLaMettrieorHolbach,whoreallydidgivenegativeanswersandinwhosethoughtreasonwassufficientlyconfidenttomakestatementsabouttheAbsolute.Itispreciselythisthatis
restrictedinKant.ThecrucialfeatureoftheKantianwork(andthiswillperhapsgiveyouaninsightintoitsinnernature)is
thatitisguidedbytheconvictionthatreasonis
deniedtherighttostrayintotherealmoftheAbsolute,tostrayintointelligibleworlds',ashetermsit.12Thisexplainswhywecanstandwithbothfeetfirmlyplantedonthegroundanditisthankstothisthatwereallyknowwhatitisthatwecanpositivelyanddefinitelyknow.Wemightalmostsay,then,thatwhathasbeencodifiedintheCri-tt'que
ofPureReasonisa theodicyofbourgeoislife whichis
consciousMETHODSANDINTENT{ONS7_____________________________________________________________________ofitsownpracticalactivitywhiledespairingofthefulfilmentofitsownutopia.ThepoweroftheCritiqueo(PureReasonresidesnotsomuchinitsresponsestotheso-calledmetaphysicalquestionsasin
itshighlyheroicandstoicalrefusaltorespondtothesequestionsin
thefirstplace.WhatmakesthispossibleforKantistheself-reflexivenatureofreason.BythisImeanthat,asarationalbeing,Iamcap-ableofreflectingonmyownreason,andthroughthisreflectionI
amaetogivemyblselfanaccountofwhatitcanandcannothacieve.Thisdualaspectofself-reflexivityiswhatenablesKanttoclaimthathehasestablishedthefoundationofexperience-inotherwordstheoriginalleadingconceptsofourknowledgeofnature;andontheotherhand,it
iswhatpreventsusfromgoingbeyondthisknowledgeandenteringintospeculationsabouttheAbsolute.Nevertheless,Ishouldsayatthispointthattheideaoftheself-reflexivityofreasoncontainsadifficultyandalsoachallengethatonlyemergedfullyinpost-KantianphilosophyandthephilosophyofGermanidealisminthenarrowersense.Thedifficultyis
thatwecanenquire,howcanreasoncriticizeitself?Doesnotthefactthatitcriticizesitselfmeanthatitis
alwayscaughtupinaprejudice?Thatis
tosay,whenreasonjudgesthepossibilityofmakingabsolutestate-ments,doesthisnotnecessarilyimplythatithasalreadymadestate-mentsabouttheAbsolute?Andinfactpost-KantianidealismdidtakeupthisquitesimpleideaandturnitagainstKant.PerhapsthecrucialdistinctionbetweenKantandhissuccessorsisthatinKantthereflexivityofreasonisconceivedinaquitestraightforwardway,muchas
withtheEnglishempiricistswhosimilarlydissectthemechan-isms
ofreason.ItistruethatatonepointKantdoesmakefunof
theconceptofthephysiologyofreasonthathefoundinLockeandwhichventuredsomethingofthesort.13Butwhenwelookmorecloselyatwhathehashimselfdonein
theCritiqueofPureReason,wediscoverthatitisrlotallthatfarremovedfromsuchaphysiologyofreason,thatis,fromadissectionofreason,albeitinthecaseofKantonthebasisofprinciples'.Incontrasthissuccessorsthenfaceduptothequestionofwhatitmeansforreasontocriticizeitself-andtheywereledbythatquestionbothtocriticizeKantandtoinferaseriesofanswersthatKanthimselfwasinitiallyunwillingtoprovidewithhiscritique.ButI
believethatitwouldbegoodforyoutograsptheideathat,forallKant'snotoriousreputationfordifficulty,hewasarelativelystraightforwardwriterinasmuchashebelieved-withoutwastingtoomuchtimethinkingaboutit-thatreasonisabletotreatof
thereoe~kowwile.thdge'tfllsjus,t_anas
thffeIsct`,Iaser8LECTUREONEprerequisiteforunderstandingKantthatisabsolutelyindispensableifyouwishtoseewhatisinvolvedinhisphilosophy-connectedwiththisisthefactthatunderlyingKant'sphilosophyliesahugeconfidenceinthemathematicalnaturalsciences;andthathisphilo-sophyisabsolutelyfullofthespiritofthesesciences.IfwewishtograspthechiefinspirationofthewholeCritiqueofPureReason,wemightlocateitin
theideathattheattemptsofmetaphysicstoarriveatabsolutecertaintiesbyspinningthemoutof
merethoughthaveallfailed-andHumewasrighttocriticizethem.Butthisdoesnotmeanthatweshoulddespairbecause,thankstothepersuasiveforceofthemathematicalsciences-particularlymathematicsitselfandwhattodaywewouldcalltheoreticalphysics-wepossessanentirebodyof
knowledgethatactuallydoessatisfythecriterionof
absolutetruth.Kant'sachievementonlybecomescomprehensibleontheassumptionthatscienceprovidestheabsoluteknowledgewhichmerelyabstractspeculationhadfailedtodeliver.Ibelievethattosaythisisenoughtoeliminateoneofthediffi-cutiestattentlhdocropupinthemindoftheso-'calleddnaivereaerwhoembarksupontheCritiqueofPureReasonforthefirst
time.ForKantbeginswiththequestionHoware synthetica
priorijudgementspossible?'(Thiscomesin theIntroductionandit
isexploredatlengthinthecourseofthebOOk.14)ThisisoneofthechiefquestionsoftheCritiqueofPureReason.Withoutbotheringwithanylongdrawn-outpreamblesIshouldliketosaysomethingaboutthesignificanceofthisquestion.ButfirstI
wanttocommentontheshockcontainedintheexpressionHowaretheypossible?'Forwhenthespeculativephilosopherapproachesthisbookheexpectsacompletelydifferentquestion,namely,Aresyntheticapriorijudgements,inotherwords,bIIvliasouteyadstatements,possible?ThisquestionisnotputintheCritiqueofPureReason.15
Youcansee
hereplainlyhowdifficultitistounderstandaworksimplybyreadingthetext,withoutanypriorassumptions.Andif
alecturecourselikethisone(andeverylecturecourseoncomparabletopics)hasanyjustificationbeyondthemerefactthatitisadvertisedintheuniversitylectureprogramme,thisjustificationmustsurelybesoughtintherealizationthatsuchworkscannotsimplybeunderstoodontheirown.Thisisnotmeantin
theominousschoolmasterlysensethatyouneedtoknowthehistoricalcontextsoas
tobeabletoplacethemcorrectly-I
amquiteindiffer-enttosuchmatters-butin
ordertograspthefactthattheproblemsunderdiscussionareonlycomprehensibleifyouarefamiliarwithcertainforcefieldswithinwhichphilosophiesmaybesaidtomove.Kant'sworkiscalledTheCritiqueofPureReason,andtheem-phasisheredoubtlessfallsonthewordcritique'.InessencethereisMETHODSANDINTENTIONS9_____________________________________________________________________nothingnewinthissincewemightsaythattheentirehistoryofphilosophyisnothingbutonevastnexusofcriticismwhichhasledconsciousnesstoitsideas,itsconceptsandultimatelytoitself.InthissensetheCritiqueofPureReasonisanencounterofphilosophywithIlse.uswaw.lfThhflishtosayisthatthisstrangeformulaHowaresynthetica
priorijudgementspossible?'doesbecomemeaningfulandatthesametimeitrevealssomethingoftheentirecomplexion,theInnerworIng"ksofKant'sthought.Itdoessobecausewhatlistruysubstantial,theelementthatseemstoconstituteitsunquestionabletruth,manifestsitselfin
theshapeofthesyntheticapriorijudgementsandbecauseitdoesnotspinthetruthabstractlyfromwithinitself,butproceedsfromthetruth,as
Kantcallsit,asif
fromagiven',andstickstoknowledgethatitholdstobetrueandabsolute.Letmetellyourightawaywhatsyntheticapriorijudgementsare.Forgivemeif
Ispeakataratherbasiclevel,butif
IamtotakeseriouslymyownfictionthatyouknownothingofKant,thereis
nootherwayforward.I muststartbytellingyouwhata
judgementis.Youallhaveamoreorlessvagueideaofwhatismeant,butIamsureit
is
Vaue.lugtheoldtraditionoflogic,judSementsweredefinedastheunionofsubject,predicateandcopula-thatistosay,anobjectwhichcorrespondsingrammaticaltermstoasubjecthassome-thingdifferentpredicatedofit.Thisisexpressedintheformofis',asinAisB'.Thisisasomewhatsuperficialcharacterizationofajudgementbecauseitpresupposesthatthesecomponentsarediscreteentities,whichisnotinfactthecase.Moreover,theimpliedidentityofA
=
Bisproblematicbecauseingeneraltheconceptbeneathwhichaspecificthingissubsumedisalwaysbroaderthanthatthing,sothatthejudgcmcntisbothidcnticalandnon-identical.Youencounterdifficultiesofallkindsherewiththeconsequencethatajudgementisdefinedasastateofaffairsofwhichitismeaningfultoaskwhetheritistrueorfalse.Ifsuchastateofaffairsisexpressedinwordsitiscustomarytocallitaproposition[Satz],butthisdistinctionplaysnosignificantroleinKant.InKantweheargenerallyofjudgements',eventhoughitispropositionsthataregenerallymeantandnottheInterconnectionsbetweenprimitive,pre-linguisticconcepts.Judgementsmaybesyntheticoranalytic.Thismeansthatthecon-cePtin
thepredicateaddssomethingtotheconceptin
thesubject,or,moreprecisely,theconceptinthepredicateisnotcontainedinthatofthesubject.Wherethatisnotthecase,thatistosay,if
wehaveajudgementthataddssomethingnewandiswhatwemaycallanampliativejudgement',thenwespeakofsyntheticjudgements.Andhrethatisnothecase.,
wertheprcdateissiplya,
repeti~on_____________________________________________________________________JOLECTUREONEwespeakof
analyticjudgements.In thatcasethejudgementisa
mereanalysis,amereanalysisofitsownsubject;itmerelymakesexplicitwhatisalreadycontainedinthesubject.Inotherwords,analyticjudgementsarereallyalltautologies.Kantcombinestheseconceptswiththeadditionalconceptsofaprioriandaposteriori.Itis
self-evidentthattheanalyticjudgementsareall
apriori,thatistosay,theyarevalidabsolutelyanduncondi-tionally-preciselybecausetheyaretautologous.Becausetheyare'a,ctuallynotJudgementsatalltheycannotberefuted.Theyaresim-plyrepetitionsof
definitionsthatarepresupposed.Syntheticjudge-ments,ontheotherhand,canbeeitherapriorioraposteriori.Thismeansthatif
youmakeastatementaboutsomething,formajudge-mentaboutit,thenthisjudgementmayeitherarisefromexperience(Kantwouldsay)oritcanbenecessaryeventhoughit
isnotalreadycontainedintheconcept.Thusif
yousay,Allmenaremortal',thatisajudgementofexperience,sincemortalityisnotimplicitassuchintheconceptofmen'However,whenyousayAllbodiesareextended',thatis
a synthetica priorijudgement.16 It meansthatexten-sionis
notcontainedintheconceptof
thebody,butnotwithstandingthatallbodiesnecessarilypossessthequalityofextension.Youwinowll
askme-andthisbringsmebackhtoteGreatElectorandtothequestionofwhetherhehasa
wigorapigtail-youmaywellobject:forgoodness'sake,thisissupposedtobethemostimportantworkinthehistoryofphilosophyandnowwehavetoendureanaccountofhowsyntheticaprtorijudgementsarepossible.Wehavetoputupwithlisteningtotheassertionthatjudgementsarepossiblewhichsaysomethingnew,butwhicharevalidforalltime.
. .
OnthispointwehavetosaythattheconceptoftruthinKant-andthisisprofoundlyboundupwithbourgeoisthought-isitselfthatofatimelesstruth.Tobeabsolute'forKantmeansasmuchas
tobeirrefutablebythepassageoftime;anabsolutelysecuresiposseson;somethingthatcannotbetakenawayfromyou,thatyoucankeepsafeinyourownhandsforever.Theconceptofatimelesstruth,theconceptthatonlythatwhichistimelesscanbegenuinelytrue,whereaswhatevercanberefutedcannotreallyaspiretotheconceptoftruth-thatisoneoftheinnermostdrivingforcesofKantianphilosophy.Andif,finally,theideaofimmortalityappearsasoneofthesupremeideas,thatprovidesyouwiththekeytotheenormousemotionalweightthatthisconceptof
ana priort statushasin Kant.Whatheis concernedwithinhisworkisa
kindoftenderingofaccountsinwhichheseekstocrystallizethosetruthsthatIenduppossessingwithabsolutecertainty,withoutincurringanydebtsandwithouttheirbeingexposedtoanyclaimsthroughthepassageof
