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Session 2: Political Demography and Russia’s Past and Future. Sergei V. Zakharov Institute of Demography (IDEM) Higher School of Economics (HSE) Moscow, Russia [email protected]. First International Conference on Political Demography and Social Macro-Dynamics - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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Session 2: Political Demography and Russia’s Past and Future
Sergei V. ZakharovInstitute of Demography (IDEM)
Higher School of Economics (HSE)Moscow, Russia
First International Conference on Political Demography and Social Macro-Dynamics
Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration
Moscow, December 13-14, 2013
The Demographic Demise of the Soviet Union
I strongly support the idea. Demographic differences, backed by cultural differences made it impossible for the existence of the USSR.
It should be noted that Russian demographers have always talked about it. Fundamental works on the demographic problems of the USSR, even the ones that were published during the period of Soviet censorship, devoted to these issues.
See, for example: A.Volkov, A.Vishnevsky (eds.) Human Reproduction in the USSR (1983).
Only need to have in mind that for obvious reasons, the Russian experts could not do political conclusions
2
Monica Duffy Toft
History and Demography in the Caucasus as a Political Minefield: The Case of the Sochi Olympics
The role of demographic factors in social change in the North Caucasus is very high. Just as proved their influence in North Africa and in other regions of the world.
The erosion of traditional values and the destruction of the traditional organization of the demographic system not only leads to the emergence of the avant-garde political forces, which is important for the modernization of society, but also to the consolidation of conservative forces, who are losing their power.
Time is working against the latter. Unfortunately we live in a period of confrontation. To what extent do we have the resources and tools to reduce the negative consequences of this conflict?3
Georgi Derluguian
Russian Youth Movements: Hope or Hype?
Youth movements, organized and supported by power - an important channel for obtaining resources, social capital. They are an effective way to lift the career of a young person.
Can we talk about the fundamental differences with the Soviet period??
4
Jennifer Dabs Sciubba
Russia’s Recent Fertility Increase – Why it Occurred and Can it be Sustained?
At the macro level demographic statistics we have strong evidence that pronatalist policy influenced period indicators of fertility. Cohort fertility indicators, taking into account the data for 2012 (outstanding increase in period fertility rates) also showed a positive reaction , albeit a weak one.
Historical trend towards lower ultimate cohort fertility in Russia apparently stopped at the level of 1.6 births per woman.
5
V.N. Archangelskiy, J.V. Zinkina, A.V. Korotayev
Russia’s Recent Fertility Increase – Why it Occurred and Can it be Sustained?
At the same time, there is no clear evidence on the microdata level, namely on economic policies (in particular, the parent capital ) had a strong positive response. Until today, the econometric analysis does not give grounds for optimism. Neither the intentions nor the realization of intentions did not change principially.
Future changes in fertility under the sign of great uncertainty. While we can not say that the generations born in the 1980s will have more children than their parents .
We also worrying that fertility increased more significantly in those regions where it was above average before the policy intervention, especially in rural areas.6
Completed Cohort and Period Total Fertility in Russia (average number of births to a woman by age 50): birth cohorts 1841-1982 (extrapolation with fixed ASFR as of 2012), period 1897-2012
7 Source: Zakharov S.V. (2008). Russian Federation: From the first to second demographic transition. Demographic Research. Vol. 19, p.910 (http://www.demographic-research.org/Volumes/Vol19/24/ ). (Updated for 2012 data)
1870
1880
1890
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1840 1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980
Calendar Year
Birth
s pe
r w
oman
Birth Cohort
Period
Cohort
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
11,21,41,61,8
22,22,42,62,8
1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980
Calendar Year
Birth
s pe
r w
oman
Birth Cohort
Period
Cohort
1,85 - 1,91,6 - 1,65
Different Indicators of Total Fertility: Cohort versus Synthetic Measures, Russia, 1979-2012
8
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
1
1,2
1,4
1,6
1,8
2
2,2
2,4
1949 1951 1953 1955 1957 1959 1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985
Calendar Year
Birt
hs p
er w
oman
Female Birth CohortCTFR actual
CTFR expected (fixed ASFR for 2012)PTFR
PTFRst (1959 cohort age pattern as a standard)Period Mean Birth Order
adjPTFR (B-F method)
Period indicators
Cohort indicators
Cumulated Period ASFR, Russia: 1979-2012, per 1000
90
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
1979
1981
1983
1985
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
by 20by 25by 30by 35by 40by 50 (PTFR)
Cumulated Cohort ASFR, Russia: Cohorts1945-1990, per 1000
10
0200400600800
100012001400160018002000
1945195019551960196519701975198019851990Female birth cohort
by 20by 25by 30by 35by 40by 50 (CTFR)
Differences in Cumulated cohort ASFR between base (1960) and subsequent cohorts 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980 and 1985
11
-0,6
-0,5
-0,4
-0,3
-0,2
-0,1
0
0,1
15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Birth
s pe
r w
oman
Age
c1960c1965c1970c1975c1980c1985
Period Parity Progression Ratios, 1979-2012(transitions to the next birth for women)
12
00,10,20,30,40,50,60,70,80,9
1
1979
1982
1985
1988
1991
1994
1997
2000
2003
2006
2009
2012
PPR 0-->1PPR 1-->2PPR 2-->3PPR 3-->4PPR 4-->5
Cohort Parity Progression Ratios by Age of 20, 25, 30, 35, 50: Transition 01
13
00,10,20,30,40,50,60,70,80,9
1
1955
1957
1959
1961
1963
1965
1967
1969
1971
1973
1975
1977
1979
1981
1983
1985
1987
1989
Female birth cohort
PPR 0-->1
by 20by 25by 30by 35by 50
Cohort Parity Progression Ratios by Age of 20, 25, 30, 35, 50: Transition 12
14
00,10,20,30,40,50,60,70,8
1955
1957
1959
1961
1963
1965
1967
1969
1971
1973
1975
1977
1979
1981
1983
1985
1987
1989
Female birth cohort
PPR 1-->2
by 20by 25by 30by 35by 50
Cohort Parity Progression Ratios by Age of 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 50: Transition 23
15
0
0,05
0,1
0,15
0,2
0,25
0,3
1955
1957
1959
1961
1963
1965
1967
1969
1971
1973
1975
1977
1979
1981
1983
1985
1987
1989
Female birth cohort
PPR 2-->3
by 20by 25by 30by 35by 40by 50
Cohort Parity Progression Ratios by Age of 25, 30, 35, 40, 50: Transition 34
16
0,10,120,140,160,18
0,20,220,240,260,28
0,3
Female birth cohort
PPR 3-->4
by 25by 30by 35by 40by 50