September 2009 1

CSA

“Code Red” – Public Warning in Operation “Cast Lead”

ISMOR 2009

Lt.Col. Ami Mizrahi, M.Sc.

Center for System Analysis

Planning Division

IDF

September 2009 2

CSA

Background

In operation “Cast Lead”

Hamas fired rockets on civilians

Protection based on “Most Protected Room”

• Concrete room / Inner room / Lower floors / Staircases

Alerting the population• Sensor constellation

/ Sirens

September 2009 3

CSA

The Dilemma

Increase alert probability Maximize P alert

Minimal distraction of civilian life under ongoing rocket attacks

Minimize P unnecessary alert

Analogous to Pfa and Pd

September 2009 5

CSA

Protection Policy

Partial Alert “Stay in Shelters”

Halt Civilian Routine

Psychological Impact

Alert Everyone

The “Blitz” on London

Yom Kippur War

Focused Alert

Desert Storm 2nd Lebanon War

Cast Lead

1940 1973 1991 2006 2009

September 2009 6

CSA

Desert Storm 1991 39 Al-Hussein Missiles (SCUD) were launched at Israel

Israel was divided into 6 alert zones“Sealed Room”

Gas Masks

Every missile caused ~1/3 of Israel’s population to be alerted (~2M)

September 2009 7

CSA

2nd Lebanon War 2006 ~4,000 rockets were fired at Israel

Improved hit predictions

New sensors

More Public Warning Zones

On the average ~100K people were alerted

September 2009 8

CSA

Prior to Operation “Cast Lead” 2001-2008

Experience gathered for 8 years 2001-2008

A few rockets per day - 4000 rockets over the years

Order of magnitude increase in # of zones• Order of magnitude decrease in # of people in a zone

Improved hit prediction

Implement relevant alerting logic

September 2009 9

CSA

Logic for Improvised Rockets

September 2009 10

CSA

Operation “Cast Lead” Dec. 27th, 2008 - Jan. 17th, 2009

During “Cast Lead” ~1000 Rockets and Mortars Fired

New threats - longer range rockets

Alerting logic problematic for longer range rockets

September 2009 11

CSA

Longer Threats -> more Unnecessary Alerts

September 2009 12

CSA

Longer Threats -> more Unnecessary Alerts

September 2009 13

CSA

Logic Change

Vector of launchHit Area Prediction

September 2009 14

CSA

What was done?

Empirical estimation of hit prediction accuracy

Why empirical?• Non-standard rockets• Adaptation to theater (sensor combination, specific locations…)

Define MOEs

Palert

Number of people affected by the Unnecessary Alerts

Define new logic

Calibrate parameters

Test new logic on new cases (Validation)

Test stability of new logic

“Go to the decision makers”

September 2009 15

CSA

Research Timeline

Identify Problem

Collect Data

~ 3 Days ~ 1 Week

Change Code

~ 3 Days

Test Stability & Validate

~ 1 Week

Approval

End of Operation

September 2009 16

CSA

Research Difficulties Data collection Vs. Real time crisis management

Hard to get data from rescue personnel

Rocket locationLow priority to locate rockets falling outside residential areas

Possible sample skewing

Numerous authorities Military / Civilian - Police, Intel, Home Front Command, Our teams

Very Noisy DataLimited accuracy of data

Cross-check the data. Go to the field.

Limited High Level Attention

September 2009 17

CSA

Summary

Basic dilemma remains:P alert <> P unnecessary alerts

Requirement for flexibility for the alert systemAlert Time <> Accuracy

Local optimizations based on scenario

Real time Alerting Zone Control

Active Defense (intercept) poses more questions:• Danger from Debris

OR During HostilitiesImproved Data Collection During Hostilities

Relevant research time