Sensitivity and Responsibility for Consequences

Sensitivity and Responsibility for ConsequencesAuthor(s): Walter GlannonSource: Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the AnalyticTradition, Vol. 87, No. 3 (Sep., 1997), pp. 223-233Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4320776 .

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WALTER GLANNON

SENSITIVITY AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONSEQUENCES

(Received in revised form 28 July 1995)

In a recent series of papers, John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza articulate the conditions under which a person may be morally responsible for the consequences of his actions and omissions.I They focus on a class of consequences that are inevitable for a person in the sense that their obtaining is ensured by events other than his action. Yet a person may be responsible for a consequence he could not have prevented from obtaining if his action plays a causal role in bringing it about. Fischer and Ravizza argue that a person is responsible for a consequence if and only if it is sensitive to his action, which is identified with a voluntary bodily movement.2 This means that the agent directly causes the consequence to obtain by acting, and if he had performed a different action or had refrained from acting, then a different consequence would have obtained. They offer an example to illustrate that one can be responsible for an inevitable consequence that is sensitive to action, as well as a different example to show that one cannot be morally responsible for a consequence that is not sensitive to action.

But I shall offer two counterexamples to show that a person may indeed be morally responsible for a consequence that is not sensitive to his action. He may be responsible for a consequence even when he lacks the physical ability to prevent it from obtaining by acting on his own. What will emerge from the discussion is that it is not a physical ability but rather the cognitive ability to foresee the likely outcomes of our actions and omissions which ultimately grounds responsibility for consequences.

Philosophical Studies 87: 223-233, 1997. ? 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.



224 WALTER GLANNON

I

Fischer and Ravizza take inevitable consequences to be universals rather than particulars. They point out that the distinction between these two species of outcome is to be made in terms of criteria of indi- viduation and stipulate that a consequence-particular is individuated more finely than a consequence-universal. Specifically, "the actual causal pathway to a consequence-particular is an essential feature of it, so that if a different causal pathway were to occur, then a different consequence-particular would occur."3 A consequence-universal, in contrast, "can be brought about via different causal antecedents."4

Consequence-universals are displayed in the cases of preemptive causal overdetermination envisaged by Harry Frankfurt.5 In these cases, the agent located in the actual sequence leading to action deliberates and freely performs a certain action. At the same time, a second agent, the "counterfactual intervener" located in the alternative sequence, would force the first agent to act if he were to show any sign of wavering in his deliberation. But the first agent freely performs the action and is morally responsible for it; the second agent does not in fact intervene and therefore plays no causal role in the performance of the action. Although Frankfurt-type cases ordinarily pertain to actions, they may be extended to pertain to consequences as well. The relevant consequence is ensured, either by the first agent acting freely in the actual sequence, or else by being forced to act by the second agent from his position in the alternative sequence. It is in this sense of being causally overdetermined that the consequence is inevitable for the first agent.

Responsibility for a consequence requires that the consequence issue from a responsive sequence. Fischer and Ravizza specify two components in such a sequence. The first component consists in a mechanism leading to action which is weakly reasons-responsive, while the second consists in a process leading from action to the relevant event in the world which is sensitive to action.6 The mechanism in the first component involves practical reasoning concerning actions, as distinct from theoretical reasoning concerning beliefs about the foreseeable consequences of actions. They distinguish between strong and weak forms of reasons-responsiveness: Strong reasons-responsiveness points us to the alternative scenario in which there is a sufficient reason for the agent to do otherwise (and the actual mechanism



SENSITIVITY AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONSEQUENCES 225

operates) which is most similar to the actual situation. In contrast, under weak reasons-responsiveness, there must simply exist some possible scenario in which there is a sufficient reason to do otherwise, the agent's actual mechanism operates, and the agent does otherwise. This possible scenario need not be the one in which the agent has a sufficient reason to do otherwise (and the actual mechanism operates) which is most similar to the actual situation.7

In other words, the fit between reasons and action is tighter in the stronger than in the weaker form of responsiveness, which may be understood as the agent's disposition to weakness of will. Never- theless, weak reasons-responsiveness is a sufficient condition of responsibility for actions.

The second component of a responsive sequence involves the relationship between action and consequence. To test for sensitivity in the process leading from action to consequence, they hold fixed all "triggering" events other than the agent's action which might have occurred and brought about the event in question. Fischer and Ravizza take "a triggering event (relative to some consequence C) as an event that would initiate a causal sequence leading to C, if it were to occur."8 They point out that, "when we are interested in the sensitivity of the process to action, we are interested in whether there would have been a different outcome, if the agent had not performed a certain sort of action and all non-occurring triggering events were not to occur."9 As they describe it, sensitivity implies a proximate causal relation between an action and a consequence. The action is sufficient for the consequence to obtain, and there are no other events occuIring later than the action which would have been sufficient for the consequence to obtain.'0

In their example "Assassin," Sam tells his friend Jack of his plan to murder the mayor of the town in which they live."1 Because Jack worries that Sam might fail to carry out his plan, he secretly implants a device in Sam's brain which he can activate to force his friend to act and thereby ensure the consequence that the mayor is killed. But Sam freely carries out his own intention and kills the mayor. Jack merely monitors Sam's behavior from his position in the alternative sequence, though he would have intervened and forced Sam to act if the latter had shown any inclination to refrain from acting. Since Jack plays no causal role in Sam's killing of the mayor, Sam is responsible for the consequence-universal that the mayor is killed, even though he could not have prevented it from obtaining. For Jack was standing



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by, ready to intervene and thereby ensure that the mayor is killed by forcing Sam to act. "Assassin" is a Frankfurt-type case displaying preemptive causal overdetermination. That is, Sam preempts Jack by doing what the latter intends. The example illustrates that an agent may be morally responsible for a consequence that is inevitable for him if that consequence is sensitive to his action. More precisely, "had Sam not squeezed the trigger (either as a result of his own deliberation or because of Jack's intervention) and others' relevant behavior were held fixed, the mayor would not have been killed."12

The last of three variants of the same type of example offered by Fischer and Ravizza purportedly shows that an agent is not morally responsible for an inevitable consequence-universal precisely because the consequence is not sensitive to that agent's action.13 In "Missile 1," an evil woman, Elizabeth, has launched a missile toward Washington, D.C. But she has a device implanted in her head by a counterfactual intervener who would ensure that the missile be' launched if Elizabeth were to waver in her deliberation. Eliza- beth freely launches the missile toward Washington and is morally responsible for the consequence-universal that the city is bombed, even though that state of affairs is inevitable for her. There is nothing she can do to prevent the obtaining of this state of affairs, owing to the presence of the counterfactual intervener. Yet she is responsible because she actually causes this state of affairs to obtain and the counterfactual intervener plays no causal role in the way it obtains.

"Missile 2" is similar to "Missile 1," except that there is no counterfactual intervener poised to manipulate Elizabeth's brain. Instead, there is another woman, Carla, who would fire a different missile and thus ensure that the city be bombed. Again, Elizabeth freely fires her missile and is morally responsible for the consequence, even though she could not have prevented it from obtaining. If she had refrained from firing her missile, then Carla would have ensured the upshot by firing a different one.

In "Missile 3," Joan knows that Elizabeth already has launched a missile toward Washington, D.C. Although Joan has a weapon which she can use to deflect the missile to a less populous area of the city, her position, the missile's trajectory, and the nature of her weapon make it the case that she cannot prevent the incoming missile from hitting the city at all. Joan may be held responsible for deflecting




the missile insofar as her action is weakly responsive to a reason for doing so. Thus the first component of the process leading to the consequence is responsive to the mechanism involving practical reasoning. However, the sequence as a whole is not responsive because the second component of that sequence, the process leading from action to event in the world, is not sensitive to action. Joan is not morally responsible for the consequence-universal that Washington, D.C. is bombed because the process leading from her action to the event of Washington being bombed is not responsive. Unlike Sam in "Assassin," Joan is not responsible for the consequence because "the world is such that, no matter how Joan acts, the bomb will hit Washington, D.C., given that the appropriate actual-sequence facts are held fixed."'4

II

Moral responsibility entails causal responsibility. Roughly, a person is causally responsible for a consequence just in case he acts, or fails to act, in such a way as to make it obtain. He is morally responsible for a consequence if he causes it to obtain, it involves benefit or harm to others, and it generates a normative judgment about how he ought to have acted in the circumstances in which it obtains.

It is important to distinguish between two types of control in determining causal and moral responsibility for consequences.'5 Proximate causal control of a consequence consists in a person's cognitive ability to respond to practical reasoning concerning action as well as the physical ability to act in accord with this reasoning and directly bring about the consequence by acting. The second type of ability is physical in the sense that it involves a voluntary bodily movement. In contrast, remote causal control of a consequence consists in a person's cognitive ability to respond to theoretical reasoning concerning the foreseeable outcomes of his actions and omissions that are responsive to practical reasoning. Unlike proximate causal control, remote causal control of a consequence does not entail the physical ability to directly cause the consequence to obtain or to prevent it from obtaining. Nor does it require that no other events occur between the agent's action or omission and the consequence. All that this type of control requires is that, at the time of action,



228 WALTER GLANNON

the agent have the cognitive ability to foresee the likely outcome of his acting or failing to act on his own.'6 By arguing that sensitivity of an event in the world to a voluntary bodily movement is a necessary condition of responsibility for a consequence, Fischer and Ravizza are committed to the position that proximate causal control is a necessary condition of responsibility for a consequence. Sen- sitivity of a consequence to an action entails the agent's proximate causal control of that consequence. But I shall now show that remote causal control alone is sufficient for a person to be responsible for a consequence.

Consider the following variant of "Missile 3." Suppose that the trajectory of the missile fired by Elizabeth is such that it cannot be deflected but only destroyed completely before hitting ground zero. Suppose further that Joan and a colleague, Mary, wield similar weapons and are situated in different parts of the city. But only one of these two agents is in a position to destroy the incoming missile. Because of her expertise in these matters, Joan has the authority to overrule Mary, should she deem it necessary. Moreover, Joan's weapon is equipped with a remote control device that will disarm Mary's weapon once Joan fires her own. As the missile approaches the city, Joan records data on the speed and trajectory of the missile relative to her position and concludes that she, not Mary, is in the proper position to destroy it. Accordingly, Joan fires her weapon and thereby precludes Mary from firing hers. Unfortunately, Joan miscalculated. She negligently overlooked important data which would have led her to revise her beliefs and therefore realize that she was not in a position to prevent the consequence of the city being bombed. If Joan had not overlooked the information and had not made an incorrect inference from her action to its likely consequence, then she rightly would have refrained from firing her own weapon and would have deferred to her colleague, who was in the proper position to destroy the missile and thus prevent the consequence from obtaining.

Assuming that only one missile has been fired toward Washington, that the city is bombed is a consequence-particular. Admittedly, this makes my example slightly different from the original, which involves a consequence-universal. This difference is not crucial, however. For what is at issue in each of these examples is the sensi-




tivity of consequence to action, not whether the consequence for which the agent is held responsible is construed as a universal or a particular. The consequence of Washington being bombed is inevitable for Joan to the extent that she cannot prevent it from obtaining. Holding fixed all other relevant facts in the actual sequence leading to the consequence, the world is such that, no matter how she acts, the city is bombed. Thus the consequence is not sensitive to her act of firing her weapon.

Nevertheless, Joan is morally responsible for the consequence. By acting as she did, she precluded another agent from preventing it and had the cognitive capacity at the time of action to realize that Mary alone was physically able to perform the preventive act as well as to foresee what the likely outcome would be of firing her weapon. For an agent to be responsible for a consequence, that consequence must be sensitive to her mental states concerning the foreseeable outcome of an action that is responsive to practical and theoretical reasoning; but it need not also be sensitive to that action. That is, she needs only the cognitive ability of remote causal control and not also the physical ability of proximate causal control to be morally responsible. A person may be responsible for a consequence even though, holding fixed all non-occurring triggering events other than her action, the consequence would have obtained whether she acted or refrained from acting as she did. By acting negligently, she makes her physical inability come to play a causally and morally significant role in a sequence of events leading to a harmful outcome.

One might object that, while the consequence is not directly sensitive to the agent's action in this case, it is indirectly sensitive. Joan could have ensured that the city not be bombed by not using her weapon and allowing Mary to use hers. But Fischer and Ravizza seem to have direct sensitivity in mind. After all, they stipulate that all non-occurring triggering events in the actual sequence are held fixed, and surely Mary's inaction is one of these events. Moreover, if she had allowed Mary to act, then strictly speaking Joan would not have acted but instead would have refrained from acting. At issue is the direct causal relationship between Joan's action and the consequence. Joan's use of her weapon is the triggering event that initiates the actual causal sequence leading to the bad outcome. Mary's use of her weapon would have been the triggering event



230 WALTER GLANNON

initiating the alternative causal sequence leading to the prevention of the bad outcome. But in fact this is a non-occurring triggering event, and only triggering events that occur in the actual sequence leading to the outcome are pertinent to responsibility for it. So my claim about sensitivity is sustained.

Another, less fanciful, example will serve to support my argu- ment. Imagine a first-year medical student who happens to be in a hospital and notices a patient in cardiac arrest. Although he does not yet have the knowledge and experience to deal with such cases, he wants to be a hero and attempts to save the patient by performing what he believes is the appropriate action. Rather than call doctors or nurses who know how to deal with this sort of emergency, he remains with the patient, shaking him to no avail and triggering a sequence of events which results in the patient's death. The consequence that the patient dies is not sensitive to the student's action. If all non-occurring triggering events involving doctors or nurses were not to occur, then the patient still would have died, regardless of whether the student acted or refrained from acting on his own. Nevertheless, he is morally responsible for this consequence on the ground that, by acting as he did, he precluded others from preventing the consequence from obtaining and had the cognitive ability to realize this and to foresee the patient's death as the likely consequence of his action.

The agent in this example lacks proximate causal control of the consequence insofar as it is not directly sensitive to his action. Yet he has the remote causal control to realize that he lacks the requisite training and to foresee what the probable outcome of his action will be. The fact that he possesses this sort of control and that he freely performs the action that triggers the sequence of events resulting in the patient's death is enough to make him morally responsible for this consequence. As in the variant of "Missile 3," the crucial point in this second example is that at the time of action the agent has but fails to exercise his capacity for practical and theoretical reasoning concerning the likely sequence of events triggered by what he does. In both examples, although the agents were not physically able to prevent the consequence from obtaining by acting on their own, they were cognitively able to realize that, by refraining from acting, they would have allowed others to prevent it. The only difference between




my two examples is that, in the first case the crucial cognitive failure leads to a negligent act, while in the second case it leads to a reckless act. In each case, it is not the physical but rather the cognitive sense of "ability" which grounds the attribution of responsibility.

Again, one might object that the consequence is indirectly sensitive to the student's action. He could have prevented the patient's death by calling doctors and nurses. But consistent with the conditions stipulated by Fischer and Ravizza, any actions by these other agents are non-occurring triggering events that would have prevented the patient's death only in an alternative causal sequence. Their inaction is held fixed in the actual causal sequence, and it is on the basis of what happens in this sequence alone that a consequence is determined to be sensitive or insensitive to action.

III

Fischer and Ravizza maintain that moral responsibility for a consequence requires that the consequence be sensitive to the agent's action, where that action is identified with a voluntary bodily movement. A consequence is sensitive to an agent's action just in case a different consequence would have obtained if the agent had not performed the action in question and all non-occurring triggering events leading to the consequence were not to occur. This condition of holding fixed all events that do not play an actual causal role in the obtaining of the consequence suggests that the consequence must be directly and not just indirectly sensitive to action for an agent to be responsible for it.

But my counterexamples to the examples offered by Fischer and Ravizza to support their thesis show that an agent may indeed be responsible for a consequence that is not directly sensitive to his action. Even when a consequence will obtain no matter what an agent does or fails to do on his own, he may be morally responsible for it if he negligently or recklessly acts and thereby precludes other agents from preventing it. To be morally responsible for a consequence, a person need only the cognitive ability to foresee it as the likely outcome of his action or omission. He need not also have the physical ability to perform a voluntary bodily movement and thereby directly cause the consequence to obtain or prevent it from obtaining. Remote



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causal control, but not also proximate causal control, is required for responsibility for consequences. For a person to be responsible for a consequence, that consequence must be sensitive to his mental state of belief about the likely outcome of an action or omission that is responsive to his practical and theoretical reasoning. Contrary to what Fischer and Ravizza maintain, the consequence need not also be sensitive to the agent's action in the way they describe it.

NOTES

1 "Responsibility and Inevitability," Ethics 101 (January 1991), pp. 258-278, "The Inevitable," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (December 1992), pp. 388-404, and "Responsibility for Consequences," in Perspectives on Moral Responsibility. Fischer and Ravizza, eds. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 322-347.

Fischer and Ravizza identify actions with bodily movements in "Responsibility and Inevitability," p. 268, and in "Responsibility for Consequences," p. 340. 3 "The Inevitable," p. 390. 4 Ibid, p. 390. 5 In "Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility," Journal of Philosophy 66 (December 1969), pp. 829-839. Reprinted in The Importance of What We Care About (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 1-10. See also Peter van Inwagen, An Essay on Free Will (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), Ch. 5. 6 "Responsibility for Consequences," pp. 338 ff. 7 Ibid., p. 339. 8 Ibid., p. 340. 9 Ibid., p.342. 10 Here I follow Myles Brand's definition of proximate causation between events. He says that "for any events e and f, e proximately causes f if and only if (i) e causes f and (ii) there are no events gl, g2, ... gn (where n > 1), distinct from e and f, such that e causes gI and gl causes g2, and ... and gn causes f," and '>' stands for 'later than or simultaneous with.' "Proximate Causation of Action," in Philosophical Perspectives, 3: Philosophy of Mind and Action Theory, James E. Tomberlin, ed. (Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview, 1989), p. 425. 11 "Responsibility and Inevitability," pp. 258-259, "Responsibility for Conse- quences," pp. 324-325. 12 Ibid., p. 343. 13 "Responsibility and Inevitability," p. 264, "Responsibility for Consequences," p. 328. 14 "'The Inevitable," p. 399. 15 I draw a similar distinction to determine responsibility for failures to act in "Responsibility and the Principle of Possible Action," Journal of Philosophy 92 (May 1995), pp. 261-274. In that paper, I argue that a person may be morally responsible for failing to perform an action that he is physically unable to perform at any time. 16 I am assuming that the consequence is not brought about by deviant causal



SENSITIVIY AND RESPONSBILITY FOR CONSEQUENCES 233

chains, that is, via causal pathways that are either unintended by or unforeseeable to the agent who is held responsible for the consequence.

For more on the relation between foreseeability and responsibility, see Gerald Dworkin, "Intention, Foreseeability, and Responsibility," in Responsibility. Character. and the Emotions Ferdinand Schoeman, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 338-354.

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Sensitivity and Responsibility for Consequences