Shakespeare and the English Equity Jurisdiction. the Merchant of Venice and the Two Texts

8/8/2019 Shakespeare and the English Equity Jurisdiction. the Merchant of Venice and the Two Texts

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Shakespeare and the English Equity Jurisdiction: The Merchant of Venice and the Two Textsof King LearAuthor(s): B. J. Sokol and Mary SokolSource: The Review of English Studies, New Series, Vol. 50, No. 200 (Nov., 1999), pp. 417-439Published by: Oxford University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/517390

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SHAKESPEARE AND THE ENGLISH EQUITYJURISDICTION

THE MERCHANT OF VENICE AND THE TWOTEXTS OF KING LEAR

BY B. J. SOKOL AND MARY SOKOL

The article reviews connections long alleged between equity and a variety ofShakespeare'splays. Not all writers have been responsiveto the complexitiesofoverlappingbut differinguses of the term 'equity'.Also manycriticaltreatmentsofShakespeare nd equity incorrectlycharacterizehe historicalrelationsbetween theearlymodern common law and equity jurisdictionsonly in relation to a notoriouspoliticalcrisis of 1616. A more fine-grainedanalysisof lawyers'discussions and oflegalandpoliticaldevelopmentsallows the delineationof subtlerhistoricaldynamicsand of conceptualand terminologicaldifferences.Followingfrom this it is arguedthatmany twentieth-century laimsthat thesupposedconflictsof Elizabethan quityand lawjurisdictionsnformpassagesor themes of 1 Henry V, MeasureforMeasure,and especially The Merchantof Venice,are unfounded.However, it appearsthatShakespearedid refer to co-operative equity and law jurisdictions n the quartoversion of King Lear, although the relevant passageand indeed its scene wereremoved from the folio text. This, together with the historicaldetail provided,suggestsa datingof at least some of the folio revisionsof KingLear.

Many later twentieth-century students of Shakespeare who have taken an interestin the legal contexts of his plays have persistently misapplied a particular legal-historical background to an early Shakespeare play. Yet an application of the samebackground to a later play may be most illuminating.An examination of the play's text in relation to the historical nature anddevelopment of Elizabethan jurisdictions renders unfounded a widespread beliefthat the trial in The Merchant of Venice is concerned with the vicissitudes of theEnglish jurisdiction of equity. On the other hand, historical contexts indicate thatShakespeare did have the political difficulties of that jurisdiction in mind when hemade particular changes to the 1608 quarto version of King Lear. Approximately1608 and 1610 were the likely dates between which Shakespeare had good reasonsto eliminate a reference to peaceful relations between the jurisdictions of equityand law. He did this by cutting out the trial scene of King Lear.' This dating fitswell with Gary Taylor's lengthy examination of the play's textual changes,1 All citations of Shakespearewill be from WilliamShakespeare,The CompleteWorks:ElectronicEdition, d. S. Wells and G. Taylor(Oxford, 1989).In that editionthe quartoand folio versionsof KingLearareseparatelypublishedanddesignatedLRQand LRF respectively. Shakespeare' ereafterwillstand for the author(s)of the texts of LRQ and LRF, as well as, for instance,of Henry VIII. Theedition's abbreviations re used throughout his article.The Review of EnglishStudies, New Series, Vol. 50, No. 200 (1999) ( Oxford University Press 1999


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B. J. SOKOL AND MARY SOKOLconcludingon other bases that the play, composed in 1605-6, was 'revisedbyShakespearehimself,probably1609-10'.2Anotheroutcome of our investigation s a confirmationof the first numberedpoint in AnnabelPatterson'sanalysisof 'the hermeneuticsof censorship'.This isthat one must observe theimportance f an exactchronology n determiningwhatany given text was likelyto meanto its audience at the time of its appearance'.3However, we also find that one of Shakespeare'sacts of political tact or self-censorship, heonemotivating hecuttingof thetrial n KingLear, s not in accordwith the themes focused upon by many who have questioned whether adangerouslyradicaloutlookis reflected in the play.4A conclusionto be drawnis that lookingfor radicalism rom a modernperspectivemay not reveal all thepoliticallysensitive issues of the past.The following discussion of Shakespeareand equity will proceed from ahistorical overview to a considerationof errors concerning The MerchantofVenice,then to a closely focused review of Jacobeanevents, and finally toconclusionsaboutKingLear.

IIJillMartinopensherleading ext ModernEquityby commenting: Equity s a wordwithmany meanings'.5The need for sucha warningarisesbecause n current egalusage 'equity' is not synonymouswith 'justice in a broadsense', but means aparticular ystemof legal rules, procedures,and principles.6A widersense of the word'equity' ong in use, indicating usticeand fairness ngeneral, eads one to supposethat at some time its legal usagealso meantjustice.But there are difficultiesfor those who, lookingat early legal institutionsfor theorigins of the law of equity, try to equate ideas of justice and fairness withmedievalChancery udgments.It is said that 'fewbeginningsare aselusive as thatof the Chancellor's quitable urisdiction'.7Because recordswere not kept of the2 G. Taylor,'The DateandAuthorshipof the Folio Version', n G. Taylorand M. Warren edd.), TheDivisionof theKingdoms: hakespeare's wo Versionsf KingLear(Oxford,1986),351-468: 468.3 A. Patterson,CensorshipndInterpretation: he Conditionsf W/ritingndReadingn EarlyModernEngland Madison, Wis., 1984),47.4 Ibid.59 describesmodels of subversion n KingLeardrawn rommanyrecent moreor lessexplicitlyMarxist . . readings hattry to deal with the fact thatthis playaloneof the major ragedies s clearlyand profoundlyengagednot only with questionsof authority n the state but with socio-economicissues, feudalrightsand obligations,and somethingthat verges upon class analysis'.Such issues areexemplary ormanyviews of whatmighthave been seen to be tactlessor objectionable.NeitherGaryTaylor's extensive analysis, in 'Monopolies, Show Trial, Disaster, and Invasion:King Lear andCensorship', n TaylorandWarren edd.), TheDivisionof theKingdoms,5-119: 88-101, nor thoseofothers,find the trial scene 'subversive'.5 J. E. Martin,HanburyandMartin:ModernEquity London, 1997),3.6 For the classic technical definition see F. W. Maitland,Equity:A Course f LecturesCambridge,1936), 1.7 S. F. C. Milsom,HistoricalFoundationsfthe Common aw(London, 1981),82.J. B. Post, 'EquitableResortsBefore1450', n E. W. Ives and A. H. Manchesteredd.),Law, Litigants ndtheLegalProfession

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SHAKESPEAREAND ENGLISH EQUITYcourt'sproceedingsuntil the sixteenthcentury,a lackof historicalevidencehasobscureddetail andtempted manyto conjecture.Procedurally,he courtbeganasthe royal secretariat, the descendant of the Anglo-Saxon scriptorium.TheChancellor,as the king's minister, presided over the issue of royal writs andgrants. By the fourteenth century petitions were addressed directly to theChancellor. Medieval legal thinking appears not to have considered thatcommon law and equity were separatebodies of rules.sBy the sixteenthcenturythe most widelyacceptedtheorywasthat 'anygeneralrule must work njustice nparticularcases, and therefore that the applicationof positive law should besubjectto some dispensingpowerin the interestof higherjustice'.'The appeal oa higher justicefor such correctionwas of great antiquity;10he new element insixteenth-centuryEnglandwas that positive law could be embodiedin a whollyseparatesystem of substantivelaw. Thus, accordingto S. F. C. Milsom, theunique English innovation was the institution of a system of equity and ofcommonlaw as separatebodies of rules.11In practice, and indeed as reflected in contemporarydiscussions, the lateElizabethancourts of equity, and especially the most important-Chancery-did not freely apply'conscience' o correctdefectsof positivelaw,12 ndcertainlydid not offer free 'pardon' or crimes.'3Nor did they extendclemency,a function(London,1983),68-79: 78-9, finds medievalChancery's quitable urisdictionneithercivilian n basisnor particularly istinctive'in the legalcharacter f its judgments'.8 Milsom, HistoricalFoundations,3-4.9 Ibid. 88. This summarys borneout in many16th-cent.texts:see ChristopherSt German d. 1540],Doctorand Student(London, 1975), 96; William West, The Second Part of Symboleography . .Whereuntos annexedanotherTreatiseof Equitie(London, 1601), 174;John Cowell, TheInterpreter(Cambridge,1607),N2'-N3r; WilliamLambard,Archeion, r a Commentaryponthe High CourtsofJusticein England London, 1635), 46-7 (the spelling of the author'sname in the first edition isregularized lsewhere n this article as 'Lambarde').10 See Eth. Nic. 1137a-1138a, n Aristotle,The BasicWorksNew York, 1941), 1019-20.11 Milsom, HistoricalFoundations,8-91.12 The classic treatmentof an English jurisdictionof 'conscience' s found in the dialogueDoctorandStudentby ChristopherSt German.J. L. Barton's ntroduction o a modernedition,St German's octorandStudent,ed. J. L. Bartonand T. F. T. Plucknett(London, 1975),pp. xi-lxvii, makesabundantlyclearthatattemptsto equatea court of 'conscience'withcontemporaryEnglish equity led St Germannot only to write crucial ambiguities,but indeed to 'outright self-contradiction' pp. xxviii-xxix).Difficulties arise in a numberof ways, detailed on pp. xlvi-li, particularly n relation to equity'sjurisdictionover uses (trusts).Althoughit was typicalto referto English Chanceryas a 'Courtof Conscience',West, TheSecondPartof Symboleography,76,qualifies his, notingthatonly 'the commonpeopleterme the Chauncerythe Court of Conscience'. West offers an alternativedefinition: 'Equitie as some other say, is areasonablemeasure,containing n it selfe a fit proportionof rigor... a ruled kindof Justice'(p. 174).IHegives good illustrationof this by filling pp. 177-300 with patternsfor the specific formalitiesofpreordainedypes of Chanceryaction.13 Onlyin exercisingone of its manyadministrativeunctionsas a general ecretariato the Crowndidthe multifaceted Chancellor'sdepartmenthave to do with pardons.J. Bellamy, The TudorLaw of7TreasonLondon,1979),218-19, explains hat'special'pardons orparticular asesweregrantedby theCrown, while 'general' pardonsextending for some fixed period were also occasionallyoffered byproclamationor parliamentary cts. He adds that at the announcementof royal proclamationsofpardon,as in that followingthe Pilgrimageof Grace,the Chancellormightbe prominentamongtheassemblednobles(ibid. 223-4). Following generalpardonsbeneficiarieshad to register heir namesand

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B. J. SOKOL AND MARY SOKOLthat was seen as 'onelyproper o the Prince',14nor,despitesome contradictionsnthe work of sixteenth-centurytheorists, did they consider abstract'mercy'.15Narrowing the medieval Chancellors'theoretically,perhaps mythically,broadremit, these courts had developed only in certaindistinct areasof legal concern.Althoughthere were some developmentsexpanding he scope of injunctions orequitablerelief in Shakespeare'sra,16he courtsoperatedmainly n civilmatters17involvingreal property(land) and the uses (trusts)under which this was oftenheld.

Inconsistent theoretical and pragmaticperspectives typical of a period oftransformationeature n a discussion of equityin WilliamLambarde'sArcheion.This importantandcomplexlytransmittedwork wasmostlywrittenby 1591,andrevisedby 1598,butit wasunpublisheduntilit appearedn twodissimilar ersionsin 1635.18 t holds first that the common law part of the Chancellors' doubleobtain sealed documents fromChancery or a smallfee, or sometimesfreely. Some appliedfor suchdocumentsas a protection rombeingcharged n the future,but generalpardonsregistered n advanceof chargeswere not automatically cceptedby courts.14 West, TheSecondPartof Symboleography,75. WilliamLambarde tressed hesamepointin one ofhis 'Charges o theJurors'quoted n W. Dunkel,'LawandEquity n MeasureforMeasure', hakespeareQuarterly, 3 (1962),275-85: 276.15 St German, Doctor and Student,95-9, first states that 'Equytye', which 'considerythall thepertyculercyrcunstauncesof the dede', 'alsois temperydwith the sweetnessof mercye'.He goes on,however, to equate this equity with 'epicaia',which is Aristotle's doctrine that generallaws mustsometimesbe interpretednot literally,but in terms of theirunderlying ntent as it applies n particularcircumstances:equytierather olloweththe intent of the law then thewordesof the law'. The examplegiven has nothing to do with clemency;the confusion of 'sweetness of mercie' with the supposedlimitlessflexibilityof equity is endemicin similararguments,as in an 'as some othersay' alternativedefinitiongiven in West, The SecondPartof Symboleography,74.Excessive 'mercy' was indeed a political problem.It was difficult to get Elizabethan uries (andindeed constableslike Dogbery and Verges) to act againstroguish offences towards which localcommunities were more tolerantthan was centralauthority;see K. Wrightson,'Two ConceptsofOrder:Justices, Constables and Jurymen in Seventeenth-CenturyEngland', in J. Brewer and J.Styles (edd.), An Ungovernable eople:The Englishand their Law in the Seventeenth nd EighteenthCenturiesLondon, 1983), 21-46, esp. 24, and J. Kent, 'Attitudes of Members of the House ofCommons to Regulation of Personal Conduct', Universityof LondonBulletinof the InstituteofHistoricalResearch, 46 (1973),41-71. Such derelictionon the partof localquarter essionsjuriesthatwould not bring presentmentswasrepeatedlyrailedagainst,with threats, n the series of Lambarde'sinstructionsto juries, printed in C. Read, WilliamLambarde nd Local GovernmentIthaca,NY,1962). Another of Lambarde's Chargesto the Jurors', quoted in Dunkel, 'Law and Equity inMeasure or Measure', 276, admonishesthem against 'a feygned Equitie', complainingthat they'thearbyacquitemost guiltieoffendors'and also 'arrogateunto theimselves,bothe the Office of theChauncelor,and the prerogativeof her Maejestieto whome only it belongethto grauntpardontoMalefactors'.16 A 16th-cent.growthof equitable elief from harshconditionalbonds is discussedbelow. There wasalso a laterdevelopmentof an 'equityof redemption' or mortgages.17 Yet, according o the introductory ssayof D. E. C. Yale, LordNottingham'sManualof ChanceryPractice'and 'Prolegomenaf Chancery nd Equity' Cambridge,1965), 16-17, the Chancellor's ourtpunishedcriminalperjury,and 'In Equityall processwas foundedin principleuponthe defendant'scontempt. . . often on the footingof criminalcontempt'(ibid. 39).18 We cite BL 507.a.33,the corrected T' edition, which is signed 'T. L' on A6'. On the complexmanuscriptand publicationhistoryof this work see C. H. Mcllwain and P. L. Ward, Lambarde'sArcheion (Cambridge,Mass., 1957), 145-76. On its fate due to relationsbetweenRobert Cecil andLambarde,who was Egerton'sclose associate,see W. Dunkel, WilliamLambard, Elizabethanurist(New Brunswick,NJ, 1965),esp. pp. 5 and 162.

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SHAKESPEAREAND ENGLISH EQUITYJurisdiction's 'limittedin power',but that the otherpart,concerning Equitie',sby contrast 'meere absolute, and infinite'."9Yet Archeion ater wonders in apractical-mindedway'whether t be meet, that the Chancellorhouldappointuntohimselfe,andpublishto othersanycertaineRules&Limitsof Equity,or no'.20Theinternalcontradictionheresuggeststhe inchoatebeginningof the development nthe understanding f equityjurisdictioneadingtowardSir FrancisMoore's cleardescription 1621),21 nd then LordNottingham'sexact delineations c.1673)of itsscope.22This progressionoccurred hroughan evolution of the guiding'maxims',procedures,and notablerulingsthatshapedanddefined its principles, imits,andtypes of concern.

IIITwo mid-1960s publicationsare the usuallycited first sources for a continuingstreamof criticalessayscontainingrepetitionsof or variantson the theme of 'lawversus equity' in The Merchantof Venice.The more substantialof these two, abook-lengthdiscussionof a partialscene of TheMerchant f Venice,has in fact averycurioushistory.This book,MarkEdwinAndrews'sLaw Versus quity n 'TheMerchantof Venice',23was actuallywritten thirty yearsbefore its publication n1965.It wasoriginallya collegeessay by an ablelawstudent,who later becameanassistantsecretaryof the Americannavy.It seems the essaywas foundin a dustylibrarybox at Andrews'sold college.A letterreprinted n the book(dated23 April1964-Shakespeare's nominal400thbirthday), hows that Andrewswas tracedbythe Universityof Coloradoibrarian, nd asked orpermission o publishhis essay.The work was lavishlybroughtout by the UniversityPress the followingyear.This often referencedbut actuallyquiterarebookbeginswith a highlyfancifulrevampingof the trial scene in TheMerchantof Venice. n an expandedcolumn,parallelwith Shakespeare'sext, Andrewsupdatesthe languageand rewritestheactionsof the trial,with first Cokeand then Ellesmeresitting, and with FrancisBaconcast as Bellario.This redrafted ext is keyedby superscriptednumbers ntoa numbered eriesof discussionson pointsof law andhistorywhich constitutetherest of the book. It is very important o note, but rarelynoted, that Andrewsisquite free both with chronology and with the play's structure.He ranges inhistoricalreferencefrom centuriesbefore to twenty yearsand more beyond the19 Lambard,Archeion, 8. 'Meere'meant'pure'or 'sole' in legalcontexts(OED'mere'a22), and alsohad the meaningas a qualifier exactlycontrary o today's meaning)of 'in the full senseof the term'(OED4). The 'absolute'aspectof the Chancellor'spowers, n which he is 'not limitedby the powerofthe writtenlaw',is alsostressed n Cowell, TheInterpreter, 2r;see below on how Cowell'sdictionarycauseda scandalby its definitionsof prerogative s absolute.20 Lambard,Archeion,74; pp. 74-7 offer interestingsuggestionsfor equity reform,on which seeMcllwainand Ward,Lambarde'srcheion,158-9.21 In a letter of adviceto BishopJohnWilliams, he onlychurchman o be appointedChancellor fterWolsey,modernized n Yale,LordNottingham'sManual',78-80.22 In the two treatisesedited ibid.23 Boulder, Colo., 1965.

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B. J. SOKOL AND MARY SOKOLtime of the play'swriting,withanevident aim of showingoff awideknowledgeoflegal history. He divides Shakespeare'sdepictionof the trial of Shylock versusAntonio into two separatehearings, with litigants rushing from one end ofWestminsterHall to the other to get a Chancery njunctionin equity followinga decisionat common aw. Thus a sectionof TheMerchant f Venice . 1becomestwo separatescenes, with separate judges in separatetribunals. Those judges'identities are associatedwith actual historical figures whose conflicts reachedcrisis-pointtwo decadesafter the playwas written.In the yearbeforeAndrews'sbookappeared,an essay by MaxineMacKayalsoasserted hat a historical onflictof Englishcommon aw withequity nformedTheMerchant f Venice.Howeverthe mainpointof MacKay'sclaim was to assert hatequity in the play was equivalentto mercy, and thereforeto the New Law ofChristianity,as opposedto Shylock'srigidand unmercifulOldLaw of Judaism.24This position has been surprisinglyoften echoed concerning TheMerchantofVenice,25but the attribution o Shakespeare f a calumny hat the laws of Judaismeschew mercyhas been well remediedby severalcriticsrecently.26Detailed correctionsto historical errors in this pioneeringarticle27 eem tohave little effect on continued claims that historical conflicts between theEnglish common law and the equity jurisdiction are represented in TheMerchantof Venice.An allied notion also persists that equity doctrines areapplied by Portia in the play's trial scene, despite contrarywarningsof manywriters, including Sir Frederick Pollock in 1914,28F. Lyman Windolph in24 M. MacKay, TheMerchant f Venice:A Reflectionof theEarlyConflictbetweenCourtsof LawandCourtsof Equity', Shakespeare uarterly,15(1964), 371-5: 372, 375.25 On the play's supposedcondemnation f Shylock's old law'and praiseof 'Christiancivilisation',seeJ. S. Colley, 'Launcelot,Jacoband Esau:Old andNew Law in TheMerchant f Venice',Yearbookof EnglishStudies,10 (1980), 181-9: 189; for a laudingof the 'more civilised characters'and thesalvation of the 'Christiancommunity'from 'their own Shylockeantendencies'see M. J. Hamill,'Poetry,Law and the Pursuit of Perfection:Portia'sRole in The Merchant f Venice',SEL: Studies nEnglishLiterature,1500-1900, 18 (1978), 229-43: 232 and 241. More or less similarpolaritiesareadduced n e.g. J. S. Coolidge,'Law and Love in TheMerchant f Venice', hakespeare uarterly, 7(1976), 243-63; R. M. Levitsky, 'Shylockas UnregenerateMan', ShakespeareQuarterly,28 (1977),58-64; L. E. Johnson, 'Shylock'sDaniel:"Justicemore than thou desir'st"',CLAJournal,35(1991),353-66.26 See R. Weisberg,Poethics ndOtherStrategies fLawandLiteratureNewYork,1992),93-104;J. L.Halio, 'Portia:Shakespeare'sMatlock?',Cardozo tudies n Law andLiterature, (1993), 57-64: 60 and62;J. 0. Holmer,TheMerchant f Venice:Choice,Hazard,andConsequenceHoundsmill,1995),232-3;M. D. Yaffe, Shylockand theJewish Question London, 1997),passim.Similarpoints were made inC. Slights's studyofJessica,'InDefenseofJessica:The RunawayDaughter n the Merchant f Venice',Shakespeare uarterly, 1(1980), 357-68: 359. M. A. Hamilton, The End of Law', Cardozo tudiesnLaw andLiterature, (1993), 125-36: 128 n. 12, explicitly agreeswith Halio, 'Portia:Shakespeare'sMatlock?',60, on the Old Testament enjoiningmercy, yet acknowledges p. 132), a view that acommitment o the old law is 'deadening'; he againqualifiesthis on p. 133.27 Errors n MacKay, TheMerchant f Venice',ncluding heequatingof equitywithmercyorpardon,a mistakennotion that EnglishChancellors n Shakespeare'sime were churchmen,and other legal-historical aults,are identified n E. F. J. Tucker,'The Letterof the Law in TheMerchant f Venice',Shakespearetudies,29 (1976),93-101.28 F. Pollock, A Note on Shylockv. Antonio',LawQuarterlyReview,30 (1914), 175-7: 175,in replyto J. Hirshfield, 'Portia'sJudgmentand GermanJurisprudence',Law QuarterlyReview,30 (1914),167-74, says, parenthetically,There is no questionof equityin any technicalsense'.

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SHAKESPEAREAND ENGLISH EQUITY1956,29one of ourselves in 1992,30Joan Ozark Holmer in 1995,31and R. S.White in 1996.32

For instance,a 1990 article asserts that 'the court that tries Shylock'scase isconvenedas a court of equityon the lines of Chancery,with its appellaterelationto commonlaw'.33The notion of an appellatecourtignoresthe drama'sessentialpremissthat Shylockbrings the case to enforcehis bond, not Antonio o obtainrelief fromit. The articlenext finds that the ruling favouringShylockcannotbeoverturned,statingthat the 'rule . . . Equity follows Law' meantthat Chancerycould only 'enforce' and not 'annul' 'the letterof the commonlaw'. But EnglishChanceryoften did overturnspecific forfeits of bonds. Forgettingits powersofsubpoena, njunction,andimprisonment orperjuryorcontempt,this thenallegesthat 'equityfails before the lawof property n TheMerchant f Venice, s it wouldbe bluntedby the English bourgeoisie'.34n fact,however,the burgeoningequityjurisdictionof Chancerywas the only prerogative urisdiction hat waspreservedin the (bourgeois?) evolutionsof the 1640s and 1688.So ingrainedaresimilarpremisses hat a 1994 articleon TheMerchant f Veniceaims to shed 'new light on the meaningof the trialscene's common law-versus-equity debate',never doubtingthat the scene containsthis debate. It too easilyconnects a 1615judicialdispute'to the 1596play,whileinterestinglyarguing hat'the broadersocial conflict behind the common-law/equity dispute is not theprimarilyeconomic battle between capitalismand feudalism,but the primarilypoliticalbattle betweentwo socioeconomicfactions for the spoils of the nascentcapitalisteconomy'.It concludesthat 'the ideologicalbattlefought in Shylockv.Antoniowould prove to be but an early skirmishbetween the rising and rulingclassesthat was to dominatethe next centuryof English politics'.35Liberal or Whiggish ideas of history have also become entangled withallegationsthat Shakespearewas deeply concerned with contrastingcommonlaw with equity, especially n regard o the legaldilemmas mplicitin Measure/orMeasure.For instance,a 1996 articlealleginga crucialrole for 'equity' n this playbeginsbluntly: legalhistoryoftenappears o be littlemore than a contest betweenlaw and equity'.36Without historical warrant, it then connects the equityjurisdictionwith socialprogresstowardsthe positivetolerationof privatesexual29 F. L. Windolph, Reflections f the Law in LiteraturePhiladelphia,Pa., 1956),55. A. T. Denning,Leaves rom My Library:An EnglishAnthology London, 1986), 30, makes a slightly ambiguousstatement hat Portiaappliesstrict constructionand'hasrejectedanypleaformercyorrelief in equity'.30 B. J. Sokol, 'The Merchantof Veniceand the LawMerchant',Renaissancetudies,6 (1992),60-7.31 Holmer, TheMerchant f Venice, 12-13, 327-9.32 R. S. White, NaturalLaw in EnglishRenaissance iteratureCambridge,1996), 164.33 R. Wilson, 'The Qualityof Mercy:Discipline and Punishment n Shakespeare',The SeventeenthCentury, (1990), 1-42: 15.34 Ibid. 16.35 S. A. Cohen, "'The qualityof mercy": Law, Equity, and Ideologyin TheMerchantof Venice',Mosaic,27 (1994),35-54: 37, 36, 39, 52.36 J. Levin, 'The Measureof Law andEquity:Tolerance n Shakespeare'sVienna', n B. L. Rockwood(ed.), Law and Literature erspectivesNew York, 1996), 193-207: 193.

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B. J. SOKOL AND MARY SOKOLacts. Commentaries nMeasureforMeasurewhichsupposethat'equity'comprises'everythingnice' missing from the harshness of positive law, such as sexualtolerationor the free pardoningof all crimes, ignorea centralassumption n theplay, that socialand moral chaos result from excessivejudicial eniency.37Confusions may partly arise because the term 'equity' can be employed inseveral nconsistent,or at best partlyoverlapping, enses.38We are not addressingthe argumentsof somewhodiscuss'equity' n relation o Shakespeare,ocusingonbroad philosophicalconcepts or intellectual movements distinct from the par-ticularmeaningof 'equity'in Elizabethan rJacobean egalpractice.For instanceLuke Wilson, perfectlyawareof the multiple meaningsof the term 'equity' inphilosophicaland jurisprudential raditions,39 hooses to discuss an aspect ofAristotle'sequitywhich involvesestimating he intentionsof lawgivers,andputsthis in analogy with interpretationsof the intentions of playwrights.Othersinterestinglydiscuss 'equity' in Shakespeare'sntellectualcontexts in relation toClassicalor humanistictraditionsinvolving truth-seeking through probability.Such discussionsneed not distortlegal history.40To determine whether Shakespearewas concerned about the operationorprinciplesof theEnglishequitycourtswillrequire hefine-grained nvestigation fhistoricalbackground, sattempted n our next section. Fornow, let us consider fShakespearever alluded o anyof thejurisdictionalelationsof the several orts oflawcourtsof his time. He avoidedsuch referenceswherethey mighthave availedhim well, in his frequentcontextsof jestingor facetiousnessaboutlegaljargonornicety. So, while the gravedigger's peech in Hamletburlesquesthe antics ofjudicial anguageconcerning elf-drowning n the caseof Halesv. Petet,andmanyotherShakespearian assagescontain rreverentallusions o legal terminologiesortechnicalities,there are no Shakespearian llusions, for instance, to the (droll)37 This pointis noted at the end of Dunkel,'Law andEquity nMeasureforMeasure',which, however,seems to equate Egerton's equity jurisdictionof Chancerywith the administrationof clemency(pp. 275-7). White, Natural Law in EnglishRenaissance iterature, 81-2, offers a cogent argumentagainst heories of 'mercy'as equity in the play.38 As was well known: 'To the courteousReader',P7r-A8r,the prefaceto Thomas Ashe, Epiekeia(London, 1609), cites a variety of descriptionsof equity, taken from Aristotle, Cicero, Aquinas,Plowden,Erasmus,St German,WilliamWest,and others. Severalalternativedefinitionsare exhibitedin West, TheSecondPart of Symboleography,74. See L. A. Knafla,Law and Politics inJacobeanEngland:The Tracts fLordChancellor llesmereCambridge,1977), 161-3, for a delineationof severaldefinitions.D. E. C. Yale's ntroduction o EdwardHake, Epiekeia:A DialogueonEquityn ThreeParts(London, 1953), pp. xiii-xxix, carefully analyses and critiques theoretical distinctions used indefinitions. This comments,for example,that Hake was unconcerned with the antithesisof rightsin remand inpersonam hichhas so unnecessarily exedlaterauthorson equity jurisprudence' p. xv),and in a note to this states: The wholecontroversy eallygoesto show thatjurisprudencemay analysethe law but only legal history explains t'.39 L. Wilson,'Hamlet:Equity,Intention,Performance', tudies n theLiterary magination,4 (1991),91-113: 96.40 J. Altman, The TudorPlay of Mind(Berkeley,Calif., 1978),esp. pp. 67, 169;this book (p. 390),suggests the sort of 'equity' it discusses is only 'virtually'a kind of law. L. Hutson, "'Our oldstorehouse":Plowden'sCommentariesnd PoliticalConsciousnessn Shakespeare',n P. DavidhaziandH. Klein (edd.),ShakespeareYearbook (Lewistown,NY, 1996), 249-73, and L. Hutson, The Usurer'sDaughter:Male Friendshipnd Fictionsof Womenn Sixteenth-Centuryngland London, 1994), allegemore directconnectionsof similarmatters with English legal history.

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SHAKESPEAREAND ENGLISH EQUITYcontemporaryictionalbills of latitat,by means of whichKing's Bench took oversome of theprofitable ivil law workof the Courtof CommonPleas.41t is not easyto know whetherShakespearekept off such territories,howeverripe for parody,becausehe wasleeryof strayingon to dangerousgroundsforhumour.But we aresure thatShakespeare'sexts makeno directreferences o earlymodernconflictsofEnglishjurisdictions.42An only nominalexception concerns a referenceto praemunire, prohibitedappeal from the king's court to anotherjurisdiction,in the play Henry VIII.Suffolksays to CardinalWolsey:

LordCardinal,he King'sfurtherpleasures-Becauseall thosethingsyouhave done of late,By your power egantinewithinthiskingdom,Fall into th' compassof a praemunire-That therefore ucha writ be suedagainstyou,To forfeitallyour goods, ands,tenements,Chattels,andwhatsoever,nd to beOut of the King'sprotection.This is my charge.

(AIT 3. 2. 338-43)In history,as in the play, these accusationsagainstWolsey did not involve anyconflict betweenEnglishjurisdictions,and even if Shakespearewrote these lineshe wasonly reflectingthe historicalrecord.43 hakespearen fact strictlyavoidedallusion to uses of praemuniren English jurisdictionaldisputes, as well as thejocularorfigurativeusesof'praemunire' hat featured n hisage,as seenin OED3.Anothergeneralpointis that,exceptin one possibleplaceto be discussed n thenext section, Shakespearenever made any reference to the English equityjurisdiction.He several times did refer to a generalconceptof 'equity',meaningby thisonlya kind of rightful awfulness asin OED1 and2, not 3, 4, or 5). This isspokenof in variousplayseitherasendangered r asresurgent, n suchphrasesas:'equity stirring' 1H4 2. 3. 8);44'equityexiled' (CYL 3. 1. 146);or 'downtroddenequity' UN 2. 1. 241).41 See Knafla,Law and Politics n JacobeanEngland,117. These bills are described n more detailbelow.42 Justpossiblysuch conflict s implied n thewrangling verthe useof Star Chamberor'riot' n WIV1. 1. 1-35. Such allegationswere often fictional means to extend jurisdiction: ee W. B. Willcox,'Lawyersand Litigants in Stuart England',CornellLaw Quarterly,24 (1939), 533-58: 536; T. G.Barnes, 'Star Chamberand the Sophisticationof the CriminalLaw', CriminalLaw Review(1977),316-26: 319.43 G. W. Keeton, Shakespeare'segalandPoliticalBackgroundLondon,1967),31, pointsout that thispassageusesthe verywordsof the Statuteof Praemunire16Rich.II, c.5.], but, of course,Shakespearewould find these wordsin anyaccountof the fall of Wolsey'.44 C. E. Phelps,FalstaffandEquity:4n InterpretationCambridge,Mass., 1901)holds that Falstaff'squip'noequitystirring' s an allusionto the 'warbetweenthe [common awandequity]courts'by wayof a topical gag' (repeatedon pp. 6, 26, 71, 87, 89). This is accompanied y repetitiveaccountsof manyelementsof the 'law versusequity in TheMerchantof Venice'myth, althoughthe book only brieflymentions the play (pp. 123-4). Phelps is not, of course,cognizantwith laterworkshowingreducedfriction between commonlaw and equity in the lateryearsof Elizabeth.In supportof his claims heallegesthe opposite(pp. 154-5).

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B. J. SOKOL AND MARY SOKOLSuchusessurelywere not impliedallusions o thecourtof Chanceryor to lesser

equity courts,or to the operationsof equitymaxims or procedures.However,inShakespeare's ime the opportunityfor equitablerelief from a conditionalbondlike Shylock'swascertainlyavailable rom suchcourts,and waswell knownto beso.45This mayraise a question: s therea discerniblereasonwhy no such relief isever thought of during its trial scene or elsewhere?Despite the huge attentiongivento Shylock'scase,themost famouseverof all fictional rials,no singlereasonfor this omission has been agreed.Somesuggestionsare basedon the fact that in 1597-9 Shakespeare'swnfamilyentered a Chancerysuit attemptingto regain propertythat they had lost in aforfeitedmortgage.46 his suit could have been foreseenat the time of the play'swriting,as it followed a seriesof King's Bench actionsstarting n 1588. Thus one1996 commentaryproposes that, in the palpableomission of equity from TheMerchant f Venice,Shakespeareis obliquelycommentingon the existingsystemof equityin Englandby implyingthat the problem of Shylock'sbond]could havebeen circumvented and more expeditiously solved without anxiety if equityexisted'.47This goes on to suggest unconvincinglythat 'Shakespeare's nbuiltflatteryof the English monarchicalsystem of equity, may well reveal ulteriormotive at a time when he was attemptingto pursue through Chancerya caseinvolvinghis own property nterest'.48

There are good reasons why the presumptions widespreadsince the 1960saboutequity and TheMerchantof Venicewere not the commoncurrencyof theprevious hundred years of subtle international awyer's wranglingsabout theplay.49To assertthese presumptionsone must overlook he facts thatPortiaasksShylockfor humanmercy,not the bench for the benefitof an equitableremedy,and moreover that Portia ripostes Shylock's refusal not with an equitableinjunction but with positive law, indeed statutory criminal law. One legallysophisticatedcommentatordid just this: in 1930the often facetious awprofessorGeorge Keeton wrote that, while 'commonlaw, in fact, can do nothingto help45 See E. G. Henderson, Relieffrom Bonds in English Chancery',AmericanJournalof LegalHistory,18 (1974), 298-306;J. H. Baker,An Introductiono EnglishLegalHistory London, 1990),370-1.46 e.g.W. N. Knight,'Equity,TheMerchant f Venice ndWilliamLambarde', hakespeareurvey,27(1974), 93-104: 98-103; A. Firenze, Love's Usury: Love and Greedin the Anti-SemiticWorldofShakespeare'sMerchant f VeniceNew York and London, 1989),pp. vii-viii. The documentsof thisdisputearepartlyreproducedn E. K. Chambers,WilliamShakespeare: Studyof FactsandProblems(Oxford, 1930),ii. 35-41, andtranslated n Phelps, FalstaffandEquity,157-70. It is allegedto haveinfluenced Measureor Measure n J. W. Dickinson, 'RenaissanceEquity in Measureor Measure',ShakespeareQuarterly,13 (1962), 287-97: 292, which also equatesSeneca'sclementia,which is 'notChristianmercy but merely a rationalmercy', with 'equity', wherebycourts may pardonoffenders(pp. 288-9).47 White, NaturalLaw in EnglishRenaissance iterature, 66.48 Ibid. 167.H. Berry,'Shylock,RobertMiles, and Events at the Theatre',Shakespeare uarterly, 4(1993), 183-201, suggeststhatShakespearemayhave knownabouta roughlycontemporaryChanceryaction overa bond involvingsome theatreproprietors,but it is not made clearhow this lawsuitcouldhave inspiredthe trialin TheMerchant f iVenice, here no equitablerelief is sought.49 These debates are summarized n 0. H. Phillips, Shakespearend the Lawyers London, 1972),91-118.

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SHAKESPEAREAND ENGLISH EQUITYAntonio . . . Portia, however, is so "learned n the law" that she practisestheChanceryside as well'. Keeton, himself an equity expert, was well awarethat'Equity is not mercy',50and so betters later commentarieswhich find equitysimply equivalentto 'the qualityof mercy' famouslydescribedin the play. (Infact the word 'mercy'appears n every Shakespeareplay exceptJulius Caesar.)We think that what misled Keeton is also what has misled many expert legalcommentatorson Shakespeare.This is the allure of specialist technicality-spotting in prestigious literary texts, a temptation that has led to some oddtextualand contextualdistortions.51

A position holding that, on the contrary, Shakespearewas not primarilyconcerned with legal accuracy, was taken in 1988 by Richard Posner, whosuggested that in the trial in The Merchantof Venice, the absence of explicitreferenceto equity jurisprudenceor to any other basis for the ameliorationofpenaltiesor forfeitures n contractsis unrealistic,but a literary mperative; heaudiencemust takeseriously hatAntoniowillbe killed'.52Thus Posner holds thata notion of equityor relief from bonds is implicitly resent n the play,but keptatbay for dramaturgic easons. Posner'smixed positionis partlylauded and partlydamnedby RichardWeisberg,53whoseownposition s thata deliberateoverthrowof 'equity'by 'law',or of 'mediation'by strict'commitment', s the hiddencentralmotiveof the play's plot. Posner andWeisbergagreethat an unpopularalienlikeShylock 'would mistrusta jurisprudence hat gave judgesa broaddiscretiontomitigatethe rigorsof legalrules,for he couldexpectanydiscretion o be exercisedagainst him'.54Howeverinteresting, hese reflectionsdo not address he scandalof the trialinTheMerchant f Venice.This is identifiedby MoelwynMerchantas its 'offensivestructure' n which 'a civil action ... modulatesto an equity action basedon anappealto misericordia,and this in turn changestragically o a criminalaction forconspiracy'.55The most usual excuse for anomalies such as these is that50 G. W. Keeton, Shakespearend hisLegalProblemsLondon, 1930), 18, 19.51 e.g. a 1924 discussionby an American awyerwho, in the dry summationof Phillips,Shakespeareand the Lawyers,109, held: 'The action of the play must be after AD 311 when ConstantinemadeChristianityan officialreligion,and beforeAD 320 when the right to seize the body of an insolventdebtorwas abolished.The scene is laid,not in Venice,but in the Stateof the Veneti (Aquileia)whereRoman awapplied n the fourthcentury.The Duke is not the Doge but the Dux or militarygovernoractingundera"charter" f authority,and Portia s an arbiter.TheMerchant f Venice, hen, is one of the"Roman"plays.'Suchtechnical ngenuitydependson pushingasideall that will not fit, overwhelminghow, crucially, he Rialto, ducats,Mexico, etc., signalRenaissanceworld trade.52 R. A. Posner,Law and Literature: MisunderstoodelationCambridge,Mass.,andLondon,1988),94. It is hardto agree hatShakespearewasdisabled romexpressinga theme of equityin TheMerchantof Venicebecause of the demandsof plot. For, when he chose to touch on contentiousmatters,hecharacteristicallymadegood use of apparentartistic constraints o cover his tracks.53 Weisberg,Poethics nd OtherStrategies, 07-10.54 Posner,Law andLiterature,7, which s discussed n Weisberg,Poethics ndOtherStrategies, 10.Asimilarview is takenby Weisberg, bid. 94-104, esp. p. 103.55 W. M. Merchant, Lawyerand Actor:Processof Law in ElizabethanDrama',English tudiesToday,3 (1964), 107-24: 123. The scandal is further articulated n T. Ziolkowski,TheMirrorof Justice(Princeton,NJ, 1997), 175-82, within a chapter (pp. 163-83) which adducesthe familiar aw versus

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B. J. SOKOL AND MARY SOKOLShakespearewas unconcernedwith realcourts,or the realworld,and caredonlyfora magical heatrical ffect.'6A few alternativeshave beensuggested, ncludingsomewherejurisdictionsknownto Elizabethans ave beenproposedasmodelsforthe Shakespearianrial. These include Star Chamber,"Staplecourts,'5possiblythe civilianAdmiralty urisdiction,' andthe proposal hatShakespearemayhavehadin mind the Law Merchant ribunals hatwere still activealthough n declinein his time.6"European nternationalLaw Merchanthad Italianorigins, and itrendered-as in the play-swift and summary judgments over commercialdisputes. In Englandit also combined a civil and criminaljurisdiction,as seenin Ben Jonson's play Bartholomew air. It was often presidedover by mayors,hardly he dogeof Venice-but thenShakespeare's layrefers o thatgreatstate ashaving an endangered charterand . . . city's freedom'(4. 1. 38). By the earlyseventeenthcenturyCoke thought, perhaps propagandized,hat Law Merchanthadbeen absorbed nto commonlaw,61while Ellesmereexcluded merchantcasesfrom Chanceryexcept those involving fraud.62 f there is some validity in ourhypothesisthat Shakespeare's pectatorsmay have rememberedLaw Merchantandits urbantribunalswhenthey sawShylock's awcase, thenequityhas no partin the trial.

IVTo appreciatethe quite different circumstancesconcerning jurisdictionssur-roundingTheMerchant f Venice f approximately1596,the quartoKingLear of1604-6, and the revisions to the folio King Lear of a later date, we must lookvery closelyat the sequenceof emergent deasand events leadingto the crisis of1616.

In 1616 the conflict between Sir EdwardCoke,ChiefJusticeof King's Bench,and the Lord Chancellor,Thomas Egerton, Lord Ellesmere, finally becameintolerable o the king, and Coke was dismissed from office.'3 The story is wellequitytheme in TheMerchant f Veniceindeedrelyingon Andrews),butunusuallyconcludes hat theplay portrays an irresponsible quity'.56 For instances panningourcenturyseePollock, A Note on Shylockv. Antonio',andW. C.Jordan,'Approachesto the Court Scene in the Bond Story: Equity and Mercy or Reason and Nature',Shakespeare uarterly, 3 (1982),49-59: 58.57 In a half-hearted uggestion n a note in Pollock,'A Note on Shylockv. Antonio',176.58 H. Saunders, StapleCourtsin TheMerchant f Venice',Notes andQueries, 1 (1984), 190-1.59 Andrews,LawversusEquity n 'TheMerchant f Venice', 9, mentionsthis jurisdiction. n the 16thcent. it had particularauthority n cases whereforeigntrade was involved,but was also increasinglyadjudicatingdomestic cases.60 Sokol, 'The Merchantof Venice and the Law Merchant'.This takesaccountof the fact thatthesetribunals n declinemaynot ever have beenveryactive.61 See T. F. T. Plucknett,A ConciseHistoryof theConmmonaw (Boston, Mass., 1956),663.62 See Yale, LordNottingham'sManual',13.63 Coke had beenappointedas ChiefJusticeof CommonPleas n 1606and thenKing'sBenchin 1613,

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SHAKESPEAREAND ENGLISH EQUITYdocumented, the sequence being Coke's insistence on the supremacyof thecommonlaw, Ellesmere's ntransigence,James'swrath,and the machinationsofSir Francis Bacon. The immediatecause of Coke's dismissal in 1616 was hisencouragementof proceedings in praemunireagainst Chancery officials andlitigants,64 ndhis lone refusalamongthe twelve commonlaw judgesof Englandat the famous meeting of 1616 to agree to James's demand that they stayproceedingsto consult with him in a case where his interest was concerned.65The story has been presented variouslyas Coke's stand against the politicalabsolutismof King James;a jurisdictional trugglefor precedencebetween thecommon law courts and prerogativecourts;and the unhappyresult of personalanimositybetween Coke and Ellesmere.66The crisis of 1616was not asudden occurrence.The clashbetweenthe commonlaw courts and the prerogativecourts was anticipated n medievalEngland, indisputes concerning he relationshipbetweenthe king'scourts and the ecclesias-tical courts. The boundaries f the jurisdictionbetweenthe ecclesiastical ndroyalcourtsweresupposedto have been settled by the earlyfourteenthcentury,67 utthe royalcourts issued writs of praemunire,68 irst to preventsuits being taken toRome, then to prevent papal legates asserting heirauthority n England.Finallythe royal courts issued writs of prohibition to intervene in litigation inecclesiasticalcourts within England, for example assertingthe common law'sright to hear casesof realproperty.As we havenoted, in 1529 CardinalWolsey, Lord Chancellor rom 1515, wasindicted forpraemunire. eforehis fallWolseyhad been much dislikedbycommonlawyersfor his apparentdisregard or the common law and his interferencewithwhichwasregarded s an elevation:he was therefore he leadingcommon awjudge.He was a memberof parliamentn 1589,Speakerof the House in 1593,and was returned n 1621,1624, 1626,and 1628.Ellesmerehad beenappointedMasterof the Rolls in 1594and then LordKeeperby Elizabeth n 1596,holdingboth offices untilthe nextreign.So he presidedoverthe courtof Chanceryand held the GreatSeal.In 1603Jamesappointedhim LordChancellor ndhe held this office,evenin failinghealth,untilhis deathin 1617.64 Glanville'sCaseCro.Jac. 344. For Ellesmere'sviews and three remarkableettersof commentbyFrancisBaconsee S. E. Thorne, 'Praemunire nd Sir EdwardCoke',HuntingtonLibraryQuarterly,(1938), 85-7, and FrancisBacon, WorksLondon, 1872- ), xii. 246-54, respectively.See also H. J.Berman, The Originsof HistoricalJurisprudence:Coke, Selden,Hale', Yale LawReview,103(1994),1651-738: 1685, and J. H. Baker,'The CommonLawyersand the Chancery:1616', IrishJurist, 4(1969), 368-92: 374.65 Caseof the Coinmendams. olt and Gloverv. Bishopof CoventryMoore 898; 1 Rolle 451. SeeW. Holdsworth, 4 Historyof EnglishLaw (London, 1903- ), v. 438-40; Baker,An IntroductionoEnglishLegal History,122-6; Berman, The Originsof HistoricalJurisprudence', 675.66 See G. W. Thomas,'James , Equityand LordKeeperJohnWilliams',EnglishHistoricalReview,91(1976), 506-28: 508; Baker, The CommonLawyersandthe Chancery',369;J. P. Dawson,'Coke andEllesmereDisinterred:The Attackon the Chancery n 1616',IllinoisLawReview,36 (1941), 127-52:128; Yale,LordNottingham'sManual',12. When FrancisBacon becameChancellorhe claimed: nowthe men aregone the matter s gone' (Works, i. 198).67 By Circumspectegatis 1285 and Articuli Cleri 1315. See Baker, 4n Introductiono EnglishLegalHistory, 149;Dawson, 'Coke and EllesmereDisinterred',128.68 Using the Statutes of Provisorsof 1351and 1353,andthe Statute of Winchesterof 1393by whichconfiscationof property ollowed a praemunirection.

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B. J. SOKOL AND MARY SOKOLits courts.69Wolsey was succeeded as Lord Chancellor by Sir Thomas More, whois said to have tried to resolve the jurisdictional disputes by asking all the commonlaw judges to dine with him and telling them that if they would 'mitigate andreform the rigour of the law' he would desist from interfering with judgments atcommon law. His request was refused.70There is an appearance of continuity between these events and the Jacobeanconflicts, but such a reading is too superficial. W. J. Jones and others argue thatthe Elizabethan, and therefore Jacobean, court of Chancery should really beconsidered a different institution from that of Henry VIII because of legal andprocedural developments.7' Moreover, several complex new developments pre-cipitated the Jacobean jurisdictional crisis, including 'the rise in prominence ofnew courts of law' and 'the impact of new social and economic demands'.72Sixteenth-century England saw great growth in volume of litigation reflecting theexpansion of population, trade, and commerce.73 Inflation and the 40-shilling limiton cases in the local county courts meant that the royal courts were thebeneficiaries of this increased litigation. The various royal courts, particularlyKing's Bench, Chancery, and newer prerogative courts such as Admiralty,expanded their jurisdictions beyond former boundaries.'4 King's Bench heardcases formerly the preserve of Common Pleas, such as debt and detinue, makinguse of an old rule which allowed complaints by bill to be brought against King'sBench prisoners. Another effective device used by King's Bench was allowinglitigants to sue by bill on the legal fiction of a trespass in Middlesex, extended by abill of latitat ('he lurks') to cover the whole country. An immense increase in theuse of bills of Middlesex and bills of latitat took place in the early seventeenthcentury.7Meanwhile Thomas Egerton, aided by William Lambarde, and following in thefootsteps of an earlier Lord Keeper of the Great Seal (1558-79), Sir NicholasBacon, father of Francis Bacon, initiated a series of important procedural reformsin Chancery. These regulated fees charged by Chancery officials and worked to

69 Baker,An IntroductionoEnglishLegalHistory,123; d., TheReports fSirJohnSpellmanLondon,1978),77.70 Baker,An Introductiono EnglishLegalHistory,124. See also Yale, LordNottingham'sManual',10-11; Baker,TheReports f Sir JohnSpellman,41.71 W.J. Jones, TheElizabethanCourt f ChanceryOxford, 1967),467. More recentresearchndicatinga latedatefor the developmentof the equitable urisdictionof Chancerys verywell reviewed nJ. A.Guy, 'The Developmentof Equitable urisdictions,1450-1550',in Ives andManchester edd.), Law,Litigantsand theLegalProfession,0-6.72 Knafla,Lawand Politics nJacobeanEngland,105-6.73 See Willcox, 'Lawyersand Litigantsin StuartEngland';P. Clarkand P. Slack,EnglishTownsnTransition1500-1700 (Oxford, 1976), 83; J. H. Baker, 'Law and Legal Institutions', in J. F.Andrews(ed.), WilliamShakespeare:His World,his Work,his Influence New York, 1985), 41-54:41; W. R. Prest, TheRise of the Barristers:A Social History of the EnglishBar 1590-1640 (Oxford,1986), 5-6.74 Baker,TheReports f SirJohnSpellman,51-83.75 Baker,An Introductiono EnglishLegal History,51.

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SHAKESPEAREAND ENGLISH EQUITYend administrativencompetenceand unnecessaryitigation.76 gertonalso maderules to regulateChanceryjurisdiction,for exampleas we have noted refusingaccessto the court to merchantsexcept in casesof fraud.Initiallythese reforms,togetherwith the consequences ollowingthe decisionin Finchv. Throgmortonn1598,7 had the effect of reducing Chancerybusiness. But within a few yearsChancerybusiness began to grow more rapidlythan ever before, and Egertonresumed his use of the common injunction to interfere with common law courts.78The common law courts of King's Bench and Common Pleas viewedencroachments and interference by the newer prerogative courts with suspicion.To curb interference they used writs of supersedeas (to stay proceedings),certiorari (to remove the records of an inferior court to a higher court) andprohibition (to forbid an inferior court from proceeding) against the courts ofAdmiralty, Requests, and the High Commission.7' Despite this activity, D. E. C.Yale claims that towards the end of Elizabeth's reign relations between thediffering jurisdictions improved.8" W. J. Jones emphasizes Elizabethan practicesallowing co-operation between Chancery and other jurisdictions; such dealings,intended to promote justice, were sometimes based on informal arrangementsand sometimes on the appointment by Chancery of commissioners drawn fromother jurisdictions,81 and these were 'indicative of a sense of cohesion injudicature'.82 Thus common law judges often sat in Chancery and cases whichraised important issues could be referred to all the judges of England sittingtogether to hear argument.

However, relations entered a new and discordant phase following the coronationof James and then the appointment of Coke as Chief Justice of Common Pleas in1606. Ellesmere angered common lawyers by resuming his use of the commoninjunction and he began again to examine parties after common law judgments.83Tracts criticizing or defending Ellesmere's actions began to circulate in manu-script, indicating that 'the relations between courts of equity and common law hadnow entered the arena of public debate'.84

At first Coke turned his attention to the ecclesiastical courts and newerprerogative courts, and then finally against the court of Chancery. In particular,76 SeeJones, TheElizabethanCourtof Chancery,8-87; Knafla,Law and Politics nJacobeanEngland,156-7.77 The issue in Finch v. Throgmorton,ited Cro.Jac. 344, was whetherthe Chancellor ouldprovideequitablerelief to partieswho hadjudgmentat common aw.The casewas consideredbyall the judges,fromcommon aw andequitable urisdictions,who held that casesdecided at common aw couldnot bereopened.See Knafla,Law and Politics nJacobeanEngland,159.78 Ibid. 163n. 4.79 Dawson, 'Coke and EllesmereDisinterred',128-9.80 Yale,LordNottingham'sManual',11.81 Jones, TheElizabethanCourtof Chancery, 81-4 andpassim.82 Ibid. 278.83 Knafla,Law and Politics nJacobeanEngland,163.84 Ibid. 160.

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B. J. SOKOL AND MARY SOKOLhe challenged he jurisdictions f the ecclesiastical ourts85ndthe equitycourt ofRequests.86He alsoquestioned he use of ex officiooathsby the High Commissionwhich compelled people to incriminate hemselves,87 nd attacked he provincialequitycourts of the northandthe Welsh Marcheswith writs of habeas orpus ndprohibition.88 ventuallyCokedirectlyaddressed he long-standingdisputeabouttherightof Chancery o reopenjudgmentsat common aw,relyingon the statute4Hen. IV, c.23 (1403) that judgments n the king'scourts wereto be left in peaceunlessreversedby attaintor writ of error,or on thepraemuniretatutes.89King'sBench issuedwrits of prohibitionand habeas orpus gainst he court of Chancery,and finally considered praemunirein Glanville's Case in 1616.9"It is significantthat Coke's actions took place in the new reign. Althoughtensions between the use of the royalprerogativeandparliamentwerepresentinElizabeth's eign, theydid not become so openlya matterof publicconflict.Jamesarrived in England with firmly held opinions on the respective roles of themonarchyand the law. Scotlandtraditionallyhad closer ties with France thanEngland.Jamesderivedmanyof his ideas from the Frenchsixteenth-century egalphilosopherJean Bodin, who believed that just as God ruled the universe, soshould a king rule as an absolute monarch on earth. Parliamentwas probablysurprised n 1603whenJamestold it that he was 'the Husbandand the whole Isleis my lawfulWife;I am the Head,andit is my Body'.91AlthoughJamesprofessedto love the common aw,92 e did not hesitate o pointoutwhathe considered o beits faults:that it was unwrittenand uncertain.93 his was atvariancewith Coke'sbelief that the historical haracter f the common awgaveit stabilityandpoliticaland moralauthority.94 et it has beensuggested hatit was Coke'sand notJames's85 e.g. nFullers ase1607)12CokeRep.41.SeeDawson,Coke ndEllesmere isinterred',29,onhow n thiscase occasion as eized o claim hebroadestowerncommonawcourtso define helimitsof the ecclesiasticalurisdiction'.86 e.g.inPenson. Cartwright,ro.Jac.345(1614).87 e.g.inProhibitionselRoyof 1608,12CokeRep.63.88 Seetheadvisorypinionn 12CokeRep.50. Fora discussionf theseevents eeDawson,CokeandEllesmere isinterred',29-30.89 SeeHeath . Ridley1614) Bulstrode94,Cro.Jac.335,whereCokeatKing'sBench efused oobeya Chancerynjunction,ndWright'sase1614)MooreKB836,1 RolleRep.71,whereCokeconsideredrohibitionsgainst hancery.oke's ctionsn theEarlof Oxford'sase1615)1Rep.Ch.1incurredheparticularnmity f FrancisBacon ndEllesmere.90 Cro. ac.344 1614).SeeDawson,Coke ndEllesmere isinterred',37;Knafla, awandPoliticsinJacobeanngland,70.Fora fulldiscussionfCoke'snterventionsgainsterceivedncroachmentsof equityagainsthe commonaw see C. Gray, TheBoundariesf Equitable unction',AmericanJournal f LegalHistory,0(1976),192-226.91 C. H. Mcllwain,ThePoliticalWorksfJames (Cambridge, ass.,1918),p. xxxv.92 InBasilikonoron,nMcllwain,ThePoliticalWorksfJames, 39,James dvised isson o 'Nextethe Scriptures,tudiewellyourowneLawes'. n his 1607speech o parliamentibid.292),heannouncedhat thegroundsf theCommon awofEngland,re he bestofanyLaw n theworld,eitherCiuilorMunicipall,nd ittest orthispeople'.93 SeeJames's 607and1609 peechesoparliamentibid.293and306-13).94 See Coke'sA Reading n 27 EdwardheFirst . .', consistingf twenty-sevenReading[s]n

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SHAKESPEAREAND ENGLISH EQUITYviews which representeda remarkablehange n attitudesto law andhistory,andthat we owe to Coke the theory later to become known as historicaljurispru-dence.95n the sixteenthcentury awyersdid not have sucha theoryof the originsof the English common law, although the humanist influence behind theElizabethanSociety of Antiquarieshad led to a renewed interest in early YearBooks and a greater enseof historicalrelativity.96t is evident that bothJamesandCoke held firm opinionsand neither was to be easilyaccommodated.The strugglebetweenCoke andJameshas been representedas a paradigmofthe conflict which was to lead to civil war.97Certainlythere were importantconstitutionalquestions behind the jurisdictionaldisputes. Debates on mixedmonarchy,divineright,androyalprerogativewere linkedwithconflicting heorieson the nature, sources, and role of law.98These debates were played out indisputesbetween the courts.Rumours arose that James admiredthe Roman derived civilianor civil law,although in his 1609 speech to parliamenthe strenuouslydenied any wish tointroduceit to England.At the very same time he suggestedsome civilian-likereforms.There wasa limitedEnglishcivilian urisdiction.Civilian awyers tudiedat OxfordandCambridge,were membersof Doctors'Commons,andpractised ntheprerogative recclesiastical ourts.Manyof them subscribed o Bodin'stheoryof absolute monarchy, as did Francis Bacon, the Attorney-General.Theysupported systematizationof the law, and looked down on the common lawbecause of its inconsistenciesand use of legal fictions.99 ames's 1609 speechsuggestedthreereformsto the common law:an end to the use of Latin and LawFrench whichwas understoodonly by lawyers; hat the law shouldbe settled andwritten;andlastlythereview of statute aw and its reconciliationwithcase law. Tohis hearers,many of them common lawyers, this suggested support for whatBenthamwas to call the codificationof the commonlaw, an ideanot welcome tomost of them.100

Relations worsened in 1607 in the aftermathof the publicationof Dr JohnFines', in EdwardCoke,'AReadingon 27 Edward he First[or27]Reading[s]on Fines', in ThreeLawTractsLondon,1764),211-78:222-6, and also the prefaces o Coke's hird,sixth,andeighthreports nEdwardCoke, TheReportsLondon,1826):vol. ii, pp. iii-xxiii (esp. pp. xi ff.);vol. iii, pp. iii-xix (esp.pp. vi ff.); vol. iii, pp. iii-xiii (esp. pp. xvi ff.).95 See K. Sharpeand C. Brooks, 'History, English Law and the Renaissance',Past & Present,72(1976), 133-42, andBerman, The Originsof HistoricalJurisprudence', 680 andpassim.96 Many commonlawyersattendedOxfordandCambridgeandstudiedthe civil law beforegoingtothe Innsof Court.See SharpeandBrooks, History,EnglishLaw andthe Renaissance',137;Berman,'The Originsof HistoricalJurisprudence',1659. See also Baker, TheReports f Sir John Spellman,32-4.97 Berman, The Originsof HistoricalJurisprudence',1689.98 See I. Ward,'The Political Contextof Shakespeare'sConstitutionalism',n Klein and Davidhazi(edd.), ShakespeareYearbook , 275-90: 275-83; C. Gray, 'Reason,Authorityand Imagination:TheJurisprudenceof Sir EdwardCoke', in P. Zagorin(ed.), Cultureand Politics rom Puritanismo theEnlightenmentBerkeley,Calif., 1980),25-66; Berman, The Originsof HistoricalJurisprudence'.99 Berman, The Originsof HistoricalJurisprudence',1670.100 Mcllwain, ThePolitical Works f JamesI, 312.

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B. J. SOKOL AND MARY SOKOLCowell's law dictionary,TheInterpreter.?'0owell was a civilian and had been amemberof the Collegeof Civil Lawyersat Doctors' Commons n 1584.By 1598he was Regius Professorof Civil Law at Cambridgeand the Masterof TrinityHall. His patronwas RichardBancroft, rom 1604 the Archbishopof Canterbury.In 1604 Cowell and others had prepareda list of canons for the archbishop owhich allclergyweresupposed o subscribe.This causedconcern n parliamentarycircles becauseof the dangerthat the High Commissioncould now use ex officiooaths to demandto know if a cleric acceptedthe canons.Refusal to reply couldlead to loss of livingsor worse.'02As a civilianDr Cowellwasinfluencedby ideason codification,andin 1605 hadpublished a book which set out English law in the form given by Justinian'sInstitutes.Coke was not pleasedand is said to have thereafterreferred o him as'Dr. Cow-heel'."'3However t was the publicationof Cowell'sTheInterpreterhatcaused the greatestconsternation o common lawyers, including Coke. In thisbook Cowell defines the king as being abovethe law in his absolutepower, andabove parliament,and defines the royal prerogativeas the king's pre-eminenceover all other people and the common law. The storycirculated hat the king atdinner had privatelyapproved he work and criticized the commonlaw.104 hisangeredparliament,and the king suppressed he bookby proclamation.''0In 1608a contentiousmeetingtookplaceat Whitehallbetweenthe kingand allthe judgesto answerBancroft'scomplaintto the kingabout writsof prohibitionraisedagainstecclesiastical ourtsby King's Bench. Coke'sretrospectiveversionof eventsis considered uspect,butbriefcontemporaneous otesweretakenby SirJuliusCaesar,Masterof the Rolls, and the event is alsorecorded n contempora-neous letters.106 ancroftsaid that, as judgesweredelegatesof the Crown,Jamescould decide the case himself."17ames remarkedcontentiouslythat the judgeswere likepapistswho referred o the scripturesandyet reserved he interpretationto themselves,because the judges cited statute'08 and reserved nterpretation othemselves.Cokeobjectedto the whole proceedingsas not foundedon law, and101 For an accountof the CowellaffairseeJ. Simon,'Dr. Cowell',Cambridge awJournal,26 (1968),260-72.102 Simon, 'Dr. Cowell',267.103 Ibid. 263.104 See the king'sdenialin 1609,printedin McIlwain,The PoliticalWorks fJames, 310.105 Proclamation n 'D. Cowelsbooke', n J. F. Larkinand P. L. Hughes,StuartRoyalProclamations(Oxford, 1973), . 243-5. In 1615the civilians ook humorousrevengeby entertaininghekingwhenhevisitedCambridgewith a play, Ignoramus, hich mockedthe common awyers ortheirignoranceandcrude use of Latin. The leadingactor mimicked the voice and dress of Coke.The king enjoyedtheentertainment o muchhe saw the playa secondtime, but Cokewas said to havereactedwithperhapsunderstandableitterness.See Simon,'Dr. Cowell', 271, andMcllwain,ThePoliticalWorks fJamesI,p. lxxxviii.106 Coke'sand the other versionsaregiven and discussed n R. G. Usher, 'James and Sir EdwardCoke',EnglishHistoricalReview,18 (1903),664-75. See 12 CokeRep. 65.107 Usher, 'James and Sir EdwardCoke',664. See alsoC. D. Bowen, The Lionand theThrone:TheLifeand Timesof Sir EdwardCoke1552-1634(London, 1957),261-4.108 Here Circumspectegatis1285andArticuliCleri 1315.

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SHAKESPEAREAND ENGLISH EQUITYsaid that the commonlaw protectedthe king.Jamesthen becamevery angryandsaid this was a traitorous peech,becauseit was the king who protectedthe law,and not the law which protectedthe king.ButJames's angerseems to have gonebeyondwords.In oneaccounthe is saidto have clenchedhis fist,whereuponCokefell on all fours and askedfor compassionand pardon.Jameswas only restrainedby the LordTreasurer,RobertCecil, related o Cokeby marriage,whoon bendedknee askedforthe king'sfavour.News of the remarkable ventsquicklycirculatedwidely aroundthe Inns of Court and legaland literaryLondon.'09

Following this, James's speech to parliament n March 1609 mentioned DrCowell's book of 1607 to deny wantingto bring in civil law. James went on toexpound his idea of the source of law, opposing Coke's remarks n 1608. Hearguedthat kings havepowerof life and death over subjectsand areaccountableto no one but God, suggesting that they 'haue power to . . . make of theirsubjects like men at the Chesse'. It is the king alone who makesthe law, butthen he binds himself both tacitly and expressly to observe the laws of thekingdom.lWithin a yearfurthercontentious egaleventsbecamepublic.In 1610HenryVIof France was murdered, and James, shaken by the news, issued a royalproclamation equiringall subjectsto take a new Oathof Allegiance.Parliamentobjectedbecause he oathimposedcriminalpenalties ornon-compliance, ndwasvery general.Coke then addressed he PrivyCouncilto arguethat the kingcouldnot create offences by proclamation,after which the Privy Council held thatproclamationswere not partof Englishlaw."'Therefore both important issues of state and scandalous events made theworseningrelationsof differentcourts,particularlyhose of equity and commonlaw, a tense and public subject by 1608-10.

VSuch close considerationof the historyof the conflict of jurisdictionsprovidesapartialanswerto the famousquestionof the two differentthe texts of KingLear.Variations on the quarto text that produced the folio version have beenallegedto be: an improvementaesthetically;1' heatrically aluable;"3 egrettably109 Two of the sources used in Usher, 'JamesI and Sir Edward Coke' are hearsay,being lettersreportingeventsheardfrom others who werereputedto havebeen there.Clearlynews of the scandalwascirculating.Usher (ibid. 669) shows thatJohnHercywrote,'I [ .. ] thinkyour Lordshipbeforethis by some other had heard thereof'.110 Mcllwain,ThePoliticalWorksofames I, 308-9. The kingis boundtacitlyby virtueof the factthathe is bound to protectboth the laws and the people of the kingdom,and bound expresslyby hiscoronationoath.111 Caseof Proclamations1611) 12 Coke Rep. 74. See Holdsworth,iv. 296-7 and v. 333.112 W. M. T. Nowottny, 'Some Aspectsof the Style of KingLear', Shakespeareurvey,13 (1960),49-57; Taylor, 'Monopolies,Show Trial, Disaster,and Invasion'.113 Taylor,'Monopolies,ShowTrial,Disaster,andInvasion';R. Warren, The Date andAuthorshipof the Folio Version',in Taylorand Warren edd.), TheDivisionof theKingdoms,5-57.

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B. J. SOKOL AND MARY SOKOLundertaken for reasons of theatrical expedience;'14 mainly apolitical in motive;115or politically motivated by self-protective self-censorship."6When the supporters of these mutually contending positions consider inparticular the removal of the mock-trial scene from the folio text they posit avariety of contrary motives. Censorship is not the motive for the omissionaccording to Gary Taylor, who nonetheless holds that the trial scene may havebeen marred aesthetically by political anxieties making it 'unfocussed emotionallyas well as politically'. Taylor judges that its loss in the folio 'does a service to ...the play's structure'.1" Kenneth Muir, while partly agreeing with critics likeTaylor and Roger Warren that the scene is hard to stage, wholly disagrees that itsomission is an improvement."1 Annabel Patterson disagrees vigorously withTaylor on the motive for the cutting of the mock-trial scene; while applaudinghis concern with an authorial 'anticipation of censorship', she excoriates hissupposed denial that political factors actually shaped the play or its foliochanges. 1Kenneth Muir, alone of the above, thinks the folio changes were the work ofunskilled 'vandals', and not Shakespeare. The others think that Shakespeare wasresponsible for cutting the mock-trial, but do not agree why. Patterson objects thatTaylor and others deny political motives for this,12?but despite alleging extensivepolitical reasons for other changes to the quarto, gives no reasons for Shakespeareto self-censor the mock-trial. Yet a simple and plausible reason for its suppressionis available.

This emerges in a consideration of the one place where English-style separateequity and law jurisdictions are referred to in a Shakespearian play. This uniqueplace is in the quarto, but not in the folio, text of King Lear, at the start of themock-trial. The hallucinating Lear commands:

Thou robed man of justice, take thy place;And thou, his yokefellow of equity,Bench by his side. (LRQ S13. 32-4)

Having convened a special mixed tribunal seating a Bedlam beggar addressed as a'most learned justicer', a coarse servant, and the court Fool, Lear then arraigns arough piece of furniture, a 'join-stool', as if it were Gonoril, and an equally114 K. Muir, Shakespeare:Contrastsnd ControversiesBrighton,1985), 51-66, concluding vandals'damaged he play 'fatally'by cuttingit.115 Taylor, 'Monopolies,Show Trial, Disaster,and Invasion'.116 Patterson,CensorshipndInterpretation,8-73.117 Taylor, 'Monopolies,Show Trial, Disaster,and Invasion',97.118 Warren, The Date andAuthorshipof the Folio Version',passim;Muir,Shakespeare: ontrastsndControversies,7.119 Patterson,CensorshipndInterpretation,2-3.120 Ibid.

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SHAKESPEAREAND ENGLISH EQUITYimaginaryRegan. Some satiric intent is probably implicit, for other of Lear's'mad' speecheschallengethe authorityof merelyworldly 'justicers'.Thus Learcomments: handy-dandy,whichis the thief, which is the justice?Thou hastseena farmer'sdog bark at a beggar?'(LRQ S20. 148-9, and (nearly) LRF 4. 5.149-51).121Even so, a mixed element of approbation f the tribunalbenchedby Learmaybe implicitin the quarto ext. The mock-trial cene indeedpresentsa view of howjustice had, on important occasions, actually been executed. The uniquelyempoweredand exceptionallyelected commission for the trial of Mary Queenof Scots was chosen by a particularly omplex process:'22t includedLords, theChancellor, the Chief Justice, and other judges. Perhaps more to the point,because t wasnot a criminal rial but a landlawactionsubjectto equity,was thecase of the postnati.In 1608-9 King Jamessaw to it thatthe veryimportant ssuestested in Calvin'sCasewere put to all the judges in both Chanceryand King'sBench.123Eventually, ull accessto bothequitableand common aw remediesby asingle tribunalwas allowedby theJudicatureActs of 1873-5.But in the 1608quartoLearplaces'justice'and'equity'side by side on a singlebench,asco-operative yokefellows'.At the time when he wrotethatversionof theplay, between 1604 and 1606, Shakespearecould have showed them as suchwithout risking contention. For the expert opinion is that by late Elizabethantimes long-standingdisagreementsbetween these jurisdictionswere abating.124Yet by 1610 there was overwhelmingpublic evidence of an intensely politicalstruggle growing between jurisdictions,exemplified and perhaps deliberatelyexaggeratedn the argumentsover law and equity between Cokeand Ellesmere.Shakespeare'swish to avoid nvolvementwith a conflict distinct fromthepurposesof his playplausiblyexplains he politiceliminationof the trialscenefromthe textdestinedfor the folio version of KingLear.

Finallyit is worthconsidering ustwhya portrayal f peacefulandco-operativerelationsbetweenthe jurisdictionsof law and equitywould have seemedpositiveand non-contentious n the yearspreceding 1606. Aside from the astonishinglyclose physical ocationsof the king'scourts in WestminsterHall andWhitehall,'25121 On this see Merchant, Lawyerand Actor', 121-3.122 Bellamy, The TudorLaw of Treason, 123-4, explainsthat this instancepresentsthe single casewheredetailed nformation till exists aboutthe selectionof a specialcommissionfor a state trial:theLords weregroupedin such a waythat a chain of selectedcommissionersof particular ankselectedothersof lowerrank.123 See B. J. SokolandM. Sokol, 'The TempestandLegalJustificationof Plantationn Virginia', nKlein andDavidhazi(edd.), ShakespeareYearbook , 353-80.124 This is the view set in the context of legaleventsof 1587and 1591 in S. E. Thorne'sprefacetoEdwardHake,Epiekeia:A Dialogueon Equity n ThreeParts(London, 1953),pp. xi-xii. The view isstronglyemphasized hroughout ones,TheElizabethanCourt fChancery.t is furtherset in context nYale,LordNottingham'sManual',10-11, echoed in Tucker, The Letterof the Lawin TheMerchant fVenice', and specificallydiscussedin relationto the Admiralty urisdiction n L. M. Hill, BenchandBureaucracy:ThePublicCareer f Sir JuliusCaesar1580-1636 (Stanford,Calif., 1988),40-53.125 See E. W. Ives, 'The Law and the Lawyers',Shakespeare urvey,17 (1964), 73-86: 75-6; Baker,'Lawand LegalInstitutions',42.

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438 B. J. SOKOL AND MARY SOKOLthe leading udgesof the ageafterallconstituteda smallcommunity.126ccordingto D. E. C. Yale, following 'the new practiceof appointingChancellorsfromamonglawyersratherthan clerics' the relationsof equity with the commonlawwere stabilized or soothed in the late Elizabethanyears, but a long-standing'inflammationwas not cured andfromtime to time foundexpression n bickeringand conflict'.127However, if we look to contemporarydiscussionsas opposedtopractice,we find that morethan a mere truce betweenequityand law was in theminds of a numberof late Elizabethanwriters.'28n the 1590s WilliamLambardewrote in Archeion:even as two Herbesbeing in extremitie of heate, or cold, bee by themselves so many poysons,and if they bee skilfully contempred, will make a wholesome Medicine: So also would itcome to passe, if either this Aritmeticall Governement as they call it) by rigour of Law onely,or this GeometricallJudgementat the pleasure of the Chancellouror Praetor onely should beeadmitted; and yet if they bee well compounded together, a most sweete and harmonicallJustice will follow of them.129Here both musical'30 and medicinal analogies laud a congenial partnershipbetween law and equity that not only moderates but transcends the deficienciesof both.

Correspondingly, William West wrote in 1601 that 'the common people termethe Chauncery the Court of Conscience: Yet herein conscience is so regarded, thatLawes be not neglected, for they must joine hands in the moderation ofextremitie'.'31 A joining of hands signified, for the period, a powerful linking ofpersons and their interests, similar or identical to handfasting in promise ofmarriage.132Such imagery, like Shakespeare's image of 'yokefellows','33 corresponds with a126 Baker, LawandLegal Institutions',47-8.127 Yale,LordNottingham'sManual',11.128 Minimizing he disparitybetween awandequityis the mainthrust of all threedialoguesof Hake,Epiekeia, n edition of BM Add. MS 35326.This manuscriptwascompletedby 1603,probablymainlywritten somewhatearlier,and never published.In the prefaceto this edition (p. xii) D. E. C. Yalesupposesthat Hake'perhapshopedto minimize the differencesbetween the two kindsof justiceandbringaboutthe kind of reconciliationSir Thomas More had urged'.129 Lambard,Archeion, 1-2, this sectionprobablywrittenby 1591. The 'H' MS, which,according oMcIlwainandWard,Lambarde'srcheion, 70,wasrevisedbetween1596and 1598,containsa strikingunpublishedaddition,whichthey print (p. 159).It suggeststhat, if the Chancellor ailed to keephisjurisdictionwithinbounds,it mightbe 'more sufferableand Convenient o have noe Courtof Equitieatt all'.130 Lambarde imilarlyused musicalharmony o imagethe good applicationof law on 20 Apr. 1596:see Read, WilliamLambarde nd LocalGovernment,24-5.131 West, The SecondPartof Symboleography,76.132 See A. P. Slater, Shakespearehe Director Brighton, 1982), 49-62; M. Leslie, 'The Dialoguebetween Bodies and Souls:PicturesandPoesyin the EnglishRenaissance',Word ndImage,1 (1985),17-30: 177-9.133 'Yoke-fellow'denotedpartner n a task(OED 1) or specificallymarriagepartner OED2), while'yoke[d]' ndicatesclose alliance n more than a dozenShakespearianontexts(in TNK, TGV, ADO,RDY, JC, MND, MV, OTH, WT, and in threeplacesin H5, at 2. 2. 103, 2. 3. 50, and4. 6. 9).


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SHAKESPEAREAND ENGLISH EQUITY 439view of equityand lawoperating n closeharmonyorfellowship,Jones's'cohesionin judicature'.Ratherthanwishingto point up a breakdownor contrastbetweenthese jurisdictions,as often alleged, Shakespeare n the contraryavoidedmakinganyreference o them at all when theirdifficultieshad become a matterof publicnote and scandal.

Documents

Shakespeare and the English Equity Jurisdiction. the Merchant of Venice and the Two Texts