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Arun Sood George Mason University/Computer Science Task Technologies Ltd [email protected], 703.347.4494 SCIT Collaborators: Dr Yih Huang, Mr. David Arsenault, Mr. Ravi Bhaskar and Mr. Jeffrey Zeiberg http://cs.gmu.edu/~asood/scit Research supported by TATRC (US Army), NIST funded Critical Infrastructure Protection Program, SUN Microsystems Self Cleansing Intrusion Tolerance: An Approach for Increasing Security and Availability

Self Cleansing Intrusion Tolerance: An Approach for Increasing Security and Availability

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Self Cleansing Intrusion Tolerance: An Approach for Increasing Security and Availability. Arun Sood George Mason University/Computer Science Task Technologies Ltd [email protected], 703.347.4494 SCIT Collaborators: Dr Yih Huang, Mr. David Arsenault, Mr. Ravi Bhaskar and Mr. Jeffrey Zeiberg - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: Self Cleansing Intrusion Tolerance:  An Approach for Increasing Security and Availability

Arun SoodGeorge Mason University/Computer Science

Task Technologies Ltd [email protected], 703.347.4494

SCIT Collaborators: Dr Yih Huang, Mr. David Arsenault, Mr. Ravi Bhaskar and Mr. Jeffrey Zeiberg

http://cs.gmu.edu/~asood/scit

Research supported by TATRC (US Army), NIST funded Critical Infrastructure Protection Program, SUN Microsystems

Self Cleansing Intrusion Tolerance: An Approach for Increasing Security and

Availability

Page 2: Self Cleansing Intrusion Tolerance:  An Approach for Increasing Security and Availability

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Background and Overview

Self Cleansing Intrusion Tolerance (SCIT)• Limits the exposure of servers to attacks.• Uses redundancy to reduce exposure.• Does *not* rely on signatures, prior knowledge or

intrusion detection. Development process

• Prototypes built for Firewall, Web Server and DNS Server. Working on LDAP.

• Three patent applications are pending. One disclosure filed.

• SCIT research funded by US Army (TATRC), NIST funded Critical Infrastructure Protection Project, and SUN Microsystems.

Page 3: Self Cleansing Intrusion Tolerance:  An Approach for Increasing Security and Availability

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Review of Intrusion Management

Intrusion Prevention.• Block intrusions.• Common security practices, such as blocking unused

ports, restricting Server privileges, choosing strong passwords, …

Intrusion Detection and Recovery.• Timely detection of intrusion to stop losses and repair

damage.• Processing overhead grows with traffic volume.• A large site will have to use a significant portion of the

processing power for intrusion detection.• False alarm management.

Page 4: Self Cleansing Intrusion Tolerance:  An Approach for Increasing Security and Availability

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Review - 2

Intrusion Tolerance.• Minimizes losses and facilitates automatic recovery.

• Addresses undetected intrusion (the worst-case scenarios).

SCIT: Self Cleansing Intrusion Tolerance.• Security thru server cleansing and rotations.• Effectiveness increases with server redundancy.• Reduces exposure window.• Fends off attacks or at least limits losses.• Makes it difficult to exploit vulnerabilities.• Overhead independent of traffic volume.

Page 5: Self Cleansing Intrusion Tolerance:  An Approach for Increasing Security and Availability

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Project Summary

Our objective is to develop a secure cluster architecture that• Applies to several critical and/or infrastructure applications. • Manages undetected attacks.• Improves security through increasing server redundancy.

• Improvements in security can be “bought”.

• Hardware redundancy enhances security and availability.• Uses virtualization technologies.

Page 6: Self Cleansing Intrusion Tolerance:  An Approach for Increasing Security and Availability

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Application Domains: Examples

Our work is expected to suit server clusters that • Process transactions with no inter transaction

dependencies. • Can handle session info. State info is more difficult.

• Within reasonable time limits.

Examples: DNS servers, Web servers, Directory servers, File servers, DHCP servers, Authentication servers, Back office servers, Transaction-oriented database servers, …

Page 7: Self Cleansing Intrusion Tolerance:  An Approach for Increasing Security and Availability

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Application Domains: Restrictions

Our current approach does not address the following:• Media streaming servers.• Telnet/ssh servers.• FTP servers, or any server that supports long data

downloads/uploads.• Essentially, long sessions without time constraints.

The solutions to the above are part of our longer term research goals.

Page 8: Self Cleansing Intrusion Tolerance:  An Approach for Increasing Security and Availability

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Overview

Research objectives Self-Cleansing Intrusion Tolerance (SCIT) concept Hardware Enhanced Security (SCIT – HES) DNS – SCIT server Cluster security vs availability trade-off Virtualization

Page 9: Self Cleansing Intrusion Tolerance:  An Approach for Increasing Security and Availability

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Redundancy + SCIT = Availability + Security

SCIT = Self Cleansing Intrusion Tolerance

To Achieve

Page 10: Self Cleansing Intrusion Tolerance:  An Approach for Increasing Security and Availability

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SCIT Server RotationsExample: 5 online and 3 offline servers

Onlineservers;

potentiallycompromised

Server Rotation

Offlineservers; inself-cleansing

Page 11: Self Cleansing Intrusion Tolerance:  An Approach for Increasing Security and Availability

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SCIT Server RotationsExample: 5 online and 3 offline servers

Onlineservers;

potentiallycompromised

Server Rotation

Offlineservers; inself-cleansing

Page 12: Self Cleansing Intrusion Tolerance:  An Approach for Increasing Security and Availability

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SCIT Server RotationsExample: 5 online and 3 offline servers

Onlineservers;

potentiallycompromised

Server Rotation

-No Server service interruption.-For DNS, 2 second exposure time using SUN server.

Offlineservers; inself-cleansing

Page 13: Self Cleansing Intrusion Tolerance:  An Approach for Increasing Security and Availability

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Exposure Window

SCIT increases security by reducing exposure window. Exposure window is the time a server is online. SCIT target - keep the exposure window below T, a client

defined requirement.

Loss Curve

Intruder Res idence Tim e

Lo

ss

T

T

Co

st

Page 14: Self Cleansing Intrusion Tolerance:  An Approach for Increasing Security and Availability

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Overview

Research objectives Self-Cleansing Intrusion Tolerance (SCIT) concept Hardware Enhanced Security (SCIT – HES) DNS – SCIT server Cluster security vs availability trade-off Virtualization

Page 15: Self Cleansing Intrusion Tolerance:  An Approach for Increasing Security and Availability

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SCIT Primitives: Incorruptibility Requirements

SCIT server rotations should not be disrupted.

Online servers connected to the clients (public Internet), but not the central controller.

Offline/cleansing servers connected to controller, but not to the clients.

The controller and cleansing servers always isolated from external influences.

Page 16: Self Cleansing Intrusion Tolerance:  An Approach for Increasing Security and Availability

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Reconfiguration Network Paths using HES

SC

IT C

entr

al

Con

trol

ler

Clients

reset

toggle

Clients

Online

Offline

Page 17: Self Cleansing Intrusion Tolerance:  An Approach for Increasing Security and Availability

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SCIT with Hardware Enhanced Security (HES)

SCITControl

Clients

Clients

Clients

Clients

Page 18: Self Cleansing Intrusion Tolerance:  An Approach for Increasing Security and Availability

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Implementation Considerations

IPMI (Intelligent Platform Management Interface) supports power management (power up/down) and remote reset/reboot.

Many managed Ethernet switches can enable/disable ports individually and dynamically.

Or customized hardware.

Page 19: Self Cleansing Intrusion Tolerance:  An Approach for Increasing Security and Availability

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Overview

Research objectives Self-Cleansing Intrusion Tolerance (SCIT) concept Hardware Enhanced Security (SCIT – HES) DNS – SCIT server Cluster security vs availability trade-off Virtualization

Page 20: Self Cleansing Intrusion Tolerance:  An Approach for Increasing Security and Availability

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Secure DNS

Domain Name

IP Address (type A)

Nominal Name

Nominal Name

Nominal Name

Nominal Name

Signature Resource Record

Null record

Objective: Enhancements to enable query clients to authenticate DNS reply.

Zone private key is used to sign the DNS record.• Zone private key exposure will

comprise integrity of the DNS responses

Query clients verify signature using zone public key

If DNS server is successfully attacked, there are dire consequences

Resource Record Set

Page 21: Self Cleansing Intrusion Tolerance:  An Approach for Increasing Security and Availability

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Dynamic Updates: Key exposed

For secure operations, private key should not be reachable from the public internet.

The Challenge:

How can we do dynamic updates without exposing the private key?

The Solution:

Do Dynamic Update computations off-line. Trade-off:

Turnaround time for Dynamic Updates increases.

Page 22: Self Cleansing Intrusion Tolerance:  An Approach for Increasing Security and Availability

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DNS-HES Cluster

Advertises two public IP addresses• A primary DNS IP.• A secondary DNS IP.

Uses four or more servers• A primary DNS server.• A secondary DNS server.• A backend processing server.• One or more servers in cleansing.

Page 23: Self Cleansing Intrusion Tolerance:  An Approach for Increasing Security and Availability

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Example: DNS-HES Cluster

Online 0

Online 1

One ormoreserversin cleansing(mode C)

P

S

BClients

Clients

Network link

Electrical/Opticalsignal line

MasterStorage

(Master file, keys)

Cen

tral

C

ontr

olle

r

Page 24: Self Cleansing Intrusion Tolerance:  An Approach for Increasing Security and Availability

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The Primary Server Connects to one Online Storage and Clients

P ClientsSCIT

Controller

Online 0 Online 1

MasterStorage

LocalMaster file

Yih Huang
DNS queries and dynamic update requests
Yih Huang
DNS replies
Yih Huang
dynamic update requests
Page 25: Self Cleansing Intrusion Tolerance:  An Approach for Increasing Security and Availability

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Overview

Research objectives Self-Cleansing Intrusion Tolerance (SCIT) concept Hardware Enhanced Security (SCIT – HES) DNS – SCIT server Cluster security vs availability trade-off

Example: 2DNS-3WEB Cluster Virtualization

Page 26: Self Cleansing Intrusion Tolerance:  An Approach for Increasing Security and Availability

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Session Persistence: Sticky Sessions

User 1 User 2 User 3 User N

Load Balancer Traffic Distribution, Session Persistence, SSL Termination

Server 1 Server 2 Server 3 Server N

Page 27: Self Cleansing Intrusion Tolerance:  An Approach for Increasing Security and Availability

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Server Clusters

User 1 User 2 User 3 User N

Load Balancer Traffic Distribution, Session Persistence, SSL Termination

Server 1 Server 2 Server 3 Server N

Persistent db • Disk, memory resident.MulticastingShared memory

Page 28: Self Cleansing Intrusion Tolerance:  An Approach for Increasing Security and Availability

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Virtual Server Implementation: Session Replication

User 1 User 2 User 3 User N

Load Balancer Traffic Distribution, Session Persistence, SSL Termination

Server 1 Server 2 Server 3 Server N

VirtualServer

1

VirtualServer

2

VirtualServer

3

Virtual servers are short lived.

Persistent db is easy. Multi casting

• Additional network traffic.

• Reduce traffic through smaller clusters.

Shared memory is not recommended.

Page 29: Self Cleansing Intrusion Tolerance:  An Approach for Increasing Security and Availability

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Unified SCIT Control forSecurity and Availability

Ensure SCIT operations.

Guarantee minimum service availability.

Servers can be added to or removed from the cluster at any time.

Adding servers improves both.

• Availability.

• Security, by reducing server exposure times.

Page 30: Self Cleansing Intrusion Tolerance:  An Approach for Increasing Security and Availability

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Generalization: N servers and M roles

The DNS-HES design can be generalized to a SCIT cluster using N servers to support M roles.

Without loss of generality, each role is assumed by only one server.

Example:• A 2DNS-3WEB cluster supports M=5 roles: P, W, W,

W, and S.• The primary DNS server (P) and one web server (W)

provides minimum (but still useful) services

Page 31: Self Cleansing Intrusion Tolerance:  An Approach for Increasing Security and Availability

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Role Swap

A Role-R Swap (or simple R Swap) rotates the present online server in Role R offline for cleansing and finds a newly cleansed server to resume role R.

The 2DNS-3WEB cluster supports P, W, W, W, and S swaps.

Example of P-swap.

P

C

Page 32: Self Cleansing Intrusion Tolerance:  An Approach for Increasing Security and Availability

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Role Swap

A Role-R Swap (or simple R Swap) rotates the present online server in Role R offline for cleansing and finds a newly cleansed server to resume role R.

The 2DNS-3WEB cluster supports P, W, W, W, and S swaps.

Example of P-swap.

P

C

P

P

C

Page 33: Self Cleansing Intrusion Tolerance:  An Approach for Increasing Security and Availability

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Rotation Pattern

A rotation pattern P is a sequence of role swaps that covers all M roles.

Example 1: Round Robin patternPWWWS

Example 2: Skewed patternPWWPWS

Example 3: with randomnessPXWXPXWXWXS

X {P, W, W,W,S}

Yih Huang
Primary DNS is rotated twice as often as others, cuting its exposure times to half.
Yih Huang
X is a random variable of all M roles.
Page 34: Self Cleansing Intrusion Tolerance:  An Approach for Increasing Security and Availability

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Relative Importance of Roles

Each service role R has an index, (R), that reflects its relative importance. (We use integers.)

Without loss of generality, the indices are assumed in descending order

2DNS-3Web:

(P)(W)10, and (W)(W)(S)0.

Page 35: Self Cleansing Intrusion Tolerance:  An Approach for Increasing Security and Availability

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Cluster Index

The SCIT cluster index at time t, is denoted by (t) - it is the sum of the indices of those roles that are active at time t.

The value of a SCIT cluster must be at all times greater than or equal to a predetermined minimum value, min.

2DNS-3WEB: min=20

Page 36: Self Cleansing Intrusion Tolerance:  An Approach for Increasing Security and Availability

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Minimum Number of Servers

Let Nmin be the minimum number of servers required to achieve min

• Nmin = 2 in 2DNS-3WEB.

When N<Nmin, behavior undefined.

When N=Nmin

• N servers servicing the most important N roles.

• No server rotations/swaps.

Page 37: Self Cleansing Intrusion Tolerance:  An Approach for Increasing Security and Availability

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Servers in Cleansing

When MN>Nmin (more roles than servers).• N-1 most important roles active. • At least one server in cleansing to trigger rotations.• Virtualization ?

When N>M (more servers than roles).• M servers servicing M roles.• NM servers in cleansing and for rotations.• The more servers in cleansing, the faster the rotations, and the

shorter the server exposure times.

Page 38: Self Cleansing Intrusion Tolerance:  An Approach for Increasing Security and Availability

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Number of Servers

# of servers Active roles Rotation

1 Undefined 10 No

2 P, W 20 No

3 P, W 20 Yes

4 P, W, W 20 Yes

5 P, W, W, W 20 Yes

6 P, W, W, W, S

20More spare servers lead to

faster server rotations and shorter server exposure times

Page 39: Self Cleansing Intrusion Tolerance:  An Approach for Increasing Security and Availability

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Provable Properties

The proposed SCIT control algorithm satisfies the following properties:• Server Rotation Guarantee.

With arbitrary server failures, server rotations continue if there are NNmin+1 functioning servers in the cluster.

• Minimum Service Guarantee. With arbitrary server failures, min is maintained at all times (after an adjustment period) if there are NNmin functioning servers in the cluster.

Page 40: Self Cleansing Intrusion Tolerance:  An Approach for Increasing Security and Availability

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Effect of Server Redundancy Server Exposure Times

0

1

2

3

4

5

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

number of spare servers

Exp

osu

re T

ime

s in

SC

T

All roles

Yih Huang
SCT=Standard cleansing time,the average cleansing times of all roles,288 seconds in 2DNS-3WEB according toour previous prototypes
Page 41: Self Cleansing Intrusion Tolerance:  An Approach for Increasing Security and Availability

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Effect of “Skewed” RotationPWWPWS

0

1

2

3

4

5

1 2 3 4 5

number of spare servers

Exp

osur

e T

imes

in S

CT

All roles P-DNS Others

Page 42: Self Cleansing Intrusion Tolerance:  An Approach for Increasing Security and Availability

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Overview

Research objectives Self-Cleansing Intrusion Tolerance (SCIT) concept Hardware Enhanced Security (SCIT – HES) DNS – SCIT server Cluster security vs availability trade-off

Example: 2DNS-3WEB Cluster Virtualization

Page 43: Self Cleansing Intrusion Tolerance:  An Approach for Increasing Security and Availability

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Virtualization in Support of Security

Virtualization was motivated by server consolidation. Intensive ongoing research to use virtualization to enhance

security. Features that would help (a researcher’s wish list).

• Fast creation of new Virtual Server (VS) on the fly.• VS forking like in process forking.

• Checkpoints and fast reverts.• Snapshot only the memory in use, not the entire VS memory (as in the

case of VMware snapshots).

• Efficient sharing of resources.• Memory and disk: copy on write among identically configured VS.

• Ultimate goal is single use VS.

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SCIT: Virtualization

Importance for SCIT SUN and Virtuozzo VMware and Xen

Guest OS kernel

Impacts diversity. VS and host share OS kernel.

Each VS has its own kernel - potentially different than host OS.

Diversity of Configuration.

Increases security. Choice of applications.

Process memory image.

Guest OS.

Choice of applications. Process memory image.

Virtualization overhead.

Throughput of VS. Lower. Higher.

Potential cleansing technology.

Faster reuse. Reboot and system integrity checks.

Snapshots and revert.

Efficient resource sharing.

More VS. Less exposure time.

Good for processor and memory sharing.

Good for processor sharing, poor for memory sharing.

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Current Research

SCIT/VS: SCIT with Virtual Servers.• Take advantages of virtualization features for virtual

server rotations and cleansing.• Operates at much faster speed than hardware rotations,

resulting in much smaller exposure windows.• A SCIT/VS+Apache testbed is being built.

Initial results.• 10% of SCIT operational overhead.• VS cleansing every 30 seconds.

A promising combination:Solaris+FireEngine+Xen.• Should reduce the overall overhead significantly.

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Conclusions

Incorruptible intrusion tolerance through physical isolation.

Connecting security and service availability. Many critical infrastructure services use

redundancy for availability / dependability. Many hardware components are included in

modern high availability systems.

Page 47: Self Cleansing Intrusion Tolerance:  An Approach for Increasing Security and Availability

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SCIT Publications + Contact Info

Current research focuses on combining SCIT with virtualization technology to drastically reduce server exposure times.

SCIT papers are available at http://cs.gmu.edu/~asood/scit

Arun Sood

[email protected]

703.993.1524