Self-deception and other-person deception: A new conceptualization of one central type of self-deception

S E L F - D E C E P T I O N AND O T H E R - P E R S O N DECEPTION: A N E W C O N C E P T U A L I Z A T I O N OF

ONE C E N T R A L TYPE OF S E L F - D E C E P T I O N

WILLIAM WHISNER

I will argue that all recent models designed to identify, describe and explain self-deception individually ~md collectively fail to generate sufficient conditions to identify the most frequent type of successful self-deception. These models fail in this respect because they do not recognize the important differences between self-deception ,and other- person deception and also because they lail to recognize the relev,'mt respect in which the most frequent self-deception attempt is intentional. I have argued that there is a distinction between self-deception attempts, successful self-deception attempts, and the state of self- deception that results from a successful self-deception attempt.

There is a general formula for identifying the most frequent type of self-deception attempt: in the self-deception attempt one is aware of avoiding a Iocused attention on an "object" of awareness, either by shifting attention from one's focused attention on the "object" or by refusing to locus attention on the "object" in the attempt to terminate one's awareness of the "object." One's locused attention on the "object" results in discomfort (typically guilt and/or fear) and the discomlk~rt gives rise to the motivation to disavow responsibility by avoiding a focused attention on the "object" in the attempt to terminate one's awareness of the "object" ,and the concomitant discomtort. One is aware of the shift of attention or the refusal to locus attention. The state of self- deception results from a successful self-deception attempt in which one is not aware of the former "object" of awareness becanse of the successful attempt.

The term "object" c~m denote, at least, the following types of "objects:" occun'ent thoughts and judgments; intentional states (e.g. beliefs, desires, etc.) and the occurrent thoughts that m~mifest the states; feelings that are not constituted by intentional states; emotional states that are constituted, in part, by intentional states; ~md acts and actions.

In the skate of self-deception one is sell-deceived about what one

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believed, wanted, felt, etc. because one is not aware of the "object" because of a successful self- deception attempt. 2 All recent models that provide an account of self-deception, as it relates to belief, fail to recognize the most frequent type of self-deception. 3

The proponents of these models underestimate the frequency of successful self-deception as it relates to belief, in part, because they think that the state of self-deception is constituted by one's awareness of some belief with respect to which one is self-deceived.

I will attempt to show that these models do not account for the most frequent type of successful self- deception, in part, because they do not recognize important differences between self-deception and other-person deception.

The similarities between self-deception ,and other-person deception are sufficient to warrant the use of the term "deception" in both cases; however, a neglect of the differences between the two types may help to account, in part, for why these models have neglected the most frequent type of self-deception.

I. The Self-Deception Attempt and the State of Self-Deception.

To illustrate the above conceptualization let us consider a possible c a s e .

Assume that Jim sees Jane lk)r the first time in three years and tells her he will call her.

He is aware that he is lying and has no intention of c~dling her. He believes that he has lied and that it is wrong to lie unless one

has a good reason for doing so. When Jim has the occ~tent thought "that it was wrong to lie" he

feels discomfort and shifts attention from the thought. Whenever the thought occurs he shifts attention repeatedly. He is aware of avoiding responsibility for his belief and the occurrent thought that manifests the belief. He is motivated to disavow responsibility for the belief by avoiding the occurrent thought that manifests the belief. Let us assume that over time he is not aware of his fonner belief because of the successful thought avoidance. He no longer thinks about his past wrong doing and he is not aware of having held the former belief.

He is self-deceived about his past belief and action. We have the following description of the phenomenologic~d I~lcts

related to the self-deception attempt: (1) Jim believes that he lied to Jane. (2) Jim believes that it was

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wrong to lie to Jane. (3) Jim disapproves of himself because of the judgment in (2). (4) Jim feels guilt ,and discomfort because of the beliefs in (1) and (2) and the attitude in (3). (5) Jim judges that the persistence of the discomfort is threatening and undesirable (this judgment constitutes, in part, the fear state). (6) Jim wishes that the felt guilt and discomfort not occur. (7) Jhn's discomfort is intensified because he is afraid of the persistent guilt mid concomitant discomfort. (8) Jim is motivated by his tear to terminate the discomfort ((5), (6), (7), and (8) constitute, in part, the tear state). (9) Jim feels both guilt and fear because of the judgments in (2) and (5) and the concomitant overlapping feelings intensify his discomfort.. (10) Jim's fear motivates him to terminate the discomfort by engaging in a self-deception attempt to avoid the belief in (2) by avoiding the occunem thought that manifests the belief.

If the thought avoidance and belief avoidance is successful Jim will be self-deceived about his former beliefs and unaware of the belief because of the successful self-deception attempt.

It should be noted that in this exmnple Jim's evaluative judgment that it was wrong to lie results in guilt and discomfort. He tears the persistence of the discomfort (the fear is constituted, in part, by the evaluative judgment that the discomfort is threatening and undesirable) and forms the fear motivation to terminate or reduce the discomfort by avoiding the occurrent thought that m~mifests the evaluative belief.

Jim's guilt state and fear state are dissommt and the fear motivates the self-deception attempt to terminate the guilt.

In the above account of the self-deception attempt (1) through (4) constitute, in part, the guilt state and feeling of discomfort and (5) through (8) constitute, in part, the fear state and the overdetermined feeling of discomfort. 4

Jim's tear motivates the self-deception attempt to avoid the occurrent thought that manifests the belief in (2). If the thought avoidance is successful he is self- deceived about what he believed and unaware of this belief. 5 If the self- deception attempt is successful Jim resolves the dissonance between the guilt and fear ~md is not aware of the former evaluative belief aud the concomitant feeling of guilt and discomfort. This type of self-deception attempt need not involve the avoidance of guilt or shame. They may involve other types of self-disapproval that constitute discomfort or they might involve types of discomfort that are not conuected with self- disapproval.

In some cases the discomfort may be constituted by fear alone

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(i.e. sometimes one has a second-order lear that one's first-order lear will persis0. In cases free of guilt and shzune it is still the discomfort that gives rise to the fear motivation to engage in the self- deception attempt to reduce or terminate the discomfort. Contr,'u-y to the many philosophers who think that one must hold a conscious belief with respect to which one is self-deceived, Jim holds no such belief. Since he f'n'mly believed that he was not justified in lying it is unlikely that he could convince himself to believe that it was not wrong to lie. It is psychologically easier for Jim to intentionally avoid and terminate the belief that it was wrong to lie than to form the new self-deceptive belief that it was not wrong to lie.

I maintain that this type of successful self- deception occurs more frequently because it it easier to intentionally forget an insUmce of wrong doing than to convince oneself that a wrong action is not wrong if one has good reason for believing the action is wrong. Admittedly, one can sometimes succeed in deceiving oneself by terminating the belief that p or the belief that -p and forming the contradictory belief that -p or the belief that p by engaging in rationalization or some other sell'- deceptive maneuver.

This type of successful self-deception is more difficult and occurs less frequently than the type o f successful self-deception I have described. I maintain that the most frequent type of successful self- deception as it relates to belief occurs when one is aware of one's belief that p at T1 (or the-belief that -p) engages in a successful self-deception attempt and is not aware of the stone belief that p at T2 (or the same belief that -p). At T2 one is not aware of the former belief because of a successful self-deception attempt and self-deceived about what one believed.

�9 5 ~ _ .

Philosophers have focused on believing p at an earlier time and believing -p at a later time because of a successful self-deception attempt (or believing -p at an earlier time and believing p at a later time because of a successful self-deception attemp0.

It is typically easier to succeed in deceiving oneself in the former sense than in the latter sense since one need not deceive oneself in the formation of a new belief in order to be sell-deceived.

For example, one might intentionally forget the belief that p and the reasons for p by means of a successful self-deception attempt; however, when one attempts to form the new self-deceptive belief that -p one activates one's awareness of p and one's reasons for believing p and fails in the attempt to form the new belief that -p. There is no doubt a high frequency of failed self-deception attempts

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in this type of self-deception. In those less frequent cases in which the sell- deceptive attempt

to form the new belief succeeds the person will have forgotteu the reasons for believing p and one's awareness of the reasons will not be activated in one's formation of the belief that -p (these cases are more likely to occur if there is a long time lag between the termination of the first belief and the self-deceptive t~mnation of the new belie/). Since Jim has good reason for believing it was wrong to lie it is easier for him to terminate his belief that it was wrong to lie them to convince himself that it was not wrong to lie.

According to my account of the most frequent type of successful self-deception he is able to terminate a belief for which he has good reasons merely by repeatedly avoiding the thought that manifests the belief.

I have not taken an empirical survey of the various types of self-deception attempts and of the frequency with which each type is successful; however, I have tried to show that it is typic~dly easier to terminate a belief by means of a successful self-deception attempt than to terminate a belief and form a contradictory belief by means of a successful self-deception attempt.

Since a successful self-deception attempt results in the reduction or termination of discomfort it is likely that persons are more likely to engage in the type of self-deception attempt that is most likely to achieve this end.

I have tried to show why this type of self-deception attempt is more likely to achieve this outcome. Admittedly it is ~m empirical question whether this is the most Ii'equent type of successful self- deception. I have provided reasons why I think this hypothesis is highly probable, 6

II. The Sense in Which the Self-Deception Attempt is Intentional.

In the self-deception attempt these intentional attentional maneuvers that constitute acts of "object" avoidance ,are "intentional" in the sense that the person is aware of engaging in the attentional maneuvers.

Typically the person does not consciously intend to shift attention or refuse to focus attenOon. Also the person does not shift attention or refuse to focus attention with the conscious intention of achieving some other end. I suggest that persons can be aware of intentional

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attentional maneuvers that are not consciously intended. The person does not consciously form an intention to shift attention or to refuse to focus attention. These intentional attempts ,are motivated by the desire to disavow responsibility by terminating one's awareness of the belief (or other "object" of awareness) and the concomitant discomfort. One is motivated to terminate the belief in order to reduce or to terminate the discomfort. This account of intentional attentional maneuvers that are not consciously intended is analogous to the case Elizabeth Anscombe describes in which one finds oneself drawing circles in the sand . 7 One is aware of drawing circles in the sand.

One did not consciously intend to draw circles in the sand and one is not drawing circles with the conscious intention of achieving some other end. Self-deception attempts ,are successful, in part, just because the person is not executing a conscious intention in attempting to deceive oneself. It is more difficult to succeed in deceiving oneself if one torms an intention to do so and engages in the self-deception attempt to execute this intention. One can disavow responsibility more easily if he or she does not form an explicit plan to do so in advance. Most persons have some desire to take responsibility for their thought and action. If such persons tbnn an explicit plrm to deceive themselves it is likely that the formation of such a plan will activate the counter desire to take responsibility and resist one's desire to disavow responsibility. We catch ourselves as it were in the acts of shifting or refusing and this is why they are not deliberate, consciously chosen, or consciously intended. This does not mean that we cannot take steps to avoid or terminate the occurrence of such acts and take responsibility for shifting attention back to a focused attention on the "object." If the acts of "object" aw)id~mce are unsuccessful, which they frequently are, we can shift attention back to the "object" and take responsibility for refusing to avoid similar attempts with respect to the "object." In claiming that the acts of "object avoidance" are not consciously intended Imn not denying that there may be unconscious intentions and pre-la Sartre. The reflective intentions claim that the attentional maneuvers are "intentional" should also be distinguished from the phenomenologist's sense of "intentional" in which an intentional act is directed toward an object. I am using "intentional" in the sense that one would provide a sincere yes in answer to the question are you aware of avoiding a focused attention on the "object? ''~

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IlL Relevant Differences and Similarities Between Self-Deception and Other-Person Deception.

In the paradigm case in which x succeeds in deceiving y, x intentionally produces a false belief.in y by saying something or doing something that results in y's forming or maintaining a false belief. 9

For example, Sid tells Clara that her husband is at the local tavern when Sid knows that Joe is at the gym. Clara thinks that Joe is at the gym but she changes her belief alter Sid misleads her about Joe's location. Clara is deceived about her husbands location. She holds the false belief that Joe is at the tavern ,'u~d she does not hold a true belief about his real location because Sid has succeeded in deceiving her. There is an important difference between standard cases of the most frequent type of self-deception and other-person deception. If x succeeds in deceiving himself about his belief that p (or some other "object" of awareness) he will not be aw~ue of the former belief and self-deceived about what he believed. Jim is not aware of his belief that it was wrong to lie; hence, he is self-deceived about what he believed. In the paradigm case of successful other-person deception the deceived person holds a conscious false belief. Clara holds the false belief about Joe's location and is not aware of his real location; whereas, in the most frequent type of successful self- deception about beliefs, one is not aware of what one believed and necessarily holds no beliefs about what one believed (i.e. the belief with respect to which one is in self-deception). There are some similarities between other-person deception and self- deception that allow us to speak of deception in both cases.

If x tries to deceive y, the attempt to deceive is intentional. If b tries to deceive herself, her self-deception attempt is ~dso intention~d. The deception attempt is "intentional" in the sense that one is aware of engaging in the attempt. In both cases the person is unaw~u'e of being deceived if the deception attempt is successful. In both cases one is unaware of what one is deceived about. In both cases, in typical cases, we can identity the state of being deceived only if we can identify the successful attempt to deceive that results in one's state of being deceived or self-deceived. In both types of deception one can fail in the attempt to deceive oneself or the other. In spite of these similarities between other-person deception and self-deception, it is the differences between the two types of deception that may have led philosophers to neglect the most frequent type of successful

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self-deception as it relates to beliefs and other "objects" of awareness. In both types of deception the attempt to deceive is intentional; however, they differ with respect m the role tlmt intentions play in the intentional attempt. In the standard other-person deception attempt in which x tries to deceive y, x intends m produce or maintain y's false belief and attempts to execute her intention in saying or doing something to produce or maintain the other's false belief. In the most frequent self-deception attempt one does not consciously intend to deceive oneself and one does not engage in the self- deceptitm attempt to execute such an intention. The most frequent type of self-deception is successful just because one does not form and execute a conscious intention to deceive oneself. ~~ There is another important difference between the two types of deception. If x succeeds in deceiving y, y forms a belief or maintains a deceptive belief because of the successful attempt; whereas, if b succeeds in deceiving herself about a belief, in accordance with the above account, she terminates her awareness of the belief because of the successful self- deception attempt.

I~. The Most Frequent Type of Self-Deception as it Relates to "Objects" Other Than Belie.~.

I will now describe two additional cases of self-deception and attempt to take account of both the relev~mt simil,'u'ities and differences between self-deception and other-person deception.

These cases satisfy the criteria specified in the above conceptualization of the most frequent type of successful self- deception. These recent accounts of self-deceptive beliefs and the tendency to think that self-deception is analogous to other-person deception in a strong sense may explain why some writers focus on beliefs as the only proper "object" of the self-deception attempt. I have claimed that occurrent thoughts; intentional states (in addition to beliefs) and the occurrent thoughts that manifest these states; emotional states that are constituted, in part, by intentional states; feelings that are not constituted by intentional states; and acts and actions, can all be proper "objects" of the self-deception attempt. Let us first consider a type of self-deception I call action-act deception.

Consider Sartre's famous patri,-uchal ex~anple in which a woman deceives herself about what she does in a romantic interlude. She wants to promote further intimacy with a man and believes it is wrong to do so. ~ At the moment the m ~ takes her h~md, she leaves

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her hand but does not "notice" what she does. Her belief that it is wrong and her fear of wrong doing motivate her to refuse to lk)cus attention on the "act" of which she is less explicitly aware (she is aware of leaving her hand but the act is not an "object" of focused attention). She is motivated to avoid ,and to terminate her awareness of the "act of leaving her hand" by refusing to locus attention on what she does. Should she focus attention on the act the discomfort would motivate her to shift attention from the act.

If the self-deception attempt is successful she does not remember what she did and she is self- deceived about her past act. In this type of self-deceptive state she i s self- deceived about a past act and unlike the first case, the self-deceptive attempt does not involve thought avoidance. Admittedly the self-deception attempt might fail, as is frequently the case, and she will believe that she chose to leave her hand. Let us consider two cases that I will call feeling avoidance and desire avoidance. We can redescribe the first case and show how one can engage in self-deception attempts with respect to feelings and desires. Let us assume Jim feels guilt because he lied and is motivated to disavow reslxmsibility for the feelings of guilt by shifting attention from an explicit awareness of his felt guilt (he has an explicit awareness of the guilt when he l~cuses attention on his felt guilt). Whenever he focuses attention on the feeling he shifts attention from the feeling. If the shifts are successful, he will not be aware of feeling the guilt. He might also engage in shifts of attention and combine these attentional maneuvers with refusals to focus attention on the guilt feelings of which he is less explicitly aware (the feeling is not an "object" of focused attention). The shifts and refusals both constitute intentional acts of "object" avoidance. This type of feeling avoidance is free of thought avoi&mce. He believes that it was wrong to lie and this belief grounds and constitutes, in part, his guilt state and feelings of guilt. He might ~dso avoid the guilt feelings by avoiding the occurrent thought that it was wrong to lie. The avoid~mce of the occurrent thought that manifests the belief state results in his aw~i&mce of the belief and the feeling that is constituted, in part, by the belief (similar to case 1). We have a distinction between "the avoidance of occurrent thoughts" and "the avoidance of the occmTence of thoughts" about the object of the guilt (the object in this case is his wrong doing). The avoidance of feelings and desires can result in the avoidance of the occurrence of thoughts about the object of one's guilt (i.e., what one feels guilty abou0 and the avoidance of occurrent thoughts can result in the awfidance of a focused attention on the

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feeling of guilt. Jim could also engage in the same combination of intentional attentional maneuvers (intentional attentional maneuvers that are not consciously intended) with respect to his awareness of the desire to take responsibility for the lie by telling Jane that he lied. His guilt results in the motivation to terminate the discomfort by making reparations. Jim is explicitly aware of the felt desire to call Jane two months later. On the other hand he is ,'ffr~dd of her disapproval and the possibility that others might discover his deception. His fear of disapproval motivates him to disavow responsibility for the desire by avoiding and attempting to terminate the desire. When he is explicitly aware of the felt desire he shifts attention from the desire and he also refuses to focus explicit attention on the felt desire. He might also avoid occurrent thoughts about the object of the desire (to make reparations for the guilt by confessing the lie). Like feeling avoidance, desire avoidance may or may not involve the avoidance of occurrent thoughts. Shifts of attention ,'rod refus~ds to focus attention can also be unconscious. If one is unaware of the shifts and refusals then the object avoidance is unconscious and not intentional. Unconscious object avoidance does not fall under the rubric of a self-deception attempt. The cl~t~sic~d defensive m~meuvers c~m function consciously or unconsciously and inw)lve self-deception attempts if they satisfy the above conditions for the se l f deception attempt.

My account of the successful self-deception attempt might be described as a process of motivated intentional forgetting (i.e, one is aware of avoiding the "objects" and of disavowing responsibility).

We can distinguish this type of forgetting from the motivated forgetting that we call repression that is not intentional (i.e. one is not aware of avoiding !'objects" and not aware of disavowing responsibility). Intention~al successful self-deception ,and repression can both result in unconscious states. They differ from the moral standpoint since one is aware of engaging in self-deception attempts and unaware of the process of repression.

V. Two Recent Accounts of Self Deception that Reject the Starutard Analysis.

Robert Audi and Kent Bach are exceptions in offering an an~dysis of self-deception as it relates to belief that does not presuppose that the state of self-deception is constituted by a conscious belief with respect to which one is self-deceived. In this respect their accounts

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differ from the views that I have criticized. Each view is subtle and complex. I will argue that each view presents problems and that each account will not fit the most frequent type of sell-deception as it relates to belief. Audi begins with an analysis of the state of self- deception and explains self-deceptive acts and actions in terms of the state.

Audi maintains that the self-deceptive acts ,are public avowals that contradict an unconscious belief.

He writes: A person, S, is in a state of self-deception with respect to a proposition p, if and only if: (1) S unconsciously knows that not-p (or has reason to believe, ,and unconsciously and truly believes, that not-p); (2) S sincerely avows p, or is disposed to avow sincerely that p; and (3) S has at least one w~mt that explains, in pro't, both why S's belief that not-p is unconscious and why S is disposed to avow that p, even when presented with what he sees is evidence against P- t2 In one of Audi's examples a woman holds the unconscious belief that she is afraid of public speaking and publicly avows that she is not afraid of speaking. She wants to maintain an image of competence and she avows p, that she is not afraid of public speaking and she believes -p unconsciously, that she fears public speaking. Audi's appropriate description of the genesis of the unconscious belief state leads us to view this as a plausible case of self-deception. He states that she is aware of her fear and by awfiding the fern" and thoughts about the threatening situation the fear becomes unconscious. On my account she has engaged in a successful self-deception attempt in forming the unconscious belief with respect to which she is sell- deceived. Audi thinks she is sell-deceived in publicly avowing the contradictory of the state. She is self-deceived in m~uking the public avowals but only because she has succeeded in deceiving herself about a former belief of which she is not aware because of the successful self-deception attempt. We could construct a different c~se in which the woman has an unconscious fern" of public speaking but the fear is a consequence of repression. We can assume that the fear of public speaking causes excess anxiety mid the anxiety is reduced by the unconscious repression of the conscious fear. The process of repression is not intentional in the sense in which the self-deception attempt is intentional; hence, she was not aware of having avoided the fear. She avoids speaking engagements and publicly avows that she she is not afraid of public speaking; however, the unconscious fear state does not result from a prior self-deception attempt. To avow the contradictory of an unconscious belief is not enough to

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identify the state of self-deception. We need a prior account of the successful self- deception attempt to show that the unconscious belief state results from such an attempt.

We find Audi's description of his cases plausible because he provides descriptions that, with slight modifications, will fit my account of the self-deception attempt. Kent Bach ,also provides an account of the state of self-deception that begins with an analysis of the state.

He writes: Over tl-t2, S deceives himself about not-p if and only if, over tl-t2: (1) S desires that not-p: (2) S believes that p (or that he has strong evidence for p); (3) conditions 1 and 2 combine to motivate him to avoid, and he does avoid, the sustained or recurrent thought that p; and (4) if condition 3 is satisfied by S's ~woiding the sustained or recurrent thought of p, then even if the sustained or recurrent thought of p were to occur to him during tl-t2, conditions 1 and 2 would still motivate S to avoid the sustained or recurrent thought that p.~3 In one example Bach claims that a man wants his wife to return to him and believes that she will not return. Whenever the thought occurs, that she will not retun~, he awfids the thought Bach is not clear whether the person is aware or unaware of the act of thought avoidance. If the person is unaw~u'e of the thought avoidance then the person may be deceived in maintaining the unconscious belief that she will not return if the unconscious belief state results from a successful self-deception attempt. As in the Audi case this unconscious state may or may not result from a successful self- deception attempt. It is not enough to identify the state of self-deception with a form of unconscious thought aw)idance that maintains an unconscious state since such states may or may not result from prior self- deception attempts. I f the man is aw~e of the thought avoidance then we have a case of conscious thought avoidance and this will constitute a self-deception attempt if it is motivated in the right way.

Under these circumstances Bach has provided an account of a self deception attempt without ,an account of the state of self-deception. I have found difficulties with each account of self-deception that begins with the state of self-deception and attempts to analyze the state without a prior account of the successful self-deception attempt that results in the state. Even if their analyses were correct the conceptualization would not fit the most frequent type of self- deception.

I have argued that in the most frequent type of self-deception the person who is self-deceived is always self-deceived about a former

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"object" of awareness. Neither Audi nor Bach develops a model that fits these cases.

VI. A Justification of This Conceptualization ~?f Self-Deception.

Philosophers and psychologists have provided a variety of conceptualizations of self-deception that ~u'e designed to serve different purposes.

The above conceptualization focuses on the significant phenomenological fact that persons are somethnes aware of avoiding responsibility for "objects" of awareness by engaging in intentional attentional maneuvers to terminate one's awareness of "objects." When persons avoid responsibility Ik~r their intentional states, their thoughts, and their acts and actions they frequently do this by engaging in what I have called self-deception attempts. Any conceptualization of self-deception that does not make the intentional avoidance of responsibility central will not capture what is pivotal lk)r hol~ling persons responsible for self-deception attempts and the states of self- deception that result from successful attempts. ~4 I have emphasized the role that intentionality plays in the sell- deception attempt ~md argued that persons are sometimes able to avoid and to terminate self-deception attempts. When perscms are justifiably responsible for the self-deception attempt they can also be held responsible for the state of self-deception that results from a successful attempt. In discussing the similarities between self-deception zmd other person deception I have maintained that both types of deception are intentional, in spite of the difference that conscious intentions play in one type and fall to play in the other type. This sense of intentiomdity seems to be a necessary condition for holding persons responsible for self-deception attempts and states of self-deception. In other-person deception we use the phrase "x deceives Y" to describe ~md evaluate x's activity. Frequently when we use this phrase we imply that that what x did was morally wrong unless he or she can provide an excuse or an overriding justification (e.g. the person could not help it or one did it to achieve a greater good). Analogously if we say that x has deceived him or herself we also imply in a variety of moral contexts that what x did was morally wrong unless he or she c~m provide an excuse or an oveniding justification.

The degree of blameworthiness for the wrong doing, if any, will depend on other morally relevant factors in the circumstances.

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According to the above analysis the state of self-deception is not constituted by a conscious belief (or other intentional state ) in the most frequent type.

Most recent writers think that one cannot identity the state of self-deception unless one can identify a c(mscious belief with respect to which one is self-deceived (analogous to the belief state that results when one is deceived by another).

ff my account of the most frequent type of successful sell:deception is correct it follows that we identify the state of self-deception by showing that it results from a successful self-deception attempt. This means that one cannot identify the state of self-deception unless one can identify the successful self deception attempt that results in the state. In the state of self-deception one is not aware of a former "object" of awareness because of a success/ul self-deception attempt. Even in cases in which one forms a new self-deceptive belief it is still necessary to show that the belief results from a successful self- deception attempt before we c:m identify the state of self-deception. I am not suggesting that the above conceptualization of sell: deception fits all of the different types of self-deception.

I do maintain that this conceptualization capttu'es the most frequent type of self-deception and that the recent m~xlets fail to do this. If the above account of self-deception is conect it follows that there are no necessary and sufficient conditions for identifying even this type since we cannot identify the type until we can identify the token "object" of the successful self-deception attempt in particular circumstances. Under this general type of self-deception we have various species types of self-deception depending on the type of "object" of the self-deception attempt (e,g. thoughts, intentional states, acts and actions, emotional states, etc,). There ~tre v;tfious combinations of sufficient conditions for identifying token instances of self- deception depending on the token "object" of the self-deception attempt in particular circumstances. We identify the token state of self- deception by showing that it results from a successful self-deception attempt and we identify the token self-deception attempt by identifying the token "object" of the attempt. We identify the "object" type of self-deception by identifying the token of the type in particul~tr circumstances. In the less frequent and more difficult cases of successful self-deception in which one tk)rms a new conscious belief or beliefs with respect to which one is sell:deceived one is able to do this, in part, because one has succeeded in deceiving oneself about one's former belief that p or the belief that -p and tk)rmed the self-

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d e c e p t i v e b e l i e f that -p o r the b e l i e f that p. In such cases one is s e l f - d e c e i v e d abou t w h y one fo rms the consc ious b e l i e f ( i .e . the exp lana t ion o f the or igin o f the bel ief ) and ~dso se l f -dece ived about the fo rmer be l i e f o f which one wa~s aware.

UNIVERSITY OF U T A H SALT L A K E CITY, UTAH 84112

USA

NOTES

i I develop and attempt to defend a less complex conceptualization of self-deception in my article, "Self-Deception, Human Emotion, and Moral Responsibility," The Journal.[br the Theo)y of Social Behavior, vol. 19, 4, (Dec., 1989), pp. 389-411. I want to thank the editor, Professor Asa Kasher, for a series of fruitful criticism both with respect to substance, style, and structtu'e. I would also like to thank Tom Reed, Donald Gustafson, Fred Hagen, Bernard Harrison, Mary Reddick, and Mike W. Martin for discussions related to these issues. I am, of course, responsible for the final product and its deficiencies.

2 The phrase "self-deception" suffers from a specific type of process-product ambiguity. The phrase "self-deception" is sometimes used to refer to the process of "engaging in a self-deception attempt." At another times the phrase is used to refer to the product state of being in "a state of self- deception" (being self-deceived). Sometimes the phrase is used to refer to the process of "engaging in mental and verbal maneuvers to maintain the state of self-deception." Some of the confusions that arise in the context of philosophical and psychological discussions of self-deception might be traced to the ambiguity of the phrase "x is deceiving oneself." The phrase might mean "one is attempting to deceive oneself and has not succeeded" or it might mean "that one is in a state of self-deception and engaging in mental and/or verbal maneuvers that constitute a process that maintains the state of self-deception." Some writers in the existentialist tradition have mistakenly and perhaps unwittingly assimilated self- deception to the process of attempting to deceive oneself and denied that there are states of self-deception in my sense. See:J.P. Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel Barnes (New York: Pocket Books, 1986); H. Fingarette, Self Deception (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969); and R. Solomon, The P~sions (New York: Anchor press/Doubleday, 1976). Other writers have provided an account of the sate of being

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self-deceived and denied that there are or could be self-deception attempts in the manner specified in my account. These writers deny, what the existentialists affirm, that successful self-deception attempts can be intentional. See the otherwwise insightful article of M. Johnson, "Self- Deception and the Nature of Mind," in McLaughlin and Rorty, pp. 53-91 and the articles of the skeptics referred to at the end of footnote 3.

3 One finds this extensive literature beginning with A. Mele, "Recent Work on Serf-Deception," American Philosophical Quarterly. 24, (Jan. 1987) pp. 1-17; M. Martin, ed., Self Deception and Self-Understanding (Lawrence, Kansas: Univ. of Kansas Press. 1986); Brian McLaughlin, and Am61ie Rorty, eds., Perspectives on Self-Deception, (Berkeley, California: Univ. of California Press, 1988). The McLaughlin and Rorty volume includes 24 articles. There are over twenty two articles in these works and referred to in these works that hold the view that one must hold a conscious belief with respect to which one is self-deceived if one is self-deceived, about a belief We have the following new works related to this topic: T.S. Champlin Rt!flexive Paradoxes (London: Routledge, 1988). Champlin provides an insightful account of self-deception that recognizes that one might from either a true or a false belief as a consequence of a successful self-deception attempt; however, his account does not fit the most frequent type of self-deception. See also J. Catalano, "Successfully Lying to Oneself," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 50, 4, (Jun.1, 1980), pp. 673-694; R. Audi," Self-Deception and Practical Reasoning," Canadian .lournal of Philosophy, vol 19, n. 2, (June 1989), pp. 247-260. Audi provides some penetrating observations about the way self-deception fi~s into the broader domain of practical and theoretical reason. In this article he continues to presuppose the account of self-deception that I criticize below. D. Jones, in "Pervasive Self-Deception," The Southern .lournal of Philosophy, vol 27, n.2, (Summer 89) pp. 217-23 develops an interesting distinction between pervasive self-deceptio n and episodic self-deception; however, his perceptive analysis ha~s n~o implications tbr my account of the most frequent type of intentional self-deception. Many of these writers provide a conceptualizat ion of self-deception that rules out a priori the phenomenological account I provide. Even the skeptics think one must be self-deceived about a conscious belief and this leads them, in part, to be skeptical about literal self-deception: See M. Haight, "Tale From a Black Box," in Martin, 244-260; D. Kipp, "On Self-Deception," Philosophical Quarterly 30, (1980), 304-317; S. Paluch, "Self-Deception," Inquiry 10, (1967), 268-278. My account avoids skepticism since one is aware of attempting to deceive oneself at time T1 and unaware of being self-deceived at time T2 a.s a result of a successful self-deception attempt.

4 I am presupposing that in paradigm instances of occurrent emotional states the occurrent emotional state is caused by and constituted, in part, by one's evaluative judgment about an object, one's factual beliefs about

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the object, an attitudinal feature, an affective feature, a conative feature, attentional dispositions, and bodily states and processes.

5 My account of fear has been influenced by R. Gordon's, The Structure of Emotions (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1987) and P. Greenspan, Emotions and Reason: An Inquily Into Emotional Justification (New York: Routledge, Chapman , and Hall, 1988).

6 If one terminates the belief that p or the belief that -p as a result of a successful self- deception attempt and fi~rms the belief that -p or the belief that p one is more likely to confront what A. Mele has called the dynamic paradoxes pp. 10-11 in his article, "Recent Work On Self- Deception." The emergence of these paradoxes indicates why it is so difficult to succeed in deceiving oneself in this way. My account of intentional "object" avoidance avoids the dynamic paradoxes and this accounts, in part, for why it is easier to deceive oneself in this way.

7 E. Anscombe, Intention (Oxford, England: Blackwell, Press, 1957) 8 I want to thank Mike W. Martin for some invaluable criticisms and

helpful sugges t ions with respect to my description of what I call the self-deception attempt. Apart from my account of intentionality the rest of the distinctions in this paragraph are bor rowed from Martin. I have also learned a great deal from Martin's work on self-deception and I find his book, Self-Deception and Morality (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1986), a superb insightful discussion of the moral issues related to self-decept ion.

9 I speak of standard cases in which x succeeds in producing a false belief in Y . since there may be cases in which a successful deception attempt can result in true be liefs. F. Schmitt, "Epistemic Dimensions of Self- Deception," in B. McLaughlin and A. Ror ty , pp. 183-207, provides two controversial examples in footnote 11. Even if there are peripheral cases in which the belief is true, other-person deception will still differ from the most frequent case of successful self-deception, since holding a belief with respect to which one is deceived, whether true or false, is a necessary condition for other-person deception and such a belief is not present in the most frequent type of successful self- deception. In spite of Schmitt 's perceptive comments about other-person decepti on his analysis of self- deception is included in the models I criticize when he states, that "if there is genuine self-deception, properly so called, it must consist of deceiving oneself into believing some proposition" p. 189.

i t I am not not denying that persons can intend to deceive themselves and succeed but I do maintain that one does not form an intention to deceive oneself in the most f requent cases of successful self-deception.

H J. Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel Barnes, (New York: Pocket Books , 1966)

12 R. Audi,"Self-Deception, Rationalization, and Reasons for Acting," in McLaughl in and Rorty, Perspect ives on Self Deception (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1988), p 98.

t3 K. Bach , "An Ana lys i s of Se l f -Decept ion ," Ph i losophy and

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Phenomenological Research, 41 (1981), 351-370. I want to thank Mike W. Martin for his helpful cominenLs about assessing the adequacy of a conceptualization of self-deception in light of the purposes it is designed to serve and the degree to which a particular conceptualization fulfills its purposes. Certainly Fingarette, Sartre, and Solomon all see that the issue of taking responsibility and avoiding responsibility is central to issues surrounding the identification, description, and explanation of self-deception. See H. Fingarette, Sel:f- Deception (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969) for his account of the connection between self-deception and the disavowal of moral responsibility.

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Documents

Self-deception and other-person deception: A new conceptualization of one central type of self-deception