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ORI GIN AL PA PER
Self-serving legislators? An analysis of the salary-setting institutions of 27 EU parliaments
Karsten Mause
Published online: 10 January 2014
� Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014
Abstract It is often criticized in public debates that politicians in many juris-
dictions have the power to set their own salaries. This paper scrutinizes this practice
from a constitutional political economy perspective. A novel dataset is presented
which provides an empirical overview of the methods used to set the pay for
members of parliament (MPs) in the national parliaments of 27 member states of the
European Union. There is considerable cross-country variation in this respect.
While in the majority of national legislatures MPs to some degree decide on their
own salaries (i.e., ‘self-service’ model), in some systems MP pay is set by bodies
independent from MPs. A multiple regression analysis provides empirical support
for the self-serving-legislators prediction derived from Public Choice theory: con-
trolling for population size and living costs, salaries are systematically higher in
legislatures in which MPs have some say in their own salaries. However, this result
has to be interpreted with caution as (1) independent wage-setting bodies exist only
in five parliaments, and (2) this study could only include MPs’ basic salaries.
Keywords Members of parliament � Separation of powers � Paying
politicians � European Union
JEL Classification D72 � J33 � J45
1 Introduction
Being an employee in the labor market for politicians seems to be a worker’s
paradise: members of the Austrian Nationalrat, the German Bundestag, and
K. Mause (&)
Department of Political Science, University of Munster, Scharnhorststr. 100, 48151 Munster,
Germany
e-mail: [email protected]
123
Const Polit Econ (2014) 25:154–176
DOI 10.1007/s10602-013-9150-y
members of parliament (MPs) in many other jurisdictions are allowed to set their
own salaries and other parts of their remuneration package (travel expenses,
retirement benefits, etc.).1 This practice obviously invalidates the principle of nemo
iudex in causa sua (i.e., no one should be judge in his/her own cause) because in this
case legislators are in fact ‘judges’ in their own cause (see e.g., McCormick and
Tollison 1978; Hibbing 1983; von Arnim 1993; Isensee 2000). Critics of such
compensation-setting practice have apparently been inspired by John Locke’s
(1632–1704) democratic theory and its separation-of-powers ideal, culminating in
the concern that ‘‘it may be too great a temptation’’ to legislators, being both
employees and employers in a labor contract perspective, to ‘‘suit the law, both in its
making, and execution, to their own private advantage, and thereby come to have a
distinct interest from the rest of the community, contrary to the end of society and
government’’ (Locke 1689/2003: 164; i.e., Locke’s Second Treatise of Government,
chap. XII, § 143).
It is not hard to find media reports about allegedly ‘self-serving’ and ‘overpaid’
MPs using their legislative powers to increase their private income. Likewise, public
opinion polls reveal that many citizens in advanced democracies perceive their
political representatives to be ‘cash-hungry.’ For example, following the scandal
involving British MPs’ abuse of expense allowances, in a representative Spring
2009 public opinion poll 62 % of respondents agreed that ‘‘MPs put their own
interests first’’ (i.e., ahead of the ‘‘interests of their party, constituents and country’’),
68 % believed that half or more ‘‘MPs use their power for their own personal gain,’’
48 % thought that half or more ‘‘MPs are corrupt,’’ and 68 % agree that ‘‘most MPs
make a lot of money by using public office improperly’’ (Ipsos MORI 2009).
There is a great deal of empirical research on different aspects of politicians’ pay
in single countries including the United States (see e.g., Crain and Tollison 1976;
Hafer 1977; McCormick and Tollison 1978; Sen 1991; Sollars 1994; Clark 1996;
Besley 2004; Di Tella and Fisman 2004; Theriault 2004; Diermeier et al. 2005;
Alston et al. 2006; Keane and Merlo 2010; Tuttle and Bumpass 2010; Hoffman and
Lyons 2013), the United Kingdom (Judge 1984; Baimbridge and Darcy 1999), Italy
(Merlo et al. 2010; Gagliarducci and Nannicini 2013; Fedele and Giannoccolo
2013), Germany (Rohrbein 2007; Peichl et al. 2013), and other (sub)national
settings (Podes 1993; Jones 2007; Ferraz and Finan 2009; Kotakorpi and Poutvaara
2011). Moreover, some recent studies focus on the salaries of Members of the
European Parliament (Fisman et al. 2012; Dimitrakopoulos and Page 2012;
Braendle 2013; Mocan and Altindag 2013). However, there is comparatively little
cross-country research on paying politicians. In addition to a number of reports that
provide descriptive overviews of MP pay across different samples of countries (see
below), there are only a few empirical studies that explore the determinants of MPs’
salaries in an internationally comparative perspective (Hood 1992; Hood and Peters
1994, 2003; Peters and Hood 1995; Squire 2008; Brans and Peters 2012).
1 Like in McCormick and Tollison (1978), Besley (2004), Messner and Polborn (2004), Gersbach (2009)
and other contributions to the ‘‘paying politicians’’ literature, in what follows the terms salary, wage, pay
and remuneration are used interchangeably to denote the monetary earnings a MP receives in a given
period (say, a month or year) for doing his/her parliamentary job.
Self-serving legislators? 155
123
This paper contributes to the latter literature by analyzing a neglected potential
determinant: namely, the methods used to set MP salaries. Section 2 gives an
empirical overview of the current salary levels in the national parliaments of 27
member states of the European Union (EU). Section 3 presents a novel dataset
providing information about existing salary-setting methods, revealing considerable
variation across countries. While in the majority of national legislatures MPs to
some degree decide on their own salaries (i.e. ‘self-service’ model), there are also
political systems in which MP pay is set by bodies independent from MPs. Section 4
examines, in a cross-country perspective, whether or not differences in salary-
setting methods translate into significant differences in salary levels. A multiple
regression analysis provides empirical support for the self-serving-legislators
prediction derived from Public Choice theory: controlling for population size and
living costs, MP salaries are systematically higher (lower) in countries where MPs
(independent bodies) decide on MPs’ salaries. This is what one would expect from
the perspective of Public Choice theory which works with the homo-economics
assumption and presumes that political actors are primarily motivated by
(economic) self-interest.2 However, as discussed in Sect. 5, this result should be
interpreted with caution as (1) independent wage-setting bodies exist only in five
parliaments, and (2) this study could only include MPs’ basic salaries.
2 Empirical background: MPs’ salaries in the European Union
Figure 1 displays the annual gross salaries of members of the national parliaments
(lower houses) in 27 EU member states in the year 2013 in Euros (EUR). For
countries which are not members of the Euro currency area (i.e., BUL, CZE, LAT,
LTU, HUN, POL, ROM, SWE, DEN, GBR), the salary in national currencies has
been converted into EUR based on the EUR reference exchange rates of the
European Central Bank (average over the year 2012). The salary data reflects the
situation as of October 2013, and was taken from official parliament websites or was
directly provided by the parliament administration via email.
Obviously, there are considerable cross-country differences. The highest
legislator salaries are paid in Italy (125,220 EUR per year), Austria (116,297
EUR), the Netherlands (102,040 EUR) and Germany (99,024 EUR). Please note that
the presented figures are only basic salaries. In all countries, the compensation
package of a MP also includes a number of additional payments (e.g., expense
allowances for stationery, ICT equipment, postal and telephone charges, accom-
modation, travel, etc.), non-cash benefits (e.g., free train tickets, free usage of
official cars, etc.), and pension benefits. However, making the details of the full
compensation packages comparable across the 27 EU countries, and expressing
2 See also McCormick and Tollison (1981), Buchanan (2003), Besley (2004), or already Downs (1957:
28): ‘‘From the self-interest axiom springs our view of what motivates the political actions of party
members. We assume that they act solely in order to attain the income, prestige, and power which come
from being in office.’’
156 K. Mause
123
these complex packages (including non-cash benefits) in monetary terms turned out
to be a mission impossible.3
There is a striking divide in terms of MP pay between Western and Eastern
Europe. All of the 10 East European countries in the sample (see the grey-colored
bars) can be found in the lower half of the salary ranking, showing a pay level below
the EU-27 mean. And there is a North–South divide. With the exception of Italy
(125,220 EUR) and Greece (68,467 EUR), MPs in southern European countries
such as Cyprus, Portugal, Spain, and Malta earn relatively less than MPs in northern
European countries. Obvious and plausible explanations for the striking West–East
and North–South divides are the still existing differences across the member states
of the EU in terms of the standard of living. In fact, legislator salaries are
significantly higher in countries with a relatively high standard of living as proxied
by the GDP per capita (see also Squire 2008, using 2005 salary data for national
parliaments in 20 advanced and 15 emerging market economies). Numerically, the
pairwise correlation (Spearman’s rho) between the 2013 annual MP salaries and the
2012 GDP per capita (current EUR) is 0.863 (p \ 0.0000; N = 27).
13,407
13,498
16,355
20,111
26,106
26,658
28,367
30,341
33,766
40,560
42,912
43,935
46,123
47,326
47,326
59,750
68,467
76,020
81,882
82,444
85,110
85,202
86,067
87,258
88,739
99,024
102,040
116,297
125,220
Romania (ROM)
Bulgaria (BUL)
Hungary (HUN)
Malta (MLT)
Latvia (LAT)
Czech Republic (CZE)
Poland (POL)
Lithuania (LTU)
Spain (ESP)
Estonia (EST)
Slovakia (SVK)
Slovenia (SLO)
Portugal (POR)
Cyprus (CYP)
EU-27 MEDIAN
EU-27 MEAN
Greece (GRE)
Finland (FIN)
United Kingdom (GBR)
Sweden (SWE)
Luxembourg (LUX)
France (FRA)
Belgium (BEL)
Ireland (IRL)
Denmark (DEN)
Germany (GER)
Netherlands (NED)
Austria (AUT)
Italy (ITA)
Fig. 1 Annual gross basic salary 2013 (in EUR) of members of national parliaments (EU-27)
3 See also Hood and Peters (2003), Behnke et al. (2008), and Brans and Peters (2012: 18) who note: ‘‘The
individual country chapters in this book reveal particular features that are too unique and variegated to
capture in cross country comparisons.’’
Self-serving legislators? 157
123
This statistically significant association is illustrated by the scatter plot in Fig. 2,
which divides the sample into (1) a low pay/low economic wealth and (2) a high
pay/high economic wealth country cluster. Moreover, four observations stand out:
Luxembourg, with its large GDP per capita due to its large financial sector, its
smallness in terms of population size (about 500,000 inhabitants), and the many
work commuters who contribute to the GDP but do not live in the country; Greece,
with its high MP salaries compared to legislator pay in its neighboring countries in
southern Europe; and Italy and Austria, with the highest MP salaries in the EU-27
sample.
The issue of defining what the ‘right’ amount of pay is for politicians is a hotly
debated topic, not only in the European Union.4 Some citizens have the impression
that MPs are ‘overpaid,’ while others (including probably many politicians) feel
they are ‘underpaid.’ One problem in such a discussion is that it is difficult to find a
yardstick against which to measure whether an MP earns ‘too much.’ A yardstick
often used in the media is to compare the MP salary to the average wage in a
country. Following this approach and using the 2011 gross average annual wages in
a country as a proxy indicator,5 shows that members of national parliaments in all of
the considered countries earn more than the average citizen in his/her country (see
Table 1, Column 1). This is not surprising given the fact that being an MP is a
stressful and responsible job at the ‘top’ of society. Moreover, many MPs probably
have a university degree which means that their outside options may be substantially
different from those of the average citizen.
However, the wage gaps presented in Column (1) of Table 1 reveal some
interesting cases that deserve closer scrutiny: for example, Italian and Greek MPs
receive a 4.5 and 3.4 times higher salary than the average citizen, respectively. In
absolute terms, Italian and Greek MPs earn 97,111 EUR and 48,032 EUR more per
year than the average citizen, respectively. The figures illustrate that citizens in
Italy, Greece, and some other countries, who criticize that their ‘political elite’ is a
self-serving ‘‘caste’’ (Rizzo and Stella 2008), indeed have a point—because it has to
be taken into account that the figures presented above just cover MPs’ basic salaries
and do not include additional payments (e.g., expense allowances, per-diem
allowances, additional salaries for committee chairmen, etc.), non-cash benefits
(related to housing, traveling, etc.), potential outside earnings (e.g., directorships,
honoraria for lecturing) as well as pension benefits (we return to this caveat in the
conclusion). For example, according to Day (2012) and other media reports, the
average annual gross salary for Italian and Greek MPs—including expense
allowances—is about 192,000 EUR and 103,128 EUR, respectively. This is 6.8
times and 5.1 times higher than the average citizen’s annual salary.
4 See e.g., Dekker (2013). Judge (1984: 59) provides a survey of the debate about ‘‘the proper level of
salary for MPs,’’ discusses different pay criteria/mechanisms, and concludes: ‘‘How much is an MP
worth? Who decides? Throughout the centuries there has been a profusion of partial, uncomfortable,
embarrassing and often contradictory answers, but satisfactory and universally acceptable ones still
remain undiscovered.’’5 The wages cover the total economy and are expressed per full-time equivalent employee (data source:
UNECE Statistical Database and ILO Global Wage Database). For ‘non-Eurozone countries,’ wages have
been converted using the ECB’s EUR reference exchange rates (average over the year 2011).
158 K. Mause
123
According to calculations by Merlo et al. (2010: 49), ‘‘[i]n Italy, the (before-tax)
real annual parliamentary wage (indennita parlamentare) in 2005 euros increased
from 10,712 euros in 1948 to 137,691 euros in 2006 (an overall growth of
1,185.4 %), at an average annual growth rate of 9.9 %. […] Over the same period of
time, Italy’s real per-capita GDP grew 449.5 %, at an average annual growth rate of
3.2 %.’’ As some may argue that comparing members of the political ‘elite’ with
‘average’ citizens is misleading (see above), Merlo et al. (2010: 60) present another
interesting comparison: ‘‘Average real annual earning of managers in the private
sector increased 62.2 % between 1985 and 2004 at an average annual growth rate of
2.9 %. During the same period, the average real total annual income of legislators
grew 96.7 % at an average annual growth rate of 3.8 %.’’ In 2004, Italian MPs’
annual real income was 1.8 times larger than the average annual real earnings of
managers in the Italian private sector.
3 Paying MPs: cross-country differences in salary-setting methods
Given the lively public debates about politicians’ salaries in many countries, it is not
surprising that a number of cross-country studies have been published which, among
other things, provide information about MPs’ remuneration across samples of
countries (see e.g., Judge 1984; Hood 1992; Hood and Peters 1994; Peters and Hood
1995; Van der Hulst 2000; CPA 2005; Baker 2008; Behnke et al. 2008; TPA 2009;
Maer and Kelly 2009; Z’graggen 2009; Brans and Peters 2012; Fedele and
Giannoccolo 2013). Unfortunately, such studies often remain silent on the issue of
how exactly MPs’ salaries are set in the respective countries. Based on the
Fig. 2 MP salaries and GDP per capita (EU-27)
Self-serving legislators? 159
123
Ta
ble
1P
ayin
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ember
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inth
eE
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PP
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lBody
125,2
20
147,3
18
Aust
ria
Nat
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tric
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116,2
97
133,6
75
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man
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99
,02
41
17
,88
6
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40
115,9
55
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dep
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82
,44
47
7,1
61
Den
mar
kF
olk
etin
g1
.7M
PsR
estr
icte
d8
8,7
39
75
,83
8
Fin
lan
dE
du
sku
nta
2.0
Ind
epB
od
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20
74
,52
9
Slo
vak
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dn
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da
3.8
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sRes
tric
ted
42
,91
27
2,7
32
Cyp
rus
Vo
uli
ton
An
tip
roso
po
n2
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Ps
47
,32
66
5,7
31
Port
ugal
Ass
emble
iada
Rep
ub
lica
2.8
MP
s4
6,1
23
64
,96
2
Est
on
iaR
iigik
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u3
.8M
Ps
40
,56
06
4,3
81
Slo
ven
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rzav
ni
zbor
2.0
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lBody
43,9
35
62,7
64
Po
lan
dS
ejm
2.9
MP
sRes
tric
ted
28
,36
75
9,6
52
Lit
huan
iaS
eim
as4
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30
,34
15
6,6
27
Cze
chR
ep.
Posl
anec
ka
snem
ov
na
2.2
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sRes
tric
ted
26
,65
84
3,7
33
Lat
via
Sae
ima
3.3
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,34
3
Spai
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ongre
sode
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Dip
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1.3
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lBody
33,7
66
42,7
42
160 K. Mause
123
Ta
ble
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nti
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ed
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db
MP
sala
ry(€
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Psa
lary
(US
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PP
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Bulg
aria
Nar
od
no
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ran
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aA
nn
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asic
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ross
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Ex
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the
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tc
An
nu
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ross
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Rd
Annual
gro
ssbas
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Psa
lary
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US
Dat
purc
has
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erpar
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(PP
P)
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ange
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se
Fre
nch
go
ver
nm
ent
dec
ides
on
MP
pay
bu
tg
ov
ernm
ent
mem
ber
sn
ot
allo
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eM
Ps
(see
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t)f
Mal
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ent
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ides
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MP
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but
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curr
ent
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etm
ember
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eM
Ps
(see
text)
Self-serving legislators? 161
123
information about ESP, FRA, GER, IRL, ITA, NED, SWE in Baker (2008), the
chapters on BEL, ESP, EST, FRA, HUN, IRL, ITA, NED, ROM, SVK, SWE in
Brans and Peters (2012; most information as of 2007/08), and on own investigations
(i.e., legal texts, parliaments’ official websites, contacting parliamentary adminis-
tration), Column (2) of Table 1 provides an overview of MP salary-setting
mechanisms in 27 EU member states. The data reflects the situation as of October
2013.
As in the case of MP salaries, there are considerable cross-country differences
with respect to the applied methods of salary setting. Basically, four methods can be
distinguished which are labeled as ‘MPs’, ‘MPsRestricted’, ‘ParlBody’, and
‘IndepBody’ in Column (2) of Table 1. In what follows, the coding is explained
in detail. First of all, it turns out that in the majority of countries (17 out of 27;
63 %) MPs to some degree have the power to decide on their own salaries. This
does not, however, imply that MPs can choose whatever figure they want. In 10 out
of 27 legislatures (37 %), changes of MP salaries have to be approved by parliament
but legislators are constrained by some mechanism which, as a rule, is laid down in
the constitution, parliamentary standing order, or some other legal text (hence,
coded as ‘MPsRestricted’ legislatures). For example, in Austria the national audit
court annually calculates an ‘‘adjustment coefficient’’ (adjusted to inflation) as a
salary cap. In Bulgaria, MPs ‘‘shall receive base monthly remuneration equivalent to
three average monthly salaries in the economy according to data supplied by the
National Statistics Institute,’’ and the monthly salary ‘‘shall be adjusted quarterly on
the basis of the average monthly salary for the last month of the preceding quarter’’
(Art. 5 of the Appendix to the Rules of Organization and Procedure of the National
Assembly). Members of the German Bundestag decide on MP pay but use the
salaries of senior civil servants as a reference point; and, as a further constraint, an
approval by the upper house (Bundesrat) is required. A similar system is applied in
the Czech Parliament (i.e., an MP salary is linked to the salaries of high civil
servants, plus approval from the upper house is required). In Denmark, Hungary,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Poland, MP salaries are linked to the salaries of
high-ranking civil servants in the respective countries; in the case of Slovakia, MP
pay is linked to the wage development in the private sector.
Only in a quarter of the analyzed legislatures (7 out of 27; 26 %) parliamen-
tarians are able to decide ‘unconstrained’ (in the above sense) on their own salaries:
in the cases of Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, and Romania, I
could not find a formal mechanism restricting MPs (i.e., coding ‘MPs’). In the case
of Lithuania, MPs determine their pay but changes become effective only in the next
legislative term; that is, only MPs that are sure of being an MP in the following term
can deliberately set their own salaries. However, an exception to this rule was
recently created: in 2009, the Constitutional Court of Lithuania decided that MPs
were allowed to take a cut in their own salaries in times of financial/economic
crises, which actually happened (e.g., 8.2 % reduction of basic salary in 2009).
Moreover, there is a group consisting of four countries in which MPs do not
directly decide on their salaries (be it constrained or unconstrained) but the latter are
set by a cross-partisan parliamentary body consisting of MPs: Belgium, Italy,
Slovenia, and Spain (coded as ‘ParlBody’). So, actually, in these countries MPs set
162 K. Mause
123
the wages for themselves and their fellow MPs. It should be mentioned, however,
that there are certain constraints. In Italy, the parliamentary body determines MP
pay but ‘‘[a]nnual increments to MPs’ salaries are linked to those of’’ supreme court
judges (whose salary is set by the government); ‘‘however, there is no legal
requirement to stay at this level’’ (Baker 2008: 36). In the other cases, the
parliamentary body decides on the MP salary but the latter is linked to the salary of
a supreme administrative court judge (Belgium), to public-sector salaries (Slove-
nia), or to salaries of high-ranking civil servants (Spain).
Furthermore, in four countries independent bodies decide on MPs’ pay: Finland,
Ireland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom (coded as ‘IndepBody’). In Finland, since
2003 an MP’s pay has been determined by an independent Remuneration
Committee, which consists of three members (who are not MPs) and which is
appointed by the Speaker of Parliament. In the UK, since 2013 the Independent
Parliamentary Standards Authority has been responsible for determining MPs’ pay.
In Sweden, since 1994 MP pay has been determined by the Riksdag Remuneration
Committee which is appointed by a parliamentary body (Riksdag Board). The
Remuneration Committee is formally independent and consists of a chair (currently
a legal expert, former court of appeal president) and two members (currently two
county governors). When the Remuneration Committee ‘‘decides whether or not to
increase salaries, it makes a determination which is accepted without government
involvement or a vote by MPs. When making its judgment the [Committee]
compares levels with cabinet ministers and some civil servants and takes account of
the wider economy’’ (Baker 2008: 38). Ireland is a special case. Since 2000 MP pay
has been linked to civil servant pay which is set by a ‘‘national wage agreement…agreed between unions, employers and the government. It is not passed through
parliament’’ (Baker 2008: 33). The national wage agreement is coded as
‘IndepBody’ here, as neither MPs nor a parliamentary body decides on MP salaries.
Finally, two special cases remain. In Malta, at first glance, the salary-setting method
has been ‘de-parliamentarized’ in the sense that the government decides on MP
salaries. Yet, Malta is coded as ‘ParlBody’ because all 15 members of government
simultaneously belong as MPs to the 69-seat parliament (at least in the current
legislative period), and set the wage for themselves and their fellow MPs. In France,
since 1958 the basic salary of Members of the Assemblee Nationale has been ‘‘directly
linked to the pay of the senior civil service’’ (SCS) and ‘‘automatically increased by the
average of the highest and lowest rates of SCS pay increase. Reviews of SCS pay
(conducted by the Ministry of the Civil Service) are sporadic but generally occur once
a year… MPs do not vote on the level of their own or SCS pay’’ (Baker 2008: 35). As
MPs do not set their own salaries and, at the same time, a parliamentary mandate is
incompatible with a position in the French government (which sets the reference
point), the French case is coded as ‘IndepBody.’
4 Salary-setting methods and MP salaries
It is often argued that the ‘political class’ as a self-regulating profession (ab)uses its
compensation-setting power to realize a compensation level that is significantly
Self-serving legislators? 163
123
higher than the respective level would be under a system in which independent
regulators (e.g., a remuneration commission) decide on politicians’ pay. That is, if
MPs have the power to set their own salaries (i.e., ‘‘wage cartel’’ situation;
McCormick and Tollison 1978), then they will use this power to increase salary
levels to ‘excessive’ amounts. The novel dataset introduced above offers a good
opportunity to empirically analyze whether the type of compensation-setting
regulation really has the effect predicted by Public Choice theory.
Before proceeding, it should be mentioned that there is some empirical evidence
on this issue from the USA. In their analysis of wage-setting methods at the state
level in the US in the mid-1970s, McCormick and Tollison (1978) indeed found that
legislative pay in 1974/75 was significantly higher in states in which ‘‘legislators are
given a direct hand in wage determination’’ compared to states where pay is set in
the constitution. By contrast, some years later Sollars (1994) found that the cross-
state differences in compensation-setting methods did not help to explain the
differences in legislative pay across the US states in 1988/89 (see also Squire 2008,
using 2004 data). And Sollars (1990: 85), using US state-level data for 1983/84,
found ‘‘that states with a constitutional pay provision [i.e., pay is set in constitution,
constitutional amendment necessary to amend pay] have compensation levels
significantly less… than those who do not.’’6
4.1 Comparison of group means
If one simply looks at the average salary levels of the country groups differentiated
by the different salary-setting methods, the following country ranking appears. The
highest annual salary, on average, is paid in those national parliaments in which an
independent body determines MP pay: 82,561 EUR (median 82,444 EUR). The
average for the ‘MPsRestricted’ legislatures in which MPs decide on their salaries
but have linked the latter to some outside indicator (e.g., civil service pay) is 61,900
EUR (median 64,011 EUR). The average for the countries in which a parliamentary
body decides on MP pay is 61,820 EUR (median 43,935 EUR). And the average for
the parliaments in which MPs can make an ‘unconstrained’ decision regarding their
own salaries is 38,904 EUR (median 40,560 EUR). This is anything but empirical
support for the self-serving-legislators hypothesis. According to this conjecture, the
last group actually should be on top of such a salary ranking.
However, the above calculations neglect the differences between countries in
terms of price levels and cost of living. To take this into account, like in Brans and
Peters (2012) and other comparative studies, the annual gross basic MP salaries in
national currencies have been converted into US dollars using purchasing power
parity (PPP) exchange rates. The PPP conversion factors (2011 as latest available
year) were provided by the United Nations Statistics Division. Using the PPP-
adjusted salaries (see Table 1, Column 4) to calculate averages for the different
country groups, the same ranking as above appears: 86,085 USD (IndepBody;
6 An explanation for this result is provided by McCormick and Tollison (1978: 67): when ‘‘legislative
pay is set in the constitution… [pay] is quite difficult to change. A new wage would require the passage of
a constitutional proposal. Such proposals typically emanate from the legislature under relatively strict
voting and quorum rules and must be signed by the governor and passed in a statewide referendum.’’
164 K. Mause
123
Ta
ble
2R
egre
ssio
nre
sult
s:d
eter
min
ants
of
MP
s’sa
lari
es(E
U-2
7,
20
13)
Full
countr
ysa
mple
Countr
ysa
mple
wit
hout
Den
mar
kW
ithout
Luxem
bourg
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
Popula
tion
(log)
6878.9
**
[2.5
0]
6,8
44.4
**
[2.6
4]
6,8
44.4
**
[2.6
4]
6,8
12.8
**
[2.4
0]
6,8
41.3
**
[2.6
5]
6,8
41.3
**
[2.6
5]
5,8
54.5
**
[2.6
3]
Liv
ing
cost
s1,0
73.6
***
[6.5
9]
1,0
63.3
***
[6.9
2]
1,0
63.3
***
[6.9
2]
1,2
43.7
***
[8.7
2]
1,2
08.4
***
[8.4
3]
1,2
08.4
***
[8.4
3]
1,0
39.5
***
[9.9
1]
GD
Pper
capit
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66,8
72.8
***
[3.5
7]
69,6
62.9
***
[4.1
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96,5
70.3
***
[8.9
2]
93,8
22.4
***
[11.7
3]
MP
sre
fere
nce
gro
up
refe
rence
gro
up
MP
sRes
tric
ted
315.0
[0.0
5]
2,0
64.9
[0.3
1]
Par
lBody
–3,8
88.3
[0.3
5]
–7,3
75.2
[0.6
9]
MP
s?
MP
sRes
tric
ted
?P
arlB
ody
13,7
91.0
[1.2
8]
20,4
51.1
*
[1.8
9]
Indep
Body
–14,9
12.1
[1.3
6]
–13,7
91.0
[1.2
8]
8,1
13.8
[0.8
1]
–22,5
97.1
**
[2.2
5]
–20,4
51.1
*
[1.8
9]
–4,4
78.5
[0.5
6]
Rsq
uar
ed0.7
72
0.7
70
0.7
70
0.5
88
0.5
80
0.8
10
0.8
01
0.8
01
0.7
62
0.7
09
0.7
07
Fst
atis
tics
33.0
0***
45.9
6***
45.9
6***
35.7
0***
17.2
1***
38.4
6***
47.9
4***
47.9
4***
49.2
1***
77.6
1***
137.5
***
VIF
-val
ues
B2.2
5B
1.3
7B
1.3
7B
1.1
1B
1.0
0B
2.4
2B
1.5
2B
1.5
2B
1.0
1B
1.2
7B
1.0
0
Fte
st:
pay
inst
ituti
on
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iable
(s)
0.7
51.6
51.6
50.6
6–
2.5
5*
3.5
6*
3.5
6*
–0.3
2–
N27
27
27
27
27
26
26
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26
26
Unst
andar
diz
edco
effi
cien
tsof
OL
Sre
gre
ssio
ns
wit
hM
Ps’
annual
gro
ssbas
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es2013
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R)
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,*
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%
Self-serving legislators? 165
123
median: 91,851 USD), 77,030 USD (MPsRestricted; median: 74,285 USD), 76,075
USD (ParlBody; median: 62,764 USD), and 58,795 USD (MPs; median: 64,381
USD). Again, the performed comparison of means does not provide empirical
support for the self-serving-legislators hypothesis—quite the contrary: MPs in
legislatures where salary-setting has been delegated to an independent body, on
average, earn 27,290 USD per year more than MPs in legislatures where MPs still
decide on their own salaries.
One possible explanation for this result could be that the independent
remuneration commissions in the sample might not really be independent from
MPs. Sollars (1990: 83) in this context speaks of the possibility that such bodies are
‘‘captured by the legislature.’’7 As mentioned above, in the Swedish case a
parliamentary body (Riksdag Board) appoints the three members of the remuner-
ation committee. Currently, no member is an MP. But as two members are
politicians (i.e., county governors), some might argue that the ‘political class’ is still
involved in setting MP pay despite the wage-setting process being ‘de-parliamen-
tarized.’ The same point could be made in the British case. However, only one of the
six persons currently on top of the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority
(IPSA) is a former politician. The current IPSA board members were selected by an
independent commission. In the Irish case, a body consisting of representatives from
labor unions, employer associations, and the government set the wage via a wage
agreement. That is, government politicians are involved. The latter also holds in the
French case.
To avoid any doubt as to whether remuneration commissions are really
independent, one should follow the Finnish example and not have any (former)
politician on board. Here, the commission is appointed by parliament but does not
consist of any MPs; and the three current commission members, to my knowledge,
are not former politicians. However, even in such case it cannot be ruled out that
‘‘the pay commission’s interests may be congruent with the legislature’s, and the
commission may provide the political cover necessary to increase pay’’ (Sollars
1994: 512).
4.2 Multiple regression analysis
The fact that MPs in legislatures with independent wage-setting bodies, on average,
get a higher pay than MPs in parliaments in which MPs to some degree set their own
compensation, could be driven by factors other than wage-setting methods.
Therefore, a multiple regression analysis (OLS) including MPs’ annual basic
salaries in 2013 as the dependent variable has been conducted. In this analysis, a
number of independent variables capture the different salary-setting methods: ‘MPs’
(7), ‘MPsRestricted’ (10), ‘MPs ? MPsRestricted’ (17), ‘ParlBody’ (5), ‘MPsRe-
stricted ? ParlBody’ (15), ‘MPs ? ParlBody’ (12), ‘MPs ? MPsRestrict-
ed ? ParlBody’ (22), and ‘IndepBody’ (5) are dummy variables taking on the
7 See also McCormick and Tollison (1978: 67): ‘‘There is also some use of pay commissions among [US]
states. These commissions are appointed by the legislature, and no elaborate theory of regulation is
needed to explain why we treat these states as cases where the legislature sets the wage.’’
166 K. Mause
123
value of 1 if the respective salary-setting method(s) (as defined above) are applied in
a national parliament. In parentheses the number of legislatures is reported that use
the respective methods.
The reason for merging the categories ‘MPs’ and ‘MPsRestricted’ in some
specifications is that it could be the case that MPs (a) decide to depart a ‘little’ from
the extra-parliamentary reference point for wage-setting or (b) have an influence on
this reference point. For example, legislative pay in Hungary (coded as ‘MPsRe-
stricted’) is linked to civil service pay but the latter, in turn, is decided on by
parliament. The underlying argument behind merging the categories ‘MPsRestrict-
ed’ and ‘ParlBody’ is that, as noted above, the parliamentary bodies use some type
of extra-parliamentary reference point for wage setting. And merging ‘MPs’ and
‘ParlBody’ as well as ‘MPs’, ‘MPsRestricted’ and ‘ParlBody’ makes sense because
a parliamentary commission is not independent from MPs: here, some MPs in their
role as commission members set the pay for themselves and their fellow MPs.
Table 2 presents the results of the multiple regression analysis. All regression
models exhibit no problematic level of multicollinearity (see the low VIF-values).
Moreover, in all models the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test indicates heter-
oskedasticity so that heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors were adopted.
Controlling for cross-country differences in terms of population size and living
costs (the results of these control variables are discussed below), salary levels are
lower in parliaments where a body independent from MPs decides on MP pay; see
the regression coefficients of the variable ‘IndepBody’ in model (3) or in model (1),
in which the dummy variable ‘MPs’ is the reference category. Conversely, salary
levels are higher in parliaments where MPs to some degree set their own salaries, as
indicated by the positive coefficient of the dummy variable ‘MPs ? MPsRestrict-
ed ? ParlBody’ in model (2). Though the coefficients of the variables ‘IndepBody’
and ‘MPs ? MPsRestricted ? ParlBody’ indeed have the signs expected from the
perspective of Public Choice theory, they do not reach conventional levels of
statistical significance. The latter also holds for the other MP-pay-method variables
explained above (results not reported here).
However, it is well known that single countries may have a strong leverage on the
findings of cross-sectional regressions including a small number of countries. To
check for this, regression models (1) to (3) have been jackknifed by removing each
country in turn. It turns out that the regression results are sensitive to the inclusion
of Denmark, which has the highest living costs in the EU-27 sample (summary
statistics of ‘living costs’ and the other metric variables used in this study are
provided in the ‘‘Appendix’’ in Table 3). If the Danish case is excluded (see models
6–9), the coefficients of the variables ‘IndepBody’ and ‘MPs ? MPsRestrict-
ed ? ParlBody’ become statistically significant at the 5 or 10 % level and—in line
with McCormick and Tollison (1978)—provide empirical support for the self-
serving-legislators hypothesis (see also the significant partial F tests for the pay
institution variable(s) in models 6–9). For example, holding the factors ‘population
size’ and ‘living costs’ constant, numerically MPs in ‘IndepBody’ systems on
average receive 22,597.10 EUR less basic salary per year (1,883.10 EUR less per
month) than MPs in systems where the latter set their own salaries (see model 6 with
‘MPs’ as the reference category).
Self-serving legislators? 167
123
Yet this result has to be interpreted with caution as only in five parliaments (i.e.,
Finland, France, Ireland, Sweden, the UK) do independent wage-setting bodies exist
(we return to this caveat in the conclusion). The size of the data set does not allow as
thorough a statistical analysis as would be ideal. Moreover, it should be mentioned that
the coefficients of the wage-setting variables ‘IndepBody’ and ‘MPs ? MPsRestrict-
ed ? ParlBody’ in models (7) and (8) (narrowly) miss the 10 % level of statistical
significance (p value B 0.1) when these models are jackknifed by removing each
country in turn: Austria (p value of wage-setting variables after removing this
country = 0.154), Finland (0.120), Germany (0.147), Italy (0.200), Netherlands
(0.137), and Sweden (0.112). But the coefficient of the variable ‘IndepBody’ in model
(6) consistently remains statistically significant when this model is jackknifed:
removing Italy, with the highest MP salaries, yields a p value of 0.098; removing any
other single country yields p values between 0.009 and 0.070. Overall, despite the
mentioned caveats, the regression analysis suggests that MP salaries, ceteris paribus,
are systematically higher (lower) in countries where MPs (independent bodies) decide
on MPs’ salaries. The results provide evidence that salary-setting institutions matter,
but the evidence for institutional effects is weaker than expected.
Moreover, Table 2 shows that the socio-economic factors ‘cost of living’ and
‘population size’ help explain the considerable cross-national differences with
respect to MP pay. One may argue that higher MP salaries simply reflect the fact
that living in some European countries is cheaper for citizens (including MPs) than
living in others. In fact, there is a high and statistically significant positive
correlation between the variable ‘living costs’ and MP salaries in current EUR
(Spearman’s q = 0.828; p \ 0.0000; N = 27). Likewise, in all regression models
presented in Table 2, the coefficient of the variable ‘living costs’ has the expected
positive sign and is statistically significant. As a proxy for comparing the cost of
living across nations, Eurostat’s 2012 price level index for private household
consumption expenditure is used. This index considerably varies across EU
countries, ranging from 43.5 in Bulgaria to 144.9 in Denmark (EU-27 = 100).
As mentioned in Sect. 2, a correlation analysis shows that countries with
relatively high standards of living (as measured by GDP per capita) can afford to
pay its legislators higher salaries than less wealthy countries (see also Squire 2008,
analyzing a cross-section of 35 national parliaments in 2005). This effect also
appears in regression model (5) whose R-squared indicates that the GDP per capita
(PPP, current international $) already explains 58 % of the cross-national variation
in legislator salaries (70 % if the outlier Luxembourg with the by far highest GDP
per inhabitant is excluded; see model 11). Nevertheless, to avoid multicollinearity
problems, the GDP per capita has not been included in the regression models (1) to
(3) and (6) to (9): GDP per capita and the variable ‘living costs’ are highly
correlated (Spearman’s q = 0.926; p \ 0.0000; N = 27) and I think that the cost of
living as a ‘common sense’ determinant of legislative pay should be included as a
control variable in such a cross-national analysis.
However, including GDP per capita instead of ‘living costs’ as an alternative
specification, reveals an interesting relationship: while the coefficient for GDP per
capita has the expected positive sign and is statistically significant, the coefficient of
the pay method variable ‘IndepBody’ is insignificant (see model 4)—and remains
168 K. Mause
123
insignificant but has the expected negative sign if the outlier Luxembourg, the
leader of the GDP per capita country ranking, or any other single country (e.g.
Denmark with the highest living costs) is excluded (see e.g. model 10 without
Luxembourg). An explanation of this result is that this specification exhibits a
medium degree of multicollinearity because salary-setting institutions and national
wealth are interdependent. This is indicated by the positive association between the
‘IndepBody’ dummy and ‘GDP per capita’ (log): the point biserial correlation
coefficient is 0.313 (p = 0.1110; N = 27) and 0.455 (p = 0.0194; N = 26) if the
outlier Luxembourg is excluded. Bearing in mind the small-N caveat (see above),
the correlation suggests that wealthier (poorer) democracies are more likely to
liberalize (stick to) their ‘‘wage cartel’’ regimes in the sense of McCormick and
Tollison (1978).8 This is basically in line with Congleton (2011) who argues that an
interdependence exists between the level of economic development and the degree
to which political systems have been reformed towards liberal democracies.
Furthermore, the regressions indicate that MP pay is higher in larger countries in
terms of population size. This finding could be interpreted in the sense that MPs in
larger countries tend to have to care for a larger number of constituents than their
colleagues in smaller countries and, therefore, bear a higher degree of responsibility
(see also Tuttle and Bumpass 2010, analyzing US state governors’ salaries).9 This is
underlined by the fact that there is a high and significant positive correlation
between the variables ‘population’ and ‘citizens per seat’ in parliament (Spearman’s
q = 0.944; p \ 0.0000; N = 27). Moreover, unsurprisingly, ‘population’ is highly
correlated with the sheer ‘number of seats’ in national parliaments (Spearman’s
q = 0.877; p \ 0.0000; N = 27). The latter variable is not included in the
regressions, as this would obviously cause a multicollinearity problem. Overall, the
factors ‘cost of living’ and ‘population size’ together already explain a great deal
(76 %) of the cross-country variation with respect to MPs’ salaries (see the
R-squared in model 9).
To check for the robustness of the results, a number of alternative specifications
were tested. Although MP salaries are significantly lower in East European
countries, an ‘East’ dummy (1 = East European country) is not included as a
control in the regressions in Table 2 because of an obvious multicollinearity
problem: there is a statistically significant negative correlation between the
variables ‘East’ and ‘living costs’ (log). The point biserial correlation coefficient is
-0.816 (p = 0.0001; N = 27). Moreover, including ‘living costs’ instead of ‘East’
leads to a better fit of the regression models. The same applies for the inclusion of
the variable ‘EU membership’ measuring the number of years a country has been an
EU member state: there is a statistically significant positive correlation between this
variable and ‘living costs’ (Spearman’s q = 0.796; p \ 0.0000; N = 27).
According to the ‘‘monitoring hypothesis’’ formulated in McCormick and Tollison
(1978: 75), it can be assumed ‘‘that higher turnouts… reflect greater concern among
8 Note that the correlation between ‘IndepBody’ and ‘GDP per capita’ (log) remains statistically
significant at the 5 % level if each of the ‘IndepBody’ nations (FIN, FRA, IRL, SWE, UK) is excluded in
turn from the EU-26 sample without the outlier Luxembourg.9 An alternative explanation is offered by Squire and Hamm (2005: 86): ‘‘Large populations generate
more income that can be used to finance the legislature, and the costs are spread across more people.’’
Self-serving legislators? 169
123
voters about the… earning activities of legislators’’. Thus, we should observe lower
MP salaries in countries with higher turnouts. Testing this hypothesis shows, however,
that MP salaries are higher in EU countries with high rates of voter turnout in the latest
national election (Spearman’s q = 0.610; p = 0.0007; N = 27). The variable ‘voter
turnout’ has not been included in the regressions as a control because of
multicollinearity: voter turnout is higher in countries with a relatively high GDP per
capita (q = 0.778; p \ 0.0000; N = 27) and high living costs (q = 0.745;
p \ 0.0000; N = 27). Another factor that could matter in the context under
investigation is the role of second chambers. For example, in Germany MPs’
decisions on their pay have to be approved by the upper house of parliament
(Bundesrat). However, including a ‘bicameral’ dummy, which gets 1 in the 13
countries in which an upper house of parliament exists, does not substantially change
the regression results reported above. Moreover, one might conjecture that MP salaries
are higher in countries which forbid MPs to earn outside income; but this hypothesis
cannot be tested here as all considered legislatures allow outside earnings.
5 Concluding discussion: ‘de-parliamentarization’ as a role model?
To put an end to the debate about allegedly self-serving legislators who violate the
principle nemo iudex in causa sua and decide on their own salaries, the determination
of MPs’ salaries could simply be delegated to a body independent from MPs. This has
been done in five out of 27 EU countries (i.e., Finland, France, Ireland, Sweden, the
UK). And this could be done in other countries as well. In the German case, for
instance, it would be possible that an independent remuneration commission—which
does not include MPs and whose members are appointed by the German President as
someone who is not a member of parliament or government—sets MPs’ salaries. To
realize this proposal, whose pros and cons have been frequently discussed in the
German public and academic debate (for an overview, see Wiefelsputz 2001),
however, an amendment of the (constitutional) legal rules regulating MP pay would be
necessary—and for such an amendment a two-thirds majority in the German
parliament would be required. In other words, the MPs would have to decide on
whether or not their salary setting should be delegated to an independent commission.
The small number of EU countries with independent remuneration bodies
suggests that MPs, considered as a special interest group (McCormick and Tollison
1978, 1981), have a rather low incentive to abdicate the right and privilege to set
their own compensation voluntarily. At the same time, there might simply not be
enough public pressure to change a country’s established remuneration system
toward a de-parliamentarized system. The negative correlation between the dummy
variable ‘MPs’ (1 = MPs set their wage) and ‘voter turnout’ (in %) in the latest
national election points in this direction; suggesting that a low level of voter turnout
(i.e., a low risk of being sanctioned via the ballot box) creates rather low incentives
for MPs to abandon an existing ‘‘wage cartel’’ regime (McCormick and Tollison
1978). This association is statistically significant at the 5 % level (point biserial
correlation coefficient = -0.379; p = 0.050; N = 27) but, of course, correlation is
not causation. There might be reverse causality because such a regime and its
170 K. Mause
123
perceived exploitation by the ‘political class’ (see below) might have a negative
effect on voter turnout.
In retrospect, often only high public pressure and huge political scandals around
MPs’ misconduct have led to substantial changes to the rules of conduct for politicians.
For example, in the UK the 2009 MPs’ expenses scandal was the major trigger for
creating the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority (IPSA) as an independent
body regulating MP expenses, salaries, and pensions.10 Following the UK example
would surely satisfy the critics of the current salary-setting practices in Austria,
Germany, Greece and many other countries (keyword: ‘self-serving legislators’).
These critics demand a clear separation of powers in this area of the political system.
Though the above regression analysis suggests that, controlling for population
size and living costs, salaries are systematically higher in legislatures in which MPs
to some degree decide on their own salaries, this result has to be interpreted with
caution. On the one hand, only in five of the considered 27 parliaments do
independent wage-setting bodies exist. That is, the observed effect might change
when the sample is extended. On the other hand, due to data limitations, the analysis
had to be based on current MP salaries in a cross-section of national parliaments. In
this cross-sectional analysis, the degree of independence of wage-setting helps
explain the considerable cross-national differences in terms of MP pay. And
banning MPs from setting their own salaries definitely leads to a ‘better’ outcome in
the perspective of democratic theory and its ideal of the separation of powers (nemo
iudex in causa sua). But it should be noted that it is by no means clear that the
delegation to an independent wage-setting body will lead to lower MP salary levels
compared to the status quo ante, which seems to be the expectation or wish of many
critics of the systems in which MPs still set their own compensation.
For instance, in none of those legislatures in the sample, which recently switched
to a regime in which bodies independent from MPs set legislative pay (Sweden in
1994; Ireland 2000; Finland 2003; UK 2013), were MPs’ basic salaries lower after
the regime shift.11 That is, the new independent bodies came to the conclusion that
MPs were not ‘overpaid’ and did not abuse their wage-setting powers as they had in
previous years—quite the contrary: the independent bodies granted MPs a pay rise.
Furthermore, it has to be taken into account that this study could only include
MPs’ basic salaries. The picture might change if the full compensation package is
considered. From the rather ‘unromantic’ perspective of Public Choice theory
(Buchanan 2003), it can be expected that in systems in which legislators set their
own pay, MPs pursue the following pay policy: as they fear popularity and vote
losses, they will try to keep their basic salaries, which are rather easy to identify by
journalists and voters (and Public Choice scholars), at moderate levels—and seek to
10 See e.g., Bell (2010). In its mission statement, IPSA writes: ‘‘Our approach and rules are a clean break
from the old system of self regulation by MPs and the House of Commons. The new rules are fair to MPs
and the public purse, workable and, crucially, transparent—anyone can go online and see what their MP
has claimed for and what they are paid. […] For the first time, an independent body, IPSA, not Parliament
nor the government of the day, is going to determine the package of remuneration that MPs will get’’ (see
http://parliamentarystandards.org.uk, accessed November 21, 2013).11 For more details, see the country information on the Swedish and Irish case in Brans and Peters (2012),
on the Finnish case in Kotakorpi and Poutvaara (2011), and on the British case in Kelly (2013).
Self-serving legislators? 171
123
maximize personal income via a complex system allocating certain additional
payments and privileges to the individual MP (cost allowances, per-diem
allowances, accommodation, flight and train tickets, an official car, retirement
benefits, and so on).12 And, in fact, in all legislatures reviewed, MPs get additional
payments on top of their basic salaries. For example, current Italian MPs, among
several other things, receive an allowance of up to 3,503.11 EUR per month to
reimburse the ‘‘costs of living in Rome.’’13
Such practices highlight an important desideratum for further research as, to the
best of my knowledge, up to now no empirical study has convincingly managed to
make these complex and often not-so-transparent parts of MPs’ compensation
packages comparable across a greater number of nations of the considered European
country sample (see also Brans and Peters 2012). To illustrate, under the chapter
title ‘‘Into the Labyrinth,’’ Staronova and Lastic (2012: 265) note in their country
case study that ‘‘[i]t was possible to broadly reconstruct the reward structure of
Slovak HPOs [i.e., high public officials], by using a range of separate laws,
regulations, documents, some of which were declared as confidential (because of the
protection of personal data), some public. The Slovak reward structure is
characterized by its extreme fragmentation, and one has to make various
calculations from secondary data to get an actual idea of how much high officials
really get. One possible explanation is that the whole Slovak reward structure is
meant to be so complicated in order not to be easily understood.’’
So, the transition to an independent salary-setting system in a jurisdiction may
increase the transparency of legislative pay and could be accompanied by a
thorough evaluation of the appropriateness of those parts of a legislator’s
compensation package that are paid in addition to basic salaries. This can be
illustrated by the case of the UK, where the 2009 reform led to a rethinking and
retrenchment of certain privileges (e.g., expense and travel allowances) members of
the House of Commons had before (see e.g., Bell 2010). It can be assumed that an
independent remuneration commission has a stronger incentive to take a critical
look at the different parts of the whole compensation package (and to implement
cuts where necessary) than the MPs themselves.
Acknowledgments The author is grateful to Jennifer Rontganger, Bernd Schlipphak, Ludger
Wortmann, the participants of the European Center for the Study of Public Choice (ECSPC) Conference
‘‘Rethinking the Separation of Powers’’ at the Walter Eucken Institute Freiburg (Germany, May 6–7,
2013), two anonymous referees and the editor, Roger D. Congleton, for their useful comments and
suggestions.
Appendix
See Table 3.
12 In this context, Hood and Peters (1994, 2003) and many others use the ‘iceberg’ metaphor. For
example, Nunberg and Wescott (2003: xiii) speak of a ‘‘largely invisible, compensation ‘iceberg’’’ and
add: ‘‘In democratic contexts, governments fear upsetting constituents who favor egalitarian basic wage
structures, and the ‘real’ rewards are thus obscured beneath the water’s surface.’’13 See http://www.camera.it/leg17/383?conoscerelacamera=4, accessed November 21, 2013.
172 K. Mause
123
Tab
le3
Sum
mar
yst
atis
tics
of
met
ric
var
iable
s
Var
iable
Obs.
Mea
nS
DM
in.
Max
.S
ourc
eD
escr
ipti
on
MP
sala
ry27
59,7
49.4
33,6
70.3
13,4
07
125,2
20
Ow
nca
lcula
tions
bas
edon
offi
cial
sou
rces
(see
tex
t)
An
nu
alg
ross
bas
icM
Psa
lary
(in
EU
R)
Po
pu
lati
on
27
18
,60
0,0
00
23
,70
0,0
00
42
1,3
64
82
,00
0,0
00
Eu
rost
atT
ota
lp
op
ula
tio
no
nJa
nu
ary
1,
20
13
Liv
ing
cost
s2
79
1.4
28
.14
3.5
14
4.9
Eu
rost
at2
01
2P
rice
lev
elin
dex
for
pri
vat
eh
ou
seh
old
con
sum
pti
on
exp
endit
ure
(EU
-27
=1
00
)
GD
Pp
erca
pit
a2
73
3,3
21
.31
4,5
48
.71
5,9
32
.69
1,3
87
.9W
orl
dB
ank
20
12
GD
Pp
erca
pit
a(P
PP
,cu
rren
t
inte
rnat
ional
$)
Nu
mb
ero
fse
ats
27
26
3.9
18
4.1
59
65
0P
arli
amen
tary
web
site
sN
um
ber
of
par
liam
enta
ryse
ats
aso
f
No
vem
ber
21
,2
01
3
Cit
izen
sper
seat
27
51,6
89.5
38,8
89.6
6,1
06.7
133,4
40.9
Ow
nca
lcula
tions
Num
ber
of
citi
zens
per
par
liam
enta
ryse
at
Vo
ter
turn
ou
t2
76
6.7
14
.93
5.9
93
.0In
tern
atio
nal
Inst
itu
tefo
r
Dem
ocr
acy
and
Ele
cto
ral
Ass
ista
nce
(ID
EA
)
Vo
ter
turn
ou
tin
late
stn
atio
nal
elec
tio
n(i
n
%)
EU
mem
ber
ship
27
26.9
21.3
66
1O
wn
calc
ula
tions
Dura
tion
of
EU
mem
ber
ship
inyea
rs
Self-serving legislators? 173
123
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