Separate Opinion, Dissenting and Concurring Justice Puno

Embed Size (px)

Citation preview

  • 8/9/2019 Separate Opinion, Dissenting and Concurring Justice Puno

    1/48

    [Philosophy of Law]

    SEPARATE OPINION

    PUNO, J.:

    While I concur in the result of theponenciaof Mr. Justice Carpio, the ruling on whether or not pespondent Dimaano could invoke her rights against unreasonable search and seizure and to the eclusi

    evidence resulting therefrom compels this humble opinion. !heponenciastates that "#t$he correct isswhether the %ill of &ights was operative during the interregnum from 'ebruar( )*, +-* #the da( Corazo/uino took her oath as 0resident$ to March )1, +-* #immediatel( before the adoption of the 'reeConstitution$.23+4 !he ma5orit( holds that the %ill of &ights was not operative, thus private respondent Dimcannot invoke the right against unreasonable search and seizure and the eclusionar( right as her housesearched and her properties were seized during the interregnum or on March 6, +-*. M( disagreemnot with the ruling that the %ill of &ights was not operative at that time, but with the conclusion that the pespondent has lost and cannot invoke the right against unreasonable search and seizure and

    eclusionar( right. 7sing a different lens in viewing the problem at hand, I respectfull( submit that the cssue for resolution is whether she can invoke these rights in the absence of a constitution undeetraordinar( circumstances after the +-* 8D9 &evolution. !he /uestion boggles the intellect, anteresting, to sa( the least, perhaps even to those not half:interested in the law. %ut the /uestion of whhe 'ilipinos were bereft of fundamental rights during the one month interregnum is not as perpleing a

    /uestion of whether the world was without a ;od in the three da(s that ;od the 9on descended into the before

  • 8/9/2019 Separate Opinion, Dissenting and Concurring Justice Puno

    2/48

    [Philosophy of Law]

    olitical /ights as olitical 0uestions, 1he arado- of $uther v. !orden, '22 arvard $aw /eview '')3, ''44

    '6*7+8547

    t is m( considered view that under this same natural law, private respondent Dimaano has a right agunreasonable search and seizure and to eclude evidence obtained as a conse/uence of such illegal ac

    eplain m( thesis, I will first la( down the relevant law before appl(ing it to the facts of the cabar. !racking down the elusive law that will govern the case at bar will take us to the lab(rinths of philosand histor(. !o be sure, the difficult( of the case at bar lies less in the application of the law, but moinding the applicable law. I shall take up the challenge even if the route takes negotiating, but wrespassing, on political and religious thickets.

    II. Natural Law and Natural Rights

    s earl( as the ;reek civilization, man has alluded to a higher, natural standard or law to which a state aaws must conform. 9ophocles unmistakabl( articulates this in his poignant literar( piece,Antigone. I

    mid:fifth centur( thenian traged(, a civil war divided two brothers, one died defending !hebes, and the o0ol(neices, died attacking it. !he king forbade 0ol(neicesA burial, commanding instead that his bod( be be devoured b( beasts. %ut according to ;reek religious ideas, onl( a burial :even a token one with a haof earth: could give repose to his soul. Moved b( piet(, 0ol(neicesA sister, ntigone, disobe(ed the comof the king and buried the bod(. 9he was arrested. %rought before the king who asks her if she knew command and wh( she disobe(ed, ntigone replies@

    . . .1hese laws were not ordained of 9eus,

    "nd she who sits enthroned with gods below,

    ustice, enacted not these human laws.;or did % deem that thou, a mortal man,

    #ouldst by a breath annul and override1he immutable unwritten laws of heaven.

    1hey were not born today nor yesterday4 Eocke thus maintains, again using thepropert(2 in the broad sense, that, "#t$he great and chief end, therefore, of menAs uniting into com

    wealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their propert(.2 3?-4 9econdl(central purpose that has brought a civil government into eistence, i.e., the protection of the individnatural rights, sets firm limits on the political authorit( of the civil government. government that violatenatural rights of its sub5ects has betra(ed their trust, vested in it when it was first established, theundermining its own authorit( and losing its claim to the sub5ectsA obedience. !hird and finall(, indivsub5ects have a right of last resort to collectivel( resist or rebel against and overthrow a government thaailed to discharge its dut( of protecting the peopleAs natural rights and has instead abused its powe

    acting in an arbitrar( or t(rannical manner. !he overthrow of government, however, does not le

    dissolution of civil societ( which came into being before the establishment of civil government. 3?4

    EockeAs ideas, along with other modern natural law and natural rights theories, have had a profound impamerican political and legal thought. merican law professor 0hilip

  • 8/9/2019 Separate Opinion, Dissenting and Concurring Justice Puno

    8/48

    [Philosophy of Law]

    proposition. Ane feels as though it was treading on forbidden ground, to attempt a refutation of what has been adva

    by a $ocke, a !acari5a7, and some other writers and statesmen.85B37

    %ut, while EockeAs theor( showed the necessit( of civil societ( and government, it was careful to assertprotect the individualAs rights against government invasion, thus impl(ing a theor( of limited governmen

    both restricted the role of the state to protect the individualAs fundamental natural rights to life, libert(propert( and prohibited the state, on moral grounds, from violating those rights. 3**4 !he natural rights thwhich is the characteristic merican interpretation of natural law, serves as the foundation of the entrenched concept of limited government in the 7nited 9tates. It provides the theoretical basis oormulation of limits on political authorit( vis::vis the superior right of the individual which the govern

    should preserve.3*>4

    EockeAs ideas undoubtedl( influenced !homas Jefferson, the eminent statesman and "philosopher omerican$ revolution and of the first constitutional order which free men were permitte

    establish.23*-4 Jefferson espoused EockeAs theor( that man is free in the state of nature. %ut while Emited the authorit( of the state with the doctrine of natural rights, JeffersonAs originalit( was in his use o

    doctrine as basis for a fundamental law or constitution established b( the people. 3*4 !o obviate the da

    hat the government would limit natural libert( more than necessar( to afford protection to the govehereb( becoming a threat to the ver( natural libert( it was designed to protect, people had to stipulate inconstitution which natural rights the( sacrificed and which not, as it was important for them to retain tportions of their natural libert( that were inalienable, that facilitated the preservation of freedom, or that sdid not need to be sacrificed.3>F4 !wo ideas are therefore fundamental in the constitution@ one is the reguof the form of government and the other, the securing of the liberties of the people. 3>+4 !hus, the meConstitution ma( be understood as comprising three elements. 'irst, it creates the structure and authoritepublican form of government second, it provides a division of powers among the different parts o

    national government and the checks and balances of these powers and third, it inhibits governmentAs pvis::vis the rights of individuals, rights eistent and potential, patent and latent. !hese three parts haveprime ob5ective@ to uphold the libert( of the people.3>)4

    %ut while the constitution guarantees and protects the fundamental rights of the people, it should be strehat it does not create them. s held b( man( of the merican &evolution patriots, "liberties do not resultcharters charters rather are in the nature of declarations of pre:eisting rights.2 3>64 John dams, one opatriots, claimed that natural rights are founded "in the frame of human nature, rooted in the constitution ontellect and moral world.23>14 !hus, it is said of natural rights vis::vis the constitution@

    . . . (t+hey e-ist before constitutions and independently of them. Constitutions enumerate such rights and proviagainst their deprivation or infringement, but do not create them. %t is supposed that all power, all rights, and a

    authority are vested in the people before they form or adopt a constitution. !y such an instrument, they create agovernment, and define and limit the powers which the constitution is to secure and the government respect. !ut th

    not thereby invest the citiCens of the commonwealth with any natural rights that they did not before

    possess.85*37(emphasis supplied+

    constitution is described as follows@

    " #onstitution is not the beginning of a community, nor the origin of private rights< it is not the fountain of law, no

    ncipient state of government< it is not the cause, but consequence, of personal and political freedom< it grants no rig

    he people, but is the creature of their power, the instrument of their convenience. Designed for their protection in

    8 | P

    http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn65http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn66http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn67http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn68http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn69http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn70http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn71http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn72http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn73http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn74http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn75http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn65http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn66http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn67http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn68http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn69http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn70http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn71http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn72http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn73http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn74http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn75
  • 8/9/2019 Separate Opinion, Dissenting and Concurring Justice Puno

    9/48

    [Philosophy of Law]

    njoyment of the rights and powers which they possessed before the Constitution was made, it is but the frame

    of the political government, and necessarily based upon the pree-isting condition of laws, rights, habits and modes o

    hought. 1here is nothing primitive in it< it is all derived from a known source. %t presupposes an organiCed societyorder, propriety, personal freedom, a love of political liberty, and enough of cultivated intelligence to know how to g

    against the encroachments of tyranny.85*B7(emphasis supplied+

    !hat EockeAs modern natural law and rights theor( was influential to those who framed and ratified the 79tates constitution and served as its theoretical foundation is undeniable. 3>>4 In a letter in which ;eWashington formall( submitted the Constitution to Congress in 9eptember +>->, he spoke of the difficultidrafting the document in words borrowed from the standard eighteenth:centur( natural rights anal(sis@

    Individuals entering into society, must give up a share of liberty to preserve the rest . 1he magnitude of theacrifice must depend as well on situation and circumstance, as on the ob?ect to be obtained. %t is at all times difficu

    draw with precision the line between those rights which must be surrendered, and those which may be

    eserved . . . .85*67(emphasis supplied+

    =atural law is thus to be understood not as a residual source of constitutional rights but instead, aeasoning that implied the necessit( to sacrifice natural libert( to government in a written constitution. =aw and natural rights were concepts that eplained and 5ustified written constitutions. 3>4

    With the establishment of civil government and a constitution, there arises a conceptual distinbetween natural rightsand civil rights, difficult though to define their scope and delineation. It has proposed that natural rightsare those rights that "appertain to man in right of his eistence.2 3-F4 !hese undamental rights endowed b( ;od upon human beings, "all those rights of acting as an individual fo

    own comfort and happiness, which are not in5urious to the natural rights of others.2 3-+4 Bn the other handightsare those that "appertain to man in right of his being a member of societ(.2 3-)4 !hese rights, how

    are derived from the natural rights of individuals since@

    @an did not enter into society to become worseoff than he was before, nor to have fewer rights than he had beforeo have those rights better secured. is natural rights are the foundation of all his rights.85647

    Civil rights, in this sense, were those natural rights particularl( rights to securit( and protection whichemselves, individuals could not safeguard, rather re/uiring the collective support of civil societ(

    government. !hus, it is said@

    Dvery civil right has for its foundation, some natural right pree-isting in the individual, but to the en?oyment of whhis individual power is not, in all cases, sufficiently competent.856&7

    !he distinction between natural and civil rights is "between that class of natural rights which man retains

    entering into societ(, and those which he throws into the common stock as a member of societ(.2 3-?natural rights retained b( the individuals after entering civil societ( were "all the intellectual rights, or righhe mind,23-*4i.e., the rights to freedom of thought, to freedom of religious belief and to freedom of epresn its various forms. !he individual could eercise these rights without government assistancegovernment has the role of protecting these natural rights from interference b( others and of desistingtself infringing such rights. ;overnment should also enable individuals to eercise more effectivelnatural rights the( had echanged for civil rights like the rights to securit( and protection : when the( entnto civil societ(.3->4

    9 | P

    http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn76http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn77http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn78http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn79http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn80http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn81http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn82http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn83http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn84http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn85http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn86http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn87http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn76http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn77http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn78http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn79http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn80http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn81http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn82http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn83http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn84http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn85http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn86http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn87
  • 8/9/2019 Separate Opinion, Dissenting and Concurring Justice Puno

    10/48

    [Philosophy of Law]

    merican natural law scholars in the +>-Fs and earl( +>Fs occasionall( specified which rights were naand which were not. Bn the Eockean assumption that the state of naturewas a condition in which all huwere e/uall( free from sub5ugation to one another and had no common superior, merican scholars tendagree that natural libert( was the freedom of individuals in the state of nature.3--4 Natural rightsunderstood to be simpl( a portion of this undifferentiated natural libert( and were often broadl( categorize

    he rights to life, libert(, and propert( or life, libert( and the pursuit of happiness. More specificall(,dentified as natural rights the free eercise of religion, freedom of conscience, 3-4freedom of speechpress, right to self:defense, right to bear arms, right to assemble and right to oneAs reputation. 3F4 In concertain other rights, such as habeas corpusand 5ur( rights, do not eist in the state of nature, but eisunder the laws of civil government or the constitution because the( are essential for restraining governm+4 !he( are called civil rightsnot onl( in the sense that the( are protected b( constitutions or other lawsalso in the sense that the( are ac/uired rights which can onl( eist under civil government. 3)4

    n his !onstitutional "a#$ %lack states that natural rightsma( be used to describe those rights which beloman b( virtue of his nature and depend upon his personalit(. "

  • 8/9/2019 Separate Opinion, Dissenting and Concurring Justice Puno

    11/48

    [Philosophy of Law]

    he right to libert(, propert(, securit( and resistance of oppression. ll other civil and political rights : suo limits on government, to freedom to choose a government, to freedom of speech, and to fair taation : derived from those fundamental natural rights. 3*4

    0aine inspired and activel( assisted the merican &evolution and defended the 'rench &evolution.

  • 8/9/2019 Separate Opinion, Dissenting and Concurring Justice Puno

    12/48

    [Philosophy of Law]

    not to be tortured. side from these, but more controversiall(, it affirmed the importance of sociaeconomic rights.3+F)4 !he 7D*3+F14and are binding as internaaw upon governments subscribing to them. lthough admittedl(, there will be differences in interprparticular statements of rights and freedoms in these 7nited =ations instruments "in the light of varied culand historical traditions, the basis of the covenants is a common agreement on the fundamental ob5ectihe dignit( and worth of the human person. 9uch agreement is implied in adherence to the #7nited =a

    Charter and corresponds to the universal urge for freedom and dignit( which strives for epression, de

    var(ing degrees of culture and civilization and despite the countervailing forces of repressionauthoritarianism.2 3+F?4

  • 8/9/2019 Separate Opinion, Dissenting and Concurring Justice Puno

    13/48

    [Philosophy of Law]

    dentif( human rights. It seems though that the concept of human rights is broadest as it encompasshuman personAs natural rights #e.g., religious freedom$ and civil rights created b( law #e.g. right to triur($.

    n sum, natural law and natural rights are not relic theories for academic discussion, but haveconsiderable application and influence. =atural law and natural rights theories have pla(ed an importan

    n the Declaration of Independence, the bolition #anti:slaver($ movement, and parts of the modern&ights movement.3+++4In charging =azi and Japanese leaders with "crimes against humanit(2 at the end o9econd World War, llied tribunals in +1? invoked the traditional concept of natural law to overridedefense that those charged had onl( been obe(ing the laws of the regimes the( served. 3++)4 Eikewise, naw, albeit called b( another name such as "substantive due process2 which is grounded on reasonairness, has served as legal standard for international law, centuries of development in the 8nglish comaw, and certain aspects of merican constitutional law. 3++64 In controversies involving the %ill of &ightsnatural law standards of "reasonableness2 and "fairness2 or "5ustified on balance2 are used. Huestionsas these are common@ "Does this form of government involvement with religion endanger religious libertwa( that seems unfair to some groupG Does permitting this restriction on speech open the dogovernment abuse of political opponentsG Does this police investigative practice interfere with cit

    egitimate interests in privac( and securit(G2 3++14 7ndeniabl(, natural law and natural rights theories carved their niche in the legal and political arena.

    III. Natural Law and Natural Rightsin Philiine !ases and the !onstitution

    A. Tra"es o# Natural Law andNatural Rights Theor$ in Sureme !ourt !ases

    lthough the natural law and natural rights foundation is not articulated, some 0hilippine cases have meference to natural law and rights without raising controvers(. 'or eample, in Peole v. Asas,3++?4the

    admonished courts to consider cautiousl( an admission or confession of guilt especiall( when it is alleghave been obtained b( intimidation and force. !he Court said@ "#w$ithal, aversion of man against forcedaffliction is a matter of =atural Eaw.2 3++*4 In Peole v. Ag%ot,3++>4we did not uphold lack of instruction aecuse for killing because we recognized the "offense of taking oneAs life being forbidden b( natural lawherefore within instinctive knowledge and feeling of ever( human being not deprived of reason.2 3++-4 In &

    Oil Philiines, In". v. 'io"ares, et al. ,3++4Chief Justice 'ernando acknowledged the influence of naturan stressing that the element of a promise is the basis of contracts. In &anila &emorial Par( !emeter$v. !ourt o# Aeals, et al.,3+)F4the Court invoked the doctrine of estoppel which we have repea

    pronounced is predicated on, and has its origin in e/uit(, which broadl( defined, is 5ustice according to naaw. In)u !on v. Iil, et al.,3+)+4we recognized the application of natural law in maritime commerce.

    !he Court has also identified in several cases certain natural rights such as the right to libert(, 3+))4the rigepatriation,3+)64the right of parents over their children which provides basis for a parentAs visitorial rightshis illegitimate children,3+)14and the right to the fruits of oneAs industr(.3+)?4

    n Simon, *r. et al. v. !ommission on +uman Rights, 3+)*4the Court defined human rights, civil randpolitical rights. In doing so, we considered the 7nited =ations instruments to which the 0hilippines

    13 | P

    http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn111http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn112http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn113http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn114http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn115http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn116http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn117http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn118http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn119http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/nov2000/137122.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/nov2000/137122.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn120http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn121http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn122http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn123http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn124http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn125http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn126http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn111http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn112http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn113http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn114http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn115http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn116http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn117http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn118http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn119http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/nov2000/137122.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/nov2000/137122.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn120http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn121http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn122http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn123http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn124http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn125http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn126
  • 8/9/2019 Separate Opinion, Dissenting and Concurring Justice Puno

    14/48

    [Philosophy of Law]

    signator(, namel( the 7D

  • 8/9/2019 Separate Opinion, Dissenting and Concurring Justice Puno

    15/48

    [Philosophy of Law]

    competent court, and freedom from deprivation of propert( or domicile ecept b( virtue of 5udgment passea competent court of authorit(.3+6*4

    !he %iak:na:%ato Constitution was pro5ected to have a life:span of two (ears, after which a final constitwould be drafted. !wo months after it was adopted, however, the 0act of %iak:na:%ato was signed whehe 'ilipino militar( leaders agreed to cease fighting against the 9paniards and guaranteed peace for at

    hree (ears, in echange for monetar( indemnit( for the 'ilipino men in arms and for promeforms. Eikewise, ;eneral 8milio guinaldo, who b( then had become the militar( leader after %onif

    death, agreed to leave the 0hilippines with other 'ilipino leaders. !he( left for 4 %( this time, the relations between the merican troops and the 'ilipino fohad become precarious as it became more evident that the mericans planned to sta(. In 9eptember he &evolutionar( Congress was inaugurated whose primar( goal was to formulate and promulga

    Constitution. !he fruit of their efforts was the Malolos Constitution which, as admitted b( 'elipe Calderon

    drafted it, was based on the constitutions of 9outh merican &epublics

    3+6-4

    while the %ill of &ightssubstantiall( a cop( of the 9panish Constitution. 3+64 !he %ill of &ights included among others, freedoeligion, freedom from arbitrar( arrests and imprisonment, securit( of the domicile and of papers and ef

    against arbitrar( searches and seizures, inviolabilit( of correspondence, due process in criminal prosecutreedom of epression, freedom of association, and right of peaceful petition for the redress of grievancerticle )- stated that "#t$he enumeration of the rights granted in this title does not impl( the prohibition oothers not epressl( stated.23+1F4!his suggests that natural law was the source of these rights.3+1+4!he MaConstitution was short:lived. It went into effect in Januar( +-, about two months before the ratificathe !reat( of 0aris transferring sovereignt( over the Islands to the 7nited 9tates. Within a month afte

    constitutionAs promulgation, war with the 7nited 9tates began and the &epublic survived for onl( aboumonths. Bn March )6, +F+, merican forces captured guinaldo and a week later, he took his oa

    allegiance to the 7nited 9tates.

    3+1)4

    n the earl( months of the war against the 7nited 9tates, merican 0resident McKinle( sent the 0hilippine Commission headed b( Jacob ;ould 9churman to assess the 0hilippine situation. Bn 'ebru

    FF, in its report to the 0resident, the Commission stated that the -iliino eole wanted a%ove guarantee o# those #undamental human rights whi"h Ameri"ans hold to %e the natural and inalien%irthright o# the individual %ut whi"h under Sanish domination in the Philiines had shame#ull$ invaded and ruthlessl$ tramled uon.23+164 #emphasis supplied$ In response to this, 0resMcKinle(, in his )nstructionof pril >, +FF to the 9econd 0hilippine Commission, provided an authorizand guide for the establishment of a civil government in the 0hilippines and stated that "#u$pon ever( divand branch of the government of the 0hilippines . . . must be imposed these inviolable rules . . .2 !inviolable rules2 were almost literal reproductions of the 'irst to =inth and the !hirteenth mendment o

    7nited 9tates Constitution, with the addition of the prohibition of bills of attainder and e* post facto larticle +, 9ection of said Constitution. !he "inviolable rules2 or %ill of &ights provided, among others, thperson shall be deprived of life, libert(, or propert( without due process of law that no person shall be tput in 5eopard( for the same offense or be compelled to be a witness against himself that the right tsecure against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated that no law shall be paabridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights of the people to peaceabl( assemblepetition the ;overnment for redress of grievances. 9cholars have characterized the )nstructionas the "MCharta of the 0hilippines2 and as a "worth( rival of the Eaws of the Indies.2 3+114

    15 | P

    http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn136http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn137http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn138http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn138http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn139http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn140http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn141http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn142http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn143http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn143http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn144http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn136http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn137http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn138http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn139http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn140http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn141http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn142http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn143http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn144
  • 8/9/2019 Separate Opinion, Dissenting and Concurring Justice Puno

    16/48

    [Philosophy of Law]

    !he "inviolable rules2 of the )nstructionwere re:enacted almost eactl( in the 0hilippine %ill of +F),3+1?4awhich temporaril( provided for the administration of the affairs of the civil government in the 0hilippine Isla

    1*4and in the 0hilippine utonom( ct of ++*,3+1>4otherwise known as the Jones Eaw, which was an adeclare the purpose of the people of the 7nited 9tates as to the future of the 0hilippine Islands and to pran autonomous government for it.3+1-4 !hese three organic acts : the )nstruction, the 0hilippine %ill of

    and the Jones Eaw : etended the guarantees of the merican %ill of &ights to the 0hilippines. In /enUnited States,3+14Justice Da( prescribed the methodolog( for appl(ing these "inviolable rules2 to0hilippines, viz@ "#t$hese principles were not taken from the 9panish law the( were carefull( collated fromown Constitution, and embod( almost verbatim the safeguards of that instrument for the protection of lifebert(.23+?F4 !hus, the inviola%le rules0 should %e alied in the sense whi"h has %een la"ed uhem in "onstruing the instrument #rom whi"h the$ were ta(en.0 3+?+4#emphasis supplied$

    !hereafter, the 0hilippine Independence Eaw, popularl( known as the !(dings:McDuffie Eaw of +61enacted. It guaranteed independence to the 0hilippines and authorized the drafting of a 0hiliConstitution. !he law provided that the government should be republican in form and the Constitution drafted should contain a %ill of &ights. 3+?)4 !hus, the Constitutional Convention of +61 was convenedrafting the Constitution, the Convention preferred to be generall( conservative on the belief that to be s

    and permanent, the Constitution must be anchored on the eperience of the people, "providing for instituwhich were the natural outgrowths of the national life.2 3+?64 s the people alread( had a political organizbuttressed b( national traditions, the Constitution was to sanctif( these institutions tested b( time an'ilipino peopleAs eperience and to confirm the practical and substantial rights of the people. !husnstitutions and philosoph( adopted in the Constitution drew substantiall( from the organic acts whichgoverned the 'ilipinos for more than thirt( (ears, more particularl( the Jones Eaw of ++*. In the absen0hilippine precedents, the Convention considered precedents of merican origin that might be suitable tsubstantiall( merican political s(stem and to the 'ilipino ps(cholog( and traditions. 3+?14 !hus, in the woClaro M. &ecto, 0resident of the Constitutional Convention, the +6? Constitution was "frankl( an imitatihe merican charter.23+??4

    side from the heav( merican influence, the Constitution also bore traces of the Malolos Constitution;erman Constitution, the Constitution of the &epublic of 9pain, the Meican Constitution, andConstitutions of several 9outh merican countries, and the 8nglish unwritten constitution. !houg!(dings:McDuffie law mandated a republican constitution and the inclusion of a %ill of &ights, with or wsuch mandate, the Constitution would have nevertheless been republican because the 'ilipinos were satwith their eperience of a republican government a %ill of &ights would have nonetheless been also incbecause the people had been accustomed to the role of a %ill of &ights in the past organic acts. 3+?*4

    !he %ill of &ights in the +6? Constitution was reproduced largel( from the report of the Convencommittee on bill of rights. !he report was mostl( a cop( of the %ill of &ights in the Jones Eaw, which inwas borrowed from the merican constitution. Bther provisions in the report drew from the MaConstitution and the constitutions of the &epublic of 9pain, Ital( and Japan. !here was a conscious eff

    etain the phraseolog( of the well:known provisions of the Jones Eaw because of the 5urisprudence thabuilt around them. !he Convention insistentl( avoided including provisions in the %ill of &ights not tested i'ilipino eperience.3+?>4 !hus, upon submission of its draft bill of rights to the 0resident of the Conventioncommittee on bill of rights stated@

    "doption and adaptation have been the relatively facile work of your committee in the formulation of a bill or

    declaration of rights to be incorporated in the #onstitution of the hilippine %slands. ;o attempt has been made toncorporate new or radical changes. . .

    16 | P

    http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn145http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn146http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn147http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn148http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn149http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn150http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn151http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn152http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn153http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn154http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn155http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn156http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn157http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn145http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn146http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn147http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn148http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn149http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn150http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn151http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn152http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn153http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn154http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn155http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn156http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn157
  • 8/9/2019 Separate Opinion, Dissenting and Concurring Justice Puno

    17/48

    [Philosophy of Law]

    1he enumeration of individual rights in the present organic law ("cts of #ongress of :uly ', '2), "ugust ), ''B+

    onsidered ample, comprehensive and precise enough to safeguard the rights and immunities of Filipino citiCens aga

    abuses or encroachments of the >overnment, its powers or agents. . .

    @odifications or changes in phraseology have been avoided, wherever possible. This is because the principles mu

    emain couched in a language epressive of their historical bac!ground, nature, etent and limitations, asonstrued and epounded by the great statesmen and jurists that have vitali"ed them.# 5'367(emphasis supplied+

    !he +6? Constitution was approved b( the Convention on 'ebruar( -, +6? and signed on 'ebruar(6?. Bn March )6, +6?, 7nited 9tates 0resident &oosevelt affied his signature on the Constitution.

    overwhelming ma5orit(, the 'ilipino voters ratified it on Ma( +1, +6?. 3+?4

    !hen dawned the decade of the *Fs. !here grew a clamor to revise the +6? charter for it to be esponsive to the problems of the countr(, specificall( in the socio:economic arena and to the sourchreats to the securit( of the &epublic identified b( then 0resident Marcos. In +>F, delegates t

    Constitution Convention were elected, and the( convened on June +, +>+. In their deliberations, "the spmoderation prevailed, and the . . . Constitution was hardl( notable for its novelt(, much less a ra

    departure from our constitutional tradition.2 3+*F4 Bur rights in the +6? Constitution were reaffirmed angovernment to which we have been accustomed was instituted, albeit taking on a parliamentar( ratherpresidential form.3+*+4

    !he %ill of &ights in the +>6 Constitution had minimal difference from its counterpart in the Constitution. 0reviousl(, there were )+ paragraphs in one section, now there were twent(:three. !hights added were the recognition of the peopleAs right to access to official records and documents anight to speed( disposition of cases. !o the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, a se

    paragraph was added that evidence obtained therefrom shall be inadmissible for an( purpose inproceeding.3+*)4

    !he +>6 Constitution went into effect on Januar( +>, +>6 and remained the fundamental law until 0res

    Corazon /uino rose to power in defiance of the +>6 charter and upon the "direct eercise of the powhe 'ilipino people23+*64in the 8D9 &evolution of 'ebruar( )6:)?, +-*. Bn 'ebruar( )?, +-*, she is

    0roclamation =o. + recognizing that "sovereignt( resides in the people and all government authorit( emanrom them2 and that she and Lice 0resident 9alvador Eaurel were "taking power in the name and b( the whe 'ilipino people.23+*14!he old legal order, constitution and enactments alike, was overthrown b( the

    administration. 3+*?4 month thenceforth, 0resident /uino issued 0roclamation =o. 6, "Declaring =at0olic( to Implement the &eforms Mandated b( the 0eople, 0rotecting their %asic &ights, dopti0rovisional Constitution, and 0roviding for an Brderl( !ransition to ;overnment under a Constitution.2 !he 0rovisional Constitution, otherwise known as the "'reedom Constitution2 adopted cprovisions of the +>6 Constitution, including the %ill of &ights which was adopted in toto, and provided foadoption of a new constitution within *F da(s from the date of 0roclamation =o. 6. 3+**4

    0ursuant to the 'reedom Constitution, the +-* Constitutional Commission drafted the +-> Constitwhich was ratified and became effective on 'ebruar( ), +->.3+*>4s in the +6? and +>6 Constitutioetained a republican s(stem of government, but emphasized and created more channels for the eerche sovereignt( of the people through recall, initiative, referendum and plebiscite. 3+*-4 %ecause of the

    scale violation of human rights during the dictatorship, the +-> Constitution contains a %ill of &ights wmore 5ealousl( safeguards the peopleAs "fundamental liberties in the essence of a constitutional democrn the words of ConCom delegate 'r. Joa/uin %ernas, 9.J. 3+*4 It declares in its state policies that "#t$he

    17 | P

    http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn158http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn159http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn160http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn160http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn161http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn162http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn163http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn163http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn164http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn165http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn166http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn167http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn168http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn169http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn158http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn159http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn160http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn161http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn162http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn163http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn164http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn165http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn166http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn167http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn168http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn169
  • 8/9/2019 Separate Opinion, Dissenting and Concurring Justice Puno

    18/48

    [Philosophy of Law]

    values the dignit( of ever( human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.2 3+>F4In addition, it separate rticle on 9ocial Justice and ?4 Malcolm and Eaurel define it according to Justice M

    definition in his opus on the merican Constitution 3+>*4published in +-6 as "the written instrument b( whe fundamental owers o# government are esta%lished, limited and de#ined, and b( which those po

    are distributed among the several departments for their safe and useful eercise for the %ene#it o# the oliti".23+>>4 !he constitution eists to assure that in the governmentAs discharge of its functions, the "dhat is the birthright of ever( human being is dul( safeguarded.23+>-4

    Clearl( then, at the core of constitutionalism is a strong concern for individual rights 3+>4as in the moperiod natural law theories. Justice Eaurel as delegate to the +61 Constitutional Convention declaredma5or address before the Convention@

    1here is no constitution, worthy of the name, without a bill or declaration of rights. (%t is+ the palladium of the peo

    iberties and immunities, so that their persons, homes, their peace, their livelihood, their happiness and their freedom

    be safe and secure from an ambitious ruler, an envious neighbor, or a grasping state.85'627

    s Chairman of the Committee on the Declaration of &ights, he stated@

    1he history of the world is the history of man and his arduous struggle for liberty. . . . %t is the history of those bravable souls who, in the ages that are past, have labored, fought and bled that the government of the lash that symbol

    lavery and despotism might endure no more. %t is the history of those great selfsacrificing men who lived and su

    n an age of cruelty, pain and desolation, so that every man might stand, under the protection of great rights and

    privileges, the e$ual of every other man.85'6'7

    %eing substantiall( a cop( of the merican %ill of &ights, the histor( of our %ill of &ights dates back toots of the merican %ill of &ights. !he latter is a charter of the individualAs liberties and a limitation upo

    18 | P

    http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn170http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn171http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn172http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn173http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn174http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn175http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn176http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn177http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn178http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn179http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn180http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn181http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn170http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn171http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn172http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn173http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn174http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn175http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn176http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn177http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn178http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn179http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn180http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn181
  • 8/9/2019 Separate Opinion, Dissenting and Concurring Justice Puno

    19/48

    [Philosophy of Law]

    power of the state3+-)4which traces its roots to the 8nglish Magna Carta of +)+?, a first in 8nglish histor(written instrument to be secured from a sovereign ruler b( the bulk of the politicall( articulate communit(ntended to la( down binding rules of law that the ruler himself ma( not violate. "In Magna Carta is to be he germ of the root principle that there are #undamental individual rights that the State 2soverhough it is 2 ma$ not in#ringe.23+-64#emphasis supplied$

    n Sales v. Sandigan%a$an, et al.,3+-14/uoting Allado v. 'io(no,3+-?4this Court ruled that the %ill of &guarantees the preservation of our natural rights, viz@

    1he purpose of the !ill of /ights is to protect the people against arbitrary and discriminatory use of political

    power. 1his bundle of rights guarantees thepreservation of our natural rights which include personal liberty an

    ecurity against invasion by the governmentor any of its branches or instrumentalities.85'6B7(emphasis supplied+

    We need, however, to fine tune this pronouncement of the Court, considering that certain rights in our %&ights, for eample habeas corpus, have been identified not as a natural right, but a civil right createaw. Eikewise, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures has been identified in Simonas aight, without epounding however what civil right meant therein : whether a natural right eisting befor

    constitution and protected b( it, thus ac/uiring the status of a civil right or a right created merel( b( lawnon:eistent in the absence of law. !o understand the nature of the right against unreasonable searchseizure and the corollar( right to eclusion of evidence obtained therefrom, we turn a heedful e(e onhistor(, concept and purpose of these guarantees.

    I3. +istor$ o# the 4uarantee againstUnreasona%le Sear"h and Sei5ure and the

    Right to E1"lusion o# Illegall$ Sei5ed Eviden"ein the United States and in the Philiines

    !he origin of the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure in the 0hilippine constitutions caraced back to hundreds of (ears ago in a land distant from the 0hilippines. =eedless to sa(, the right is

    entrenched in histor(.

    !he power to search in 8ngland was first used as an instrument to oppress ob5ectionable publications. 3+->

    oo long after the printing press was developed, seditious and libelous publications became a concern oCrown, and a broad search and seizure power developed to suppress these publications.3+--4 ;ewarrants were regularl( issued that gave all kinds of people the power to enter and seize at their discrunder the authorit( of the Crown to enforce publication licensing statutes. 3+-4 In +*61, the ultimate ignomhe use of general warrants came when the earl( "great illuminar( of the common law,2 3+F4and most influof the CrownAs opponents,3++49ir 8dward Coke, while on his death bed, was sub5ected to a ransacking se

    and the manuscripts of his )nstituteswere seized and carried awa( as seditious and libelous publications.

    !he power to issue general warrants and seize publications grew. !he( were also used to search foseize smuggled goods.3+64 !he developing common law tried to impose limits on the broad power to seo no avail. In his +istor of the ,leas of !ro#n, Chief Justice

  • 8/9/2019 Separate Opinion, Dissenting and Concurring Justice Puno

    20/48

    [Philosophy of Law]

    1he poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the forces of the #rown. %t may be frail its roof may shak

    he wind may blow through it the storm may enter the rain may enter< but the Hing of Dngland may not enter< all

    force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement.85'37

    =evertheless, legislation authorizing general warrants continued to be passed. 3+*4

    n the +*thcentur(, writs of assistance, called as such because the( commanded all officers of the Crowparticipate in their eecution,3+>4were also common. !hese writs authorized searches and seizureenforcement of import dut( laws. 3+-4 !he "same powers and authorities2 and the "like assistance2 that offhad in 8ngland were given to merican customs officers when parliament etended the customs laws tcolonies. !he abuse in the writs of assistance was not onl( that the( were general, but the( wereturnable and once issued, lasted si months past the life of the sovereign. 3+4

    !hese writs caused profound resentment in the colonies.3)FF4 !he( were predominantl( useMassachusetts, the largest port in the colonies3)F+4and the seat of the merican revolution. When theepired si months after the death of ;eorge II in Bctober +>*F,3)F)4sit(:three %oston merchants who opposed to the writs retained James Btis, Jr. to petition the 9uperior Court for a hearing on the /uesti

    whether new writs should be issued.

    3)F64

    Btis used the opportunit( to denounce 8nglandAs whole polic( tcolonies and on general warrants. 3)F144 %ut the 9uperior Court nevertheless held that the writs could be issued.3)F-4

    Bnce the customs officials had the writs, however, the( had great difficult( enforcing the customs laws o

    o rampant smuggling and mob resistance from the citizenr(. 3)F4 !he revolution had begun. !he Declaratndependence followed. !he use of general warrants and writs of assistance in enforcing customs anaws was one of the causes of the merican &evolution.3)+F4

    %ack in 8ngland, shortl( after the %oston debate, John Wilkes, a member of 0arliament, anon(mopublished the North -riton, a series of pamphlets criticizing the policies of the %ritish government. 3)++4 In one pamphlet was ver( bold in denouncing the government. !hus, the 9ecretar( of the 9tate issugeneral warrant to "search for the authors, printers, and publishers of 3the4 seditious and treasopaper.23)+)40ursuant to the warrant, WilkesA house was searched and his papers were indiscriminseized.

  • 8/9/2019 Separate Opinion, Dissenting and Concurring Justice Puno

    21/48

    [Philosophy of Law]

    Euch is the power and therefore one would naturally e-pect that the law to warrant it should be clear in proportion

    power is e-orbitant. %f it is law, it will be found in our books< if it is not to be found there, it is not law.

    The great end for which men entered into society was to secure their property . 1hat right is preserved sacred ancommunicable in all instances where it has not been taken away or abridged by some public law for the good of th

    whole. 1he cases where this right of property is set aside by positive law are various. istresses, e-ecutions, forfeita-es, etc., are all of this description, wherein every man by common consent gives up that right for the sake of ?usti

    and the general good. !y the laws of Dngland, every invasion of private property, be it ever so minute, is a trespassman can set his foot upon my ground without my license but he is liable to an action though the damage be nothing4

    !he merican eperience with the writs of assistance and the Enti"( "asewere considered b( the 79tates 9upreme Court in the first ma5or case to discuss the scope of the 'ourth mendment right agunreasonable search and seizure in the +--? case of o$d v. United States, supra, where the uled, viz@

    1he principles laid down in this opinion (Dntick v. #arrington,supra+ affect the very essence of constitutional lib

    and security. 1hey reach farther than the concrete form of the case then before the court, with its adventitious

    ircumstances< they apply to allinvasions, on the part of the %overnment and its employees, of the sanctity of a

    man&s home and the privacies of life. It is not the brea!ing of his doors and the rummaging of his drawers thonstitutes the essence of the offense' but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, person

    iberty and private property,where that right has never been forfeited by his conviction of some public offense< it

    nvasion of this sacred right which underlies and constitutes the essence of $ord #amdens ?udgment.85)'67(emphasisupplied+

    n another landmark case of ++1, 6ee(s v. United States,3)+4the Court, citing Adams v. New ))F4reiterated that the 'ourth mendment was intended to secure the citizen in person and propert( aghe unlawful invasion of the sanctit( of his home b( officers of the law, acting under legislative or 5u

    sanction.

    With this genesis of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures and the 5urisprudence that hadaround it, the 'ourth mendment guarantee was etended b( the 7nited 9tates to the 'ilipinos in sucerms in 0resident McKinle(As )nstructionof pril >, +FF,viz@

    . . . that the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seiCures shall not be violated.85))'7

    !his provision in the )nstructionwas re:enacted in 9ection ? of the 0hilippine %ill of +F), this time wprovision on warrants, viz@

    21 | P

    http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn216http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn217http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn218http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn219http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn220http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn221http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn216http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn217http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn218http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn219http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn220http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn221
  • 8/9/2019 Separate Opinion, Dissenting and Concurring Justice Puno

    22/48

    [Philosophy of Law]

    1hat the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seiCures shall not be violated.

    1hat no warrant shall issue e-cept upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describin

    place to be searched and the person or things to be seiCed.85)))7

    !he above provisions were reproduced verbatim in the Jones Eaw of ++*.

    !hen came the +6? Constitution which provides in rticle IL, 9ection +#6$, viz@

    Eection '(4+. 1he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable

    earches and seiCures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined byudge after e-amination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particu

    describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seiCed.8

    nitiall(, the Constitutional ConventionAs committee on bill of rights proposed an eact cop( of the 'o

    mendment of the 7nited 9tates Constitution in their draft, viz@

    1he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches andeiCures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation

    particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seiCed.85))47

    During the debates of the Convention, however, Delegate Licente 'rancisco proposed to amend the provb( inserting the phrase "to be determined b( the 5udge after eamination under oath or affirmation ocomplainant and the witness he ma( produce2 in lieu of "supported b( oath or affirmation.2 6 Constitution, viz@

    Eec. 4. 1he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searcand seiCures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest

    ssue e-cept upon probable cause to be determined by the ?udge, or such other responsible officer as may be authori

    22 | P

    http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn222http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn223http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn224http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn225http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn226http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn222http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn223http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn224http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn225http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn226
  • 8/9/2019 Separate Opinion, Dissenting and Concurring Justice Puno

    23/48

    [Philosophy of Law]

    by law, after e-amination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and

    particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seiCed.8

    =oticeabl(, there were three modifications of the +6? counterpart, namel(@ #+$ the clause was mapplicable to searches and seizures "of whatever nature and for an( purpose2 #)$ the provision on war

    was epressl( made applicable to both "search warrant or warrant of arrest2 and #6$ probable causemade determinable not onl( b( a 5udge, but also b( "such other officer as ma( be authorized b( law.2 3))

    he concept and purpose of the right remained substantiall( the same.

    s a corollar( to the above provision on searches and seizures, the eclusionar( rule made its mappearance in rticle IL, 9ection 1#)$ of the Constitution, viz@

    Eection & ('+. 1he privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable e-cept upon lawful order of t

    ourt, or when public safety and order require otherwise.

    )+ "ny evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any

    proceeding.8

    !hat evidence obtained in violation of the guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizurnadmissible was an adoption of the CourtAs ruling in the +*> case of Stonehill v. 'io(no.3))-4

    9ections 6 and 1 of the +>6 Constitution were adopted in toto in rticle I, 9ection + of the 'reeConstitution which took effect on March )?, +-*, viz@

    Eection '. 1he provision of . . . "/1%#$D %I (!ill of /ights+ . . . of the '*4 #onstitution, as amended, remain in

    and effect and are hereby adopted in toto as part of this rovisional #onstitution.85))7

    !hereafter, pursuant to the 'reedom Constitution, the +-> Constitution was drafted and ratified on 'eb

    ), +->. 9ections ) and 6, rticle III thereof provide@

    Eection ). 1he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable

    earches and seiCures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant oarrest shall issue e-cept upon probable cause to be determined personally by a ?udge after e-amination under oath or

    affirmation of 5the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be search

    and the persons or things to be seiCed.

    Eection 4 ('+. 1he privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable e-cept upon lawful order of th

    ourt, or when public safety and order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.

    )+ "ny evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any

    proceeding.8

    !he significant modification of 9ection ) is that probable cause ma( be determined onl( b( a 5udge anonger b( "such other responsible officer as ma( be authorized b( law.2 !his was a reversion tcounterpart provision in the +6? Constitution.

    23 | P

    http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn227http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn228http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn229http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn227http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn228http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn229
  • 8/9/2019 Separate Opinion, Dissenting and Concurring Justice Puno

    24/48

    [Philosophy of Law]

    0arentheticall(, in the international arena, the 7D

  • 8/9/2019 Separate Opinion, Dissenting and Concurring Justice Puno

    25/48

    [Philosophy of Law]

    1he inviolability of the home is one of the most fundamental of all the individual rights declared and recogniCed in

    political codes of civiliCed nations. ;o one can enter into the home of another without the consent of its owners or

    occupants.

    The privacy of the home + the place of abode, the place where man with his family may dwell in peace and enj

    he companionship of his wife and children unmolested by anyone, even the !ing, ecept in rare cases + has albeen regarded by civili"ed nations as one of the most sacred personal rights to whom men are entitled. !oth t

    ommon and the civil law guaranteed to man the right to absolute protection to the privacy of his home. 1he king wpowerful< he was clothed with ma?esty< his will was the law, but, with few e-ceptions, the humblest citiCen or sub?e

    might shut the door of his humble cottage in the face of the monarch and defend his intrusion into that privacy whic

    egarded as sacred as any of the kingly prerogatives. . .

    " mans house is his castle, has become a ma-im among the civiliCed peoples of the earth. is protection therein

    become a matter of constitutional protection in Dngland, "merica, and Epain, as well as in other countries.

    Eo ?ealously did the people of Dngland regard this right to en?oy, unmolested, the privacy of their houses, that they m

    ven take the life of the unlawful intruder, if it be nighttime. 1his was also the sentiment of the /omans e-pressed b1ullyJ Quid enim sanctius quid omni religione munitius, quam domus uniuscu jusque civium.85)4*7 (emphasis supp

    !he Court reiterated this in the +++ case of United States v. 'e Los Re$es, et al.,3)6-4to demonstratuncompromising regard placed upon the privac( of the home that cannot be violated b( unreasosearches and seizures, viz@

    %n the case of @c#lurg vs. !renton (')4 %owa, 4B6+, the court, speaking of the right of an officer to enter a private

    o search for the stolen goods, saidJ

    1he right of the citiCen to occupy and en?oy his home, however mean or humble, free from arbitrary invasion and s

    has for centuries been protected with the most solicitous care by every court in the Dnglishspeaking world, from @#harta down to the present, and is embodied in every bill of rights defining the limits of governmental power in our

    epublic.

    1he mere fact that a man is an officer, whether of high or low degree, gives him no more right than is possessed by

    ordinary private citiCen to break in upon theprivacy of a homeand sub?ect its occupants to the indignity of a searche evidence of crime, without a legal warrant procured for that purpose. ;o amount of incriminating evidence, wh

    ts source, will supply the place of such warrant. "t the closed door of the home, be it palace or hovel, even blood

    hounds must wait till the law, by authoritative process, bids it open. . .85)47 (emphasis supplied+

    t is not onl( respect for personalit(, privac( and propert(, but to the ver( dignit( of the human being that lhe heart of the provision.

    !here is also public interest involved in the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure. !he reshat government accords its people helps it elicit allegiance and lo(alt( of its citizens. Chief Justice 'ern

    writes about the right against unreasonable search and seizure as well as to privac( of communication iwise@

    25 | P

    http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn237http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn238http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn239http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn239http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn237http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn238http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn239
  • 8/9/2019 Separate Opinion, Dissenting and Concurring Justice Puno

    26/48

    [Philosophy of Law]

    1hese rights, on their face, impart meaning and vitality to that liberty which in a constitutional regime is a mans bi

    ight. There is the recognition of the area of privacy normally beyond the power of government to intrude.

    and unimpaired respect to that etent is accorded his personality. e is free from the prying eyes of publicofficials. e is let alone, a prerogative even more valued when the agencies of publicity manifest less and less diffid

    n impertinent and unwelcome inquiry into ones person, his home, wherever he may be minded to stay, his possessi

    his communication. Moreover, in addition to the individual interest, there is a public interest that is li!ewise seby these constitutional safeguards. They ma!e it easier for state authority to enlist the loyalty and allegiance

    iti"ens, with the unimpaired deference to one&s dignity and standing as a human being, not only to his person

    uch but to things that may be considered necessary appurtenances to a decent eistence. " government that tecogniCes such limits and is careful not to trespass on what is the domain sub?ect to his sole control is likely to prov

    more stable and enduring.85)&27 (emphasis supplied+

    n the +*> case of Stonehill, et al. v. 'io(no,3)1+4this Court affirmed the sanctit( of the home and the prof communication and correspondence, viz@

    -To uphold the validity of the warrants in $uestion would be to wipe out completely one of the most fundamen

    ights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy ofommunication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of peace officers. This is

    precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above $uoted + to outlaw the so+called

    general warrants. %t is not difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of keen political strife, when the party

    power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal means.85)&)7(emphasis supplied+

    8ven after the +*+ Silvermanand +*> /at5 "asesin the 7nited 9tates, which emphasized protectiprivac( rather than propert( as the principal purpose of the 'ourth mendment, this Court declareavowed purposes of the guarantee in the +-+ case of Peole v. !-I o# Ri5al, ran"h I7, 8ue5on ;

  • 8/9/2019 Separate Opinion, Dissenting and Concurring Justice Puno

    27/48

    [Philosophy of Law]

    tate. In contrast, a system of limited government safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the individualirmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can control. rotection of this private sector +

    protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual+ has become increasingly important a

    modern society has developed. "ll the forces of technological age industrialiCation, urbaniCation, and organiCatio

    operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion to it. %n modern times, the capacity to maintain and sup

    his enclave of private life marks the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian society.85)&37

    (emphasis sup

    !he right to privac( discussed in Justice DouglasA dissent in the +a$den "aseis illuminating. We /uotength, viz@

    :udge $earned and stated a part of the philosophy of the Fourth "mendment in Gnited Etates v. oller, &4 F)d '

    '&J 5%7t is only fair to observe that the real evil aimed at by the ourth /mendment is the search itself, that

    nvasion of a man&s privacy which consists in rummaging about among his effects to secure evidence against

    him. %f the search is permitted at all, perhaps it does not make so much difference what is taken away, since the offi

    will ordinarily not be interested in what does not incriminate, and there can be no sound policy in protecting what do

    - - - - - - - - -

    1he constitutional philosophy is, % think, clear. The personal effects and possessions of the individual 0all contra

    and the li!e ecepted1 are sacrosanct from prying eyes, from the long arm of the law, from any rummaging by

    police. rivacy involves the choice of the individual to disclose or to reveal what he believes, what he thin!s, w

    he possesses. 1he article may be nondescript work of art, a manuscript of a book, a personal account book, a diary,nvoices, personal clothing, ?ewelry, or whatnot. Those who wrote the 2ill of Rights believed that every individu

    needs both to communicate with others and to !eep his affairs to himself. That dual aspect of privacy means

    he individual should have the freedom to select for himself the time and circumstances when he will share hi

    ecrets with others and decide the etent of the sharing 0footnote omitted1. This is his prerogative not the

    *tates&. 1he Framers, who were as knowledgeable as we, knew what police surveillance meant and how the practic

    ummaging through ones personal effects could destroy freedom.

    - - - - - - - - -

    would . . . leave with the individual the choice of opening his private effects 0apart from contraband and the

    o the police and !eeping their contents as secret and their integrity inviolate. The eistence of that choice is

    very essence of the right of privacy. 5)&B7(emphasis supplied+

    !hus, in 4riswold v. !onne"ti"ut,3)1>4the 7nited 9tates 9upreme Court upheld the right to marital privac(uled that lawmakers could not make the use of contraceptives a crime and sanction the search of m

    bedrooms, viz@

    =ould we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of

    ontraceptivesM 1he very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.

    (e deal with a right of privacy older than the 2ill of Rights N older than our political parties, older than our schoystem. @arriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of bei

    acred. %t is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes< a harmony in living, not political faiths< a bilater

    27 | P

    http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn245http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn246http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn247http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn245http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn246http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn247
  • 8/9/2019 Separate Opinion, Dissenting and Concurring Justice Puno

    28/48

    [Philosophy of Law]

    oyalty, not commercial or social pro?ects. Ket it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prio

    decisions.85)&67(emphasis supplied+

    n relation to the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, private respondent Dimaano likeclaims a right to the eclusionar( rule, i.e., that evidence obtained from an unreasonable search cann

    used in evidence against her. !o determine whether this right is available to her, we again eaminhistor(, concept, and purpose of this right in both the merican and 0hilippine 5urisdictions.

    !he eclusionar( rule has had an uneven histor( in both the 7nited 9tates and 0hilippine 5urisdictioncommon law, the illegal seizure of evidence did not affect its admissibilit( because of the view that ph(evidence was the same however it was obtained. s distinguished from a coerced confession, the iseizure did not impeach the authenticit( or reliabilit( of ph(sical evidence. !his view prevailed in meurisdiction until the 9upreme Court ruled in the ++1 6ee(s "ase that evidence obtained in violation o'ourth mendment was inadmissible in federal court as it amounted to theft b( agents ogovernment. !his came to be known as the eclusionar( rule and was believed to deter federal law enforom violating the 'ourth mendment. In +1, 'ourth mendment was incorporated into the Due 0rocess Clause under the 'ourt

    mendment3)14 and made applicable in the state s(stem in 6ol# v. !olorado,3)?F4 but the e5ected to incorporate the eclusionar( rule. t the time 6ol#was decided, +> states follhe 6ee(s doctrine while 6F states did not. 3)?+4 !he Court reasoned@

    =e cannot brush aside the e-perience of Etates which deem the incidence of such conduct by the police too slight t

    for a deterrent remedy not by way of disciplinary measures but by overriding the relevant rules of evidence. 1here a

    moreover, reasons for e-cluding evidence unreasonably obtained by the federal police which are less compelling in ase of police under Etate or local authority. 1he public opinion of a community can far more effectively be e-erted

    against oppressive conduct on the part of police directly responsible to the community itself than can local opinion,

    poradically aroused, be brought to bear upon remote authority pervasively e-erted throughout the country.8 5)3)7

    !his difference in treatment on the federal and state level of evidence obtained illegall( resulted in the "platter2 doctrine. 9tate law enforcement agents would provide federal officers with illegall( seized evidwhich was then admissible in federal court because, as with illegall( seized evidence b( private citizederal officers were not implicated in obtaining it. !hus, it was said that state law enforcers served u

    evidence in federal cases in "silver platter.2 !his pernicious practice was stopped with the 7nited 99upreme CourtAs +*F decision,El(ins v. United States.3)?64 !welve (ears after 6ol#, the 7nited 99upreme Court reversed 6ol# and incorporated the eclusionar( rule in the state s(stem in &aOhio3)?14becauseother means of controlling illegal police behavior had failed.3)??4 We /uote at lhe &aruling as it had a significant influence in the eclusionar( rule in 0hilippine 5urisdiction, viz@

    . . . 1oday we once again e-amine the =olfs constitutional documentation of the right of privacy free from

    unreasonable state intrusion, and after its doCen years on our books, are led by it to close the only courtroom dooremaining open to evidence secured by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right, reserved to all perso

    a specific guarantee against that very same unlawful conduct. . .

    Eince the Fourth "mendments right to privacy has been declared enforceable against the Etates through the ue ro

    #lause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the same sanction of e-clusion as it is used against the Fe>overnment. =ere it otherwise, then ?ust as without the =eeks rule the assurance against unreasonable federal sear

    and seiCures would be a form of words, valueless and undeserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable

    28 | P

    http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn248http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn249http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn249http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn250http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn251http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn252http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn253http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn254http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn255http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn248http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn249http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn250http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn251http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn252http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn253http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn254http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn255
  • 8/9/2019 Separate Opinion, Dissenting and Concurring Justice Puno

    29/48

    [Philosophy of Law]

    human liberties, so too, without that rule the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral aneatly severed from its conceptual neus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not

    permit this Court&s high regard as freedom )implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.& "t that time that the #oheld in =olf that the amendment was applicable to the Etates through the ue rocess #lause, the cases of this cour

    we have seen, had steadfastly held that as to federal officers the Fourth "mendment included the e-clusion of the

    vidence seiCed in violation of its provisions. Dven =olf stoutly adhered to that proposition. 1he right to privacy,onceded operatively enforceable against the Etates, was not susceptible of destruction by avulsion of the sanction u

    which its protection and en?oyment had always been deemed dependent under the !oyd, =eeks and Eilverthorne

    #ases. Therefore, in etending the substantive protections of due process to all constitutionally unreasonable

    earches + state or federal + it was logically and constitutionally necessary that the eclusion doctrine + an ess

    part of the right to privacy + be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient of the right newly recogni"ed by t

    (olf case. In short, the admission of the new constitutional right by (olf could not consistently tolerate deni

    ts most important constitutional privilege, namely, the eclusion of the evidence which an accused had been

    orced to give by reason of the unlawful sei"ure. To hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to withh

    ts privilege and enjoyment. 3nly last year the Court itself recogni"ed that the purpose of the eclusionary ru

    o deter + to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only available way + by removing the incent

    disregard it.& (Dlkins v. Gnited Etates, 4B& GE at )'*+

    - - - - - - - - -

    1he ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the Etate tends to destroy the entire system of constitutional restraint

    which the liberties of the people rest. (#f. @arcus v. Eearch =arrant of roperty, B $ ed )d post, p. '')*+ aving onecogniCed that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth "mendment is enforceable against the Etates, and that th

    ight to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore constitutional in origin, we can no l

    permit that right to remain an empty promise. !ecause it is enforceable in the same manner and to like effect as oth

    basic rights secured by its ue rocess #lause, we can no longer permit it to be revocable at the whim of any po

    officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment. 3ur decision, founded o

    eason and truth, gives to the individual no more than that which the Constitution guarantees him, to the poliofficer no less than that to which honest law enforcement is entitled, and to the courts, that judicial integrity s

    necessary in the true administration of justice.85)3B7(emphasis supplied+

    t is said that the eclusionar( rule has three purposes. !he ma5or and most often invoked is the deterrenunreasonable searches and seizures as stated in El(ins v. United States3)?>4and /uoted in &a@ "#t$hs calculated to prevent, not repair. Its purpose is to deter to compel respect for constitutional guarahe onl( effective available wa( b( removing the incentive to disregard it.2 3)?-4 9econd is the "imperatudicial integrit(2, i.e., that the courts do not become "accomplices in the willful disobedience of a Constihe( are sworn to uphold . . . b( permitting unhindered governmental use of the fruits of such invasionsuling admitting evidence in a criminal trial . . . has the necessar( effect of legitimizing the conduct w

    produced the evidence, while an application of the eclusionar( rule withholds the constitumprimatur.23)?4 !hird is the more recent purpose pronounced b( some members of the 7nited 99upreme Court which is that "of assuring the people all potential victims of unlawful government condhat the government would not profit from its lawless behavior, thus minimizing the risk of seri

    undermining popular trust in government.23)*F4 !he focus of concern here is not the police but the publichird purpose is implicit in the &adeclaration that "no man is to be convicted on unconstitu

    evidence.23)*+4

    29 | P

    http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn256http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn257http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn258http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn259http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn260http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn261http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn256http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn257http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn258http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn259http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn260http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768_puno.htm#_ftn261
  • 8/9/2019 Separate Opinion, Dissenting and Concurring Justice Puno

    30/48

    [Philosophy of Law]

    n 0hilippine 5urisdiction, the Court has likewise swung from one position to the other on the eclusioule. In the +)F case of U$ /he$tin v. 3illareal,3)*)4the Court citing o$d, ruled that "seizure or compu

    production of a manAs private papers to be used against him2 was tantamount to self:incrimination andherefore "unreasonable search and seizure.2 !his was a proscription against "fishing epeditions.2

    Court restrained the prosecution from using the books as evidence. 'ive (ears later or in +)?, we

    n Peole v. !arlos3)*64

    that although the o$dand SilverthorneLum%er !o. and Silverthorne v. UStates3)*14"ases are authorities for the doctrine that documents obtained b( illegal searches nadmissible in evidence in criminal cases, 6ee(smodified this doctrine b( adding that the illegalit( osearch and seizure should have initiall( been directl( litigated and established b( a pre:trial motion foeturn of the things seized. s this condition was not met, the illegalit( of the seizure was not deeme

    obstacle to admissibilit(. !he sub5ect evidence was nevertheless ecluded, however, for hearsa(. !hereafter, in +6), the Court did not uphold the defense of self:incrimination when "fraudbooks, invoices and records2 that had been seized were presented in evidence in Peole v. Ru%io.3)*?

    Court gave three reasons@ #+$ the public has an interest in the proper